Criminal Procedure Case Digests 3xx2m

Albert v. Sandiganbayan Topic: Conditional Arraignment; When Valid Facts 

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Special Prosecution Officer (SPO) II of the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao charged Ramon Albert, President of the National Home Mortgage and Finance Corporation, of violation of RA 3019 for making it appear in his tax declarations that 2 parcels of real property are residential land in order to acquire a higher loanable amount of of P4,535,400.00 from the NHMFC when in truth, the said parcels of land are agricultural land A Hold Departure Order was issued by the Sandiganbayan against petitioner and his co-accused. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Criminal Case No. 25231 on the following grounds: (1) the accused (petitioner) was denied due process of law; (2) the Office of the Ombudsman did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused; (3) the constitutional rights of the accused to a speedy disposition of cases and to a speedy trial were violated; and (4) the resolution dated 26 February 1999 finding the accused guilty of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 is not ed by evidence. Pending the resolution of the Motion to Dismiss, petitioner filed a Motion to Lift Hold Departure Order and to be Allowed to Travel. The prosecution did not object to the latter motion on the condition that petitioner would be "provisionally" arraigned Sandiganbayan arraigned petitioner who entered a plea of "not guilty” and granted petitioner’s Urgent Motion to Amend Motion to Lift Hold Departure Order and to be Allowed to Travel but denied his Motion to dismiss and ordered the prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation of the case with respect to petitioner. The Arraignment was set to on October 2, 2003 and on October 7, 2003 the prosecution filed a Motion for Leave to it Amended Information. The amended information included changing “gross neglect of duty” to “gross inexcusable negligence” in the information. Sandiganbayan granted the amendment. Petitioner opposed the motion, alleging that the amendment made on the information is substantial and, therefore, not allowed after arraignment. Sandiganbayan granted the prosecution’s Motion to it Amended Information and explained that "gross neglect of duty" which falls under Section 3(f) of RA 3019 is different from "gross inexcusable negligence" under Section 3(e), and that allegations of gross neglect of duty, it is not a requirement that such neglect or refusal causes undue injury compared to an information alleging gross inexcusable negligence where undue injury is a constitutive element. A change to

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this effect constitutes substantial amendment considering that the possible defense of the accused may divert from the one originally intended. Sandiganbayan held that even granting that the amendment of the information be formal or substantial, the prosecution could still effect the same in the event that the accused had not yet undergone a permanent arraignment. And since the arraignment of petitioner on 13 March 2001 was merely "provisional," then the prosecution may still amend the information either in form or in substance. Petitioner contends that under Section 14, Rule 110 of the rules, only a formal amendment of the information may be made after a plea and the rule does not distinguish between a plea made during a "provisional" or a "permanent" arraignment. Since petitioner already entered a plea of "not guilty" during the 13 March 2001 arraignment, then the information may be amended only in form. o

Sec. 14. Amendment or Substitution.-- A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.

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Whether the sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in itting the amended information

Ruling: No. 

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An arraignment is that stage where in the mode and manner required by the rules, an accused, for the first time, is granted the opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him.The accused is formally informed of the charges against him, to which he enters a plea of guilty or not guilty. The practice of the Sandiganbayan of conducting "provisional" or "conditional" arraignments is not sanctioned by the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan or by the regular Rules of Court. However, in People v. Espinosa, this Court recognized such practice, provided that the alleged conditions attached thereto should be "unmistakable, express, informed and enlightened." Moreover, the conditions must be expressly stated in the Order disposing of the arraignment; otherwise, the arraignment should be deemed simple and unconditional

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In the case, the arraignment of petitioner is reflected in the Minutes of the Sandiganbayan Proceedings dated 13 March 2001 which merely states that the "[a]ccused when arraigned entered a plea of not guilty. The Motion to Travel is granted subject to the usual and conditions imposed on accused persons travelling abroad.” Sandiganbayan mentioned the arraignment of petitioner and granted his Urgent Motion to Amend Motion to Lift Hold Departure Order and to be Allowed to Travel, setting forth the conditions attendant thereto which, however, were limited only to petitioner’s itinerary abroad; the setting up of additional bailbond; the required appearance before the clerk of court; and written advice to the court upon return to the Philippines. Nothing on record is indicative of the provisional or conditional nature of the arraignment. Hence, following the doctrine laid down in Espinosa, the arraignment of petitioner should be deemed simple and unconditional.

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The rules mandate that after a plea is entered, only a formal amendment of the Information may be made but with leave of court and only if it does not prejudice the rights of the accused.

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The original information filed against petitioner alleged that he acted with "evident bad faith and manifest partiality and or (sic) gross neglect of duty." The amended information, on the other hand, alleges that petitioner acted with "evident bad faith and manifest partiality and/or gross inexcusable negligence." Simply, the amendment seeks to replace "gross neglect of duty" with "gross inexcusable negligence." Given that these two phrases fall under different paragraphs of RA 3019—specifically, "gross neglect of duty" is under Section 3(f) while "gross inexcusable negligence" is under Section 3(e) of the statute—the question remains whether or not the amendment is substantial and prejudicial to the rights of petitioner.

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The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or information is when a defense under the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might have, would be inapplicable to the complaint or information as amended. On the other hand, an amendment which merely states with additional precision something which is already contained in the original information and which, therefore, adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged is an amendment to form that can be made at anytime.

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Despite being substantial, the change made is allowable even after arraignment and plea being beneficial to the accused. As a

replacement, "gross inexcusable negligence" would be included in the Information as a modality in the commission of the offense. 

The inclusion of "gross inexcusable negligence" in the Information, which merely alleges "manifest partiality" and "evident bad faith" as modalities in the commission of the crime under Section 3(e) of RA 3019, is an amendment in form.

People v. Gonzaga FACTS  In an information dated November 3, 1977, accused Gonzaga was indicted for the crime of murder for fatally stabbing with a jungle bolo one Amparo M. Quilatan, allegedly attended by the aggravating circumstances of "evident premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of superior strength deliberately making use of drunkenness or after having taken liquor, armed with an illegally-possessed 27 inches jungle bolo (accused has been separately charged for this offense), without due regard to the profession of a public school teacher." Five days later, or on November 8, 1977, accused Gonzaga appeared for arraignment without counsel. The trial court thereupon issued an order appointing Atty. Crisanto Saruca as counsel de oficio "for the purpose of arraignment only." Immediately thereafter, Atty. Saruca manifested that the accused was ready for arraignment and the accused pleaded guilty to the offense charged. 

The trial court then ordered the presentation of evidence but the prosecution was not ready for trial. The prosecution witnesses had not been notified because the prosecution did not expect that the accused would plead guilty and that trial would continue thereafter. The case was then set for hearing the next day, November 9, 1977, and for purposes of trial Attys. Leonardo Rodriguez and Felimon Koh were appointed as counsels de oficio.

Issue of Arraignment

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The records of the case, particularly the transcripts of stenographic notes of the proceedings taken during the hearing, amply show the inordinate haste with which accused was charged, arraigned and convicted. The information was filed on November 3, 1977. On November 8, 1977, accused was immediately arraigned and pleaded guilty to the offense charged with the assistance of a counsel de oficio who had just been appointed then and there. The case was set for trial the next day, November 9, 1977, notwithstanding counsel de oficio's request that he be given two days to prepare for trial.

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The constitutional rights of the accused are for the protection of the guilty and of innocent alike. Only the assurance that even the guilty shall be given the benefit of every constitutional guaranty can the innocent be secure in the same rights. 2 Thus, this Court has always stressed its constant concern in due observance of the fundamental requirements of fairness and due process that the most meticulous care be exercised by the trial court before acceptance of an accused plea of guilty in a capital case. 3 Sec. 1, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court prescribes that "the arraignment must be made by the judge or clerk and shall consist in reading the complaint or information to the defendant and delivering to him a copy thereof, including a fist of witnesses and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty as charged." In the instant case, records confirm the fact that the accused was not adequately informed of the nature of the crime imputed against him and the consequences of his plea. Nor does it appear that the averments in the

information, including the qualifying and aggravating circumstances were explained to him No dialogue whatsoever transpired between accused and the trial judge. The transcript of the stenographic notes taken during the arraignment on November 8, 1977 shows: ISSUE- When arraignment was properly made RULING – NO – FAILED TO ADHERE OF THE REQUISITES OF A PROPER ARRAIGNMENTUnder See. 5, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, whenever an attorney de oftcio is  employed or assigned by the court to defend an accused either at the arraignment or  at the trial he should be given a reasonable time to consult with the accused and  prepare his defense before proceeding further in the case which should not be less  than two (2) hours in case of arraignment and two (2) days in case of trial. These  requirements were not complied with. After accused's arraignment on November 8,  1977, the court immediately set the case for trial the next day, November 9, 1977,  disregarding counsel de oficio's manifestation that he be allowed the required two­ day period within which to prepare for trial. The transcript of the stenographic notes  taken during the arraignment shows:

RATIO - In a long line of cases, this Court has repeatedly ened trial judges to refrain from accepting with alacrity an accused's plea of guilty, for while justice demands a speedy istration judges are duty bound to be extra solicitous in to it that when an accused pleads guilty he understands fully the meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable conviction. The essence of a plea of guilty in a criminal trial is that the accused on arraignment its his guilt freely, voluntarily and- with full knowledge of the consequences and meaning of his act. If the accused does not clearly and fully understand the nature of the offense charged, if he is not advised as to the meaning and effect of the technical language so often used in formal complaints and informations in qualifying the acts constituting the offense, or if he does not clearly understand the consequences by way of a heavy and even a capital penalty flowing from his ission of his

guilt of the crime in the precise technical manner and form in which it is charged, his plea of guilty should not be accepted and if accepted it should not be held to be sufficient to sustain a conviction. Finally, the fact that immediately after the prosecution had rested its case in the last hearing held on November 16, 1977, the trial court read a "ready made" decision of conviction shows that the accused was meted the death penalty without due process of law. With the perfunctory arraignment of the accused and the undue haste with which the hearing was held, the Court sees that accused's fate was predetermined from the start. Even before the termination of the sentence of death had already been prepared. At the last page of the transcript of stenographic notes taken by stenographer Luisa S. Golla, a note appears which states: "NOTE: Sentence already attached to the original records of the cage."

People vs. Gambao [2013] Facts: Lucia Chan was kidnapped by the accused-appellants, and asked for P400,000 ransom for her liberty. Shortly after the transaction b/w the accused appellants and Chan’s son, the police were able to arrest the former. Lucia then was rescued. The accused-appellants, along with 10 others, were charged with Kidnapping for Ransom. During the hearing, the accused-appellants all manifested their desire to change their earlier plea of “not guilty” to “guilty”. The presiding judge then explained the consequences of a change of plea to each of them, stating: "It would mean the moment you withdraw your previous pleas of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty, the court of course, after receiving evidence, xxx, will outrightly sentence you to the penalty provided by law after the prosecution shall have finished the presentation of its evidence. Now that I have explained to you the consequences of your entering a plea of guilty, are you still desirous of entering a plea of ‘guilty’?" All of them answered in the affirmative. TC convicted them; penalized w/ death. CA affirmed. Hence, this pet. Issue: W/n the accused-appellants improvidently plead, therefore, entitled to be acquitted Held: Yes. But they were still convicted based on the strength of the evidence presented against them Jurisprudence laid down the duties of the trial court when the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense. The trial court is mandated: (1) to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the plea of guilt, (2) to require the prosecution to still prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability, and (3) to inquire w/n the accused wishes to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires The rationale behind the rule is that the courts must proceed with more care where the possible punishment is in its severest form, namely death, for the reason that the execution of such a sentence is irreversible. Moreover, the requirement of taking

further evidence would aid this Court on appellate review in determining the propriety or impropriety of the plea. Anent the first requisite, the searching inquiry determines whether the plea of guilt was based on a free and informed judgement – the ff. guidelines should be observed: - Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred with, and completely explained to, the accused the meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty. -

Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age, socio-economic status, and educational background, which may serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty.

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Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty under the law and the certainty that he will serve such sentence. For not infrequently, an accused pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because of promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he it guilt or express remorse.

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Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is charged and fully explain to him the elements of the crime which is the basis of his indictment.

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All questions posed to the accused should be in a language known and understood by the latter.

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The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in pleading guilty, is truly guilty. The accused must be required to narrate the tragedy or reenact the crime or furnish its missing details.

The records show that accused-appellants had the mistaken assumption that their plea of guilt would mitigate the imposable penalty and that both the judge and his counsel failed to explain

to him that such plea of guilt will not mitigate the penalty. They were not warned by the judge that in cases where the penalty is single and indivisible, like death, the penalty is not affected by either aggravating or mitigating circumstances. The trial court judge’s seemingly annoyed statement that a conditional plea is not allowed, as provided below, is inadequate As a general rule, convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside and the cases are remanded for further proceedings if such plea is the sole basis of judgement. If the trial court, however, relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused, as it did in this case, the conviction must be sustained.

People vs. Uy Facts:  A female confidential informant personally informed the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the PNP Malabon City that Ramon Uy (alias Chekwa) asked her to look for a buyer of shabu at a price of P1,000.00 per gram. 

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Acting on the given information, the of the unit subsequently planned a buy-bust operation against the accused. The confidential informant told Uy that there is a prospective buyer (to be delivered in front of Justice Hall of Malabon City). One police acted as poseur buyer. Then, they were able to obtain shabu from him. o Police yielded more shabu packets from his attache case When he was brought to the office for investigation, it was learned that there was still an undetermined amount shabu that is left at his home. o

TC DECISION: The trial court gave credence to the prosecution’s story of a legitimate buy bust operation and testimony of witnesses despite the nonpresentation of the NBI forensics chemist who tested and confirmed that substance found in the accused possession is indeed shabu. The accused interposed the defense of frame-up and alleged that the evidence was merely ‘planted.’ ISSUE: W/N the prosecution’s evidence should be itted – YES 

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SPO4 Regalado applied on the following day for a search warrant to lawfully search the said premises of the accused for shabu. They were able to obtain shabu.

UY’S VERSION  He just got home from tending to his garments business and was carrying a large amount of money, P132,000 to be exact from his collections for the sales of the day.  He said that he saw a white Toyota car outside his residence, the same being offered to him for sale.  He allegedly refused but agreed to test-drive the said car. It was then that he was allegedly stopped by the police and was ordered to give up his attaché case and forcible taken to the police station. It was there that he was accused that said case contained the illegal substance.

It may at once be noted that neither accused nor his counsel made express ission that the contents of the plastic bags to “be marked” as Exhibits contain methamphetamine hydrochloride. o Based on the t order, it is clear that accused and his counsel merely agreed to the marking of the exhibits, and the clause “thereby dispensing with the testimony of forensic Chemist Bravo.

The ission cannot be used in evidence against him because the t Order was not signed. Nevertheless, Uy cannot take advantage of the absence of his and his counsel’s signatures on the pre-trial order. o When the prosecution formally offered in evidence what it had marked in evidence during the pre-trial, Uy did not object to the ission of Bravo’s Preliminary Report. The issue of non-presentation of evidence of Forensic Chemist Bravo was never raised in the lower courts. This is for the first time, on appeal. o Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without such objection he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal. The familiar rule in this jurisdiction is that the inissibility of certain documents upon the ground of hearsay if not urged before the court below CANNOT, for the first time, be raised on appeal. Finally, as to the reports of Forensic Chemist Bravo, it must be stressed that as an NBI Forensic Chemist, Bravo is a public officer, and his report carries the presumption of regularity in the performance of his function and duty. In People vs. De Vera: the prosecution’s evidence more than proved beyond reasonable doubt all the elements necessary in every prosecution for the illegal sale of shabu, to wit: o (1) identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and o (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. The delivery of the contraband to the poseur-buyer and the receipt of the marked money successfully consummated the “buy-bust” transaction between the entrapping officers and the accused. What is material in a prosecution for illegal sale of prohibited drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti. There is also no doubt that the charge of illegal possession of shabu in Criminal Case No. 16200-MN was proven beyond reasonable doubt since accused knowingly carried with him more than 400 grams of shabu without legal authority at the time he was caught during the buy-bust operation. Decision of CA affirmed in toto. o

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On the validity of the buy bust operation A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted for the purpose of trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan; it is a procedure or operation sanctioned by law and which has consistently proved itself to be an effective method of apprehending drug peddlers, and unless there is a clear and convincing evidence that the of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their duty, their testimony on the operation deserved full faith and credit. 18 As has been repeatedly held, credence shall be given to the narration of the incident by the

prosecution witnesses especially when they are police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there be evidence to the contrary; moreover in the absence of proof of motive to falsely impute such a serious crime against appellant, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, shall prevail over appellant’s self-serving and uncorroborated claim of having been framed.

FULE vs. CA Topic: Effect of non-appearance

FACTS: 1. A Petition for Review on certiorari of the Decision of respondent Appellate Court, which affirmed the judgment of the RTC Lucena convicting petitioner (the accused-appellant) of Violation of BP Blg. 22 (The Bouncing Checks Law) on the basis of the Stipulation of Facts entered into between the prosecution and the defense during the pre-trial conference in the TC. 2. The facts stipulated upon read: a) That this Court has jurisdiction over the person and subject matter of this case; b) That the accused was an agent of the Towers Assurance Corpon or before January 21, 1981; c) That on January 21, 1981, the accused issued and made out check No. 26741, dated January 24, 1981 in the sum of P2,541.05; d) That the said check was drawn in favor of the complaining witness, Roy Nadera; e) That the check was drawn in favor of the complaining witness in remittance of collection; f) That the said check was presented for payment on January 24, 1981 but the same was dishonored for the reason that the said checking was already closed; g) That the accused Manolo Fule has been properly Identified as the accused party in this case. 3. At the hearing, only the prosecution presented its evidence consisting of Exhibits “A,B,C”. At the subsequent hearing, petitioner-appellant waived the right to present evidence and, instead, submitted a Memo confirming the Stipulation of Facts. TC convicted the petitioner. 4. On appeal, respondent Appellate Court upheld the Stipulation of Facts and affirmed the judgment of conviction. Hence, this recourse.

5. Petitioner-appellant contending that: Honorable Respondent CA erred in the decision of the RTC convicting the petitioner of the offense charged, despite the cold fact that the basis of the conviction was based solely on the stipulation of facts made during the pre-trial on August 8, 1985, which was not signed by the petitioner, nor by his counsel. 6. CA - Petition meritorious. It gave due course. 7. The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which became effective on January 1, 1985, applicable to this case since the pre-trial was held on August 8, 1985, provides: SEC. 4. Pre-trial agreements must be signed. — No agreement or ission made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence against the accused unless reduced to writing and signed by him and his counsel. (Rule 118) [Emphasis supplied] 8. Having been effective since January 01, 1985, the above rule is applicable.

ISSUE: Whether or not the omission of the signature of the accused and his counsel, as mandatorily required by the Rules, renders the Stipulation of Facts inissible in evidence. YES HELD: Judgment of Appellate Court is REVERSED and RE-OPENED and REMANDED to the appropriate Branch of RTC Lucena for further reception of eveidence. RATIO: 1. By its very language, the Rule is mandatory. Under the rule of statutory construction, negative words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely directory. The use of the term "shall" further emphasizes its mandatory character and means that it is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced. And more importantly, penal statutes whether substantive and remedial or procedural are, by consecrated

rule, to be strictly applied against the government and liberally in favor of the accused. 2. The conclusion is inevitable, therefore, that the omission of the signature of the accused and his counsel, as mandatorily required by the Rules, renders the Stipulation of Facts inissible in evidence. The fact that the lawyer of the accused, in his memorandum, confirmed the Stipulation of Facts does not cure the defect because Rule 118 requires both the accused and his counsel to sign the Stipulation of Facts. What the prosecution should have done, upon discovering that the accused did not sign the Stipulation of Facts, as required by Rule 118, was to submit evidence to establish the elements of the crime, instead of relying solely on the supposed ission of the accused in the Stipulation of Facts. Without said evidence independent of the ission, the guilt of the accused cannot be deemed established beyond reasonable doubt. 3. Thus, under the circumstances, the ends of justice require that evidence be presented to determine the culpability of the accused. When a judgment has been entered by consent of an attorney without special authority, it will sometimes be set aside or reopened (Natividad vs. Natividad, 51 Phil. 613 [1928]).

Jimenez v. People Topic: Discharge of accused to be a State Witness Facts: 1. Montero (a former employee of the Jimenezes) confessed his participation in the killing of Ruby Rose Barrameda, and naming Manuel Jimenez, Lope Jimenez (Manuel’s younger brother), Lennard Descalso, Robert Ponce, and Eric Fernandez, as his co-conspirators. 2. The statements of Montero are the details on where the alleged steel casing containing the body of Ruby Rose was dumped. It led to the recovery of a cadaver. 3. People filed an Information before the RTC, charging Jimenez et al. of murder. 4. Montero filed a motion for his discharge of the witness as accused pursuant to the Witness Protection Program, RA 6981. The People also filed a motion to discharge Montero as a state witness for the prosecution. Jimenez opposed both motions. 5. RTC: Judge Almeyda denied the motions. 6. Judge Almeyda ruled that the prosecution failed to comply with the requirements of Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure; it failed to clearly show that Montero was not the most guilty or, at best, the least guilty among the accused. The prosecution also failed to present evidence to sustain the possibility of conviction against Jimenez. 7. Montero and the People filed separate MR. 8. The July 30, 2010 order o Judge Docena reversed previous order and ruled that the prosecution had presented clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence showing compliance with the said Rules. o The crime would have remained undiscovered and unsolved had it not been for Montero’s extrajudicial confession. o RTC further ruled that Montero does not appear to be the most guilty although he is a principal by direct participation. The principals by inducement are more guilty because, without their orders, the crime would not have been committed. o During the pendency of MR, Jimenez filed a motion for inhibition, praying that Judge Docena inhibit himself from hearing the case on the ground of bias and prejudice- DENIED 9. Jimenez filed with CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Issuance of a TRO and WPI- GRANTED. 10. MR filed by the People, the CA REVERSED its earlier ruling. o Judge Docena did not gravely abuse his discretion in ordering Montero’s discharge to become a state witness because the prosecution had complied with the requirements of Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

o Montero is not the most guilty among the accused because the principals by inducement are more guilty than the principals by direct participation. o It should still be raffled to another sala for trial on the merits to avoid any claim of bias and prejudice. 11. G.R. No. 209195 (The Jimenez Petition) o Jimenez raises the following errors: i. There is no necessity to discharge Montero as a state witness because the voluntary extrajudicial confessions of Montero are all in the possession of the prosecution which they could readily present in court without discharging Montero; ii. Inconsistencies with Montero’s statement. Jimenez argued that these inconsistencies would require a thorough scrutiny; hence, the immediate discharge is suspicious. iii. Montero appears to be the most guilty. iv. RPC imputes on the principal by direct participation the heavier guilt; without the latter’s execution of the crime, the principal by inducement cannot be made liable. v. The discharge of Montero was irregular because Judge Docena failed to conduct a prior hearing. o Comment of the People i. Jimenez is now estopped from raising the lack of hearing since he raised this issue only after the motion to discharge was granted and not after it was previously denied. ii. The availability of the extrajudicial statements in the prosecution’s possession is not a ground to disqualify an accused from being a state witness. iii. Material allegations of Montero on the identity of the victim and the manner of her killing were substantially corroborated by evidence. 12. G.R. No. 209215(The People’s Petition) o The People, through OSG, argue that the CA’s order to re-raffle the case to another sala is not ed by Sec 1, Rule 137 of the ROC, either under mandatory or voluntary inhibition. o To disqualify a judge from hearing a case, bias and prejudice must be proven.

Issue: 1. WON the CA erred in ruling that Judge Docena did not commit grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion to discharge Montero as a state witness- NO

2. WON the CA erred in ordering the re-raffle of the case to another RTC for trial on the merits. – YES. No reason for inhibition. 5. Ratio: 1. Judge Docena did not gravely abuse his discretion when he granted the motion to discharge Montero as a state witness. 2. The prosecution has complied with the requisites under Sec 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides that: “In the discharge of an accused inorder that he may be a state witness, the following conditions must be present, namely: (1) Two or more accused are tly charged with the commission of an offense; (2) The motion for discharge isfiled by the prosecution before it rests its case; (3) The prosecution is required to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in of the discharge; (4) The accused gives his consent to be a state witness; and (5) The trial court is satisfied that: a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested; b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused; c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points; d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and, e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.” 3. 5(a) Absolute necessity of the testimony of Montero o Absolute necessity exists for the testimony of an accused sought to be discharged when he or she alone has knowledge of the crime. The requirement of absolute necessity for the testimony of a state witness depends on the circumstances of each case regardless of the number of the participating conspirators. 4. 5 (b) Not one of the accused-conspirators, except Montero, was willing to testify on the alleged murder and their participation. He alone is available to provide direct evidence of the crime. o To the prosecution belongs the control of its case and this Court cannot dictate on its choice in the discharge of a state witness, save only when the legal requirements. o The prosecution’s right to prosecute gives it a wide range of discretion. o Under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the court is given the power to discharge a state

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witness only after it has already acquired jurisdiction over the crime and the accused. 5 (c) Montero’s testimony can be substantially corroborated o The alleged discrepancies in the physical evidence, particularly on the height and dental records of Ruby Rose, are matters that should properly be dealt with during the trial proper. o To resolve a motion to discharge, the Rules only require that that the testimony of the accused sought to be discharged be substantially corroborated in its material points, not on all points. 5 (d) Montero is not the most guilty o By jurisprudence, "most guilty" refers to the highest degree of culpability in of participation in the commission of the offense and does not necessarily mean the severity of the penalty imposed. While all the accused may be given the same penalty by reason of conspiracy, yet one may be considered to have lesser or the least guilt taking into his degree of participation in the commission of the offense. To correct the rulings of the CA. o A principal by inducement is not automatically the most guilty in a conspiracy. o What are controlling are the specific acts of the accused in relation to the crime committed. A state witness does not need to be found to be the least guilty; he or she should not only "appear to be the most guilty." It appears that while Montero was part of the planning, preparation, and execution stage as most of his co-accused had been, he had no direct participation in the actual killing of Ruby Rose. It was done by Lennard. Montero’s participation was limited to providing the steel box where victim’s body was placed, welding the steel box, operating the tug boat, and dropping the steelbox containing the cadaver into the sea. The discharge of an accused to be utilized as a state witness because he does not appear to be the most guilty is highly factual in nature. Other issues: o Jimenez is estopped from raising the issue of lack of hearing prior to the discharge of Montero as a state witness. o Notice of withdrawal filed by Montero is considered inferior to the testimony given in open court. It would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before a court simply because the witness who gave it later changed his/her mind. The appreciation of the notice of withdrawal properly belongs to the trial court. Roles of the prosecution and the trial court judge in the resolution of a motion to discharge an accused as a state witness. o It is still the trial court that determines whether the prosecution’s preliminary assessment of the accused-witness’ qualifications to be a state witness satisfies the procedural norms.

o In requiring a hearing in of the discharge, the essential objective of the law is for the court to receive evidence for or against the discharge, which evidence shall serve as the court’s basis – independently of the fiscal's or prosecution's persuasions – in granting or denying the motion for discharge. o Actual hearing is not required provided that the parties have both presented their sides on the merits of the motion. INHIBITION 1. CA did not provide factual or legal when it ordered the inhibition of Judge Docena. 2. 2 par. of Sec. 1 of Rule 137 does not give judges the unlimited discretion to decide whether or not to desist from hearing a case. The inhibition must be for just and valid causes. The mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for their inhibition, especially when the charge is without basis. nd

Merciales vs. CA (2002) Facts: On Aug. 12, 1993, criminal case nos. 6307, 6308, 6309, 6310, 6311 and 6312 for rape with homicide were filed against private respondents (Nuada, Moral, Nieves, Lobete, Grageda and Flores) before the RTC for the death Maritess Merciales. During trial, after presenting 7 witnesses, the public prosecutor filed a motion for the discharge of Nuada to be a state witness. However, the prosecutor contended to the court that it was no longer required to present evidence to warrant the discharge of Nueada because he was already in the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ. Because of this, the respondent judge denied the motion for failure to of the prosecution to present evidence, pursuant to sec. 9 of Rule 119. The prosecution then filed a petition for certiorari to the SC, questioning the denial of the motion to discharge Nuada. The said petition did not have a prayer for a temporary restraining order, but the trial court still did not set the trial for hearing to give the prosecution time to secure such TRO. Subsequently, Private respondents filed a motion to set the case for hearing, alleging their constitutional right to a speedy trial. It was granted by the court, which set the hearing for July 29, 1994. On the same day, instead of presenting more evidence, the prosecution filed an MR. the respondent judge then re-set the hearing to Aug 9, 1994. On Aug 9, 1994, the prosecution filed an MR, alleging the pending petition before the SC. Private Respondents objected to it, invoking again their right to a speedy trial. The trial court then called for a recess, in order to let the prosecution decide if they were going to present the NBI agent, who was present at the hearing, to prove the due execution of the accused Nuada’s extrajudicial confession. After the recess, the prosecution declined to present the NBI agent, and instead manifested that he was not presenting any further evidence. The defense then moved that the case be deemed submitted and ask the court for leave to file a demurrer to evidence. On Aug 29, 1994, the Solicitor General filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or TRO before the SC to en the respondent judge to proceed with the resolution. However it was denied. The Trial Court subsequently issued the assailed order, which acquitted all the accused. Petitioner, Leticia Merciales who was the mother of the victim, filed before the respondent CA a petition to

annul the decision of the trial court. The CA dismissed the said petition. An MR was subsequently filed, but it was denied. Hence this instant petition. Issue: WoN the public prosecutor committed error when it refused to present evidence to /justify the discharge of Nuada as a state witness? Ruling: Yes, the public prosecutor was guilty of serious nonfeasance. It is the duty of the public prosecutor to bring the criminal proceedings for the punishment of the guilty. Same with this obligation is the duty to pursue a criminal proceeding and to represent the public interest. A crime is an offense against the state. At the present case, the public prosecutor knew that he has not presented sufficient evidence in order to convict the accused. Yet, despite all the motion of the defense to continue with the hearing, the prosecutor deliberately failed to present an available witness and thereby allowing the court to declare the case rested. At this instance, the public prosecutor was remiss of his duty to protect the interest of the offended parties. The mother’s victim could do nothing but to watch helplessly as the public prosecutor, who was under the legal obligation to pursue the action on their behalf, renege on that obligation and refused to perform his sworn duty. It is true that Rule 119, sec. 9 expressly provides the presentation of evidence to the discharge of an accused to be a state witness. It states that: “When two or more persons are tly charged with the commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case, the court may direct one or more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses for the state when after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in of the discharge, xxx xxx xxx.” By refusing to comply with the trial courts order to present evidence, the public prosecutor grossly violated the above-quoted rule. Moreover, the public prosecutor violated his bounden duty to protect the interest of the offended party, at least insofar as the criminal aspect is concerned. After the trial court denied his motion to discharge Nuada as a state witness, he should have proceeded to complete the evidence of the prosecution by other means. Instead, he willfully and deliberately refused to present an available

witness, i.e., the NBI Agent who was present in court on that date and time. The public prosecutor was duty-bound to exhaust all available proofs to establish the guilt of the accused and bring them to justice for their offense against the injured party.

Ampatuan v. De Lima Topic: R.A. No. 6981 - ("Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act") Author: Lemonade

Issue: Whether respondents may be compelled by writ of mandamus to charge Dalandag as an accused for multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre despite his ission to the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ.

Facts: (MAGUINDANAO MASSACRE) - long digest

Held: NO.

1. 57 innocent civilians were massacred in Sitio Masalay, Municipality of Ampatuan, Maguindanao Province. Among the principal suspects was petitioner, then the Mayor of the Municipality of Datu Unsay, Maguindanao Province. Inquest proceedings were conducted against petitioner before he was flown to Manila and detained at the main office of NBI. 2. Through Department Order No. 948, then Secretary of Justice Devanadera constituted a Special of Prosecutors to conduct the preliminary investigation. 3. DOJ resolved to file the corresponding informations for murder against petitioner, and to issue subpoenae to several persons. Cases were filed with the RTC of Cotabato City. 4. The Secretary of Justice Devanadera wrote to Chief Justice Puno requesting the transfer of the venue of the trial of the Maguindanao massacre from Cotabato City to Metro Manila, either in QC or in Manila, to prevent a miscarriage of justice – Granted. 5. However, prior to the transfer of the venue of the trial to Metro Manila, the Prosecution filed a manifestation regarding the filing of 15 additional informations for murder against petitioner in Cotabato City RTC. Additional informations for murder were also filed against petitioner in QC RTC, the new venue of the trial pursuant to the resolution of the Court. 6. Petitioner pleaded not guilty. 7. The of Prosecutors, relying on the affidavits of one Kenny Dalandag, charged 196 individuals with multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre. 8. Dalandag was itted into the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ. QC RTC issued its amended pre-trial order, wherein Dalandag was listed as one of the Prosecution witnesses. 9. Petitioner, through counsel, wrote to respondent to request the inclusion of Dalandag in the informations for murder considering that Dalandag had already confessed his participation in the massacre through his two sworn declarations. However, Secretary De Lima denied petitioner’s request. 10. Accordingly, petitioner brought a petition for mandamus in the RTC of Manila seeking to compel respondents to charge Dalandag as another accused in the various murder cases undergoing trial in the QC RTC. 11. RTC of Manila issued a subpoena to Dalandag, care of the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ, requiring him to appear and testify. 12. Respondents moved to quash the subpoena, to which petitioner opposed. 13. RTC of Manila issued the assailed order dismissing the petition for mandamus. Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.

Ratio: 1. Consistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution, the Court deems it a sound judicial policy not to interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and to allow the Executive Department, through the Department of Justice, exclusively to determine what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the prosecution of supposed offenders. By way of exception, however, judicial review may be allowed where it is clearly established that the public prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion. 2. The records herein are bereft of any showing that the of Prosecutors committed grave abuse of discretion in identifying the 196 individuals to be indicted for the Maguindanao massacre. 3. Sect. 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, which requires that "the complaint or information shall be against all persons who appear to be responsible for the offense involved," albeit a mandatory provision, may be subject of some exceptions, one of which is when a participant in the commission of a crime becomes a state witness. The two modes by which a participant in the commission of a crime may become a state witness are, namely: (a) by discharge from the criminal case pursuant to Sec. 17 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court; and (b) by the approval of his application for ission into the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ in accordance with RA 6981 (The Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act). These modes, while seemingly alike, are distinct and separate from each other. 4. Under Sec. 17, Rule 119 of ROC, the discharge by the trial court of one or more of several accused with their consent so that they can be witnesses for the State is made upon motion by the Prosecution before resting its case. On the other hand, Sec. 10 of RA 6981, which allows any person who has participated in the commission of a crime and desires to be a witness for the State, can apply and, if qualified as determined in this Act and by the Department, shall be itted into the Program whenever the following circumstances are present: a. the offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave felony as defined under the Revised Penal Code or its equivalent under special laws; (NOTE: same requisites under both laws except this; I did not see this in Sec. 17, Rule 119 - VEAC) b. there is absolute necessity for his testimony; c. there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed; d. his testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points; e. he does not appear to be most guilty; and f. he has not at any time been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.

5. An accused discharged from an information by the trial court pursuant to Sec. 17 of Rule 119 may also be itted to the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ provided he complies with the requirements of RA 6981. 6. A participant in the commission of the crime, to be discharged to become a state witness pursuant to Rule 119, must be one charged as an accused in the criminal case. The discharge operates as an acquittal of the discharged accused and shall be a bar to his future prosecution for the same offense, unless he fails or refuses to testify against his co-accused in accordance with his sworn statement constituting the basis for his discharge. The discharge is expressly left to the sound discretion of the trial court, which has the exclusive responsibility to see to it that the conditions prescribed by the rules for that purpose exist. However, such discretion is not absolute. Anent the requisite that there must be an absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is sought, the trial court has to rely on the suggestions of and the information provided by the public prosecutor. 7. On the other hand, there is no requirement under RA 6981 for the Prosecution to first charge a person in court as one of the accused in order for him to qualify for ission into the Witness Protection Program. It also operates as an acquittal and said witness cannot subsequently be included in the criminal information except when he fails or refuses to testify. The immunity for the state witness is granted by the DOJ, not by the trial court. Should such witness be meanwhile charged in court as an accused, the public prosecutor, upon presentation to him of the certification of ission into the Witness Protection Program, shall petition the trial court for the discharge of the witness. The Court shall then order the discharge and exclusion of said accused from the information. 8. The ission of Dalandag into the Witness Protection Program of the Government as a state witness was warranted by the absolute necessity of his testimony to the successful prosecution of the criminal charges. Apparently, all the conditions prescribed by RA 6981 were met in his case. His ission of his participation in the commission of the Maguindanao massacre was no hindrance to his ission into the Witness Protection Program as a state witness, for all that was necessary was for him to appear not the most guilty. Accordingly, he could not anymore be charged for his participation in the Maguindanao massacre, as to which his ission operated as an acquittal, unless he later on refuses or fails to testify in accordance with the sworn statement that became the basis for his discharge against those now charged for the crimes. 9. In matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus may only be resorted to in order to compel respondent tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person to take action, but it cannot be used to direct the manner or the particular way discretion is to be exercised, or to compel the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of judgment or discretion. As such, respondent Secretary of Justice may be compelled to act on the letter-request of petitioner, but may not be compelled to grant or deny such letter-request. Considering that respondent Secretary of Justice already denied the letter-request, mandamus was no longer available as petitioner's recourse.

Quarto v Ombudsman (Oct 5, 2011) (sorry mahaba, haba ng discussion on immunity, pls check full text. - izzy) Topic: Discharge of accused to be state witness & Effect ; RA 6770, Sec. 17

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Petitioner: Chief of the Central Equipment and Spare Parts Division as well as the head of the Special Inspectorate Team (SIT) (he approves the job orders and signs the inspections reports made by the SIT) Respondents: of the SIT (they are the ones who make the inspection reports) 

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The DPWH Secretary created a committee to investigate alleged anomalous transactions involving the repairs and/or purchase of spare parts of DPWH service vehicles with the DPWH Internal Audit Service to conduct the actual investigation. The DPWH-IAS discovered that from March to December 2001, several emergency (pre-repair and post repair inspections) repairs and/or purchase of spare parts of hundreds of DPWH service vehicles, which were approved and paid by the government, did not actually take place, resulting in government losses of approximately P143 million for this ten-month period alone. The Atty Ofilada of the DPWH-IAS then filed before the Office of the Ombudsman complaints charging the petitioner, the respondents, who are officials and employees of the DPWH, and other private individuals who purportedly benefitted from the anomalous transactions.

Atty Ofilada imputed the acts to petitioner:  approving 4 job orders for the repairs and purchase of spare parts for the service vehicle to which such job orders concurred with the pre-repair and post repair inspection reports by the respondents Atty. Olifada charged respondents with the following:  as of the SIT they accomplished & signed pre and post repair inspection reports in of the 4 job orders  they made it appear that the vehicle was inspected prior and after the alleged repair even if they knew that the vehicle was never turned over to them for inspection  the accomplishment of the inspection reports were the bases for preparation of the disbursement vouchers and then authorizing the payment of the said repairs thru reimbursement scheme to the damage and prejudice of the DPWH. Petitioner denied the allegations, he claimed that he only relied on his subordinates when he signed the job orders and inspection reports Respondents itted the irregularities in the repairs and purchase of spare parts and offered to testify to prove evidence against the DPWH officials and employees involved in exchange for their immunity. According to them:

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In most instances, service vehicles are immediately brought to a car repair shop of the end-’s choice without bringing it first to the [Motorpool Section, CESPD, BOE] for the preparation of the required job order by [Gayya] of the Motorpool Section and the pre-repair inspection to be conducted by the SIT. After the purported repairs are done, SIT are made to sign a post-repair inspection report which already includes a typed-in recommendation for the payment of repairs, and the signature of the Head of the [SIT] indicating his alleged concurrence with the findings of the SIT despite the absence of an actual inspection. they said that the post - repair inspection report is accompanied by the (a) falsified job order signed by the head of the SIT (b) an empty/falsified prerepair inspection report they said that they have photocopies of these sets of falsified documents because those documents were presented to them before they affix their signatures they also said that the post-repair inspection report is accomplished only after the preparation and approval of the job order but what is being done is that the documents are dated much later than the post-repair inspection report. And since there was no actual pre-repair and post-repair inspection, it paved way for ghost repairs of the DPWH service vehicles they also said there are more instances wherein they are willing to testify to in exchange for immunity from prosecution

The Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan several information charging the said DPWH officials and employees with plunder, estafa through falsification of official/commercial documents and violation of Section 3(e), RA No. 3019. On the other hand, the Ombudsman granted the respondents' request for immunity in exchange for their testimonies and cooperation in the prosecution of the cases filed. Petitioner then filed for certiorari with the Sandiganbayan questioning that grant of immunity by the Ombudsman but this was demised due to lack of jurisdiction as was advised to file a petitioner before the SC. Hence the petition for certiorari and mandamus Petitioner’s argument:  Ombudsman should have included respondents since it was their inspection reports that paved way for the commission of the alleged irregularities  due to respondent’s criminal complicity, no repair could have started and no payment for repairs could have been made without their respondent’s prerepair and post-repair inspection reports  there was selective prosecution which is clear GAD  before Ombudsman may avail respondents as state witness, they must be first included in the informations filed with the court and after that, the Ombudsman can ask the court for their discharge so that they could be used s state witness under the conditions laid down in Sec 17 Rule 119 of the

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ROC since, as petitioner alleged, the court has the “sole prerogative” to determine if these conditions exits (conditions: there should be absolute necessity for testimony of the proposed witness AND he should not appear to be the most guilty) he alleged that respondent’s testimony is not absolutely necessary and the manner of respondent’s participation proves that they are the most guilty

Ombudsman and Respondents argument: According to the Ombudsman, RA 6770 expressly grants him the power to grant immunity from the prosecution of witnesses. And the ROC is inapplicable because the decision on whom to prosecute is an executive not judicial prerogative. It also invoked the Court’s policy of non-interference in the Ombdusman’s exercise of his discretion regarding his investigatory and prosecutorial powers. He also claimed that the matter as to the “most guilty” is a defense which should be raised in the trial proper (factual) According to the respondents, Ombudsman has the discretion who should be included in the information as to his basis of finding probable cause. And the courts could only interfere if there is clear showing of GAD which petitioner failed to do so. ISSUE: Whether the Ombudsman has the authority to grant immunity from prosecution to witnesses? HELD: YES. RA No. 6770 specifically empowers the Ombudsman to grant immunity "in any hearing, inquiry or proceeding being conducted by the Ombudsman or under its authority, in the performance or in the furtherance of its constitutional functions and statutory objectives." Mandamus will not lie. In the exercise of his investigatory and prosecutorial powers, he enjoys the same latitude of discretion in determining what constitutes sufficient evidence to a finding of probable cause and the degree of participation of those involved or the lack thereof. His findings and conclusions on these matters are not ordinarily subject to review by the courts except when he gravely abuses his discretion, which the petitioner has failed to establish in this case. SC is not a trier of facts, the Ombudsman is in a better position to know the strength and weakness of evidence presently in his possession, the kind, tenor and source of testimony he needs to enable him to prove his case. The grant if immunity effectively but conditionally results in the extinction of the criminal liability the accused-witnesses might have incurred, as defined in of the grant. The grant directly affects the individual and enforces his right against self-incrimination. But if on the basis of the same evidence, the Ombudsman arbitrarily excludes from an indictment some individuals while impleading all others, the remedy of mandamus lies since he is duty-bound, as a rule, to include in the information all persons who appear responsible for the offense involved.

Sec 17 of Ra 6670: “Sec. 17. Immunities.—x x x. Under such and conditions as it may determine, taking into the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court, the Ombudsman may grant immunity from criminal prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession and production of documents or other evidence may be necessary to determine the truth in any hearing, inquiry or proceeding being conducted by the Ombudsman or under its authority, in the performance or in the furtherance of its constitutional functions and statutory objectives. The immunity granted under this and the immediately preceding paragraph shall not exempt the witness from criminal prosecution for perjury or false testimony nor shall he be exempt from demotion or removal from office.”  

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The Ombudsman is granted a broad discretion that allows the Ombudsman’s consideration of factors other than those outlined under Sec 17 of Rule 119 The rationale for this provision: the power to compel testimony from its residents; this power enables the government to secure vital information necessary to carry out its myriad functions. This power though is not absolute. Immunity statutes seek a rational accommodation between the imperatives of an individual’s constitutional right against self- incrimination (considered the fount from which all statutes granting immunity emanate) and the legitimate governmental interest in securing testimony. By voluntarily offering to give information on the commission of a crime and to testify against the culprits, a person opens himself to investigation and prosecution if he himself had participated in the criminal act. To secure his testimony without exposing him to the risk of prosecution, the law recognizes that the witness can be given immunity from prosecution. In this manner, the state interest is satisfied while respecting the individual’s constitutional right against self-incrimination.

Other discussions (take time to read) a. As to non-exhaustion of remedies by petitioner  the pre-condition for certiorari and mandamus is that they are only availed when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law  in this case, petitioner did not file MR nor file a motion for inclusion of the respondents in the informations before filing the present petitioner (those are the adequate remedies they did not avail of)  they did not file within the 60 day reglementary period before the SC because they initially and erroneously filed the certiorari with the Sandiganbayan

b. Nature of grant of immunity:  The power to grant is essentially legislative. Congress has broad discretion and can lay down conditions and extent of immunity to be granted. The number granting immunity escalated to secure vital information for purposes of prosecution. It considered the importance of the testimony and the character of some offences and of some situations where the criminal participants are in the best position to give useful testimony RA No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989 was formulated of making Ombudsman the protector of the people against inept, abusive and corrupt government officers and employees. Congress saw it fit to grant the Ombudsman the power to directly confer immunity to enable his office to effectively carry out its constitutional and statutory mandate of ensuring effective ability in the public service. c. Consideration in the grant of immunity:  While the legislature is the source of the power to grant immunity, the authority to implement is lodged elsewhere. The authority to choose the individual to whom immunity would be granted is a constituent part of the process and is essentially an executive function.  It is essentially a tactical decision to forego prosecution of a person for government to achieve a higher objective. It is a deliberate renunciation of the right of the State to prosecute all who appear to be guilty of having committed a crime. Its justification lies in the particular need of the State to obtain the conviction of the more guilty criminals who, otherwise, will probably elude the long arm of the law. RA No. 6770 fully recognizes this prosecutory prerogative by empowering the Ombudsman to grant immunity, subject to “such and conditions” as he may determine. The only textual limitation imposed by law on this authority is the need to take “into the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court,”—i.e., Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court.64 This provision requires that: (a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested; (b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused; (c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points; (d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and (e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. 

Under this provision, the court is given the power to discharge a state witness only because it has already acquired jurisdiction over the crime and the accused. The discharge of an accused is part of the exercise of jurisdiction but is not a recognition of an inherent judicial function. these guidelines are necessarily implied in the discretion granted to the courts.

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RA No. 6770 recognizes that these same principles should apply when the Ombudsman directly grants immunity to a witness. The same consideration (that is the achieve greater purpose of securing conviction of the most guilty and greatest number among the accused)is involved whether the grants is by the public prosecutor w/ court intervention or by the Ombudsman Distinction b/w public prosecutor and Ombdusman: it is the higher priority given by law to the Ombudsman to focus on offences committed by public officers & employees to ensure ability in public service. Which s for the Ombudsman’s unique power to grant immunity by itself and even before filing of the information in court (a power which the public prosecutor generally doesn’t enjoy)

Petition dismissed, SC did not interfere with the Ombudsman’s grant of immunity since petitioners did not clearly and convincingly show that there was grave abuse of discretion.  

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Petitioner simply concluded that the requirement of “absolute necessity” does not exist based on the Ombudsman’s “evidence,” without even attempting to explain how he arrived at this conclusion. In their t Counter-Affidavit, the respondents narrated the accused DPWH officials/employees’ flagrant disregard of the proper procedure and the guidelines in the repair of DPWH service vehicles which culminated in losses to the government. Particularly telling is the respondents’ statement that a number of pre-repair inspection reports for a particular month in 2001 bear the petitioner’s signature despite the fact that these reports are not ed by findings from the respondents as SIT . This kind of statement cannot but impact on how the Ombudsman viewed the question of “absolute necessity” of the respondents’ testimony since this testimony meets the defense of good faith head-on to prove the prosecution’s allegations. Under these circumstances, we cannot preempt, foreclose, nor replace with our own the Ombudsman’s position on this point as it is clearly not without basis.

Valencia v. Sandiganbayan (2005) FACTS:  Valencia was the Governor of Oriental Mindoro. He was elected in 1992. Information was filed charging Valencia w/ violation of RA 3019. The prosecution contends that the appointment gives unwarranted benefit to Umbao who is disqualified to be appointed w/in 1 year after losing the 1992 election. Valencia pleaded not guilty.

 W/N Sanidganbayan committed GAD in setting case for presentation of evidence;

 The parties submitted a t Stipulation of Facts (JSF) which stated that Councilor Mercene died in 1992 so there was a permanent vacancy in the Sanguniang Bayan of Pola, Oriental Mindoro. Valencia appointed Umbao who ran for the same position but lost earlier that year.

 The motion for leave to file demurrer was premature. Prosec had yet to formally rest its case. The JSF was not yet offered as evidence although Valencia did receive by mail a motion and formal offer of evidence dated Jan 20. The filing shall be proved by its existence in the case records. The records of the Sandiganbayan bear no such offer filed by the prosecution.

 In March 2003, Sandiganbayan directed the parties to sign the JSF. Signed only by the Special Prosecutor and petitioner’s counsel.  In Jan 12 2004, Prosecutor Salindong rested the case based on the JSF and waived the presentation of evidence for the prosecution.  Jan 19: Valencia filed a Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence because the prosecution failed to present, mark and offer evidence that would substantiate the charge against him. JSF lacks his signature. Prosec failed to submit evidence establishing injury and presence of partiality.  Pros. Autencio-Daquis (pinalitan yung una) filed an opposition contending the demurrer is premature because they have yet to formally offer the JSF.  Sandigan directed them again to sign the JSF.  Valencia filed MR, claiming that his former counsel was not authorized to enter into any agreement and he only found out about the JSF in Jan.

HELD:  Under R119: Demurrer is filed after the prosecution rests its case. It tests the sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence.  R132: Before evidence may be itted, it must be formally offered.

 Assuming it was formally offered, the motion was still premature because it was filed a day before the date of the offer. Valencia himself said the prosecution failed to mark and offer evidence.  No GAD. The court may grant parties the opportunity to adduce additional evidence in furtherance of justice. The trial procedure in R119 depends upon the circumstances of each case at the discretion of the trial judge.  The reception of additional evidence is not technically a reopening of the case as the prosec had yet to formally rest its case. A motion to reopen presupposes that parties have formally offered and closed their evidence. If the ission of add’l evidence is sanctioned before judgment, with more reason that it should be allowed when the prosec had not yet concluded its presentation of evidence. His refusal to sign the JSF is justification to recall the pre-trial order set the case for presentation of evidence.

 Sandigan issued a pre-trial order, embodying the JSF.

 Valencia can’t claim denial of due process. He can still contest the evidence adduced against him and prove his own defenses after prosecution concludes its presentation of evidence.

 Sandigan issued then issued another order recalling the pre-trial order, denying the motion for leave to file demurrer and setting the case for presentation of prosecution’s evidence. MR denied.

 The State is entitled to due process. Pros. Salindong committed GAD by resting the case without adducing evidence for the State and without ensuring that Valencia signed the JSF before submitting it to the Sandigan.

 Prosecution proceeded with the presentation since there’s no TRO or PI.

 He can’t invoke the right to a speedy trial. Since the first anon complaint in 1994 before the Ombudsman, Valencia never contested the prosecutorial proceedings nor the pendency of the case. Right is deemed waived.

ISSUE:  W/N Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence was premature;

 R119 provides that an order denying motion to file demurrer is not reviewable by appeal or certiorari before judgment.

 Valencia’s remedy is to proceed with the presentation of his evidence and appeal from any adverse decision that may be rendered.