Case Digest 5g555q

CASE DIGEST IN ISTRATIVE LAW and LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS LIST OF CASES ISTRATIVE LAW 1. URC v. LLDA. G.R. No. 191427. May 30, 2011 2. PEOPLE v. MORALES. G.R. No. 166355. May 30, 2011 3. LACSON v. EXEC. SEC, ET.AL. G.R. No. 165399. May 30, 2011 4. GANNAPAO v. CSC. G.R. No. 180141. May 31, 2011 5. IMPERIAL v. GSIS. G.R. No. 191224. October 4, 2011 6. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. REYES. G.R. No. 170512. October 5, 2011 PUBLIC OFFICERS 1. JAPSON v. CSC. G.R. No. 189479. April 12, 2011 2. GSIS v. MAYORDOMO. G.R. No. 191218. May 31, 2011 3. GANADEN v. CA. G.R. No. 170510-11. June 1, 2011 4. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. ANDUTAN. G.R. No. 164679. July 27, 2011 5. MARTINEZ v. VILLANUEVA. G.R. No. 169196. July 6, 2011 6. CSC V. CRUZ. G.R. No. 187858. August 9, 2011 7. COASTAL SAFEWAY MARINE SERVICES VS. ESGUERRA, G.R. No. 185352, August 10, 2011) 8. PCGG v. SANDIGANBAYAN. G.R. No. 152500. September 14, 2011 9. OP v. CATAQUIZ. G.R. No. 183445. September 14, 2011 10. DUMDUMA v. CSC. G.R. No. 182606. October 4, 2011 11. QUARTO v. MARCELO. G.R. No. 169042. October 5, 2011 12. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ; NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ VS. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ET AL., G.R. No. 191805 & G.R. No. 193160. November 15, 2011 13. NAPOCOR v. CSC. G.R. No. 152093. January 24, 2012 14. ONG v. OP. G.R. No. 184219. January 30, 2012 15. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION VS. MINERVA M.P. PACHECO, G.R. No. 178021, January 31, 2012 16. UNICAN v. NEA. G.R. No. 187107. January 331, 2012

ISTRATIVE LAW UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORP. (CORN DIVISION), VS. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, [G.R. NO. 191427, MAY 30, 2011] Doctrines: • The thrust of the doctrine of exhaustion of istrative remedies is that courts must allow istrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence. • istrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense for it is enough that the party is given the chance to be heard before the case against him is decided. Facts: Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA), respondent, found that Universal Robina Corp. failed to comply with government standards provided under Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) istrative Orders (DAOs) Nos. 34 and 35, series of 1990. After conducting hearings, the LLDA resolved that respondent is found to be discharging pollutive wastewater. Petitioner moved to reconsider however the LLDA denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and reiterated its order to pay the penalties. Petitioner challenged by certiorari the orders before the Court of Appeals. The appellate court went on to chide petitioner’s petition for certiorari as premature since the law provides for an appeal from decisions or orders of the LLDA to the DENR Secretary or the Office of the President, a remedy which should have first been exhausted before invoking judicial intervention. Issue: Whether petitioner was deprived of due process and lack of any plain, speedy or adequate remedy as grounds which exempted it from complying with the rule on exhaustion of istrative remedies. Held: No. The doctrine of exhaustion of istrative remedies is a cornerstone of our judicial system. The thrust of the rule is that courts must allow istrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence. The rationale for this doctrine is obvious. It entails lesser expenses and provides for the speedier resolution of controversies. Comity and convenience also impel courts of justice to shy away from a dispute until the system of istrative redress has been completed.Petitioner had thus available istrative remedy of appeal to the DENR Secretary. Its contrary arguments to show that an appeal to the DENR Secretary would be an exercise in futility as the latter merely adopts the LLDA’s findings is at best, speculative and presumptuous. The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to istrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. istrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense for it is enough that the party is given the chance to be heard before the case against him is decided.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. LUIS J. MORALES [G.R. No. 166355, May 30, 2011] Doctrine: A government-owned or controlled corporation must be owned by the government, and in the case of a stock corporation, at least a majority of its capital stock must be owned by the government. Facts: The National Centennial Commission (NCC) and the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA) organized the Philippine Centennial Expo ’98 Corporation or Expocorp whose primary purpose was to operate, ister, manage and develop the Philippine Centennial International Exposition 1998. The Philippine Centennial project was marred by numerous allegations of anomalies, among them, the lack of public biddings. Both the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee and the AHICC recommended to the Office of the Ombudsman that a more exhaustive investigation of the Philippine Centennial project be conducted. The investigation resulted in the filing in of an Information by the Ombudsman’s Fact-Finding and Investigation Bureau against respondent Luis J. Morales (Morales), the acting president of Expocorp at the time relevant to the case. In the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan, Morales moved for the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction over his person and over the offense charged. Issue: Whether Expocorp was organized and created for the sole purpose of performing the executive functions of the National Centennial Commission and the sovereign functions of the government, and should be considered as a public office Held: No. The Court here ruled that Philippine Centennial Expo ’98 Corporation is a private corporation. It was not created by a special law but was incorporated under the Corporation Code and was ed with the Securities and Exchange Commission. It is not a government-owned or controlled corporation. Although the Bases Conversion Development Authority owned almost all of the shares of Expocorp at the time of the latter’s incorporation, the Board of Directors of Expocorp allowed a private corporation to buy its shares constituting 55.16% of its outstanding capital stock two months after incorporation. With the BCDA as a minority stockholder, Expocorp cannot be characterized as a government-owned or controlled corporation. A government-owned or controlled corporation must be owned by the government, and in the case of a stock corporation, at least a majority of its capital stock must be owned by the government. Since Expocorp is not a GOCC, its officers and employees are private individuals who are outside the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

LACSON VS. EXEC. SEC, ET.AL. [G.R. NO. 165399, MAY 30, 2011] Doctrine: The power of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officials is not exclusive, but is concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the government in relation to the offense charged. Facts: Petitioners Theron V. Lacson, Jaime R. Millan and Bernardo T. Viray were non-presidential appointees and career service officials of respondent Philippine Estates Authority. Sulficio O. Tagud filed a complaint-affidavit with the Office of the Ombudsman accusing petitioners for overpricing, by P600 million the contract for the construction of the President Diosdado Macapagal Boulevard.The Ombudsman proceeded with the investigation of both the criminal and the istrative aspects of the case. The Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) requested the Ombudsman for authority to conduct istrative disciplinary proceedings against the petitioners. The basic complaint has not been further docketed as an istrative case. Thus, the same did not preclude the subsequent filing with the PAGC of an istrative complaint against the concerned PEA officials. A formal complaint was filed by the Investigation Office of PAGC charging several employees of PEA, including petitioners.PAGC issued a resolution recommending the dismissal of petitioners with the imposition of the corresponding accessory penalties of forfeiture of retirement benefits and disqualification from employment in the government. The President approved the recommendation. Millan and Viray, together with Manuel R. Beriña, Jr. filed a motion for reconsideration. This motion was not acted upon. Aggrieved, they filed their Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 with the CA. The CA dismissed the consolidated petitions. Issue: Whether the Ombudsman should conduct the investigation on the charge of overpricing of the project against petitioners. Held: The Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction with similarly authorized agencies. Petitioners argue that because they are not presidential appointees, it is only the Ombudsman which has jurisdiction over them. In this regard, the petitioners are not correct. The Court has repeatedly ruled that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officials is not exclusive, but is concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the government in relation to the offense charged. Therefore, with respect to petitioners, the Ombudsman may share its authority to conduct an investigation concerning istrative charges against them with other agencies. At any rate, this issue is already moot and academic as the Ombudsman has terminated its investigation of petitioners. It appears therefrom that the Ombudsman dismissed the istrative case against the petitioners because the charges had already been ed upon by PAGC.

GANNAPAO VS. CSC [GR NO. 180141, MAY 31, 2011] Doctrines: The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to istrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. In the application of the principle of due process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard. As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he was not denied due process. Facts: Private respondents Barien, et al are stockholders and board of United Workers Transport Corp. which took over the defunct Metro Manila Transit Corp. They allege that upon orders of UWTC’s general manager, the buses regularly driven by them were confiscated by a “task force” composed 0of former drivers, conductors and mechanics led by petitioner. Armed with deadly weapons, petitioner and his group intimidated and harassed the regular bus drivers and conductors, and took over the buses. Petitioner is not authorized to use his firearm or his authority as police officer to act as bodyguard of Atty. Gironella and to intimidate and coerce the drivers/stockholders and the bus engers. Barien, et al. thus prayed for the preventive suspension of petitioner, the confiscation of his firearm and his termination after due hearing. He was sentenced the penalty of 3 mos. suspension from service without pay. Petitioner appealed his case with the DILG but Sec. Alfredo Lim denied it and affirmed the suspension. He then appealed to the CSC claiming that he was denied due process but was again denied and modified the decision to dismissal from service. Issues: (1)Whether the petitioner was denied due process in the proceedings before the Office of the Legal Service of the PNP (2) Whether the CA correctly affirmed the CSC decision modifying the penalty of petitioner from three months suspension to dismissal from the service. Held: (1)No. The records of the case show that petitioner was adequately apprised of the charges filed against him and he submitted his answer to the complaint while the case was still under a pre-charge investigation. When the Office of the Legal Service conducted a summary hearing on the complaint, petitioner was again duly notified of the proceedings and was given an opportunity to explain his side but failed to do so. (2) Yes. Petitioner, acting as private bodyguard without approval of the proper authorities is classified as a grave offense punishable with dismissal from service as provided in Memorandum Circular No. 93024 (Guidelines in the Application of Penalties in Police istrative Case)

IMPERIAL, JR. V. GSIS [GR NO. 191224, OCTOBER 4, 2011] Doctrine: Procedural due process is the constitutional standard demanding that notice and an opportunity to be heard be given before judgment is rendered. As long as a party is given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he would have no reason to complain; the essence of due process is in the opportunity to be heard.A formal or trial-type hearing is not always necessary.

Facts: Petitioner, then Branch Manager of GSIS Naga Field Office was istratively charged with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service for approving salary loan requests of 8 employees who lacked contribution requirements. He was preventively suspended for 90 days. The counsel of the petitioner explained that his client granted the loan applications under an existing board resolution, with the approval of the GSIS Vice President; the loans were fully paid, without causing any prejudice to the service. The GSIS President found him guilty of the said charges. This being petitioner’s second istrative offense, the penalty of dismissal was imposed upon him with accessory penalties of forfeiture of retirement benefits, cancellation of eligibility and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the government.

Issue: Whether the petitioner was denied due process

Held: No. What negates any due process infirmity is the petitioner’s subsequent motion for reconsideration which cured whatever defect the Hearing Officer might have committed in the course of hearing the petitioner’s case. Again, the GSIS President duly considered the arguments presented in the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration when he denied the same. Thus, the petitioner was actually heard through his pleadings.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VS. REYES [GR NO. 170512, OCTOBER 5, 2011] Doctrine: Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In istrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process.

Facts: Respondent Antonio Reyes being then the Head Office LTO was found guilty of grave abuse of misconduct by the Office of the Ombudsman. Based on the affidavits and testimonies of several witnesses (Penaloza, Amper and Valdehueza) it was said that Reyes would give the flunkers of the driver’s license examination the option of retaking the examination or to simply pay an additional cost to have a ing grade without actually retaking the same. It is alleged that he illegally exacted money from Acero in exchange for the issuance of a driver's license to the latter, notwithstanding that Acero did not the requisite written examination therefor. On appeal, the CA reversed the said judgment and exonerated him from the istrative charge for insufficiency of evidence.

Issue: Whether Reyes was denied due process

Held: Yes. The 5th requirement (the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected) on the cardinal principles on due process in istrative proceedings as laid down in the case of Ang Tibay v CIR was not complied with. Reyes was not properly apprised of the evidence offered against him, which were eventually made the bases of petitioner's decision that found him guilty of grave misconduct. There is nothing on record to show that Reyes was furnished with, or had otherwise received, a copy of the affidavits of Peñaloza, Amper and Valdehueza, whether before or after the petitioner issued its Decision.

PUBLIC OFFICERS JAPSON VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION [GR NO. 189479, APRIL 12, 2011] Doctrine: Dishonesty is defined as the concealment or distortion of truth in a matter of fact relevant to one’s office or connected with the performance of his duty. Misconduct is a transgression of some established or definite rule of action, is a forbidden act, is a dereliction of duty, is willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. Facts: Records show that Japson became the subject of a series of inquiries conducted by the SSS linking him to a profiting venture involving the processing of claims for SSS death and funeral benefits while he was assigned at SSS Baguio City from 1997 to May 1998. The inquiry was spurred by an affidavit dated October 6, 1999 of Mina Balanag, who happened to assist her illiterate mother, Cat-an Paanos, in claiming, as beneficiary, the SSS death benefits of her deceased father, Kitos Paanos. She alleged that because she knew nothing of the steps for processing of claims for death benefits, a village mate referred her to spouses Boyet and Shirley Abuan who have been frequenting their village. The spouses Abuans assured that her mother will receive the benefits in due time since Shirley has a relative working at the SSS Baguio City who also happened to be their neighbor at Baguio City. Later, she learned that this neighbor-relative turned out to be Shirley’s cousin Japson. Issue: Whether Petitioner is guilty of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service whether or not he gained from such acts. Held: Yes. Dishonesty is defined as the concealment or distortion of truth in a matter of fact relevant to one’s office or connected with the performance of his duty. On the other hand, misconduct is a transgression of some established or definite rule of action, is a forbidden act, is a dereliction of duty, is willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. More particularly, it is an unlawful behavior by the public officer. The term, however, does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent. In this case, petitioner’s acts were found by the Supreme Court as clearly reflecting his dishonesty and grave misconduct. He allowed the Spouses Abuan to use his position as SSS Senior Member Services Representative to make their “clients” believe that he could give them undue advantage – over others without the same connection – by processing their SSS claims faster. Likewise, his acts, according to the SC, imply malevolent intent, and not merely error in judgment. He was aware of what the Spouses Abuan were doing and was complicit in the same. At the very least, according to the Supreme Court, he failed to stop the illegal trade, and that constitutes willful disregard of the laws and rules.

GSIS AND WINSTON F. GARCIA VS. ARWIN T. MAYORDOMO [G.R. NO. 191218, MAY 31, 2011] Doctrine: In order to be considered as “misconduct,” the act must have a “direct relation to and be connected with the performance of his official duties amounting either to malistration or willful, intentional neglect or failure to discharge the duties of the office. Facts: Respondent Arwin T. Mayordomo was employed as s Management Specialist of the GSIS Fund Management ing Department (FMAD). Ignacio L. Liscano, then GSIS Information Technology Officer (ITO) III called the attention of Joseph Sta. Romana another ITO, about a network conflict in his personal computer. Sta. Romana conducted a network scan to identify the source of the problem and he discovered that another personal computer was also using the internet protocol (IP) address of Liscano’s computer. This other computer was eventually identified as the one assigned to Mayordom. Sta. Romana immediately restored the correct IP address assigned to Mayordomo’s personal computer. Until this restoration, Liscano was deprived of access to the GSIS computer network and prevented from performing his work as ITO. Mayordomo was verbally reminded that he had no authority to change his IP address and warned that doing so would result in network problems. Subsequently, Sta. Romana again encountered the name same name. The President and General Manager Garcia issued a formal istrative charge against Mayordomo, for Grave Misconduct and/or Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. The GSIS rendered its Decision finding Mayordomo guilty of Grave Misconduct and impoon him the penalty of dismissal, with forfeiture of benefits, loss of eligibility and disqualification from government service. However the Court of Appeals downgraded the offense to Simple Misconduct. Issue: Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals Committed error in downgrading the offense to simple misconduct. Held: Yes. The Court has come to a determination that the istrative offense committed by the respondent is not “misconduct.” To constitute misconduct, the act or acts must have a direct relation to and be connected with the performance of official duties. The duties of Mayordomo as a member of the GSIS FMAD surely do not involve the modification of IP addresses. The act was considered unauthorized, precisely because dealing with the GSIS network’s IP addresses is strictly reserved for ITSG personnel who are expectedly knowledgeable in this field. In Manuel v. Calimag, Jr., the Court emphatically ruled: In order to be considered as “misconduct,” the act must have a “direct relation to and be connected with the performance of his official duties amounting either to malistration or willful, intentional neglect or failure to discharge the duties of the office. Misconduct in office has been authoritatively defined by Justice Tuazon in Lacson v. Lopez in these words: "Misconduct in office has a definite and well-understood legal meaning. By uniform legal definition, it is a misconduct such as affects his performance of his duties as an officer and not such only as affects his character as a private individual. In such cases, it has been said at all times, it is necessary to separate the character of the man from the character of the officer x x x x It is settled that misconduct, misfeasance, or malfeasance warranting removal from office of an officer must have direct relation to and be connected with the performance of official duties amounting either to malistration or willful, intentional neglect and failure to discharge the duties of the office x x x More specifically, in Buenaventura v. Benedicto, an istrative proceeding against a judge of the court of first instance, the present Chief Justice defines misconduct as referring ‘to a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior

or gross negligence by the public officer.’” GANADEN V. CA. [G.R. NO. 170510-11; JUNE 1, 2011] Doctrine: An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension or removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal. Facts: In OMB-L-A-02-0068-B and OMB-L-A-02-0070-B, the Ombudsman found petitioners Ganaden, Bautista and Narciso liable for dishonesty and imposed upon them the penalty of one-year suspension while in OMB-L-A02-0069-B, the Ombudsman found petitioners Ganaden and Mina liable for dishonesty and imposed on them the penalty of one-year suspension. Petitioners filed motions for reconsideration, but the Office of the Ombudsman denied their motions for reconsideration and increased the penalty to dismissal from the service as to petitioner Ganaden in OMB-L-A02-0069-B and as to petitioners Ganaden, Bautista and Narciso in OMB-L-A-02-0070-B. The penalty of oneyear suspension as to petitioner Mina was, however, maintained. Aggrieved, petitioners filed separate petitions for review before the CA. Meanwhile, petitioners availed of the early retirement program from the NPC. At the time the three Decisions and three orders of the Ombudsman came to their attention, they were already employed at the National Transmission Commission (TRANSCO). Hence, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a 1st Indorsement requesting from TRANSCO the issuance of Orders for Dismissal from the service of petitioners Ganaden, Bautista and Narciso and the issuance of an Order of Suspension from Service for one-year against petitioner Mina. In compliance respondent Ortiz issued the aforementioned orders. Issue: Whether istrative decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman imposing the penalties of dismissal and oneyear suspension from office are immediately executory pending appeal. Held: Yes. This is the rule provided for under Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by istrative Order No. 17, dated September 15, 2003, which provides among others: “An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension or removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal. A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in istrative cases shall be executed as a matter of course…” Under this provision, a respondent who is found istratively liable by the Office of the Ombudsman and is slapped with a penalty of suspension of more than one month from service has the right to file an appeal with the CA under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. But although a respondent is given the right to appeal, the act of filing an appeal does not stay the execution of the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN V. ANDUTAN [G.R. NO. 164679; JULY 27, 2011] Doctrine: istrative offenses do not prescribe. The Ombudsman can no longer institute an istrative if the latter was not a public servant at the time the case was filed. Facts: Pursuant to the Memorandum directing all non-career officials or those occupying political positions to vacate their positions, Andutan resigned from the DOF as the former Deputy Director of the One-Stop Shop Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center of the DOF. Subsequently, Andutan, et al. was criminally charged by the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) of the Ombudsman with Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents, and violations RA 3019. As government employees, Andutan et al. were likewise istratively charged of Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, Falsification of Official Documents and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. The criminal and istrative charges arose from anomalies in the illegal transfer of Tax Credit Certificates (TCCs) to Steel Asia, among others. The Ombudsman found the respondents guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty. Having been separated from the service, Andutan was imposed the penalty of forfeiture of all leaves, retirement and other benefits and privileges, and perpetual disqualification from reinstatement and/or reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government owned and controlled agencies or corporations. The CA annulled and set aside the decision of the Ombudsman, ruling that the latter “should not have considered the istrative complaints” because: first, Section 20 of R.A. 6770 provides that the Ombudsman “may not conduct the necessary investigation of any istrative act or omission complained of if it believes that x x x [t]he complaint was filed after one year from the occurrence of the act or omission complained of”; and second, the istrative case was filed after Andutan’s forced resignation Issue: (1) Whether Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 prohibit the Ombudsman from conducting an istrative investigation a year after the act was committed. (2) Whether the Ombudsman has authority to institute an istrative complaint against a government employee who had already resigned. Held: (1) No. Well-entrenched is the rule that istrative offenses do not prescribe. istrative offenses by their very nature pertain to the character of public officers and employees. In disciplining public officers and employees, the object sought is not the punishment of the officer or employee but the improvement of the public service and the preservation of the public’s faith and confidence in our government. Clearly, Section 20 of R.A. 6770 does not prohibit the Ombudsman from conducting an istrative investigation after the lapse of one year, reckoned from the time the alleged act was committed. Without doubt, even if the istrative case was filed beyond the one (1) year period stated in Section 20(5), the Ombudsman was well within its discretion to conduct the istrative investigation. (2) No. The Ombudsman can no longer institute an istrative case against Andutan because the latter was not a public servant at the time the case was filed. It is irrelevant, according to the Ombudsman, that Andutan had already resigned prior to the filing of the istrative case since the operative fact that

determines its jurisdiction is the commission of an offense while in the public service. The SC observed that indeed it has held in the past that a public official’s resignation does not render moot an istrative case that was filed prior to the official’s resignation. However, the facts of those cases are not entirely applicable to the present case. In the past cases, the Court found that the public officials – subject of the istrative cases – resigned, either to prevent the continuation of a case already filed or to pre-empt the imminent filing of one. Here, neither situation obtains. First, Andutan’s resignation was neither his choice nor of his own doing; he was forced to resign. Second, Andutan resigned from his DOF post on July 1, 1998, while the istrative case was filed on September 1, 1999, exactly one year and two months after his resignation. What is clear from the records is that Andutan was forced to resign more than a year before the Ombudsman filed the istrative case against him. If the SC agreed with the interpretation of the Ombudsman, any official – even if he has been separated from the service for a long time – may still be subject to the disciplinary authority of his superiors, ad infinitum. Likewise, if the act committed by the public official is indeed inimical to the interests of the State, other legal mechanisms are available to redress the same.

MARTINEZ VS. VILLANUEVA [G.R. NO. 169196. JULY 6, 2011] Doctrine: Section 7(d) of R.A. No. 6713 which prohibits public officials and employees to solicit or accept, directly or indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor, entertainment, loan or anything of monetary value from any person in the course of their official duties or in connection with any operation being regulated by, or any transaction which may be affected by the functions of their office is malum prohibitum. Facts: Petitioner Martinez is the General Manager of Claveria Agri-Based Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. (CABMPCI) while respondent Villanueva is the Assistant Regional Director of the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA), Regional Office No. 02, Tuguegarao City, Cagayan. Respondent solicited several loans from CABMPCI. The Ombudsman later found that Respondent abused her position when she solicited a loan from CABMPCI despite the fact that she is disqualified by its by-laws. The relevant provision under which respondent was charged is Section 7(d) of R.A. No. 6713 which reads: SEC. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions.- In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful: (d) Solicitation or acceptance of gifts. - Public officials and employees shall not solicit or accept, directly or indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor, entertainment, loan or anything of monetary value from any person in the course of their official duties or in connection with any operation being regulated by, or any transaction which may be affected by the functions of their office. xxxx On appeal, Respondent argued that the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon erred in treating the loan she obtained from CABMPCI as a prohibited loan under Section 7(d) of R.A. No. 6713 because she was an official of the CDA. Respondent argued that although Section 7(d) of R.A. No. 6713 prohibits all public officials and employees from soliciting or accepting loans in connection with any operation being regulated by her office, the subsequent enactment of R.A. No. 6938 or the Cooperative Code of the Philippines allows qualified officials and employees to become of cooperatives and naturally, to avail of the attendant privileges and benefits of hip. She contended that it would be absurd if CDA officials and employees who are eligible to apply for hip in a cooperative would be prohibited from availing loans. On appeal, the CA that respondent should not have been held liable for grave misconduct because of the supposed failure of Martinez to show undue influence Issues: 1. Whether the Cooperative Code impliedly repealed Section 7(d) of R.A. No. 6713. 2. Whether the prohibition under Section 7(d) of R.A. No. 6713 requires undue influence. Held: 1. NO. True, the Cooperative Code allows CDA officials and employees to become of cooperatives and enjoy the privileges and benefits attendant to hip. However, it should not be taken as creating in favor of CDA officials and employees an exemption from the coverage of Section 7(d), R.A. No. 6713 considering that the benefits and privileges attendant to hip in a cooperative are not confined solely to availing of loans and not all cooperatives are established for the sole purpose of providing credit facilities to their . Thus, the limitation on the benefits which respondent may enjoy in connection with her alleged hip in CABMPCI does not lead to absurd results and does not render naught hip in the cooperative or render R.A. No. 6938 ineffectual,

contrary to respondent’s assertions. We find that such limitation is but a necessary consequence of the privilege of holding a public office and is akin to the other limitations that, although interfering with a public servant’s private rights, are nonetheless deemed valid in light of the public trust nature of public employment. 2. NO. Said prohibition in Section 7(d) is malum prohibitum. It is the commission of that act as defined by the law, and not the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has been violated. Therefore, it is immaterial whether respondent has fully paid her loans since the law prohibits the mere act of soliciting a loan under the circumstances provided in Section 7(d) of R.A. No. 6713. Whether respondent used her position or authority as a CDA official is of no consequence in the determination of her istrative liability.

CSC VS. CRUZ [G.R. NO. 187858; AUGUST 9, 2011] Doctrine: If the istrative offense found to have been actually committed is of lesser gravity than the offense charged, the employee cannot be considered exonerated if the factual premise for the imposition of the lesser penalty remains the same. Facts: The respondent, Storekeeper A of the City of Malolos Water District (CMWD), was charged with grave misconduct and dishonesty by CMWD General Manager (GM) Nicasio Reyes. He allegedly uttered a false, malicious and damaging statement against GM Reyes and the rest of the CMWD Board of Directors which stemmed from the respondent’s act of claiming overtime pay despite his failure to and out in the computerized daily time record for three working days. GM Reyes preventively suspended the respondent for 15 days. Before the expiration of his preventive suspension, however, GM Reyes, with the approval of the CMWD Board, found the respondent guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty, and dismissed him from the service. The CSC however reversed the ruling and stated that respondent should not be held liable for grave misconduct. Issue: Whether the respondent is entitled to back salaries after the CSC ordered his reinstatement to his former position. Held: The mere reduction of the penalty on appeal does not entitle a government employee to back salaries if he was not exonerated of the charge against him. If the exoneration of the employee is relative (as distinguished from complete exoneration), an inquiry into the factual premise of the offense charged and of the offense committed must be made. If the istrative offense found to have been actually committed is of lesser gravity than the offense charged, the employee cannot be considered exonerated if the factual premise for the imposition of the lesser penalty remains the same.

COASTAL SAFEWAY MARINE SERVICES VS. ESGUERRA [G.R. NO. 185352; AUGUST 10, 2011] Doctrine: Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to a conclusion, even if other equally reasonable minds might conceivably opine otherwise. Facts: After 46 days of shipboard employment, Esguerra requested medical attention for back and chest pains. Esguerra was declared “not fit for work until complete cardiac evaluation is done” and “advised to rest until then”. Despite the normal results of the serology, hematology, biochemistry and x-ray tests istered upon him, however, Esguerra insisted on going home on the ground that he had been rendered unfit for work. Esguerra further underwent diagnostic tests and was prescribed various medications at the PGH for “chronic stable angina.” Esguerra filed against CSMSI, its president, and CMEGT, the complaint for medical reimbursement, sickness allowance, permanent disability benefits, damages and attorney’s fees before the arbital level of the NLRC. Esguerra alleged that he was repatriated for medical reasons on of his workrelated/aggravated ailment; that despite being apprised of his intention to submit himself for medical examination, CSMSI failed to refer him to a company-designated physician, and insisted that he was fit for work; and, that left with no choice but to seek medical attention on his own at the PGH, PHC and POH, he was constrained to file his complaint for disability benefits, sickness allowance, damages and attorney’s fees. Finding in favor CSMSI, Morcilla and CMEGT, Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint on the ground that Esguerra failed to prove his disability and to submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician, pursuant to Section 20-B of the POEA SEC. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision. Issue: Whether the ruling of the Court of the Court of Appeals is contrary to the evidence on record and runs afoul with prevailing jurisprudence. Held: Yes. Self-serving and unsubstantiated declarations are insufficient to establish a case before quasi-judicial bodies where the quantum of evidence required establishing a fact is substantial evidence. Often described as more than a mere scintilla, substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to a conclusion, even if other equally reasonable minds might conceivably opine otherwise. In this case, there is no dispute regarding the fact that Esguerra had altogether failed to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement under the POEA-SEC. Beyond his bare assertion that CSMSI (employer) “never gave him referrals to continue his medications as recommended by the foreign doctor” despite his call on 8 July 2003 “to inform them that he will report the next day in order to submit his medical evaluation abroad,” Esguerra did not present any evidence to prove justification for his inability to submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician. Thus, he was not awarded disability benefits and sickness allowance.

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT AND PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-GRAFT COMMISSION VS. CATAQUIZ [GR NO. 183445, SEPTEMBER 14, 2011] Doctrine: Accordingly, the dismissal of the criminal case by the Ombudsman does not foreclose istrative action against Cataquiz. His absolution from criminal liability is not conclusive upon the OP, which subsequently found him to be istratively liable. The pronouncement made by the Ombudsman cannot serve to protect the respondent from further istrative prosecution. A contrary ruling would be unsettling as it would undermine the very purpose of istrative proceedings, that is, to protect the public service and uphold the time-honored principle that a public office is a public trust. Facts: Respondent Cataquiz, then General Manager of the Laguna Lake Development Authority, was being ousted in a petition by a majority of the of the Management Committee and the rank and file employees of the LLDA, on the grounds of corrupt and unprofessional behavior and management incompetence. In an investigation into the allegations against Cataquiz ordered by Secretary Gozun of the DENR, it was determined that respondent may be found guilty for acts prejudicial to the best interest of the government and for violations of several pertinent laws and regulations. It was recommended that the case be forwarded to the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission. Later, a duly organized employees union of the LLDA, CELLDA, filed a complaint before the PAGC charging Cataquiz with violations of RA 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), The istrative Code and The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. The Office of the President adopted the findings and recommendations of PAGC, and dismissed the respondent from service. The decision was amended by the OP imposing the penalties of disqualification from reemployment and forfeiture of retirement benefits because the penalty of dismissal was no longer available to him because of his replacement as General Manager of LLDA. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision. Meanwhile, the Office of the Ombudsman recommended the dismissal of the charges against respondent for violation of RA No. 3019. Issue: Whether the dismissal of the charges against respondent by the Ombudsman serves as a bar to the finding of istrative liability. Held: No. It is a basic rule in istrative law that public officials are under a three-fold responsibility for a violation of their duty or for a wrongful act or omission, such that they may be held civilly, criminally and istratively liable for the same act. Obviously, istrative liability is separate and distinct from penal and civil liability. In the case of People v. Sandiganbayan, the Court elaborated on the difference between istrative and criminal liability: “The distinct and independent nature of one proceeding from the other can be attributed to the following: first, the difference in the quantum of evidence required and, correlatively, the procedure observed and sanctions imposed; and second, the principle that a single act may offend against two or more distinct and related provisions of law, or that the same act may give rise to criminal as well as istrative liability.

DUMDUMA VS. CSC [GR NO. 182606, OCTOBER 4, 2011] Doctrine: Only those who can live up to the constitutional exhortation that public office is a public trust deserve the honor of continuing in public service. Facts: Petitioner, a PNP Officer in Leyte, took the Career Service Professional Examination in 1998. In 1999, he filled out a Personal Data Sheet pursuant to his promotional appointment as Police Inspector and stated that he ed the Career Service Professional Examination Computer-Assisted Test in Quezon City with a rating of 81%. His appointment was forwarded to the PNP-CSC for verification and approval where it was then discovered that he did not have the proper civil service eligibility, contrary to what he disclosed in his PDS. His appointment was disapproved on the ground of spurious eligibility and was charged with Dishonesty. Petitioner denied the charged and alleged that a certain Dilodilo, who was allegedly a retired CSC director promised him total in his examination and that he was in good faith when he wrote the information of his eligibility in his PDS. The CSC found him guilty of Dishonesty and imposed on him the penalty of dismissal from service, forfeiture of retirement benefits and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in government service. He reiterated his defense of good faith in his appeal to the CA, but the appellate court was unconvinced. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether the petitioner may be dismissed from service for falsification of his eligibility for appointment purposes. Held: Yes. The Court agrees with the CSC and the CA that the undisputed facts, as revealed by the evidence, make out a clear case of dishonesty against Dumduma. When Dumduma’s claim of eligibility was contradicted by the CSC of Eligibles and the List of ing/Failing Examinees, it became incumbent uponDumduma to explain why he made the incorrect entry in his PDS. Unlike his PDS entry, the CSC records are presumed correct and made in the regular course of official business. In explaining his action, however, Dumduma dug a deeper hole from which he could not extricate himself. Dumduma’s contention is in start contrast to his issions and does not merit belief. The concept of good faith in istrative cases such as this one is explained in a recent case in this wise: “Good faith is ordinarily used to describe that state of mind denoting honesty of intention and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquire; an honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another, even through technicalities of law, together with absence of all information, notice, or benefit or belief of facts which render a transaction unconscientious. In short, good faith is actually a question of intention. Although this is something internal, we can ascertain a person’s intention not from his own protestation of good faith, which is self-serving, but from evidence of his conduct and outward acts.”

QUARTO VS. OMBUDSMAN SIMEON MARCELO [GR NO. 169042 OCTOBER 5, 2011] Doctrine: Mandamus is the proper remedy to compel the performance of a ministerial duty imposed by law upon the respondent. In matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus may only be resorted to, to compel the respondent to take action; it cannot be used to direct the manner or the particular way discretion is to be exercised Facts: The DPWH Secretary created a committee to investigate alleged anomalous transactions involving the repairs and/or purchase of spare parts of DPWH service vehicles with the DPWH Internal Audit Service to conduct the actual investigation. The DPWH-IAS discovered that from March to December 2001, several emergency repairs and/or purchase of spare parts of hundreds of DPWH service vehicles, which were approved and paid by the government, did not actually take place, resulting in government losses of approximately P143 million for this ten-month period alone. The committee then filed before the Office of the Ombudsman complaints charging the petitioner, the respondents, who are officials and employees of the DPWH, and other private individuals who purportedly benefitted from the anomalous transactions.

The Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan several information charging the said DPWH officials and employees with plunder, estafa through falsification of official/commercial documents and violation of Section 3(e), RA No. 3019. On the other hand, the Ombudsman granted the respondents' request for immunity in exchange for their testimonies and cooperation in the prosecution of the cases filed. Issue: Whether the Ombudsman has the authority to grant immunity from prosecution to witnesses Held: Yes. RA No. 6770 specifically empowers the Ombudsman to grant immunity "in any hearing, inquiry or proceeding being conducted by the Ombudsman or under its authority, in the performance or in the furtherance of its constitutional functions and statutory objectives." In the exercise of his investigatory and prosecutorial powers, he enjoys the same latitude of discretion in determining what constitutes sufficient evidence to a finding of probable cause and the degree of participation of those involved or the lack thereof. His findings and conclusions on these matters are not ordinarily subject to review by the courts except when he gravely abuses his discretion, which the petitioner has failed to establish in this case.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ [GR NO. 191805, NOVEMBER 15, 2011] Doctrine: The presidential immunity from suit exists only in concurrence with the president’s incumbency but not beyond.

Facts: Petitioner Noriel Rodriguez is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan (Kagimungan), a peasant organization d with Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP). He claims that the military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State under the Oplan Bantay Laya, making its targets of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. Rodriguez was abducted by military men and was tortured repeatedly when he refused to confess to his hip in the NPA. When released, he filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and and Petition for the Writ of Habeas Datawith Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and Production of Documents and Personal Properties. The petition was filed against former Pres. Arroyo, et al. The writs were granted but the CA dropped Pres Arroyo as party-respondent, as she may not be sued in any case during her tenure of office or actual incumbency.

Issue: Whether former Pres GMA should be dropped as respondent on the basis of presidential immunity from suit

Held: No. As was held in the case of Estrada v Desierto, a non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity from suit, even for acts committed during the latter’s tenure; that courts should look with disfavor upon the presidential privilege of immunity, especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission also reveal that the intent of the framers is clear that presidential immunity from suit is concurrent only with his tenure and not his term. Therefore, former Pres. GMA cannot use such immunity to shield herself from judicial scrutiny that would assess whether, within the context of amparo proceedings, she was responsible or able for the abduction of Rodriguez

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION VS. CSC AND RODRIGO A. TANFELIX [GR NO. 152093, JANUARY 24, 2012] Doctrine: Grave misconduct consists in a government official’s deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior. It is regarded as grave when the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rules are present. In particular, corruption as an element of grave misconduct consists in the official’s unlawful and wrongful use of his station or character [reputation] to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others. Rigging by a public official at a bidding in the organization where he belongs is a species of corruption.

Facts: Petitioner’s Board of Inquiry and Discipline found Tanfelix, a Supervising Mechanical Engineer, guilty of grave misconduct for rigging the bidding for the construction of the wind break fence of its (NPC) thermal power plant’s coal storage in Batangas to favor ALC Industries, Inc. He was then ordered by the NPC-BID to be dismissed from service.

On appeal, the CSC, which initially affirmed the Board’s decision, reversed itself and exonerated Tanfelix on the ground that the misconduct which warrants removal must have direct relation to and be connected with the performance of official duties. As it happened, Tanfelix was neither a member of the NPC bids committee nor was there any proof that he influenced the of that committee.

The NPC appealed to the CA but the court affirmed CSC’s ruling.

Issue: Whether Tanfelix was guilty of grave misconduct

Held: Yes. Tanfelix wrongfully and unlawfully used his station or reputation to rig the bids for an NPC construction project. Although he was not a member of NPC’s bids committee, he was NPC’s supervising mechanical engineer, a public officer endowed with the duty to protect the public bidding of his organization. Instead, he misused his position to gain access to information on construction projects that were up for bidding and to the NPC staffs involved in them. And he misused his reputation and credibility as a ranking NPC officer to bring the pre-qualified bidders together to hammer out with them a scheme for cheating NPC of a large sum of money, the result of rigged bids.

ONG VS. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT [GR NO. 184219, JANUARY 30, 2012] Doctrine: Temporary appointments are made if only to prevent hiatus in the government's rendition of public service. However, a temporary appointee can be removed even without cause and at a moment's notice. As to those with eligibilities, their rights to security of tenure pertain to ranks but not to the positions to which they were appointed.

Facts: Petitioner Samuel Ong, as a career employee in the NBI , was appointed as Director III co-terminus with the appointing authority and would end effectively at midnight on June 30, 2004, unless a new appointment would be issued in his favor by the President consistent with her new tenure effective July 1, 2004; and until then, he shall only hold his position in a de facto/ hold over status. On Dec. 1, 2004, the President appointed respondent Victor Bessat as Director III replacing the petitioner. Ong filed a quo warranto before the CA but was denied.

Issue: Whether petitioner has been removed from his position as NBI Director III

Held: No. Ong lacked the CES eligibility required for the position of Director III and his appointment was “co-terminus with the appointing authority.” His appointment being both temporary and co-terminous in nature, it can be revoked by the President even without cause and at a short notice.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PACHECO [GR NO. 178021 JANUARY 25, 2012]

Doctrine: While a temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible even without the employee's prior consent, it cannot be done when the transfer is a preliminary step toward his removal, or a scheme to lure him away from his permanent position, or when it is designed to indirectly terminate his service, or force his resignation. Facts: Respondent Minerva Pacheco, through a Revenue Travel Assignment Order (RTAO) issued by the BIR, was reassigned as Assistant Chief of Legal Division from Quezon City to San Fernando, Pampanga. The BIR cited exigencies of the revenue service as basis for such issuance. Pacheco claims that she was constructively dismissed as her reassignment will result in the reduction of her salary and let her suffer physical burden from waking up early and coming home late at night. The CSC dismissed her complaint on the ground that she was not constructively dismissed as she maintained her position as Revenue Atty. IV and was designated as Assistant Chief. The CA reversed the CSC’s decision and ordered her immediate reinstatement with full backwages and benefits. Issue: Whether respondent was constructively dismissed, and, therefore, entitled to backwages Held: Yes. The contention of the CSC, through the OSG, that the deliberate refusal of Pacheco to report to work either in her original station in QC or her new place of assignment in Pampanga negates her claim of constructive dismissal is untenable. It was legally impossible for Pacheo to report to her original place of assignment in Quezon City because the said RTAO also reassigned another personnel as Assistant Chief from Pampanga to QC, the very same position that Pacheco held. It is also erroneous on the part of the CSC to argue that the subject RTAO was immediately executory, unless otherwise ordered by the CSC, and, thus, it was incumbent upon Pacheco to report to her new place of assignment. The Court held that it is an order to detail that is immediately executory and not reassignment. However, Pacheco is not entitled to full backwages and benefits. It is a settled jurisprudence\ that an illegally dismissed civil service employee is entitled to back salaries but limited only to a maximum period of five (5) years, and not full back salaries from his illegal dismissal up to his reinstatement.

UNITED CLAIMANTS ASSOCIATION OF NEA (UNICAN) VS. NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ISTRATION (NEA) [GR NO. 187107 JANUARY 31, 2012] Doctrine: Reorganization involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. It could result in the loss of one's position through removal or abolition of an office. However, for a reorganization for the purpose of economy or to make the bureaucracy more efficient to be valid, it must the test of good faith; otherwise, it is void ab initio.

Facts: NEA is a GOCC created in accordance with PD 269 wherein it states that the NEA Board is empowered to organize or re-organize NEA’s staffing structure. When The Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA Law) was thereafter enacted to restructure the electric power industry, including the privatization of the assets of the National Power Corp. (NPC), it imposed upon NEA additional mandates in relation to the promotion of the role of rural electric cooperatives to achieve national electrification. Its Implementing Rules and Regulations provides that all NEA employees shall be considered legally terminated with the implementation of a reorganization program pursuant to a law enacted by Congress or pursuant to Sec. 5(a)(5) of PD 269 through which the reorganization was carried out. The

Issue: Whether the NEA Board has the power to terminate all the NEA employees

Held: Yes. Pursuant to PD 269, the termination of all the employees of NEA was within the NEA Board's powers and may not successfully be impugned absent proof of bad faith to which the petitioners have clearly failed to establish. It is undisputed that NPC was in financial distress and the solution found by Congress was to pursue a policy towards its privatization. The privatization of NPC necessarily demanded the restructuring of its operations. The privatization and restructuring of the NPC was, therefore, done in good faith as its primary purpose was for economy and to make the bureaucracy more efficient.