Exapharma 593v3h

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SEJT SIBH ASSESSMENT 34(IXd)) V MIS t 3 j4D I TRAISI 2057/B ILODEAU FROM; AnlcaralM-C5 Pascal Laurin CS Michelle Raty CS

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073UN2013

CIC PILE:

W300457930 I UCI 40158281

8281 CESA FILE: CA2013.4049389 /4015CIT: Iran 01 DEC1965 I Male / COB: Iran / SUBJECT: Ramin FALLA1 / DOE: Ecvntive Suniarnrv 013, for a (TRy) hi Ankara on March 19,2 t Vis iden Res ary por Tem a for lied 1. Mr. Ramin FALLAFI app e years, Canadian Plasma ly created business thr the ccitt thre the purposes of working on his new Resources / Exaphartna Inc. (B) shgabi since October2001. naging Director of Fanavari Azmayeh procurement connected to e Ma the n bee has J-I LIA FA Mr. 2. this company has been involved wit Iranian nuclear program. (S) temporary pleted the final assessment of the com ) has SD (NS n isio Div ing een ble Scr that there are reasona 3. The National Security applicant named above, It is assessed resident application for the primary is inissible to Canada pursuant to paragraph 34(1 )(d) of the ) H urity of Canada. (13 grounds to believe that Mr. FALLA PA) for bcing a danger in the sec (IR Act ion tect Pro ee Mg Re[ wJd n haraigratio following: l be labeled in accordance with the wil ort rep this out ugh thro tion rma The info (S) (B) (U)

Refers to “Secret” information Refers to “Protected B” information tion Refers to “Unclassified” infbzma

Law

tiont 34 to 37 include constitute inissibility under sec e are reasonable that s fact “the A, IRP the of 33 Pursuant to section facts for which ther unless otherwise provided, include . The threshold of reasonable grounds facts arising from omissions and, iW’ occ e occurred, arc occurring or may grounds to believe that they hav

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to believe has been confirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Mugcyera v. Canada (Minister of Cftizenshlp and ImmiRration), [2005] 2 S.C.R. 100, at paragraph 114. (U) “34. (1) A pemianerit resident or a foreign national is inissible on security grounds for... (d) being a danger to the security of Canada... Applicant-SiecificJ*formaiion On April 12, 2013, TR.AIS received a referral from the Canadian Mission in Ankara for Ramin FALLAH (hereafter refened to as the applicant) who has applied for a Temporary Resident Visa (TRV) for the purposes of working on his newly created business for the next three years, Canadian Plasma Resources / Exaphartna Inc. The business address for these entities am indicated as 508 Spadina Avenue in Toronto. Ontario. (B) According to the information provided, the applIcant has been the Managing Director of Fanavari Azmayeshgabi since October 2001. Prior to that, he was the Marketing Director of the same company from 1996 to 2001. From 1991 to 1996 he was a sales manager for Technology Azmaycshgahi and a salesman for that same company from 19811 to 1991. (B)

As Managing Director of Panavari Azmayeshgahi, the applicant indicates in his C.V. being in charge of! 80 employees. As part of his duties, he indicates “perfbrm duties as managing director for a leading importing company in the field of medical and laboratories equipment, and one of the biggest medical and laboratories companies at Iran”. (B) According to FOSS, the applicant was previously issued TRVs in August 2001, July 2003, and August 2005. (B) Topic-Specific Information gctions awsiiinn Since 2006, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has imposed four rounds of sanctions (Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1929 (2010)] against Iran in response to the proliferation risks presented by its nuclear program in tight of Iran’s continuing failure to meet the requirements of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and to comply with the provisions of earlier UNSC Resolutions to suspend aft uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing activities. (U) The UNSC Resolutions provide for the following: impose an embargo on certain goods and services that could contribute to iran’s activities linked to enrichment, reprocessing, heavy water or the development of nuclear wenpons delivery systems; prohibit the provision of technical or financial assistance on products

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under the export ban; impose a travel ban for designated Iranian officials; and implement a freeze of nets of designated Iranian companies and officials. (U) On July 22, 2010, Canada implemented the IJNSC Resolutions with the Special Economic Measur (Jraa) 2 On November 21.2011. Can daxdposed Regulations, under the Special Economic Measures 4cr (SEMA). new sanctions against fran to prohibit financial transactions with Iran, expand the list of prohibited goods to include all goods used in the petrochemical, oil and gas industry In iran, amend the list of prohibited goods to include additional hems that could be used in Itan’s nuclear program, and add new individuals and entities to the list of designated persons found in Schedule I of the SEMA Regulations. (U) Fsnavari Azmaveshgpbi

According to its website : 4 Our company was formed in 1985 with the ann to supply medical and laboralaiy instruments. Our mission is to furnish our clients with a solution and not a simple sale of instrument. Installation, Training and 10 years after sales services are guaranteed by us.. Fanevari succeeded to become a reliable institution for the heatthesre sector; thanks to a continuous growth period resulted from investments made for lorigderm planning and development and based on safeguarding our national imerests. Weve attempted to obtain our customers’ satisthction using 25 years of our management teams’ experience and selected set of the best medical products, in folbwmg area: ‘Providing high quality equipments and superior technology proportionate to necessities of medical centers. ‘Deg, consulting and providing engineering services before choosing the required equipments. ‘Obtaining our customers’ relief using our experienced technical team who are responsible to provide guarantee and after sales service which can optimia medical centers investments with superior performance. Fanavail Azmayeshgahl reprnscnts well known brands and sophisticated products: ‘Siemens: Ultrasound systems, C-Ami, Mobile X-Ray, Mammography, Lithotripsor System, Radiology. Fluoroecopy system, Angiogrephy and MRI •Olynspus: Wkle range of Endoscopic Products in 01, Rcspiratory and surgery ‘Covidien: Surgical Staplers. Advanced Laparosic Instruments, Oenersl and Specialty Sutures, Biosurgexy and 1VS ‘Getinge. Hospital Sterilizers and Washer Dsmfnctora •Maquec Ventilators, Ceiling Pendants, Surgical Lights •Daincca: Ancstiwsla machines Accoithng to classified infonnation ol,taiiwd on June 3,2013:

‘Special Economic Measures (Iran) Regulations, SORI2OIO-165 July22, 2010, escusred 02 October2012, g:llcanadzettc.ec.ca’rn-Io2r2Ol0flO lO.flS.O4Ihunl!sor-dorsl 6.ej1gJfl5J.

Special Economic Measures (iran) Regulations, SORI2OIO-165 July22, 2010, accessed 02 October2012,

flip:lirsriadaneac.cWv-eWe220i 0f4mj(sor.dosi65-eiiajiiip1, Sanctions against han, accessed 02 October2012, Fanavari Azmayeehgahi, , ht ,iwwwfa.,avariwm!httniiaboutus.htui1 {acceed lune 7,20131

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s the U.K.’s Department of Business innovation and Skill The company Fanavari Aznrnyeshgahl is listed on : 5 that s state ate Sabz Co. which (BIS) as Fanavan Azn’iayeshgahi eke Eghlim Sana nce of the Export Control Organisation (ECO) experie The entities in chided on the list are mainly based on to a rsion dive of risks ptable unacce s due to either invoking the WML) End-Use Control or refusing ticence WMD programme of concern, that have have beco named in licence applications Entities anti organistitions are also included where they tion (EU) 96112010 of 25th October 2G10, or in Regula been refused in line with the provisions of CouncilStajem erg issued on 9th November 2,010 by Mark Prisk, erial Minist n Writte om Kingd line with the United Minister of State for Business and Enterprise. or list, for whom we may not have received applicahons Lu addition, (here are adier entities included in the or refuse a Iicences but for whom there is publicly ls enquiries in which to invoke the End-Use Contro programmes of concern. available information indicating their involvement in WMD ed. (U> ti has had liccnses both granted and deni

According to this document, Fanavari Azrnayeshgal

ed by Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade ucenl ndurn doc r Fanavari Azmayesbgalii is also llswd on a 1 and Industry as an entity of potential WMI) concern.

pharmna& Canadian Plasma Resources Exnphanna’s websile, its mission is’: According to the mission statement found on order to sowno plasma and plasma derived therapies in To provide a reliable supply of Ike highest quality make Canada self-sufficient. According to its vblon’ acturer in Canada To be recognized as the leading source plasma manuf s, service cts and for our excellence, innovative proiu

and tobe internationally renowned

dian Plasma According to the mission statement for Cana ranIIst-0tl.5Jia4 acccssed June 6, 2013)

Iuk-dbit-l ‘pJ/ww.lranwauth.orsJjtotemrneni1UK y, Industr ant ‘Ministry of Economy, Trade

June?, 2013)

n’coracrate.s1atement5 taceemsed Jane 7.20131 E,tapbarma. About Exaphamie. bttp:’fwww.exmiin June 7, 2013] ‘Tbid htlçIJwww vcoIasnIe.caIcoIpolanaLefnis (accessed Canadlan Plasuta Resources, , 9 Carad, Caa Agency

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and reliability ply plasma ot’ the highest quality sup l wil ces our Res sma Pla ld Canadian Canada and around the wor that improve and savC Hves itt According to lb vision:

ure Canada reliable supply of plasma to ens The goal is to provide a safe and s detived from ft. human plasma and therapeutic

for creating treatments

will be self4uffic lent in

strives to Canadian Plasma Rasournas derived therapies fermi d fbr importing of plasma nee the e inat elim ally ntu eve Significantly dec,eae and ntrieç other plasma producing cou *

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Rarnin FaLIah

is identified ar website the applicant Ye ess sin Bu e Th in ted the applicant’ : with the applicant pos of the questions posed to e som According to an Interview ong Am hi. hga yes Funavasi Azrna as the Managing Director of medical ludnatry’? ynar company provide to the dou a. vic aer and ts duc TflY What sort of pro ters, pitals and imaging cen s imaging products to hosvide raaduines nocssary for men Sie ply sup nly mai We addition, we pro R.AMIN FALLAN I, X-ray, and ultra-sound. In company. Also, we supply surgical products se Including systems such as MR ane Jap a us, mp different parts of the supplied by Oly endoecopy, though these are n and laparoscopic surgery, and we source those from to hospitals—both like staples and suturos for ope te of the advanced surgical products that we supply cover CSR, oparuting of smi world. These arc examples ply products from Gchnge and Maquet, their products private and state, We also sup . room equipment, and ventilators blems with shipments? t Do you capetiesee tiny pro airy product that you wan y are very bureaucratic for istr Iran Min in is the ton lth, cus Hea The . of ous y Fortunately, nothIng very seri se, You have to have the permission of the Ministr world, for example in to release from the customs hou toms to obtain its release. In other puts of the you receive it at your that to cus of Cornnicrcc and then go ped to companies via OHL, and then the day after nkItnl and they told us ship Fra are in ts duc use huge wareho Armenia, die pro problems at customs we se. Siemens has established a office, not In the customs hou Tehrun because of this huge investment Yet, due to ssary cost for us, though in ause it’s an unnece that we would not need mie . We aim to get rid of It, bec ran Teb in use eho a war e hav have to t. we cannot do that at the momen

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de”, hcipi w Raisin Fdlah. uFeom the InsI

“The BusIness Year, Intervie wie 6, 20t31 ide taccasred 2QJ tffrom.the4ns

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Pursuant to paragraph 34(IX4) of 1I&PA, an applicant may be found inissible for being a “danger to the sccwity of Canada”; therefore, an individual who has engaged, engages, or will eagage in proLifemtlon of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) may be found inissible to Canada. The Supreme Comnt of Canada held in Surek v. Cara4a (Minister of Citizenship and Immigraaion), L2002] I S.C.R. 3, ai paragraph 5, that: a fair, large and liberal Interpretation In accordance with International norms must be accorded La “danger to the security of Canada” in deportation legislation. We recognize that “danger to the security of Canada” is difficult to defoe We also accept dint the determination of what constitutes a “danger to the security of Canada” Is highly fhet-based and political in a general sense. All this suggests a bread aid flexible approach to national security and..a deferential standard of judicial review” tEawhasLc arkied.) (U)

“.

The Court also held, at paragraph RE, that “[ijntcrnational conventions must be interpreted in light of canant conditions”:

“1110 insist on direct proof of a specitlc threat to Canada as the test for “dauger lathe security of Canada” Is to Sat the bar too high. There must be a real and serious possibility of adverse effect to Canada. But the threat need not be direct naiher it may be grounded ii, distant events that indirectly have a real possibility ciharming Canadian security.” tEmp hasis oddert I (U) The Court concluded, at paragraph 90, that “IAI peraoa canstitutca a “danger to the security nt Canada” if ha or she poses a serious threat to the secmity of Canada, whether direct an’ Indirect, and bearing In mind the fact that the security of one coutry Is often dependent on the security of other nations. The threat rnu be “serious”, in the sense that ii must be grounded art objectively reasonable suspicion based on evidence and in the sense that the threatened harm must be substantial rather than negligible.” Emphasir added.) (U> In addition, the Federal Court of Appeal held in Suresh i Canada (M.C.L), (2000) 2 FC 592 (CA), at paragraph 6!. that: “ITJtbe “security of Canada” cannot be limited en Instances where the personal safety of Canadians Ii concerned. It should logically extend to instances where the integrity of Canada’s Intenritiond relations and obligations are aUected. It must be adcnowledged that only through lbs collective efforts of nations will the threat of terrorism be diminished. The efficacy of those collective efforts is undermined each time a natioO ptvvides terrorist organizations with a window of opportunity to openate off-shore arid achieve indirectly what cannot be done as efficiently and efl’ectively ifl the country targeted for tcrrcristattocks” (Emphasis adde€Lj(U) Although the Snresh case dealt with terrorism, the National Security Screening Division (NSSD) is of the view that the arguments regarding what constitutes “a danger to the security of Canada” are applicable to situations dealing with nuclear proliferation or proliferation of WMi) which constitutes a serious threat or danger to the security of Canada. Nucicar proliferation constitutes a worldwide threat, hence the impvsdtafl of economic sanctions on Iran. To note, as part of its non-proliferation policy, Canada is a signatory to the

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s a safeguard Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which establishe intertiatianal Treaty On the Non-Proliferation of han is a party ough Alth A). nal Atomic Energy Agency (IAE system under the responsibility of the Internatio international and IAEA the by ce non-complian to the NFl, as nientioned above, it has been found in sanctions have been imposed against Iran. (U) Canada is constitutes a danger to the security of In addition, the interpretation of the courts as to what and (0: nragraphs 3(1)(h) conrirmed in the objectives of IRPA, specifically in subp are. “3. (1) The objectives of this Act with respect to Immigration in the security of Canadian society; to mainta s and dian Cana of (Ii) to protect the health and safety ng resperS for human rights and by denying (1) to promote ernatlaisi justiad end security by fosteri or security risks....” (U) acceas to Canadian territory to persons who are criminals (Mtncter of Canada held in Medovarski it Canada In regards to section 3 of IAPA, the Supreme Court of at paragraph 10, that Ci&eisrhip andImmigrcuios), 12005)2 S.C.R. 539, to prioritize security. This objective is given “The otijectives as expressed in the 11W4 indicate an interd records, by removing applicants with such effct by praveasing the entry of applicants with criminalpermanent residents to behave lawfully while of records from Canada, and by emphasizing the obligationthe predecessor atsiute, which emphasized the in focus the from change a marks lids da. Cana in e.g., see s. 3(IXI) of the IRPA versus s. 3(j) of thef successful Integration of applicants more than security er Act s. 3(lXh) of the IRP.4 versus s. 3(i) f&ni the of former Act a. 3(lXe) of the JRP4 versus s. 3(d) IRPA and its provisions concerning permanent the former Act. Viewed collectively, the objectives of theand security threats less [aniendy than under the als residents, communicate a strong desire to treat crimin former Act” (U) personally missible to Canada on security grounds be There is no requ.irement that an individual who is inad ment that criminality be determined in order for an quire involved in acts of violence. There is, therefore, nore Canada. (U) of rity secu to the er dang a individual to be considered iduals who dian policy, NSSD is of the view that indiv Considering the above case law, legislation arid Cana or preliferation of WMD may be found inissible ion ore. are linked, directly or indirectly, to nuclear proliferat nt a danger to the security of Canada. Furthermls or prese they that ve belie to nds grou e nabl reaso are idua there as are linked, directly or indirectly, to the indiv NSSD is also of the view that individuals who iran may ho found inissible as there are reasonable st organizations listed in the SEMA sanctions again the security of Canada. (B) to er dang a titute cons they that ve to belie grounds In the case of that

d governments as identified in opon sources and by allie Fasiavari Azmayethgalii Company has also been was identified by the U.K.’s Department of Business ple, it being an entity of WMD concern. For exam

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CBSA 4SFC SECIUl Innovation and Skills (RIS) as entity that poses “unacc eptable risks of diversion to a WMD programme of concern”. It was also identified

by the Japanese government as an entity of potential WMD COflCCtTh Funher, according to its website, Fanavari Azmayeshgahi rresents well-known brands and pruducts that have potential dual-use application. For example, several produc application, such as Xray equipment, which highlig ts under the Siemens brand have potential dual use is hted in the U.S’s 2010 TechnolOgy Alert List (TAL) as critical technologies for the production of WMD s. X-ray equipment / technologies highlighted in the TAL include: FLASH DISCHARGE TYPE X-RAY SYSTE MS, FLASII X-RAY, iMAGiNG SYSTEMS’ and X AW TJCH AS I. Y.RAy1’u’’

When considering the above, there are reason able grounds to believe that the appliCaflt by virtue of his position as Nanaging Director of Fanavari Azmay eshgahi Company, and by virtue 0 f this carnpaay’s reported Involvement with procurement connected to the Iranian nuclear program, presents a danger to the security of Canada and its allies and is inissible pursua nt to paragraph 34(1 )(d) of IRPA (B). Recommendation

The National Security Division (NSSD) recommends that there are reasonable grotifld ifl believe that the applicant is inissible pursuant to paragraph 34(I)(d ) of IRPA, at this time. The dcCiSi0fl of whether the subject is inissible rests solely with the decisionm akcr. We trust that the infnmiatio° provided will be of assistance in your decision-making process. (B)

Please do not hesitate to us should you require additional information or QSSISWJ1CC Temporary Resident Assessments and Intelligence Section (TRAIS) Outlook: CBSA-ASFCjnteIl_TempResScreenjRM S-RensJflt_Res IcmpfilthRT SMTP: lS-SRERT(Thcbsa-asfc,p,c.ca This documeat casnwtes a record which may be e.’cempt from disclosure under the 4ccB 10 JJj.flJCJIIWi 4cr or the Privacy 4cr. The information or intelligence may also protect be ed by the provisions of the Canada Evidence Act. The information or intelligence must not be disclosed or used as evidence without prior consultahbotl With the Canada Border Services Agency (CIISA). Classified information coataitied within this document Ca000( be disclosed to outside parties

This document is the property of the CBSA lt is loaned to your agency / department in cønfidCflCC br internal only. It must not be reclassified or disseminated, in whole or in pan, without the consent of the originBt

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