Alipio Vs Ca Digest 132058

PURITA ALIPIO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ROMEO G. JARING, represented by his Attorney-In-Fact RAMON G. JARING,respondents. Facts: Respondent Romeo Jaring was the lessee of a 14.5 hectare fishpond in Barito, Mabuco, Hermosa, Bataan. The lease was for a period of five years ending on September 12, 1990. On June 19, 1987, he subleased the fishpond, for the remaining period of his lease, to the spouses Placido and Purita Alipio and the spouses Bienvenido and Remedios Manuel. The stipulated amount of rent was P485,600.00, payable in two installments of P300,000.00 and P185,600.00, with the second installment falling due on June 30, 1989. Each of the four sublessees signed the contract. The first installment was duly paid, but of the second installment, the sublessees only satisfied a portion thereof, leaving an unpaid balance of P50,600.00. Despite due demand, the sublessees failed to comply with their obligation, so on October 13, 1989, private respondent sued the Alipio and Manuel spouses for the collection of the said amount. In the alternative, he prayed for the rescission of the sublease contract should the defendants fail to pay the balance. Petitioner Purita Alipio moved to dismiss the case on the ground that her husband, Placido Alipio, had ed away on December 1, 1988. She based her action on Rule 3, 21 of the Rules of Court. (but this is now amended! See ratio later) The trial court denied petitioner's motion on the ground that since petitioner was herself a party to the sublease contract, she could be independently impleaded in the suit together with the Manuel spouses and that the death of her husband merely resulted in his exclusion from the case. The Manuel spouses failed to file their answer. For this reason, they were declared in default. RTC and CA ruled against petitioners. SABI NG CA: The rule that an action for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon must be dismissed when the defendant dies before final judgment in the regional trial court, does not apply where there are other defendants against whom the action should be maintained. Moreover, it is noted that all the defendants, including the deceased, were signatories to the contract of sub-lease. Under the law and well settled jurisprudence, when the obligation is a solidary one, the creditor may bring his action in toto against any of the debtors obligated in solidum. Thus, if husband and wife bound themselves tly and severally, in case of his death, her liability is independent of and separate from her husband's; she may be sued for the whole debt and it would be error to hold that the claim against her as well as the claim against her husband should be made in the decedent's estate.

ISSUE (simplified!): 1. WoN a creditor can sue the surviving spouse of a decedent in an ordinary proceeding for the collection of a sum of money chargeable against the conjugal partnership. 2. t or solidary obligation ba itey? SC: REVERSED LOWER COURTS. Petition granted! Creditor CANNOT sue. Proper remedy is for him to file a claim in the settlement of estate of the decedent. First. Petitioner's husband died on December 1, 1988, more than ten months before private respondent filed the collection suit in the trial court on October 13, 1989. This case thus falls outside of the ambit of Rule 3, §21 which deals with

dismissals of collection suits because of the death of the defendant during the pendency of the case. As amended, Rule 3, §20 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure now provides that the case will be allowed to continue until entry of final judgment. Petitioner and her late husband, together with the Manuel spouses, signed the sublease contract binding themselves to pay the amount of stipulated rent. Under the law, the Alipios' obligation (and also that of the Manuels) is one which is chargeable against their conjugal partnership. When petitioner's husband died, their conjugal partnership was automatically dissolved and debts chargeable against it are to be paid in the settlement of estate proceedings. The reason for this is that upon the death of one spouse, the powers of istration of the surviving spouse ceases and is ed to the appointed by the court having jurisdiction over the settlement of estate proceedings. Indeed, the surviving spouse is not even a de facto such that conveyances made by him of any property belonging to the partnership prior to the liquidation of the mass of conjugal partnership property is void. Where a complaint is brought against the surviving spouse for the recovery of an indebtedness chargeable against said conjugal [partnership], any judgment obtained thereby is void. The proper action should be in the form of a claim to be filed in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. It must be noted that for marriages governed by G, an obligation entered into by the husband and wife is chargeable against their conjugal partnership and it is the partnership which is primarily bound for its repayment. Thus, when the spouses are sued for the enforcement of an obligation entered into by them, they are being impleaded in their capacity as representatives of the conjugal partnership and not as independent debtors such that the concept of t or solidary liability, as between them, does not apply. But even assuming the contrary to be true, the nature of the obligation involved in this case, as will be discussed later, is not solidary but rather merely t. From the foregoing, it is clear that private respondent cannot maintain the present suit against petitioner. Second. The trial court ordered petitioner and the Manuel spouses to pay private respondent the unpaid balance of the agreed rent in the amount of P50,600.00 without specifying whether the amount is to be paid by them tly or solidarily. Art. 1207—presumption of t obligation! To be sure, should the lessees or sublessees refuse to vacate the leased property after the expiration of the lease period and despite due demands by the lessor, they can be held tly and severally liable to pay for the use of the property. The basis of their solidary liability is not the contract of lease or sublease but the fact that they have become t tortfeasors. In the case at bar, there is no allegation that the

sublessees refused to vacate the fishpond after the expiration of the term of the sublease. Indeed, the unpaid balance sought to be collected by private respondent in his collection suit became due on June 30, 1989, long before the sublease expired on September 12, 1990. Neither does petitioner contend that it is the nature of lease that when there are more than two lessees or sublessees their liability is solidary. On the other hand, the pertinent portion of the contract involved in this case reads: 2. That the total lease rental for the sub-leased fishpond for the entire period of three (3) years and two (2) months is FOUR HUNDRED EIGHT-FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED (P485,600.00) PESOS, including all the improvements, prawns, milkfishes, crabs and related species thereon as well all fishing equipment, paraphernalia and accessories. The said amount shall be paid to the Sub-Lessor by the Sub-Lessees in the following manner, to wit: A. Three hundred thousand (P300,000.00) Pesos upon g this contract; and B. One Hundred Eight-Five Thousand Six-Hundred (P185,6000.00) Pesos to be paid on June 30, 1989.

Clearly, the liability of the sublessees is merely t. Since the obligation of the Manuel and Alipio spouses is chargeable against their respective conjugal partnerships, the unpaid balance of P50,600.00 should be divided into two so that each couple is liable to pay the amount of P25,300.00.