Compilation Of Case Digests - Consti 12224631431417673001 3w2c6n

Constitutional Law 1

(1) Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS 267 SCRA 408 (1997) .............................................7 (2) Lambino vs. COMELEC GR 174153 (2006)...........................................................8 (3) Marbury vs. Madison, 5 US 137 ..............................................................................9 (4) Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil 139 (1936) ..........................................10 (5) Maria Carolina P. Araullo, et al. vs. Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III et al, GR 209287, July 1, 2014 ..................................................................................................................11 (6) Francisco vs. House of Representatives GR, 160261 (Nov 10, 2003) ...................12 (7) Mariano vs. Comelec, GR 118577 .........................................................................13 (8) Montesclaros vs. Comelec, GR 152295 (2002) .....................................................14 (9) Belgica vs. Ochoa, GR 208566, 710 SCRA 1,89, Nov 19, 2013 ...........................15 (10) Ocampo vs Enriquez GR 225973, November 8, 2016 .........................................16 (11) Imbong v. Ochoa, GR 204819, April 8, 2014 ......................................................17 (12) Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, GR 148560 (2001) ....................................................18 (13) Imbong v. Ochoa, GR 204819, April 8, 2014 ......................................................19 (14) Disini, Jr. v. The Secretary of Justice, Gr 203335, February 11, 2014 ................20 (15) Gonzales III v. Office of the President .................................................................21 (16) Vinuya v. Romulo, GR 162230, April 28, 2010 ..................................................22 (17) Gonzales v. Narvasa, GR 140835 ........................................................................23 (18) Lacson v. Perez, GR 147780 ................................................................................24 (19) Defunis v. Odegard ..............................................................................................25 (20) Interational Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia, GR 209271, December 8, 2015 ......................................26 (21) David vs. Arroyo, GR 171396, May 03, 2006 [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez] ........27 (22) Belgica, et al vs. Exec. Sec. Ochoa, et al, GR No. 208566, November 19, 2013 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].........................................................................................28 (23) KMU Labor Center vs. Garcia, GR 115381, December 23, 1994 [Per J. Kapunan, First Division] ..............................................................................................................29 (24) IBP vs. Zamora, GR 141284, August 15, 2000 [Per J. Kapunan, En Banc] ........30 (25) Tanada vs. Tuvera, GR L-63915, April 24, 1985 [Per J. Escolin, En Banc] .......31 (26) Ople vs. Torres, GR 127685, July 23, 1998 [Per J. Puno, En Banc] ...................32 (27) Information Technology Foundation vs. ComElec, GR 159139 [Per J. Panganban, En Banc].......................................................................................................................33 (28) Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, GR 113375, May 5, 1994 [Per J. Davide, En Banc] ..34 (29) Ocampo, et al vs. iral Enriquez, GR 225973, November 08, 2016 [Per J. Peralta, En Banc] .........................................................................................................35 (30) Arigo vs. Swift, et al, GR 206510, Septeber 16, 2014 [Per J. Villarama, En Banc]36 (31) MIRASOL VS CA ...............................................................................................37 (32) SAYSON VS SINGSON .....................................................................................39 (33) REPUBLIC VS PURISIMA ................................................................................41 (34) UP VS DIZON .....................................................................................................42 (35) RAYO VS CFI .....................................................................................................44 (36) FAROLAN VS CTA ............................................................................................45 (37) REPUBLIC VS SANDIGANBAYAN ................................................................46 (38) SANTIAGO VS REPUBLIC ...............................................................................47 (39) DOTC VS SPS. ABECINA .................................................................................48 (40) AMIGABLE VS CUENCA .................................................................................49

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(41) EPG CONSTRUCTION VS VIGILAR ...............................................................50 (42) TORIO v. FONTANILLA ...................................................................................51 (43) ARIGO v. SWIFT G.R. No. 206510 ....................................................................52 (44) Holy See vs. Rosario G.R. 101949 (1994) ...........................................................53 (45) USA vs Ruiz G.R. No. L-35645...........................................................................54 (46) MINUCHER VS. COURT OF APPEALS ..........................................................55 (47) REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA VS VINZON .......................................................56 (48) DFA v. NLRC G.R. No. 113191 ..........................................................................57 (49) ATCI v. Echin 632 SCRA 528 (2010) .................................................................58 (50) Animos vs. PVAO G.R. No. 79156 .....................................................................59 (51) USA v. Reyes, GR No. 79233 (1993) ..................................................................60 (52) Shauf v. CA, 191 SCRA 713 (1990) ....................................................................61 (53) Nessia v. Fermin, 220 SCRA 615 (1993).............................................................62 (54) Caloocan City v. Allarde, GR No. 107721 (2003) ...............................................63 (55) Pable Ocampo v. HRET, GR No. 158466 (2004) ................................................64 (56) Maquiling v. COMELEC, GR No. 195649 (2013) ..............................................65 (57) Villavivencio v. Lukban, 39 Phil 778 (1919) .......................................................66 (58) Agustin v. Edu, 88 SCRA 195 (1979) ..................................................................67 (59) Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil 115 (1957) ..........................................................68 (60) Deutsche Bank AG Manila Branch v. CIR, 704 SCRA 216 (2013) ....................69 (61) IN RE GARCIA ...................................................................................................70 (62) PEOPLE VS LAGMAN.......................................................................................71 (63) ESTRADA VS ESCRITOR .................................................................................72 (64) REPUBLIC VS MANALO ..................................................................................73 (65) SALONGA VS CRUZ .........................................................................................74 (66) SERRANO DE AGBAYANI VS PNB ................................................................75 (67) CIR VS SAN ROQUE POWER CORP ...............................................................76 (68) MARIA CAROLINA ARAULLO VS BENIGNO AQUINO III, JULY 1,201477 (69) MARIA CAROLINA ARAULLO VS BENIGNO AQUINO III, FEBRUARY 3, 2015 (ENBANC) .........................................................................................................78 (70) MAGALLONA VS ERMITA ..............................................................................79 (71) Province of North Cotabato vs GRP Peace on Ancestral ...........................80 (72) Reagan v CIR , 30 SCRA 968 (1969) ..................................................................81 (73) People vs Gozo 53 SCRA 476 .............................................................................82 (74) Lee vs. Director of Lands GR 128195 .................................................................83 (75) Republic vs Chule Lim GR 153883 .....................................................................84 (76) Calilung vs Datumanong GR 160869 ..................................................................85 (77) Republic vs Nora Sagun GR 187567 (2012) ........................................................86 (78) In re Ching, Bar Matter 914 (1999)......................................................................87 (79) Co v HRET 199 SCRA 692 .................................................................................88 (80) Bengson v HRET GR 142840 ..............................................................................89 (81) So v Republic 513 SCRA 268 (2007) ..................................................................90 (82) David vs. Agbay G.R. No. 199113 March 18, 2015 ............................................92 (83) Nicolas-Lewis, et al vs. Comelec GR 162759 August 4, 2006 ............................93 (84) JOSE AZNAR vs COMELEC and Emilio Mario Renner Osmeña GR 83820 25 May 1990..............................................................................................................................94

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(85) Valles v COMELEC GR 137000, Aug. 9, 2000 ..................................................95 (86) MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S POE- LLAMANZARES vs. COMELEC,et al. GR 221697 , GR 221698-700 March 8,2016 .....................................................................96 (87) DEPT OF AGRICULTURE VS NLRC GR 104269 November 11, 1993 ..........98 (88) Philippine Agila Sattelite Inc. vs. Lichauco G.R. No. 142362, May 3, 2006 ......99 (89) Lansang vs. CA G.R. No. 102667, February 23, 2000 ......................................101 (90) Republic vs. Sandoval 220 SCRA 124...............................................................102 (91) Bayan v Exec Secretary GR 138570 ..................................................................103 (92) Pamatong v Comelec GR 161872 ......................................................................104 (93) Garcia v Drilon 699 SCRA 352 ........................................................................105 (94) PASEI v Drilon 163 SCRA 386 .........................................................................106 (95) UP BOR v CA GR 134625` ...............................................................................107 (96) CoTesCUP v Secretary of Education GR 216930 .............................................108 (97) University v CA 230 SCRA 761 ........................................................................109 (98) SSS vs CA 175 SCRA 686.................................................................................110 (99) Oposa v Factoran GR 101083 ............................................................................111 (100) Republic v Albios 707 SCRA 5584 (2013) ......................................................112 (101) Imbong vs Ochoa, 721 SCRA 584 (2013) .......................................................114 (102) Roe vs Wade, 410 US 113 ...............................................................................115 (103) Limbona vs Conte Mangelin, 170 SCRA 786..................................................116 (104) Mamiscal vs Abdullah 761 SCRA 39 (2015)...................................................117 (105) In RE Laureta and Maravilla 148 SCRA 382 ..................................................118 (106) INS vs Chadha, 462 US 919 (1983) .................................................................119 (107) Arnault vs Balagtas, 97 Phil 358 (1955) ..........................................................120 (108) Belgica vs Ochoa, Jr, 710 SCRA 1(2013) ........................................................121 (109) Mendoza vs People, 659 SCRA 681 (2011) ....................................................122 (110) NPC Drivers and Mechanical Association vs Napocor, 503 SCRA 138 (2006)123 (111) Garcia v. Executive Secretary, 211 SCRA 219 ................................................125 (112) US v. Tang Ho, 43 Phil 1 .................................................................................126 (113) CoTeSCUP v. Secretary of Education, G.R. 216930, October 2018 ...............127 (114) Pelaez v. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569 ........................................................128 (115) People v. Judge Dacuycuy, 173 SCRA 90 .......................................................129 (116) Sema v. COMELEC, G.R. 177597, (2008) ......................................................130 (117) Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr., et al. v. The Secretary of Justice, et al., G.R. No. 203335, Feb. 11, 2014..............................................................................................................131 (118) Powell v. McCormack 395 US 486 ..................................................................132 (119) Pobre v Defensor-Santiago 597 SCRA 1 (2009) .............................................133 (120) Aquino III vs COMELEC 617 SCRA 623 (2010) ...........................................134 (121) Aldaba vs. COMELEC 611 SCRA 147 (2010)................................................135 (122) Naval v Comelec, 729 SCRA 299 (2014) ........................................................136 (123) Bagabuyo v Comelec, 573 SCRA 290 (2008) .................................................137 (124) Reyes v Comelec, 699 SCRA 522 (2013) and 708 SCRA 197 (2013 .............138 (125) Banat v Comelec, GR 179271 (2009) ..............................................................139 (126) Ang Ladlad v Comelec, GR 190582 (2010) ....................................................140 (127) Walden Bello v Comelec GR 191998 (2010) ..................................................141 (128) Atong Paglaum v Comelec, GR 203766 ..........................................................142

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(129) Coalition of Asso. of Senior Citizens in the Phil. v Comelec, 201 SCRA 786 (2013) ....................................................................................................................................143 (130) Lico v Comelec, GR 205505, Sep 29, 2015 .....................................................144 (131) Abang Lingkod vs. Comelec 2013 ...................................................................145 (132) Akbayan vs HRET ...........................................................................................146 (133) Aquino vs. Comelec .........................................................................................147 (134) Abayon vs HRET .............................................................................................148 (135) Santiago vs Guingona.......................................................................................149 (136) Avelino vs Cuenco ...........................................................................................150 (137) Alejandrino vs Quezon .....................................................................................151 (138) De Venecia vs Sandiganbayan .........................................................................152 (139) Pobre vs. Defensor Santiago ............................................................................153 (140) Philconsa vs. Mathay........................................................................................154 (141) Ligot vs. Mathay, 56 SCRA 823 (1974) ..........................................................155 (142) People vs. Jalosjos, GR 132875-76, February 3, 2000 ....................................156 (143) Adaza vs Pacana, 135 SCRA 431 (1985) .........................................................157 (144) Puyat vs. De Guzman, 113 SCRA 31 (1982) ...................................................158 (145) Liban vs. Gordon, 593 SCRA 68 (2009) and 639 SCRA 709 (2011) ..............159 (146) Macalintal vs. COMELEC, GR 157013, July 10, 2003 ...................................160 (147) Abakada Group Party list vs. Purisima, GR 166715, August 14, 2008 ...........161 (148) Bengzon vs. Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA 767....................................162 (149) Arnault vs. Nazareno, GR L-3820, July 18, 1950 ............................................163 (150) PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation vs. Senate, GR 180308, June 19, 2012164 (151) Neri v Senate Committee on ability of Public Officers 549 SCRA 77 and 564 SCRA 152) ..........................................................................................................165 (152) Balag v. Senate GR 234608 .............................................................................166 (153) Senate v. Ermita GR 169777 ............................................................................167 (154) Belgica v. Executive Secretary GR 208566 .....................................................168 (155) Araullo v Abad GR 209287 .............................................................................169 (156) Lawyers against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP) v. The Secretary of Budget and Management GR 164987 ...........................................................................................170 (157) Arnault v. Balagtas 97 Phil 358 .......................................................................171 (158) Imbong v. Ochoa 721 SCRA 146.....................................................................172 (159) Tanada v. Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 ......................................................................173 (160) Abbas v. SET....................................................................................................174 (161) Bondoc vs Pineda .............................................................................................175 (162) Codilla vs De Venecia ......................................................................................176 (163) Cunanan vs Tan ................................................................................................177 (164) Velasco vs Belmonte ........................................................................................178 (165) Ty-Delgado vs HRET.......................................................................................179 (166) Republic vs Sandiganbayan .............................................................................180 (167) Estrada vs Arroyo .............................................................................................181 (168) Macalintal vs PET ............................................................................................182 (169) Pormento vs Estrada .........................................................................................183 (170) Laurel vs Garcia ...............................................................................................184 (171) Marcos v. Manglapus .......................................................................................185

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(172) Saguisag v. Ochoa ............................................................................................186 (173) Funa v. Ermita ..................................................................................................187 (174) Funa v. Agra .....................................................................................................188 (175) De Castro v. JBC ..............................................................................................189 (176) Velicaria-Garafil v. OP ....................................................................................190 (177) Manalo v. Sistosa .............................................................................................192 (178) Hontiveros-Baraquel v. TollRegulatory Board ................................................193 (179) Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape TanonStrait, et al v. Secretary Angelo Reyes, et al ....................................................................................................194 (180) Kulayan v. Tan .................................................................................................196 (181) Ampatuan vs Puno ...........................................................................................198 (182) Fortun vs Arroyo ..............................................................................................199 (183) Lagman vs Medialdea ......................................................................................200 (184) Monsantos vs Factoran Jr. ................................................................................201 (185) Rosa-Vidal vs Comelec ....................................................................................202 (186) Saguisag vs Ochoa Jr........................................................................................203 (187) Bayan vs Exec Secretary ..................................................................................204 (188) Biraogo vs Philippine Truth Commission ........................................................205 (189) Chavez vs. JBC ................................................................................................206 (190) Jardeleza vs. Sereno .........................................................................................207 (191) Villanueva vs JBC ............................................................................................208 (192) RE: COAopinion on the computation of the appraised value of the properties purchased by the retired Chief / associate justices of the supreme court A.M. NO. 11-710-SC JULY 31, 2012................................................................................................209 (193) RE: Request for guidance/clarification on Section 7, Rule III of RA NO 10154, Requiring retiring government employees to secure a clearance of pendency/nonpendency of case/s from the Civi Service Commission.............................................210 (194) RE: Save the SC judicial independence and fiscal autonomy movement v abolition of judiciary development fund(JDF) and reduction of fiscal autonomy UDK-15143, Jan. 21, 2015......................................................................................................................211 (195) RE: Petition for recognition of exemption of the GSIS from payment of legal fees 612 SCRA 193 (2010) ...............................................................................................212 (196) Cayetano v Monsod ..........................................................................................213 (197) Gaminde v COA ..............................................................................................214 (198) Brillantes v Yorac............................................................................................216 (199) CSC v DBM .....................................................................................................217 (200) Funa v Duque ...................................................................................................218 (201) Sarmiento v Comelec .......................................................................................219 (202) Ambil v Comelec .............................................................................................220 (203) Brillantes v comelec .........................................................................................221 (204) Sandoval v comelec ..........................................................................................222 (205) Al haj v comelec ...............................................................................................223 (206) General v Roco .................................................................................................224 (207) CSC v salas.......................................................................................................225 (208) Office of the ombudsman v CSC .....................................................................226 (209) Vistan v nicolas ................................................................................................227

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(210) Domingo v zamora ...........................................................................................228 (211) OP v Buenaobra ...............................................................................................229 (212) Capablanca v. CSC ...........................................................................................230 (213) DBP v. COA 231 SCRA 202 ...........................................................................231 (214) Bustamante v. COA..........................................................................................232 (215) DBP v. COA GR 88435 ...................................................................................233 (216) Nuñez v. Sandiganbayan ..................................................................................234 (217) Roxas v. Vasquez .............................................................................................235 (218) People v. Velez .................................................................................................236 (219) Ledesma v. CA .................................................................................................237 (220) Ombudsman v. Madriaga .................................................................................238 (221) Ombudsman v. Madriaga .................................................................................239 (222) Caoibes v. Ombudsman....................................................................................240 (223) Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan ...............................................................................241 (224) Orap v. Sandiganbayan ....................................................................................242 (225) Canonizado vs Aguirre .....................................................................................244 (226) Carino v CHR ...................................................................................................245 (227) PBM Employees v. PBM Co............................................................................246 (228) MMDA v. Viron Trans.....................................................................................247

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(1) Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS 267 SCRA 408 (1997) ISSUE: Whether or Not the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-executing. FACTS: The GSIS, pursuant to the privatization program of the Government under Proclamation 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC). DECISION: Dismissed RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes. Sec 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision. A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is selfexecuting.

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(2) Lambino vs. COMELEC GR 174153 (2006) ISSUE: Whether or not the Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential and conditions” to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution FACTS: Lambino et al filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act. They alleged that their petition had the of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of all ed voters, with each legislative district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its ed voters. They also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.The Lambino Group’s initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department)4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department) and by adding Article XVIII entitled “Transitory Provisions.” These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. DECISION: Dismissed RATIO DECIDENDI: The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a people’s initiative to amend the Constitution. There is no need to revisit this Court’s ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential and conditions” to cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change the outcome of the present petition. Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively ruled that RA 6735 does not comply with the requirements of the Constitution to implement the initiative clause on amendments to the Constitution.

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(3) Marbury vs. Madison, 5 US 137 ISSUE: Does the Supreme Court have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus? FACTS: On the last day in office President John Adams names forty-two justices of the peace and sixteen new circuit court justices for the District of Columbia under the Organic Law, to take control of the federal judiciary before the Thomas Jefferson took office.The commission was signed by President Adams and sealed by acting Secretary of State, John Marshall but they wenot delivered before the expiration of Adam’s term as President. When the new President Thomas Jefferson took office he refused to honor the commissions, claiming that they were invalid because they have not been delivered before the end of Adam’s term as president. William Marbury was one of the intended recipient of an appointment as justice of the peace. Marbury directly went tothe supreme court to file his complaint, refusing for a writ of Mandamus to compel Jefferson’s Secretary James Madisonto deliver the commissions. At that time The Judiciary Act 1789 had granted the Supreme Court original jurisdiction to issue writs of Mandamus toany courts appointed or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States DECISION: Dismissed RATIO DECIDENDI: No. The Supreme Court does not have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus. To enable this court then to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, or to be necessary to enable them to exercise appellate jurisdiction. It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create that case. Although, therefore, a mandamus may be directed to courts, yet to issue such a writ to an officer for the delivery of a paper is, in effect, the same as to sustain an original action for that paper, and is therefore a matter of original jurisdiction.

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(4) Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil 139 (1936) ISSUE: Whether or not The Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction. FACTS: In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Jose A. Angara and the respondents Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor were candidates for the position of of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas. On Oct. 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the National Assembly and on Nov. 15, 1935, he took his oath of office. On Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly ed Resolution No. 8, which in effect, fixed the last date to file election protests. On Dec. 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against Angara and praying, among other things, that Ynsua be named/declared elected Member of the National Assembly or that the election of said position be nullified. On Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution (No. 6) stating that last day for filing of protests is on Dec. 9. Angara contended that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of contested elections to the National Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case. DECISION: Dismissed RATIO DECIDENDI: In this case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the of the National Assembly." (Sec 4 Art. VI 1935 Constitution). It is held, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the election protest filed by Ynsua.

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(5) Maria Carolina P. Araullo, et al. vs. Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III et al, GR 209287, July 1, 2014 ISSUE: Are the acts and practices under the DAP, particularly their non-conformity with Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution and the principles of separation of power and equal protection, constitutional? FACTS: In this Motion for Reconsideration, Aquino III, et al. maintain that the issues in these consolidated cases were mischaracterized and unnecessarily constitutionalized because the Court’s interpretation of savings can be overturned by legislation considering that savings is defined in the General Appropriations Act (GAA), hence making savings a statutory issue. They aver that the withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations constitute savings and may be used for augmentation and that the Court should apply legally recognized norms and principles, most especially the presumption of good faith, in resolving their motion. On their part, Araullo, et al. pray for the partial reconsideration of the decision on the ground that the Court failed to declare as unconstitutional and illegal all moneys under the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) used for alleged augmentation of appropriation items that did not have actual deficiencies. They submit that augmentation of items beyond the maximum amounts recommended by the President for the programs, activities and projects (PAPs) contained in the budget submitted to Congress should be declared unconstitutional. DECISION: WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petitions for certiorari and prohibition; and DECLARES the following acts and practices under the Disbursement Acceleration Program, National Budget Circular No. 541 and related executive issuances UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being in violation of Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the doctrine of separation of powers RATIO DECIDENDI: No. Regardless of the perceived beneficial purposes of the DAP, and regardless of whether the DAP is viewed as an effective tool of stimulating thenational economy, the acts and practices under the DAP and the relevant provisions of NBC No. 541 cited in the Decision should remain illegal and unconstitutional as long as the funds used to finance the projects mentioned therein are sourced from savings that deviated from the relevant provisions of the GAA, as well as the limitation on the power to augment under Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution. In a society governed by laws, even the best intentions must come within the parameters defined and set by the Constitution and the law. Laudable purposes must be carried out through legal methods.

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(6) Francisco vs. House of Representatives GR, 160261 (Nov 10, 2003) ISSUE: Whether or not the certiorari jurisdiction of the court may be invoked to determine the validity of the second impeachment complaint pursuant to Article XI of the Constitution. FACTS: An impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario Davide and seven Asociate Justices was filed on 2 June 2003 but was dismissed by The House Committee on Justice on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in substance. On 23 October 2003, Representative Gilbert Teodoro and Felix Fuentabella filed a new impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice. Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives et al, most of which contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5, Article XI of the Constitution, “no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within the period of one year.” Senator Aquilino Pimintel Jr, filed a Motion to Intervene, stating that the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court and that the sole power, authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as the impeachment court be recognized and upheld pursuant to the provision of Article XI of the Constitution. DECISION: The second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution RATIO DECIDENDI: Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.

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(7) Mariano vs. Comelec, GR 118577 ISSUE: Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy to challenge the constitutionality of one of the questioned sections of R.A. No. 7854 FACTS: The petitioners assails certain provisions of RA 7854, Section 51 on the ground that it attempts to alter or restart the "3-consecutive term" limit for local elective officials, disregarding the term previously served by them which collides with Section 8 Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the constitution DECISION: Dismissed RATIO DECIDENDI: The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper partiesto raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.

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(8) Montesclaros vs. Comelec, GR 152295 (2002) ISSUE: Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction imputable to respondents. FACTS: Petitioners sought to prevent the postponement of the 2002 SK election to a later date since doing so may render them unqualified to vote or be voted for in view of the age limitation set by law for those who may participate. The SK elections was postponed since it was deemed "operationally very difficult" to hold both SK and Barangay elections simultaneously in May 2002. Petitioners also sought to en the lowering of age for hip in the SK. DECISION: Denied RATIO DECIDENDI: The Court held that, in the present case, there was no actual controversy requiring the exercise of the power of judicial review. While seeking to prevent a postponement of the May 6, 2002 SK elections, petitioners are nevertheless amenable to a resetting of the SK elections to any date not later than July 15, 2002. RA No. 9164 has reset the SK elections to July 15, 2002, a date acceptable to petitioners. Under the same law, Congress merely restored the age requirement in PD No. 684, the original charter of the SK, which fixed the maximum age for hip in the SK to youths less than 18 years old. Petitioners do not have a vested right to the permanence of the age requirement under Section 424 of the Local Government Code of 1991.

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(9) Belgica vs. Ochoa, GR 208566, 710 SCRA 1,89, Nov 19, 2013 ISSUE: Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of legislati FACTS: The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects" using dummy NGOs. Thus, Criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the complaints are some of the lawmakers’ chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3) implementing agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles. Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO. Several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional DECISION: The petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. In view of the constitutional violations discussed in this Decision, the Court hereby declares as UNCONSTITUTIONAL: RATIO DECIDENDI: Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is one which "involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. In other words, "there must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence." Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of "ripeness," meaning that the questions raised for constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for adjudication. "A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action." "Withal, courts will decline to upon constitutional issues through advisory opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve hypothetical or moot questions." Based on these principles, the Court finds that there exists an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases. The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties on the constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System." Also, the questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the provisions allowing for their utilization – such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential Social Fund – are currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a result of the unconstitutional use of these public funds.

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(10) Ocampo vs Enriquez GR 225973, November 8, 2016 ISSUE: [1] Would respondents gravely abuse their discretion in allowing Marcos' burial in the LNMB? [2] Would Marcos' burial be violative of the 1987 Constitution, jurisprudence and the law? FACTS: President Duterte allowed the burial of President Marcos's remains in the Libingan ng Mga Bayani (LNMB). He ordered herein respondent's superior to prepare the burial. DECISION: Dismissed RATIO DECIDENDI: It is not. The Supreme Court found for the respondents. It is the President's discretion to allow who should be buried in the LNMB. In fact, even Congress may and can enact a law allowing anyone to be buried therein. Since the LNMB is under the authority of the AFP and the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP is the President, it is within the President's discretion to allow or disallow the burial of anyone in the LNMB. The Pantheon Law does not cover the LNMB. It is merely a national shrine converted into a memorial shrine. Hence, anyone buried therein would not be treated as a hero and would not be labeled as one who is worth emulating or who is an inspiration to the youth.

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(11) Imbong v. Ochoa, GR 204819, April 8, 2014 ISSUE: Whether or not the petition present an actual case or controversy even though the RH Law is not yet effective FACTS: On December 21, 2012, Congress enacted RH Law (RA 10354). RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the current laws on contraception, women’s health and population control. Petitioners assail its constitutionality because according to them, it violates the right to health of women and the sanctity of life, which the State is mandated to protect and promote. The proponents of the RH law, however, contend that the petitions do not present any actual case or controversy because the RH Law has yet to be implemented. They claim that the questions raised by the petitions are not yet concrete and ripe for adjudication since no one has been charged with violating any of its provisions and that there is no showing that any of the petitioners' rights has been adversely affected by its operation. DECISION: RATIO DECIDENDI: The petition present an actual case or controversy even though RH Law is not yet effective. An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination. The fact of the law or act in question being not yet effective does not negate ripeness. Concrete acts under a law are not necessary to render the controversy ripe. Even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty. Here, an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been ed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. When an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute. Hence, the court shall take cognizance of the case.

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(12) Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, GR 148560 (2001) ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7080 is unconstitutional for being vague FACTS: Petitioner Joseph Estrada was prosecuted under RA 7080 (Plunder Law). He assailed, however, that the Plunder Law does not constitute an indictable offense because of its failure to provide for the statutory definition of the "combination" and "series" in the key phrase "a combination or series of overt or criminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word "pattern" in Sec. 4. These omissions, according to Estrada, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence, violative of his fundamental right to due process. DECISION: RATIO DECIDENDI: Tha Plunder Law is not unconstitutional for being vague. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law. The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law. The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines apply only to free speech cases, but not to penal statutes.

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(13) Imbong v. Ochoa, GR 204819, April 8, 2014 ISSUE: Whether or not the RH Law cannot be challenged “on its face” because it is not a speech regulating measure FACTS: On December 21, 2012, Congress enacted RH Law (RA 10354). RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the current laws on contraception, women’s health and population control. Petitioners assail its constitutionality because according to them, it violates the right to health of women and the sanctity of life, which the State is mandated to protect and promote. The proponents of the RH law, however, assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject petitions, contending that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech regulating measure. DECISION: RATIO DECIDENDI: While the Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues, it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights. The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of the petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed constitutional scrutiny.

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(14) Disini, Jr. v. The Secretary of Justice, Gr 203335, February 11, 2014 ISSUE: Whether or not aiding or abetting libel on the cyberspace is consitutional. FACTS: RA 10175 (Cybercrime Law) was enacted, which aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace. Petitioners filed petitions to declare several provisions of Cybercrime Law unconsitutional and void. One of the assailed provisions is Section 5, which punishes the aiding or abetting and attempt in the commission of Cybercrimes such as libel. Petitioners argue that such provision suffers from overbreadth, creating chilling and deterrent effect on protected expression. The OSG, however, contends that the current body of jurisprudence and laws on aiding and abetting sufficiently protects the freedom of expression of "netizens," the multitude that avail themselves of the services of the internet. He points out that existing laws and jurisprudence sufficiently delineate the meaning of "aiding or abetting" a crime as to protect the innocent. DECISION: RATIO DECIDENDI: When a penal statute encroaches upon the freedom of speech, a facial challenge grounded on the void-for-vagueness doctrine is acceptable. The inapplicability of the doctrine must be carefully delineated. A petitioner may for instance mount a "facial" challenge to the constitutionality of a statute even if he claims no violation of his own rights under the assailed statute where it involves free speech on grounds of overbreadth or vagueness of the statute. The rationale for this exception is to counter the "chilling effect" on protected speech that comes from statutes violating free speech. A person who does not know whether his speech constitutes a crime under an overbroad or vague law may simply restrain himself from speaking in order to avoid being charged of a crime. The overbroad or vague law thus chills him into silence. Here, the "aiding or abetting" constitute broad sweep that generates chilling effect on those who express themselves through cyberspace posts, comments, and other messages. Hence, Section 5 of the cybercrime law that punishes "aiding or abetting" libel on the cyberspace is a nullity.

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(15) Gonzales III v. Office of the President ISSUE: Whether or not a Deputy Ombudsman may be subjected to the istrative disciplinary jurisdiction of the President (concurrently with that of the Ombudsman) is a justiciable not a political question. FACTS: Rolando Mendoza (Mendoza) was dismissed in the PNP on of the extortion incident, which led him to hijack a tourist bus that resulted his death and several others on board. Said incident is on of Mendoza’s plea to the Office of the Ombudsman to reconsider his case. President Benigno Aquino III created an Incident Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC) to conduct an investigation relative to the incident of hostage-taking. Subsequently, IIRC charged and dismissed Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III (Gonzales), who handled Mendoza’s case. Gonzales argues that the Office of the President has no istrative disciplinary jurisdiction over a Deputy Ombudsman. DECISION: RATIO DECIDENDI: The issue of whether a Deputy Ombudsman may be subjected to the istrative disciplinary jurisdiction of the President (concurrently with that of the Ombudsman) is a justiciable not a political question. A justiciable question is one which is inherently susceptible of being decided on grounds recognized by law, as where the court finds that there are constitutionally-imposed limits on the exercise of the powers conferred on a political branch of the government. Here, in resolving the petitions, the Court does not inquire into the wisdom of the Congress’ choice to grant concurrent disciplinary authority to the President, but as to whether the statutory grant violates the Constitution.

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(16) Vinuya v. Romulo, GR 162230, April 28, 2010 ISSUE: Can the Supreme Court decide as to whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against Japan? FACTS: The petitioner Malaya Lolas is an organization established for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during World War II. Malaya Lolas filed a petition to compel the respondents to espouse their claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan before the International Court of Justice and other international tribunals. According to them, the general waiver of claims by the Philippine government in the peace treaty with Japan is void. DECISION: Dismissed. RATIO DECIDENDI: No. The question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question. Neither could petitioners herein assail the said determination by the Executive Department via the instant petition for certiorari.

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(17) Gonzales v. Narvasa, GR 140835 ISSUE: Whether or not the court can take cognizance of the case FACTS: On November 26, 1998, President Joseph Estrada created the Preparatory Commission on Consitutional Reform (PCCR) by virtue of Executive Order No. 43 to study and recommend proposed amendments and/or revisions to the 1987 Consitution, and the manner implementing the same. On November 9, 1999, Petitioner, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, assails the consitutionality of the creation of the PCCR. On December 20, 1999, the PCCR submitted its recommendations to the President, and was dissolved by the President on the same day. DECISION: Dismissed RATIO DECIDENDI: The case has become moot and academic. An action is considered "moot" when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved have become academic or dead. The PCCR submitted its recommendations to the President on December 20, 1999 and was dissolved by the President on the same day. It had likewise spent the funds allotted to it. Thus, the PCCR has ceased to exist, having lost its raison d’etre. Subsequent events have overtaken the petition and the Court has nothing left to resolve. The staleness of the issue before us is made more manifest by the impossibility of granting the relief prayed for by petitioner.

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(18) Lacson v. Perez, GR 147780 ISSUE: Whether or not the Petitions have been rendered moot and academic FACTS: On May 1, 2001, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (GMA) issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring a state of rebellion in the NCR. She likewise issued General Order No. 1 directing the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion in the NCR. Petitioners assail the declaration of a state of rebellion and the warrantless arrest allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as having no basis both in fact and in law. On May 6, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of the declaration of a state of rebellion in Metro Manila. DECISION: Dismissed. RATIO DECIDENDI: The Petitions have been rendered moot and academic when GMA lifted the declaration of a state of rebellion in Metro Manila.

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(19) Defunis v. Odegard ISSUE: Whether or not the petition is moot and academic FACTS: DeFunis was denied ission at the University of Washington Law School, a stateoperated institution. He sued a state education official, Odegaard, as well as the law school issions committee on the basis that it had violated the Equal Protection Clause because its policies and procedures had resulted in discrimination against him because of his race. He sought a mandatory injunction from the trial court that would compel Odegaard to grant him ission into the first-year law school class because his application had been unconstitutionally denied. He prevailed in the lower court and was itted to the law school, pending Odegaard's appeal. The state Supreme Court eventually ruled that the law school issions policy was constitutional.DeFunis received a writ of certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court, which stayed the judgment of the Washington Supreme Court until the U.S. Supreme Court had resolved the case. DeFunis was already in his third and final year of law school when the Court granted his petition. DECISION: RATIO DECIDENDI: Because petitioner will complete law school at the end of the term for which he has ed regardless of any decision, the case is moot. Mootness here does not depend upon a "voluntary cessation" of the school's issions practices, but upon the simple fact that petitioner is in his final term, and the school's fixed policy to permit him to complete the term. The case presents no question that is "capable of repetition, yet evading review," since petitioner will never again have to go through the school's issions process, and since it does not follow that the issue petitioner raises will in the future evade review merely because this case did not reach the Court until the eve of petitioner's graduation.

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(20) Interational Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia, GR 209271, December 8, 2015 ISSUE: Whether or not the case is moot and academic. FACTS: On September 24, 2010, a Memorandum of Undertaking was executed pursuant to collaborative research and development project on eggplants. The petitioners conducted field trials for "bioengineered eggplants," known as Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) eggplant (Bt talong). Bt talong contains the crystal toxin genes from the soil bacterium Bt, which produces the CrylAc protein that is toxic to target insect pests. The Cry1Ac protein is said to be highly specific to lepidopteran larvae such as the fruit and shoot borer, the most destructive insect pest to eggplants. Subsequently, respondents filed a Petition for Writ of Kalikasan alleging that the field trials violated their consitutional right to health and a balance ecology considering that BT talong is presumed harmful to human health and the environment DECISION: RATIO DECIDENDI: The case is not moot and academic. An action is considered “moot” when it presents a justiciable controversy becasue the issues involved have become academic or dead or when the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again between the parties. The case falls under the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception to the mootness principle. The human and environmental health hazards posed by the introduction of a genetically modified plant which is a very popular staple vegetable among Filipinos is an issue of paramount public interest.

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(21) David vs. Arroyo, GR 171396, May 03, 2006 [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez] ISSUE: Whether or not the petition is moot and academic. FACTS: On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency. President Arroyo by virtue of the powers vested upon her by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution commanded the Armed Forces of the Philippines to maintain peace and order throughout the Philippines, prevent and suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion. Comes petitioners Randolf S. David, et al, who was arrested without warrant on the basis of PP 1017 and was brought to Camp Karingal, Quezon City where he was finger printed, photographed and booked like a criminal suspect. He was also treated brusquely by policemen and was charged with violation of BP Blg. 880 and later on detained for 7 hours and was released thereafter due to insuffiecieny of evidence. The petition herein assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress; (2) it is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requireents for the imposition of Martial Law; and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of press, speech and of assembly. DECISION: The petition was PARTLY GRANTED. RATIO DECIDENDI: The case was partly granted since the court finds and so holds PP 1017 constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to prevent ot suppress lawless violence. The proclamation is sustained by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. However, PP 1017's extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied power (1) to issue decrees; (2) to direct AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless violenece as well as decrees promulgated by the President; (3) to imposed standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press are ultra vires and unconstitutional. The court also rules that under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the President, in the absence of legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public utility and private business afftected with public interest.

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(22) Belgica, et al vs. Exec. Sec. Ochoa, et al, GR No. 208566, November 19, 2013 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc] ISSUE: Whether or not the petition is moot and academic. FACTS: On September 3, 2013, petitioners Belgica et al filed an Urgent Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the immediate issuance of TRO and or writ of Preliminary injunction seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the GA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive's lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion. DECISION: The petition was PARTLY GRANTED. RATIO DECIDENDI: The case is not moot as the proposed reforms on the PDAF and the abolition thereof does not actually terminate the controversy on the matter. The President does not have constitutional authority to nullify or annul the legal existence of the PDAF. The “moot and academic principle” cannot stop the Court from deciding the case considering that: (a) petitioners allege grave violation of the constitution, (b) the constitutionality of the pork barrel system presents a situation of exceptional character and is a matter of paramount public interest, (c) there is a practical need for a definitive ruling on the system’s constitutionality to guide the bench, the bar and the public, and (d) the preparation and age of the national budget is an annual occurrence.

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(23) KMU Labor Center vs. Garcia, GR 115381, December 23, 1994 [Per J. Kapunan, First Division] ISSUE: Whether or not Kilusang Mayo Uno has legal standing to file a petition against LTFRB. FACTS: The Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center (KMU) assails the constitutionality and validity of a memorandum which, among others, authorize provincial bus and jeepney operators to increase or decrease the prescribed transportation fares without application therefore with the LTFRB, and without hearing and approval thereof by said agency. DECISION: The petition was GRANTED. RATIO DECIDENDI: Petitioner KMU has the standing to sue. The requirement of LOCUS STANDI inheres from the definition of judicial power. In the case at bench, petitioner, whose had suffered and continue to suffer grave and irreparable injury and damage from the implementation of the questioned memoranda, circulars and/or orders, has shown that it has a clear legal right that was violated and continues to be violated with the enforcement of the challenged memoranda, circulars and/or orders. KMU , who avail of the use of buses, trains and jeepneys everyday, are directly affected by the burdensome cost of arbitrary increase in enger fares. They are part of the millions of commuters who comprise the riding public. Certainly, their rights must be protected, not neglected nor ignored.

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(24) IBP vs. Zamora, GR 141284, August 15, 2000 [Per J. Kapunan, En Banc] ISSUE: Whether or not IBP has legal standing to assail constitutionality of calling the AFP to assist PNP to suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. FACTS: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, President Ejercito Estrada directed the Armed Forces of the Philippines Chief of Staff and Philippine National Police Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional. Solicitor General contend that petitioner has no legal standing to assail. DECISION: The petition was DISMISSED. RATIO DECIDENDI: IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from this declaration the IBP asserts no other basis in of its locus standi. While undoubtedly true it is not sufficient to merit standing. However, when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure. The Court relaxed the rules on standing and resolved the issue now.

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(25) Tanada vs. Tuvera, GR L-63915, April 24, 1985 [Per J. Escolin, En Banc] ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioners have legal standing. FACTS: Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and istrative orders. Respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition and that it is not required for a law to be published when the date of its effectivity are expressly mentioned in said laws. Petitioners then contended that the publication of said Presidential Issuances is a public right and that compelling the respondent to publish it is a public duty that does not need any other specific interest from the petitioner to be given due course. DECISION: The petition was GRANTED. RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes, the Court agrees with petitioners that although they are private citizens, the subject of the Petition is a public right and thus they, being citizens of this country, have the proper interest in seeing this case resolved.

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(26) Ople vs. Torres, GR 127685, July 23, 1998 [Per J. Puno, En Banc] ISSUE: Whether or not Senator Ople has standing to maintain suit. FACTS: istrative Order No 308, otherwise known as “Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System” was issued by President Fidel Ramos on 12 December 1996. Senator Blas Ople filed a petition to invalidate the said order for violating the right to privacy. He contends that the order must be invalidated on two constitutional grounds, (1) that it is a usurpation of the power to legislate; and (2) that it intrudes the citizen’s right to privacy. DECISION: The petition was GRANTED. RATIO DECIDENDI: Petitioner, Senator Ople is a distinguished member of the Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issue of istrative Order No 308 is a usurpation of legislative power. Ople’s concern that the Executive branch not to tres on the lawmaking domain of Congress is understandable. The blurring demarcation line between the power of legislature to make laws and the power of executive to execute laws will disturb their delicate balance and cannot be allowed.

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(27) Information Technology Foundation vs. ComElec, GR 159139 [Per J. Panganban, En Banc] ISSUE: Whether or not ITF has standing to file the case. FACTS: RA 8046 was ed on 07 June 1995 authorizing COMELEC to conduct nationwide computerized election system. Gloria Arroyo allocated php 2.5 billion fund for the automated election system on 24 January 2003. The bidding process commenced on the same month and out of the 57 bidders it was awarded to MPC and TIMC. Although DOST’s evaluation report states that the two obtained a number of failed marks in the technical evaluation. Five individuals and entities protested the matter to COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr. Abalos rejected the protest, hence the present petition. DECISION: The petition was GRANTED. RATIO DECIDENDI: The case at bar is a matter of public concern and imbued with public interest, it is of paramount public interest and transcendental importance. Taxpayers are allowed to sue when there is a claim of “illegal disbursement of public funds” or if public money is being “deflected to any improper use,” or when petitioner seek to restrain “wasting of public funds through the enforcement of an unconstitutional law.”

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(28) Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, GR 113375, May 5, 1994 [Per J. Davide, En Banc] ISSUE: Whether or not Kilosbayan has standing to maintain instant suit. FACTS: Pursuant to Section 1 of the charter of the PCSO (R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42) which grants it the authority to hold and conduct “charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities,” the PCSO decided to establish an on- line lottery system for the purpose of increasing its revenue base and diversifying its sources of funds. Sometime before March 1993, after learning that the PCSO was interested in operating an on-line lottery system, the Berjaya Group Berhad became interested to offer its services and resources to PCSO. Berjaya Group Berhad organized with some Filipino investors in March 1993 a Philippine corporation known as the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC), which “was intended to be the medium through which the technical and management services required for the project would be offered and delivered to PCSO.” KILOSBAYAN submit that the PCSO cannot validly enter into the assailed Contract of Lease with the PGMC because it is an arrangement wherein the PCSO would hold and conduct the on-line lottery system in “collaboration” or “association” with the PGMC, in violation of Section 1(B) of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42. respondents allege that the petitioners have no standing to maintain the instant suit, citing our resolution in Valmonte vs. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office. DECISION: The petition was GRANTED. RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes. Issue on the locus standi of the petitioners should, indeed, be resolved in their favor. A party’s standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of the issues raised. In the landmark Emergency Powers Cases, 29 this Court brushed aside this technicality because “the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure.

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(29) Ocampo, et al vs. iral Enriquez, GR 225973, November 08, 2016 [Per J. Peralta, En Banc] ISSUE: Whether petitioners have locus standi to file the instant petitions. FACTS: During the campaign period for the 2016 Presidential Election, then candidate Rodrigo R. Duterte publicly announced that he would allow the burial of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan Ng Mga Bayani (LNMB). He won the May 9, 2016 election, garnering 16,601,997 votes. At noon of June 30, 2016, he formally assumed his office at the Rizal Hall in the Malacañang Palace. August 7, 2016, public respondent Secretary of National Defense Delfin N. Lorenzana issued a Memorandum to the public respondent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), General Ricardo R. Visaya, regarding the interment of Marcos at the LNMB DECISION: The petition was GRANTED. RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes. Petitioners, who filed their respective petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, in their capacities as citizens, human rights violations victims, legislators, of the Bar and taxpayers, have no legal standing to file such petitions because they failed to show that they have suffered or will suffer direct and personal injury as a result of the interment of Marcos at the LNMB.

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(30) Arigo vs. Swift, et al, GR 206510, Septeber 16, 2014 [Per J. Villarama, En Banc] ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have legal standing. FACTS: The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the said vessel “to enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty.” On January 6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan. On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No one was injured in the incident, and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil. Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and postsalvaging operations of the USS Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology. DECISION: The petition was DENIED. RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes. Petitioners have legal standing Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” Specifically, it is “a party’s personal and substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result” of the act being challenged, and “calls for more than just a generalized grievance.” However, the rule on standing is a procedural matter which this Court has relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the subject matter of the controversy is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.

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(31) MIRASOL VS CA ISSUE: Whether or not the Trial Court has jurisdiction to declare a statute unconstitutional without notice to the Solicitor General where the parties have agreed to submit such issue for the resolution of the Trial Court. Whether PD 579 and subsequent issuance FACTS: The Mirasols are sugarland owners and planters.Philippine National Bank (PNB) financed the Mirasols' sugar production venture FROM 1973-1975 under a crop loan financing scheme. The Mirasols signed Credit Agreements, a Chattel Mortgage on Standing Crops, and a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of PNB. The Chattel Mortgage empowered PNB to negotiate and sell the latter'ssugar and to apply the proceeds to the payment of their obligations to it.President Marcos issued PD 579 in November, 1974 authorizing Philippine Exchange Co., Inc. (PHILEX) to purchase sugar allocated for export and authorized PNB to finance PHILEX's purchases. The decree directed that whatever profit PHILEX might realize was to be remitted to the government. Believing that the proceeds were more than enough to pay their obligations, petitioners asked PNB for an ing of the proceeds which it ignored. Petitioners continued to avail of other loans from PNB and to make unfunded withdrawals from their s with said bank. PNB asked petitioners to settle their due and demandable s. As a result, petitioners, conveyed to PNB real properties by way of dacion en pago still leaving an unpaid amount. PNB proceeded to extra judicially foreclose the mortgaged properties. PNB still had a deficiency claim. Petitioners continued to ask PNB to for the proceeds, insisting that said proceeds, if properly liquidated, could offset their outstanding obligations. PNB remained adamant in its stance that under P.D. No. 579, there was nothing to since under said law, all earnings from the export sales of sugar pertained to the National Government. On August 9, 1979, the Mirasols filed a suit for ing, specific performance, and damages against PNB. RATIO DECIDENDI: It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute, presidential decree, or executive order. The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all regional trial courts The purpose of the mandatory notice in Rule 64, Section 3 is to enable the Solicitor General to decide whether or not his intervention in the action assailing the validity of a law or treaty is necessary. To deny the Solicitor General such notice would be tantamount to depriving him of his day in court. We must stress that, contrary to petitioners' stand, the mandatory notice requirement is not limited to actions involving declaratory relief and similar remedies. The rule itself provides that such notice is required in "any action" and not just actions involving declaratory relief. Where there is no ambiguity in the words used in the rule, there is no room for construction. In all actions assailing the validity of a statute, treaty, presidential decree, order, or proclamation, notice to the Solicitor General is mandatory. Petitioners contend that P.D. No. 579 and its implementing issuances are void for violating the due process clause and the prohibition against the taking of private property without just compensation. Petitioners now ask this Court to exercise its power of judicial review. Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for the exercise of this power: First, there must be before the Court an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial review. Second, the question before the Court must be ripe for adjudication. Third, the person challenging the validity of the act must have standing to challenge. Fourth, the question of

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constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest opportunity, and lastly, the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case

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(32) SAYSON VS SINGSON ISSUE: WON the mandamus suit of the respondent (Singson) involving a money claim against the government, predicated on a contract is valid FACTS: "In January 1967, the Office of the District Engineer requisitioned various items of spare parts for the repair of a D-8 bulldozer which was signed by the District Engineer Fernandez, and the Requisitioning Officer (civil engineer), Manuel S. Lepatan. ... It was approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, Antonio V. Raquiza. It is noted in the approval of the said requisition that "This is an exception to the telegram dated Feb. 21, 1967 of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications." ... So, a canvass or public bidding was conducted on May 5, 1967. The committee on award accepted the bid of the Singkier Motor Service for the sum of P43,530.00. ... Subsequently, it was approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications; and on May 16,1967 the Secretary sent a letterorder to the Singkier Motor Service, Mandaue, Cebu requesting it to immediately deliver the items listed therein for the lot price of P43,530.00. ...It would appear that a purchase order signed by the District Engineer, the Requisitioning Officer and the Procurement Officer, was addressed to the Singkier Motor Service. ... In due course the Voucher No. 07806 reached the hands of Highway Auditor Sayson for pre-audit. He then made inquiries about the reasonableness of the price. ... Thus, after finding from the indorsements of the Division Engineer and the Commissioner of Public Highways that the prices of the various spare parts are just and reasonable and that the requisition was also approved by no less than the Secretary of Public Works and Communications with the verification of V.M. Secarroa representative of the Bureau of Supply Coordination, Manila, he approved it for payment in the sum of P34,824.00, with the retention of 20% equivalent to P8,706.00 to submit the voucher with the ing papers to the Supervising Auditor, which he did. ... The voucher was paid on June 9, 1967 in the amount of P34,824.00 to Singson. On June 10,1967, Highway Auditor Sayson received a telegram from Supervising Auditor Fornier quoting a telegraphic message of the General Auditing Office which states: "In view of excessive prices charge for purchase of spare parts and equipment shown by vouchers already submitted this Office direct all highway auditors refer General Office payment similar nature for appropriate action." ... In the interim it would appear that when the voucher and the ing papers reached the GAO, a canvass was made of the spare parts among the suppliers in Manila, particularly, the USI(Phil.), which is the exclusive dealer of the spare parts of the caterpillar tractors in the Philippines. Said firm thus submitted its quotations at P2,529.64 only which is P40,000.00 less than the price of the Singkier. ... In view of the overpricing the GAO took up the matter with the Secretary of Public Works in a third indorsement of July 18, 1967. ... The Secretary then circularized a telegram holding the district engineer responsible for overpricing." What is more, charges for malversation were filed against the district engineer and the civil engineer involved. It was the failure of the Highways Auditor, one of the petitioners before us, that led to the filing of the mandamus suit below, with now respondent Singson as sole proprietor of Singkier Motor Service, being adjudged as entitled to collect the balance of P8,706.00, the contract in question having been upheld. Hence this appeal by certiorari DECISION: No RATIO DECIDENDI: the claim is void for the cause or consideration is contrary to law, morals or public policy, mandamus is not the remedy to enforce the collection of such claim

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against the State but an ordinary action for specific performance. the suit disguised as one for mandamus to compel the Auditors to approve the vouchers for payment, is a suit against the State, which cannot prosper or be entertained by the Court except with the consent of the State. In other words, the respondent should have filed his claim with the General Auditing Office, under the provisions of Com. Act 327 which prescribe the conditions under which money claim against the government may be filed: "In all cases involving the settlement of s or claims, other than those of able officers, the Auditor General shall act and decide the same within sixty days, exclusive of Sundays and holidays, after their presentation. If said s or claims need reference to other persons, office or offices, or to a party interested, the period aforesaid shall be counted from the time the last comment necessary to a proper decision is received by him." Thereafter, the procedure for appeal is indicated: "The party aggrieved by the final decision of the Auditor General in the settlement of an or claim may, within thirty days from receipt of the decision, take an appeal in writing: (a) To the President of the United States, pending the final and complete withdrawal of her sovereignty over the Philippines, or (b) To the President of the Philippines, or (c) To the Supreme Court of the Philippines if the appellant is a private person or entity. "Once consent is secured, an action may be filed. There is nothing to prevent the State, however, in such statutory grant, to require that certain istrative proceedings be had and be exhausted. Also, the proper forum in the judicial hierarchy can be specified if thereafter an appeal would be taken by the party aggrieved. Here, there was no ruling of the Auditor General. Even had there been such, the court to which the matter should have been elevated is this Tribunal; the lower court could not legally act on the matter.

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(33) REPUBLIC VS PURISIMA ISSUE: WON the respondent’s decision is valid FACTS: A motion to dismiss was filed on September 7, 1972 by defendant Rice and Corn istration in a pending civil suit in the sala of respondent Judge for the collection of a money claim arising from an alleged breach of contract, the plaintiff being private respondent Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc. At that time, the leading case of Mobil Philippines Exploration Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Service where Justice Bengzon stressed the lack of jurisdiction of a court to on the merits of a claim against any office or entity acting as part of the machinery of the national government unless consent be shown, had been applied in 53 other decisions. Respondent Judge Amante P. Purisima of the Court of First Instance of Manila denied the motion to dismiss dated October 4, 1972. Hence, the petition for certiorari and prohibition. DECISION: No RATIO DECIDENDI: The position of the Republic has been fortified with the explicit affirmation found in this provision of the present Constitution: "The State may not be sued without its consent. "The doctrine of non-suability recognized in this jurisdiction even prior to the effectivity of the [1935] Constitution is a logical corollary of the positivist concept of law which, to para-phrase Holmes, negates the assertion of any legal right as against the state, in itself the source of the law on which such a right may be predicated. Nor is this all, even if such a principle does give rise to problems, considering the vastly expanded role of government enabling it to engage in business pursuits to promote the general welfare, it is not obeisance to the analytical school of thought alone that calls for its continued applicability. Nor is injustice thereby cause private parties. They could still proceed to seek collection of their money claims by pursuing the statutory remedy of having the Auditor General upon them subject to appeal to judicial tribunals for final adjudication. We could thus correctly conclude as we did in the cited Providence Washington Insurance DECISION: "Thus the doctrine of non-suability of the government without its consent, as it has operated in practice, hardly lends itself to the charge that it could be the fruitful parent of injustice, considering the vast and ever-widening scope of state activities at present being undertaken. Whatever difficulties for private claimants may still exist,is, from an objective appraisal of all factors, minimal. In the balancing of interests, so unavoidable in the determination of what principles must prevail if government is to satisfy the public weal, the verdict must be, as it has been these so many years, for its continuing recognition as a fundamental postulate of constitutional law." [ Switzerland General Insurance Co., Ltd. v. Republic of the Philippines] ***The consent, to be effective, must come from the State acting through a duly enacted statute as pointed out byJustice Bengzon in Mobil. Thus, whatever counsel for defendant Rice and Corn istration agreed to had no binding force on the government

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(34) UP VS DIZON ISSUE: Was UP's funds validly garnished? FACTS: University of the Philippines (UP) entered into a General Construction Agreement with respondent Stern Builders Corporation (Stern Builders) for the construction and renovation of the buildings in the campus of the UP in Los Bas. UP was able to pay its first and second billing. However, the third billing worth P273,729.47 was not paid due to its disallowance by the Commission on Audit (COA). Thus, Stern Builders sued the UP to collect the unpaid balance. On November 28, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision ordering UP to pay Stern Builders. Then on January 16, 2002, the UP filed its motion for reconsideration. The RTC denied the motion. The denial of the said motion was served upon Atty. Felimon Nolasco (Atty.Nolasco) of the UPLB Legal Office on May 17, 2002. Notably, Atty. Nolasco was not the counsel of record of the UP but the OLS in Diliman, Quezon City. Thereafter, the UP filed a notice of appeal on June 3, 2002. However, the RTC denied due course to the notice of appeal for having been filed out of time. On October 4, 2002, upon motion of Stern Builders, the RTC issued the writ of execution. On appeal, both the CA and the High Court denied UPs petition. The denial became final and executory. Hence, Stern Builders filed in the RTC its motion for execution despite their previous motion having already been granted and despite the writ of execution having already issued. On June 11, 2003, the RTC granted another motion for execution filed on May 9, 2003 (although the RTC had already issued the writ of execution on October 4, 2002). Consequently, the sheriff served notices of garnishment to the UPs depositary banks and the RTC ordered the release of the funds. Aggrieved, UP elevated the matter to the CA. The CA sustained the RTC. Hence, this petition. DECISION: Granted RATIO DECIDENDI: UP's funds, being government funds, are not subject to garnishment. (Garnishment of public funds; suability vs. liability of the State) Despite its establishment as a body corporate, the UP remains to be a "chartered institution" performing a legitimate government function. Irrefragably, the UP is a government instrumentality, performing the States constitutional mandate of promoting quality and accessible education. As a government instrumentality, the UP isters special funds sourced from the fees and income enumerated under Act No. 1870 and Section 1 of Executive Order No. 714, and from the yearly appropriations, to achieve the purposes laid down by Section 2 of Act 1870, as expanded in Republic Act No. 9500. All the funds going into the possession of the UP, including any interest accruing from the deposit of such funds in any banking institution, constitute a "special trust fund," the disbursement of which should always be aligned with the UPs mission and purpose, and should always be subject to auditing by the COA. The funds of the UP are government funds that are public in character. They include the income accruing from the use of real property ceded to the UP that may be spent only for the attainment of its institutional objectives. A marked distinction exists between suability of the State and its liability. As the Court succinctly stated in Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme: A distinction should first be made between suability and liability. "Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to

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be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable. The Constitution strictly mandated that "no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." The execution of the monetary judgment against the UP was within the primary jurisdiction of the COA. It was of no moment that a final and executory decision already validated the claim against the UP.

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(35) RAYO VS CFI ISSUE: Whether respondent National Power Corporation performs a governmental function with respect to the management and operation of the Angat Dam; and Whether the power of respondent National Power Corporation to sue and be sued under its organic charter inclu FACTS: On October 26, 1978, typhoon “Kading” struck Bulacan. Due to this, the National Power Corporation (NPC), through its plant superintendent Benjamin Chavez, simultaneously opened 3 floodgates of Angat Dam.The opening of the floodgates caused several towns to be inundated (the town of Norzagaray was the most affected one). It resulted to a hundred deaths and damage to properties that were worth over a million pesos. Petitioners (victims) filed a complaint for damages against NPC, including plant superintendent Benjamin Chavez. Respondent filed counterclaims and put up a special and affirmative defense that “in the operation of the Angat Dam,” it is “performing a purely governmental function”, hence it “cannot be sued without the express consent of the State.”Petitioners oppose the defense, contending that the NPC is not performing governmental but merely proprietary functions and that under its own organic act, Section 3 (d) of Republic Act No. 6395, it can sue and be sued in any court. CFI dropped the NPC from the complaint and left Chavez as the sole party-defendant. DECISION: Upon a motion for reconsideration, the CFI ruled that petitioners’ reliance on Sec. 3 of RA 6395 is not tenable since the same refer to such matters that are only within the scope of the other corporate powers of said defendant and not matters of tort as in the instant cases. Being an agency performing a purely governmental function in the operation of the Angat Dam, said defendant was not given any right to commit wrongs upon individuals. To sue said defendant for tort may require the express consent of the State. PETITION DISMISSED. RATIO DECIDENDI: SC reversed the CFI decision and GRANTED petitioners to reinstate their complaint against the NPC.It is sufficient to say that the government has organized a private corporation, put money in it and has allowed it to sue and be sued in any court under its charter. (R.A. No. 6395). As a government owned and controlled corporation, it has a personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the Government. Moreover, the charter provision that the NPC can “sue and be sued in any court” is without qualification on the cause of action and accordingly it can include a tort claim such as the one instituted by the petitioners.

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(36) FAROLAN VS CTA ISSUE: Whether or not the Collector of Customs may be held liable for the 43,050 yardsactually lost by the private respondent. FACTS: S/S Pacific Hawk vessel with Registry No. 170 arrived on January 30, 1972 at the Port of Manila carrying among others, 80 bales of screen net consigned to Bagong Buhay Trading (Bagong Buhay). The import was classified under Tariff Heading no. 39.06-B of theTariff and Customs Code at 35% ad valorem. Bagong Buhay paid the duties and taxes due in the amount of P11,350.00. The Office of the Collector of Customs ordered a re-examination of the shipment upon hearing the information that the shipment consisted of mosquito net made of nylon under Tariff Heading No. 62.02 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Upon re-examination, it turns out that the shipment was undervalued in quantity and value as previously declared. Thus the Collector of Customs forfeited the shipment in favor of the government. Private respondent filed a petition on August 20, 1976 for the release of the questioned goods which the Court denied. On June 2,1986, 64 bales out of the 80 bales were released to Bagong Buhay after several motion. The sixteen remaining bales were missing. The respondent claims that of the 143,454 yards released, only 116,950 yards were in good condition and the rest were in bad condition. Thus, respondents demand that the Bureau of Customs be ordered to pay for damages for the 43,050 yards it actually lost. DECISION: RATIO DECIDENDI: Bureau of Customs cannot be held liable for actual damages that the private respondent sustained with regard to its goods. Otherwise, to permit private respondent's claim to prosper would violate the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Since it demands that the Commissioner of Customs be ordered to pay for actual damages it sustained, for which ultimately liability will fall on the government, it is obvious that this case has been converted technically into a suit against the state. On this point, the political doctrine that “state may not be sued without its consent,” categorically applies. As an unincorporated government agency without any separate judicial personality of its own, the Bureau of Customs enjoys immunity from suit. Along with the Bureau of Internal Revenue, it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty, namely taxation. As an agency, the Bureau of Customs performs the governmental function of collecting revenues which is defined not a proprietary function. Thus private respondents claim for damages against the Commissioner of Customs must fails.

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(37) REPUBLIC VS SANDIGANBAYAN ISSUE: WON the Republic can invoke state immunity. FACTS: The PCGG issued writs placing under sequestration all business enterprises, entities and other properties, real and personal, owned or ed in the name of private respondent Benedicto, or of corporations in which he appeared to have controlling or majority interest due to his involvement incases of ill-gotten wealth. Among the properties thus sequestered and taken over by PCGG fiscal agents were the 227 shares in NOGCCI owned by and ed under the name of private respondent. As sequester of the 227 shares formerly owned by Benedicto, PCGG did not pay the monthly hip fee. Later on, the shares were declared to be delinquent to be put into an auction sale. Despite filing a writ of injunction, it was nevertheless dismissed. So petitioner Republic and private respondent Benedicto entered into a Compromise Agreement which contains a general release clause where petitioner agreed and bound itself to lift the sequestration on the227 NOGCCI shares acknowledging that it was within private respondent’s capacity to acquire the same shares out of his income from business and the exercise of his profession. Implied in this undertaking is the recognition by petitioner that the subject shares of stock could not have been ill-gotten Benedicto filed a Motion for Release from Sequestration and Return of Sequestered Shares/Dividends praying, inter alia, that his NOGCCI shares of stock be specifically released from sequestration and returned, delivered or paid to him as part of the parties’ Compromise Agreement in that case. It was granted but the shares were ordered to be put under the custody of the Clerk of Court. Along with this, PCGG was ordered to deliver the shares to the Clerk of Court which it failed to comply with without any justifiable grounds. In a last-ditch attempt to escape liability, petitioner Republic, through the PCGG, invokes state immunity from suit. DECISION: No RATIO DECIDENDI: In fact, by entering into a Compromise Agreement with private respondent Benedicto, petitioner Republic thereby stripped itself of its immunity from suit and placed itself in the same level of its adversary. When the State enters into contract, through its officers or agents, in furtherance of a legitimate aim and purpose and pursuant to constitutional legislative authority, whereby mutual or reciprocal benefits accrue and rights and obligations arise therefrom, the State may be sued even without its express consent, precisely because by entering into a contract the sovereign descends to the level of the citizen. Its consent to be sued is implied from the very act of entering into such contract, breach of which on its part gives the corresponding right to the other party to the agreement.

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(38) SANTIAGO VS REPUBLIC ISSUE: Whether or not the state can be sued without its consent. FACTS: On August 9, 1976, Ildefonso Santiago through his counsel filed an action for revocation of a Deed of Donation executed by him and his spouse in January of 1971, with the Bureau of Plant Industry as the Donee, in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City. Mr. Santiago alleged that the Bureau, contrary to the of donation, failed to install lighting facilities and water system on the property and to build an office building and parking lot thereon which should have been constructed and ready for occupancy on before December7, 1974. That because of the circumstances, Mr. Santiago concluded that he was exempt from compliance with an explicit constitutional command, as invoked in the Santos v Santos case, a 1952 decision which is similar. The Court of First Instance dismissed the action in favor of the respondent on the ground that the state cannot be sued without its consent, and Santos v Santos case is discernible. The Solicitor General, Estelito P. Mendoza affirmed the dismissal on ground of constitutional mandate. Ildefonso Santiago filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court. DECISION: RATIO DECIDENDI: The Supreme Court rules, that the constitutional provision shows a waiver. Where there is consent, a suit may be filed. Consent need not to be express. It can be implied. In this case it must be emphasized, goes no further than a rule that a donor, with the Republic or any of its agency being a Donee, is entitle to go to court in case of an alleged breach of the conditions of such donation. The writ of Certiorari prayed is granted and the order of dismissal of October 20, 1977 is nullified, set aside and declare to be without force and effect. The Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City, Branch II, is hereby directed to proceed with this case, observing the procedure set forth in the rules of court. No cost.

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(39) DOTC VS SPS. ABECINA ISSUE: Whether or not DOTC may properly invoke state immunity FACTS: In February 1993, the DOTC awarded Digitel Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (Digitel) a contract for the management, operation, maintenance, and development of a Regional Telecommunications Development Project (RTDP) under the National Telephone Program, Phase I, Tranche 1 (NTPI-1). Later on, the municipality of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, donated a one thousand two hundred (1,200)square-meter parcel of land to the DOTC for the implementation of the RDTP in the municipality. However, the municipality erroneously included portions of the respondents' property in the donation. Pursuant to the FLAs, Digitel constructed a telephone exchange on the property which encroached on the properties of the respondent spouses. It argues that while the DOTC, in good faith and in the performance of its mandate, took private property without formal expropriation proceedings, the taking was nevertheless an exercise of eminent domain. The Department prays that instead of allowing recovery of the property, the case should be remanded to the RTC for determination of just compensation. DECISION: NOT A VALID EXERCISE OF EMINENTDOMAIN BECAUSE NO EXPROPRIATIONPROCEEDINGS WERE HELD. RATIO DECIDENDI: It is unthinkable then that precisely because there was a failure to abide by what the law requires, the government would stand to benefit. It is just as important, if not more so, that there be fidelity to legal norms on the part of officialdom if the rule of law were to be maintained. It is not too much to say that when the government takes any property for public use, which is conditioned upon the payment of just compensation, tobe judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to the jurisdiction of a court. There is no thought then that the doctrine of immunity from suit could still be appropriately invoked.

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(40) AMIGABLE VS CUENCA ISSUE: W/N the appellant may properly sue the government. FACTS: Victoria Amigable is the is the ed owner of a lot which, without prior expropriation proceedings or negotiated sale, was used by the government. Amigable's counsel wrote the President of the Philippines requesting payment of the portion of her lot which had been expropriated by the government. Amigable later filed a case against Cuenca, the Commissioner of Public Highways, for recovery of ownership and possession of the said lot. She also sought payment for compensatory damages, moral damages and attorney's fees. The defendant said that the case was premature, barred by prescription, and the government did not give its consent to be sued. DECISION: Where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit. The doctrine of immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen. The only relief available is for the government to make due compensation which it could and should have done years ago. To determine just compensation of the land, the basis should be the price or value at the time of the taking. RATIO DECIDENDI:

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(41) EPG CONSTRUCTION VS VIGILAR ISSUE: Whether or not the Principle of State Immunity is applicable in the case at bar. FACTS: (1983) The herein petitioners-contractors, under contracts with DPWH,constructed 145 housing units but coverage of construction and funding under the saidcontracts was only for 2/3 of each housing unit. Through the verbal request andassurance of then DPWH Undersecretary Canlas, they undertook additional constructionsfor the completion of the project, but said additional constructions were not issued payment by DPWH.With a favorable recommendation from the DPWH Asst. Secretary for LegalAffairs, the petitioners sent a demend letter to the DPWH Secretary. The DPWH Auditor did not object to the payment subject to whatever action COA may adopt.(1992) Through the request of then DPWH Secretary De Jesus, the DBM releasedthe amount for payment but (1996) respondent DPWH Secreatry Vigilar denied themoney claims prompting petitioners to file a petition for mandamus before the RTCwhich said trial court denied. Hence, this petition.Among others, respondent-secretary argues that the state may not be suedinvoking the constitutional doctrine of Non-suability of the State also known as the RoyalPrerogative of Dishonesty DECISION: Petition Granted RATIO DECIDENDI: The respondent may not conveniently hide under the State's cloak of invincibility against suit, considering that this principle yields to certain settled exceptions. The State's immunity cannot serve as an instrument perpetrating injustice

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(42) TORIO v. FONTANILLA ISSUE: Whether or not the Municipality of Malasiqui may be held liable. FACTS: On October 21, 1978, the municipal council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan ed 2 resolutions: one for management of the town fiesta celebration and the other for the creation of the Malasiqui Town Fiesta Executive Committee. The Executive Committee, in turn, organized a sub-committee on entertainment and stage with Jose Macaraeg as Chairman. The council appropriated the amount of P100.00 for the construction of 2 stages, one for the "zarzuela" and another for the cancionan. While the zarzuela was being held, the stage collapsed. Vicente Fontanilla was pinned underneath and died in the afternoon of the following day. Fontanilla’s heirs filed a complaint for damages with the CFI of Manila. The defendants were the municipality, the municipal council and the municipal council . In its Answer, defendant municipality argued that as a legally and duly organized public corporation it performs sovereign functions and the holding of a town fiesta was an exercise of its governmental functions from which no liability can arise to answer for the negligence of any of its agents. DECISION: Yes. The Municipality of Malasiqui was held liable. RATIO DECIDENDI: Under the doctrine of respondent superior, petitioner-municipality is liable for damages for the death of Vicente Fontanilla because the accident was attributable to the negligence of the municipality's officers, employees, or agents.

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(43) ARIGO v. SWIFT G.R. No. 206510 ISSUE: Whether or not immunity from suits can be invoked within territorial waters. FACTS: The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the said vessel “to enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty.” On January 6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan. On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles eastsoutheast of Palawan. No cine was injured in the incident, and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil. DECISION: Yes. Immunity from suits can be invoked within territorial waters, except from the exceptions set by UNCLOS. RATIO DECIDENDI: Warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in cases where they fail to comply with the rules and regulations of the coastal State regarding age through the latter’s internal waters and the territorial sea.

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(44) Holy See vs. Rosario G.R. 101949 (1994) ISSUE: Whether the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its business relations regarding selling a lot to a private entity. FACTS: Petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land. Lot 5-A, ed under the name Holy See, was contiguous to Lot 5-B and 5-D under the name of Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC). The land was donated by the Archdiocese of Manila to the Papal Nuncio, which represents the Holy See, who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City, Rome, Italy, for his residence. Said lots were sold through an agent to Ramon Licup who assigned his rights to respondents Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc. When the squatters refuse to vacate the lots, a dispute arose between the two parties because both were unsure whose responsibility was it to evict the squatters from said lots. Respondent Starbright Sales Enterprises Inc. insists that Holy See should clear the property while Holy See says that respondent corporation should do it or the earnest money will be returned. With this, Msgr. Cirilios, the agent, subsequently returned the P100,000 earnest money. The same lots were then sold to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation. Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc. filed a suit for annulment of the sale, specific performance and damages against Msgr. Cirilios, PRC as well as Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation. The Holy See and Msgr. Cirilos moved to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit DECISION: Petiton granted. RATIO DECIDENDI: The Holy See is immune from suit because the act of selling the lot of concern is non-propriety in nature. The lot was acquired through a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila, not for a commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio thereof. The transfer of the property and its subsequent disposal are likewise clothed with a governmental (non-proprietal) character as petitioner sold the lot not for profit or gain rather because it merely cannot evict the squatters living in said property.

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(45) USA vs Ruiz G.R. No. L-35645 ISSUE: Whether the United States Naval Base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions to be able to invoke state immunity. FACTS: The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States. Sometime in May, 1972, the United States invited the submission of bids for a couple of repair projects. Eligio de Guzman land Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. Subsequent thereto, the company received from the US two telegrams requesting it to confirm its price proposals and for the name of its bonding company. The company construed this as an acceptance of its offer so they complied with the requests. The company received a letter which was signed by William I. Collins of Department of the Navy of the United States, also one of the petitioners herein informing that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating in repairs, and that the projects were awarded to third parties. For this reason, a suit for specific performance was filed by him against the US. DECISION: Yes. The Supreme Court held that the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions RATIO DECIDENDI: The Supreme Court held that the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order, they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

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(46) MINUCHER VS. COURT OF APPEALS ISSUE: Whether the Doctrine of State Immunity from suit is applicable herein. FACTS: Violation of the “Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,” was filed against Minucher following a “buy-bust operation” conducted by Philippine police narcotic agents accompanied by Scalzo in the house of Minucher, an Iranian national, where heroin was said to have been seized. Minucher was later acquitted by the court. Minucher later on filed for damages due to trumpedup charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo. Scalzo on his counterclaims that he had acted in the discharge of his official duties as being merely an agent of the Drug Enforcement istration of the United States Department of Justice. Scalzo subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that, being a special agent of the United States Drug Enforcement istration, he was entitled to diplomatic immunity. DECISION: Case was dismissed. RATIO DECIDENDI: A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit as long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state.

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(47) REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA VS VINZON ISSUE: Whether or not the Republic of Indonesia can invoke the doctrine of sovereign immunity from suit. FACTS: Petitioner, Republic of Indonesia, represented by its Counsellor, Siti Partinah, entered into a Maintenance Agreement with respondent James Vinzon, sole proprietor of Vinzon Trade and Services. The equipment covered by the Maintenance Agreement are air conditioning units and was to take effect in a period of four years. When Indonesian Minister Counsellor Kasim assumed the position of Chief of istration, he allegedly found respondent’s work and services unsatisfactory and not in compliance with the standards set in the Maintenance Agreement. Hence, the Indonesian Embassy terminated the agreement. The respondent claims that the aforesaid termination was arbitrary and unlawful. Hence, he filed a complaint against the petitioners which opposed by invoking immunity from suit. DECISION: Yes. The Republic of Indonesia can invoke the doctrine of sovereign immunity from suit. RATIO DECIDENDI: The Republic of Indonesia is acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity when it entered into a contract with the respondent. The maintenance agreement was entered into by the Republic of Indonesia in the discharge of its governmental functions.

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(48) DFA v. NLRC G.R. No. 113191 ISSUE: Whether the ADB is correct in invoking its immunity from suit. FACTS: On January 27, 1993, private respondent initiated NLRC-NCR Case for his alleged illegal dismissal by Asian Development Bank and the latter's violation of the "labor-only" contracting law. Two summonses were served, one to the ADB and the other through the DFA. Forthwith, the ADB and the DFA notified respondent Labor Arbiter that the ADB, as well as its President and Office, were covered by an immunity from legal processes except for borrowing, guaranties or the sale of securities pursuant to the Agreement Establishing the Asian Development Bank (the "Charter") and the Agreement Between the Bank and the Government of the Philippines regarding the Banker's Headquarters (the "Headquarters Agreement). The Labor Arbiter took cognizance of the complaint on the impression that the ADB had waived its diplomatic immunity from suit. The ADB did not appeal the decision. Instead, the DFA referred the matter to the NLRC; in its referral, the DFA sought a "formal vacation of the void jugdgment". DECISION: Yes. The stipulations of both the Charter and the Headquarter's Agreement establish that, except in the specified cases of borrowing and guarantee operations, as well as the purchase, sale and underwriting of securities, the ADB enjoys immunity from legal process of every form RATIO DECIDENDI: The Bank's officers, on their part, enjoy immunity in respect of all acts performed by them in their official capacity. The granting of these immunities and privileges are treaty covenants ans commitments voluntarily assumed by the Philippine Government. Being an international organization that has been extended diplomatic status, the ADB is independent of the municipal law.

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(49) ATCI v. Echin 632 SCRA 528 (2010) ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners be held liable considering that the contract specifically stipulates that respondent‘s employment shall be governed by the Civil Service Law and Regulations of Kuwait. FACTS: Respondent Echin was hired by petitioner ATCI in behalf of its principal co-petitioner, Ministry of PublicHealth of Kuwait, for the position of medical technologist under a two-year contract with a monthlysalary of US$1,200.00. Within a year, Respondent was terminated for not ing the probationaryperiod which was under the Memorandum of Agreement. Ministry denied respondent‘s request and she returned to the Philippines shouldering her own fair. Respondent filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a complaint against ATCI forillegal dismissal. Labor Arbiter rendered judgment in favor of respondent and ordered ATCI to pay her$3,600.00, her salary for the three months unexpired portion of the contract. ATCI appealed Labor Arbiter‘s decision, however, NLRC affirmed the latter‘s decision and denied petitioner ATCI‘s motion for reconsideration. Petitioner appealed to the Court Appeals contending thattheir principal being a foreign government agency is immune from suit, and as such, immunity extendedto them. DECISION: Petition denied. RATIO DECIDENDI: According to RA 8042: The obligations covenanted in the recruitmentagreement entered into by and between the local agent and its foreign principal are not coterminouswith the term of such agreement so that if either or both of the parties decide to end the agreement,the responsibilities of such parties towards the contracted employees under the agreement do not at allend, but the same extends up to and until the expiration of the employment contracts of the employeesrecruited and employed pursuant to the said recruitment agreement. In international law, the party whowants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law.Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreignlaw is the same as ours. Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in determining the issues presented before us.

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(50) Animos vs. PVAO G.R. No. 79156 ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint against PVAO can be considered a suit against the state. FACTS: Isidro Animos is a World War II veteran, having been a member of the USAFFE and the guerilla forces thereafter. Originally, the case was a suit for mandamus by the petitioners against PVAO, for the payment of full pension benefits, retroactive to 1947, under Republic Act No. 65, as amended. However, the petitioner’s claim was denied on the basis that Animos’ disability was only considered partial, rather than total, according to the “Rules on Disability Ratings”, thus precluding the maximum payment of his pension benefits. The petitioner submits that the rating system adopted by PVAO is null and void. DECISION: No. The doctrine of immunity from the suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. RATIO DECIDENDI: When officers and agents of the government are sued in their individual capacity, the cloak of protection from the government is removed. According to the doctrine in Ruiz vs. Cabahug: “We hold that under the facts and circumstances alleged in the amended complaint, which should be taken on its face value, the suit is not one against the Government, or a claim against it, but one against the officials to compel them to act in accordance with the rights to be established by the contending architects, or to prevent them from making payment and recognition until the contending architects have established their respective rights and interests in the funds retained and in the credit for the work done”. Hence, the complaint cannot be considered a suit against the state because it is a well-settled principle of law that we may consider a public official liable in his personal private capacity for the damage caused by his acts when done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority and jurisdiction.

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(51) USA v. Reyes, GR No. 79233 (1993) ISSUE: Whether or not Bradford enjoys state immunity FACTS: Nelia T. Montoya, an American citizen employed as an identification checker at the U.S. Navy Exchange (NEX) at the t United States Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) headquarters in Quezon City, filed a complaint against Maxine Bradford, also an American citizen working as a manager at JUSMAG Headquarter’s activity exchange, for damages due to the oppressive and discriminatory acts committed by the latter in excess of her authority as store manager of the NEX JUSMAG. This was due to the incident on January 22, 1987 when Bradford searched Montoya’s body and belongings while the latter was already in the parking area after buying some items NEX JUSMAG’s retail store, where she had purchasing privileges. Bradford then invoked his non-suability on the ground of state immunity. DECISION: No, Bradford does not enjoy state immunity. RATIO DECIDENDI: The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent is expressly declared in the Constitution. It also applies to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of its duties. However, it is a different matter where the public official is made to in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. In other words, the doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. Here, Bradford acted beyond his authority when he searched Montoya in the parking lot, that is, outside of NEX JUSMAG. Hence, he may be sued in his private and personal capacity.

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(52) Shauf v. CA, 191 SCRA 713 (1990) ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents are immune from suit being officers of the US ArmedForces FACTS: Loida Shauf, a Filipino by origin, filed for damages and equal employment opportunity complaint against Don Detwiler and Anthony Persi, both officers of the Base Education Office at Clark Air Base. The former was allegedly rejected for a position of Guidance Counselor in the said institution because of her sex, color, and origin. The respondents defended that they are immune from suit for acts done made by them inperformance of their official governmental functions. DECISION: No, the respondents cannot rely on the US blanket of diplomatic immunity for all its acts orthe acts of its agents in the Philippines. RATIO DECIDENDI: The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent is expressly declared in the Constitution. It also applies to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of its duties. However, it is a different matter where the public official is made to in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. In other words, the doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. Here, the respondents were found guilty of discriminating against Shauf on of her sex, origin and color. Hence, the respondents may be sued in their private and personal capacity.

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(53) Nessia v. Fermin, 220 SCRA 615 (1993) ISSUE: Whether or not Fermin was acting within the scope of his authority. FACTS: Nessia was the Deputy Municipal Assesor of Victorias, Negros Occidental. He filed a complaint for recovery of damages and reimbursement of expenses against respondent Fermin and Municipality of Victorias. He alleged that respondent deliberately ignored and caused nonpayment of the vouchers because he defied the latter’s request to and vote in the local elections. On the other hand, Fermin countered that Nessia’s claims could not be approved because they exceeded budgetary appropriations. The Municipality, for its part, added that Nessia was also at fault since he did not give justification for drawing funds in excess of the budget. DECISION: No, he acted maliciously and intended to prejudice Nessia RATIO DECIDENDI: The Court held that while it is true that Fermin may not be compelled by mandamus to approve vouchers because they exceeded the budgetary appropriations, he may, nevertheless, be held liable for damages under Art. 27 for malicious inaction because he did not act on the vouchers. It is apparent that public officials are called upon to act expeditiously on matters pending before them. For only in acting thereon either by signifying approval or disapproval may the plaintiff continue on to the next step of the bureaucratic process. On the other hand, official inaction brings to a standstill the istrative process and the plaintiff is left in the darkness of uncertainty. In this regard, official "inaction" cannot be equated with "disapproval."

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(54) Caloocan City v. Allarde, GR No. 107721 (2003) ISSUE: Is Judge Allarde correct in ordering the garnishment of City funds to satisfy the judgment in favor of Santiago? FACTS: The City Mayor, through an ordinance, abolished the position of Assistant City and 17 other positions from the plantilla of the local government of Caloocan. Later, all dismissed employees were paid their back wages except respondent Santiago who was only partially paid. When the City Council of Caloocan enacted appropriation Ordinance No. 0134, Series of 1992 which included the amount of P439,377.14 claimed by Santiago, Judge Allarde issued an order for the City of Caloocan to deliver to the RTC a manager’s check for the satisfaction of the judgment. When the City Mayor refused to sign the check intended for Santiago’s payment, Judge Allarde ordered the Sheriff to garnish the funds of the City of Caloocan. The order was questioned by the City contending their public funds are beyond the reach of garnishment. DECISION: Yes, Judge Allarde's action were proper. RATIO DECIDENDI: The rule is and has always been that all government funds may not be subject to garnishment or levy, in the absence of a corresponding appropriation as required by law. However, the rule its a qualification, that is, when there is a corresponding appropriation as required by law. In other words, the rule on the immunity of public funds from seizure or garnishment does not apply where the funds sought to be levied under execution are already allocated by law specifically for the satisfaction of the money judgment against the government. In such a case, the monetary judgment may be legally enforced by judicial processes. Here, the amount was allocated for the back-pay obligation. Hence, The judgment of the trial court could then be validly enforced against such funds.

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(55) Pable Ocampo v. HRET, GR No. 158466 (2004) ISSUE: Whether or not the candidate who has the second highest vote should be declared as winner considering that the duly-elected representative is not eligible for the office. FACTS: Mario B. Crespo aka Mark Jimenez, a duly-elected congressman of the 6th district of Manila, was declared ineligible for the position in which he was elected for lack of residency in the district and was ordered to vacate his office. Ocampo then averred that since Crespo was declared as such, he should be declared the winner, having garnered the second highest number of votes. DECISION: No, it is not the proper procedure. RATIO DECIDENDI: The fact that the candidate who had the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or ineligible for office does not give rise to the right of the candidate who garnered the second highest vote to be declared winner. To do otherwise would be anathema to the most basic precepts of republicanism and democracy. Therefore, the only recourse to ascertain the new choice of the electorate is to hold another election.

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(56) Maquiling v. COMELEC, GR No. 195649 (2013) ISSUE: Is the rule on succession in the Local Government Code applicable? FACTS: Rommel Arnado is a natural bon Filipino citizen who lost his citizenship upon his naturalization as an American citizen. Subsequently, he renounced his American citizenship and ran as a Mayor of Lanao del Norte. After he was proclaimed the winner, the COMELEC anulled such proclamation and consequently directed that the order of succession under the Local Government Code be followed. Maquiling, another candidate for mayor, and who garnered the second highest number of votes in the election intervened the case, claims that he should be proclaimed as the winner. DECISION: No, it is not applicable. RATIO DECIDENDI: The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado's candidacy involves his citizenship. It does not involve the commission on election offenses as provided for in the Omnibus Election Code, the effect of which is to disqualify the individual from continuing as a candidate, or if he has already been elected, from holding the office. Arnado being a noncandidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as the qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. The old doctrine was that the vice mayor or the vice governor, as the case may be, shall succeed the disqualified winning candidate, not the candidate for the same position who had received the next highest vote.

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(57) Villavivencio v. Lukban, 39 Phil 778 (1919) ISSUE: Whether or not mayor of Manila had the power to deport the women without their knowledge. FACTS: In 1918, the mayor of Manila had 170 "women of ill repute" forcibly rounded up, put on a ship, and sent to Davao as laborers. A writ of habeas corpus was filed against him. The Supreme Court said that the women were not chattels but Filipino citizens who had the fundamental right not to be forced to change their place of residence. This case justifies one of the basic rights of citizen, the right of domain. Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief of Police, took custody of about 170 women at the night of October 25 beyond the latters consent and knowledge and thereafter were shipped to Mindanao specifically in Davao where they were signed as laborers. Said women are inmates of the houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia Street, in the district of Sampaloc. DECISION: No, he did not have such power. RATIO DECIDENDI: Lukban committed a grave abuse of discretion by deporting the prostitutes to a new domicile against their will. There is no law expressly authorizing his action. On the contrary, there is a law punishing public officials, not expressly authorized by law or regulation, who compels any person to change his residence Furthermore, the prostitutes are still, as citizens of the Philippines, entitled to the same rights, as stipulated in the Bill of Rights, as every other citizen.

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(58) Agustin v. Edu, 88 SCRA 195 (1979) ISSUE: Whether or not the assailed Letter of Instruction is invalid and violated constitutional guarantees of due process. FACTS: This is a petition questioning the validity of a Letter of Instruction providing for an early warning device mandatory for motor vehicles. It is assailed in this prohibition proceeding as being violative to the constitutional guarantee of due process in as far as the rules and regulations for its implementation are concerned. DECISION: No, the LOI is valid. RATIO DECIDENDI: The assailed Letter of Instruction was a valid exercise of police power and there was no unlawful delegation of legislative power on the part of the respondent. As identified, police power is a state authority to enact legislation that may interfere personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. In this case, the particular exercise of police power was clearly intended to promote public safety. In addition, the UN and the Vienna Convention, both ratified by the Philippine Government recommended the enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices. The Constitution provides that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. It is not for this country to repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its word.

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(59) Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil 115 (1957) ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles. FACTS: Lao Ichong, representing himself and other resident-aliens who are engagedin the retail industry in the Philippines petitioned the Supreme Court to declare RA1180 (An Act to Regulate the Retail Business) as unconstitutional. One of the provisions of the Act was the prohibition of persons, not Filipino citizens, and against associations, partnerships, or corporations not wholly-owned by citizens of the Philippines from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade. Petitioners said that the act denies them the equal protection of laws and deprives them of their liberty and property without due process. DECISION: Yes, a law may supersed a treaty or a generally accepted principle. RATIO DECIDENDI: In this case, the Supreme Court saw no conflict between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause “does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced”; and, that the equal protection clause “is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.”

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(60) Deutsche Bank AG Manila Branch v. CIR, 704 SCRA 216 (2013) ISSUE: Whether or not Deutsche Bank is no longer entitled to the treaty relief due to failure to comply with the application first with the BIR. FACTS: Deutsche Bank applied for a tax refund by virtue of the preferential rate of 10% BPRT provided by the RP- Tax Treaty as it had erroneously paid the regular 15% rate. When the matter was elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals, the tax refund was denied due to the failure of the taxpayer to file an application with the BIR prior to the availment of the preferential tax rate under the RP- Tax Treaty. DECISION: Deutsche bank is still entitled. RATIO DECIDENDI: The Court held that the BIR must not impose additional requirements that would negate the availment of the reliefs provided for under international agreements. Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that the failure to strictly comply with RMO 1-2000 will not deprive the taxpayer of the benefits provided under the RP- Tax Treaty for as long as it possesses all the requirements stated therein. It went on to state that at most, the application for a tax treaty relief from the BIR should merely operate to confirm the entitlement of the taxpayer to the relief under the RP- Tax Treaty.

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(61) IN RE GARCIA ISSUE: Whether or not a treaty may enable Garcia to practice law in the Philippines? FACTS: Arturo E. Garcia, a Filipino citizen, finished a law course in Spain and was thereafter allowed to practice law. He contends that he is entitled to practice law in the Philippines without submitting himself to the bar examinations under the Treaty of Academic Degree and the Exercise of Professions between the Philippines and Spain. DECISION: No. The treaty only applies to Filipino citizens desiring to practice their profession in Spain and Spanish citizens desiring to practice their profession in the Philippines. RATIO DECIDENDI: Since, Garcia is a Filipino citizen, he is therefore subject to the laws of his own country. The executive department may not encroach upon the constitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules for ission to the practice of law in the Philippines.

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(62) PEOPLE VS LAGMAN ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 60 of the Commonwealth Act 1 is constitutional? FACTS: In 1936, Tranquilino Lagman, a Filipino citizen whom have attained the age of 20, is being compelled by Section 60 of the Commonwealth Act 1, otherwise known as the “National Defense Law’ to and render the military service. Lagman refused to the military and argued the provision was unconstitutional. He also defended that reason he does not want to serve the military is because he has a father to , has no military leanings and he does not wish to kill or be killed. DECISION: Yes. Sec. 60 of Commonwealth Act 1 is constitutional. RATIO DECIDENDI: Because it is the duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through an army. Thus, the National Defense Law, may require its citizens to compulsory render military service. Sec. 4, Art. II of the Constitution states that “The prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal military or civil service.”

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(63) ESTRADA VS ESCRITOR ISSUE: Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement FACTS: Escritor is the Court Interpreter of RTC Branch 253 of Las Piñas City. Estrada requested an investigation of respondent for cohabiting with a man not her husband and having a child with the latter while she was still married.Estrada believes that Escritor is committing a grossly immoral act which tarnishes the image of the judiciary, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court condones her act. Escritor itted the above-mentioned allegations but denies any liability for the alleged gross immoral conduct for the reason that she is a member of the religious sect Jehovah’s Witness and Watch Tower Society and her conjugal arrangement is approved and is in conformity with her religious beliefs. DECISION: No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom of religion. RATIO DECIDENDI: The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our Constitution. the State has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner. Thus the State’s interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition. Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind.

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(64) REPUBLIC VS MANALO ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the Manila RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the t order? FACTS: Republic of the Philippines, represented in this case by the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), filed a complaint for civil forfeiture. In the said civil forfeiture cases, the Republic sought the forfeiture in its favor of certain deposits and government securities maintained in several bank s by the defendants therein, which were related to the unlawful activity of fraudulently accepting investments from the public, in violation of the Securities Regulation Code as well as the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001. In a Decision dated May 21, 2009, the CA granted respondents' petition, ruling that the Manila RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying respondents' separate motions for intervention. Feeling aggrieved, the Republic moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied by the CA. DECISION: No. The petition must be dismissed for having become moot and academic. A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or use. RATIO DECIDENDI: In such instance, there is no actual substantial relief which a petitioner would be entitled to, and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.In this case , the Manila RTC's rendition of the Decision dated September 23, 2010 as well as the Decision dated February 11, 2011 and the Amended Decision dated May 9, 2011 by virtue of which the assets subject of the said cases were all forfeited in favor of the government, are supervening events which have effectively rendered the essential issue in this case moot and academic, that is, whether or not respondents should have been allowed by the Manila RTC to intervene on the ground that they have a legal interest in the forfeited assets.

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(65) SALONGA VS CRUZ ISSUE: Whether or not Salongas alleged remarks are protected by thefreedom of speech. FACTS: Jovito Salonga was charged with the violation of the Revised Anti-Subversion Act after he was implicated, along with other 39 accused, byVictor Lovely in the series of bombings in Metro Manila. He was tagged by Lovely in his testimony as the leader of subversive organizations for two reasons 1) because his house was used as point; and because of his remarks during the party of RaulDaza in Los Angeles. Heallegedly opined about the likelihood of a violent struggle in the Philippinesif reforms are not instituted immediately by then President Marcos. DECISION: Yes the petitioners is a legitimate exercise of freedom of thought and expression. RATIO DECIDENDI: In PD 885, political discussion will only constitute prima facieevidence of hip in a subversive organization if such discussionamounts to conferring with officers or other of such association or organization in furtherance of any plan or enterprise thereof. In the case,there is noproof that such discussion was in furtherance of any plan tooverthrow the government through illegalmeans. Lovely also declared thathis bombing mission was not against the government, but directedagainst aparticular family. Such a statement negates any politically motivated or subversive assignment.

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(66) SERRANO DE AGBAYANI VS PNB ISSUE: WON the action prescribed? FACTS: In 1939, Agbayani borrowed P450 from PNB secured by a realty mortgage. In1944, the loan matured but PNB could not collect because it was at thistime of the war. In 1945, Pres.Osmena issued the Debt Moratorium Law (EO #32), suspending the payment of loans for four years due to the ravagesof war. In 1948, RA 342 extended the Debt Moratorium Law for another eight years (up to 1956). In 1953, however, the SC declared RA 342 as unconstitutional in the case of Rutter v Esteban. In 1959, PNB filed a suit for payment of the loan. DECISION: No. The action could still prosper. RATIO DECIDENDI: The period from 1945 when the law was promulgated, to 1953 when itwas declared unconstitutional should not be counted for the purpose ofprescription since the Debt Moratorium Law was operative during this time. Ineffect, only 7 years had elapsed (194445, 1953-59). Indeed, it would be unjust topunish the creditor who could not collect prior to 1953 because the DebtMoratorium Law was effective, only to be told later that his respect foranapparently valid law made him lose his right to collect. Art. 7 of the Civil Code which provides that, "When the courtsdeclare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be voidand the latter shall govern."

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(67) CIR VS SAN ROQUE POWER CORP ISSUE: WON San Roque is entitled to tax refund? FACTS: On October 11, 1997, San Roque entered into a Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) with the National Power Corporation (NPC) by building the San Roque Multi- Purpose Project in San Manuel, Pangasinan. The San Roque Multi-Purpose Project allegedly incurred, excess input VAT in the amount of P559,709,337.54 for taxable year 2001 which it declared in its Quarterly VAT Returns filed for the same year. San Roque duly filed with the BIR separate claims for refund, amounting to P559,709,337.54, representing unutilized input taxes as declared in its VAT returns for taxable year 2001. However, on March 28, 2003, San Roque filed amended Quarterly VAT Returns for the year2001 since it increased its unutilized input VAT To the amount of P560,200,283.14. SanRoque filed with the BIR on the same date, separate amended claims for refund in the aggregate amount of P560,200,283.14. On April 10, 2003, a mere 13 days after it filed its amended istrative claim with the CIR on March 28, 2003, San Roque filed a Petition for Review with the CTA. CIR alleged that the claim by San Roque was prematurely filed with the CTA. DECISION: No. SC granted the petition of CIR to deny the tax refund or credit claim of San Roque. RATIO DECIDENDI: San Roque is not entitled to a tax refund because it failed to comply with the mandatory and jurisdictional requirement of waiting 120 days before filing its judicial claim. On April 10, 2003, a mere 13 days after it filed its amended istrative claim with the CIR on March 28, 2003, San Roque filed a Petition for Review with the CTA, which showed that San Roque did not wait for the 120-day period to lapse before filing its judicial claim. Compliance with the 120-day waiting period is mandatory and jurisdictional, under RA8424 or the Tax Reform Act of 1997. Failure to comply renders the petition void. Article 5 of the Civil Code provides, "Acts executed against provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity." Section 112(D) of the 1997 Tax Code is clear, unequivocal, and categorical that the CIR has 120 days to act on an istrative claim. The taxpayer can file the judicial claim(1) Only within 30 days after the CIR partially or fully denies the claim within the 120-day period, or(2) only within 30 days from the expiration of the 120- day period if the CIR does not act within the 120-day period.

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(68) MARIA CAROLINA ARAULLO VS BENIGNO AQUINO III, JULY 1,2014 ISSUE: 1.Whether or not the DAP violates Sec. 29, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, which provides: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." 2. Whether or not the DAP, NBC No. 541, and all other execu FACTS: Senator Jinggoy Estrada, in his privileged speech, revealed that some senators had been allotted an additional PHP50 million each as incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of Chief Justice Corona. As a response, Department of Budget and Management Secretary Abad explained that the funds released had been part of the DAP, a program designed by the DBM to ramp up spending to accelerate economic expansion. The DAP is a stimulus package intended to fast track public spending and to push economic growth by investing on high-impact budgetary programs, activities, or projects to be funded from the savings generated during the year as well as from unprogrammed funds. Petitioners contend that the appropriations funded under the DAP, being an appropriation that set aside public funds for public use, should require an enabling law for its validity. Petitioners also question the constitutionality of such realignments and transfers pursuant to Section 25 (5) Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. DECISION: 1.No. The SC held that the DAP did not violate this constitutional provision. 2.Disbursement Acceleration Program, National Budget Circular No. 541 and related executive declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. RATIO DECIDENDI: 1.DAP was merely a program of the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government spending. As such, no additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury; otherwise, an appropriation law would have been signed. Funds already appropriated were merely realigned. 2. DAP being in violation of Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the doctrine of separation of powers, namely: (a) The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the implementing agencies, and the declaration of the withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations as savings prior to the end of the fiscal year and without complying with the statutory definition of savings contained in the General Appropriations Acts; (b) The cross-border transfers of the savings of the Executive to augment the appropriations of other offices outside the Executive; and (c) The funding of projects, activities and programs that were not covered by any appropriation in the General Appropriations Act.

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(69) MARIA CAROLINA ARAULLO VS BENIGNO AQUINO III, FEBRUARY 3, 2015 (ENBANC) ISSUE: Whether or not the DAP realignments or transfers are unconstitutional? FACTS: Section 24 and 26(2), Article VI, 1987 When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his istration noticed the sluggish growth of the economy. The World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio “Butch” Abad then came up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP). The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables the Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next year’s appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that if a certain government project is being undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as “savings” by the Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the economy as economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by the Supreme Court). DECISION: Yes. The Court held that for the transfer of appropriated funds to be valid RATIO DECIDENDI: Such transfer must be made upon the concurrence of the following requisites, namely: (1) there is a law authorizing the president, the Senate President, the Speaker of the HOR, the Chief Justice of the SC, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions to transfer such funds within their respective offices; (2) the funds to be transferred are savings, generated from the appropriations for their respective offices; and (3) the purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the General Appropriations Law for their respective offices. That law, generally, is the GAA of a given fiscal year. To comply with the first requisite, the GAAs should expressly authorize such transfers. Whereas the GAAs of 2011 and 2012 lacked valid provisions to authorize transfers of funds under the DAP, such transfers were unconstitutional. DAP also failed to comply with the second requisite since the DAP transfers are not savings contrary to what was being declared by the Executive. Under the definition of savings in the GAA, savings only occur, among other instances, when there is an excess in the funding of a certain project once it is completed, discontinued, or abandoned. The GAA does not refer to savings as funds withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory definition of savings was not complied with under the DAP, there is no basis for the transfers, further, savings should only be declared at the end of the fiscal year. However, under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the year and subsequently being declared as savings by the Executive through the DBM.

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(70) MAGALLONA VS ERMITA ISSUE: Whether or not Republic Act 9522 is unconstitutional for reducing the Philippine Maritime Territory? FACTS: Magallona, et. al., assailed the constitutionality of Republic Act 9522 which mandates the adjustment of the country’s archipelagic baselines and classifying the baseline regime of nearby territories. Historically, Republic Act No. 3046 is the ruling law which demarcates the maritime baselines of the Philippines, as an archipelago. Republic Act No. 3046 follows the framing of the Convention on Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of 1958, which codifies the sovereign rights of the states over their territorial sea. Republic Act No. 9522 aims to amend Republic Act No. 3046 by complying with the of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea III which took between 1973 and 1982. DECISION: No. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea III (UNCLOS III) has nothing to do with the acquisition or loss territory. RATIO DECIDENDI: It is a multilateral treaty regulating sea use rights over maritime zones. Baseline laws such as Republic Act 9522 are enacted pursuant to UNCLOS III and only serves to mark out specific basepoints from which baselines are drawn straight or curve, and to serve and to start as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of maritime zones and continental shelf.

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(71) Province of North Cotabato vs GRP Peace on Ancestral ISSUE: Whether or not Republic Act 9522 is unconstitutional for reducing the Philippine Maritime Territory? FACTS: The MOA on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement of Peace of 2001 is assailed on its constitutionality. This document prepared by the t efforts of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) Peace and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) Peace , was merely a codification of consensus points reached between both parties and the aspirations of the MILF to have a Bangsamoro homeland. DECISION: The MOA on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 is declared contrary to law and the Constitution. RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes. Since the MOA has not been signed, its provisions will not at all come into effect. The MOA will forever remain a draft that has never been finalized. It is now nothing more than a piece of paper, with no legal force or binding effect. It cannot be the source of, nor be capable of violating, any right. The instant Petitions, therefore, and all other oppositions to the MOA, have no more leg to stand on. They no longer present an actual case or a justiciable controversy for resolution by this Court.

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(72) Reagan v CIR , 30 SCRA 968 (1969) ISSUE: Whether or not a sale made on a foreign military base is excluded from tax FACTS: Petitioner questioned the payment of an income tax assessed on him by public respondent on an amount realized by him on a sale of his automobile to a member of the US Marine Corps, the transaction having taken place at the Clark Field Air Base. Petitioner contends that the base is outside Philippine territory and therefore beyond the jurisdictional power to tax. DECISION: The decision of the CTA asof May 12, 1966 denying the refund of P2,979.00 as the income tax paid by petitioner is affirmed. With costs against petitioner. RATIO DECIDENDI: No. The said foreign military bases is not a foreign soil or territory for purposes of income tax legislation. Philippine jurisdictional rights including the power to tax are preserved.

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(73) People vs Gozo 53 SCRA 476 ISSUE: Whether or not the State can exercise istrative jurisdiction within the naval base leased by the Philippines to the American armed forces. FACTS: Appellant seeks to set aside a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Zambales, convicting her of a violation of an ordinance of Olongapo, Zambales, requiring a permit from the municipal mayor for the construction or erection of a building, as well as any modification, alteration, repair or demolition thereof. She questions its validity on the pretext that her house was constructed within the naval base leased to the American armed forces. While yielding to the well-settled doctrine that it does not thereby cease to be Philippine territory, she in effect seek to emasculate the State's sovereign rights by the assertion that the latter cannot exercise therein istrative jurisdiction. DECISION: The appealed decision of November 11, 1969 is affirmed insofar as it found the accused, Loreta Gozo, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 14, RATIO DECIDENDI: The Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. Under the of the treaty, the United States Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine Government retains not only jurisdictional lights not granted, but also all such ceded rights as the United States Military authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of.

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(74) Lee vs. Director of Lands GR 128195 ISSUE: Whether or not the lot can revert back to the owner. FACTS: The sale of the land in question was consummated sometime in March 1936, during the effectivity of the1935 Constitution which prohibits aliens to acquire private agricultural lands, save in cases of hereditary succession.Thus, Lee Liong, a Chinese citizen, was disqualified to acquire the land in question. The former owners filed with theCourt of First Instance, Capiz an action against the heirs of Lee Liong for annulment of sale and recovery of land. DECISION: The Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 36274. In lieu thereof, the Court sets aside the order of reconstitution of title in Reconstitution Case No. R-1928, Regional Trial Court, Roxas City, and dismisses the petition, without prejudice. RATIO DECIDENDI: No. The land is now in the hands of Filipinos. If the land was invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is valid.

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(75) Republic vs Chule Lim GR 153883 ISSUE: Whether or not Lim complied with the legal requirement in electing her citizenship FACTS: Chule Y. Lim filed a petition for correction of entries under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte. She claimed that she was born on 29 October 1954 in Buru-an, Iligan City. Her birth was ed in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte but the Municipal Civil Registrar of Kauswagan transferred her record of birth to Iligan City. The Court finding the petition sufficient in form and substance ordered the publication of the hearing of the petition. DECISION: The instant petition for review is DENIED. Accordingly, the Civil Registrar of Iligan City is DIRECTED to make the following corrections in the birth record of respondent Chule Y. Lim, to wit: 1. Her family name from "YO" to "YU"; 2. Her father’s name from "YO DIU TO (CO TIAN)" to "YU DIOTO (CO TIAN)"; 3. Her status from "legitimate" to "illegitimate" by changing "YES" to "NO" in answer to the question "LEGITIMATE?"; and, 4. Her citizenship from "Chinese" to "Filipino". RATIO DECIDENDI: The Republic avers that respondent did not comply with the constitutional requirement of electing Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority. It cites Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, which provides that the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. Likewise, the Republic invokes the provision in Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625, that legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention “in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to ister oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines.”

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(76) Calilung vs Datumanong GR 160869 ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9225 is unconstitutional by recognizing and allowing dual allegiance FACTS: Petitioner prays for a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from implementing RA 9225, or Act Making the Citizenship of the Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, as Amended, and for Other Purposes. Petitioner avers that said Act is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution: "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law." DECISION: Dismissed RATIO DECIDENDI: What RA 9225 does is to allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship, by reason of naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. In its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance.

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(77) Republic vs Nora Sagun GR 187567 (2012) ISSUE: Has Norma complied with the procedural requirements in the election of Philippine citizenship? FACTS: Nora Fe Sagun is the legitimate child of Albert S. Chan, a Chinese national, and Marta Borromeo, a Filipino citizen. She was born on August 8, 1959 in Baguio City and did not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. In 1992, at the age of 33 and after getting married to Alex Sagun, she executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Said document was notarized but was not recorded and ed with the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City. DECISION: Petition Granted RATIO DECIDENDI: The respondent clearly failed to comply with the procedural requirements for a valid and effective election of Philippine citizenship. Respondent cannot assert that the exercise of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship since the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of citizenship by election. The mere exercise of suffrage, continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other similar acts showing exercise of Philippine citizenship cannot take the place of election of Philippine citizenship. Hence, respondent cannot now be allowed to seek the intervention of the court to confer upon her Philippine citizenship when clearly she has failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship.

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(78) In re Ching, Bar Matter 914 (1999) ISSUE: Whether or not Ching should be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath FACTS: Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964. Since his birth, Ching has resided in the Philippines. In 1998, Vicente Ching finished his law degree at the Saint Louis University in Baguio City. He eventually ed the bar but he was advised that he needs to show proof that he is a Filipino citizen before he be allowed to take his oath. Apparently, Ching’s father was a Chinese citizen but his mother was a Filipino citizen. His parents were married before he was born in 1963. Under the 1935 Constitution, a legitimate child, whose one parent is a foreigner, acquires the foreign citizenship of the foreign parent. Ching maintained that he has always considered himself as a Filipino; that he is a certified public ant – a profession reserved for Filipinos; that he even served as a councilor in a municipality in La Union. DECISION: The Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D. Ching's application for ission to the Philippine Bar. RATIO DECIDENDI: No. In the present case, Ching was already thirty-five (35) years old when he complied with the requirements of CA No. 625 or fourteen years after he had reached the age of majority. The age of majority commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21) years. The Supreme Court noted that the period is originally 3 years but it was extended to 7 years. (It seems it can’t be extended any further). Ching’s special circumstances can’t be considered. It is not enough that he considered all his life that he is a Filipino; that he is a professional and a public officer (was) serving this country. The rules for citizenship are in place. Further, Ching didn’t give any explanation why he belatedly chose to elect Filipino citizenship (but I guess it’s simply because he never thought he’s Chinese not until he applied to take the bar). The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Ching’s unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply glossed over.

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(79) Co v HRET 199 SCRA 692 ISSUE: Whether or Not Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born citizen of the Philippines FACTS: On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held. Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar. The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the following grounds: 1)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and 2)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar. DECISION: Dismissed RATIO DECIDENDI: The Court interprets Sec 1, Par 3 of Art 4 above as applying not only to those who elect Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that date. The provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was not, under earlier laws, conferred the status of a natural-born.

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(80) Bengson v HRET GR 142840 ISSUE: Whether or Not respondent Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines in view of the constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of Representative unless he is a natural-born citizen.” FACTS: Respondent Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country.” He was naturalized in US in 1990. On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection. DECISION: Dismissed RATIO DECIDENDI: Respondent is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and ing said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

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(81) So v Republic 513 SCRA 268 (2007) ISSUE: Whether or not Edison So did meet all the qualification needed to be a naturalized Filipino citizen FACTS: He was born on February 17, 1982, in Manila; he is a Chinese citizen who has lived in No. 528 Lavezares St., Binondo, Manila, since birth; as an employee, he derives an average annual income of around P100,000.00 with free board and lodging and other benefits; he is single, able to speak and write English, Chinese and Tagalog; he is exempt from the filing of Declaration of Intention to become a citizen of the Philippines pursuant to Section 6 of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 473. On March 22, 2002, the RTC issued an Order8 setting the petition for hearing at 8:30 a.m. of December 12 and 17, 2002 during which all persons concerned were ened to show cause, if any, why the petition should not be granted. The entire petition and its annexes, including the order, were ordered published once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and also in a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Manila. The RTC likewise ordered that copies of the petition and notice be posted in public and conspicuous places in the Manila City Hall Building.9 During the hearing, petitioner presented Atty. Adasa, Jr. who testified that he came to know petitioner in 1991 as the legal consultant and adviser of the So family’s business. He would usually attend parties and other social functions hosted by petitioner’s family. He knew petitioner to be obedient, hardworking, and possessed of good moral character, including all the qualifications mandated by law. Another witness for petitioner, Mark Salcedo, testified that he has known petitioner for ten (10) years; they first met at a birthday party in 1991. He and petitioner were classmates at the University of Santo Tomas (UST) where they took up Pharmacy. Petitioner was a member of some school organizations and mingled well with friends. The RTC granted the petition on June 4, 2003. DECISION: Denied RATIO DECIDENDI: Naturalization signifies the act of formally adopting a foreigner into the political body of a nation by clothing him or her with the privileges of a citizen.44 Under current and existing laws, there are three ways by which an alien may become a citizen by naturalization: (a) istrative naturalization pursuant to R.A. No. 9139; (b) judicial naturalization pursuant to C.A. No. 473, as amended; and (c) legislative naturalization in the form of a law enacted by Congress bestowing Philippine citizenship to an alien. First. C.A. No. 473 and R.A. No. 9139 are separate and distinct laws – the former covers all aliens regardless of class while the latter covers native-born aliens who lived here in the Philippines all their lives, who never saw any other country and all along thought that they were Filipinos; who have demonstrated love and loyalty to the Philippines and affinity to the customs and traditions.52 To reiterate, the intention of the legislature in enacting R.A. No. 9139 was to make the process of acquiring Philippine citizenship less tedious, less technical and more encouraging which is istrative rather than judicial in nature. Thus, although the legislature believes that there is a need to liberalize the naturalization law of the Philippines, there is nothing from which it can be inferred that C.A. No. 473 was intended to be amended or repealed by R.A. No. 9139. What the legislature had in mind was merely to prescribe another mode of acquiring Philippine citizenship which may be availed of by native born aliens. The only implication is that, a native born alien has the choice to apply for judicial or istrative naturalization, subject to the prescribed

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qualifications and disqualifications. In naturalization proceedings, it is the burden of the applicant to prove not only his own good moral character but also the good moral character of his/her witnesses, who must be credible persons.56 Within the purview of the naturalization law, a "credible person" is not only an individual who has not been previously convicted of a crime; who is not a police character and has no police record; who has not perjured in the past; or whose affidavit or testimony is not incredible. What must be credible is not the declaration made but the person making it. This implies that such person must have a good standing in the community; that he is known to be honest and upright; that he is reputed to be trustworthy and reliable; and that his word may be taken on its face value, as a good warranty of the applicant’s worthiness. e do not agree with petitioner’s argument that respondent is precluded from questioning the RTC decision because of its failure to oppose the petition. A naturalization proceeding is not a judicial adversary proceeding, and the decision rendered therein does not constitute res judicata. A certificate of naturalization may be cancelled if it is subsequently discovered that the applicant obtained it by misleading the court upon any material fact. Law and jurisprudence even authorize the cancellation of a certificate of naturalization upon grounds or conditions arising subsequent to the granting of the certificate.59 If the government can challenge a final grant of citizenship, with more reason can it appeal the decision of the RTC within the reglementary period despite its failure to oppose the petition before the lower court.

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(82) David vs. Agbay G.R. No. 199113 March 18, 2015 ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner may be indicted for falsification for representing himself as a Filipino in his Public Land Application despite his subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship under the provisions of R.A. 9225 FACTS: Petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon retirement, petitioner and his wife returned to the Philippines and purchased a lot along the beach in Oriental Mindoro where they constructed a residential house. However, the portion where they built their house is public land and part of the salvage zone. Petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application (MLA) over the subject land with the DENR. In the said application, petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino citizen. Private respondent Editha Agbay opposed the application on the ground that petitioner, a Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own land. She also filed a criminal complaint for falsification of public documents under Article 172 of the RPC against the petitioner. Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225. The CENRO rejected petitioner’s MLA, ruling that petitioner’s subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship did not cure the defect in his MLA which was void ab initio. An information for Falsification of Public Document was filed before the MTC and a warrant of arrest was issued against the petitioner. Since the crime for which petitioner was charged was alleged and itted to have been committed before he had reacquired his Philippine citizenship, the MTC concluded that petitioner was at that time still a Canadian citizen. Petitioner elevated the case to the RTC via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTC. The petition was denied. DECISION: Denied RATIO DECIDENDI: Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to the effectivity of R.A. 9225, he belongs to the first category of natural- born Filipinos under the first paragraph of Section 3 who lost Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. As the new law allows dual citizenship, he was able to re-acquire his Philippine citizenship by taking the required oath of allegiance. For the purpose of determining the citizenship of petitioner at the time of filing his MLA, it is not necessary to discuss the rulings in Frivaldo and Altarejos on the retroactivity of such reacquisition because R.A. 9225 itself treats those of his category as having already lost Philippine citizenship, in contradistinction to those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 came into force. In other words, Section 2 declaring the policy that considers Filipinos who became foreign citizens as not to have lost their Philippine citizenship, should be read together with Section 3, the second paragraph of which clarifies that such policy governs all cases after the new law’s effectivity. Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that he is a Filipino citizen at the time of the filing of said application, when in fact he was then still a Canadian citizen. Under CA 63, the governing law at the time he was naturalized as Canadian citizen, naturalization in a foreign country was among those ways by which a natural-born citizen loses his Philippine citizenship. While he re-acquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 six months later, the falsification was already a consummated act, the said law having no retroactive effect insofar as his dual citizenship status is concerned. The MTC therefore did not err in finding probable cause for falsification of public document under Article 172, paragraph 1.

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(83) Nicolas-Lewis, et al vs. Comelec GR 162759 August 4, 2006 ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners may participate in the election sans the compliance of the 1 year residency. FACTS: Petitioners were dual citizens by virtue of RA 9225. Petitioners sought to avail their right of suffrage under RA 9189 or the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003. Comelec, however, did not allow petitioners to vote in the 2004 election, reasoning the petitioners faield to comply with the requirement of 1-year residency prior the elections as provided for under Article 5, Sec 1 of the Constitution. DECISION: Granted RATIO DECIDENDI: The Court held that those who retained or reacquired their citizenship under RA 9225 may exercise their right to vote under the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, RA 9189. Article 5, Section 2 of the Constitution provides for the exception to the residency requirement in Section 1 of the same article. The voting mechanism in RA 9189 was practically set forth to provide a system wherein Filipinos of dual citizenship and are, at the same time, not residing in the Philippines are empowered to vote. The Court held that present day duals may now exercise their right of suffrage provided they meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution in relation to R.A. 9189

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(84) JOSE AZNAR vs COMELEC and Emilio Mario Renner Osmeña GR 83820 25 May 1990 ISSUE: Whether or not Osmeña remains a Filipino and loss of his Philippine Citizenship cannot be presumed. FACTS: On 19 November 1987, private respondent filed his certification of candidacy with the COMELEC for the position of Governor of Cebu. Petitioner filed with the COMELEC a petition for disqualification of Osmeña on the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen. In 27 January 1988, Petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation submitting a certificate issued by the then Immigration and Deportation Commission that Osmeña is an American Citizen. According to the evidence presented, Osmeña maintained that he is a Filipino Citizen, that he is a legitimate son of Emilio Osmeña, a Filipino and son of the Late President Sergio Osmeña Sr., that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine port and been continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and that he has been a ed voter in the Philippines. COMELEC dismissed the petition for Disqualification for not having been timingly filed and for lack of sufficient proof that private respondent is not s Filipino citizen and Osmeña was proclaim of winning candidates for obtaining the highest number of votes. DECISION: Granted RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes, Petitioner failed to present direct proof that Osmeña had lost his Filipino Citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63 these are : 1. By naturalization in foreign country; 2. By express renunciation of Citizenship; and 3. By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to the Constitution or Law of the foreign country. The evidence clearly shows that Osmeña did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of the three (3) mentioned hereinaboved or any other modes of losing Philippine citizenship. The 1987 Constitution, Article IV, Section 5 states “Dual allegiance of citizens is iniminical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law” has no retroactive effect.

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(85) Valles v COMELEC GR 137000, Aug. 9, 2000 ISSUE: Whether or not Rosalind is an Australian or a Filipino FACTS: Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Australia to a Filipino father and an Australian mother. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines, where she later married a Filipino and has since then participated in the electoral process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well. In the May 1998 elections, she ran for governor but Valles filed a petition for her disqualification as candidate on the ground that she is an Australian. DECISION: Granted RATIO DECIDENDI: The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth. Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born a year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect and at that time, what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the United States governed the country. These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of Aug. 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law. Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondents father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on Jan. 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte.... Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforo’s daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines. The g into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the principle of jus sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship, xxx So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood relationship, was subsequently retained under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.

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(86) MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S POE- LLAMANZARES vs. COMELEC,et al. GR 221697 , GR 221698-700 March 8,2016 ISSUE: (1) Whether or not Grace Poe- Llamanzares is a natural- born Filipino citizen (2) Whether or not Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement FACTS: In her COC for Presidency on the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and that her residence up to day before May 9, 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months counted from May 24, 2005. Grace Poe was born in 1968., found as newborn infant in Jaro,Iloilo and was legally adopted by RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (FPJ) and JESUS SONORA POE (SUSAN ROCES) in 1974. She immigrated to the US in 1991 after her marriage to Theodore Llamanzares who was then based at the US. Grace Poe then became a naturalized American citizen in 2001. On December 2004, he returned to the Philippines due to his father’s deteriorating medical condition, who then eventually demice on February 3,2005. She then quitted her job in the US to be with her grieving mother and finally went home for good to the Philippines on MAY 24, 2005. On JULY 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino citizenship under RA 9225. She ed as a voter and obtained a new Philippine port. In 2010, before assuming her post as appointes Chairperson of the MTRCB , she renounced her American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirements as to Reacquistion of Filipino Citizenship. From then on, she stopped using her American port. Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground particularly among others, that she cannot be considered a natural born Filipino citizen since she was a FOUNDLING and that her bioligical parents cannot be proved as Filipinos. The Comelec en banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground that she is in want of citizenship and residence requirements and that she committed misrepresentation in her COC. On CERTIORARI, the SUPREME COURT, reversed the ruling and held a vote of 9-6 that POE is qualified as candidate for Presidency. DECISION: Granted RATIO DECIDENDI: YES. GRACE POE is considerably a natural-born Filipino Citizen. For that, she satisfied the constitutional reqt that only natural-born Filipinos may run for Presidency. (1) there is high probability that Poe’s parents are Filipinos, as being shown in her physical features which are typical of Filipinos, aside from the fact that she was found as an infant in Jaro, Iloilo, a municipality wherein there is 99% probability that residents there are Filipinos, consequently providing 99% chance that Poe’s bilogical parents are Filipinos. Said probability and circumstancial evidence are issible under Rule 128, Sec 4 of the Rules on Evidence. (2) The SC pronounced that FOUNDLINGS are as a class, natural born- citizens as based on the deliberations of the 1935 Constitutional Convention, wherein though its enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language either to definitely exclude the foundlings to be natural born citizens. (3) That Foundlings are automatically conferred with the natural-born citizenship as to the country where they are being found, as covered and ed by the UN Convention Law. As to the residency issue, Grace Poe satisfied the 10-year residency because she satisfied the requirements of ANIMUS MANENDI (intent to remain permanently) coupled with ANIMUS NON REVERTENDI (intent of not returning to US) in acquiring a new domicile in the Philippines. Starting May 24,2005, upon returning to the Philippines, Grace Poe presented overwhelming evidence of her actual stay and intent to abandon permanently her domicile in the

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US, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Filipino Citizenship under RA 9225. Hence, her candidacy for Presidency was granted by the SC.

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(87) DEPT OF AGRICULTURE VS NLRC GR 104269 November 11, 1993 ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of the State applies in the case. FACTS: The case is regarding money claim against Department of Agriculture (DA) as filed and requested by National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Petitioner Department of Agriculture and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract for security services to be provided by the latter to the said governmental entity. Pursuant to their arrangements, guards were deployed by Sultan Security Agency in the various premises of the DA. Thereafter, several guards filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay, and overtime pay, as well as for damages against the DA and the security agency. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding the DA tly and severally liable with the security agency for the payment of money claims of the complainant security guards. The DA and the security agency did not appeal the decision. Thus, the decision became final and executory. The Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution to enforce and execute the judgment against the property of the DA and the security agency. Thereafter, the City Sheriff levied on execution the motor vehicles of the DA. The petitioner charges the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion for refusing to quash the writ of execution. The petitioner faults the NLRC for assuming jurisdiction over a money claim against the Department, which, it claims, falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. More importantly, the petitioner asserts, the NLRC has disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of the State. The private respondents, on the other hand, argue that the petitioner has impliedly waived its immunity from suit by concluding a service contract with Sultan Security Agency. DECISION: Denied RATIO DECIDENDI: No. The rule does not say that the State may not be sued under any circumstances. The State may at times be sued. The general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, where the Philippine government “consents and submits to be sued upon any money claims involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties.” n this case, The DA has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in character. But the claims of the complainant security guards clearly constitute money claims.

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(88) Philippine Agila Sattelite Inc. vs. Lichauco G.R. No. 142362, May 3, 2006 ISSUE: Is the suit one against the state? FACTS: Petitioner Philippine Agila Satellite Inc. is a duly organized corporation, whose President and Chief Executive Officer is co-petitioner Michael C.U. De Guzman. PASI was established by a consortium of private telecommunications carriers which in 1994 had entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the DOTC, through its then Secretary Jesus Garcia, concerning the planned launch of a Philippine-owned satellite into outer space. The Philippine government, through the DOTC, was tasked under the MOU to secure from the International Telecommunication Union the required orbital slots and frequency assignments for the Philippine satellite. The government, together with PASI, coordinated through the International Telecommunication Union two orbital slots, designated as 161º East Longitude and 153º East Longitude, for Philippine satellites. PASI wrote then DOTC Secretary Amado S. Lagdameo, Jr., seeking for official Philippine government confirmation on the assignment of the two aforementioned Philippine orbital slots to PASI for its satellites. Secretary Lagdameo, Jr. replied in a letter confirming “the Philippine Government’s assignment of Philippine orbital slots 161E and 153E to PASI for its satellites.” PASI averred that after having secured the confirmation from the Philippine government, it proceeded with preparations for the launching, operation and management of its satellites, including the availment of loans, the increase in its capital. However, respondent Lichauco, then DOTC Undersecretary for Communications, allegedly “embarked on a crusade to malign the name of Michael de Guzman and sabotage the business of PASI.” Aggrieved by Lichauco’s actions, PASI and De Guzman instituted a civil complaint against Lichauco, by then the Acting Secretary of the DOTC. The complaint, alleging three causes of action, was for injunction, declaration of nullity of award, and damages. The third cause of action, for damages, imputed several acts to Lichauco as part of her alleged “crusade” to malign the name of plaintiff De Guzman and sabotage the business of PASI. DECISION: Denied RATIO DECIDENDI: The hornbook rule is that a suit for acts done in the performance of official functions against an officer of the government by a private citizen that would result in a charge against or financial liability to the government must be regarded as a suit against the State itself, although the latter has not been formally impleaded. However, government immunity from suit will not shield the public official being sued if the government no longer has an interest to protect in the outcome of a suit; or if the liability of the officer is personal because it arises from a tortious act in the performance of his duties. As earlier noted, the complaint alleges three causes of action against Lichauco: one for injunction against her performing any act in relation to orbital slot 153º East Longitude; one for declaration of nullity of award, seeking to nullify the alleged award of orbital slot 153º East Longitude; and one for damages against Lichauco herself. As stated earlier, it is when the acts done in the performance of official functions by an officer of the government will result in a charge against or financial liability to the government that the complaint must be regarded as a suit against the State itself. However, the distinction must also be raised between where the government official concerned performs an act in his/her official and jurisdictional capacity and where he performs an act that constitutes grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. In the latter case, the Constitution itself assures the availability of judicial review, and it is the official concerned who should be impleaded as the

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proper party- defendant or respondent. As to the first two causes of action, the Court ruled that the defense of state immunity from suit do not apply since said causes of action cannot be properly considered as suits against the State in constitutional contemplation. These causes of action do not seek to impose a charge or financial liability against the State, but merely the nullification of state action. The prayers attached to these two causes of action are for the revocation of the Notice of Bid and the nullification of the purported award, nothing more. Had it been so that petitioner additionally sought damages in relation to said causes of action, the suit would have been considered as one against the State. Had the petitioner impleaded the DOTC itself, an unincorporated government agency, and not Lichauco herself, the suit would have been considered as one against the State. But neither circumstance obtains in this case. The doctrine, as summarized in Shauf v. Court of Appeals states: “While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded. It must be noted, however, that the rule is not so all-encoming as to be applicable under all circumstances.” It is a different matter where the public official is made to in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al. vs. Aligaen, etc., et al.: “Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights or the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its consent.' The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice

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(89) Lansang vs. CA G.R. No. 102667, February 23, 2000 ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint filed against the petitioner is in reality a complaint against the State, which could not prosper without the State’s consent FACTS: Private respondents General Assembly of the Blind, Inc. (GABI) and Jose Iglesias were allegedly awarded a verbal contract of lease in 1970 to occupy a portion of Rizal Park by the National Parks Development Committee (NPDC), a government initiated civic body engaged in the development of national parks. Private respondents were allegedly given office and library space as well as kiosks area selling food and drinks. Private respondent GABI was to remit to NPDC 40% of the profits derived from operating the kiosks. After the EDSA Revolution, petitioner Lansang, the new Chairman of the NPDC, sought to clean up Rizal Park. Petitioner terminated the so-called verbal agreement with GABI and demanded that the latter vacate the premises and the kiosks it ran privately within the public park. On the day of the supposed eviction, GABI filed an action for damages and injunction against petitioner. DECISION: Denied RATIO DECIDENDI: The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaints filed against public officials for acts done in the performance of their duties. The rule is that the suit must be regarded as one against the state where satisfaction of the judgment against the public official concerned will require the state itself to perform a positive act, such as appropriation of the amount necessary to pay the damages awarded to the plaintiff. The rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts that are unlawful and injurious to the rights of others. Public officials are not exempt, in their personal capacity, from liability arising from acts committed in bad faith. Neither does its apply where the public official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in his personal capacity, although the acts complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public position. In the case, the petitioner is being sued not in his capacity as NPDC chairman but in his personal capacity. It is also evident the petitioner is sued allegedly for having personal motives in ordering the ejectment of GABI from Rizal Park. The important question to consider is whether or not petitioner abused his authority in ordering the ejectment of GABI. The Court found no evidence of such abuse of authority. Rizal Park is beyond the commerce of man and, thus, could not be the subject of lease contract. That private respondents were allowed to occupy office and kiosk spaces in the park was only a matter of accommodation by the previous . This being so, petitioner may validly discontinue the accommodation extended to private respondents, who may be ejected from the park when necessary. Private respondents cannot and do not claim a vested right to continue to occupy Rizal Park.

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(90) Republic vs. Sandoval 220 SCRA 124 ISSUE: (1) Whether or not there is a valid waiver of immunity (2) Whether or not the State is liable for damages FACTS: Farmer-rallyists marched to Malacanang calling for a genuine land reform program. There was a marchers-police confrontation which resulted in the death of 12 rallyists and scores were wounded. As a result, then Pres. Aquino issued AO 11 creating the Citizens Mendiola Commission for the purpose of conducting an investigation. The most significant recommendation of the Commission was for the heirs of the deceased and wounded victims to be compensated by the government. Based on such recommendation, the victims of Mendiola massacre filed an action for damages against the Republic and the military/police officers involved in the incident. DECISION: Denied RATIO DECIDENDI: The Court held that there was no valid waiver of immunity as claimed by the petitioners. The recommendation made by the Commission to indemnify the heirs of the deceased and the victims does not in any way mean that liability attaches to the State. AO 11 merely states the purpose of the creation of the Commission and, therefore, whatever is the finding of the Commission only serves as the basis for a cause of action in the event any party decides to litigate the same. Thus, the recommendation of the Commission does not in any way bind the State. The State cannot be made liable because the military/police officers who allegedly were responsible for the death and injuries suffered by the marchers acted beyond the scope of their authority. It is a settled rule that the State as a person can commit no wrong. The military and police officers who were responsible for the atrocities can be held personally liable for damages as they exceeded their authority, hence, the acts cannot be considered official.

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(91) Bayan v Exec Secretary GR 138570 ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction. FACTS: On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States of America forged a Military Bases Agreement which formalized, among others, the use of installations in the Philippine territory by United States military personnel. In view of the impending expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement in 1991, the Philippines and the United States negotiated for a possible extension of the military bases agreement. On September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security which, in effect, would have extended the presence of US military bases in the Philippines. On July 18, 1997, the United States , headed by US Defense Deputy Assistant Secretary for Asia Pacific Kurt Campbell, met with the Philippine , headed by Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Rodolfo Severino Jr., to exchange notes on “the complementing strategic interests of the United States and the Philippines in the Asia-Pacific region.” Both sides discussed, among other things, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA for brevity). Thereafter, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by public respondent Secretary Siazon and Unites States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard. On October 5, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ratified the VFA. On October 6, 1998, the President, acting through respondent Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, officially transmitted to the Senate of the Philippines, the Instrument of Ratification, the letter of the President and the VFA, for concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution DECISION: Dismissed RATIO DECIDENDI: No. In fine, absent any clear showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondents, the Court as the final arbiter of legal controversies and staunch sentinel of the rights of the people is then without power to conduct an incursion and meddle with such affairs purely executive and legislative in character and nature. For the Constitution no less, maps out the distinct boundaries and limits the metes and bounds within which each of the three political branches of government may exercise the powers exclusively and essentially conferred to it by law.

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(92) Pamatong v Comelec GR 161872 ISSUE: Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold office FACTS: Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not ed by a ed political party with a national constituency. Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the COMELEC violated his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of government. DECISION: Dismissed RATIO DECIDENDI: No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort.

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(93) Garcia v Drilon 699 SCRA 352 ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the issue of constitutionality was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the petition constitutes a collateral attack on the validity of the law. FACTS: Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary Protection Order against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled “An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” She claimed to be a victim of physical, emotional, psychological and economic violence, being threatened of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial and also a victim of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner. The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the conditions set forth by the said TPO, private-respondent filed another application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial court issued a modified TPO and extended the same when petitioner failed to comment on why the TPO should not be modified. After the given time allowance to answer, the petitioner no longer submitted the required comment as it would be an “axercise in futility.” Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO on, questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due process and equal protection clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for being “an unwanted product of an invalid law.” The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the petition for failure to raise the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court and the petition for prohibition to annul protection orders issued by the trial court constituted collateral attack on said law. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed. DECISION: Dismissed RATIO DECIDENDI: Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and jurisdiction, inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality. Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute. The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible time so that if not raised in the pleadings, it may not be raised in the trial and if not raised in the trial court, it may not be considered in appeal.

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(94) PASEI v Drilon 163 SCRA 386 ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a valid classification in the challenged Department Order No. 1. FACTS: Petitioner, Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female of overseas employment. It challenges the constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled “Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers.” It claims that such order is a discrimination against males and females. The Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills, and that it is in violation of the right to travel, it also being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for worker participation in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the challenged guidelines involving the police power of the State and informed the court that the respondent have lifted the deployment ban in some states where there exists bilateral agreement with the Philippines and existing mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of the Filipino workers. DECISION: Dismissed RATIO DECIDENDI: the petition ruled that there has been valid classification, the Filipino female domestics working abroad were in a class by themselves, because of the special risk to which their class was exposed. There is no question that Order No.1 applies only to female contract workers but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between sexes. It is well settled hat equality before the law under the constitution does not import a perfect identity of rights among all men and women. It its of classification, provided that: (1) Such classification rests on substantial distinctions (2.) That they are germane to the purpose of the law (3). They are not confined to existing conditions (4.) They apply equally to al of the same class In the case at bar, the classifications made, rest on substantial distinctions. Dept. Order No. 1 does not impair the right to travel. The consequence of the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right, as the right to travel is subjects among other things, to the requirements of “public safety” as may be provided by law. Deployment ban of female domestic helper is a valid exercise of police power. Police power as been defined as the state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote general welfare. Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power as the labor code vest the DOLE with rule making powers.

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(95) UP BOR v CA GR 134625` ISSUE: Whether or not Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine was deprived of her right to substantive due process. FACTS: Respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine enrolled in the doctoral program in Anthropology of the UP CSSP Diliman. She already completed the units of course work required and finished her dissertation and was ready for oral defense. After going over her dissertation, Dr. Medina informed CSSP Dean Paz that she committed plagiarism. However, respondent was allowed to defend her dissertation. Four out of the five ists gave a ing mark except Dr. Medina. UP held meeting against her case and some of the s indicated disapproval. Hence, she expressed her disappointments over the CSSP istration and warned Dean Paz. However, Dean Paz request the exclusion of Celine’s name from the list of candidates for graduation but it did not reach the Board of Regents on time, hence Celine graduated. Dr. Medina formally charged private respondent with plagiarism and recommended that the doctorate granted to her be withdrawn. Dean Paz informed private respondent of the charges against her. CSSP College Assembly unanimously approved the recommendation to withdraw private respondent's doctorate degree. The Board sent her a letter indicating that they resolved to withdraw her Doctorate Degree recommended by the University Council. She sought an audience with the Board of Regents and/or the U.P. President, which request was denied by President Hence, Celine then filed a petition for mandamus with a prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and damages, alleging that petitioners had unlawfully withdrawn her degree without justification and without affording her procedural due process. DECISION: Dismissed RATIO DECIDENDI: No. Respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine was indeed heard several times. Several committees and meetings had been formed to investigate the charge that private respondent had committed plagiarism and she was heard in her defense. In istrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one's side of a controversy or a chance seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A party who has availed of the opportunity to present his position cannot tenably claim to have been denied due process. In the case at bar, Celine was informed in writing of the charges against her and given opportunities to answer them. She was asked to submit her written explanation which she submiited. She, as well, met with the U.P. chancellor and the of the Zafaralla committee to discuss her case. In addition, she sent several letters to the U.P. authorities explaining her position. It is not tenable for private respondent to argue that she was entitled to have an audience before the Board of Regents. Due process in an istrative context does not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in the courts of justice. It is noteworthy that the U.P. Rules do not require the attendance of persons whose cases are included as items on the agenda of the Board of Regents.

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(96) CoTesCUP v Secretary of Education GR 216930 ISSUE: Whether the K to 12 Law violates petitioners' right to substantive due process and equal protection of the laws. FACTS: In an attempt to bolster petitioner case against the K to 12 Law, petitioners also raised the following policy issues: 1)K to 12 only increases the resource gap by creating more need for resources. The solution to the problem is closing the resource gap by giving priority to education in the budget and public spending program of the government and addressing the issue of poverty and malnutrition and programs aimed at alleviating if not eradicating poverty in the long run but instead government comes up with the K to 12 Law which is a copycat and elitist solution.275 2)K to 12 is problem-ridden. Instead, what we need is to prioritize deficiencies in personnel, facilities and materials; and a nationalist-oriented curriculum relevant to the needs of the people.276 3)The Philippine government does not have enough funds to add two (2) more years of senior high school.277 4)Student-teacher ratio is far from ideal.278 5)Teachers are paid low salaries.279 6)There is no assurance that senior high school results in good employment. DECISION: Denied RATIO DECIDENDI: Policy matters are not the concern of the Court. To reiterate, government policy is within the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the government. It is not for the Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of legislative determination. Stated otherwise, the judiciary does not upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. Indeed, whether an enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound economic theory, whether it is the best means to achieve the desired results, whether, in short, the legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular manner — all these are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the serious conflict of opinions does not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial cognizance. When the validity of a statute is challenged on constitutional grounds, the sole function of the court is to determine whether it transcends constitutional limitations or the limits of legislative power.Further, the courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution, but also because the judiciary, in the determination of actual cases and controversies, must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government.The Court, despite its vast powers, will not review the wisdom, merits, or propriety of governmental policies, but will strike them down only on either of two grounds: (1) unconstitutionality or illegality and/or (2) grave abuse of discretionFor having failed to show any of the above in the age of the assailed law and the department issuances, the petitioners' remedy thus lies not with the Court, but with the executive and legislative branches of the government.

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(97) University v CA 230 SCRA 761 ISSUE: Wheter or not the That Mandamus will not lie to compel the respondents to enroll petitioning students because of their academic deficiencies and that this refusal of respondent university falls within its right to do so under the academic freedom clause o FACTS: Private respondents Antonio Marco Ho, Ma. Elaine Magante, Roy D. Sancho, Michael Kim So and Bernardita Cainoy were third year Nursing students of petitioner University of San Agustin (USA) who were refused re-ission in the summer classes of 1989 and last two semesters of school year 1989-1990 on the alleged ground that they failed to obtain grades of not lower than 80% in Nursing 104 (Nursing Practice II With Related Learning Experience). Its persistent refusal to re-it them prejudiced their right to freely choose their field of study and finish a college degree and worse, no other school within the city and nearby areas is willing to accept them due to the difference in the curriculum and school residency requirement. Thus, they filed a petition for mandamus before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, to command petitioner USA to re-it them. Aside from the prayer for re-ission, they also prayed for actual and moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for each of them. Submitting a t answer to the petition, petitioner USA and the other petitioners, Dean Concepcion Cajilig and Clinical Instructors Nenalyn Abioda, Mary Espino, Rhodora Azucena, Ma. Dulce Socorro Posa and Cosette Monteblanco itted having barred private respondents from finishing their Nursing course but justified the decision not to re-it them as being in pursuance of the school's policy that only students with grades of at least 80% in any major Nursing subject, including Nursing 104, and two minor subjects, are allowed enrollment in the following year. Private respondents were duly informed and forewarned of their below 80% performance rating. To buttress petitioners' stance, they placed reliance on Section 9(2) of the Education Act of 1982 (B.P. Blg. 232) which recognizes the right of students to freely choose their field of study subject to existing curricula, and to continue their course up to graduation, except in cases of academic deficiency or violation of disciplinary regulations; and Section 13(2) thereof vesting in institutions of higher learning the right to determine on academic grounds who shall be itted to study, who may teach, and what shall be the subjects of study and research.Additionally, petitioners contended that private respondents have no cause of action for mandamus under the premises because there is no clear and well-defined right of the latter which has been violated neither do the former have a corresponding ministerial duty to re-it them, since petitioner USA is a private educational institution not performing public functions and duties. Under the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, petitioner USA enjoys the right to academic freedom. DECISION: Granted RATIO DECIDENDI: Equally mandated by Article XIV, Section 5(2) of the 1987 Constitution is that academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning. Academic freedom of educational institutions has been defined as the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them - free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students. Said constitutional provision is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion. That would be to frustrate its purpose and nullify its intent.

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(98) SSS vs CA 175 SCRA 686 ISSUE: whether or not the Regional Trial Court can en the Social Security System Employees Association (SSSEA) from striking and order the striking employees to return to work. Collaterally, it is whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) FACTS: On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 9, 1987, the officers and of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees from reporting for work and SSS from transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to return to work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike. The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to en the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to work; that the defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be declared illegal. It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands, which included: implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of temporary or contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into regular and permanent employees and their entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the children's allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices DECISION: Denied RATIO DECIDENDI: The court ruled that Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations, either petition the Congress for the betterment of the and conditions of employment which are within the ambit of legislation or negotiate with the appropriate government agencies for the improvement of those which are not fixed by law. If there be any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to the Public Sector Labor Management Council for appropriate action. But employees in the civil service may not resort to strikes, walk-outs and other temporary work stoppages, like workers in the private sector, to pressure the Govemment to accede to their demands. As now provided under Sec. 4, Rule III of the Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Right of Government- Employees to Self- Organization, which took effect after the instant dispute arose, "[t]he and conditions of employment in the government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof and government- owned and controlled corporations with original charters are governed by law and employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing changes thereof."

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(99) Oposa v Factoran GR 101083 ISSUE: Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent the misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests?” FACTS: A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their generation and generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to: 1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country; 2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new TLAs; and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.” They alleged that they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources property he holds in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: 1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him; 2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of the government. DECISION: Granted RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to come. The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation, and for the succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations is based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature” which indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as the future generations. Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minor’s assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

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(100) Republic v Albios 707 SCRA 5584 (2013) ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Albios and Fringer be declared null and void. FACTS: Respondent Libert Albios married Daniel Lee Fringer, an American citizen. She later on filed a petition to nullify their marriage. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering into a married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She said that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that Fringer returned to the United States and never again communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him the $2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for citizenship. She described their marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio. The RTC ruled in her favor. In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception. In its resolution denying the OSG’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that the marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means for the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA. The CA, however, upheld the RTC decision. Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. It held that the parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting married. As in the Rubenstein case, the CA found the marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest considering that the parties only entered into the marriage for the acquisition of American citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They never intended to enter into a marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family. The OSG then elevate the case to the Supreme Court DECISION: Granted RATIO DECIDENDI: No, respondent’s marriage is not void. The court said: “Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.” The court also explained that “There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.” “No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. It must, therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the

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contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the impression that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified when no longer needed.”

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(101) Imbong vs Ochoa, 721 SCRA 584 (2013) ISSUE: SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES: Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the: Right to life Right to health Freedom of religion and right to free speech Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy) Freedom of e FACTS: Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012. Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the said Act. The petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds: SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES: The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products. The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude. The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. The RH Law violates the right to free speech. The RH Law is “void-for-vagueness” in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution. The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one’s family protected by the Constitution PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy. Power of Judicial Review Actual Case or Controversy Facial Challenge Locus Standi Declaratory Relief One Subject/One Title Rule DECISION: RATIO DECIDENDI: SUBSTANTIAL Majority of the of the Court believe that the question of when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. However, they agreed that individual could express their own views on this matter. Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: “The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.”

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(102) Roe vs Wade, 410 US 113 ISSUE: Whether or not a woman’s right to privacy as protected by the constitution includes the right to abort her child. FACTS: This is an appeal of the decision of a US District Court in Texas, which granted the declaratory relief prayed for by the plaintiff who challenged the constitutionality of the Texas Criminal abortion laws; but denied issuing an injunction against enforcement of such statutes. In 1970, Norma L McCorvey ( “Jane Roe” ), a pregnant single woman (allegedly a result of rape), filed a suit against the defendant, District Attorney Henry Wade questioning Texas State Laws which proscribe procuring or attempting an abortion except on medical advice for the purpose of saving the mother’s life. She argues that said laws are unconstitutionally vague and that they abridge her right of personal privacy as guaranteed and protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Later, she amended her complaint as to represent or sue “ on behalf of herself and all other women similarly situated;” thereby becoming a class suit. DECISION: RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes. The “right of privacy x x x is broad enough to encom a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. We therefore conclude that the right of personal privacy includes abortion decision, but that this right is not unqualified and must be considered against important state interests in regulation.” “A state criminal abortion statute of the current Texas type that exempts from criminality only a lifesaving procedure on behalf of the mother, without regard to pregnancy stage and without recognition of the interests involved (such as liberty interests), is violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”

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(103) Limbona vs Conte Mangelin, 170 SCRA 786 ISSUE: Is the expulsion valid? Are the so-called autonomous governments of Mindanao, as they are now constituted, subject to the jurisdiction of the national courts? In other words, what is the extent of self-government given to the two autonomous governments of FACTS: Petitioner was appointed member of the Sanguniang Pampook, Regional Autonomous Government and was later elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly. Congressman Datu invited petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly for consulations and dialogues on the recent and present political developments and other issues affecting Regions IX and XII hopefully resulting to chart the autonomous governments of the two regions as envisioned and may prod the President to constitute immediately the Regional Consultative Commission as mandated by the Commission. Consistent with the said invitation, Petitioner addressed all Assemblymen that there shall be no session in November as “our presence in the house committee hearing of Congress take (sic) precedence over any pending business in batasang pampook … .” In defiance of Petitioner’s advice, After declaring the presence of a quorum, the Speaker Pro-Tempore was authorized to preside in the session. On Motion to declare the seat of the Speaker vacant, all Assemblymen in attendance voted in the affirmative. DECISION: RATIO DECIDENDI: We therefore order reinstatement, with the caution that should the past acts of the petitioner indeed warrant his removal, the Assembly is ened, should it still be so minded, to commence proper proceedings therefor in line with the most elementary requirements of due process. And while it is within the discretion of the of the Sanggunian to punish their erring colleagues, their acts are nonetheless subject to the moderating band of this Court in the event that such discretion is exercised with grave abuse. the Decree PD 168 established “internal autonomy” in the two regions “[w]ithin the framework of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines and its Constitution,” with legislative and executive machinery to exercise the powers and responsibilities specified therein

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(104) Mamiscal vs Abdullah 761 SCRA 39 (2015) ISSUE: Whether or not Mamiscal had validly effected a divorce from his wife is a matter that must first be addressed by the Shari'a Circuit Court which, under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (Muslim Code),enjoys exclusive original jurisdictio FACTS: Mamiscal and Adelaidah decided to have divorce repudiated Adelaidahs (talaq) embodied in an agreement (kapasadan) but later on they reconciled. Despite such, Adelaidah still filed the Certificate of Divorce (COD) with the office of Abdullah for registration. Albeit the same was not signed by Mamiscal it was annotated in the certificate that it was executed in the presence of two witnesses and in accordance with Islamic Law. Abdullah then issued the Certificate of Registration of Divorce finalizing the same. DECISION: WHEREFORE, the istrative matter against Macalinog S. Abdullah, Clerk of Court II, Shari'a Circuit Court, Marawi City, for partiality, violation of due process, dishonesty, and conduct unbecoming a court employee is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction, without prejudice. The complaint of Baguan M. Mamiscal against Macalinog S. Abdullah is hereby REFERRED to the Office of the Mayor, Marawi City and the Civil Service Commission for appropriate action. RATIO DECIDENDI: The Court ruled that they do not have jurisdiction to impose the proper disciplinary action against civil registrars. Shari’a Circuit Court which, under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (Muslim Code) enjoys exclusive original jurisdiction to resolve disputes relating to divorce. The civil registrar is the person charged by law for the recording of vital events and other documents affecting the civil status of persons. The Civil Registry Law embraces all acts of civil life affecting the status of persons and is applicable to all persons residing in the Philippines. The test of jurisdiction is the nature of the offense and not the personality of the offender. The fact that the complaint charges Abdullah for "conduct unbecoming of a court employee" is of no moment. Well-settled is the rule that what controls is not the designation of the offense but the actual facts recited in the complaint. Unless jurisdiction has been conferred by some legislative act, no court or tribunal can act on a matter submitted to it.

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(105) In RE Laureta and Maravilla 148 SCRA 382 ISSUE: WON privacy of communication was violated FACTS: Maravilla Illustre wrote to the justices of the SC, complaining about the dismissal of the her case(aland dispute involving large estate) by a minute-resolution. Illustre claims that it was an unjust resolution deliberately and knowingly promulgated by the 1st Division, that it was railroaded with such hurry beyond the limits of legal and judicial ethics.Illustre also threatened in her letter that, “there is nothing final in this world. This case is far fromfinished by a long shot.” She threatened that she would call for a press conference. Illustre’s letter basically attacks the participation of Justice Pedro Yap in the first division. It was established that Justice Yap was previously a law partner of Atty. Ordonez, now the Solgen and counsel for the opponents. The letters were referred to the SC en banc. The SC clarified that when the minute-resolution was issued, the presiding justice then was not Justice Yap but Justice Abad Santos (who was about to retire), and that Justice Yap was not aware that Atty Ordonez was the opponents counsel. It was also made clear that Justice Yap eventually inhibited himself from the case. Still, Illustre wrote letters to the other justices (Narvasa, Herrera,Cruz), again with more threats to “exposethe kind of judicial performance readily constituting travesty of justice.”True to her threats, Illustre later filed a criminal complaint before the Tanodbayan, charging the Justices with knowingly rendering an unjust Minute Resolution. Justice Yap and Solgen Ordonez were also charged of using their influence in the First Division in rendering said Minute Resolution. Atty LAURETA was the counsel of Illustre. He circulate copies of the complain to thepress, without any copy furnished the Court, nor the Justices charged. It was made to appear that the Justices were charged with graft and corruption. The Tanodbayan dismissed the complaint. Now, the SC is charging them with contempt.They claim that the letters were private communication, and that they did not intend to dishonor the court. DECISION: RATIO DECIDENDI: The letters formed part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern for the entire court.There is no vindictive reprisal involved here. The Court’s authority and duty under the premises is unmistakable. It must act to preserve its honor and dignity from the scurrilous attacks of an irate lawyer, mouthed by his client, and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal profession.

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(106) INS vs Chadha, 462 US 919 (1983) ISSUE: Whether a single house can vote to override an executive decision such that it violates the principle of separation of powers. FACTS: An immigration law ed by Congress holds that the attorney general can suspend the deportation of an illegal immigrant if the immigrant would sustain “severe hardship” as a result. Additionally, if either the Senate or House of Representatives voted by majority to veto the attorney general’s decision regarding deportation. Chadha was a student who had remained in the US with an expired Visa. The attorney general held that he should remain in the US due to hardship. The House of Representatives vetoed the decision to grant amnesty, thereby sustaining the deportation order. Chadha brought this litigation after the legislative veto. DECISION: RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes, Act invalidated. The court recognize the argument of “efficiency” regarding a single house vote. Efficiency is achieved by this measure because the attorney general may frequently override deportation and calling both houses of the legislature to vote for each instance would be time consuming and burdensome. However, the constitution is very clear that legislative decisions are to be bicameral. There are reasons relating to fair representation of states that maintain this justification as paramount, particularly when weighed against arguments of efficiency. The act of overriding an executive veto is inherently legislative and therefore requires bicameral, legislative .

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(107) Arnault vs Balagtas, 97 Phil 358 (1955) ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has authority to punish recalcitrant witness? FACTS: Arnault continuously withheld information. This time about an affidavit supposedly giving details surrounding the acquisitions of the estates. To this he gave the name Jesse Santos as the person he gave the amount to. DECISION: RATIO DECIDENDI: Judgment appealed reversed. Provided the contempt is related to the exercise of the legislative power and is committed in the course of legislative process, the legislative authority is supreme. Said power must be considered implied or incidental to the exercise of legislative power or necessary to effectuate said power.

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(108) Belgica vs Ochoa, Jr, 710 SCRA 1(2013) ISSUE: Whether or not the 2013 PDAF article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel laws are unconstitutional for violating the constitutional provisions on separation of powers, nondelegability of legislative power and checks and balances. FACTS: Petitioner sought that the annual pork barrel system be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretition. DECISION: RATIO DECIDENDI: The post enactent measures including project identification, fund relelase, and fund alignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and does not allow legislature to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere belongs to the executive department.

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(109) Mendoza vs People, 659 SCRA 681 (2011) ISSUE: Without violating the separation of powers, can the Supreme Court recommend to the President, the grant of executive clemency to a convict? FACTS: Romarico Mendoza (petitioner) is a company boss/employer convicted for violating a special law known as the Social Security Condonation Law of 2009 for non-remittance of the Social Security Service (SSS) contributions to his employees. The offense is criminal in nature. Nevertheless, Mendoza itted his fault, as he said, he acted in good faith. But still, the Court has to render judgment and apply the proper penalty how harsh it may be dura lex sed lex). The Court sentenced Mendoza to an indeterminate prison term. Considering the circumstances, the court the Court transmitted the case to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, and RECOMMENDS the grant of executive clemency to the petitioner DECISION: RATIO DECIDENDI: The Court the discretion to recommend to the President actions it deems appropriate but are beyond its power when it considers the penalty imposed as excessive. It is clearly stated in the Revised Penal Code which provides; “Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be made the subject of legislation. In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense.”

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(110) NPC Drivers and Mechanical Association vs Napocor, 503 SCRA 138 (2006) ISSUE: The issue was whether or not NPB Resolution Nos. 2002-124 and 2002-125 were properly enacted. FACTS: On June 8, 2001, Republic Act 9136, otherwise known as the “Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001” (EPIRA Law), was approved and signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. It took effect on 26 June 2001. Under Section 48 of the EPIRA Law,[2] a new National Power Board (NPB) of Directors was formed. An energy restructuring committee (Restructuring Committee) was also created to manage the privatization and the restructuring of the National Power Corporation (NPC), the National Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO), and the Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Corporation (PSALC). On November 18 , 2002, pursuant to Section 63[3] of the EPIRA Law and Rule 33[4] of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR), the NPB ed NPB Resolution No. 2002-124, which provided for “Guidelines on the Separation Program of the NPC and the Selection and Placement of Personnel.” Under this Resolution, the services of all NPC personnel shall be legally terminated on January 31, 2003, and shall be entitled to separation benefits provided therein. On the same day, the NPB approved NPB Resolution 2002-125, constituting a Transition Team to manage and implement the NPC’s Separation Program. Contending that the assailed NPB Resolutions were void, petitioners filed, in their individual and representative capacities, the present Petition for Injunction to restrain respondents from implementing NPB Resolution Nos. 2002-124 and 2002- 125. DECISION: RATIO DECIDENDI: The Court’s Decision, written by Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario,[5] held that the Resolutions were invalid, because they lacked the necessary number of votes for their adoption. Under Section 48, the power to exercise judgment and discretion in running the affairs of the NPC was vested by the legislature upon the persons composing the National Power Board of Directors. When applied to public functionaries, discretion refers to a power or right conferred upon them by law, consisting of acting officially in certain circumstances, according to the dictates of their own judgment and conscience, and uncontrolled by the judgment or conscience of others. Presumably, in naming the respective department heads as of the board of directors, the legislature chose these secretaries of the various executive departments on the basis of their personal qualifications and acumen that had made them eligible to occupy their present positions as department heads. Thus, the department secretaries cannot delegate their duties as of the NPB, much less their power to vote and approve board resolutions. Their personal judgments are what they must exercise in the fulfillment of their responsibilities. There was no question that the enactment of the assailed Resolutions involved the exercise of discretion, not merely a ministerial act that could be validly performed by a delegate. Respondents’ reliance on American Tobacco Company v. Director of Patents[6] was misplaced. The Court explicitly stated in that case that, in exercising their own judgment and discretion, istrative officers were not prevented from using the help of subordinates as a matter of practical istrative procedure. Officers could seek such aid, as long as the legally authorized official was the one who would make the final decision through the use of personal judgment. In the present case, it is not difficult to comprehend that in approving NPB Resolutions 2002-124 and 2002-125, it is the representatives of the secretaries of the different executive departments

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and not the secretaries themselves who exercised judgment in ing the assailed Resolution. This action violates the duty imposed upon the specifically enumerated department heads to employ their own sound discretion in exercising the corporate powers of the NPC.

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(111) Garcia v. Executive Secretary, 211 SCRA 219 ISSUE: Whether or not the President may issue an EO that can increase tariff rates FACTS: The President issued an EO 438 which imposed, across the board, including crude oil and other oil products, additional duty ad valorem. The Tariff Commission held public hearings on said EO and submitted a report to the President for consideration and appropriate action. The President, on the other hand issued an EO which levied a special duty of P0.95 per liter of imported crude oil and P1.00 per liter of imported oil products DECISION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner. RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes, the delegation is constitutional. The Court said that although the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills is within the province of the Legislative, it does not follow that EO in question, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measure are prohibited to the President, that they must be enacted instead by Congress. Section 28 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides: “The Congress may, by law authorize the President to fix… tariff rates and other duties or imposts…” Thus, there is explicit constitutional permission for Congress to authorize the President "subject to such limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose. This referred to the Tariff and Customs Code which authorized the President to issue said EOs.

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(112) US v. Tang Ho, 43 Phil 1 ISSUE: Whether or not Article 2868 is a delegation of power and is thus unconstitutional FACTS: The Philippine Legislature enacted Act 2868 with one of its salient provisions, Section 1, authorizing the governor-General “for any cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of the Act”. Thus, on August 1, 1919, the Governor-General signed EO 53, fixing the price of rice. On August 6, 1919, Ang Tang Ho was caught selling a ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos, a price higher than that fixed by EO 53. Defendant was found guilty and now assails the constitutionality of the Act 2868 for invalid delegation of legislative powers. DECISION: The judgment of the lower court is reversed, and the defendant discharged RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes. Said Act constituted an invalid delegation of power since the said Act authorized the Governor-General to promulgate laws and not merely rules and regulations to effect the law. The said Act was not complete when it left the legislature as it failed to specify what conditions the Governor-General shall issue the proclamation as the said Act states “for any cause”. It also failed to define “extraordinary rise” that such proclamation by the GovernorGeneral aims to prevent. Lastly, the said Act authorized the promulgation of temporary rules and emergency measures by the Governor-General,

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(113) CoTeSCUP v. Secretary of Education, G.R. 216930, October 2018 ISSUE: Whether the K to 12 Law constitutes an undue delegation of power FACTS: On May 15, 2013, Congress ed the K to 12 law, which took effect on June 8, 2013. This essentially adds 2 more years to the then-current 10-year scheme of the Philippine education system. DECISION: Petitions were denied; RA No 10533 (K to 12 Law), among others, was declared constitutional RATIO DECIDENDI: There is no undue delegation of legislative power in the enactment of the K to 12 law. To determine this, there are two tests: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. For completeness test, the law must be complete when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. For sufficient standard test, it mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the delegate's authority; limits must be specified. The K to 12 law's lack of provision on labor does not render the law incomplete. Clearly, under the two tests, the K to 12 law, is complete in all essential and conditions and contains sufficient parameters on the power delegated to the DepEd, CHED and TESDA.

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(114) Pelaez v. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569 ISSUE: Whehter or not Section 68 of Revised istrative Code constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power FACTS: Pursuant to the Section 68 of the Revised istrative Code, the President issued EO Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129, creating 33 municipalities enumerated in the margin. Petitioner Pelaez alleged that said Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by RA No. 2370, and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. The third paragraph of Section 3 of RA No. 2370 stated: "Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their nams changed except under the provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress." DECISION: EOs were declared null and void RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes, there is undue delegation of power. Section 10 (1) of the Constitution's Article VII states that: "The President shall have control of al the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws are faithfully executed." The Constitution is clear in saying that only general supervision can be exercised over the local governments. No more authority that that of checking or supervision may be done. In this case, by creating the 33 municipalities, the law conferred upon the President more power over the local governments.

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(115) People v. Judge Dacuycuy, 173 SCRA 90 ISSUE: Whether or not the case constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power, the duration of the penalty of imprisonment being solely left to the discretion of the court as if the latter were the legislative department of the Government FACTS: Private respondents were charged with violating RA 4670 (Magna Carta for Public School Teachers), for which they have been convicted of. The penal provision, Section 32 of said Act, states that "x x x upon conviction, [they] may be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred pesos, or by imprisonment, in the discretion of the court." Respondents posited that said penalty merely indicated as imprisonment is too broad and should not be enforced. DECISION: Decision and resolution of respondent judge are REVERSED and SET ASIDE RATIO DECIDENDI: There is undue delegation of legislative powers. Section 32 of RA 4670 provides an indeterminable period of imprisonment, with no maximum or minimum period set by legislative authority. The courts are thus given a wide latitude of discretion, without benefit of sufficient standard. This cannot be allowed, as it vests in the courts a power and a duty essentially legislative in nature and is thus violative of the rules on separation of powers as well as non-delegability of legislative powers.

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(116) Sema v. COMELEC, G.R. 177597, (2008) ISSUE: Whether or not the Congress can delegate to the Regional Assembly the power to create provinces FACTS: On August 28, 2006, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create provinces under Section 19 of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. On May 10, 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution 7902 renaming the legislative district combining the said provice with Cotabato as "Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City." Sema, here petitioner, questioned the Resolution combining the Shariff Kabunsuan and Cotabato CIty into a single legislative district. DECISION: Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it grants to the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao the power to create provinces and cities. Thus, SC declares VOID Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. COMELEC Resolution 7902 is VALID. RATIO DECIDENDI: SC ruled that Section 19, RA 9054, insofar as it grants to the Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, is void. Only Congress can create provinces and cities because the creation of provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative districts, a power only Congress can exercise under Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution.

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(117) Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr., et al. v. The Secretary of Justice, et al., G.R. No. 203335, Feb. 11, 2014 ISSUE: Whether or not Congress validly delegated its legislative power when it gave the Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC) the power to formulate a national cybersecurity plan FACTS: Petitioners, as taxpayers, filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before the Court. They seek to nullify the several sections of RA 10175, otherwise known as the "Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012". They claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable cyberspace activities violate constitutional rights. The government in turn posits that the law merely seeks to put order into cyberspace activities, punish wrongdoings, and prevent attacks in the system. DECISION: The following were declared void for being unconstitutional: Section 4(c)(3), 12 and 19 of RA 10175. RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes, the delegation is valid. The Court referred to the two tests for valid delegation: the completeness test and sufficient standard test. The Cybercrime law was deemed to be complete in itself when it directed CICC to formulate and implement a national cybersecurity plan. Sufficient standards were also clear when the law provided for the definition of cybersecurity. The definition served as the parameters within which CICC should work in formulating the plan. The formulation of the cybersecurity plan is also consisted with the policy of the law; the policy was clearly adopted in the interest of law and order, which has been considered as sufficient standard.

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(118) Powell v. McCormack 395 US 486 ISSUE: Does the House have a textual commitment in the constitution to determine the qualifications of its ? FACTS: During the 89th Congress, it was found that Plaintiff had engaged in deceptive and possibly illegal actions surrounding his service as chairman of the Committee on Education and Labor. After his reelection to the 90th Congress, he was asked to step aside while the other representatives were sworn in. Also, he was later asked to inform the Governor of New York that his seat was vacant. Plaintiff sued, alleging the House did not have the constitutional authority to deny his seat when he met the qualifications expressly set forth for Representatives in Article I of the United States Constitution (Constitution). DECISION: Yes. Case reversed and remanded. RATIO DECIDENDI: The Defendants-Respondents, of Congress including the Speaker of the House John W. McCormack (Defendants), argued that the House has broad powers under Article I, Section: 5 of the Constitution to determine the qualifications of its hip. Plaintiff argued and the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) agreed, the ratification debates and historical context of the framers limit the qualifications to those set forth in the Constitution. The Supreme Court also notes that to hold otherwise would nullify the framers’ decision to require two-thirds vote for expulsion.

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(119) Pobre v Defensor-Santiago 597 SCRA 1 (2009) ISSUE: Whether or not there is a ground for Sen. Defensor-Santiago to be disbarred or subjected to disciplinary action by the Court for her questioned speech. FACTS: In one of her privilege speeches before the Senate, Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago as a response to the decision of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) declaring that only sitting of the Supreme Court can be nominated for the impending vacancy of the CJ post. Consequently, nominees who were not incumbent of the Court, including Sen. Defensor-Santiago, were automatically disqualified. Private complainant Antero J. Pobre filed the instant petition before the Court, contending that the lady senator's utterances amounted to a total disrespect towards then CJ Panganiban and a direct contempt of Court. Accordingly, he wanted disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions to be taken against Sen. DefensorSantiago. DECISION: No RATIO DECIDENDI: The Court sided with Sen. Defensor-Santiago's defense that she should be afforded parliamentary immunity from suit pursuant to Section 11, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, which section states in part that "no [Senator] x x x shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof." Although there was no express ission on the part of the lady senator that she did indeed say those words, there was no categorical denial either, which the Court ultimately regarded as an implied ission. Despite the dismissal of the letter-complaint, the Court heavily chastised the lady senator for indulging in "insulting rhetoric and offensive personalities." In fact, her excuse that her questioned speech was a prelude to crafting remedial legislation on the JBC struck the Court as being a mere afterthought in light of the controversy her utterances had managed to stir. Still, the Court held that parliamentary immunity is essential because without it, the parliament or its equivalent would "degenerate into a polite and ineffective forum." However, it should be noted that "[l]egislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of of their legislative duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the public good."

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(120) Aquino III vs COMELEC 617 SCRA 623 (2010) ISSUE: w/n a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a province? Held: FACTS: The Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a population of 1,693,821,2 distributed among four (4) legislative districts. Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district. Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000 minimum population standard. The provision reads: (3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative. The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383. DECISION: Dismissed RATIO DECIDENDI: There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must compose a legislative district. The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase “each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand” from the phrase “or each province” point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population is only required for a city, but not for a province. Requisites for Creation. – (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites: (i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or (ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office. Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely an alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement. ments

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(121) Aldaba vs. COMELEC 611 SCRA 147 (2010) ISSUE: RA 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit representation in Congress as provided under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1 FACTS: This is an original action for Prohibition to declare unconstitutional Republic Act No. 9591 (RA 9591), creating a legislative district for the city of Malolos, Bulacan, for violating the minimum population requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city. On 1 May 2009, RA 9591 lapsed into law, amending Malolos City Charter,2 by creating a separate legislative district for the city. The population of Malolos City was 223,069. The population of Malolos City on 1 May 2009 is a contested fact but there is no dispute that House Bill No. 3693 relied on an undated certification issued by a Regional Director of the National Statistics Office (NSO) that “the projected population of the Municipality of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78 between 1995 to 2000.” DECISION: Granted RATIO DECIDENDI: RA 9591 is unconstitutional for being violative of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district, the city must have “a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand.” House Bill No. 3693 cites the undated Certification of Regional Director Alberto N. Miranda of Region III of the National Statistics Office (NSO) as authority that the population of the City of Malolos “will be 254,030 by the year 2010.” The Certification states that the population of “Malolos, Bulacan as of May 1, 2000 is 175,291.” The Certification further states that it was “issued upon the request of Mayor Danilo A. Domingo of the City of Malolos in connection with the proposed creation of Malolos City as a lone congressional district of the Province of Bulacan.” First, certifications on demographic projections can be issued only if such projections are declared official by the National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB). Second, certifications based on demographic projections can be issued only by the NSO or his designated certifying officer. Third, intercensal population projections must be as of the middle of every year. Moreover, the Certification states that “the total population of Malolos, Bulacan as of May 1, 2000 is 175,291.” The Certification also states that the population growth rate of Malolos is 3.78% per year between 1995 and 2000. Based on a growth rate of 3.78% per year, the population of Malolos of 175,291 in 2000 will grow to only 241,550 in 2010. Any population projection forming the basis for the creation of a legislative district must be based on an official and credible source. That is why the OSG cited Executive Order No. 135, otherwise the population projection would be unreliable or speculative.

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(122) Naval v Comelec, 729 SCRA 299 (2014) ISSUE: Whether or not Naval can be elected as a member of Sanggunian constituting a new three-period term on a different district. FACTS: From 2004 to 2007 to 2010, Naval had been elected and had served as a member of the Sanggunian, Second District, Province of Camarines Sur. Upon the creation of RA 9716, the legislative districts of Camarines Sur has been reapportioned moving the distric of Naval to the Secon District. In the 2010 & 2013 elections, Naval won again as member of the Sanggunian and subsequently questioned by Julia as another member of the Sanggunian positing the threeconsecutive term which is viloaltive of the Constitution DECISION: Dismissed RATIO DECIDENDI: Naval violated Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code when he filed his COC despite knowledge of his ineligibility

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(123) Bagabuyo v Comelec, 573 SCRA 290 (2008) ISSUE: Whether or not the law, of which pertains to the legislative apportionment of a city, involve the division and conversion of a local government unit, necessitating a plebiscite FACTS: On October 10, 2006, Cagayan de Oro’s then Congressman Constantino G. Jaraula filed and sponsored House Bill No. 5859: An Act Providing for the Apportionment of the Lone Legislative District of the City of Cagayan De Oro or RA No. 9371. It increased Cagayan de Oro’s legislative district from one to two. For the election of May 2007, CDO’s voters would be classified as belonging to either the first or the second district, depending on their place of residence. On March 13, 2007, COMELEC promulgated a resolution implementing the said act. Bagabuyo filed a petition at the Supreme Court asking for the nullification of RA 9371 and Resolution No. 7837 on constitutional grounds. Petitioner argued that COMELEC cannot implement a law without the commencement of a plebiscite which is indispensable for the division and conversion of a local govt. unit. DECISION: Dismissed RATIO DECIDENDI: The Court upheld respondent’s arguments saying that such law only increased the representation of CDO in the House of Representatives and Sangguniang Panglungsod. Creation, division, merger, abolition, and alteration of boundaries under Art. X Sec. 10 requires the commencement of a plebiscite , while legislative apportionment or reapportionment under Art. VI, Sec.5 need not. There was also no change in CDO’s territory, population, income and classfication

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(124) Reyes v Comelec, 699 SCRA 522 (2013) and 708 SCRA 197 (2013 ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the COMELEC has the jurisdiction over the petitioner who is a duly proclaimed winner and who has already taken her oath of office for the position of member of the House of Representative. 2. Whether or not the COMELEC erred in its ruli FACTS: Petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the lone district of Marinduque. Respondent, a ed voter and resident of the Municipality of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed before the COMELEC a petition for the cancellation of petitioner’s COC. On October 31, 2012, the respondent filed the amended petition on the ground that the petitioner’s COC contained material misrepresentations. Respondent alleged that the petitioner is an American citizen because of her failure to comply with the requirements of Republic Act (RA) No. 9225. DECISION: Dismissed RATIO DECIDENDI: 1. Pursuant to Section 17, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution, the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal has the exclusive jurisdiction to be . the sole judge of all contests relating to the election returns and qualification of the of House of Representative. 2. In this case, there is no showing that the petitioner reacquired her Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 so as to conclude that the petitioner renounced her American citizenship, it follows that she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA. Petitioner claim that she served as Provincial of the province of Marinduque from January 18, 2011 to July 13, 2011 is not sufficient to prove her one-year residency for she has never recognized her domicile in Marinduque as she remains to be an American citizen. No amount of her stay in the said locality can substitute the fact that she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA.

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(125) Banat v Comelec, GR 179271 (2009) ISSUE: (1) Is the 20% allocation for party-list representatives provided in Sec 5 (2), Art VI of the Constitution mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? (2)Is the 2% threshold and “qualifier” votes prescribed by the same Sec 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional? (3 FACTS: Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a petition to proclaim the full number of party list representatives provided by the Constitution. However, the recommendation of the head of the legal group of COMELEC’s national board of canvassers to declare the petition moot and academic was approved by the COMELEC en banc, and declared further in a resolution that the winning party list will be resolved using the Veterans ruling. BANAT then filed a petition before the SC assailing said resolution of the COMELEC. DECISION: Dismissed RATIO DECIDENDI: 1) Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 mandates the filling up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Sec 5 of Art VI, left the determination of the number of the of the House of Representatives to Congress. The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more then 20% of the of the House of Representatives. (2) No. We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Sec 11(b) of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party-list seats when the available party-list seat exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Sec 11 (b) of RA 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Sec 5 (2), Art VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the -broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.” (3) No. Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. However, by vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.

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(126) Ang Ladlad v Comelec, GR 190582 (2010) ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the denial of accreditation by COMELEC, violated the constitutional guaranteesagainst the establishment of religion. insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma. 2. Whether or not the Assailed Resolutions contravened FACTS: The COMELEC (Second Division)dismissed the Petition for registration of the petitioner on moral grounds that petitioner tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs, and advocates sexual immorality. Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not only for advocating immoral doctrines but likewise for not being truthful when it said that it ³ or any of itsnominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulationsrelating to the elections. Furthermore, states COMELEC, Ang Ladlad will be exposing our youth to anenvironment that does not conform to the teachings of our faith. DECISION: Granted RATIO DECIDENDI: omelec’s citation of the Bible and the Koran in denying petitioner’s application was a violation of the non-establishment clause laid down in Article 3 section 5 of the Constitution. The proscription by law relative to acts against morality must be for a secular purpose (that is, the conduct prohibited or sought to be repressed is “detrimental or dangerous to those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society"), rather than out of religious conformity. The Comelec failed to substantiate their allegation that allowing registration to Ladlad would be detrimental to society. The LGBT community is not exempted from the exercise of its constitutionally vested rights on the basis of their sexual orientation. Laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors. Discrimination based on sexual orientation is not tolerated ---not by our own laws nor by any international laws to which we adhere.

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(127) Walden Bello v Comelec GR 191998 (2010) ISSUE: 1) whether mandamus lies to compel the COMELEC to disqualify AGPP's nominees motu proprio or to cancel AGPP's registration; (2) whether the COMELEC can be ened from giving due course to AGPP's participation in the May 10, 2010... elections, the canv FACTS: GPP filed with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) its Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the May 10, 2010 elections. Subsequently, It filed its Certificate of Nomination together with the Certificates of Acceptance of its nominees wherein the first nominee is Mike Arroyo. Several petitions for disqualification of Arroyo emerged but have been dismissed both by Comelec Second division and comelec en banc. In the interim, AGPP obtained in the May 10, 2010 elections the required percentage of votes sufficient to secure a single seat. This entitled Arroyo, as AGPP’s first nominee, to sit in the House of Representatives. He was proclaimed as AGPP’s duly -elected party-list representative in the House of Representatives. On the same day, Arroyo took his oath of office, as AGPP’s Representative. And, his name was, thereafter, entered in the Roll of of the House of Representatives. Thereafter two (2) separate petitions for quo warranto were filed with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) questioning Arroyo’s eligibility as AGPP’s representative in the House of Representatives. The HRET took cognizance of the petitions by issuing a Summons directing Arroyo to file his Answer to the two petitions DECISION: Dismissed RATIO DECIDENDI: For a writ of mandamus to issue (in G.R. No. 191998), the mandamus petitioners must comply with Section 3 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which provides: "In the present case, the mandamus petitioners failed to comply with the condition that there be "no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." Under Section 2, in relation with Section 4, of COMELEC Resolution No. 8807 (quoted below), any... interested party may file with the COMELEC a petition for disqualification against a party-list nominee

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(128) Atong Paglaum v Comelec, GR 203766 ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the said party-lists. FACTS: Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on Elections in the May 2013 party-list elections for various reasons but primarily for not being qualified as representatives for marginalized or underrepresented sectors. Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC in disqualifying them. DECISION: Remanded to COMELEC RATIO DECIDENDI: No, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing decisions in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming elections. However, since the Court adopts new parameters in the qualification of the party-list system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC all the present petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are qualified to under the party-list system, and to participate in the coming elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this Decision. Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first three consecutive of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector." This provision clearly shows again that the party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two obvious reasons. First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally be open to non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list system is exclusively for sectoral parties representing the "marginalized and underrepresented." Second, the reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral parties applies only for the first "three consecutive after the ratification of this Constitution," clearly making the party-list system fully open after the end of the first three congressional . This means that, after this period, there will be no seats reserved for any class or type of party that qualifies under the three groups constituting the party-list system. Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1) and (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties.

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(129) Coalition of Asso. of Senior Citizens in the Phil. v Comelec, 201 SCRA 786 (2013) ISSUE: Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC for issuing Resolution without due process? FACTS: On May 5, 2010, the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS signed an agreement, entitled Irrevocable Covenant, containing the list of nominees to share power in their sharing power agreement. The COMELEC issued a Omnibus Resolution in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM) stating that the list of nominees submitted to them shall be permanent. This is in lieu of the empty seat in Congress after the 2010 elections following the resignation of Rep. Kho. Two SENIOR CITIZENS were allocated seats in the House of Representatives, the first being Rep. Arquiza, and Rep. Kho as the second. Rep. Arquiza, honoring Rep. Kho’s resignation, stated that their fourth nominee shall take the latter’s seat considering that the third nominee, Datol, has previously been expelled from the party. COMELEC claims that they shall stay true to the list presented by SENIOR CITIZENS, regardless of Datol’s (being the third nominee) expulsion. Also that the resignation of Rep. Kho shall not be recognized because it will change the order of nominees. DECISION: Yes RATIO DECIDENDI: There is grave abuse on the part of COMELEC for violating due process. Instead, the COMELEC issued the May 10, 2013 Omnibus Resolution in SPP No. 12157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM) without conducting any further proceedings. The Court ruled that the Omnibus Resolution dated May 10, 2013 of the Commission on Elections En Banc in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM) is REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. is concerned, and that the Commission on Elections En Banc is ORDERED to PROCLAIM the Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. as one of the winning party-list organizations during the May 13, 2013 elections with the number of seats it may be entitled to based on the total number of votes it garnered during the said elections.

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(130) Lico v Comelec, GR 205505, Sep 29, 2015 ISSUE: Commission on Elections' (COMELEC) jurisdiction over the expulsion of a sitting party-list representative: from the House of Representatives, on the one... hand; and from his party-list organization, on the other FACTS: Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64[1] in relation to Rule 65,[2] seeking to annul the Resolutions in E.M. No. 12-039 dated 18 July 2012 and 31 January 2013 of the COMELEC. Ating Koop is a multi-sectoral party-list organization On 30 November 2009, Ating Koop filed its Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the Party-List System of Representation for the 10 May 2010 Elections.[4] On 6 March 2010, it filed with the COMELEC the list of its nominees, with petitioner Lico as first... nominee and Roberto Mascarina as second nominee. On 8 December 2010, COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as one of the winning party-list groups Petitioner Lico subsequently took his oath of office on 9 December 2010 before the SecretaryGeneral of the House of Representatives,[7] and thereafter assumed office. Several months prior to its proclamation as one of the winning party-list organizations, or on 9 June 2010, Ating Koop issued Central Committee Resolution 2010-01, which incorporated a term-sharing agreement signed by its nominees.[8] Under the agreement,... petitioner Lico was to serve as Party-list Representative for the first year of the three-year term. On 5 December 2011, or almost one year after petitioner Lico had assumed office, the Interim Central Committee expelled him from Ating Koop for disloyalt The said Petition, which was subsequently raffled to the Second Division, prayed that petitioner Lico... be ordered to vacate the office of Ating Koop in the House of Representatives, and for the succession of the second nominee, Roberto Mascarina as Ating Koop's representative in the House. Ating Koop had expelled Congressman Lico for acts inimical to the party-list group, such as malversation, graft and corruption DECISION: Granted RATIO DECIDENDI: We find that while the COMELEC correctly dismissed the Petition to expel petitioner Lico from the House of Representatives for being beyond its jurisdiction, it nevertheless proceeded to rule upon the validity of his expulsion from Ating Koop - a matter beyond its purview. The COMELEC notably characterized the Petition for expulsion of petitioner Lico from the House of Representatives and for the succession of the second nominee as party-list representative as a disqualification case. For this reason, the COMELEC dismissed the petition for lack of... jurisdiction, insofar as it relates to the question of unseating petitioner Lico from the House of Representatives. Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution[34] endows the HRET with jurisdiction to resolve questions on the qualifications of of Congress. In the case of party-list representatives, the HRET acquires jurisdiction over a disqualification case... upon proclamation of the winning party-list group, oath of the nominee, and assumption of office as member of the House of Representatives.[35] In this case, the COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as a winning party-list group; petitioner Lico took his oath; and... he assumed office in the House of Representatives. Thus, it is the HRET, and not the COMELEC, that has jurisdiction over the disqualification case The jurisdiction of the HRET is exclusive. It is given full authority to hear and decide the cases on any matter touching on the validity of the title of the proclaimed winner

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(131) Abang Lingkod vs. Comelec 2013 ISSUE: Whether national, regional, and sectoral parties and organizations are required under the law to show their genuineness and bona fide existence in determining if they are eligible for registration with the Commission on Elections FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari filed by Abang Lingkod challenging the May 2013 resolution issued by COMELEC cancelling the Abang Lingkod's party-list registration. COMELEC says that it is not enough that the party-list organization claim representation of the marginalized and underrepresented because representation is easy to claim. Records shows that Abang Lingkod failed to stablish its track record which is important to prove that the party-list continuously represents the marginalized. Abang Lingkod merely offered pictures of some alleged activities they conducted after the 2010 elections. These pictures appears to be edited. Under The Party-List System Act, a group’s registration may be cancelled for declaring unlawful statements in its petition. Photoshopping images to establish a fact that did not occur is tantamount to declaring unlawful statements. It is on this ground that the Commission cancels ABANG LINGKOD’s registration. DECISION: RATIO DECIDENDI: A party, by law, is either "a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties."17 A political party is defined as: x x x an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and s certain of its leaders and as candidates for public office. A party is a national party "when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces comprising the region." On the other hand, a sectoral party: x x x refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector.

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(132) Akbayan vs HRET ISSUE: Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan. FACTS: Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the Bantay party-list group that won a seat in the 2007 elections for the of the House of Representatives. Lesaca and the others alleged that Palparan was ineligible to sit in the House of Representatives as party-list nominee because he did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that Bantay represented, namely, the victims of communist rebels, Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs), former rebels, and security guards. Petitioner Palparan countered that the HRET had no jurisdiction over his person since it was actually the party-list Bantay, not he, that was elected to and assumed hip in the House of Representatives. Palparan claimed that he was just Bantay’s nominee. Consequently, any question involving his eligibility as first nominee was an internal concern of Bantay. Such question must be brought, he said, before that party-list group, not before the HRET. DECISION: RATIO DECIDENDI: although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution,5 identifies who the “” of that House are: Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty , unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a partylist system of ed national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (Underscoring supplied) Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution9 provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the of the House of Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are “elected ” of the House of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.

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(133) Aquino vs. Comelec ISSUE: Whether “residency” in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes “domicile” to warrant the disqualification of Aquino from the position in the electoral district. FACTS: Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative for the Second District of Makati City. Private respondents Move Makati, a duly ed political party, and MateoBedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Brgy. Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which, under Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution, should be for a period not less than 1 year immediately preceding the elections. DECISION: RATIO DECIDENDI: In order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City, he must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of choice. Petitioner, in his certificate of candidacy for the 1992 elections, indicated not only that he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of the same for 52 years immediately preceding that elections. At that time, his certificate indicated that he was also a ed voter of the same district. His birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of his parents. What stands consistently clear and unassailable is that his domicile of origin of record up to the time of filing of his most recent certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac. The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. While a lease contract may be indicative of petitioner’s intention to reside in Makati City, it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of one’s original domicile.

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(134) Abayon vs HRET ISSUE: Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan. FACTS: petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat Tayo party-list organization that won a seat in the House of Representatives during the 2007 elections. Respondents filed a petition for quo warranto with respondent HRET against petitioner Abayon. They claimed that Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a party-list seat in the House of Representatives, since it did not represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors since she did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, she being the wife of an incumbent congressional district representative. It was Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat in the House of Representatives, and not Abayon who was just its nominee. All questions involving her eligibility as first nominee, said Abayon, were internal concerns of Aangat Tayo. DECISION: RATIO DECIDENDI: although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution,5 identifies who the “” of that House are: Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty , unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a partylist system of ed national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (Underscoring supplied) Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution9 provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the of the House of Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are “elected ” of the House of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.10 The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo partylist and Bantay party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan.

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(135) Santiago vs Guingona ISSUE: Whether or not there was an actual violation of the Constitution in the selection of respondent as Senate minority leader FACTS: During the election of officers in the Senate, Sen. Marcelo Fernan and Sen. Tatad were both nominated to the position of Senate President. By a vote of 20 to 2, Sen. Fernan was declared the duly elected Senate President. Thereafter, Sen. Tatad manifested that, with the agreement of Sen. Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Sen. Fernan comprised the “majority,” while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the “minority.” However, senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party – number 7 and, thus, also a minority – had chosen Sen. Guingona as the minority leader. Thus, Petitioners filed this case for quo warranto. DECISION: RATIO DECIDENDI: The term “majority” has been judicially defined a number of times. When referring to a certain number out of a total or aggregate, it simply “means the number greater than half or more than half of any total.” The plain and unambiguous words of the subject constitutional clause simply mean that the Senate President must obtain the votes of more than one half of all the senators. Not by any construal does it thereby delineate who comprise the “majority,” much less the “minority,” in the said body. And there is no showing that the framers of our Constitution had in mind other than the usual meanings of these .In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the thereof, it does not provide that the who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the “minority,” who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader.

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(136) Avelino vs Cuenco ISSUE: Whether or not Resolutions 67 & 68 was validly approved. FACTS: The petitioners, Senator Jose Avelino, in a quo warranto proceeding, asked the court to declare him the rightful Senate President and oust the respondent, Mariano Cuenco. In a session of the Senate, Tanada’s request to deliver a speech in order to formulate charges against then Senate President Avelino was approved. With the leadership of the Senate President followed by his ers, they deliberately tried to delay and prevent Tanada from delivering his speech. The SP with his ers employed delaying tactics, the tried to adjourn the session then walked out. Only 12 Senators were left in the hall. The of the senate left continued the session and Senator Cuenco was appointed as the Acting President of the Senate and was recognized the next day by the President of the Philippines. DECISION: RATIO DECIDENDI: It was held that there is a quorum that 12 being the majority of 23. In fine, all the four justice agree that the Court being confronted with the practical situation that of the twenty three senators who may participate in the Senate deliberations in the days immediately after this decision, twelve senators will Senator Cuenco and, at most, eleven will side with Senator Avelino, it would be most injudicious to declare the latter as the rightful President of the Senate, that office being essentially one that depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of that body being amenable at any time by that majority. And at any session hereafter held with thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all controversy arising from the divergence of opinion here about quorum and for the benefit of all concerned,the said twelve senators who approved the resolutions herein involved could ratify all their acts and thereby place them beyond the shadow of a doubt.

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(137) Alejandrino vs Quezon ISSUE: Whether or not the resolution disciplining Alejandrino is null and void? FACTS: Senator Jose Alejandrino was declared guilty of disorderly conduct and flagrant violation of the privileges of the Senate for having treacherously assaulted Senator Vicente de Vera. He was deprived of his prerogatives, privileges and emoluments of being a senator. He filed mandamus and injunction against respondent Senate President Manuel Quezon from executing the said resolution and to declare the said resolution null and void. DECISION: RATIO DECIDENDI: Neither the Philippine Legislature nor a branch thereof can be directly controlled in the exercise of their legislative powers by any judicial process. The court lacks jurisdiction to consider the petition.No court has ever held and no court will ever hold that it possesses the power to direct the Chief Executive or the Legislature to take any particular action. Also, if the Court does not have any authority to control the Philippine Senate, it has likewise no authority to control the actions of subordinate employees acting under the direction of the same.

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(138) De Venecia vs Sandiganbayan ISSUE: Whether the doctrine of separation of powers exclude the of Congress from the mandate of R.A. 3019. FACTS: On 12 March 1993, an Information (docketed as Criminal Case 18857) was filed with the Sandiganbayan (First Division) against then Congressman Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr., of Agusan del Sur for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended). After the accused pleaded not guilty, the prosecution filed a “Motion To Suspend The Accused Pendente Lite.” In its Resolution dated 6 June 1997, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion and ordered the Speaker to suspend the accused. But the Speaker did not comply. Thus, on 12 August 1997, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution requiring him to appear before it, on 18 August 1997 at 8:00 a.m., to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court. Unrelenting, the Speaker filed, through counsel, a motion for reconsideration, invoking the rule on separation of powers and claiming that he can only act as may be dictated by the House as a body pursuant to House Resolution 116 adopted on 13 August 1997. On 29 August 1997, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Resolution declaring Speaker Jose C. de Venecia, Jr. in contempt of court and ordering him to pay a fine of P10,000.00 within 10 days from notice.Jose de Venecia, Jr., in his capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives; Roberto P. Nazareno, in his capacity as Secretary-General of the House of Representatives; Jose Ma. Antonio B. Tuaño, Cashier, House of Representatives; Antonio M. Chan, Chief, Property Division, House of Representatives, filed the petition for certiorari. DECISION: RATIO DECIDENDI: As held in Miriam Defensor Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, et al., the doctrine of separation of powers does not exclude the of Congress from the mandate of RA 3019. The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution. The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon a determination by the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member.Its purpose is to prevent the accused public officer from frustrating his prosecution by influencing witnesses or tampering with documentary evidence and from committing further acts of malfeasance while in office. It is thus an incident to the criminal proceedings before the court. On the other hand, the suspension or expulsion contemplated in the Constitution is a House-imposed sanction against its . It is, therefore, a penalty for disorderly behavior to enforce discipline, maintain order in its proceedings, or vindicate its honor and integrity.

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(139) Pobre vs. Defensor Santiago ISSUE: Whether or not there is a ground for Sen. Defensor-Santiago to be disbarred or subjected to disciplinary action by the Court for her questioned speech FACTS: In one of her privilege speeches before the Senate, Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago delivered the following remarks: x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in a different environment than in a Supreme Court of idiots. x x x Her speech came as a response to the decision of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) declaring that only sitting of the Supreme Court can be nominated for the impending vacancy of the CJ post. Consequently, nominees who were not incumbent of the Court, including Sen. Defensor-Santiago, were automatically disqualified. Private complainant Antero J. Pobre filed the instant petition before the Court, contending that the lady senator's utterances amounted to a total disrespect towards then CJ Panganiban and a direct contempt of Court. Accordingly, he wanted disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions to be taken against Sen. DefensorSantiago. DECISION: RATIO DECIDENDI: o, the Court sided with Sen. Defensor-Santiago's defense that she should be afforded parliamentary immunity from suit pursuant to Section 11, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, which section states in part that "no [Senator] x x x shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof." Although there was no express ission on the part of the lady senator that she did indeed say those words, there was no categorical denial either, which the Court ultimately regarded as an implied ission. Despite the dismissal of the letter-complaint, the Court heavily chastised the lady senator for indulging in "insulting rhetoric and offensive personalities." In fact, her excuse that her questioned speech was a prelude to crafting remedial legislation on the JBC struck the Court as being a mere afterthought in light of the controversy her utterances had managed to stir. Still, the Court held that parliamentary immunity is essential because without it, the parliament or its equivalent would "degenerate into a polite and ineffective forum." However, it should be noted that "[l]egislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of of their legislative duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the public good."

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(140) Philconsa vs. Mathay ISSUE: Whether or not the salary increase was constitutional? FACTS: RA 4134 provided for increase of salary of Senate President, Speaker of the House and of the Senate and House of Representatives. This took effect on 30 June 1966. However record show that the increase was implemented on 1964.Philippine Constitution Association assailed the validity of RA 4134, stating that this is in violation of Section 14 Article 6 of the Constitution, “No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the of the Senate and House of Representatives approving such increase. Thus the petition for writ of prohibition. DECISION: RATIO DECIDENDI: Republic Act No. 4134 is not operative until December 30, 1969, when the full term of all of the Senate and House that approved it on June 20, 1964 will have expired. Consequently, appropriation for such increased compensation may not be disbursed until December 30, 1969. In so far as Republic Act No. 4642 (1965-1966 Appropriation Act) authorizes the disbursement of the increased compensation prior to the date aforesaid, it also violates the Constitution and must be held null and void.

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(141) Ligot vs. Mathay, 56 SCRA 823 (1974) ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to such retirement benefit FACTS: Petitioner was re-elected to a third term (December 30, 1965 to December 30, 1969) but was held not entitled to the salary increase of P32,000.00 during such third term by virtue of this Court’s unanimous decision in Philconsa vs. Mathay. He lost his next bid and filed for retirement claim. House of Representative issued a treasury warrant using the unapproved amount. Congress Auditor did not sign the warrant. Petitioner’s request for reconsideration was denied, hence the petition. DECISION: Dismissed. RATIO DECIDENDI: To grant retirement gratuity to of Congress whose expired on December 30, 1969 computed on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which they were prohibited by the Constitution from receiving during their term of office) would be to pay them prohibited emoluments which in effect increase the salary beyond that which they were permitted by the Constitution to receive during their incumbency.

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(142) People vs. Jalosjos, GR 132875-76, February 3, 2000 ISSUE: Does hip in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which apply to validly incarcerated persons in general? FACTS: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented. DECISION: Denied. RATIO DECIDENDI: The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and of the House of Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its . It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations. The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The of Congress cannot compel absent to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.

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(143) Adaza vs Pacana, 135 SCRA 431 (1985) ISSUE: Whether or not Adaza can serve as a member of the Batasan and as a governor of the province simultaneously. FACTS: Adaza is the governor of Misamis Oriental and Pacana is the vice-governor. Their respective term of office expires on March 3, 1986. Both parties ran in the Batasang Pambansa (BP) elections in 1984 and respondent lost to petitioner. On July 23, 1984, Pacana took his oath of office as the governor. Adaza has brought this petition to exclude Pacana therefrom, claiming to be the lawful occupant of the position. DECISION: Dismissed. RATIO DECIDENDI: Section 10, Article VIII of the Constitution is clear and unambiguous. A member of the BP may not hold any other office in the government. A public office is a public trust. A holder thereof is subject to regulations and conditions as the law may impose and he cannot complain of any restrictions on his holding of more than one office. The contention that Pacana, as a mere private citizen, runs afoul of BP Blg. 697 which provides that governors, or of Sanggunian or barangay officials, upon filing a certificate of candidacy be considered on forced leave of absence from office. When respondent reassumed the position of vice-governor after the BP elections, he was acting within the law. Thus, the instant petition is denied.

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(144) Puyat vs. De Guzman, 113 SCRA 31 (1982) ISSUE: Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a stockholder of IPI, may intervene in the SEC case without violating Sec. 11, Art. VIII (now Sec. 14, Art. VI) of the Constitution FACTS: After an election for the Directors of the International Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI) was held, one group, the respondent Acero group, instituted at the SEC quo warranto proceedings, questioning the election. Justice Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, entered his appearance as counsel for respondent Acero to which the petitioner, Puyat group, objected on Constitutional ground that no Assemblyman could “appear as counsel before any istrative body,” and SEC was an istrative body. Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his appearance for respondent Acero. Assemblyman Fernandez had purchased 10 shares of IPI for P200.00 upon request of respondent Acero. Following the notarization of Assemblyman Fernandez’ purchase, he filed a motion for intervention in the SEC case as the owner of 10 IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter in litigation. The SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of Fernandez’ ownership of the said 10 shares. DECISION: The intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in SEC No. 1747 falls within the ambit of the prohibition contained in Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution. RATIO DECIDENDI: Ordinarily, by virtue of the motion for intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalf of another, although he is ing the cause of the private respondents. His appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his ownership of 10 shares of IPI in respect of the matter in litigation. However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC case. He had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in IPI, representing 10 shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares. He acquired them “after the fact” that is, after the contested election of directors, after the quo warranto suit had been filed before the SEC and 1 day before the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC. And what is more, before he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel for respondent Acero, but which was objected to by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to intervene on the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation. The Court is constrained to find that there has been an indirect appearance as counsel before an istrative body, it is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition contained in Sec. 11, Art. VIII (now Sec. 14, Art. VI). The intervention was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity.

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(145) Liban vs. Gordon, 593 SCRA 68 (2009) and 639 SCRA 709 (2011) ISSUE: Was it proper for the Court to have ruled on the constitutionality of the PNRC statute? Whether respondent should be automatically removed as a Senator pursuant to Section 13, Article VI of the Philippine Constitution FACTS: Petitioners Liban, et al., who were officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter, filed with the Supreme Court what they styled as “Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate” against respondent Gordon, who was elected Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors during his incumbency as Senator. Gordon filed a motion for partial reconsideration on a Supreme Court decision which ruled that being chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) did not disqualify him from being a Senator, and that the charter creating PNRC is unconstitutional as the PNRC is a private corporation and the Congress is precluded by the Constitution to create such.The Court then ordered the PNRC to incorporate itself with the SEC as a private corporation. Gordon takes exception to the second part of the ruling, which addressed the constitutionality of the statute creating the PNRC as a private corporation. Gordon avers that the issue of constitutionality was only touched upon in the issue of locus standi. It is a rule that the constitutionality will not be touched upon if it is not the lis mota of the case. DECISION: No, it was not correct for the Court to have decided on the constitutional issue because it was not the very lis mota of the case. The PNRC is sui generis in nature; it is neither strictly a GOCC nor a private corporation. The office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. RATIO DECIDENDI: The Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the very lis mota. It is a well-established rule that a court should not upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which the court may [rest] its judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until such question will be unavoidable. PNRC is a Private Organization Performing Public Functions the Philippine government does not own the PNRC. It does not have government assets and does not receive any appropriation from the Philippine Congress. It is financed primarily by contributions from private individuals and private entities obtained through solicitation campaigns organized by its Board of Governors. The PNRC is not government-owned but privately owned.

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(146) Macalintal vs. COMELEC, GR 157013, July 10, 2003 ISSUE: Is RA 9189 [Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003], valid & constitutional? FACTS: A petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B. Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional infirmity. Claiming that he has actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of this case in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner filed the instant petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer. Petitioner posits that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional because it violates Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution which requires that the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding an election. Petitioner cites the ruling of the Court in Caasi vs. Court of Appeals to his claim. In that case, the Court held that a green card holder immigrant to the United States is deemed to have abandoned his domicile and residence in the Philippines. DECISION: Partly granted. RATIO DECIDENDI: Contrary to petitioner’s claim that Section 5(d) circumvents the Constitution, Congress enacted the law prescribing a system of overseas absentee voting in compliance with the constitutional mandate. Such mandate expressly requires that Congress provide a system of absentee voting that necessarily presupposes that the “qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad” is not physically present in the country. The petition was partly granted, Sections 17(a), 18(b), 19(c), 20(d) are declared void for being repugnant to Section 1, Article IXA of the Constitution mandating the independence of constitutional commision, such as COMELEC. Pursuant to Section 30 of RA No. 9189, the rest of the provisions of said law continues to be in full force and effect.

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(147) Abakada Group Party list vs. Purisima, GR 166715, August 14, 2008 ISSUE: Whether the creation of the congressional oversight committee violates the doctrine of separation of powers under the Constitution FACTS: Petitioners, Abakada Guro Party list invoking their right as taxpayers, filed a petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335 and sought to prevent herein respondents from implementing and enforcing said law. RA 9335 or Attrition Act of 2005 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC. The law intends to encourage their officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of Rewards and Incentives Fund and Revenue Performance Evaluation Board. Petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers, as it permits legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law, when legislative function should have been deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment of the law. Respondents, through the OSG, counter this by asserting that the creation of the congressional oversight committee under the law enhances rather than violates separation of powers, as it ensures the fulfillment of the legislative policy. DECISION: Partially granted. RATIO DECIDENDI: Congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government. It may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation of power in the executive branch. However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment “beyond the legislative sphere,” the Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints on Congress. It may not vest itself, any of its committees or its with either executive or judicial power. And, when it exercises its legislative power, it must follow the “single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures” specified under the Constitution, including the procedure for enactment of laws and presentment. Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited to scrutiny and investigation

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(148) Bengzon vs. Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA 767 ISSUE: Whether or not the inquiry that is sought by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee should be granted FACTS: It was alleged that Benjamin Romualdez and his wife together with the Marcoses unlawfully and unjustly enriched themselves at the expense of the Filipino people. That they obtained with the help of the Bengzon Law Office and Ricardo Lopa. Senator Juan Ponce Enrile subsequently delivered a privilege speech alleging that Lopa took over various government owned corporations which is in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Contained in the speech is a motion to investigate on the matter. The motion was referred to the Committee on ability of Public Officers or the Blue Ribbon Committee. Enrile subsequently took advantage of the Senate’s privilege hour upon which he insisted to have an inquiry regarding the matter. The SBRC rejected Lopa’s and Bengzon’s plea. Hence this petition. DECISION: Granted. RATIO DECIDENDI: The speech of Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look in to a possible violation of Sec.5 of RA No.3019, otherwise known as “The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.” In other words, the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by the Blue Ribbon Committee was to find out whether or not the relatives of Cory, particularly Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or39 corporations belonging to Kokoy to the Lopa Group. There appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation involved. Hence, the contemplated inquiry by the SBRC is not really “in aid of legislation” because it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress.

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(149) Arnault vs. Nazareno, GR L-3820, July 18, 1950 ISSUE: Whether or not the senate has the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative session FACTS: A petition for habeas corpus was filed by Arnault to relieve him from his confinement in the New Bilibid Prison to which he has been committed by virtue of a resolution adopted by the Senate on May 15, 1950. The Senate investigated the purchase by the government of two parcels of land, known as Buenavista and Tambobong estates. An intriguing question that the Senate sought to resolve was the apparent irregularity of the government’s payment to one Ernest Burt, a non-resident American citizen, of the total sum of Php1.5million for his alleged interest in the two estates that only amounted to Php20,000.00, which he seemed to have forfeited any way long before. The Senate sought to determine who were responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the government. DECISION: Denied. RATIO DECIDENDI: The Senate had the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative session. There is no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body to punish for contempt to the end of every session and not to the end of the last session terminating the existence of that body. The very reason for the exercise of the power to punish for contempt is to enable the legislative body to perform its constitutional function without impediment or obstruction.

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(150) PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation vs. Senate, GR 180308, June 19, 2012 ISSUE: Whether or not Senate committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in approving Committee Resolution No. 312 FACTS: Petitioners Locsin and Andal are bot directors and corporate officers of PHC, as well as nominees of the government to the board of directors of both POTC and PHILCOMSAT filed a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition assails and seeks to en the implementation of and nullify Committee Report No. 312 submitted by respondents Senate Committees on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and on Public Services (respondents Senate Committees) on June 7, 2007 for allegedly having been approved by respondent Senate of the Republic of the Philippines (respondent Senate) with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. DECISION: Dismissed. RATIO DECIDENDI: Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution provides that the Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. Such conferral of the legislative power of inquiry upon any committee of Congress, in this case the respondents Senate Committees, must carry with it all powers necessary and proper for its effective discharge. The respondents Senate Committees cannot be said to have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when it submitted Committee Resolution No. 312, given its constitutional mandate to conduct legislative inquiries.

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(151) Neri v Senate Committee on ability of Public Officers 549 SCRA 77 and 564 SCRA 152) ISSUE: Whether or not the communications elicited by the 3 questions covered by executive privilege FACTS: The Senate issued various Senate Resolutions directing SBRC, among others, to conduct an investigation regarding the NBN-ZTE deal. Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He disclosed that the COMELEC Chairman Abalos offered him P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project, that he informed PGMA about the bribery and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, he refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. As a result, the Senate cited him for contempt. DECISION: Granted RATIO DECIDENDI: The Supreme Court found the Senate to have gravely abused its discretion in citing the petitioner for contempt for his refusal to answer questions propounded to him in the course of legislative inquiry. The Court declared that “there being a legitimate claim of executive privilege, the issuance of contempt order suffers from constitutional infirmity.” Executive privilege: 2 kinds: presidential communications (between president and executive official) and deliberative process (between executive officials only)

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(152) Balag v. Senate GR 234608 ISSUE: Whether or not the Senate has power to impose the indefinite detention of a person cited in contempt during its inquiries FACTS: Balag, leader of Aegis Juris Fraternity filed a petition before the SC after senators ordered him detained in Senate premises for being uncooperative in the probe into the death of the UST Law Student Horacio "Atio" del Castillo III. During the Senate inquiry, Balag repeatedly invoked his right against self-incrimination when asked if he headed the fraternity DECISION: Denied for being moot and academic. However, the period of imprisonment under the inherent power of contempt of the Senate during inquiries in aid of legislation should only last until the termination of the legislative inquiry. RATIO DECIDENDI: The Court declared the case as moot and academic but the petition presents a critical and decisive issue that must be resolved and capable of repetition. This issue must be threshed out as the Senate's exercise of its power of contempt without a definite period is capable of repetition,” it said, adding that “the indefinite detention of persons cited in contempt impairs their constitutional right to liberty. The Supreme Court has ruled that the Senate has no power to impose the indefinite detention of a person cited in contempt during its inquiries.

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(153) Senate v. Ermita GR 169777 ISSUE: Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress, valid and constitutional? FACTS: In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation. The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of military in the so-called “Gloriagate Scandal”. Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress DECISION: Partly Granted RATIO DECIDENDI: No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.

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(154) Belgica v. Executive Secretary GR 208566 ISSUE: Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of legislati FACTS: Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For The Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO against respondents DECISION: Partly Granted RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. This violates the principle of separation of powers. Congress‘role must be confined to mere oversight that must be confined to: (1) scrutiny and (2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws. Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the constitution. Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional.

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(155) Araullo v Abad GR 209287 ISSUE: Whether or not the DAP, and all other executive issuances allegedly implementing the DAP, violated Sec 25(5) of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution FACTS: Maria Carolina Araullo filed a petition before the Supreme Cort questioning the validity of DAP (Disbursement Accelaration Program). That, it is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that "no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. DBM Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on GAA (General Appropriations Act) (Savings and augmentation provisions) DECISION: Partly Granted RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes, it violated Sec 25 (5) of Article VI of the Costitution. The augmentation is, according to the ponencia, and defined in Art. VI, Sec. 25 (5) of the 1987 Constitution, and authorized within each year’s General Appropriations Act (GAA), is the use of clearly-identified savings in the expenditures of government departments and offices to augment clearly-identified, actual deficiencies within those respective government departments and offices. What augmentation is not, however, is to allocate what was not authorized as an expenditure in the GAA. It is not a transfer of executive department savings to legislative lump sum allocations (cross-border augmentation) – by virtue of the latter’s unconstitutionality, or at the very least, because such itself violates Art. VI Sec. 25 (5)

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(156) Lawyers against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP) v. The Secretary of Budget and Management GR 164987 ISSUE: Whether or not the implementation of PDAF by the of Congress is unconstitutional and illegal FACTS: LAMP filed an action for certiorari assailing the constitutionality and legality of the implementation of the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for in Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or the General Appropriations Act for 2004 (GAA of 2004). LAMP, this situation runs afoul against the principle of separation of powers because in receiving and, thereafter, spending funds for their chosen projects, the of Congress in effect intrude into an executive function. DECISION: Dismissed RATIO DECIDENDI: The petition is miserably wanting in this regard. No convincing proof was presented showing that, indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the of Congress, who actually spend them according to their sole discretion. Devoid of any pertinent evidentiary that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a common exercise of unscrupulous of Congress, the Court cannot indulge the petitioner’s request for rejection of a law which is outwardly legal and capable of lawful enforcement.

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(157) Arnault v. Balagtas 97 Phil 358 ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has authority to punish recalcitrant witness FACTS: This was a petition for habeas corpus filed by Jean Arnault against the Director of Prisons, Balagtas. Arnault was incarcerated pursuant to a resolution by the Senate finding Arnault in contempt for refusing to disclose the name of a person with whom he transacted business in relation to a government purchase of of the Buenavista and Tambobong estates. The circumstances of Arnault's incarceration are described in the companion case Arnaultvs. Nazareno (1950) which affirmed the Legislature's power to hold a person in contempt for defying or refusing to comply with an order in a legislative inquiry. Arnault eventually divulged that he had transacted with one Jess D. Santos in relation to the Buenavista and Tambobong deal. Upon further inquiry, the Senate, obviously not satisfied with Arnault's explanations, adopted Resolution No. 114. DECISION: Denied RATIO DECIDENDI: The question raised by the petitioner was the legality of his detention by order of the Senate for his refusal to answer questions put to him by one of its investigating committees. The Supreme Court refused to order his release and deferred to the discretionary authority of the legislative body to punish contumacious witnesses for contempt. The exercise of the legislature's authority to deal with the defiant and contumacious witness should be supreme and is not subject to judicial interference, except when there is a manifest and absolute disregard of discretion and a mere exertion of arbitrary power coming within the reach of constitutional limitations.

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(158) Imbong v. Ochoa 721 SCRA 146 ISSUE: Whether or not RH Law violated the one subject-one title rule under the Constitution FACTS: Petitioners question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, prescribing the one subject-one title rule. According to them, being one for reproductive health with responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the constitutional standards of due process by concealing its true intent – to act as a population control measure. On the other hand, respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or population control measure, and that the concepts of “responsible parenthood” and “reproductive health” are both interrelated as they are inseparable. DECISION: Partly Granted RATIO DECIDENDI: No. In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth. Considering the close intimacy between “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” which bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving “sustainable human development” as stated under its , the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.

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(159) Tanada v. Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 ISSUE: Whether or not the statutes in question which contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect still need to be published in the Official Gazette FACTS: Petitioners herein are seeking a writ of mandamus to compel public officials to publish and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementation, and istrative orders. Respondents, on the other hand, claimed that this case has no legal personality or standing. Further, they argued that the publication in the Official Gazette in necessary for the effectivity of the law where the law themselves provides for their own effectivity dates DECISION: Granted RATIO DECIDENDI: . Yes. Publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date, for then the date of publication is material for determining the date of the effectivity which must be 15 days following the completion of its publication, but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes to effect. Publication of laws is part of substantive due process

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(160) Abbas v. SET ISSUE: Whether or not it is constitutional to inhibit all involved senators, six of which are sitting in the tribunal FACTS: On 09 October 1987 petitioner filed before Senate Electoral Tribunal an election contest against 22 candidates of the LABAN who were proclaimed senators-elect. With the exemption of Senator Estrada, the senators filed for motion for disqualification or inhibition from the hearing and resolution on the ground that all of them are interested parties to said case. DECISION: Dismissed RATIO DECIDENDI: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit and affirmed the decision of the Tribunal to not let Senator- to inhibit or disqualify himself, rather, just let them refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment.

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(161) Bondoc vs Pineda ISSUE: Whether or not the House of Representatives is empowered to interfere with election protests in the HRET by reorganizing the representation of the majority party in the HRET? FACTS: On May 11, 1987, the petitioner (NP) and Pineda (LDP) were rival candidates for Congressman of the Fourth District of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed the winner having garnered a total of 31,700 votes compared to Bondoc’s 28,400 votes. The petitioner filed a protest with the HRET, composed of 9 , 3 Justices of the Supreme Court, 6 of the House chosen on the basis of proportional representation from political parties. A decision was reached declaring Bondoc as the winner by 23 votes, another recount was insisted by the LDP of the tribunal which increased Bondoc to 107 votes more than Pineda’s. Congressman Camasura (LDP) along with the Justices, voted to proclaim Bondoc as the winner. Thereafter, Congressman Camasura received a letter informing him that he was expelled from the LDP for allegedly helping organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and inviting LDP to . The House voted for Cong. Cmasura’s removal from the HRET and that his vote be withdrawn. DECISION: Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is granted RATIO DECIDENDI: No, pursuant to Sec. 17 of Art. VI, the HRET is sole judge of all contests in relation to the election, returns and qualification of their . It is created as non-partisan court to provide an independent and impartial tribunal for determination of contests. The House cannot just shuffle and manipulate the political component for their benefit and interests. The alleged “party disloyalty” of Cong. Camasura, as a reason for his removal from the party, when he voted in favor of Bondoc, undermines the independence of the HRET. Such of the HRET have security of tenure. They can only be replaced in cases of term expiration, death, permanent disability, resignation from the party. Disloyalty is not a valid cause of termination.

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(162) Codilla vs De Venecia ISSUE: Whether or not respondent’s proclamation was valid. FACTS: Petitioner garnered the highest votes in the election for representative in the 4th district of Leyte as against respondent Locsin. Petitioner won while a disqualification suit was pending. Respondent moved for the suspension of petitioner’s proclamation. By virtue of the Comelec ex parte order, petitioner’s proclamation was suspended. Comelec later on resolved that petitioner was guilty of soliciting votes and consequently disqualified him. Respondent Locsin was proclaimed winner. Upon motion by petitioner, the resolution was however reversed and a new resolution declared respondent’s proclamation as null and void. Respondent made his defiance and disobedience to subsequent resolution publicly known while petitioner asserted his right to the office he won. DECISION: Petition for mandamus is granted RATIO DECIDENDI: The respondent’s proclamation was premature given that the case against petitioner had not yet been disposed of with finality. In fact, it was subsequently found that the disqualification of the petitioner was null and void for being violative of due process and for want of substantial factual basis. Furthermore, respondent, as second placer, could not take the seat in office since he did not represent the electorate’s choice. Since the validity of respondent’s proclamation had been assailed by petitioner before the Comelec and that the Comelec was yet to resolve it, it cannot be said that the order disqualifying petitioner had become final. Thus Comelec continued to exercise jurisdiction over the case pending finality. The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions of the Comelec. A petition for quo warranto must also fail since respondent’s eligibility was not the issue.

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(163) Cunanan vs Tan ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of Jorge Tan Jr is valid. FACTS: Petitioner sought to nullify the ad interim appointment of Jorge Tan Jr as acting Deputy of the Reforestation istration. Carlos Cunanan was formerly appointed in the same position but was later on rejected by the Commision of Appointment prompting the President to replace him with Jorge Tan Jr immediately without his consent. Filing the quo warranto proceeding to the Supreme Court, Cunanan questions the validity of the convened Commission of Appointments citing irregularities as to the numbers of comprising the same. DECISION: Dismissed RATIO DECIDENDI: With the reorganization of the Commission of Appointment, it was ruled that such is a power vested in the Congress as they deem it proper taking into consideration the proportionate numbers of the of the Commission of Appointment as to their political affiliations. However, with their reorganization, this affected a third party's right which they rejected as its result. To correct this, the Supreme Court declared the reinstatement of the petitioner and ordered respondent to vacate and turn over the office in contention.

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(164) Velasco vs Belmonte ISSUE: Does HRET have the jurisdiction over BB? FACTS: COMELEC has cancelled BB’s CoC, acting upon the petition of AA, for alleged misrepresentations in BB’s CoC. While the motion for reconsideration field by BB was pending, the election was held and BB was proclaimed as winner by the Provincial Board of Canvassers. CC filed an Election Protest in the HRET. COMELEC issued a Certificate of Finality on its cancellation of BB’s CoC. Despite it, Speaker DD istered the oath of office to BB. BB challenged COMELEC’s action and the Supreme Court upheld that there was no grave abuse of discretion by COMELEC. AA filed for an immediate execution of COMELEC’s previous resolution and to declare CC as winner. COMELEC declared the proclamation of BB as null and void. CC filed a petition for the Court to issue a writ of mandamus to compel Speaker DD to proclaim him as winner, despite notice given to him by COMELEC. DECISION: Granted RATIO DECIDENDI: NO. The jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a Member of the House of Representatives. BB is not a bona fide member of the House of Representatives for lack of a valid proclamation.. When BB took her oath of office before respondent Speaker DD in open session, BB had no valid COC NOR a valid proclamation. In view of the foregoing, BB has absolutely no legal basis to serve as a Member of the House of Representatives, and therefore, she has no legal personality to be recognized as a party-respondent at a proceeding before the HRET.

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(165) Ty-Delgado vs HRET ISSUE: WON the HRET gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it failed to disqualify Pichay for his conviction for libel, a crime involving moral turpitude FACTS: Philip Arreza Pichay was convicted by final judgment for four counts of libel. On 9 October 2012, Pichay filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur. Petitioner filed a petition for disqualification under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code against Pichay before the Commission on Elections on the ground that Pichay was convicted of libel, a crime involving moral turpitude. She argued that when Pichay paid the fine on 17 February 2011, the five-year period barring him to be a candidate had yet to lapse. HRET held that Pichay did not participated the writing of the libelous articles but his conviction was in line with his duty as the president of the publishing company. Based on the circumstances, the HRET concluded that Pichay’s conviction for libel did not involve moral turpitude. DECISION: Granted RATIO DECIDENDI: In the present case, Pichay its his conviction for four counts of libel. the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction when it failed to disqualify Pichay for his conviction for libel, a crime involving moral turpitude. Since Pichay’s ineligibility existed on the day he filed his certificate of candidacy and he was never a valid candidate for the position of Member of the House of Representatives, the votes cast for him were considered stray votes.

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(166) Republic vs Sandiganbayan ISSUE: Whether or not the Swiss funds can be forfeited in favour of the Republic, on the basis of the Marcoses’s lawful income? FACTS: Petitioner Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner sought the declaration of the aggregate amount of US$356 million (now estimated to be more than US$658 million inclusive of interest) deposited in escrow in the PNB, as ill-gotten wealth. The funds were previously held by the following five groups, using various foreign foundations in certain Swiss banks. Moreover, the petition sought the forfeiture of US$25 million and US$5 million in treasury notes which exceeded the Marcos couple's salaries, other lawful income as well as income from legitimately acquired property. The treasury notes are frozen at the Central Bank of the Philippines, now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, by virtue of the freeze order issued by the PCGG. Before the case was set for pre-trial, a General Agreement and the Supplemental Agreements were executed by the Marcos children and then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for a global settlement of the assets of the Marcos family to identify, collate, cause the inventory of and distribute all assets presumed to be owned by the Marcos family under their conditions contained therein. DECISION: Granted RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes. Their only known lawful income of $304,372.43 can therefore legally and fairly serve as basis for determining the existence of a prima facie case of forfeiture of the Swiss funds. The sum of $304,372.43 should be held as the only known lawful income of respondents since they did not file any Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SAL), as required by law, from which their net worth could be determined. Besides, under the 1935 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could not receive "any other emolument from the Government or any of its subdivisions and instrumentalities." Likewise, under the 1973 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could "not receive during his tenure any other emolument from the Government or any other source." In fact, his management of businesses, like the istration of foundations to accumulate funds, was expressly prohibited under the 1973 Constitution.

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(167) Estrada vs Arroyo ISSUE: Whether or not Estrada permanently unable to act as President. FACTS: Petitioner sought to en the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in any criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted. Erap also filed a Quo Warranto case, praying for judgment “confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.” DECISION: Dismissed RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes, Section 11 of Article VII provides that “Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President is incapable of performing his functions.” Both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner’s claim of inability. Even if petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court.

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(168) Macalintal vs PET ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is Constitutional. FACTS: Petitioner Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal, through a Motion for Reconsideration reiterates his arguments that Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution does not provide for the creation of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) and that the PET violates Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution. In order to strengthen his position, petitioner cites the concurring opinion of Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro in “Barok” C. Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 that the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a public office which cannot be created by the president, the power to do so being lodged exclusively with Congress. Thus, petitioner submits that if the President, as head of the Executive Department, cannot create the PTC, the Supreme Court, likewise, cannot create the PET in the absence of an act of legislature. DECISION: Dismissed RATIO DECIDENDI: The Court reiterates that the PET is authorized by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution and as ed by the discussions of the of the Constitutional Commission, which drafted the present Constitution. With the explicit provision, the present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme Court, in conjunction with latter's exercise of judicial power inherent in all courts, the task of deciding presidential and vicepresidential election contests, with full authority in the exercise thereof. The power wielded by PET is a derivative of the plenary judicial power allocated to courts of law, expressly provided in the Constitution. On the whole, the Constitution draws a thin, but, nevertheless, distinct line between the PET and the Supreme Court. We have previously declared that the PET is not simply an agency to which of the Court were designated. Once again, the PET, as intended by the framers of the Constitution, is to be an institution independent, but not separate, from the judicial department, i.e., the Supreme Court.

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(169) Pormento vs Estrada ISSUE: Whether or not Joseph Estrada is disqualified to run for presidency in the May 2010 elections according to the phrase in the Constitution which states that "the President shall not be eligible for any re-election"? FACTS: Atty. Pormento filed a petition for disqualification against former President Joseph Estrada for being a presidential candidate in the May 2010 elections. The petition was denied by COMELEC second division and subsequently by COMELEC en banc. Pormento then filed the present petition for certiorari before the Court. In the meantime, Estrada was able to participate as a candidate for President in the May 10, 2010 elections where he garnered the second highest number of votes. DECISION: Dismissed RATIO DECIDENDI: No. There is no actual controversy in the case at bar. The respondent did not win the second time he ran. The issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase "any reelection" will be premised on a person second election as President. Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior to the proclamation of a President who has been duly elected in the May 10, 2010 elections; the same is no longer true today. Following the results of that election, private respondent was not elected President for the second time. Thus, any discussion of his "reelection" will simply be hypothetical and speculative. It will serve no useful or practical purpose.

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(170) Laurel vs Garcia ISSUE: Whether or not the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the authority and jurisdiction, to sell the Roppongi property. FACTS: The subject property in this case is one of the 4 properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan, the Roppongi property. The said property was acquired from the Japanese government through Reparations Contract No. 300. It consists of the land and building for the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy. As intended, it became the site of the Philippine Embassy until the latter was transferred to Nampeidai when the Roppongi building needed major repairs. President Aquino created a committee to study the disposition/utilization of Philippine government properties in Tokyo and Kobe, Japan. The President issued EO 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of separations' capital goods and services in the event of sale, lease or disposition. DECISION: Granted RATIO DECIDENDI: It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the government on his or her own sole will. Any such conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence. It is indeed true that the Roppongi property is valuable not so much because of the inflated prices fetched by real property in Tokyo but more so because of its symbolic value to all Filipinos, veterans and civilians alike. Whether or not the Roppongi and related properties will eventually be sold is a policy determination where both the President and Congress must concur. Considering the properties' importance and value, the laws on conversion and disposition of property of public dominion must be faithfully followed.

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(171) Marcos v. Manglapus ISSUE: Whether or not, in the exercise of executive power, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. FACTS: Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the nonviolent “people power” revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But President Corazon Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Marcos and his family. Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the respondents to issue them their travel documents and prevent the implementation of President Aquino’s decision to bar Marcos from returning in the Philippines. Petitioner questions Aquino’s power to bar his return in the country. According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their right to life, liberty, property without due process and equal protection of the laws. They also said that it deprives them of their right to travel which according to Section 6, Article 3 of the constitution, may only be impaired by a court order. DECISION: Dismissed RATIO DECIDENDI: Separation of power dictates that each department has exclusive powers. According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, “the executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.” However, it does not define what is meant by “executive power” although in the same article it touches on exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons… (art VII secfs. 14-23). Although the constitution outlines tasks of the president, this list is not defined & exclusive. She has residual & discretionary powers not stated in the Constitution which include the power to protect the general welfare of the people. She is obliged to protect the people, promote their welfare & advance national interest. (Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of the Constitution). Residual powers, according to Theodore Roosevelt, dictate that the President can do anything which is not forbidden in the Constitution (Corwin, supra at 153), inevitable to vest discretionary powers on the President (Hyman, American President) and that the president has to maintain peace during times of emergency but also on the day-to-day operation of the State.

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(172) Saguisag v. Ochoa ISSUE: Whether the President may enter into an executive agreement on foreign military bases, troops, or facilities. FACTS: EDCA or Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement is an agreement between the Philippines and America wherein it authorizes the U.S. military forces to have access to and conduct activities within certain "Agreed Locations" in the country. After eight rounds of negotiations for two years, the Secretary of National Defense and the U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines signed the agreement on 28 April 2014. President Benigno S. Aquino III ratified EDCA on 6 June 2014. It was not transmitted to the Senate on the executive's understanding that to do so was no longer necessary. Senators file Senate Resolution No. (SR) 105.91. The resolution expresses the "strong sense" of the Senators that for EDCA to become valid and effective, it must first be transmitted to the Senate for deliberation and concurrence DECISION: Dismissed RATIO DECIDENDI: The manner of the President's execution of the law, even if not expressly granted by the law, is justified by necessity and limited only by law, since the President must "take necessary and proper steps to carry into execution the law”. It is the President's prerogative to do whatever is legal and necessary for Philippine defense interests (commander-in-chief powers). EDCA is considered an executive agreement, therefore may be bound through the President without the need of senatorial votes for its execution. The right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage

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(173) Funa v. Ermita ISSUE: Whether or not the designation of respondent Bautista as OIC of MARINA, concurrent with the position of DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport to which she had been appointed, violated the constitutional proscription against dual or multiple offices f FACTS: On October 4, 2006, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed respondent Maria Elena H. Bautista (Bautista) as Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC). Bautista was designated as Undersecretary for Maritime Transport of the department under Special Order No. 2006-171 dated October 23, 2006. On September 1, 2008, following the resignation of then MARINA Vicente T. Suazo, Jr., Bautista was designated as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Office of the , MARINA, in concurrent capacity as DOTC Undersecretary. On October 21, 2008, Dennis A. B. Funa in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer, filed the instant petition challenging the constitutionality of Bautista's appointment/designation, which is proscribed by the prohibition on the President, Vice-President, the of the Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants to hold any other office or employment. DECISION: Granted RATIO DECIDENDI: Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office. On the other hand, Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B reads: Sec. 7. Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. Thus, the Court ruled these sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on the President and his official family, which prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other public officials or employees such as the of Congress, of the civil service in general and of the armed forces, are proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution to treat the President and his official family as a class by itself and to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions.

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(174) Funa v. Agra ISSUE: Whether or not the designation of Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice, concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor General, violate the constitutional prohibition against dual or multiple offices for the of the Cabinet and their deputie FACTS: Petitioner alleges that Hon. Alberto C. Agra was appointed by the president to be the Acting Secretary of Justice and that Agra was also aubsequently appointed as Acting Solicitor General in concurrent capacity. Respondent has a diferrent story, he alleged that he was assigned to be the Acting Solicitor General first then was subsequently assigned to be the Acvting Secretary of Justice. Agra also alleged that he relinquished his position as Acting Solicitor General but kept performing his duties until his successor was appointed. Nothwithstanding the conflict in the versions of the parties, the fact that Agra has itted to holding the two offices concurrently in acting capacities is settled, which is sufficient for puposes of resolving the constitutional question that petitioner raises herein. DECISION: Granted RATIO DECIDENDI: According to the Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma, the only two exceptions: (1) those provided for under the Constitution, such as Section 3, Article VII, authorizing the Vice Presided to become a member of the Cabinet; and (2) posts occupied by Executive officials specified in Section 13, Article VII without additional compensation in ex officio capacities as provided by law and as ewquires by the primary functions of the officials’ offices. The primary functions of the Office of the Solicitor General are not related or necessary to the primary functions of the Department of Justice. Considering that the nature and duties of the two offices are such as to render it improper, from considerations of public policy, for one person to retain both, an incompatibility between the offices exists, further warranting the declaration of Agra’s designation as the Acting Secretary of Justice, concurrently with his designation as the Acting Solicitor General, to be void for being in violation of the express provisions of the Constitution.

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(175) De Castro v. JBC ISSUE: Whether or not the incumbent President can appoint the next Chief Justice FACTS: These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that “vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof” from a “list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.” Also considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President from making appointments within two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice. Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically considered” for the position of Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two declined their nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively. The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. DECISION: Denied RATIO DECIDENDI: Prohibition under section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the judiciary. The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the framers devoted time to meticulously drafting, styling, and arranging the Constitution. Such meticulousness indicates that the organization and arrangement of the provisions of the Constitution were not arbitrarily or whimsically done by the framers, but purposely made to reflect their intention and manifest their vision of what the Constitution should contain. As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among others, it lists the powers vested by the Constitution in the President. The presidential power of appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII.

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(176) Velicaria-Garafil v. OP ISSUE: Whether petitioners' appointments violate Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution FACTS: The present consolidated cases involve four petitions: G.R. No. 203372 with Atty. Cheloy E. Velicaria-Garafil, who was appointed State Solicitor II at the Office of the Solicitor General, as petitioner; G.R. No. 206290 with Atty. Dindo G. Venturanza, who was appointed Prosecutor IV of Quezon City, as petitioner; G.R. No. 209138 with Irma A. Villanueva , who was appointed for Visayas of the Board of s of the Cooperative Development Authority, and Francisca B. Rosquita, who was appointed Commissioner of the National Commission of Indigenous Peoples, as petitioners; and G.R. No. 212030 with Atty. Eddie U. Tamondong, who was appointed member of the Board of Directors of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority, as petitioner. Prior to the conduct of the May 2010 elections, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued more than 800 appointments to various positions in several government offices. The ban on midnight appointments in Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution reads: Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. Thus, for purposes of the 2010 elections, 10 March 2010 was the cutoff date for valid appointments and the next day, 11 March 2010, was the start of the ban on midnight appointments. Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution recognizes as an exception to the ban on midnight appointments only "temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety." None of the petitioners claim that their appointments fall under this exception. On 30 June 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III (President Aquino) took his oath of office as President of the Republic of the Philippines. On 30 July 2010, President Aquino issued EO 2 recalling, withdrawing, and revoking appointments issued by President Macapagal-Arroyo which violated the constitutional ban on midnight appointments. DECISION: the petitions in G.R. Nos. 203372, 206290, and 212030 are DENIED, and the petition in G.R. No. 209138 is DISMISSED. The appointments of petitioners Atty. Cheloy E. Velicaria-Garafil (G.R. No. 203372), Atty. Dindo G. Venturanza (G.R. No. 206290), Irma A. Villanueva, and Francisca B. Rosquita (G.R. No. 209138), and Atty. Eddie U. Tamondong (G.R. No. 212030) are declared VOID. RATIO DECIDENDI: The following elements should always concur in the making of a valid (which should be understood as both complete and effective) appointment: (1) authority to appoint and evidence of the exercise of the authority; The President's exercise of his power to appoint officials is provided for in the Constitution and laws. Discretion is an integral part in the exercise of the power of appointment. Considering that appointment calls for a selection, the appointing power necessarily exercises a discretion. (2) transmittal of the appointment paper and evidence of the transmittal; It is not enough that the President signs the appointment paper. There should be evidence that the President intended the appointment paper to be issued. It could happen that an appointment paper may be dated and signed by the President months before the appointment ban, but never left his locked drawer for the entirety of his term. Release of the appointment paper through the MRO is an unequivocal act that signifies the President's intent of

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its issuance. (3) a vacant position at the time of appointment; and (4) receipt of the appointment paper and acceptance of the appointment by the appointee who possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. Acceptance is indispensable to complete an appointment. Assuming office and taking the oath amount to acceptance of the appointment. An oath of office is a qualifying requirement for a public office, a prerequisite to the full investiture of the office. Petitioners have failed to show compliance with all four elements of a valid appointment. They cannot prove with certainty that their appointment papers were transmitted before the appointment ban took effect. On the other hand, petitioners it that they took their oaths of office during the appointment ban.

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(177) Manalo v. Sistosa ISSUE: Whether or not the appointments made by the President were valid even without the confirmation of Commission on Appointments FACTS: Petitioners question the constitutionality and legality of the permanent appointments issued by former President Corazon C. Aquino to the respondent senior officers of the Philippine National Police who were promoted to the ranks of Chief Superintendent and Director without their appointments submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution and Republic Act 6975 otherwise known as the Local Government Act of 1990. On December 13, 1990, Republic Act 6975 creating the Department of Interior and Local Government was signed into law by former President Corazon C. Aquino. In accordance therewith, on March 10, 1992, the President of the Philippines, through then Executive Secretary Franklin M. Drilon, promoted the fifteen (15) respondent police officers herein, by appointing them to positions in the Philippine National Police with the rank of Chief Superintendent to Director. The appointments of respondent police officers were in a permanent capacity. Without their names submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation, the said police officers took their oath of office and assumed their respective positions. Thereafter, the Department of Budget and Management, under the then Secretary Salvador M. Enriquez III, authorized disbursements for their salaries and other emoluments. DECISION: Dismissed RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes. Appointments are valid. PNP, herein respondents, do not fall under the first category of presidential appointees requiring the confirmation by Commission on Appointments. Section 116 Article VII provide for four groups of government to be appointed by President: First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. It is well-settled that only presidential appointments belonging to the first group require the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The appointments of respondent officers who are not within the first category, need not be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. Congress cannot by law expand the power of confirmation of the Commission on Appointments and require confirmation of appointments of other government officials not mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

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(178) Hontiveros-Baraquel v. TollRegulatory Board ISSUE: Whether the TRB has the power to grant authority to operate a toll facility FACTS: The Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) was created on 31 March 1977 by Presidential Decree No. (P.D.) 1112 in order to supervise and regulate, on behalf of the government, the collection of toll fees and the operation of toll facilities by the private sector. On the same date, P.D. 1113 was issued granting to the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (now Philippine National Construction Corporation or PNCC) the right, privilege, and authority to construct, operate, and maintain toll facilities in the North and South Luzon Toll Expressways for a period of 30 years starting 1 May 1977. TRB and PNCC later entered into a Toll Operation Agreement, which prescribed the operating conditions of the right granted to PNCC under P.D. 1113. On 27 November 1995, the Republic of the Philippines through the TRB as Grantor, CMMTC as Investor, and PNCC as Operator executed a Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement (STOA) covering Stage 1, Phases 1 and 2; and Stage 2, Phase 1 of the South Metro Manila Skyway. Under the STOA, the design and construction of the project roads became the primary and exclusive privilege and responsibility of CMMTC. The operation and maintenance of the project roads became the primary and exclusive privilege and responsibility of the PNCC Skyway Corporation (PSC), a wholly owned subsidiary of PNCC, which undertook and performed the latter's obligations under the STOA. On 18 July 2007, the Republic of the Philippines, through the TRB, CMMTC, and PNCC executed the assailed Amendment to the Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement (ASTOA). Under the ASTOA, Skyway O & M Corporation (SOMCO) replaced PSC in performing the operations and maintenance of Stage 1 of the South Metro Manila Skyway. Petitioners argue that the franchise for toll operations was exclusively vested by P.D. 1113 in PNCC, which exercised the powers under its franchise through PSC in accordance with the STOA. DECISION: Dismissed RATIO DECIDENDI: TRB has the power to grant authority to operate a toll facility. In Francisco v. TRB, the court held: It is abundantly clear that Sections 3 (a) and (e) of P.D. 1112 in relation to Section 4 of P.D. 1894 have invested the TRB with sufficient power to grant a qualified person or entity with authority to construct, maintain, and operate a toll facility and to issue the corresponding toll operating permit or TOC. First, there is nothing in P.D. 1113 or P.D. 1894 that states that the franchise granted to PNCC is to the exclusion of all others. Second, if we were to go by the theory of petitioners, it is only the operation and maintenance of the toll facilities that is vested with PNCC. This interpretation is contrary to the wording of P.D. 1113 and P.D. 1894 granting PNCC the right, privilege and authority to construct, operate and maintain the North Luzon, South Luzon and Metro Manila Expressways and their toll facilities. Third, aside from having been granted the power to grant istrative franchises for toll facility projects, TRB is also empowered to modify, amend, and impose additional conditions on the franchise of PNCC in an appropriate contract, particularly when public interest calls for it.

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(179) Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape TanonStrait, et al v. Secretary Angelo Reyes, et al ISSUE: Whether or not Service Contract No. 46 is violative of the 1987 Philippine Constitution and statutes FACTS: Petitioners, collectively referred to as the "Resident Marine Mammals" in the petition, are the toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species, which inhabit the waters in and around the Tañon Strait. They are ed by Gloria Estenzo Ramos and Rose-Liza EismaOsorio as their legal guardians and as friends (to be collectively known as "the Stewards") who allegedly empathize with, and seek the protection of, the aforementioned marine species. Also impleaded as an unwilling co-petitioner is former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, for her express declaration and undertaking in the ASEAN Charter to protect the Tañon Strait, among others. On June 13, 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the DOE, entered into a Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with JAPEX. This contract involved geological and geophysical studies of the Tañon Strait. The studies included surface geology, sample analysis, and reprocessing of seismic and magnetic data. JAPEX, assisted by DOE, also conducted geophysical and satellite surveys, as well as oil and gas sampling in Tañon Strait. On December 21, 2004, DOE and JAPEX formally converted GSEC102 into SC-46 for the exploration, development, and production of petroleum resources in a block covering approximately 2,850 square kilometers offshore the Tañon Strait. JAPEX committed to drill one exploration well during the second sub-phase of the project. On March 6, 2007, the EMB of DENR Region VII granted an ECC to the DOE and JAPEX for the offshore oil and gas exploration project in Tañon Strait.14 Months later, on November 16, 2007, JAPEX began to drill an exploratory well, with a depth of 3,150 meters, near Pinamungajan town in the western Cebu Province.15 This drilling lasted until February 8, 2008. The petitioners insist that SC-46 is null and void for having violated Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. DECISION: Granted RATIO DECIDENDI: This Court has previously settled the issue of whether service contracts are still allowed under the 1987 Constitution. In La Bugal, the Court held that the deletion of the words "service contracts" in the 1987 Constitution did not amount to a ban on them per se. In fact, portions of the deliberations of the of the Constitutional Commission (ConCom) to show that in deliberating on paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII, they were actually referring to service contracts as understood in the 1973 Constitution, albeit with safety measures to eliminate or minimize the abuses prevalent during the martial law regime. In summarizing the matters discussed in the ConCom, the Court established that paragraph 4, with the safeguards in place, is the exception to paragraph 1, Section 2 of Article XII. The following are the safeguards this Court enumerated in La Bugal: Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils. The grant thereof is subject to several safeguards, among which are these requirements: (1) The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general law that will set standard or uniform , conditions and requirements, presumably to attain a certain uniformity in provisions and avoid the possible insertion of disadvantageous to the country. (2) The President shall be the signatory for the government because, supposedly before an agreement is presented to the President for signature, it will have been vetted several times over at different levels to ensure that it conforms to law and can

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withstand public scrutiny. (3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it to Congress to give that branch of government an opportunity to look over the agreement and interpose timely objections, if any.69cralawlawlibrary. Adhering to the aforementioned guidelines, the Court finds that SC-46 is indeed null and void for noncompliance with the requirements of the 1987 Constitution.

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(180) Kulayan v. Tan ISSUE: Whether or not a governor can exercise the calling-out powers of President? FACTS: Three from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were kidnapped in the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol in Patikul, Sulu. Andres Notter, Eugenio Vagni, and Marie Jean Lacaba, were purportedly inspecting a water and sanitation project for the Sulu Provincial Jail when inspecting a water and sanitation project for the Sulu Provincial Jail when they were seized by three armed men who were later confirmed to be of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). A Local Crisis Committee, later renamed Sulu Crisis Management Committee (Committee) was then formed to investigate the kidnapping incident. The Committee convened under the leadership of respondent Abdusakur Mahail Tan, the Provincial Governor of Sulu. Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009, declaring a state of emergency in the province of Sulu. The Proclamation cited the kidnapping incident as a ground for the said declaration, describing it as a terrorist act pursuant to the Human Security Act (R.A. 9372). It also invoked Section 465 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160), which bestows on the Provincial Governor the power to carry out emergency measures during man-made and natural disasters and calamities, and to call upon the appropriate national law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder and lawless violence. In the Proclamation, Tan called upon the PNP and the CEF to set up checkpoints and chokepoints, conduct general search and seizures including arrests, and other actions necessary to ensure public safety. Petitioners, Jamar Kulayan, et al. contend that Proclamation No. 1 and its Implementing Guidelines were issued ultra vires, and thus null and void, for violating Sections 1 and 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which grants the President sole authority to exercise emergency powers and calling-out powers as the chief executive of the Republic and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. DECISION: Granted RATIO DECIDENDI: It has already been established that there is one repository of executive powers, and that is the President of the Republic. This means that when Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of executive power, it is granted to the President and no one else. Corollarily, it is only the President, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency powers as provided under Section 23, Article VI, of the Constitution, as well as what became known as the calling-out powers under Section 7, Article VII thereof. While the President is still a civilian, Article II, Section 339 of the Constitution mandates that civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military, making the civilian president the nation’s supreme military leader. The net effect of Article II, Section 3, when read with Article VII, Section 18, is that a civilian President is the ceremonial, legal and istrative head of the armed forces. The Constitution does not require that the President must be possessed of military training and talents, but as Commander-in-Chief, he has the power to direct military operations and to determine military strategy. Normally, he would be expected to delegate the actual command of the armed forces to military experts; but the ultimate power is his. Given the foregoing, Governor Tan is not endowed with the power to call upon the armed forces at his own bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a state of emergency and called upon Armed Forces, the police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force. The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President.

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An exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government Code.

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(181) Ampatuan vs Puno ISSUE: Wheter or not President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she called out the AFP and PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in Maguindano, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City. FACTS: On 24 November 2009, the day after the Maguindanao Massacre, then Pres. Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946, placing “the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state of emergency.” She directed the AFP and the PNP “to undertake such measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence” in the named places. Three days later, she also issued AO 273 “transferring” supervision of the ARMM from the Office of the President to the DILG. She subsequently issued AO 273-A, which amended the former AO (the term “transfer” used in AO 273 was amended to “delegate”, referring to the supervision of the ARMM by the DILG). DECISION: Dismissed RATIO DECIDENDI: The deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers as understood under Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, which provides: SECTION 23. x x x (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not need a congressional authority to exercise the same.

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(182) Fortun vs Arroyo ISSUE: Whether or not the Presidential Proclamation of Martial Law and suspension of the privelege of Habeas Corpus in 2009 in Central Mindanao which were withdrawn after just eight days is constitutional FACTS: On November 23, 2009 heavily armed men, believed led by the ruling Ampatuan family, gunned down and buried under shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians on a highway in Maguindanao. In response to this carnage, on November 24 President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1946, declaring a state of emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City to prevent and suppress similar lawless violence in Central Mindanao. Believing that she needed greater authority to put order in Maguindanao and secure it from large groups of persons that have taken up arms against the constituted authorities in the province, on December 4, 2009 President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1959 declaring... martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in that province except for identified areas of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front On December 9, 2009 Congress, in t session, convened pursuant to Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to review the validity of the President's action. But, two days later or on December 12 before Congress could act, the President issued Presidential Proclamation 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao. DECISION: Moot and Academic; Political Issue; Dismissed RATIO DECIDENDI: It is evident that under the 1987 Constitution the President and the Congress act in tandem in exercising the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. They exercise the power, not only sequentially, but in a sense tly... since, after the President has initiated the proclamation or the suspension, only the Congress can maintain the same based on its own evaluation of the situation on the ground, a power that the President does not have. Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the Court must allow Congress to exercise its own review powers, which is... automatic rather than initiated. Only when Congress defaults in its express duty to defend the Constitution through such review should the Supreme Court step in as its final rampart. The constitutional validity of the President's proclamation of martial law or... suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political question in the hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court. Here, President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 before the t houses of Congress, which had in fact convened, could act on the same. Consequently, the petitions in these cases have become moot and the Court has nothing to review. The lifting of martial law and... restoration of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao was a supervening event that obliterated any justiciable controversy

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(183) Lagman vs Medialdea ISSUE: Whether or not there is a sufficient factual basis for the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privelege of writ of habeas corpus FACTS: On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring Martial Law in the whole island of Mindanao and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus therein. On May 25, the president submitted a written report to Congress on the factual basis of the Martial Law declaration (as required by the Constitution). The main basis of the declaration was the attack of the Maute terrorist group in Marawi City. According to the report, the Maute group is an of ISIS which is aiming to establish an Islamic caliphate in Marawi City (and might spread its control in all the other parts of Mindanao). It also cited the ongoing rebellion and lawless violence that has plagued Mindanao for decades. DECISION: Yes RATIO DECIDENDI: In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension, the Court considers only the information and data available to the President prior to or at the time of the declaration. The determination by the Court of the sufficiency of factual basis must be limited only to the facts and information mentioned in the Report and Proclamation. The Court held that the President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual bases tending to show that actual rebellion exists. The President only has to ascertain if there is probable cause for a declaration of Martial Law and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. The petitioners’ counter-evidence were derived solely from unverified news articles on the internet, with neither the authors nor the sources shown to have affirmed the contents thereof. As the Court has consistently ruled, news articles are hearsay evidence, twice removed, and are thus without any probative value, unless offered for a purpose other than proving the truth of the matter asserted. The alleged false and/or inaccurate statements are just pieces and parcels of the Report; along with these alleged false data is an arsenal of other independent facts showing that more likely than not, actual rebellion exists.

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(184) Monsantos vs Factoran Jr. ISSUE: Whether or not public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment? FACTS: The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) of the crime of estafa through falsification of public documents. She was sentenced to jail and to indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50.The SC affirmed the decision. She then filed a motion for reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she was extended by then President Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted (at that time, the rule was that clemency could be given even before conviction). By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since the same was still vacant. Her letter was referred to the Minister of Finance who ruled that she may be reinstated to her position without the necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the date she was extended the absolute pardon. Petitioner wrote the Ministry stressing that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the crime which implies that her service in the government has never been interrupted and therefore the date of her reinstatement should correspond to the date of her preventive suspension; that she is entitled to backpay for the entire period of her suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the proportionate share of the amount of P4,892.50 The Ministry referred the issue to the Office of the President. Deputy Executive Secretary Factoran denied Monsanto’s request averring that Monsanto must first seek appointment and that the pardon does not reinstate her former position. DECISION: No RATIO DECIDENDI: The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.

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(185) Rosa-Vidal vs Comelec ISSUE: Whether or not former President Joseph Estrada run for public office despite having been convicted of the crime of plunder which carried an accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office? FACTS: On Sep 2007, Sandiganbayan convicted Estrada for the crime of plunder with the penalty of reclusion perpetua and accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification. On Oct 2007, President Arroyo extended executive clemency, by way of pardon to Estrada thereby restoring his civil and political right upon which Estrada received and accepted. On Nov 2009, Estrada filed a certificate of candidacy for the position of President and has earned 3 oppositions in the COMELEC. In 2012 Estrada filed a COC vying for the position of Manila City Mayor. Then, Risos-Vidal, petitioner, filed a petition for disqualification against Estrada. Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against Estrada before the Comelec stating that Estrada is disqualified to run for public office because of his conviction for plunder sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with perpetual absolute disqualification. Petitioner relied on Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC). The Comelec dismissed the petition for disqualification holding that President Estrada’s right to seek public office has been effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo. Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections. Alfredo Lim, who garnered the second highest votes, intervened and sought to disqualify Estrada for the same ground as the contention of Risos-Vidal and praying that he be proclaimed as Mayor of Manila. DECISION: Yes RATIO DECIDENDI: Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition or limitation, considering the unqualified use of the term “civil and political rights”as being restored. Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is not an essential part of an act as it is an introductory or preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the enactment, usually introduced by the word “whereas.” Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute because, strictly speaking, they are not part of the operative language of the statute. In this case, the whereas clause at issue is not an integral part of the decree of the pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone operate to make the pardon conditional or to make its effectivity contingent upon the fulfilment of the aforementioned commitment nor to limit the scope of the pardon.

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(186) Saguisag vs Ochoa Jr. ISSUE: Whether or not the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America (U.S.) constitutional FACTS: petitioners respectfully pray that the Honorable Court RECONSIDER, REVERSE, AND SET - ASIDE its Decision dated January 12, 2016, and issue a new Decision GRANTING the instant consolidated petitions by declaring the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) entered into by the respondents for the Philippine government, with the United States of America, UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND INVALID and to permanently en its implementation. petitioners claim this Court erred when it ruled that EDCA was not a treaty.[5] In connection to this, petitioners move that EDCA must be in the form of a treaty in order to comply with the constitutional restriction under Section 25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution on foreign military bases, troops, and facilities.[6] Additionally, they reiterate their arguments on the issues of telecommunications, taxation, and nuclear weapons.[7] Petitioners assert that this Court contradicted itself when it interpreted the word "allowed in" to refer to the initial entry of foreign bases, troops, and facilities, based on the fact that the plain meaning of the provision in question referred to prohibiting the return of foreign bases, troops, and facilities except under a treaty concurred in by the Senate Secondly, by interpreting "allowed in" as referring to an initial entry, the Court has simply applied the plain meaning of the words in the particular provision.[10] Necessarily, once entry has been established by a subsisting treaty, latter instances of entry need not be embodied by a separate treaty. After all, the Constitution did not state that foreign military bases, troops, and facilities shall not subsist or exist in the Philippines. DECISION: Yes RATIO DECIDENDI: The EDCA did not go beyond the framework. The entry of US troops has long been authorized under a valid and subsisting treaty, which is the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA).[14] Reading the VFA along with the longstanding Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT)[15] led this Court to the conclusion that an executive agreement such as the EDCA was well within the bounds of the obligations imposed by both treaties. Thus, we find no reason for EDCA to be declared unconstitutional. It fully conforms to the Philippines' legal regime through the MDT and VFA. It also fully conforms to the government's continued policy to enhance our military capability in the face of various military and humanitarian issues that may arise. This Motion for Reconsideration has not raised any additional legal arguments that warrant revisiting the Decision. Principles: On verba legis interpretation... verba legis Petitioners' own interpretation and application of the verba legis rule will in fact result in an absurdity, which legal construction strictly abhors. The settled rule is that the plain, clear and unambiguous language of the Constitution should be construed as such and should not be given a construction that changes its meaning With due respect, the Honorable Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno's theory of "initial entry" mentioned above ventured into a construction of the provisions of Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution which is patently contrary to the plain language and meaning of the said constitutional provision.

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(187) Bayan vs Exec Secretary ISSUE: Whether or not the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) unconstitutional FACTS: The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered into an agreement called the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The agreement was treated as a treaty by the Philippine government and was ratified by then-President Joseph Estrada with the concurrence of 2/3 of the total hip of the Philippine Senate. The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits, and further defines the rights of the U.S. and the Philippine governments in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies. Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates §25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate . . . and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.” DECISION: No RATIO DECIDENDI: Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state. There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution . . . the provision in [in §25, Article XVIII] requiring ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum being unnecessary since Congress has not required it.

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(188) Biraogo vs Philippine Truth Commission ISSUE: Whether or not E.O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions; FACTS: Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010. PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by thirdlevel public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous istration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law. Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to en the PTC from performing its functions. DECISION: No RATIO DECIDENDI: There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for the commission. The amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no impropriety in the funding.

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(189) Chavez vs. JBC ISSUE: Whether or not the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been met. FACTS: In 1994, instead of having only 7 , an eighth member was added to the JBC as two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each. Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition. Respondents argued that the crux of the controversy is the phrase “a representative of Congress.” It is their theory that the two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives, are permanent and mandatory components of “Congress,” such that the absence of either divests the term of its substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution. Bicameralism, as the system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise their respective powers in the performance of its mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution speaks of “a representative from Congress,” it should mean one representative each from both Houses which comprise the entire Congress. DECISION: Yes RATIO DECIDENDI: The Courts’ power of judicial review is subject to several limitations, namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have “standing” to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when these conditions sine qua non are present, especially when the constitutionality of an act by a co-equal branch of government is put in issue. The Court disagrees with the respondents’ contention that petitioner lost his standing to sue because he is not an official nominee for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true that a “personal stake” on the case is imperative to have locus standi, this is not to say that only official nominees for the post of Chief Justice can come to the Court and question the JBC composition for being unconstitutional. The JBC likewise screens and nominates other of the Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized in this regard, the JBC’s duty is not at all limited to the nominations for the highest magistrate in the land. A vast number of aspirants to judicial posts all over the country may be affected by the Court’s ruling. More importantly, the legality of the very process of nominations to the positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus of the controversy. The claim that the composition of the JBC is illegal and unconstitutional is an object of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all citizens who have the right to seek judicial intervention for rectification of legal blunders.

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(190) Jardeleza vs. Sereno ISSUE: Whether or not the right to due process is available in the course of JBC proceedings in cases where an objection or opposition to an application is raised. FACTS: Associate Justice Roberto Abad was about to retire and the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) announce an opening for application and recommendation for the said vacancy. Francis H. Jardeleza (Jardeleza), incumbent Solicitor General of the Republic was included in the list of candidates. Hence, he was interviewed. However, he received calls from some Justices that the Chief Justice herself – CJ Sereno, will be invoking unanimity rule against him. It is invoked because Jardeleza’s integrity is in question. During the meeting, Justice Carpio disclosed a confidential information which characterized Jardeleza’s integrity as dubious. Jardeleza answered that he would defend himself provided that due process would be observed. His request was denied and he was not included in the shortlist. Hence, Jardeleza filed for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for TRO to compel the JBC to include him in the list on the grounds that the JBC and CJ Sereno acted with grave abuse of discretion in excluding him, despite having garnered a sufficient number of votes to qualify for the position. DECISION: Yes RATIO DECIDENDI: While it is true that the JBC proceedings are sui generis, it does not automatically denigrate an applicant’s entitlement to due process. The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature of JBC proceedings. Notwithstanding being “a class of its own,” the right to be heard and to explain one’s self is availing. In cases where an objection to an applicant’s qualifications is raised, the observance of due process neither contradicts the fulfillment of the JBC’s duty to recommend. This holding is not an encroachment on its discretion in the nomination process. Actually, its adherence to the precepts of due process s and enriches the exercise of its discretion. When an applicant, who vehemently denies the truth of the objections, is afforded the chance to protest, the JBC is presented with a clearer understanding of the situation it faces, thereby guarding the body from making an unsound and capricious assessment of information brought before it. The JBC is not expected to strictly apply the rules of evidence in its assessment of an objection against an applicant. Just the same, to hear the side of the person challenged complies with the dictates of fairness because the only test that an exercise of discretion must surmount is that of soundness. Consequently, the Court is compelled to rule that Jardeleza should have been included in the shortlist submitted to the President for the vacated position of Associate Justice Abad. This consequence arose from the violation by the JBC of its own rules of procedure and the basic tenets of due process. True, Jardeleza has no vested right to a nomination, but this does not prescind from the fact that the JBC failed to observe the minimum requirements of due process.

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(191) Villanueva vs JBC ISSUE: W/N the policy of JBC requiring five years of service as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant to second-level courts is constitutional FACTS: Petitioner applied for a position as a judge in a second level court but JBC did not include his name in the list of applicants since he failed to qualify. This is because the JBC put priority to incumbent judges who served their position for at least five years and petitioner hereonly served as judged for more than a year. The petitioner assailed, inter alia, the authority of the JBC to add another qualification (5-year-qualitification) because thesaid qualification was already prescribed DECISION: Yes RATIO DECIDENDI: The said added 5-year-qualification being assailed by the petitioner is constitutional since as stated in the Sect. 8 (5), Art.VIII, the JBC is mandated to recommend appointees to the judiciary. Consequently, it was also stated in the said provision thatonly the persons nominated by the JBC is transmitted to the president that will choose whom to nominate as judge in the judiciary.

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(192) RE: COAopinion on the computation of the appraised value of the properties purchased by the retired Chief / associate justices of the supreme court A.M. NO. 11-7-10SC JULY 31, 2012 ISSUE: W/N COA’s interference, in this case, violates the judiciary’s autonomy. FACTS: Office of the General Counsel of the Commission on Audit (COA) found that an underpayment amounting to P221,021.50 resulted when five retired Supreme Court justices purchased from the Supreme Court the personal properties assigned to them during their incumbency in the Court. The COA attributed this underpayment to the use by the Property Division of the Supreme Court of the wrong formula in computing the appraisal value of the purchased vehicles. According to the COA, the Property Division erroneously appraised the subject motor vehicles by applying Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) t Resolution No. 35 and its guidelines, in compliance with the Resolution of the Court En Banc in A.M. No. 03- 12-01, when it should have applied the formula found in COA Memorandum No. 98-569-A4. Atty. Candelaria, Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief istrative Officer, recommended that the Court advise the COA to respect the in-house computation based on the CFAG formula, noting that this was the first time that the COA questioned the authority of the Court in using CFAG t Resolution No. 35 and its guidelines in the appraisal and disposal of government property since these were issued in 1997. As a matter of fact, in two previous instances involving two retired Court of Appeals Associate Justices, the COA upheld the inhouse appraisal of government property using the formula found in the CFAG guidelines. More importantly, the Constitution itself grants the Judiciary fiscal autonomy in the handling of its budget and resources. DECISION: Yes RATIO DECIDENDI: The COA’s authority to conduct post-audit examinations on constitutional bodies granted fiscal autonomy is provided under Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution. This authority, however, must be read not only in light of the Court’s fiscal autonomy, but also in relation with the constitutional provisions on judicial independence and the existing jurisprudence and Court rulings on these matters. Any kind of interference on how these retirement privileges and benefits are exercised and availed of, not only violates the fiscal autonomy and independence of the Judiciary, but also encroaches upon the constitutional duty and privilege of the Chief Justice and the Supreme Court En Banc to manage the Judiciary’s own affairs.

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(193) RE: Request for guidance/clarification on Section 7, Rule III of RA NO 10154, Requiring retiring government employees to secure a clearance of pendency/non-pendency of case/s from the Civi Service Commission ISSUE: W/N the said provision is applicable to of the judiciary FACTS: Section 7, Rule III of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. (RA) 101541 states that: Notice of Pendency of Case. The retiring employee shall seek Clearance of Pendency/Non-Pendency of istrative Case from his/her employer agency, Civil Service Commission (CSC),Office of the Ombudsman, or in case of presidential appointees, from the Office of the President. DECISION: No RATIO DECIDENDI: Section 6,2 Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) exclusively vests in the Court istrative supervision over all courts and court personnel.3 As such, it oversees the court personnel’s compliance with all laws and takes the proper istrative action against them for any violation thereof. The requirement of seeking a Clearance of Pendency/Non-Pendency of istrative Case from the Civil Service Commission embodied in Section 7, Rule III of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 10154 is declared INAPPLICABLE to retiring employees of the Judiciary

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(194) RE: Save the SC judicial independence and fiscal autonomy movement v abolition of judiciary development fund(JDF) and reduction of fiscal autonomy UDK-15143, Jan. 21, 2015 ISSUE: W/N petitioner Rolly Mijares has sufficiently shown grounds for this court to grant the petition and issue a writ of mandamus. FACTS: Petitioner Rolly Mijares (Mijares) prays for the issuance of a writ of mandamus in order to compel this court to exercise its judicial independence and fiscal autonomy against the perceived hostility of Congress. In the letter-petition, Mijares alleges that he is "a Filipino citizen, and a concerned taxpayer. He filed this petition as part of his "continuing crusade to defend and uphold the Constitution" because he believes in the rule of law. He is concerned about the threats against the judiciary after this court promulgated Priority Development Assistance Fund. The complaint implied that certain acts of of Congress and the President after the promulgation of these cases show a threat to judicial independence. Petitioner argues that Congress "gravely abused its discretion with a blatant usurpation of judicial independence and fiscal autonomy of the Supreme Court. Petitioner points out that Congress is exercising its power "in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of ion or personal hostility by abolishing the ‘Judiciary Development Fund’ (JDF) of the Supreme Court. With regard to his prayer for the issuance of the writ of mandamus, petitioner avers that Congress should not act as "wreckers of the law" by threatening "to clip the powers of the High Tribunal[.]" Congress committed a "blunder of monumental proportions" when it reduced the judiciary’s 2015 budget. Petitioner prays that this court exercise its powers to "REVOKE/ABROGATE and EXPUNGE whatever irreconcilable contravention of existing laws affecting the judicial independence and fiscal autonomy as mandated under the Constitution to better serve public interest and general welfare of the people." DECISION: No RATIO DECIDENDI: The power of judicial review, like all powers granted by the Constitution, is subject to certain limitations. Petitioner must comply with all the requisites for judicial review before this court may take cognizance of the case. The requisites are: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. The court held that there is no actual case or controversy and that the petitioner has no legal standing to question the validity of the proposed bill.

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(195) RE: Petition for recognition of exemption of the GSIS from payment of legal fees 612 SCRA 193 (2010) ISSUE: W/N the legislature can exempt the GSIS from legal fees imposed by the Court on GOCCs and local government units FACTS: The GSIS seeks exemption from the payment of legal fees imposed on GOCCs under Sec 22, Rule 141 (Legal Fees) of the ROC. The GSIS anchors its petition on Sec 39 of its charter, RA 8291 (The GSIS Act of 1997) Required to comment on the GSIS’ petition, the OSG maintains that the petition should be denied. On this Court’s order, the Office of the Chief Attorney (OCAT) submitted a report and recommendation on the petition of the GSIS and the comment of the OSG thereon. According to the OCAT, the claim of the GSIS for exemption from the payment of legal fees has no legal basis. DECISION: No RATIO DECIDENDI: The GSIS is a corporate entity whose personality is separate and distinct from that of its individual . The rights of its are not its rights; its rights, powers and functions pertain to it solely and are not shared by its . More importantly, the Congress could not have carved out an exemption for the GSIS from the payment of legal fees without transgressing another equally important institutional safeguard of the Court’s independence — fiscal autonomy. Legal fees therefore do not only constitute a vital source of the Court’s financial resources but also comprise an essential element of the Court’s fiscal independence. The 1987 Constitution also took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure.

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(196) Cayetano v Monsod ISSUE: W/N the appointment of Chairman Monsod of Comelec violates Section 1 (1), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution? FACTS: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC. Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void. DECISION: No RATIO DECIDENDI: The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). In the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, the Court said that, Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide.

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(197) Gaminde v COA ISSUE: W/N the term of office of Atty. Thelma P. Gaminde, as Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, to which she was appointed on June 11, 1993, expired on February 02, 1999, as stated in the appointment paper, or on February 02, 2000, as claimed by her. FACTS: The President appointed petitioner Gaminde, ad interim, Commissioner, Civil Service Commission. The Commission on Appointments, Congress of the Philippines confirmed the appointment. On February 24, 1998, petitioner sought clarification from the Office of the President as to the expiry date of her term of office. In reply to her request, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, in a letter dated April 07, 1998, opined that petitioner's term of office would expire on February 02, 2000, not on, February 02, 1999. Relying on said advisory opinion, petitioner remained in office after February 02, 1999. On February 04, 1999, Chairman Corazon Alma G. de Leon; wrote the Commission on Audit requesting opinion on whether or not Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde and her co-terminus staff may be paid their salaries notwithstanding the expiration of their appointments on February 02,1999. On February 18, 1999, the General Counsel, Commission on Audit, issued an opinion that "the term of Commissioner Gaminde has expired on February 02, 1999 as stated in her appointment conformably with the constitutional intent." Consequently, on March 24, 1999, CSC Resident Auditor Flovitas U. Felipe issued notice of disallowance disallowing in audit the salaries and emoluments pertaining to petitioner and her co-terminus staff, effective February 02, 1999. Petitioner appealed the disallowance but the Commission on Audit affirmed the propriety of the disallowance, holding that the issue of petitioner's term of office may be properly addressed by mere reference to her appointment paper which set the expiration date on February 02, 1999, and that the Commission was bereft of power to recognize an extension of her term, not even with the implied acquiescence of the Office of the President. Petitioner moved for reconsideration; however, on August 17, 1999, the Commission on Audit denied the motion in Decision No. 99129. DECISION: Her appointment expired on February 02, 1999, but is entitled to received her salary and other emoluments RATIO DECIDENDI: The term of office of Ms. Thelma P. Gaminde as Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, under an appointment extended to her expired on February 02, 1999. However, she served as de facto officer in good faith until February 02, 2000, and thus entitled to receive her salary and other emoluments for actual service rendered. The of the first Chairmen and Commissioners of the Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must start on a common date, irrespective of the variations in the dates of appointments and qualifications of the appointees, in order that the expiration of the first of seven, five and three years should lead to the regular recurrence of the two-year interval between the expiration of the . Applying the foregoing conditions to the case at bar, we rule that the appropriate starting point of the of office of the first appointees to the Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must be on February 02, 1987, the date of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution. In the law of public officers, there is a settled distinction between "term" and "tenure." "The term of an office must be distinguished from the tenure of the incumbent. The term means the time during the officer may claim to hold office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the term

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during which the incumbent actually holds the office. The term of office is not affected by the hold-over. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent." We thus see the regular interval of vacancy every two (2) years, namely, February 02, 1994, for the first Chairman, February 02, 1992, for the first five-year term Commissioner, and February 02, 1990, for the first three-year term Commissioner. Their successors must also maintain the two year interval, namely: February 02, 2001, for Chairman; February 02, 1999, for Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde, and February 02, 1997, for Commissioner Ramon P. Ereñeta, Jr.||

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(198) Brillantes v Yorac ISSUE: W/N the President may designate the Acting Chairman of the COMELEC in the absence of the regular Chairman. FACTS: The President designated Associate Commissioner Yorac as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections, in place of Chairman Hilario B. Davide, who had been named chairman of the fact-finding commission to investigate the December 1989 coup d’ etat attempt. Brillantes challenged the act of the President as contrary to the constitutional provision that ensures the independence the Commission on Elections as an independent constitutional body and the specific provision that “(I)n no case shall any Member (of the Commission on Elections) be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.” Brillantes contends that the choice of the Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections is an internal matter that should be resolved by the themselves and that the intrusion of the President of the Philippines violates their independence. The Solicitor General the designation made by the President of the Philippines should therefore be sustained for reasons of “istrative expediency,” to prevent disruption of the functions of the COMELEC. DECISION: No RATIO DECIDENDI: The Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional Commissions as “independent.” They are not under the control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of their respective functions. Each of these Commissions conducts its own proceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules and in the exercise of its own discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are subject only to review on certiorari by this Court as provided by the Constitution. The choice of a temporary chairman in the absence of the regular chairman comes under that discretion. That discretion cannot be exercised for it, even with its consent, by the President of the Philippines. The lack of a statutory rule covering the situation at bar is no justification for the President of the Philippines to fill the void by extending the temporary designation in favor of the respondent. The situation could have been handled by the of the Commission on Elections themselves without the participation of the President.

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(199) CSC v DBM ISSUE: W/N DBM’s policy of “No Report, No Release” is constitutional FACTS: CSC filed a petition for mandamus seeking to compel the DBM to release the balance of its budget for fiscal year 2002. At the same time, it seeks a determination by this Court of the extent of the constitutional concept of fiscal autonomy. General Appropriation Act of 2002 (GAA) appropriated total funds to the CSC but they claimed that there is an unreleased balance. To CSC, this balance was intentionally withheld by DBM on the basis of its no report, no release policy. DBM proffers at any rate that the delay in releasing the balance of CSC budget was not on of any failure on CSC part to submit the required reports; rather, it was due to a shortfall in revenues. Moreover, DBM contends that CSC did not exhaust istrative remedies as it could have sought clarification from DBM Secretary regarding the extent of fiscal autonomy before resorting to Court. Second, even assuming that istrative remedies were exhausted, there are no exceptional and compelling reasons to justify the direct filing of the petition with Supreme Court instead of the trial court, thus violating the hierarchy of courts. DECISION: No RATIO DECIDENDI: DBM’s policy of “No Report, No Release” may not be validly enforced against offices possessing fiscal autonomy without violating Article IX (A), Section 5 of the Constitution which states: The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released. It is under such situation that a relaxation of the constitutional mandate to automatically and regularly release appropriations is allowed. Their approved appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.

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(200) Funa v Duque ISSUE: W/N the designation of Duque as member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, in an ex officio capacity, impair the independence of the CSC and violate the constitutional prohibition against the holding of dual or mul FACTS: Then president GMA issued EO 864 which allows tge chairman of the CSC to be in the board of trustees/directors of certain GOCCs. Funa asserts that EO 864 and Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 violate the independence of the CSC, which was constitutionally created to be protected from outside influences and political pressures due to the significance of its government functions. He further asserts that such independence is violated by the fact that the CSC is not a part of the Executive Branch of Government while the concerned GOCCs are considered instrumentalities of the Executive Branch of the Government. In this situation, the President may exercise his power of control over the CSC considering that the GOCCs in which Duque sits as Board member are attached to the Executive Department. Funa claims that EO 864 and Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 violate the prohibition imposed upon of constitutional commissions from holding any other office or employment. A conflict of interest may arise in the event that a Board decision of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF concerning personnel-related matters is elevated to the CSC considering that such GOCCs have original charters, and their employees are governed by CSC laws, rules and regulations. Respondents submit that the prohibition against holding any other office or employment under Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution does not cover positions held without additional compensation in ex officio capacities. DECISION: Yes. The Court upholds the constitutionality of Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292, but declares unconstitutional EO 864 and the designation of Duque in an ex officio capacity as a member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF. RATIO DECIDENDI: While all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-President, of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. .Under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, the President exercises control over all government offices in the Executive Branch. An office that is legally not under the control of the President is not part of the Executive Branch, hence when the CSC Chairman sits as a member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, he may exercise powers and functions which are not anymore derived from his position as CSC Chairman

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(201) Sarmiento v Comelec ISSUE: Whether or not the Commission on Elections en banc may hear and decide preproclamation cases classified as special cases. FACTS: Petitioners impugned the challenged resolutions of the Commission on Elections in pre-proclamation cases classified as special cases. DECISION: No RATIO DECIDENDI: Article IX-C, Section 3 of the Constitution expressly provides that election cases include pre-proclamation controversies, and all such cases must first be heard and decided by a division of the commission. The commission, sitting en banc, does not have the authority to hear and decide the same at the first instance.

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(202) Ambil v Comelec ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court has the power to review decisions of the COMELEC. FACTS: On 04 Jun 1998, respondent Jose Ramirez filed an election protest with the COMELEC challenging the result of the 11 May 1998 elections where petitioner Ruperto Ambil, Jr. was proclaimed the duly-elected governor of Eastern Samar. On 24 Feb 2000, Commissioner Japal Guidani retired from the service prior to the finalization of his proposed resolution in the Ramirez protest. In said resolution, Commissioner Julio Desamito had dissented while Commissioner Luzviminda Tancangco did not indicate her vote. DECISION: Yes RATIO DECIDENDI: Article IX-A, Section 7 provides that any decision, order or ruling of each commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. The Court interpreted the provision to mean final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. The decision must be a final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc, not a division, certainly not an interlocutory order of a division.

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(203) Brillantes v comelec ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC may conduct “unofficial” tabulation of presidential election results based on a copy of the election returns. FACTS: Congress enacted R.A. No. 8436 authorizing COMELEC to use an automated election system for the process of voting, counting of votes and canvassing/consolidating the results of national and local elections. COMELEC subsequently approved Resolution 6712 adopting the policy that the precint election results of each city and municipality shall be immediately transmitted electronically in advance to the COMELEC in Manila. Petitioners questioned the constitutionality of the quickcount as being preemptive of the authority vested in Congress to canvass the votes for the President and Vice-President under Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitutuion. DECISION: No RATIO DECIDENDI: The assailed resolution usurps, under the guise of an “unofficial” tabulation of election results based on a copy of the election results, the sole and exclusive authority of Congress to canvass the votes for the election of President and Vice-President.

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(204) Sandoval v comelec ISSUE: whether the COMELEC's order to set aside petitioner's proclamation was valid. FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent herein were candidates for the congressional seat for the Malabon-Navotas legislative district during the elections held on May 11, 1998. After canvassing the municipal certificates of canvass, the district board of canvassers proclaimed petitioner the duly elected congressman. The petitioner took his oath of office on the same day. Private respondent filed with the Comelec a petition, which sought the annulment of petitioner's proclamation. He alleged that there was a verbal order from the Comelec Chairman to suspend the canvass and proclamation of the winning candidate, but the district board of canvassers proceeded with the canvass and proclamation despite the said verbal order. He also alleged that there was non-inclusion of 19 election returns in the canvass, which would result in an incomplete canvass of the election returns. The Comelec en banc issued an order setting aside the proclamation of petitioner and ruled the proclamation as void. Hence, this petition for certiorari seeking the annulment and reversal of the Comelec order. DECISION: No RATIO DECIDENDI: its order to set aside the proclamation of petitioner is invalid for having been rendered without due process of law. Procedural due process demands prior notice and hearing. The facts show that COMELEC set aside the proclamation of petitioner without the benefit of prior notice and hearing and it rendered the questioned order based solely on private respondent's allegations.

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(205) Al haj v comelec ISSUE: Whether or not the grounds assailed by the petitioners constitute grounds for declaration of failure of election. FACTS: Petitioner assail the resolution of the Commission on elections en banc dismissing their petition to declare a failure of elections in the Municipality of Munai, Province of Lanao del Norte. In their petition, petitioners Tawantawan M. caruntongan and Nasser Manalao, candidates for Municipal Mayor and Vice Mayor, respectively, enumerated the following as grounds for declaration of failure of election: 1.Massive vote buying; 2.Illegal assignment of Rakim Paute as Election Officer of Munai; 3.Appointment of disqualified BEIs; 4.Shoot-out on the eve of the election between unidentified armed men and of the Philippine Army escorting election forms and paraphernalia in barangay Cadulawan; 5.Transfer of polling places without notice; 6.Absence of voting booths in barangay Tambo and cadulawan; and 7.Non-g of the Voter’s Registration Form. The COMELEC dismissed the petition because the grounds relied upon are not those which constitute grounds for declaration of failure of election. DECISION: Dismissed RATIO DECIDENDI: Under Article 1, Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code explicitly states the only three instances wherein a failure of election may be validly declared are when: 1) the election in any polling places has not been held on the date fixed in of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; 2) the election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes, or 3) after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous cases. This enumeration is exclusive and restrictive. It limits the power of the Commission to annul the results of an election only to those instances where the election is not held, is suspended or results in a failure to elect. The latter phrase should be understood in its literal sense, which is, nobody was elected. Moreover, the irregularities pointed out by the petitioners such as vote-buying, fraud, and terrorism are grounds for an election contest and may not, as a rule, be invoked to declare a failure of election and to disenfranchise the greater number of electorate through the misdeeds, precisely, of only relative few.

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(206) General v Roco ISSUE: Whether or not a CES eligibility is sufficient to acquire security of tenure. FACTS: Respondent Ramon S. Roco was appointed by then President Fidel V. Ramos on 26 Aug 1996 as Regional Director of the Land Transportation Office in Region V, a position equivalent to CES rank Level V. He was re-appointed to the same position by then President Joseph Estrada. From his appointment in 1996, respondent was not a CES eligible and was only conferred CES eligibility by the Career Executive Board on 13 Aug 1999. On 07 Sep 1999, petitioner Luis Mario General, who was not a CES eligible, was appointed by then President Estrada as Regional Director of LTO-V. Pursuant thereto, DOTC Undersecretary Herminio B. Coloma, Jr., as officer-in-charge of the department, issued a memorandum directing petitioner General to assume the said office immediately and for respondent Roco to report to the Office of the Secretary. DECISION: No RATIO DECIDENDI: Two requisites must concur in order for an employee in the career executive service may attain security of tenure: CES eligibility and appointment ot the appropriate CES rank.

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(207) CSC v salas ISSUE: Whether or not Salas is a confidential employee. FACTS: On 07 Oct 1989, respondent Salas was appointed by the PAGCOR chairman as internal security staff member and assigned to the casino at the Manila Pavilion Hotel. His employment was terminated by the Board of Directors of PAGCOR on 03 Dec 1991, allegedly for loss of confidence. DECISION: No RATIO DECIDENDI: t is the nature of the position which finally determines whether a position is primarily confidential, policy-determining or highly technical. The occupant of a particular position could be considered a confidential employee if the predominant reason why he was chosen by the appointing authority was the latter’s belief that he can share a close relationship with the occupant. Where the position occupied is remote from that of the appointing authority, the element of trust between them is no longer predominant.

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(208) Office of the ombudsman v CSC ISSUE: Whether or not de Jesus’ appointment may be properly changed from temporary status to permanent despite non-compliance with the eligibility requirement for the position of Graft Investigation Officer III. FACTS: On 31 Jul 2002, Melchor Arthur Carandang, Paul Elmer Clemente, and Jose Tereso de Jesus, Jr. were appointed Graft Investigation Officers III of the Office of the Ombudsman. The Civil Service Commission approved such appointments on the condition that appointees must obtain CES or CSE eligibility to acquire security of tenure. Carandang and Clemente had been conferred with CSE eligibility on 06 Jun 2003. DECISION: Yes RATIO DECIDENDI: Under P.D.No. 807, Section 9(h) which authorizes the CSC to approve appointments to postitions in the civil service, except those specified therein, its authority is limited only to whether or not the appointee possess the legal qualifications and the appropriate eligibility, nothing else. Third level eligibility is not required for third level officials appointed by the Ombudsman in light of the provisions of the Constitution vis a vis the istrative Code of 1987.

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(209) Vistan v nicolas ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge engaged in electioneering while still an MTC judge. FACTS: Complainant Leonila Vistan alleged that as early as 10 Feb 1987, prior to the start of the campaign period, and while still an MTC judge, respondent Ruben Nicolas started circulating handbills/letters addressed to electoral constitutents in the second district of Bulacan indicating his intention to run for a congressional seat. DECISION: Yes RATIO DECIDENDI: For having held himself out as a congressional candidate while still a member of the Bench, respondent took advantage of his position to boost his candidacy, demeaned the statude of his office, and must be pronounced guilty of gross misconduct, a clear violation of Rule 5.10, Canon 5, of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

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(210) Domingo v zamora ISSUE: whether EO 81 and the DECS Memoranda are valid. FACTS: On March 5, 1999, former President Joseph E. Estrada issued Executive Order No. 813 (EO 81 for brevity) entitled Transferring the Sports Programs and Activities of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports to the Philippine Sports Commission and Defining the Role of DECS in School-Based Sports. Pursuant to EO 81, former DECS Secretary Andrew B. Gonzales (Secretary Gonzales for brevity) issued Memorandum No. 01592 on January 10, 2000. Memorandum No. 01592 temporarily reassigned, in the exigency of the service, all remaining BPESS Staff to other divisions or bureaus of the DECS effective March 15, 2000.On January 21, 2000, Secretary Gonzales issued Memorandum No. 01594 reasg the BPESS staff named in the Memorandum to various offices within the DECS effective March 15, 2000. Petitioners were among the BPESS personnel affected by Memorandum No. 01594. Dissatisfied with their reassignment, petitioners filed the instant petition. petitioners argue that EO 81 is void and unconstitutional for being an undue legislation by President Estrada. Petitioners maintain that the Presidents issuance of EO 81 violated the principle of separation of powers. Petitioners also challenge the DECS Memoranda for violating their right to security of tenure.Petitioners seek to nullify EO 81 and the DECS Memoranda. During the pendency of the case, Republic Act No. 9155 (RA 9155 for brevity), otherwise known as the Governance of Basic Education Act of 2001, was enacted on August 11, 2001. RA 9155 expressly abolished the BPESS and transferred the functions, programs and activities of the DECS relating to sports competition to the PSC. DECISION: Dismissed RATIO DECIDENDI: We dismiss this petition for being moot and academic. As manifested by both petitioners and respondents, the subsequent enactment of RA 9155 has rendered the issues in the present case moot and academic. Since RA 9155 abolished the BPESS and transferred the DECS functions relating to sports competition to the PSC, petitioners now it that it is no longer plausible to raise any ultra vires assumption by the PSC of the functions of the BPESS. Moreover, since RA 9155 provides that BPESS personnel not transferred to the PSC shall be retained by the DECS, petitioners now accept that the law explicitly protects and preserves their right to security of tenure.

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(211) OP v Buenaobra ISSUE: Whether or not respondent being a presidential appointee and a holder of a non-career service postion could be removed from service at the pleasure of the President. FACTS: The Office of the Ombudsman’s Special Prosecution Officer filed an information against Nita Buenaobra, chairman of the Komisyon sa Wikang Pilipino, with the Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 4(e) of R.A. No. 3019 for allegedly causing undue injury to the government through gross inexcusable negligence in connection with the unauthorized reprinting of the Diksyunaryo ng Wikang Pilipino. The Sandiganbayan ordered a reinvestigation while the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) conducted a parallel istrative investigation against respondent charging her with the same acts and ommissions subject of the Sandiganbayan case. On 11 Apr 2003, petitioner adopted PAGC’s recommendation and dismissed respondent from office. DECISION: No RATIO DECIDENDI: Non-career service personnel enjoy security of tenure. They may not be removed without just cause and observance of due process.

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(212) Capablanca v. CSC ISSUE: Whether or not the CSC can conduct an investigation regarding the irregularity of Capablanca’s CSP-CAT. FACTS: Eugenio Capablanca was appointed into the PNP with the position of PO1 with temporary status. He ed both the PNP Entrance Examination conducted by the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) and the Career Service Professional Examination-Computer Assisted Test (CSP-CAT) given by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) he was subsequently conferred permanent status. The CSC conducted an investigation because of irregularities regarding Capablanca’s CSP-CAT. Capablanca averred that only the NAPOLCOM had sole authority to conduct police entrance exams. DECISION: Yes. The CSC can conduct an investigation. RATIO DECIDENDI: The CSC, as the central personnel agency of the Government, is mandated to establish a career service, to strengthen the merit and rewards system, and to adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency and integrity in the civil service. Jurisprudence has held that Appointees to Police Officer and Senior Police Officer positions in the Philippine National Police must have ed any of the following examinations: a) PNP Entrance Examination; b) Police Officer 3rd Class Examination; and c) CSC Police Officer Entrance Examination. The CSC is mandated to conduct the qualifying entrance examination (CSC Police Officer Entrance Examination) for Police Officer 1.

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(213) DBP v. COA 231 SCRA 202 ISSUE: Whether or not COA is allowed to conduct post-audit. FACTS: DBP conducted a public bidding for one unit of uninterruptible power supply (UPS). Thereafter, DBP issued Purchase Order No. 0137 to Voltronics for P1,436,539.25 inclusive of customs duties and taxes. COA sent a notice to the chairman of DBP notifying him of the disallowance of the amount representing customs duties and taxes and at the same time holding him, along with other petitioners, tly and severally liable for the aforementioned sum. They submit the contrary on the ground that the transaction in question had already been approved and ed in audit in accordance with the pre-audit system then obtaining and the later circular requiring post-audit should not be applied retroactively DECISION: Yes. COA can conduct post-audit. RATIO DECIDENDI: While it is true that the applicable procedure in force at the time of the questioned transaction was COA Circular 86-257 requiring a pre-audit, there is nothing to preclude COA from conducting a post-audit of the already pre-audited transaction. Article IX (D) Section 2(1) of the Constitution expressly grants respondent Commission the power to conduct a post-audit.

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(214) Bustamante v. COA ISSUE: Whether or not such denial to give due course to the appeal of Bustamante constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. FACTS: Benito Bustamante, Regional Legal Counsel for the National Power Corporation (NPC). Pursuant to NPC policy, in addition to the use of a government vehicle, Bustamante claimed his transportation allowance for the month of January 1989. On May 31, 1990, he received an Auditor's Notice to Person Liable dated April 17, 1990 from Regional Auditor Martha Roxana Caburian disallowing P1,250.00 representing aforesaid transportation allowance. Bustamante moved for reconsideration but was denied due course. DECISION: No. The denial to give due course does not constitute grave abuse of discretion. RATIO DECIDENDI: COA Circular No. 75-6 prohibited the use of government vehicles by officials provided with transportation allowance. This includes the NPC which Bustamante avers is not mentioned in the said circular. Said circular was within the powers of the COA provided by the Constitution.

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(215) DBP v. COA GR 88435 ISSUE: Whether or not the Constitution vests in the COA the sole and exclusive power to examine and audit government banks so as to prohibit concurrent audit by private external auditors under any circumstance FACTS: After learning that the DBP had signed a contract with a private auditing firm for calendar year 1986, the new COA Chairman wrote the DBP Chairman that the COA resident auditors were under instructions to disallow any payment to the private auditor whose services were unconstitutional, illegal and unnecessary. On July 1, 1987, the DBP Chairman sent to the COA Chairman a copy of the DBP's contract with Joaquin Cunanan& Co., signed four months earlier on March 5, 1987. The DBP Chairman's covering handwritten note sought the COA’s concurrence to the contract. During the pendency of the DBP Chairman's note-request for concurrence, the DBP paid the billings of the private auditor in the total amount of P487,321.14 despite the objection of the COA. On October 30, 1987, the COA Chairman issued a Memorandum disallowing the payments, and holding the following persons personally liable for such payment. DECISION: No. COA does not have the sole and exclusive power to examine and audit government banks so as to prohibit concurrent audit by private external auditors under any circumstance. RATIO DECIDENDI: The clear and unmistakable conclusion from a reading of the entire Section 2, Article IX-D is that the COA's power to examine and audit is non-exclusive. On the other hand, the COA's authority to define the scope of its audit, promulgate auditing rules and regulations, and disallow unnecessary expenditures is exclusive. As the constitutionally mandated auditor of all government agencies, the COA's findings and conclusions necessarily prevail over those of private auditors, at least insofar as government agencies and officials are concerned. The mere fact that private auditors may audit government agencies does not divest the COA of its power to examine and audit the same government agencies. The COA is neither by-ed nor ignored since even with a private audit the COA will still conduct its usual examination and audit, and its findings and conclusions will still bind government agencies and their officials. A concurrent private audit poses no danger whatsoever of public funds or assets escaping the usual scrutiny of a COA audit.

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(216) Nuñez v. Sandiganbayan ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of Sandiganbayan violates equal protection insofar as appeals would be concerned. FACTS: Rufino Nuñez assailed the validity of P.D. 1486 creating the Sandiganbayan as amended by P.D. 1606. He was accused before the Sandiganbayan for estafa through falsification of public documents committed in connivance with his other co-accused, all public officials, in several cases. DECISION: No. The creation of the Sandiganbayan does not violate equal protection insofar as appeals would be concerned. RATIO DECIDENDI: The Constitution specifically makes mention of the creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayan, precisely in response to a problem, the urgency of which cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the public service.

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(217) Roxas v. Vasquez ISSUE: Whether or not the Court may review or interfere with the prosecutorial prerogative of the Ombudsman. FACTS: Manuel C. Roxas was the Chairman, while Ahmed S. Nail was a Member, of the Bids and Awards Committee of the PC-INP who invited bids for the supply of sixty-five units of fire trucks. The COA subsequently discovered that while the disbursement voucher indicated the bid price has discrepancy. DILG Secretary filed a complaint with the Ombudsman for violation of Republic Act No. 3019 against Roxas and Nail. DECISION: Ombudsman.

Yes. The Court may interfere with the prosecutorial prerogative of the

RATIO DECIDENDI: Ordinarily, the Court will not interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine whether there exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probable guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the appropriate courts. However, the Court found that the case at bar falls under one of the recognized exceptions to this rule, more specifically, the constitutional rights of the accused are impaired and the charges are manifestly false. In cases where the Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor were unable to agree on whether or not probable cause exists, the Court may interfere with the findings and conclusions.

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(218) People v. Velez ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan violated Section 27 of Republic Act 6770 when it treated the "t Motion for Reconsideration/ Reinvestigation" of Velez as a motion for reconsideration under Section 27 of Republic Act 6770 and when it granted the "Motio FACTS: Ignacio Salmingo filed an affidavit-criminal complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against Edwin Velez, mayor of Silay City, et al. for violation of R.A. 3019. After finding probable cause, Ombudsman recommended the filing of information against the malefactors. Velez filed with the Sandiganbayan a t motion for reconsideration which was granted. DECISION: No. The Sandiganbayan did not violate R.A. 6770 or AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE FUNCTIONAL AND STRUCTURAL ORGANIZATION OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. RATIO DECIDENDI: Records show that when the Office of the Ombudsman approved the resolution prepared by the Graft Investigator, the Information was filed prematurely against the respondents. The Office of the Ombudsman must have realized this when Velez et al. filed with the Sandiganbayan their t Motion for Reconsideration/Reinvestigation and thus agreed to treat the Motion as a motion for reconsideration under Sec 27 of RA 6770. By its agreement, the Office of the Ombudsman merely corrected itself when it denied the motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation filed by Velez with the Office of the Ombudsman on the sole ground that the Information had already been filed with the Sandiganbayan. The Office of the Ombudsman is vested under the Constitution with investigatory and prosecutorial powers. Said office, through the Special Prosecutor, has direct control over the prosecution of the case. The Office of the Ombudsman merely exercised its investigatory and prosecutorial powers.

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(219) Ledesma v. CA ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman has encroached into the power of the Bureau of Immigration over immigration matters. FACTS: An investigation was requested on alleged anomalies surrounding the extension of the Temporary Resident Visas of two foreign nationals. Graft Investigator resolved the istrative case suspending petitioner for a year. The criminal case was dismissed. DECISION: No. The Ombudsman has not encroached into the power of the Bureau of Immigration over immigration matters. RATIO DECIDENDI: The creation of the Office of the Ombudsman is a unique feature of the 1987 Constitution. The Ombudsman and his deputies, as protectors of the people, are mandated to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against officers or employees of the government, or any of its subdivisions, agency or instrumentality.

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(220) Ombudsman v. Madriaga ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman has the authority to impose istrative sanctions over public officials. FACTS: The San Juan School Club filed a letter-complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman charging Gertudes Madriaga with violation of Section 1 of Rule IV and Section 1 of Rule VI of the rules implementing R.A. 6713. DECISION: Yes. The Office of the Ombudsman has the authority to impose istrative sanctions over public officials. RATIO DECIDENDI: Article XI, Section 13 of the Constitution grants petitioner istrative disciplinary powers to investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agent, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient, and direct the officer concerned to take appropriate actions against a public official or employee at fault and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure or prosecution and ensure compliance therewith.

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(221) Ombudsman v. Madriaga ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman has the authority to impose istrative sanctions over public officials FACTS: The San Juan School Club filed a letter-complaint filed before the Office of the Ombudsman charging Gertrudes Madriaga, school principal of San Juan Elementary School and Ana Marie Bernardo, Canteen Manager of the same school, with violation of Section 1 of Rule IV and Section 1 of Rule VI of the Rules Implementing Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. They were subsequently found guilty of the offense charged. Consequently, they were meted out the penalty of six (6) months imprisonment. On appeal, the Court of Appeals declared that the sixmonth suspension meted out by the Office of the Ombudsman to Madriaga and Bernardo (Gertrudes) is merely recommendatory to the Department of Education, the Office of the Ombudsman filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari. DECISION: RATIO DECIDENDI: Article XI, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution grants the Ombudsman istrative disciplinary power to direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith. Section 15(3) of R.A. No. 6770 echoes the constitutional grant to the Ombudsman of the power to ―recommend‖ the imposition of penalty on erring public officials and employees and ensure compliance therewith. The Court notes that the proviso above qualifies the "order" "to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute" an officer or employee — akin to the questioned issuances in the case at bar. That the refusal, without just cause, of any officer to comply with such an order of the Ombudsman to penalize an erring officer or employee is a ground for disciplinary action, is a strong indication that the Ombudsman's "recommendation" is not merely advisory in nature but is actually mandatory within the bounds of law. This should not be interpreted as usurpation by the Ombudsman of the authority of the head of office or any officer concerned. It has long been settled that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public official is not an exclusive authority but a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged. By stating therefore that the Ombudsman "recommends" the action to be taken against an erring officer or employee, the provisions in the Constitution and in R.A. 6770 intended that the implementation of the order be coursed through the proper officer, which in this case would be the head of the BID. The word "recommend" in Sec. 15(3) must thus be read in conjunction with the phrases "ensure compliance therewith" or "enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21" of R.A. No. 6770. In fine, the Ombudsman's authority to impose istrative penalty and enforce compliance therewith is not merely recommendatory. It is mandatory within the bounds of the law. The implementation of the order imposing the penalty is, however, to be coursed through the proper officer.

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(222) Caoibes v. Ombudsman ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman should defer action on the criminal complaint pending resolution of the Supreme Court for appropriate action FACTS: Judge Jose Caoibes, Jr. and Florentino Alumbres were embroiled in an altercation resulting to the latter filing before the Office of the Ombudsman a criminal complaint for physical injuries, malicious mischief and assault upon a person in authority against the former. Alumbres also filed an istrative case against Caoibes with the Supreme Court. DECISION: RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes, Under Section C, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is the Supreme Court which is vested with exclusive istrative supervision over all courts and its personnel. The Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by itself whether a crminal complaint against a judge, or court employee, involves istrative matter.

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(223) Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan ISSUE: Whether or not the Tanodbayan has the authority to conduct preliminary investigations and to direct the filing of criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan FACTS: Zaldivar sought to restrain Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Raul Gonzales from proceeding with the prosecution and hearing of criminal cases were filed by said Tanodbayan without legal and constitutional authority. DECISION: RATIO DECIDENDI: Under the Constitution, the Special Prosecutor is a mere subordinate of the Tanodbayan and can investigate and prosecute cases only upon the latter's authority or orders. The Special Prosecutor cannot initiate the prosecution cases but only conduct the same if instructed to do so by the Ombudsman.

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(224) Orap v. Sandiganbayan ISSUE: Whether or not the Tanodbayan has the authority to conduct a preliminary investigation of a complaint charging a municipal judge and his clerk of court with violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019 and, upon a finding of prima facie case, proceed to FACTS: Three informations were filed before the Sandiganbayan by Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor Rodolfo B. Aquino, charging petitioner Vicente S. Orap Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court of Mangatarem, Pangasinan, with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The information, duly approved by Hon. Juan A. Sison, then Chief Special Prosecutor of the Tanodbayan, were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. SB-020, 021 and 022. Likewise charged under Criminal Case No. 020 was Melanio B. Fernandez, petitioner's Clerk of Court. The fourth information, docketed as Criminal Case No. SB-189, was filed against petitioner, also for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019. The gravamen of all these charges was to the effect that the accused on different occasions unlawfully and feloniously received and took various sums of money from several persons in connection with Criminal Case No. 2032 of the Municipal Court of Mangatarem entitled, "People vs. Pepito F. Iglesias", for reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide, serious physical injuries and damage to property. Before his scheduled arraignment, petitioner filed a motion to quash the informations on the ground that the officer who signed the same had no authority to do so and that, corollarily, the Sandiganbayan did not acquire jurisdiction over the offenses charged. After due hearing, the respondent court denied petitioner's motion to quash. Petitioner verbally moved for the reconsideration of the order but the relief sought was denied. Hence, the instant recourse. DECISION: RATIO DECIDENDI: The respondent Sandiganbayan ruled that the Tanodbayan has such authority. The Tanodbayan functions not only as an ombudsman, but as prosecutor as well. As ombudsman, his investigatory powers are limited to complaints initiated against officers and personnel of istrative agencies, as defined in Section 9(a) of the law. As prosecutor, however, the authority of the Tanodbayan is primary and without exceptions. His powers are defined in Sections 17 and 19 of P.D. 1607. Section 17 of the Decree, in unequivocal term, confers upon the Tanodbayan, through the Chief Special Prosecutor and the Special Prosecutors, the exclusive authority to "conduct preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, to file informations therefor, and to direct and control the prosecution of said cases therein." If, as petitioner contends, judges, and other court personnel lie outside the investigatory power of the Tanodbayan, then no judge or court employee could ever be brought to justice for crimes and offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, for lack of proper officer or entity authorized to conduct the preliminary investigation on complaints of such nature against them. This absurd situation the law could never have intended, considering that the Office of the Tanodbayan was purposely created to "give effect to the constitutional right of the people to petition the government for redress of grievances and to promote higher standards of integrity and efficiency in the government service." The informations in question have complied with the substantial and formal requirements of the law. They carry the certification of the investigating prosecutor as to the existence of a prima facie case. They also bear the approval of the Chief Special Prosecutor, as required by Section 11 of PD 1606. As petitioner is charged with violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which are within the jurisdiction of the

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Sandiganbayan as defined under Section 4 of P.D. 1606, the said court validly acquired jurisdiction over the informations in question.

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(225) Canonizado vs Aguirre ISSUE: Whether or Not petitioners were removed by virtue of abolition FACTS: The commissioners of NAPOLCOM were appointed separately, in various years and their had not expired at the time amendatory law RA 6975 was ed. RA 8551 declared the of sitting commissioners upon its effectivity. DECISION: No RATIO DECIDENDI: Under RA 6975, the NAPOLCOM was described as a collegial body within the DILG. Whereas, RA 8551 made it an agency attached to the department for policy and program coordination. This does not result to a creation of a new office.

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(226) Carino v CHR ISSUE: Whether or not, CHR has the power to adjudicate alleged human rights violations FACTS: On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teacher, among them the 8 herein private respondents who were of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook “mass concerted actions” to “dramatize and highlight” their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter’s attention. The respondents were preventively suspended by the Secretary of Education. They complained to CHR. RATIO DECIDENDI: No, the Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine with the character of finality and definiteness, the same issues which have been ed upon and decided by the Secretary of Education and subject to appeal to CSC, this Court having in fact, as aforementioned, declared that the teachers affected may take appeals to the CSC on said matter, if still timely. The threshold question is whether or not the CHR has the power under the constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice or even a quasi-judicial agency, it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or dear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights. The Court declares that the CHR to have no such power, and it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter. The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e. receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitely, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have. Hence it is that the CHR having merely the power to “investigate,” cannot and not “try and resolve on the merits” (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the istrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed.

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(227) PBM Employees v. PBM Co. ISSUE: Whether or not the workers who ed the strike violated the CBA? FACTS: Philippine Blooming Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass demonstration in front of Malacañang to express their grievances against the alleged abuses of the Pasig Police. After learning about the planned mass demonstration, Philippine Blooming Mills Inc., called for a meeting with the leaders of the PBMEO. During the meeting, the planned demonstration was confirmed by the union. But it was stressed out that the demonstration was not a strike against the company but was in fact an exercise of the laborers' inalienable constitutional right to freedom of expression, freedom of speech and freedom for petition for redress of grievances. The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would interrupt the normal course of their business which may result in the loss of revenue. This was backed up with the threat of the possibility that the workers would lose their jobs if they pushed through with the rally. A second meeting took place where the company reiterated their appeal that while the workers may be allowed to participate, those from the 1st and regular shifts should not absent themselves to participate, otherwise, they would be dismissed. Since it was too late to cancel the plan, the rally took place and the officers of the PBMEO were eventually dismissed for a violation of the ‘No Strike and No Lockout’ clause of their Collective Bargaining Agreement. The lower court decided in favor of the company and the officers of the PBMEO were found guilty of bargaining in bad faith. Their motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the Court of Industrial Relations for being filed two days late. DECISION: RATIO DECIDENDI: No. While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive," permitting government regulation only "with narrow specificity." Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights to freedom of expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions." The freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances are absolute when directed against public officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and women by whom we shall be governed.”

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(228) MMDA v. Viron Trans. ISSUE: Whether or not E.O, 179 is constitutional. FACTS: To solve the worsening traffic congestions problem in Metro Manila the President issued Executive Order (E.O.) 179, ―Providing for the Establishment of Greater Manila Mass Transportation System. As determined in E.O. 179, the primary cause of traffic congestion in Metro Manila has been the numerous buses plying the streets that impede the flow of vehicles and commuters and the inefficient connectivity of the different transport modes. To decongest traffic, petitioner Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) came up with a recommendation, proposing the elimination of bus terminals located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares, and the construction of mass transport terminal facilties to provide a more convenient access to mass transport system to the commuting public. The project provided for under this E.O. was called ―Greater Manila Transport System‖ (Project) wherein the MMDA was designated as the implementing agency. Accordingly, the Metro Manila Council the governing board of the MMDA issued a resolution, expressing full of the project. The respondents, which are engaged in the business of public transportation with a provincial bus operation, Viron Transport Co., Inc. and Mencorp Transportation System, Inc., assailed the constitutionality of E.O. 179 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. They alleged that the E.O., insofar as it permitted the closure of existing bus terminal, constituted a deprivation of property without due process; that it contravened the Public Service Act which mandates public utilities to provide and maintain their own terminals as a requisite for the privilege of operating as common carriers; and that Republic Act 7924, which created MMDA, did not authorize the latter to order the closure of bus terminals. The trial court declared the E.O. unconstitutional. The MMDA argued before the Court that there was no justiciable controversy in the case for declaratory relief filed by the respondents; that E.O. 179 was only an istrative directive to government agencies to coordinate with the MMDA, and as such did not bind third persons; that the President has the authority to implement the Project pursuant to E.O. 125; and that E.O. 179 was a valid exercise of police power. DECISION: RATIO DECIDENDI: By designating the MMDA as implementing agency of the “Greater Manila Transport System,” the President clearly overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. 179 ultra vires. Executive Order 125, invoked by the MMDA, was issued by former President Aquino in her exercise of legislative powers. This executive order reorganized the Ministry (now Department) of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), and defined its powers and functions. It mandated the DOTC to be the primary policy, planning, programming, coordinating, implementing, regulating and istrative entity to promote, develop and regulate networks of transportation and communications. The grant of authority to the DOTC includes the power to establish and ister comprehensive and integrated programs for transportation and communications. Accordingly, it is the DOTC Secretary who is authorized to issue such orders, rules, regulations and other issuances as may be necessary to ensure the effective implementation of the law. The President may also exercise the same power and authority to order the implementation of the mass transport system project, which ittedly is one for transportation. Such authority springs from the President‘s power of control over all executive departments as well as for the faithful execution of the laws under the Constitution.

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Thus, the President, although authorized to establish or cause the implementation of the Project, must exercise the authority through the instrumentality of the DOTC, which, by law, is the primary implementing and istrative entity in the promotion, development and regulation of networks of transportation. It is the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is authorized to establish and implement a project such as the mass transport system. By designating the MMDA as implementing agency of the Project, the President clearly overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. 179 ultra vires. In the absence of a specific grant of authority to it under R.A. 7924, MMDA cannot issue order for the closure of existing bus terminals Republic Act (R.A.) 7924 authorizes the MMDA to perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the process exercises regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide services, including transport and traffic management. While traffic decongestion has been recognized as a valid ground in the exercise of police power, MMDA is not granted police power, let alone legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no provision in R.A. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or the Metro Manila Council to enact ordinances, approveresolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. In light of the istrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of authority to implement the Greater Manila Transport System as envisioned by E.O. 179; hence, it could not have been validly designated by the President to undertake the project. It follows that the MMDA cannot validly order the elimination of respondents‘ terminals. Even assuming arguendo that police power was delegated to the MMDA, its exercise of such power does not satisfy the two sets of a valid police power measure: (1) the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from that of a particular class, requires its exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In various cases, the Court has recognized that traffic congestion is a public, not merely a private concern. Indeed, the E.O. was issued due to the felt need to address the worsening traffic congestion in Metro Manila which, the MMDA so determined, is caused by the increasing volume of buses plying the major thoroughfares and the inefficient connectivity of existing transport system. With the avowed objective of decongesting traffic in Metro Manila the E.O. seeks to eliminate the bus terminals now located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and provide more convenient access to the mass transport system to the commuting public through the provision of mass transport terminal facilities. Common carriers with terminals along the major thoroughfares of Metro Manila would thus be compelled to close down their existing bus terminals and use the MMDA-designated common parking areas. The Court fails to see how the prohibition against respondents‘ terminals can be considered a reasonable necessity to ease traffic congestion in the metropolis. On the contrary, the elimination of respondents‘ bus terminals brings forth the distinct possibility and the equally harrowing reality of traffic congestion in the common parking areas, a case of transference from one site to another. Moreover, an order for the closure of bus terminals is not in line with the provisions of the Public Service Act. The establishment, as well as the maintenance of vehicle parking areas or enger terminals, is generally considered a necessary service by provincial bus operators, hence, the investments they have poured into the acquisition or lease of suitable terminal sites.

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