Human Nature: A New Theory Of Psychology 595j3x

Human Nature:

A New Theory of Psychology

by Dick Minnerly

Copyright © 2014 by Dick Minnerly.

Library of Congress Control Number: 2014900390 ISBN: Hardcover 978-1-4931-6114-0 Softcover 978-1-4931-6113-3 eBook 978-1-4931-6115-7

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the copyright owner.

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Table of Contents

Preface

Chapter 1. Introduction

Method

Human Development

Evolution

Development

Descriptive Reasoning

The General Case

Our Four Reasoning Perspectives

Arealistic reasoning

Chapter 2. Reasoning

The First Question

The Consideration Cycle

1. Essence and Universals

2. Existence and One

3. The Relational Paradox

Intellectual Systems

Our Reasoning Biases

The Priority Controversy

Rationalism

Empiricism

Formalism

Realism

Natural versus Explicated Reasoning

Chapter 3. Reality

Metaphysics

1. The Principle of Occurrence

The Epistemic Refutation of Monotheism

2. The Principle of Abstraction

3. The Principle of Dimensionality

Traditional Confusions

Extra Dimensions

Measurement

Time

4. The Principle of Displacement

5. The Principle of Correspondence

The Six Forms of Helical Motion

Chapter 4. The Science of Human Nature

Metaphysics and Psychology

The New Science

Human Nature

The Dilemma of Uniqueness

Character vs. Personality

Characteristics vs. Traits

Manipulation

Genetics

Studying Character Backwards

Our Need for Astrology

The Theory of Humanology

3. The Principle of Unique Character

Conception versus Birth

Destiny

Forecasting

Free Will

4. The Principle of Spatial Interference

5. The Principle of Event Relation

The Study of Human Nature

Chapter 5. Our Psychologic Process

General Issues

The Whole Cycle

Impulses

Systems and Phases

Objectivity and Subjectivity

Our Five Conscious Systems

Consciousness and Subconsciousness

The Impulse Pattern

The Standard Pattern

Applying the Standard

Speed

Congenital Pathology

Psychologic Strength and Weakness

Political Attitudes

Memory

Social Implications

Education

Overpopulation

Chapter 6. Our Five Psychologic Systems

Discussing the Five Systems

1. Will

Balanced, The Planner

Projective, The Creator

Assimilative, The Follower

Reversed, The Denier

2. Thought

Balanced, The Reasoner

Projective, The Speaker

Assimilative, The Listener

Reversed, The Skeptic

3. Feeling

Balanced, The Harmonist

Projective, The Emotionalist

Assimilative, The Sybarite

Reversed, The Spectator

4. Judgment

Balanced, The Moralist

Projective, The Egoist

Assimilative, The Altruist

Reversed, The Nihilist

Our Four Judgment .

5. Power

Balanced, The Progressive

Projective, The Radical

Assimilative, The Liberal

Reversed, The Conservative

The Messiah Complex

Definitions.

Symptoms.

Examples

Chapter 7. Judgment and Power

The Hypothetical Judgment-Power System

The Generational Clash

Some Political Implications

Chapter 8. Applying the Theory

About the Tables

Table 1. US Presidents

Jefferson

The Pathological Conservative Presidents

Madison

Nixon

Bush II

T. Roosevelt and Wilson

T. Roosevelt

Wilson

Table 2. US Supreme Court

Table 3. US Governmental Figures

Table 4. US Non-Governmental Political Figures

Table 5. US Revolutionary Figures

Table 6. US Media Figures

Table 7. World Political Figures

Table 8. Philosophic Intellectuals

Table 9. Political Intellectuals

Proudhon

Table 10. Political Literary Figures

Table 11. Academics and Scientists

Table 12. Business Leaders

Table 13. Religionists and Other Mystics

Table 14. Theologians

Luther

Realists vs. Religion

Table 15. Non-Governmental Assassins or Murderers

Table 16. Nazis of WWII

Afterword

Poverty and Excess Wealth

Capitalism vs. Socialism

Conclusion

Appendix A: Calculating the Impulse Pattern

Planetary Cycles

Figure A

Appendix B: Tables of Individuals

Understanding the Tables

Appendix C: The Psychologic Eras

Figures and Tables

Figure 1. The Four Reasoning Modes

Figure 2. The Cycle’s Halves

Figure 3. Solution of the Relational Paradox

Table A. Some Cardinal and Quadrant Functions

Figure 4. Natural Reasoning

Figure 5. Elements of Helical Motion

Figure 6. The Consideration Cycle

Table B. Descriptive Keywords for the Systemic Impulses

Figure A. The Consideration Cycle with Planets and Signs

Table C. The Psychologic Eras

To the memory of my kind, loving, and exquisite wife, Irene O’Connor.

This is the true season of love, when we believe that we alone can love, that no one could ever have loved so before us, and that no one will love in the same way again. —Goethe

Preface

I developed the original theories presented in this work in the late sixties, and I conducted classes on them in the seventies. Since then, neither I nor my former students have lost confidence in their soundness and importance. I think I can truthfully say that no matter how fully you have studied any of the subjects discussed in this book, you will know far more about yourself and others after reading it than you do now. At home, at work, and in politics you will see, as the traditionalist thinkers around you cannot, the real reasons, the innate reasons, why people think and act as they do. And you will do this by learning my quick and verifiable new method for revealing the chief psychologic dispositions of anyone’s innate character.

Frankly, I was surprised to see that in the four decades since I conceived these new ideas, no one in any field has proposed anything like them. I attribute this to the nature of the time, a time in which our general understanding of reality and human nature has not progressed a whit. As a result, people still know less about themselves and others than they think they do, and this deep ignorance remains our most serious problem, if only because it prevents us from solving the other major problems that threaten us all.

One proof of this universal ignorance is that we’ve never had a science of human nature as such. Only two of our human sciences, modern psychology and astrology, have some practitioners who claim that their science can explain our nature, but neither science has actually done so. Modern psychologists study only carefully selected parts of that subject and they have never proposed a complete theory of our psychologic process. Similarly, astrologers are so lost in a surfeit of theoryless assumptions or mystical premises that they too can only comment on some of our parts. All of our other human scientists—geneticists, other biologists, medical researchers, economists, anthropologists, sociologists, political scientists, and so on—also make only partial pronouncements , but they usually it this and say that providing a complete picture of how we

function is a task for psychologists. The fact is, however, that no scientists of any kind have ever explained our nature wholly and realistically, and in this work I will try to show you why this is so and how it can be corrected.

But because that requires us to rethink the entire subject of human nature, this book differs from all prior works about people; in these ways mainly. First, unlike most intellectual works for about a century now, it asserts the logical priority of philosophy over all sciences and practices. Second, it proposes new theories and methods rather than just adopting the old flawed ones we were taught. And third, it is comprehensive, and hence directed to a broad audience with varying interests and levels of knowledge. To be comprehensive, a work must explain its subject in a realistic and logically complete way, from its universal principles to its scientific hypotheses to its practical uses. And yet I know of no such work anywhere in our literature.

These differences can make parts of this work difficult for some readers to understand. If this is so in your case, try to bear with it in the interests of seeing the whole picture. You’ll find many new thoughts and definitions in its pages that have been well considered and tested, so don’t reject them just because you were taught the opposite; instead, attend to each one and to what it means in our total context.

That context, by the way, is not solely psychologic. It is also political, very much so. Sociopolitical issues, which interest most of us, are discussed throughout this work, but most directly from the last section of Chapter 5 on. Indeed, though my basic life motive was determined by my study of moral philosophy, everything I’ve done since has followed from my work in the sixties as a political activist in the most needful parts of New York City. That’s when I formed my new ideas on politics, which I later taught at a popular evening school for political dissenters in midtown Manhattan. Our faculty there included prominent anarchists, feminists, Marxists, libertarians, civil-rights advocates, and independent leftist thinkers with various views. But, thanks mainly to CIA, FBI, and NYPD infiltrators, that fine school closed a few years later, and I decided to put my new

political theory in book form.

I worked on that for a while, but then I realized what should have been selfevident to me and every political writer before me; namely, that no one can conceive a sound political proposal, let alone an entire political theory, without first achieving a sound understanding of human nature. This realization forced me to start working instead on the dilemmas of human nature, and in doing that I came to realize, more deeply still, that no one could explain human nature without first solving the basic dilemmas of philosophy that had never been solved, especially those in epistemology and metaphysics. Though each of these epiphanies diverted me from my immediate goal, they showed me the basic failures of all previous works on politics, human nature, and philosophy. And from those insights I learned that the more deeply we reason about an issue, the more our reasoning reflects the natural sequence, or logic, of all our thinking.

Looking back to the beginning of that chain of reasoning, it is clear that the main reason why we must solve our old philosophic dilemmas and understand human nature is political. It is that our world is being destroyed by the vast majority of psychologically impaired humans among us, including our world leaders. Not only have their stupid (self-defeating) acts forced nature to respond relentlessly against all living things on earth, they are also habitual naysayers who oppose every reasonable step we could take to save ourselves and our progeny. Few people today are aware, as I am by the astrological methods I have studied, that in the second half of this century their children and grandchildren will suffer some disastrous consequences of that stupidity. The only hope our young have that their suffering will be minimal then is the slim one that we, their elders, will act in time to change our old ways of thinking, our hate for others, our greedy acts and rulers, and our corrupt economic and political systems.

Those greater issues aside, though, there are some specific reasons why some readers will be uneasy with parts of this book, so let me address three such groups now.

First, since virtually everything written in their lifetime has ignored philosophy, a large group of readers won’t see the importance of my first three chapters. These discuss in turn some major errors of traditionalist reasoning that have long blocked our progress, a new epistemology that explains how all humans reason, and a set of new metaphysical principles that form my analytic theory of Reality itself.

Those chapters are the foundation of all the practical reasoning that follows them, so it would be a mistake to skip them, but I can see why some readers would want to do so. Though philosophy is essential to all of our reasoning and is assumed by us even when we don’t think about it, over the past century our world has become largely anti-intellectual, and hence dominated by pragmatic academics who pronounced philosophy dead merely because they themselves couldn’t solve some of its age-old dilemmas. As a result, most people today were never exposed to philosophic debates and so aren’t familiar with those universal issues or the that are used to discuss them.

This is less of a problem for readers today than it was just a short time ago, for now we can quickly research almost any subject or term on the web, but even so, philosophic discussions distress many people because they don’t see how the solution of philosophy’s universal issues can affect everything that they do in practice. This may incline them to skip the philosophic Chapters 2 and 3, which I don’t recommend because it breaks the natural logic of the whole and because in those chapters I define many of the and principles that I use throughout this book. On the other hand, I understand that many readers will want to know my new psychology theory, the direct discussion of which starts at Chapter 4, without considering the deeper issues that led to it—such as the universal answer to how all humans reason and the true nature of what we call ‘time’.

Second, many readers are skeptics as to astrology. Their doubts are provably unsound and are rejected in most of the world, but their illogic on this is due mainly to our traditional system of thought and belief. Many scientifically inclined traditionalists can’t see why some astrological methods are valid, but

only because, like our mystics, they have adopted that basically ancient intellectual system—especially its false notions of space and time, which I correct in Chapter 3. When they see there what our notion of time actually is, they’ll see why every science must employ astrology’s realistic assumptions and methods. So I ask these readers to suspend those doubts temporarily while they consider my new theories and my proofs of the validity of some astrological methods. I can assure them that what I propose throughout, philosophically and practically, is not mysticism but realism.

This is not to say, however, that my psychologic theory is based on astrology. It is not, for I conceived it independently of that science before I realized that we could use some astrological methods to it.

In sum, then, what distinguishes my psychologic theory from all prior hypotheses on human nature are its conceptual completeness, its empirical verifiability through astrology as well as case studies, and its premise that the use of valid astrological methods is essential to sound scientific reasoning in psychology and every other science. And if that premise is indeed sound, then those who still oppose astrology after hearing my arguments for its use are condemning themselves to life in the old academic prison that intellectuals of the new era are confidently leaving behind them.

Third, there are many people who practice, study, or astrology because they see good reasons to accept it as a science. These readers would have appreciated the first two editions of this work, published in 2008 and 2010, which had a long chapter entitled The Natal Chart where I discussed astrology and my views on its practice. But I removed that chapter and other comments on astrology from this edition because I realized in hindsight that my attempts to address two different audiences at once—those who do and those who don’t know the basics of astrology—were confusing for readers. I plan to put that deleted chapter in a later work where I can explain more fully what I mean by ‘realistic astrology’.

Accordingly, this edition is addressed to all readers who are interested in the proposal of a new theory of psychology, whether they are or are not interested in astrology. I explain no more about astrology here than that which any person, astrologer or non-astrologer, must learn to use my new and surprisingly insightful tool for character analysis, the Impulse Pattern.

In spite of that deleted content, though, this work is still important to astrologists because my new psychologic theory transforms their science as dramatically as it does the science of modern psychology. This is so because it gives their science the logically prior psychologic theory that it always needed but never had, and because from that new theory they can now derive truer psychologic meanings for all of astrology’s elements, such as its various cycles, planets, signs, houses, and aspects. Students of astrology will learn more than is being discussed on the surface if they keep this in mind as they read the first five chapters. After that, starting with Chapter 6, I make astrology’s relation to our psychologic process more explicit.

I have confidence in the validity of my new psychologic theory because it is proven in the three necessary ways. First, and most important, it is theoretically sound because I solved many of the old problems of philosophy that others before me had never solved, mainly in epistemology and metaphysics. Second, it is confirmed by the empirical evidence that I have accumulated over decades, some of which—specifically, the Impulse Patterns of 904 prominent individuals —is included here in the sixteen tables of Appendix B.

The third form of substantiation is no less convincing. It is the unanimous testimony of everyone who has calculated their own Impulse Pattern and those of the people they know best. In the four decades or so since I created my psychologic theory and this new analytic tool, I have conducted classes and innumerable personal consultations, and every person involved told me, in one way or another, that my system gave them a true and illuminating explanation of their major psychologic strengths and weaknesses.

So whether you do or don’t accept my theories and my empirical evidence for them, it is within your power to confirm or deny my psychologic theory to your satisfaction just by following the relatively simple instructions in this book for calculating your Impulse Pattern and those of others who directly affect your life.

Whatever faults there may be in this work, I am sure, from my readings and the testimony of many others over many years, that no other book yet written could have a comparable impact on how well you are able to understand yourself, other people, our political world, and even the whole Reality in which we all live.

Whenever possible, I quote Wikipedia for currently accepted factual data and to show how traditionalists view the issues we are considering here. I don’t do this because it’s the best reference to use, but only because it is a helpful encyclopedia that, unlike the references stored in a library, is easily accessed by all, is often updated, and is widely available across the world.

I can be reached for comments or questions at [email protected].

Chapter 1. Introduction

Method

In this work I use the analytic method, which improves on the synthetic method used by most people today. Simply stated, it is criticism, correction, and creation. That is, I first show what’s wrong with our traditional reasoning on a given issue, then I show a more logical (realistic) way to reason about it, and from that I create a better system. To omit any of these steps improves nothing; it just gives us more of the bad reasoning to which we have become accustomed in discussing human nature.

I begin here by considering two major cases of that bad reasoning: how traditionalists err on the issue of human development, and how Plato and Freud erred on what they called, respectively, the ‘soul’ and the ‘psyche’. With these and other cases we will consider, I hope to show not only such specific reasoning errors, but also the broader fact that our traditional, essentially ancient way of reasoning on any subject is unreliable and much in need of fundamental revision.

Human Development

Human development to date has not been positive. On balance, we are still beasts and self-defeating fools, hardly advanced from our tribal days in the wilderness. Though we have progressed technologically, our psychologic progress has been almost undetectable, at least since the Greeks invented their alphabet nearly three millennia ago. A few centuries after that, or about a hundred generations ago, our basic beliefs on reality and human nature reached a form that is not essentially different from their present form. So, though we can split the atom, we are still functioning from a profound ignorance of what we are as individuals and societies. That ignorance is due mainly to a set of intellectual errors that compose our traditional system of thought and belief, the worst of which, I think, are corrected in this work.

An important branch of the subject of human nature is our historical development, and we usually consider this along two lines: evolution and development. The former is what we believe about organic evolution in general and as it pertains to our species, and the latter is how we understand our social or individual development historically. But our historians and evolutionary biologists have progressed unevenly on these subjects. Though the latter have gone far beyond the simplistic views of Darwin and Wallace in the midnineteenth century, our historians, who deal with the more difficult subject of human nature, have not advanced much beyond the methods proposed by Thucydides in the fifth century bce (before the common era). I won’t review their respective efforts here, but I will show why both are guilty of basic omissions and other logical failures in their assumptions and methods.

Evolution

I disagree with the commonly accepted views on evolution because I believe that the most significant changes in the individuals of any terrestrial species are caused by cataclysms—on earth, in our solar system, or even beyond. This notion is sometimes called ‘cataclysmic evolution’, a term I avoid because it suggests a whole view on evolution, which it never is. In any case, it is a reasonable supposition that traditionalists reject but have never disproven. I adopted it after reading a brilliant work that doesn’t propose an evolutionary hypothesis: Immanuel Velikovsky’s Worlds in Collision (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1950).

Academic critics disparaged Velikovsky’s views, but they never disproved them. He tried to explain, with reasonable hypotheses based on known historical facts, the extraordinary terrestrial and celestial events that occurred early in the first millennium bce and were recorded by ancient cultures on all continents—most explicitly, if allegorically, in Homer’s Iliad and the Hebrew’s Old Testament. These records all speak of a time of great catastrophes or ‘miracles’ on earth that were accompanied by strange events in the heavens. Their end result (to skip the book’s fascinating details on the great upheavals on earth and their relation to subsequent myths) was the creation of the planet Venus from a large comet. That comet, the author said, was originally a piece of Jupiter that ed similar comets in an orbit between Jupiter and the sun. But in its orbit it came increasingly closer to the neighbor-planets Mars and the earth until it ultimately ‘collided’ with their spaces, thus changing their axes and orbits and being itself thrust into a planetary orbit about the sun.

Though Velikovsky was a psychologist as well as an historian, he didn’t consider our development. Perhaps he didn’t notice, as I did, that within a few generations of the last cataclysm he proposed, and certainly by the late seventh century bce, human intellectual powers had progressed dramatically. The lapse in time

between a cataclysm and its psychologic effects is natural, for such a causative event can only change an entire species’ reasoning through the hereditary process and over several generations. Anyway, our records show that this was when our world’s first philosophers and psychologists appeared, and generally when our logic advanced greatly, especially in the linear reasoning that we use in writing, timing, music, and mathematics—reasoning that, incidentally, astrologers have long associated with the planet Venus.

The old assumption that a species changes incrementally over time is obvious, but we must qualify it by noting that those changes are themselves subject to change by sudden, more-impactive events. Such events include both natural cataclysms and human-caused environmental disasters, which weren’t even a possibility before certain willful acts by humans in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Some evolutionists propose that the chief cause of these incremental changes is the ive adaptation by the individuals of a species to new circumstances. That is a factor, but no-less important is the exercise of individual will, both in the creative active sense proposed by Bergson (1859-1941) and in the ancient sense, argued anew by Lamarck (1744-1829), which holds that we can also inherit characteristics that our ancestors acquired or developed in their lifetime. Lamarckism was dismissed by the Darwinists et al., but recent genetic research confirms it in part.

These, I believe, are the major factors that determine our evolution. (1) Celestial events that not only alter our terrestrial or celestial environment, but also affect our physical and psychologic natures before, at, and after birth. (2) The hereditary process, understood not only as a genetic process ed down by our ancestors, but also as a process that at every point along the way can be altered by events in our terrestrial and celestial environments. (3) Acts of will that are determined either by our innate characteristics or our acquired or developed traits. And (4) our ive adaptation to changes in our natural and social environment, including the will of those who shape our societies and our understanding of ourselves, others, and the world .

My chief criticisms of traditionalist thinkers on both evolution and development are that they ignore two important facts that are substantiated in this work. The first is that human nature, evolution, and history are continuously affected by celestial events, and the second is that we cannot understand the nature and history of any species until we understand the causes and interactions of the active and ive impulses that control how its real individuals reason and act in their lifetimes.

Development

The study of our development logically requires us to develop a hypothesis on why and how we humans differ psychologically and then a contingent hypothesis on what external events cause those differences. But on the latter issue two schools of thought arise: one that restricts its notion of the external events that affect us to local or terrestrial events, and another that accepts the basic astrological premise by holding that distant celestial events also affect what we are and what happens to us. The former school is always uncertain as to what events determine our nature, while the latter one tries to show that people differ in some respects according to objectively definable time periods, such as terrestrial or celestial cycles.

An ambitious effort of that kind was made early in the first millennium when Vedic astrologers used their old psychologic hypotheses to devise a complicated system of short and vast time periods defined by celestial events. This approach was valid (logical) but not sound (valid and true), since their psychologic theory wasn’t true. We can do better, and so, from my new psychologic theory, I propose that we can analyze our development soundly in of objectively defined psychologic epochs and eras.

By psychologic epoch I mean any period in which we humans are not physically altered enough, by any cause, to produce a significant change in our species’ logic and psychologic functioning, which is what we ordinarily mean by our ‘nature’. It is hard to identify such periods, but from the fact that human reasoning was strikingly improved by the seventh century bce and until someone refutes the subsequent factual evidence that s Velikovsky’s hypothesis, we must assume that our current psychologic epoch began when Venus became a planet slightly less than three millennia ago.¹

Nevertheless, intellectuals of that new epoch in Greece, India, China, and elsewhere based much of their work on the traditions of their earlier societies. We see this in the fact that the premises and many of the myths of our epoch’s religions were conceived in a prior epoch, and yet those fictions are still with us today—still promoting our ignorance of reality and human nature, still dividing us into factions, still preventing our social progress, and still causing great injustices. So we must conclude that the cataclysms that created our present epoch didn’t change everything , for in many respects, such as our theism and chauvinistic prejudices, we are as primitive now as we were before it began.

Most people wouldn’t suspect that human ignorance could last through such long periods, since we of the modern era were taught that everything progresses continually. But it does not. Our development is not the straight-line advance that traditionalists assume it to be; it is cyclical, so that with each cycle we mature and then regress, making a little progress in some areas and none at all in many other areas. And this shorter cycle is what I mean by a psychologic era, the subdivisions of which also affect us significantly.

This important new conception of psychologic eras is not based on my guess, but rather on a natural event that has been empirically proven to affect our psychologic functioning en masse, whatever our individual differences. It is the cycle of the planet Pluto, and its period is a quarter of a millennium (247.7 years), or about twelve human generations.²

The table in Appendix C shows the dates of these psychologic eras and their subdivisions from about 600 bce, which is as far back as the software I have can calculate the Pluto cycle. I include this table because it is a valuable objective tool for historical analysis by any reader. Assuming that we have a sound hypothesis on human reasoning and that our solar system is not altered, this cycle can tell us where we are today psychologically and where we are headed. In fact, our actual history in these past eras s my proposal that all human reasoning is cyclic and has a necessary sequence, or a common logic, that is our

only real standard of logical validity.

Socially speaking, each psychologic era begins with a burst of intellectual progress, because people then are more realistic, willful, objective, and creative than they are later in that era, and it ends with political and intellectual regression, because people then are more pragmatic, narrow-minded, and restricted by old reasoning than they were earlier in the era. This regression then provokes progress in the next era, which again leads to regression, and so on. But not everything progresses, as we see plainly from our history; especially our failure to understand ourselves and the destructive acts of our governments and our business and religious corporations, which of course are our own willful creations.

I number these eras from the first one that my software can calculate, regardless of when our current epoch may have begun. In this work, I use temporary descriptive names for the six eras I mention. The sophist era is 449-204 bce. The Christian era, which is named for a fictional character, is 42-287. The scholastic era is 1270-1516. The classic era is 1516-1762. The modern era is 1762-2008. And the new era is 2008-2254. The new era began on January 25, 2008.

My psychologic theory thus proposes that our first criterion for classifying any intellectual or practical work is the period of the era in which it was done. The main divisions of an era are its quadrants, which are not equal in years because they are defined parts of Pluto’s natural cycle, which is elliptical, not circular. These quadrants define the psychologic context in which people of a given time live and work, and their life and work always reflects the quadrant or quadrants during which they lived.

Our traditional education makes it hard to accept this new cyclic way of seeing our development, our history, our work, and our psychologic functioning, especially since it is based on an astrological premise that most Western academics denigrate. But we must reject their dogmatic bias on this if we are

ever to understand people and their collectives. Perhaps traditionalists have another explanation for the fact that while political leftism and rightism and intellectual realism and arealism are always with us, they achieve social dominance alternately in cyclic waves, but I haven’t heard it.³

Consider in example how our political thinking developed in the recently concluded modern era (1762-2008). In its first quadrant (1762-1822), major new political conceptions that shaped the public’s consciousness were proposed by leftists everywhere. Chief among these was the primary principle of the American and French revolutions; namely, the precedence of the inalienable rights of each individual over the rights of any state or of any social, commercial, or religious collective it has sanctioned.

But the intellectuals, academics, and politicians of the second quadrant (18221913) did little more than extend (draw the implications of) that more creative first-quadrant thinking. Some proposed retaliatory forms of monarchism and federalism to suppress the rise of individualism, while others proposed new forms of dissent, such as the socialism of Fourier and Owen, the progressivism that Proudhon mislabeled as ‘anarchism’, mutualism, anarcho-syndicalism, Marxism, and the various conflicted views that came to be called ‘libertarianism’. But this reasoning, like all secondary reasoning, was partialistic, so it caused internal dissension, partisan politics, civil wars, and harsher forms of domestic and international exploitation across the world.

Then came the heinous third quadrant (1913-1972), during which every truly leftist form of dissent was crushed or marginalized, and the absurd antiindividualistic thinking of rightists (such as fascism, corporate capitalism, oneworld government, and the totalitarian forms of communism outlined by Lenin, Stalin, or Mao) dominated.

That led us into the pragmatic fourth quadrant (1972-2008) and its highly partisan political thinking that—like the bad reasoning of the late classic era that

provoked the modern era’s first-quadrant revolutions in America, Russia, , and elsewhere—glorified rightist collectivism, religionism, greed, formalism, selfishness, wars, and international and domestic exploitation and cruelty.

Précis. This wholistic view of the modern era explains why most people who were educated in its fourth quadrant (1972-2008) have a dislike of theoretical reasoning and intellectual discourse, and occupy themselves instead with distractions such as pragmatic activities, personal diversions, and inane entertainments. Still, some leftist intellectuals worked through that quadrant on the new theories that will define the new era, so we may expect some progress in its first quadrant (2008-2066), when the basic principles and goals of all human activity until 2254 will be defined, and if we are not careful quickly coopted by rightists. From this dynamic perspective we see two things about the modern era clearly. First, that the leftist political thinking of its first quadrant (1762-1822) was far more fundamental and logical than any of the confused political thinking that followed it, leftist or rightist. And, second, that the chief goal of every rightist proposal made in that entire era was to find some way to deny the inalienable rights of individuals, that seminal leftist notion that a government could no longer openly deny without losing the respect and cooperation of most of its people. But because we were ignorant of human nature throughout the modern era, we were only able to institute illogical rightist governments during it, even at first in America and . And that is why the twentieth century—or, more precisely, the last two quadrants of the modern era (1913-2008)—was a period of sharp political, intellectual, and psychologic regression.

Indeed, that century was the most barbaric and inhumane century in all recorded history. This is so whether we judge it by the hundreds of millions of needlessly slaughtered, starved, tortured, poisoned, or diseased people; by our incredible destruction of our own ecosystem, including tens of thousands of living species and vast regions of indispensable wilderness; by the inhumanity of our mindless and heartless commercial, academic, and religious corporations; by our political systems and their police and military forces, whose first purpose is to satisfy the greed or the fantasies of those elitist corporations; by the loss of our sacred

privacy; or by the life-stifling overpopulation of our own stupid (self-betraying) species. And judging from that entire history, rather than from the few neatly excised pieces of it that our rulers and their lackeys tell us to consider instead, we have every reason to expect, barring revolutionary thinking in the near future that changes our old ways dramatically, to see far worse than this in the new era that has just begun.

Thus, any pride we humans take in our development to date is a false pride. Though our most sane and moral people are few and far from typical of our species, it is they who give us our sense of the human potential, and compared to that great potential, our so-called ‘progress’ is too trivial to mention, let alone boast about. On the whole we are beasts, we are stupid in all senses, we are indifferent to the suffering of other people and living things, and we ignore the dire situation in which we now exist and in which our progeny may exist, after a fashion. And the only people who will say otherwise to us are those who are deceived by the fictions of religion or purposeless art. Plainly, then, unless we change our traditional ways and think ‘out of the box’ that our ancestors have put us in, our species is doomed, and is not worth the saving in any case.

There is no other way. To correct a prevalent modern-era misassumption, there is no guarantee that our species will progress physically or psychologically. There is certainly no deity to ensure it. Nor is there any mystical scientific force, biological or otherwise, that ensures our endless incremental progress, as was newly proposed in the first quadrant of the modern era and then echoed by all the positivists and Darwinists who followed.⁴

The truth is that some cataclysm of either natural or human origin might end it all for us at any time, or might, in but a few generations, make us all even more stupid than we are today. On the other hand, it could also make us brighter in some way, which is apparently what happened to us nearly three millennia ago.

Though we have little reason today to respect our species, we must do what we

can for it anyway, on the chance that it will make a difference. There is no purpose in our being here if it is not to make life better, now and hereafter, for everything that lives. But through our mindless birthing we are negatively altering our species with each generation, and this along with our traditional ignorance and ecological indifference will certainly cause its extinction, probably sooner than you imagine. To avoid that, we must start immediately to restrict the number and the timing of human births, and we must learn to reason more realistically than we have in the past.

But we are not likely to do either, for it is difficult to break old social customs or to do new thinking. To be original in thought, one must soundly criticize all the thinkers of the past and then confront the certain opposition of all traditionalists, even those who agree that new thinking is needed. But few of us will do that, for it is far easier to be slaves; that is, to think as we were taught to do by the traditionalists who rule us and control our media and our business, religious, and academic institutions.

Still, that is the choice we each face, and given our grave situation today only the psychologically impaired will choose the traditional way. The rest of us will see that we must escape from that old psychologic box, or mental prison, into which we are all born and in which we are all educated, and to do this we must find the causes of that massive wall of opposition to new thinking and new ways. We need to know, for instance, why some intellectuals propose humane utopias, while others work only to rationalize the greed, cruelty, and other evils of the worst people among us, our rulers. And we need to know why we differ, if we do, from those selfish rulers, who will continue to impose on our bodies and minds and steal everything we own, in private or in common, until enough of us learn to see through their false explanations of our natural, social, and political situations.

But this requires us to understand reality and human nature first, and that we have never done. It is the height of folly to believe that we humans can remain as ignorant of the causes of human nature as we have always been and still be

personally happy or have sane societies. Our species, for all its development, is marching rapidly to its death, and fools that we are, we won’t take the pains to understand why this is happening to us.

Descriptive Reasoning

My chief criticism of traditionalist thinkers is that they are virtually all descriptive reasoners and not definitive reasoners. We will consider this common error in general below, but first let us consider two famous examples of this superficial reasoning method that pertain to the subject of human nature: the psychologic hypothesis of Plato (c.427-347 bce) and the imitation of it by Freud (1856-1939).

Some believe that Plato based his political reasoning on a theory of human nature, but he never presented such a theory. What he did say of his Republic (a work that Thomas Jefferson and John Adams rightly dismissed as ridiculous) was that its purpose was to show his view of human nature better by writing it large, in the of society rather than the individual. But this was just a rationalization for his backward reasoning, which proceeded from the artificial society rather than from its real individuals. His goal in that work, therefore, was not to propose a theory of human nature; it was to defend his antidemocratic politics, and its few psychologic comments were vague and unrelated to his political opinions, none of which were implied by a comprehensive understanding of people.

Plato knew, as we all do through our common logic, that we must understand people before we can understand their politics and how best to organize them socially. But the psychologic hypothesis he offered was so incomplete that no one could derive a sensible political theory from it. And indeed no intellectual today takes that hypothesis seriously, except perhaps in its imitative Freudian form.

It was apparently borrowed from Pythagoras (c.580-c.500 bce), the renowned academic and mystic of the prior psychologic era who described society as consisting of Three Classes: the lovers of Wealth, Honor, and Wisdom. A Pythagorean in many beliefs, including mysticism and numerology, Plato merely restated this old description of society in equivalent psychologic . That is, he proclaimed what he called ‘the Three Parts of the Soul’, which he labeled respectively our Appetite (wealth), Spirit (honor), and Reason (wisdom). Then in his political system, using this arbitrary triadic description as if it was a universal Law of human nature, he proposed a parallel social structure consisting of—if we ignore the slave class that he wished to retain—three social classes. Again changing the words into equivalent , he called these classes the Workers, the Soldiers, and the Guardians, or rulers.

So his purpose in the Republic was not what he claimed it was, a literary analogy by which he could better explain his psychologic hypothesis. On the contrary, his weak psychologic construct was derived backwards from Pythagoras’ old view of social classes. And even if we all did have these ‘Three Parts’ of our ‘Soul’, and only those, it doesn’t follow that our society must have that same threefold division. In fact, it would then have only one social class, because all individuals, even women and slaves, would have those three parts, which he proposed as universal human attributes. A universal attribute of human nature is true of all individuals, so all that can be inferred politically from his shallow hypothesis on human nature is that we are all workers, all soldiers, and all guardians. But to propose that is to propose democracy, which was just what he detested in Athens and meant not to propose.

Plato’s triadic conception of human nature was neither deep nor original, and Aristotle (384-322 bce), his student and successor at the Academy in Athens, had little interest in improving it. At root it is meaningless because it is merely descriptive, by which I mean that it lacks any true definition, or causative explanation, of our nature. Why are there exactly three parts of the soul? Why not eight or seventy-seven? And just what, in reality, is this thing that he called a ‘soul’? The entire notion is arbitrary, for it doesn’t follow by virtue of any objective fact of our external or internal reality.

Worse yet, he proposed it even though he reported Socrates’ observation that we cannot reason correctly if we don’t consider the underlying causes of the superficial effects we observe. That was the whole point of the famous ‘parable of the cave’ in his Republic, which advises us not to be fooled by mere shadows, or as I put it, to be definitive rather than descriptive reasoners. But since he routinely ignored that lesson in his work, we must conclude, just as his story implies, that he did indeed hear Socrates tell this tale.

The Platonic model of human nature stood unchallenged for millennia, not because it was widely accepted, but rather for a reason that explains why, for more than two millennia, we had little interest in understanding our nature. This was the fact that later intellectuals, who until the late eighteenth century were virtually all theists, adopted the disdain of their religion for the entire subject. Religions ignore our nature because they don’t need to know the true causes of anything so long as they can receive their tithes and control the practical world through myths and the pretense of divine edicts. And theistic intellectuals aren’t bothered by the problems of human nature because they, like Plato, consider their god or gods to be ultimately responsible for our nature and fate.

Thus, Plato’s absurd view of human nature survived into the modern era. Indirectly, it lies behind the descriptive class-based view of society proposed by the rightist Marx (1818-83), who put Plato’s worker class first and proposed the broader form of communism that Plato favored later in life.⁵ But it appears directly in modern psychology, for the rightist Freud offered what was essentially Plato’s hypothesis as his own final explanation of human nature.

The rightists Plato, Marx, and Freud never developed sound intellectual systems, for much of their work just expanded on creative proposals by leftists before them. They were traditionalists and borrowers of others’ thoughts, an academic reasoning style that is typical of psychologic rightists, a class I define later. Most of Freud’s premises were borrowed from his contemporaries or our ancient literature. His chief premise on human development was the notion of psychic

determinism, the many flaws of which I list in Chapter 4. But his two other core notions came from Plato. One is the so-called ‘pain-pleasure principle’, which was clearly though not originally stated by Plato and then later by Epicurus (341-270 bce), and the other was just the old Pythagorean-Platonic triadic scheme disguised in Freud’s own set of equivalent .

That is, Freud proposed the human psyche, a vague Greek term that only differs from the vague Platonic soul in that it has no theistic meaning, and then he claimed that this undefined thing in us consists of three innate and universal parts, to which he gave Greek-based names: our id, ego, and superego. But plainly this descriptive scheme of his merely used equivalent to echo Plato’s division of the human ‘soul’ into our innate appetite (id), spirit (ego), and reason (superego), which itself echoed Pythagoras’ division of our social nature into the seekers of wealth, honor, or wisdom. Even though Freud is widely praised among modern psychologists as a theoretician, there is obviously no theory of human nature in any of these ex post facto, merely descriptive triadic schemes. They are more accurately described as incomplete and unproven hypotheses about people that say nothing real .

The General Case

My chief criticism of the psychologic hypotheses of Plato and Freud, and of traditionalist constructs in general, is methodological; it is that they are produced by merely descriptive reasoning, not definitive reasoning. We will consider the psychologic causes of our different reasoning modes later; here I want only to show the shallowness of the descriptive reasoning that composes the bulk of our traditional intellectual literature.

The definitive method tries to explain a thing’s causes, at least its proximate cause, because that determines its nature, or defines it. But the descriptive method uses the opposite kind of explanation: ex post facto statements about a thing’s observed or inferred attributes, or parts. For example, to describe a book’s parts without identifying and describing its author, who is its proximate cause, tells us something about that book, but does not define it. Or, to say that the hypothetical thing called our ‘soul’ or ‘psyche’ has three parts does not tell us either what that thing is or what event caused it to exist in us, and with exactly three parts. Only definitive reasoning, which is analytic and hence fundamental, refers to a thing’s causes, and if it is sound, it will give us objective and certain knowledge. But descriptive reasoning is synthetic and hence superficial; that is, it is arbitrary and hypothetical, or contingent on relative circumstances, including the intelligence, logic, and psychologic state of the describer.

Using the descriptive method, one arbitrarily selects one or some of the observed effects, or parts, of some perceived whole event and then synthesizes class notions for those parts, which are then nouned. Thus armed with a set of hypothetical class , which are the opposite of true universal , the descriptive reasoner goes back to reconsider the initial whole context, and this time he or she creates an incomplete dissective scheme for it. This classificatory scheme is then used as the pseudotheory that guides and restricts that thinker in all further consideration of that context.

The triadic division of human nature by Plato and Freud is just such a pseudotheory. Three mere effects (appetite-spirit-reason or id-ego-superego) are observed, generalized, nouned, and assumed to be causes, and then, reasoning backwards, it is said that the initial whole event, a person, consists of only those three parts, which are invalidly universalized and then proposed as composing the complete nature of any real person.

Subsequent reasoning from such a partialized dissective scheme is unsound because it ignores realness, wholeness, and process, or the whole event that was first considered. It assumes that its classifications are the whole of the matter when they are not, and that they are objective facts rather than a construct built on incomplete, biased, and arbitrary observations and selections. But in spite of this illogic, the descriptive method is our traditional way of thinking about any complex subject, and every renowned intellectual work in history either is based entirely on it or is marred by fundamental instances of it. That’s why one who looks for an answer to a problem in traditional sources can find nothing but different mere descriptions of it.

The definitive method, on the other hand, is always logically valid, even when its factual assumptions are not the case. Here one first notes that, by definition, every observed effect has at least one underlying cause, and that therefore we must distinguish between a definition, which is a causative proposition, and a mere description, which is a proposition that makes no reference to any cause. In a statement, a mere description can be a definiens, but it is not a true definition because it does not propose a cause of the definiendum, the object of reference; it refers to it, but does not explain it. We can only define a distinct whole thing by identifying its cause as an event, after which we can validly describe the parts that compose it. But it is invalid to start from mere descriptions of some discretely observed parts that appear to us and then claim that these descriptions explain the whole event to which those parts belong.

Mere descriptions can work for us in practice, but only because every

description we utter presupposes a prior definition, or cause, that we do or don’t know explicitly. And when we don’t know that cause explicitly, the mere description is ersatz knowledge posing as real knowledge. Thus, though it is ubiquitous, the descriptive method is the language of ignorance. It is easier, and it permits subjective thinking that is ambiguous, vague, or deceiving, so it is widely used by intellectuals and nonintellectuals alike. But it is only valid in the narrowest of reasoning tasks, in superficial taxonomy; that is, only when the cause of the parts referred to is irrelevant to their classification, as it is in many practical or scientific applications. Otherwise, when the cause is relevant, we get two opposed kinds of classifications: the hypothetical and arbitrary ones yielded by the descriptive method, and the fundamental and real ones yielded by the definitive method. The latter are fundamental because they are based on the cause rather than some of its effects, and they are real because any cause is an event, or an actual external or internal process.

In our human sciences, such as psychology, politics, sociology, economics, linguistics, and jurisprudence, the defining causes are human motives, and since the descriptive method cannot define (tell the causes of) those inner motives, it cannot be validly used in those sciences. When it is used there anyway, it imposes two blanketing presuppositions on us: that descriptive classes matter while individuals don’t, and that we humans should be seen as functioning in life with no motives; that is, without the proximate cause of all of our actions, our psychologic process. Thus, besides being unable to define their , our mere describers classify us humans in such artificial collectivistic (rightist) ways that we are seen as having no personal will, logic, mind, ions, needs, comion, conscience, morals, and so on. But surely these are also parts of our ‘soul’ or ‘psyche’. If descriptive reasoners even mention such psychologic attributes, they are tacked on as afterthoughts that have no connection to their classifying scheme or to anything in reality.

Descriptive reasoners are also prone to another error of explicated reasoning, the failure to notice a shift of context in their references. As you know—excluding only Reality, or the Whole of Everything—we can consider any divisible thing either (1) as a part subsumed by some whole thing or (2) as a distinct whole event itself, with its own parts. Well, traditionalists routinely confuse these two

references. If we consider thing X as a part of some subsuming whole event, then its proper explanation is a description, but if we consider thing X as a whole event itself, then its proper explanation is a definition, or a proposition as to the cause of that unique event. But those who speak of X in both ways without noticing this shift in their context will assume that their mere description of it when they consider it as a part is also its definition when they consider it as a whole, whereupon they illogically infer the general semantic rule that there is no essential difference between a definition and a description, and that therefore it is valid to use arbitrary mere descriptions to ‘define’ any term or thing.

Note that throughout this work I use the definitive method before I describe things. For instance, I don’t describe Marx and Freud as ‘rightists’ in a conventional descriptive way, such as on the basis of some dictionary, of ‘rightists’ I know, or of my personal judgment of their views or biographies. Rather, I say this on the basis of what my psychologic theory proposes to be the natural and objective cause of rightist political reasoning in any human. So when I use this label for them, it doesn’t mean what the traditional word means, because I first defined the category ‘rightist’ theoretically, or objectively and universally in anyone, as a psychologic event. And this is the prior work that our mere describers try desperately to avoid.

We can see this clearly in the biographies they write. They try to explain their subject first by selecting many confirmed objective facts, and for the rest they just assemble a set of arbitrary descriptive and opinions by themselves or others that (from their own experiences, biases, and subjective judgment) seem to fit that person ex post facto, or that in any case make a more compelling story for sale. Traditional biography is thus partly a science but mostly a fictional art, or the epitome of mere description. And yet this descriptive method is our traditionalists’ sole conception of how to understand people or anything else—as if, like simple-minded empirics, we have no power to reason about any subject except through such ex post facto biographies or specific ‘case histories’, none of which allow us to validly infer any general rule.

Most descriptive reasoners understand naturally that only a causative explanation can yield a valid definition, but they don’t accept this logical law as binding on them. They will accept a nonhuman hypothesis like ‘gravity’, but not the invariable universal law that, wherever they may be in the cosmos, they can never reason validly by mere description. They assume that to do so or not is their choice, so they observe this law only when it suits their motives. That is why the descriptive method is the chief reasoning tool not only of ignorant empirics and misguided intellectuals, but also of willfully ignorant opportunists who seek to profit from proposing subjective moral, legal, theistic, or political premises as universal law.

But definitive reasoners are realists, so they base their reasoning on real and whole events and reject any explanation of some part of Reality that does not propose its cause. They also know that when the cause of an effect cannot be known for certain, they must still posit one speculatively, and they do so fully aware that their later reasoning in that context is contingent upon that speculative cause being so.

For each of us, then, the question of proper method reduces to this: Is it better to reason descriptively, even though this is invalid, or should we insist that our reasoning be valid from the start, which it can only be if we propose a cause, known or not? With the descriptive method, we can’t build a sound system for any context, and since we began by ignoring the whole, even the true statements we make cannot be validly related to each other. But with the definitive method, our systemic reasoning is always valid, and we can test our proposed cause for objective truth later. If it fails that test, then we must propose another cause and repeat the process, but if it es it, then we have learned something new, something that descriptive reasoners could never uncover.

We can see plainly that the definitive method is not the traditional way in our dictionaries, where most of the word ‘definitions’ are just word descriptions. There are some factual definitions there—as when a name for a color is defined by its measured light wavelength and, by implication, its effect on us—but not

many. And there are some speculative definitions there; for example, the noun ‘greed’ is vaguely defined by reference to a ‘desire’, which we accept as a psychologic cause. But otherwise our lexicographers merely describe most of our words. This is acceptable in explaining a word’s form and history, where psychologic cause is not an issue, but not in explaining its meaning, for we must know a word’s psychologic referents, which are its causes, before we can state its true definition. But because we have never had a complete explanation of human reasoning, our lexicographers cannot know the causes of our words or other symbols, so they pretend to explain the meaning of most of our words with circular references to other undefined words. For instance, they say ‘existence’ means ‘being’ and ‘being’ means ‘existence’, as if there were no psychologic reason why we humans coined and use those two words distinctly. But these words can be distinctly defined, as we will see in the next chapter.

Guided by their academic conventions, descriptive reasoners ignore these facts: (1) that any symbol is a product of our psychologic functioning, (2) that it can only be defined by identifying its three reality referents, explained in the next chapter, and (3) that, even when we refer to external events, those referents are events in our internal reality; that is, impressions (cognitions, ideas) in our psychologic process that cause us to coin a given term. But these causes are mysteries to traditionalists, even though they are the sole means by which all humans who know our language will comprehend the meaning we intend in coining a new term. That and the ability to translate a language into another language would be impossible if there was no common psychologic process, or universal natural logic, underlying all of our meanings and language systems. And though this truth is obvious, it has never moved our traditionalists to explain that process, our common logic.

So it is often wise to ignore the dictionaries that our traditionalists regard as sacred and inviolable texts. These works don’t have the term definitions that we need most, both to see what is real and to record that reality in our language constructs, and they have no conception of semantic completeness, which can only be revealed by a sound standard of human reasoning. But in this work I provide the missing definitions that apply to our contexts as the need arises— because, having seen that the essential issue was human reasoning, I first

developed a universal standard of our psychologic functioning that shows the underlying causes, or intended meanings, of all our symbols.

I trust that the foregoing shows why we must reject this old way of trying to solve our problems: the descriptive method that is born in our explicated reasoning and thus denies our natural reasoning, or common logic. (This is ‘the parable of the cave’ in different words.) We can’t understand any subject if we can’t judge the soundness of our reasoning about it. And this is not just an academic issue, for our very lives and welfare depend on our achieving the power to see what is truly intended by anyone who tries to persuade us to a specific political conclusion, course of action, manner of thinking, or way of life.

Obviously the issues of human logic and proper reasoning go far beyond this single issue of whether one employs the definitive or the descriptive method in constructing an intellectual system. I discussed this error first only because I think it is the simplest way to see whether an intellectual is dealing realistically with our problems or is wasting our time. I could list hundreds of examples of pretentious academic or intellectual works that depend entirely on mere descriptions and arbitrary classifications based on them, many of which were world-famous in their time. But I think it better to criticize in general with a few examples and let people find other instances of it themselves.

As you know, academics and intellectuals continuously impose upon us to make us believe what they believe, and if pressed they will defend their mistakes or lies, as the case may be, by insisting that we humans reason in a way that we actually don’t use. Knowing this, and that most of them are hired by political, religious, or economic interests that mean to enslave us or steal from us, we need to know in self-defense how to identify the shallow reasoners in our midst. In our time, when lying is the official way to speak in all our social and political institutions, it is so important that we all have this skill that I will summarize these differences now before we consider them more fully in the next chapter.

Our Four Reasoning Perspectives

Our practical reasoning is integrative reasoning; it is the reasoning we do to integrate all the known facts of our selected context and all of our prior reasoning about that context into a final unitary understanding. It is shaped by what we are, where we are, when we are, and how we reasoned to get to the final understanding that immediately precedes any decision to act. So the common view that our practical reasoning causes our actions is correct, but it is incorrect to assume, as ‘practical people’ do, that it is not itself caused by prior reasoning and all the external factors that affect how we reason to a decision. Our practical reasoning doesn’t come into existence on its own; we reach all of our decisions through a train of reasoning, and our reasoning perspective is just a question of which part of that train we prefer to jump onto.

That is, by innate impulse or conscious choice, we each decide our current habit of perspective, which is the level of causation (or implication) in the entire chain of our reasoning that we select as the beginning point of our conscious reasoning toward a practical understanding, decision, and action. Most people use the same conscious beginning point for most contexts (events) they consider, while others differentiate these points by subject, but we all choose our perspective for each case, and the possibilities range in degree from the least to the most analytic.

The least analytic perspective is that of our empirics, who do no focused reasoning except to invoke their practical reasoning just before a decision must be made. The most analytic perspective is that of our philosophers, who delve into the causes of their practical reasoning until they believe they have found, in Reality itself, the ultimate cause of all things. Most people take an intermediate perspective, with the mean being very close to the empiric extreme, where the inertia of shallow and rushed reasoning dominates their choices and then shapes their personalities, beliefs, and hence our societies. This vast class of empirics

and near-empirics consists of those who hate mental effort, the dull-witted, and all, even hard-working and highly intelligent people, who see life in superficial material only. These are the practical or spontaneous “men of action” who Dostoyevsky insisted are “stupid and limited.”

I repeat, and repeat emphatically: all spontaneous people, men of action, are active because they are stupid and limited. How is this to be explained? Like this: in consequence of their limitations they take immediate, but secondary, causes for primary ones, and thus they are more quickly and easily convinced than other people that they have found indisputable grounds for their action, and they are easy in their minds; and this, you know, is the main thing. After all, in order to act, one must be absolutely sure of oneself, no doubts must remain anywhere. But how am I, for example, to be sure of myself? Where are the primary causes upon which I can take my stand, where are my foundations? . . . I practice thinking, and consequently each of my primary causes pulls along another, even more primary, in its wake, and so on ad infinitum. That is really the essence of all thinking and self-awareness. Perhaps this, once again, is a law of nature. And what, finally, is the result? The same thing over again… . ⁷

Our pure empirics have no notion of the prior reasoning that causes their final understandings, decisions, and actions. We see this clearly in children, who start reasoning as pure empirics, after which, by their nature and their experiences, they mature to some degree in some areas. Indeed, physiologists have recently shown that teenagers’ brains are not yet fully grown, which explains a lot about them, and that this growth is not complete for most of them until their twentyfourth or twenty-fifth year. That physical issue aside, our world has masses of adult empirics or near-empirics, including many intelligent and highly educated ‘men and women of action’, who stay much like children in their intellectual habits and development throughout their lives. Though this limitation is caused by both congenital and experiential factors, most academics and human scientists today address this problem of global mass ignorance, if they consider it at all, as solely an experiential or social one.

We will not make that mistake here. Instead, leaving aside the well-recognized role of backward cultures and bad education, we will look for the objective causes of the fact that a great majority of all individuals are born with psychologic impairments—meaning congenital reasoning flaws or deformities that cause lifelong illogic in people, regardless of their postnatal experiences. Thus most people, across history and all societies, are empirics or near-empirics by birth. We know this from our observations, and we call them ‘practical people’ or ‘practitioners’. But these don’t include intellectuals, who also engage in practice, so here let us distinguish all empirics, meaning pure empirics and near-empirics, from all intellectuals, who range in type from the many pragmatists who just miss being empirics to the far fewer intellectuals who reason on deeper levels, ending with our rare, if not nonexistent, genuine philosophers.

The conventional view on this is that our intellectual level is determined by our education and profession, and before that by our ‘intelligence’, a vague descriptive term that we all use but that no one has defined because at root its cause is a complex physiological issue. So it is more precise to avoid that conventional view and define an intellectual as one who inquires on any level, with whatever education and intelligence he or she may have, about the causes that imply any or all practical reasoning.

The only sound way to distinguish our intellectuals is to start from the whole, and that whole is the universal process of human reasoning, my hypothesis on which is presented over the next five chapters. But the relevant point now is that it is conceived as a cycle, which I have named the Consideration Cycle, with four quadrants that naturally define four sequential levels, or modes, of human reasoning. Thus, the ‘train’ of our natural reasoning, or psychologic functioning, has only four ‘cars’ for us to jump onto in our explicated reasoning. As I explain later, these modes, or quadrants of the Cycle, are in reality the four different spatial directions in which we must reason: backward, forward, outward, and inward.

To indicate their logical sequence in our psychologic process, we must name these four modes with ordinal , so in the epistemic context I refer to them as our primary, secondary, tertiary, and quaternary reasoning. In other contexts, other names are more appropriate, but these are equivalent with this same sequential (logical) meaning. For example, our ‘metaphysical reasoning’ and ‘psychological reasoning’ refer respectively to instances of primary and tertiary reasoning, so now we will understand these old as having such an ordinal, or logical, meaning also. What I call ‘equivalent’ or ‘corresponding’ are identical in one reality referent; they are thus distinct from synonyms, which loosely speaking are identical in two of their reality referents, and strictly speaking in all three.

This dynamic distinction in our reasoning is the only realistic way to classify our intellectuals and their work. We will therefore discard the traditional way of classifying them, which is by the ex post facto descriptive criteria of their professions or preferred academic subjects, and classify them psychologically instead. We can refer to the four quadrantal types of reasoners with the ordinal above (primary, secondary, etc.) or with these common : (1) theorists, (2) analysts, (3) hypothesists, and (4) pragmatists. However, in the morefundamental context of epistemology, which is discussed in the next chapter, we will refer to them with these corresponding philosophic : (1) realists, (2) rationalists, (3) empiricists, and (4) formalists.

And now that we are defining our intellectuals ordinally, or by where in the cycle of their natural reasoning they prefer to begin their explicated reasoning, all of our for them or their work have a logical significance that they lacked before. That is, the reasoning of each intellectual type precedes and implies that of any subsequent type.

For instance, our hypothesists (empiricists) are tertiary reasoners who cannot be theorists (realists) or analysts (rationalists), but who may also be pragmatists (formalists) and practitioners because these subsequent roles are implied by their tertiary work. Only theorists, or primary reasoners, can work on all four

intellectual levels, though they might choose to ignore any of the three later levels.

But since these are based on the division of our whole reasoning cycle, they are partialized , and so they are all opposed to the wholistic term philosopher. If this term is to have a distinct meaning to us, it can only mean a complete reasoner, or one who creates theories pertaining to all four of the quadrantal modes of our reasoning. The first two theories must be analytic, a theory of reality and a theory of human reasoning (logic, knowledge), but there may be more than one theory in the two synthetic modes, the tertiary and quaternary modes. And of course the entire philosophy must be internally consistent.

Many academics and other people denigrate philosophy to hide the incompleteness of their own reasoning, but our psychologically based definition shows that our need for philosophers is fundamental and continual, because every practical construct we build needs a sound and realistic theoretic foundation. This is so even though every prior effort to create such a philosophy has failed. That historical failure does not mean, as many pragmatists (formalists) since the late-nineteenth century have claimed, that philosophy is dead; it only means that intellectuals must discard the fallacious assumptions and methods of the past and try harder than before. If it seems to us that we don’t need a philosophy, this only means that we are actually using some old one.

Traditionalist academics don’t share this wholistic view of philosophy because they have no standard of human reasoning to tell them explicitly what a whole intellectual system is and how its parts are logically related. That is why they can only describe the word ‘philosophy’, which is what they do when they say that it originally meant ‘a love of wisdom’, two vague descriptive words that do nothing to define it. If they had such a standard, they would see that a complete philosophy must start from a metaphysical theory, which implies an epistemic theory, which implies (at least) a psychologic theory and a moral theory, which in turn imply all of our reasoning in every area of practice or science, each of

which has its own pragmatic theory.⁸

Historically, these four kinds of theories were never seen as a whole, or as composing a complete philosophy. Traditionalists could only see them as independent and unconnected theories, to which they assigned distinct and logically unrelated . Thus they studied metaphysics, epistemology, psychology, or ethics as detached academic subjects, and often confused these with pseudotheories such as ‘ontology’, ‘formal logic’, and ‘theology’. And they gave each of their many pragmatic theories a distinct name without distinguishing its level in our whole reasoning process from the three more fundamental levels that logically implied it.

If our definition of philosophy here is strictly interpreted, it leads to the surprising conclusion that in all recorded history we haven’t had even one genuine philosopher or philosophy. This may violate every reference to deeper thinking in our literature, but it is correct. Only a few intellectuals approached this standard; the rest never came close. Even those whose systems were most complete (Plato, Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel) don’t fit our standard here because they were idealists and not realists; that is, not theorists. And the intellectuals who are farthest from the theoretical level, those pragmatists who teach the thinking of others, use their distinctions in academic fields to call their own kind ‘philosophers’, but our definition denies that label to any professor of philosophy who is not a realist and who hasn’t created a conceptually complete intellectual system.

Another old misconception that this wholistic view of our reasoning refutes is the assumption that deeper reasoning is more complex than shallow reasoning. But the deepest reasoning we can do is our primary reasoning, which is our simplest and most instinctive level of reasoning. This is so because it is closest to the reality of a matter, or to the real and whole event from which all shallower technical and practical reasoning is derived through three subsequent levels of increasing complication. This fact limits me in choosing a name for my philosophic system. It can only be realism, because this is the only proper name

for any genuine philosophy, which must begin from our primitive monistic perception of Reality itself. No other term would distinguish my intellectual system clearly from the three arealistic kinds of systems (discussed next) that compose our entire intellectual tradition to date.

So metaphysics is not really the subject of dispute that traditionalists claim that it is, because if it is properly defined, it pertains solely to the one undivided Reality, or the Whole Event, which we all know and presuppose in every thought we have and every act we perform. It seems to be controversial only because secondary, tertiary, and quaternary reasoners are threatened by primary reasoning and try hard to deny it. But there is no fundamental dispute among metaphysicians, because any intellectuals who are not monists as to Reality must begin their reasoning by denying the Whole Event they initially perceive, and so all their talk thereafter has nothing to do with metaphysics, or the Reality.

The only real disputes in our intellectual history are those among analysts, hypothesists, and pragmatists (or rationalists, empiricists, and formalists) on their derivative and hence divisive levels, and for millennia traditionalists have misdescribed these as disagreements among ‘philosophers’. The most common pseudometaphysical dispute is the one provoked by monotheists or other idealists who claim to be discussing Reality when in fact, as hypothesists (empiricists), they begin by denying primary metaphysical issues so that they can consider tertiary mystical issues without the restrictions that Reality imposes on our reasoning.

The squabbles among our arealists result from their failure to explicate their primary reasoning, the source of our common view of Reality, and from their failure to use this realism as their standard in judging their subsequent reasoning —all of which is based on the dualisms of their secondary reasoning, where they divide our whole Reality into two parts, one real and the other fictional. Italicizing the fictional term in each pair (as I do throughout), some examples of this are those old divisions of Reality called ‘heaven-earth’, ‘mind-body’, ‘spiritsubstance’, and ‘time-space’.

Arealistic reasoning

This opposition between realists and arealists is the most fundamental intellectual dispute because at root it is the clash between truth and ignorance. We can see this by the substitution of , for the basic sense of ‘true’ (or truth) is equivalent to what we mean by ‘real’ (or reality), and ‘ignorance’ means that something is lacking. And that is what the partialism, idealism, and pragmatism mean. These are arealistic views because respectively they divide, deny, or ignore reality, and all traditional reasoning is fallacious in one of those three ways.

The identity of reality with wholeness and process is a cognitive fact, for we must perceive a thing as a whole and as a process to perceive its reality. So the dispute between truth and ignorance is settled simply by noting (1) that partialists can’t be realists because the parts are not the whole and only a whole event is real, (2) that idealists can’t be realists because any form of idealism, whether mystical or scientific, is predicated on a prior denial of a reality, some realities, or the one Reality, and (3) that pragmatists can’t be realists because, as both Socrates and Dostoyevsky observed, they consider only superficial issues and ignore the reality that underlies all appearances.

We should consider the term idealist now, because we have intellectual and political reasons to avoid its conventional ambiguity. In one sense, it means one who pursues a future perfection, or a speculative hypothesis that we call an ‘ideal’. This is the natural and often-laudable process of trying to improve something according to a fabricated paradigm. This is a valid sense of the term, but so is its philosophic or logical sense, which refers to the fallacy of tertiary reasoning that is detached from its broader context. Both senses stem from the fact that in our judgment process we reach hypothetic speculative conclusions that we call our ‘beliefs’, ‘morals’, or ‘ideals’, any of which can be described

positively or negatively. I use idealist only in the second sense, the opprobrious philosophic or psychologic sense. When I mean the first sense, I qualify the term or use a different one, such as perfectionist or dreamer.

The universal standard of reasoning proposed in this work shows us the two greatest errors possible in an intellectual system, and all three types of arealists make them both. The first is the failure to reason explicitly from primary reasoning, the true beginning of our reasoning process. It is the denial of all the reasoning that logically precedes and implies one’s favorite mode of reasoning. Thus, partialism is fallacious secondary reasoning that denies or presumes primary reasoning, idealism is fallacious tertiary reasoning that denies or presumes primary and secondary reasoning, and pragmatism is fallacious quaternary reasoning that denies or presumes primary, secondary, and tertiary reasoning. The second major error follows from this. It is to adopt as a premise of one’s own reasoning an unsound conclusion from a prior level, or mode, of reasoning that one did not personally consider, which is what people do when they blindly adopt erroneous assumptions from officially respected traditional sources.

Our prior knowledge systems are our most basic problems today, so I condemn them all as a class. I express this blanket criticism by speaking of our ‘traditional intellectual system’, or our ‘traditional system of thought and belief’. This rhetorical device overgeneralizes, of course, but it simplifies our discussions by allowing me to avoid academic digressions into what intellectuals of the past said about each issue we discuss. We can leave the history of our intellectual systems to our estimable professors of philosophy, for that is properly their work. A philosopher’s task is to present a new and complete intellectual system, which is necessarily offered as against the class of all prior intellectual systems. No one would bother creating a new philosophy unless he or she thought that every prior intellectual system is flawed in its fundamental assumptions about reality and human nature.

In sum, we can only reach a true understanding of a science or other practical

subject though philosophy. And this means that only a philosopher can be truly practical. Far from being the antithesis of our practical reasoning, philosophy is the very essence of it.

Now that we have a clearer notion of how to achieve a sound understanding of human nature, let us proceed to the initial elements of our new philosophy; namely, the epistemic, metaphysical, and psychologic theories that imply both the new methods that I offer here to understand people better and the new moral and political theories that I plan to propose in my next work.

Chapter 2. Reasoning

The First Question

Reality is the first thing we know, but it is not our first subject of inquiry. Our first question must be about our knowledge of reality; it is the epistemic question, How do we humans perceive any real thing in the first place? So before we can explicate our reasoning about any real subject, we must consider how we reason. If we don’t, we will confuse our explicated reasoning with our natural reasoning, or what we say with what we mean. The former is how we reason through our symbols and languages, while the latter is how we reason through our common human logic, and the clash between the two has created some of our greatest dilemmas. For one thing, it is the difference between our ‘primitive’ and ‘civilized’ societies, since all that we mean by a civilized society is a highly explicative society, and such societies routinely deny both our natural reasoning and our humanness.

Traditionalist intellectuals have seen this distinction, but they haven’t bridged the gap it causes because they ignored the issue of our common logic, or universal standard of reasoning. If we don’t know the common elements of our reasoning, we can’t know what our mean or understand the logic that rules and relates our language constructs. Though words and other symbols are the building blocks of our explicated reasoning, the mortar that holds them together is our common logic, or our natural reasoning. So to understand ourselves better and build more humane societies, we must construct a more natural verbal language than we have now, and for this we need that missing standard.

Most of us agree that our words and other symbols refer to our psychologic impressions; indeed, they cannot refer directly to anything else, since our psychologic process lies between all realities (external or internal) and our explanations of them with symbols or languages. My view on term reference is this. Each word or other symbol that we form results from our cognition of some real external or internal event. And because, as I argue in the next chapter, Reality has only three dimensions, every term has three reality referents, which

correspond to those three dimensions. A term’s first dimension is its contextreferent, meaning its reference to the perception of a whole event that provokes an act of consideration in us. Its second dimension is its idea-referent, meaning its reference to a specific type of idea that is cognized at some point in that cycle of consideration. And its third dimension is its tense-referent, meaning its reference to where the context-referent and the idea-referent stand with respect to the past, present, or future.

We can’t pursue all the issues related to our common logic here, but we can at least consider its cyclic framework and agree on our basic for its dynamic structure as a moving process. This will show us what is logically required of our theory of reality, from which we can then derive our psychologic, moral, and various pragmatic theories.

The Consideration Cycle

My epistemic theory differs from traditional epistemologies mainly because it focuses on knowing rather than on knowledge, or on our reasoning process rather than on detached static notions. This focus led me to sketch diagrams of the dynamic structure of a single entire act of human knowing, or consideration, and after many unsuccessful attempts, I finally had the framework of the universal standard of human reasoning that we need. I refer to that standard as the process of human consideration or the Consideration Cycle.

In the next chapter, my metaphysics proposes that all events are threedimensional, and from this it follows that there is no structural distinction between an external and an internal event, or between ‘body’ and ‘mind’. The Consideration Cycle thus represents the spatial structure of any complete act of consideration, and its three-dimensional form is proposed as the natural structure of all human logic, or psychologic functioning. It purports to define all of the unit cognitions that we can have along its path and all of the natural relations that can exist among any of those psychologic impressions.

Note that I say ‘cognition’ rather than ‘idea’. Our conventional term idea has been ambiguous since the classic era, when Plato’s original sense of this term (meaning one of his ideal Forms) was replaced with our present sense of the term, which means a psychologic impression. But this sense is also ambiguous because it can mean a unit psychologic impression, a combination of unit impressions, or generically both. Locke dealt with this ambiguity by distinguishing between simple and complex ideas, as we must also. So I use idea only in its indefinite generic sense; otherwise I use epistemic idea or cognition to mean a unit psychologic impression, and notion or conception to mean a compound impression. The Cycle is similarly ambiguous, for in its universal form we consider its unit impressions as epistemic ideas, but when we relativize

it by selecting a particular event as our context, those impressions are compound notions that occur in us in the same logical sequence as our epistemic ideas.

We will ignore the Cycle’s third dimension in this work as not relevant to our subjects here, and we will add other psychologic features to it later in this work. All that we need now is a general understanding of the Cycle’s major elements as shown in Figure 1: its counterclockwise cyclic path, two of its three dimensional axes, the four points on its path as defined by those two axes, which I call our ‘cardinal ideas’, and the four reasoning directions between those cardinal ideas, which are the reasoning modes mentioned earlier.

The Cycle is a process, and its path represents the directed course of our reasoning in a single act of consideration, starting from that act’s context of reference. This process can be interrupted at any point, voluntarily or involuntarily. Each point that we can distinguish on its path is an epistemic idea in an original act of consideration or a compound notion in any reconsideration of that same context. These cognitions vary in the intensity of their impression on us, and we may either cognize them or skip over them as we rush ahead in the Cycle, a choice that more often depends on our congenital nature than on any conscious selection we make.

Some people distinguish these unit points better than others do. For instance, all things being equal, our tertiary intellectuals (hypothesists, empiricists) will cognize the third-quadrant points better than other intellectuals do, because of their natural preference for that reasoning mode and hence their greater experience in it.

Our old descriptive term ‘intelligence’ no doubt refers in part to this ability to distinguish the unit epistemic ideas of the Cycle finely and to see their logical relations easily. But no one can cognize every possible point. However, every normal person can at least distinguish the four numbered points in Figure 1, which are the directional extremes of the moving process, the absolute limits and spatial turning points of the reasoning modes, the Cycle’s quadrantal directions. These are our cardinal ideas, which are the sharpest of all our unit cognitions. This term is apt since these cognitions are equivalent in their nature and relations to the four extremes of spatial direction, the cardinal points of a com. And the fact that the Cycle proposes four cardinal ideas rather than the traditional two, a percept and a concept, is a fundamental difference between our new theory of human reasoning and all prior epistemologies.

Figure 1 shows these basic elements of the Cycle: its counterclockwise motion (explained later), its assumed reference plane (the page), the two directional axes on that plane, and the four points on its path that are defined by those axes.

The vertical axis is the axis of particularity, or specificity. Its polar points on the Cycle’s path are two cardinal ideas that I refer to as percepts, by which I mean cognitions of particularity. The Cycle and our primary reasoning begin at the top of this axis with our first cardinal idea (#1), which is our direct perception of a real and whole event. That cognition is the context of reference for all the reasoning that follows in that single act of consideration. I named this cardinal idea the complete percept because it is our only totally particular cognition, which makes it our most important epistemic idea. At the other end of the vertical axis, after we have analyzed (dissected) that whole event, we cognize the opposite percept (#3); the cardinal idea that I have named the partial percept. It differs from the complete percept in being our cognition of a part or set of parts rather than of its subsuming whole. It too is a particular idea, but an imperfect one because it is not a direct perception; that is, we derive this cognition of a part by reasoning through intervening general ideas.

The horizontal axis is the axis of universality, or generality. Its polar points on the Cycle’s path are the two cardinal ideas that I refer to as concepts, by which I mean cognitions of universality. The first concept (#2), named the abstract concept, is universal to the entire event, or context of reference, but its opposite (#4), named the concrete concept, is not. The abstract concept is our most general idea because it is derived, with no intervening cardinal idea, directly from the initially perceived whole event; it is the universal cognition that ends our primary reasoning and begins our secondary reasoning. Like the abstract concept, the concrete concept is also ‘universal’, but in a limited sense, for it is not derived directly from the complete percept (the whole event) or the abstract concept (the essence of that event); rather, its antecedent cardinal idea is the partial percept, with which we can perceive only a part of a whole event.¹

Since it is derived from our additive tertiary reasoning, the synthetic concrete concept (#4) is our ‘sum-of-all-parts’ cognition, and it has two basic forms that depend on what we sum to achieve it. In our secondary reasoning we dissect a whole thing (event), completely or not, into some perceived parts (attributes, properties), and in our tertiary reasoning we sum those parts to reach the

concrete concept. Its first form is when we sum some of those parts or what we hypothetically assume to be all of them. Here our concrete conception is of a particular set of parts, so in different cases it is our conception or misconception of a thing’s form, substance, or being. Its second form is when we hypothetically sum all the possible instances of any one of those parts. For example, if we see several different objects on a table, one of which is a pen, the first form is our summed cognition of all the objects on this table, and the second form is our summed cognition of all possible things like this one, or of all pens. Both are class ideas, both are hypothetical summations since they are not an actual count of all the particular instances, and both are static and timeless conceptions when first cognized.

Of course, we can assign a time to them later in an act of reconsideration, but to do that we must first perceive our hypothetic summation, a mere concept, as if it was a real and whole event, which it is not. This is where things get complicated in epistemology, because the initial event (context) that we are analyzing in a reconsideration can be a real external or internal event, a natural percept, or an imaginary event, a constructed percept. And if it is imaginary, then we did not cognize it with the complete percept (#1), our only cognition of realness and wholeness, but synthetically with the concrete concept (#4) in the tertiary reasoning of a prior consideration that produced a class idea. Every class idea is a hypothetical and static, or timeless, ideal. But when we imagine that ideal (form, substance, being) as if it was a real event, this still starts the Cycle’s initial analytic half, diagrammed in Figure 2a below, which leads us to deduce the imaginary parts of that ideal—such as the ‘things’ that hypothetically might compose, say, a utopia, pure justice or beauty, a heaven, a god, or a perfect person, square, or action.

All the that we use to refer to our cognition of the concrete concept in either of its two forms are hypothetical. They are our artificial class that refer to form, substance, or a state of being, or to any kind of ideal, total, or perfect conception. We can also refer to them as concrete when we wish to note their opposition to the two kinds of abstract . The concrete concept is not universal to the whole context, but only to some relative class within that context. For example, our abstract-concept ‘existence’ and ‘space’ refer to universal attributes that are shared by every event whatsoever, but concreteconcept such as ‘red’, ‘species’, ‘large’, ‘beautiful’, and ‘just’ refer to relative attributes that refer only to some parts or class of events.

Figure 1 shows that the axes of particularity and universality divide the Cycle into quadrants, and the path of our reasoning in each quadrant is plainly a different spatial direction. These quadrants are natural to all cycles, physical or psychologic. In this work, they are the basis in nature for our distinctions in the parts of a psychologic era, in our four reasoning modes, and in our four basic types of intellectuals. They also give us the proper interpretation of the quadrants of astrological charts.

All the epistemic ideas that occur on the path between two cardinal ideas are intermediate ideas. These cognitions are of four basic kinds, as defined by their quadrant.¹¹ As Figure 1 shows, each intermediate idea is either a percept in the process of becoming a concept or a concept in the process of becoming a percept, and we can give these intermediate ideas class names according to the quadrant in which we cognize them; that is, primary ideas, secondary ideas, and so on. But these class don’t apply to our four cardinal ideas, each of which is a border that ends one reasoning mode and simultaneously initiates the next mode. We can also distinguish our intermediate ideas quantitatively, by their degree of particularity or generality. But for the four middle (50%) ones, this ratio relates any intermediate idea directly to one in the opposite quadrant and inversely to one in each adjacent quadrant.

This explains only the basic elements of the Consideration Cycle shown in

Figure 1, but we don’t need more than these elements to show the power of the Cycle to solve some unsolved ancient dilemmas. The solutions to the three ancient, unsolved problems that follow should suffice to show the fundamental importance of the Cycle’s dynamic framework and to explain some key distinctions that we should all observe hereafter in our reasoning and speech.

1. Essence and Universals

The term ‘essence’ has been much considered by intellectuals since the sophist era. Their discussions of its meaning have centered on the issue of ‘universals’, a term that has remained undefined and ambiguous because traditionalists failed to distinguish either between our two concepts or between those concepts and the that refer to them. To avoid the latter confusion, we must always distinguish between a term and its epistemic referent, and so refer to our concept not as ‘concepts’ or ‘universals’, as if a term could be an epistemic idea, but rather as ‘abstract ’ or ‘concrete ’.

My proposal that we have two concepts rather than one is a new conception, and it explains why Aristotle and Locke offered contradictory explanations of how we cognize ‘a universal’, meaning their traditional notion of ‘a concept’, or general idea. Aristotle described the accretive tertiary reasoning that I say we use only to cognize the concrete concept (#4), and he specified its second form, where we pluralize one part to reach the hypothetical notion of the class of all such parts ever. He called that part the ‘essence’ of the class term, meaning the one thing that all possible of that nouned class have in common. But Locke, to explain that same concept, described the opposite process, the primary reductive reasoning that I say we use only to cognize the abstract concept (#2). He held that we achieve ‘a concept’ by reduction, not accretion, or by imaginatively stripping away the attributes of a whole event until we cognize the least possible thing about it. And since this least thing is common to any event and all of its parts, it is a universal idea and the ‘essence’ of that whole.

But in his criticism of Aristotle’s explanation, Locke didn’t see that he was defining a different cognition, so he failed to see that we humans cognize two directly opposite (180°) concepts, or ‘universals’, and two quadrantally opposite (90°) ‘essences’. The only traditionalist I know who came close to seeing this conceptual duality was Vygotsky (1896-1934).¹² At one point in reading the

work cited, I thought that he was about to propose the two-concept solution I had reached. But as a research psychologist he was not trying to map the entire process of human consideration as I was, and so, though his study implied it, he (like Locke) stopped short of concluding this notion that violates all traditional epistemologies; namely, that we have two concepts, not one, and that we cognize them by opposite reasoning modes, or directions.

As a result of this error, traditionalists since Locke have been confused over what an ‘essence’ is. The abstract concept (#2) is an essence, for it is our reductive cognition of something that is universal to every particular context (event) and hence to all possible parts of any context, but the concrete concept (#4) is not an essence, it is a hypothetical summation. What Aristotle meant by an ‘essence’ is the partial percept (#3) that we synthesize to form a hypothetical class. That percept is the cardinal source of any class idea—the one element that is, or set of elements that are, common to all of the class we have imagined. So we have quadrantally opposite senses of the term ‘essence’: the major sense that refers to the abstract concept and the minor sense that refers to the partial percept. Locke described how we reach the former, the abstract concept that is the defining essence of a whole event, but he didn’t distinguish it from Aristotle’s descriptive essence, the partial percept that is universal to only one class among all the classes that can be formed from different parts (properties, attributes) of that same whole event.

Consider the partial percept named red. In one sense, this is the ‘essence’ of the class of all red things, but that is not the sense we mean when we say that the ‘essence’ of a perceived event is its existence or space, which are universal to all distinct things. Traditionalists confuse these quadrantally opposed meanings of ‘essence’ and the directly opposed meanings of ‘universal’—universal to every part of a whole or universal only within one class, form, or ideal synthesized from one or more parts of that whole. To avoid these ambiguities, we must use universal term to mean only a term whose idea-referent is the abstract concept, and we must not use essence without specifying whether we mean a defining (universal) or a descriptive (partial) essence.

Three cardinal ideas are involved in these two confusions: the abstract concept (#2) by which we cognize a defining essence, the partial percept (#3) by which we cognize a descriptive essence, and the concrete concept (#4) by which we cognize a hypothetical summation, or a class notion that applies only to a part or parts of the whole context. And unlike the complete percept (#1) but like all intermediate ideas, these three cardinal ideas that we derive from the complete percept cannot refer to anything external to us; they refer solely to psychologic events and are only real in that sense.

2. Existence and One

These are universal . They are equivalent because the abstract concept (#2) is the idea-referent of both, but they are not synonyms because they differ in their context-referents. I call the source context of the term existence ‘the processual context’, and the contexts of the two main senses of the term one are the mathematical context and what I call ‘the relational context’, discussed next. With these we see that the Cycle yields precise psychologic definitions of that previously could not be defined. Modern-era existentialists claimed that existence cannot be objectively defined, but the Cycle defines it by not ignoring the primary reasoning that causes the abstract concept to which it refers. Similarly, mathematicians were never able to define the foundational mathematical one and zero, and so (following Frege and Russell) they merely described these universal with class that are ultimately circular.

We reach the abstract concept by reducing a whole event to its defining essence, but oddly enough this concept has two forms, depending upon whether our analytic reduction is ultimate or penultimate. So just before we cognize this second cardinal idea, we have a choice to make. If we reduce our whole context ultimately, then nothing is left of our initial event to which we can refer, and any further consideration of that context is aborted by denial. This total reduction is the idea-referent of our of complete negation, such as ‘nonexistence’, ‘nothing’, or ‘zero’. Such an ultimate reduction is not a universal cognition since it ends all further consideration of a context by denying its existence, and hence its universality, and any that refer to it have no universal meaning because nothing can be universal to nothingness. If, however, we decide to reduce a context penultimately rather than ultimately, then we do cognize a universal idea; namely, the abstract concept (#2), to which the equivalent existence and one refer. These are universal because every distinct thing we perceive exists and is a unique one.

Here, then, is another important distinction in how we reason. Primary reasoning (and hence realism) is based on affirmation alone, because we have not yet reduced the whole to reach our second cardinal idea, the cognition at which we either affirm or deny a whole context. With the abstract concept (#2), dualistic reasoning enters into our considerations for the first time, for here we must choose either to affirm or to deny our initial whole context. This is why theorists (realists) are positive in outlook, while analysts (rationalists), hypothesists (empiricists), and pragmatists (formalists) are ‘either-or’ in outlook; that is, positive or negative and hence always subject to doubts.

We can only see this fact, that in our analytic reasoning we must choose between a penultimate or ultimate reduction of the whole we are considering, by thinking processually rather than statically. Subject to our congenital nature and barring interruptions, we are free to choose whether to affirm or deny any context, or event, even our life, and we do this by deciding whether to cognize the dualistic abstract concept (#2) as a penultimate or an ultimate reduction. We choose the former, the affirmation, when we want our current act of consideration to proceed into our secondary reasoning, and we choose the latter, the denial, when we wish to abort all further consideration of that context (event).

But when we stop just short of nothingness, and thus affirm our context’s defining essence, that essence is a universal cognition; that is, it is common to everything that is subsumed by that whole context, and to all things whatsoever if that context is metaphysics, or the event of Reality itself. So we must speak unambiguously here. Only those nouns that we assign to the abstract concept in its penultimate form are universal ; the nouns that we assign to the abstract concept in its ultimate form are denial . And these are our only two kinds of abstract .¹³

The old dilemma now arises as to whether our abstract refer to anything that is objectively real, and the answer is ‘yes and no’. For instance, if we ask, Does existence exist?, the answer is ‘yes’ in the sense that the cognition to which this term refers is a real psychologic event, and ‘no’ in the sense that the referent

of this universal term is nothing more than an internal cognition we humans have. Every cognition refers to a real event within us, but only the complete percept (#1) can refer to either real external events or to real internal events, including purely imaginary ones.

To see this ambiguity is also to expose a fallacy in the old existential arguments that a god (or anything else) exists. To prove that something exists is not to prove that it is a real and whole event; it merely proves that someone has affirmed that there was such an event. And since people affirm both external events that they have perceived and hypothesized internal events that they imagine are external events, no one can dispute that the cognition named ‘god’ exists; the only issue is whether or not there is such an external thing in Reality. In fact, this is what arealists are: people who fail to distinguish between external and internal reality, and who then assume that there must be a counterpart in external reality for their psychologic hypotheses, which they are more willing to do if some other people also affirm these same internal cognitions.

What remains after a penultimate reduction is the last point to which we can reduce a thing and still have something left to refer to and name, and that point is the defining essence of our context and hence a perfectly universal cognition within it. It is this abstract concept, for instance, that permits us to count different things, for what we really mean when we count ‘one, two, three’ is ‘one existence, two existences, three existences’. We don’t count whole things; we ignore everything else about them and count only their universal essences, their mere existence. This is why we can count how many apples are on the table or how many books are there or, without distinction, how many things are there whatever they are. Everything that exists, whether externally or only internally, can be counted, but nothingness cannot be.

Thus, we can correctly define our term one as the affirmation of an existence, and our term zero as the denial of an existence. And since both those refer to the same epistemic idea, the abstract concept, they are not opposites, or contradictories. Zero denies one, but it is not its contradictory. Contradictories

must exist at the same time, but deniances and their corresponding existents cannot coexist.¹⁴

It follows that the ancient law of contradiction is only properly named if it is stated as traditional logicians do, as an artificial law of explication, “No statement can be both true and false.” But that name is not appropriate for the existential statement, “Nothing can both be and not be at the same time,” because this speaks of denial (complete negation) and not of contradiction (partial negation). Either we cognize the complete percept or we do not, and if we do, then we derive either an existence or a deniance. So we must give the latter ‘law of thought’ two epistemic names. As the law of perception it is, “We either perceive an event or we do not,” and as the subordinate law of conception it is, “We must either affirm or deny any event we have perceived.”

Our term ‘existence’ refers to our penultimate reduction of any context, so everything exists and every event, or thing, can be reduced to this next-tonothing state and given a unique name. Applying this fact personally, in various contexts we refer to our own defining essence as our self, our uniqueness, our dignity, our name, our character, and so on. ‘Existence’ is thus our paradigmatic universal term, and since it is not relative, or descriptive, it cannot be biased or refer to any contingent class idea. Every universal term refers to a universal cognition that allows no discrimination or comparison between things subsumed by the whole context. So everyone is unique and has an individual dignity, and from this it follows in the political context that every individual has equal (meaning identical, not just comparable) natural, universal, and inalienable rights.

Denial like ‘nothingness’ or ‘nonexistence’ are not the opposites of ‘existence’ because opposition is a logical relation between existents only. It must be, therefore, that we have some conventional term that refers to the direct opposite of our term existence, and we do. That term is being, the idea-referent of which is the hypothetical and static concrete concept (class idea, ideal, substance, form). This gives us two opposite general cognitions of a particular

whole thing: (1) the affirmation of its universal essence and (2) the hypothetical summation of its constituent elements, both those that we know and those that we don’t cognize individually but that we drag into our concrete concept by that act of summation. So in what I call ‘the processual context’ (because having defined the ‘existence’ and ‘being’, we must now deny the old academic subject called ‘ontology’), the universal term existence and the concrete term being are direct opposites on the axis of universality, and their quadrantal opposites on the axis of particularity are the complete-percept term cause and the partial-percept term effect.

When we begin our primary reasoning, we know that we have perceived an event, but we don’t yet know what we perceived. If we are certain that we perceived something real and whole, we consider it proven by our personal affirmation, the first of the four kinds of proof that the Cycle requires of us. The others, in quadrantal order, are verification, substantiation, and justification.

The abstract concept (#2) is dualistic because, by the law of conception, we must affirm the whole event to which it refers or else deny it. With the denial, we decide either that the context was an illusion or that it was a real event that we have no personal reason to consider further. In the case of the illusion, we might abort further consideration of that context or we might continue considering it anyway, perhaps because it is fun to do so or because we see a practical use for a fiction or lie we can construct from it. But our secondary reasoning proceeds in either case. Thus, the mere fact that something exists and can then be considered in our secondary, tertiary, or quaternary reasoning does not prove that it is an externally real thing.

of denial are as important in our explicated reasoning as affirming . Indeed, after we cognize a whole event and reduce it to its defining essence, we can say that all of our subsequent reasoning is based on this inherent dualism of the abstract concept. Without the binary logic of this fundamental either-or and its equivalents real-unreal, true-false, and one-zero, we would have no language constructs, all of which are based on the laws of perception and conception. For

instance, formal logic is based on the universal affirmation term true and the denial term false, and mathematics is based on the universal affirmation term one and the denial term zero. And, remarkably, this is so even though these refer only to internal psychologic events.

Thus the Cycle explains yet another ancient paradox that has been unsolved for millennia; namely, why it is that our logical and mathematical systems appear to refer to infallible universal truths, or absolute Laws of Reality, even though their basic do not refer to anything that is externally real. Well, the fact that these and other artificial quaternary linguistic constructs have this seemingly mysterious power substantiates what I claim is true of our common logic as a whole: that it is real, that it observes the objective Laws of Reality, and that it can reveal those absolute Laws to us.

3. The Relational Paradox

It is not probable today, but you may have heard of the ancient dilemma called ‘the paradox of the Whole and the Parts and the One and the All’. If so, you will appreciate that the Cycle’s structure yields its solution. In spite of the great importance of solving this dilemma, few scholars today even mention it. They ignore it not because they don’t know it or think it trivial, but only because it cannot be solved with their old epistemic premises.¹⁵

This paradox is relevant for us now because, with four very common — whole, part, one, and all—it illustrates and clarifies our true cardinal ideas and how they relate to each other, as well as the general nature of all logical or terminological oppositions. I call it ‘the relational paradox’ because its dilemma is one of idea relation. For some reason that traditionalists couldn’t explain, these seem especially important, and yet each has a perplexing relation to the other three; that is, they are in one sense opposites and in another sense nearly synonymous. As traditionalists, we don’t know why we do so, but we erroneously equate a Whole to a One, a One to a Part, Parts to an All (a class), and an All to a Whole. And yet we know that whole means the opposite of part and that neither is quite what we mean by one or all, and that one means the opposite of all and that neither is quite what we mean by part or whole.

Traditionalists saw this relational peculiarity as unique to these four —in spite of more obvious instances of it, like the cardinal directions of a com— because their epistemic hypotheses never proposed four cardinal ideas. They believed that there are only two kinds of epistemic ideas, which they called ‘sense percepts’ and ‘concepts’. They saw that these two epistemic ideas are opposites, but they couldn’t see how any idea could have three opposites, as the idea-referent of each of the in this paradox does. And yet their formal logicians had just such a notion in Aristotle’s square of opposition. But because their two cardinal ideas could only explain the relational Parts and All,

they (and all who followed their lead) routinely confused Parts with One and All with Whole. We could say that the rationalists proposed a third cardinal idea if we assume that their mystical notion of ‘innate ideas’ adds One to the empiricists’ Parts and All, but we must deny this case for the reasons I give later in this chapter.

One has solved this ancient paradox only if one can explain all the apparent equivalencies and oppositions of these four , such that no ambiguity or contradiction remains to plague our reasoning. And this the Consideration Cycle does with a simple picture. Figure 3 shows us the solution to this old puzzle.

The Cycle proposes that every epistemic idea, whether cardinal or intermediate, and hence every term that refers to it, has a direct opposite and two quadrantal opposites, an antecedent and a consequent opposite. Thus, each term we create has four cardinal senses, whether our symbols for them differ or are the same but for an article or other term that makes this cardinal distinction—such as this X, any X, an X, and all Xs. ¹

Moreover, there are as many equivalent sets of four that refer to those four cardinal cognitions as there are possible contexts of reference. In the epistemic context, these are the complete percept, the abstract concept, the partial percept, and the concrete concept. In the processual context, they are cause, existence, effects, and being. In the directional context, they are north, east, south, and west. And in the relational context, they are whole, one, parts, and all. Many other sets are listed in Table A below, which is worth careful study because it shows how some of our key conceptions are logically (meaning sequentially and realistically) related.

In every such set of four cardinal , the first and third term (say, Whole and Parts or Cause and Effects) are qualitative because their idea-referents are our two percepts, and the second and fourth (say, One and All or Existence and Being) are quantitative because their idea-referents are our two concepts.

Now let us return to the Consideration Cycle’s dynamics. Figure 2a shows that the qualitative axis of particularity (perception) divides an act of consideration into the semiprocesses of analysis and synthesis. The first semiprocess, analysis, begins from our context (#1), or perception of a specific whole event, and leads us to the abstract concept (#2) that begins our analytic dissection of that whole

Table A. Some Cardinal and Quadrant Functions

Context

I

II

III

State

Event

Essence

Response

Processual Mode

Cause

Existence

Effect

Causal Mode

Initial Cause

Analytic Cause

Synthetic Cause

Relational Mode

Whole

One

Parts

Sources

Beginning

Conception

Formation

Systemic Direction Inward

Backward

Outward

Graphic Direction

North/Up

East/Left

South/Down

Cardinal Idea

Complete Percept

Abstract Concept

Partial Percept

Systems Built

Theories/Plans

Structures/Symbols

Hypotheses/Fictions

Knowledge Form

Philosophy/Planning Dissective Schemes

Science/Art/Theol.

Education Form

Sources

Subjects

Parts of Speech

Proper Nouns/Verbs Nouns/Adjectives

Adverbs

Knowledge Mode

Purpose

Means

Knowl. Products

Essences/Principles Dissections/Facts

Beliefs/Speculations

Form of Proof

Affirmation

Verification

Substantiation

Arithmetic Mode

Subtraction

Division

Addition

Epistemic Premise

Realism

Rationalism

Empiricism

Logical Type

Primary

Secondary

Tertiary

Reasoning Mode

Fundamental

Explicative

Evaluative

Reality

Knowledge

Conventions Method

Reasoning

Vertical Function

Analysis

Analysis

Synthesis

Horizontal Function Reduction

Accretion

Accretion

Reasoning Type

Analytic-Reductive

Analytic-Accretive

Synthetic-Accretive

Wholistic

Symbolic

Partialistic

Communication

Explanation

Reality Orientation Subjective

Objective

Subjective

Cognition Mode

Instinct

Insight

Intuition

Conscious System

Will

Thought, Feeling

Feeling, Judgment

Motive

Meaning

Organization

Efficiency

Impressions

Realities

Abstractions

Illusions

Creative Products

Systems, Wholes

Symbols, Dissections Needs, Classes

Focus

Wishes, Possibilities Statements, Kinds

Desires, Hopes

Drives

Survival, Control

Self, Pleasures

ions, Morals

Avoids

Chaos, Old Ways

Order, Silence

Purpose, Theory

Reasoning Purpose Structure Psychologic

Pref’d Social Image Dignified, Intense

Intelligent, Objective Creative, Just

into parts, from which we then perceive and select one or some of the parts revealed to us by our analysis. That partialized selection is then the subcontext (#3) that ends analysis and begins the semiprocess of synthesis, which leads us to a tertiary hypothesis, or the concrete concept (#4), and then to our quaternary reasoning where we finally perceive a new but lesser whole event (#1) of our own construction. So analysis is reasoning from a specific whole to a specifically perceived part or set of parts, and synthesis is reasoning from one or some selected parts to a specific whole, one that is contingent on but is always different from the whole that yielded its parts.

As the synthetic semiprocess nears its end, we reach the quaternary cognition that I call an ‘understanding’. This term is normally used to distinguish the two main senses of the term ‘knowledge’; one sense means a bit of data, a distinct fact or inference, and the other means our integration of all such bits into an understanding of our subject, which is the broad sense Plato meant when he spoke of knowledge. This understanding then causes a decision and perhaps an act that ends that turn of the Cycle.

That decision tells us how to act relative to the context and subcontext we selected, if we choose to act. If so, that act is a new event that we may or may not consider further, in a new turn of the Cycle. We must have this personal understanding, such as it is, before we can decide on any act. We can act on our decision then or retain it for later as a personal power, which is our potential to act in accordance with that understanding. We thus have two kinds of psychologic power; power in action and power in reserve, which can be likened to kinetic and potential energy.

Figure 2b shows that the other axis, the horizontal axis of universality, divides our act of consideration into the semiprocesses of accretion and reduction. Accretion is the antecedent semiprocess by which we extend our abstract conception of a One to a hypothetical conception of an All relative to that One.

Reduction is the consequent semiprocess by which we reduce that conception of an All until we again cognize a One. Each semiprocess is divided by a distinct perception; the complete percept (#1) in the case of reduction, and the partial percept (#3) in the case of accretion.

These four semiprocesses are integrated as shown above in Figure 3, where they give us the technical for our four basic types of reasoning. Primary reasoning is analytic-reductive reasoning, secondary reasoning is analyticaccretive reasoning, tertiary reasoning is synthetic-accretive reasoning, and quaternary reasoning is synthetic-reductive reasoning.

This skeletal structure of the Cycle is plainly not all that we need to know in order to understand ourselves, but it suffices for our purposes in this and the next chapter. One of our goals in this chapter is to classify correctly, for the first time, all of our intellectual views and formal constructs. This is a large task, but it’s manageable if we don’t pursue it into the details of synthetic (scientific) reasoning. The new things we must know to objectively define and classify our reasoning biases and the ideologies we construct from them are the dynamics of the Cycle as just discussed and one other fact. This is that our intellectuals always assume that the cardinal idea that begins their own favorite quadrant is the first and most fundamental cognition in all human reasoning.

So the Consideration Cycle gives us two major new powers: the ability to see and judge the logical validity of an entire intellectual system, and the ability to compare two or more entire systems fundamentally. Traditionalists don’t have these powers; they are limited to judging the truth and validity of the propositions that compose a system, which leads to the error of not seeing the forest for the trees. But with the Cycle, our new wholistic standard of human reasoning, to guide us, we are not restricted to propositional logic as they are, and so no explicit ideology is beyond our ability to judge as a whole formal construct. Previously, we had to study an entire intellectual system to find its flawed propositions one by one, but now we can tell whether that system is soundly conceived or not just by noting where its reasoning begins in the Cycle,

which is usually clear from an author’s introduction or stated scope. If the proposed system doesn’t begin from primary reasoning, either the author’s or someone else’s, then it is not a realistic system and it is invalid regardless of its stated facts, internal coherence, or literary brilliance.

Intellectual Systems

Just as the term ‘knowledge’ means either isolated data or an integrated understanding, so we must distinguish between a knowledge system, which is any combination of related ideas in the same context, and an intellectual system, which reveals whatever total understanding of a context we have. An intellectual system is an explicit and structured consideration of the real and whole event that is its context, and if it is valid it will reflect the entire logical process defined by the Consideration Cycle—not because the Cycle is beyond dispute, but because it is the only standard of logical completeness yet proposed.

An intellectual system can have only one analytic theory, but it can have as many synthetic constructs as it has perceivable and classifiable parts, or subcontexts. A theory is our explication of the first half of our natural reasoning cycle, the analytic half that refers back to the complete percept (#1), and a construct is our explication of the second half of that cycle, the synthetic half that refers back to the partial percept (#3). A theory and a construct are opposite kinds of systems because a context and a subcontext are opposite kinds of particular references. An intellectual system consists of one theory plus multiple constructs, but it is not a philosophy, which must consist of at least four intellectual systems.

We use the term theory ambiguously, because strictly speaking it means any set of analytic principles that we have ordered in our secondary thought system, even if our selected context (#1) was not a whole but an ideal conceived earlier in our tertiary reasoning that we are pretending is a whole. But since only a metaphysics can yield a true theory, we must say that any such construct we analyze yields a derived theory. We usually ignore this distinction, but it reminds us to check the metaphysical assumptions of any tertiary mystical or scientific ‘theory’. Also, the more removed our secondary theorizing is from metaphysics, the less universal significance it has, so we should call such theories ‘constructs’

instead.

The unit conception of a theory is a principle, meaning an analytic proposition in universal that applies to a whole context, and the unit conception of a construct is a hypothesis, meaning a synthetic proposition in class that applies to a subcontext.

The validity of our reasoning depends on our always knowing which whole event is our current context of reference, for otherwise we can’t keep track of its perceived parts and the many constructs we hypothesized from them. This logical rule may seem too elemental to state, but it is routinely ignored by traditionalists, who often commit what I call ‘the fallacy of context shifting’, which is to refer to two different contexts in the same line of reasoning. This error imposes two conflicting logical systems on thinkers, which can confuse them to the point that they may want to deny logic or reality itself.

Of course, we can freely shift from one subcontext to another in the same context, for choosing a different part of the same whole for synthetic reasoning doesn’t violate our context’s logic. For instance, in the metaphysical context, every other subject is a subcontext, so in this case, where our context is the Reality, we can shift freely in considering all other subjects, which are its subcontexts. This freedom to shift between reality’s subcontexts is why mathematics can be used in all scientific constructs, even though it has no function in the all-subsuming theory of metaphysics, which implies it and every other synthetic science or quaternary language. But shifting our contexts, which is what mystics, theists, and even physicists do when they imagine a second kind of ‘reality’, violates our logic because it breaks the sequence of our cyclic reasoning.¹⁷

The only way we can resolve this kind of illogic, the contradictions between two or more synthetic constructs, is to shift our perspective to a higher level, to another whole event (context) that subsumes them. This technique works

because it raises the level of our logic, so that we can see those conflicting constructs as sibling subcontexts rather than as the discrete whole contexts that they were to us before. This is why the ultimate context, Reality, is the source of our universal logic. And of course we must reject the claim of our pluralists (formalists) that there is no such ultimate standard, because this irrationally denies that there is an ultimate subsuming whole, or the Reality.

Our Reasoning Biases

Earlier we distinguished our intellectuals by their quadrantal preferences; as theorists, analysts, hypothesists, and pragmatists. But this classification is imprecise because many people prefer two or even three reasoning modes about equally. To analyze a reasoner correctly, then, we must ask not which quadrant he or she prefers, but rather which cardinal idea is the preferred beginning point of his or her entire train of reasoning. If more than one quadrant is preferred, then that person’s dominant cardinal idea is the one that begins the first of those quadrants in their numerical order. But note that if the preferred quadrants are not in sequence, then the unfavored quadrant or quadrants reveal major gaps in the person’s entire reasoning process.

So this revision distinguishes our epistemic disputants not as we did earlier by their favored mode, but more fundamentally by their favored premise on epistemic priority, or by which cardinal idea comes first in our explicit reasoning. And since we now have four cardinal ideas, we have four distinct epistemologies and not just the two that are traditionally recognized: rationalism and empiricism.

Whatever cardinal bias we have, it is the most forceful psychologic impression for a hypothetical fourth of us, and the other three-fourths oppose us. But in spite of this broad disagreement, we each feel that our preferred way to begin our reasoning cannot be doubted, and that our favored cardinal idea is more fundamental than the other three. Subjective reasoners then universalize this bias by insisting that where they personally prefer to begin reasoning is where all humans begin it, and that therefore any ideology or construct that is not based on that priority premise must be rejected.

The two axes in our figures define the broadest possible distinction among human reasoners: perceptualists prefer to begin their explicit reasoning at the qualitative axis of particularity, and conceptualists prefer to begin it at the quantitative axis of universality. The perceptualists divide into wholists who put the complete percept (#1) first and partialists who put the partial percept (#3) first, and the conceptualists divide into dualists who put the abstract concept (#2) first and pluralists who put the concrete concept (#4) first. Epistemically, the wholists are realists, the dualists are rationalists, the partialists are empiricists, and the pluralists are formalists. Our earlier distinctions among intellectuals (theorist, analyst, etc.) remain useful, but they don’t refer to an epistemic position, which is the most fundamental aspect of any intellectual system.

The Cycle defines all of those italicized words, and their new meanings don’t correspond exactly to the old dictionary descriptions. For instance, traditionalists don’t use ‘formalism’ in the epistemic context because they assume that pragmatism is not a position on epistemic priority. But it is, for if we habitually start our reasoning at some point late in the Cycle, then that point is our position on epistemic priority whether we declare it to be such or not. So a formalist is a quaternary reasoner, or pragmatist, who assumes that our reasoning always begins from the concrete concept (#4), or from the hypothetical class , ideals, languages, and rule systems that we form from it.

Our formalists’ language constructs include those of speech, music, mathematics, logic, and moral or legal codes. In fact, formalism is the name that Hilbert (1862-1943) gave to one of his mathematical constructs, which proposed “that mathematics… can be based on the formal manipulation of symbols without regard for their meaning,” and one academic rightly called this view “cousin” to the older view known as nominalism.¹⁸

Also, we call our ancient propositional logic ‘formal logic’ because, like mathematics, it too is a cousin of nominalism, or a quaternary logic that pretends to be a universal logic even though it is only a piece of our whole reasoning process. Few logicians or mathematicians would propose that formal logic or

mathematics is the beginning of all human reasoning, but they don’t object when a nominalist makes that same claim for our quaternary language constructs in general.

But our definition of realism here differs even more from its traditional descriptions. Most traditionalists associate realism with empiricism or some form of conceptualism, but this is not so. Academics have mislabeled as realism many systems of the past from Aristotle’s empiricism on, ignoring the fact that no system can be realistic if it assumes the reality of a mystically derived deity. Some even speak of ‘conceptual realism’, which is a self-contradictory term because our conceptualists ignore reality. In its strict sense, I define a realist as a monistic perceptualist who asserts the epistemic priority of the complete percept, our sole means of perceiving a distinct whole event. So realists are quadrantally opposed to all conceptualists, both the rationalists who put abstract before reality and the formalists who put our concrete and language systems before reality.

Having an idea is a real event, of course, but our concepts are not our only epistemic ideas, and if we begin our reasoning from either of our two concepts or from the nouns (abstract or class ) that refer to each of them, then we are denying our whole context, which we can only cognize through the complete percept (#1). Our conceptualists therefore cannot be realists, and the formalists among them are even more unrealistic than the rationalists, given where they start their explicit reasoning. Figure 4 shows these relations as they occur in the Consideration Cycle.

These four opposing views cause sharp conflicts in a society. Perceptualists and conceptualists function as if in different dimensions, but the two kinds of each type, though directly opposed, have axially similar views. That is, realists and empiricists share the perceptualist’s bias for natural and qualitative reasoning, and rationalists and formalists share the conceptualist’s bias for explicated and quantitative reasoning.

But the 90º relation between a perceptualist and a conceptualist causes hostilities that are not equally severe on both sides. A general rule here, which holds in three of the four cases, is that we are more hostile to our antecedent opposites than to our consequent opposites. This is so because if the priority premise of our antecedent opposites is correct, then ours is flatly refuted, but if ours is correct, then that of our consequent opposites is not entirely objectionable to us because it follows logically from ours. For instance, rationalists (quadrant II) tolerate empiricists (III) but not realists (I), and empiricists (III) tolerate formalists (IV) but not rationalists (II). This is why the old debates between empiricists and rationalists were more heatedly argued by the empiricists than by the rationalists.

The formalists are the exception to this rule, because they are sharply divided from their consequent opposites, the realists, by the complete percept, which ends one act of consideration and begins another. Thus formalists are not tolerant of any other kind of intellectual, which is why they are collectivistic and form into tight cliques related to their profession or academic specialty. They oppose their antecedent opposites, the empiricists, because if the partial percept comes first in our reasoning, then so do subjective ions, needs, and moral judgments, which are the antithesis of the formalists’ supposedly objective class , language constructs, and rule systems. But they clash even more with their consequent opposites, the realists, because they arrogantly believe that their own total understanding in a context precludes any further consideration of it. And yet realists refuse to accept their constructs as dogma, or as ‘final’ understandings, since these are offered on no better authority than the arbitrary opinion of some formalist clique in, say, government, religion, science, academia, commerce, the military, or the media.

In other words, realists, or primary reasoners, are naturally inclined to start a new reasoning cycle with every event that they see as important enough to consider. They instinctively say, “I must think this out for myself,” and if the event at issue is the proposed construct of a formalist, their reasoning about that ‘final’ understanding is a critical reevaluation of it, starting from its initial premises. And this valid approach usually results in the denial of the proposed construct, for if formalists devised it, it cannot possibly be conceptually complete. Needless to say, this critical reaction by realists, this refusal to presume what all the academic experts presume, frustrates our formalists—just because, as Dostoyevsky observed, they are easy in their minds and are absolutely sure of themselves, in spite of the limitations of their arbitrarily truncated reasoning.

This fact, that our consideration begins anew each time we cognize the complete percept, has the important social consequence that the clash between realists and formalists (or theorists and pragmatists) is the sharpest of all conflicts, intellectually or otherwise. It is the conflict of primary with quaternary reasoning, of creative generation with conformity (if not plagiarism), of revolution with tradition, and of leftist progressivism with rightist conservatism.

The Priority Controversy

People seldom realize that at root many of their nonmaterial arguments are about epistemic priority. This is unfortunate, for if they saw this, their ideologic disputes could be resolved logically. The Consideration Cycle helps on this, for it shows that there are four cardinal ideas, four points where the very direction of our reasoning—forwards, backwards, inward, or outward—is changed. Now the disputants can see that they must explain how those ideas relate to each other and prove that their favored one does indeed come first in the Cycle. But then they will find it difficult to disprove the realists’ position, which is that perception comes before conception, and that we must perceive a whole event before we can perceive its parts.

The historical debate on epistemic priority won’t concern us much here, because it pertains mostly to rationalism and empiricism, neither of which is defended by sensible intellectuals today. For many decades now, academics have refused to defend the priority premise of either view, because modern-era intellectuals from Hume (1711-1776) to the mid-twentieth century exposed the absurdities of rationalism and empiricism that had not already been exposed in the classic era. But formalism, or pragmatism, escaped this fatal criticism because traditionalists didn’t see it as a position on epistemic priority, and so, starting in the late nineteenth century, it became the last bulwark of traditional epistemic error that even the defeated rationalists and empiricists had to defend.

Of course, that didn’t change people’s basic views; it just made the formalists socially and politically dominant ever since then. Given that dominance for more than a century and the fact that their view on epistemic priority is the most illogical one, I will discuss their errors here more fully than the other views. Note also that while I must speak here in the epistemic context, my words on these dispositions apply in the psychologic context as well. Though I can’t write

in two contexts at once, you can reflect on the psychologic implications as we proceed and so imagine what people with each of these four epistemic perspectives would be like in their other characteristics.

Rationalism

Because rationalism was discredited by the end of the classic era (1516-1762), the modern era (1762-2008) was built on the fallacies of empiricism. Though many views in the modern era were called ‘rationalism’ or ‘rationalistic’, this was only because they opposed empiricism, and not because they defended rationalism’s priority premise, which is that our reasoning process begins from certain ‘concepts’ that we all have in us at birth.

The rationalists knew that the empiricists’ priority premise was wrong, for it was obvious that our reasoning cannot begin with sense data because, unless these come to us in some context, they would be nothing but meaningless ‘static’ to us. So they tried to explain how we get that whole context before we employ our senses, and the best they could do in their time was to offer their weak notion of innate ideas, which has three main errors.

First, their proposal that our reasoning begins with a set of ‘concepts’ that are known to us a priori (meaning innately, or without experience) contradictorily holds that we can have a psychologic cognition (idea) that is not derived from our psychologic functioning, or mental experiences. This claim may seem reasonable to theists, for they can accept the mystical tertiary notion of a godbeing that puts these prêt-à-porter ‘cognitions’ into us before birth, but nontheists can’t accept it because it proposes a nonpsychologic state in us all—in effect a mystical realm where undefinitions dwell—that doesn’t require us to causatively define those ideas. So the rationalists just sidestepped the epistemic issue of how we humans achieve our abstract cognitions of universality and nothingness. And they did this because their primary reasoning, which causes our abstract , impressed them with little conscious force, while the abstract concept that it produces strongly impressed itself on their consciousness.

“I think, therefore I am,” the rationalist and dualist Descartes proclaimed, but this motto merely affirms that he started his own explicit reasoning at the abstract concept (#2), which in my theory begins our second psychologic system, thought, and is the idea-referent of our universal term existence. Given the strong second quadrant bias that is revealed by his natal chart, it is no surprise that he would propose such a false axiom.

Second, they illustrated these innate ‘ideas’ with arbitrary shortlists of concept . But they never defined those ; nor did they explain why each term on their varying lists belongs there of necessity, of how we cognize the epistemic ideas to which those refer, or of how, other than being innate, these abstract universal differ from the synthetic class that refer to the concrete concept.

Third, they spoke of innate epistemic ‘ideas’ that are ‘universals’ or ‘concepts’. Their error here was pluralization. Specifically, they made the mistake, common even today, of confusing our abstract with the one epistemic idea to which all such refer, the abstract concept. For example, the idea-referent of the existence, space, one, and nothingness is the abstract concept, but these are just words, or concept , and calling them ‘concepts’ makes this word ambiguous; that is, we don’t know then if ‘concept’ means a type of word or a type of cognition. Thus, the rationalists’ notion of innate ideas doesn’t propose any cognition at all; it just asks us to imagine that there is some kind of epistemic cognition that might be the idea-referent of their arbitrarily selected list of general words.

Every shortlist of supposedly innate ‘concepts’ that they proposed is just a list of that refer to a concept, usually the abstract concept, but sometimes the concrete concept. So rationalism isn’t an epistemology at all, since it doesn’t explain our reasoning, it explains how we don’t reason—that is, it holds that there is a mystical realm within us where some of our key ‘concepts’ exist with no reasoning process to cause them. But even if we grant that what they mean by some word on their list is its idea-referent, the epistemic problem is not how to

describe that unique kind of idea with a vague list of words, it is how to explain its psychologic cause as a cognition.

Since both rationalists and formalists are conceptualists who favor explicated reasoning, they cannot propose an epistemology. The rationalists put a set of first, and the formalists put our explicit languages and existing sacred texts first, and neither will it that epistemic issues refer to our natural reasoning, or to the psychologic process that causes our ideas and so defines all of our and languages.

Empiricism

Tertiary empiricists rejected the rationalist’s notion of innate ideas by proposing the priority of sense ‘perceptions’. My Random House dictionary describes a perception as “1. the act or faculty of apprehending by means of the senses or of the mind; cognition; understanding. 2. immediate or intuitive recognition or appreciation…”

This attempts definition by proposing the causes of a perception, such as the senses, the mind, or our intuition. But the empiricists propose that our five sense faculties are our only faculties of perception, or particular cognition, while the mind produces only conceptions, and only the kind formed by synthesis. The rationalists held that our five sense faculties can’t function unless some nonsensual faculties function first, and realists agree with this, but only after they add that those nonsensual faculties include our ability to instantly perceive (not conceive) wholeness, or events.

The cause of a percept or concept can be said to be the physiological faculties that provoke that cognition in us or the reasoning process with which we deduce or induce it. But while it is medically important to know which physical parts of us provoke our cognitions, this tells us nothing about the epistemic issues of what those cognitions are and how we process them in our reasoning. Our sense faculties do provoke cognitions in us, but only intermediate ideas, which are partly general and partly specific and so cannot be a wholly general or wholly specific cardinal idea. Our two concepts are caused by what we vaguely describe as nonsensual ‘mental’ faculties, and our two percepts are caused by other mental faculties, such as the ‘intuitive’ faculties that physiologists and psychologists often mention but have not yet identified.

Empiricists are correct to oppose conceptualism, or rationalism and formalism,

but they incorrectly assume: (1) that our sense faculties cause both our wholistic and our partialistic percepts, (2) that all of our reasoning begins from our perception of the parts of a whole, and (3) that we achieve our general cognitions only by the accretive synthesis of parts, and never by the reductive analysis of wholes. They rarely state the second assumption, but it follows from the fact that our senses cannot inform us of wholeness. Locke disagreed with Aristotle on the third assumption, but his commitment to the first two prevented him from proposing that we have two concepts.

The Consideration Cycle, however, holds that our reasoning begins from a perception of a whole event, or from our awareness that something has happened, though at first we don’t know what has happened, and that we begin to know this ‘what’ not through the synthesis of sense perceptions, but through the analysis (dissection) of that whole event.

For example, if we walk into a field, we know instantly that we have done so, or that this event has happened, before our senses can inform us of the plants, animals, or other things in that field, and long before we can mentally synthesize all of those sense cognitions to learn piece by piece of that ‘whole’ experience— which we can only do falsely anyway, since the true whole of that experience includes things that our senses can never cognize.

Much the same thing was said by Russell Coleburt in An Introduction to Western Philosophy (London: Sheed & Ward, 1958, p.157) when he pointed out the basic flaw in Hume’s empirical reasoning.

Hume has got his psychological data upside down: we do not in fact have a series of impressions, lump them together and call them “cow.” The process is rather the reverse: we first see a cow and then, if we choose to do so, begin to divide it up into its respective properties. True, we may hear a mooing sound and infer that there is a cow in the neighborhood, or we may see a brown tail behind the hedge and infer that it is attached to a cow behind the hedge, but all this

implies that we first know what we mean by a complete cow.

This criticism is sound, but it doesn’t explain how we come to know a whole. Anyway, we will see later that this reversed way of thinking is common among arealists, and that Hume, for instance, was one of the many prominent thinkers who had the innate psychologic impairment that I define later as a ‘thought reversal’.

The empiricists prevailed over the rationalists early in the modern era, mainly because the best intellectuals of that time had begun to reject mystical theism. This also led those intellectuals to reject the rationalists’ mystical notion of innate ‘ideas’ that are not caused by earthly reasoning, and so, seeing no alternative, they accepted the empiricists’ simplistic notion that our reasoning begins from tangible sense data.

But the empiricists could never explain how sense data, which we know can inform us of some parts of a whole, can also inform us of wholeness, a primary cognition that is indispensable to our reasoning. The senses have no such power, and many tests have proven that they can and often do deceive us as to our real and whole situation. The most that sense data can do to inform us of whole events is, in some cases, to trigger the nonsensual faculties that perform this function in us. In all other cases, including those events we imagine that are fictional or are real but beyond the range of our senses, the faculties by which we perceive events function perfectly in us with no sense stimulations at all.

The empiricists overlooked both the abstract concept (#2) and the complete percept (#1), and yet the latter is our most important epistemic idea, for it tells us that a specific event has happened, an event that becomes the whole object of reference for all the analysis and synthesis that we do later in that context. Also, other animals must have this first cardinal cognition too; that is, since they must respond to changes in their outer and inner worlds, they must be able to perceive events, or that something has happened. But sense faculties can’t serve this

primary function, for their role in our psychologic process is the secondary one of telling us something about the parts of a whole event—after we have perceived that whole through the complete percept, affirmed its defining essence through the abstract concept, and are ready to divide it into its parts, which is the true function of our senses.

Finally, note that while some empiricists call themselves ‘empiricists’ and defend the empiristic premises, most of them won’t mention those discredited claims. Instead, they propose them indirectly with some new name that means ‘empiricism’ but doesn’t say it; a name that often includes the term ‘realism’. These reluctant empiricists will say that our reasoning begins ‘from experience’, but what they mean by this is the experience of the senses in telling us about the parts of a whole event. Experience is an extraordinarily vague term to use in an epistemic discussion, because every kind of cognition we have is an experience.

Thus the empiricists’ motto, experience comes first, avoids every epistemic issue except their wish to deny the rationalists’ proposal of innate ideas. It doesn’t explain why our first experience must be waves of sense data about the parts of an event rather than our direct perception of that whole event itself, and it doesn’t establish empiricism positively, since it doesn’t distinguish an empiricist from a conceptualist, let alone from a realist who puts our perception of a whole before our perception of its parts.

Formalism

With rationalism already obsolete at the start of the modern era, empiricism was belatedly laid to rest in the late nineteenth century, when some intellectuals, impressed by the great strides made then in mathematics, physics, logic, and other sciences, concluded (as people are inclined to do after the first quadrant of an era has ed) that philosophy was dead, that it had never given us a valid epistemology (theory of reasoning), and that in any case we don’t need one. And as this negativism won world-wide dominance in politics and academia, most intellectuals embraced formalism, or pragmatism. They held, as most nonacademics soon did also, that it is a waste of time to look beneath the surface as philosophers do, and that we should just focus on our existing linguistic constructs. But that is sheer ignorance; not only because it opposes progress, but also because it denies both wholistic reasoning and the causes of things.

As our extreme conceptualists, formalists make much of our language constructs; so much that they believe that they can explain everything through the ex post facto study of speech, mathematics, logic, scientific languages, moral codes, legal systems, religious doctrines, military policies, and other formal constructs. But this puts the cart before the horse, and the horse in this case is the psychologic process that gives all of our languages and linguistic constructs their meaning. And to defend this reversed view of how we reason, our formalists must use convoluted technical arguments that make the other three epistemic perspectives seem simplistic by comparison.

For instance, though it is our hypothesists who propose the various conceptions of theism, it is our formalists who propose religions, those anti-individualist constructs that try to achieve their political goals through fictions and distortions that confuse ordinary people in their reasoning about Reality, society, and their individual lives.

Formalists also propose all forms of scientism, meaning constructs that portray science not as the derivative reasoning that it is, but rather as our prior and highest form of knowledge. A good example of this is phenomenology, the construct of Husserl (1859-1938), who began as a quaternary logician and mathematician. His rationalization for ignoring the root epistemic dilemmas, basically by “bracketing” them and jumping straight to pragmatic issues, produced an epistemic pluralism that, for one thing, led gestalt psychologists to try to explain our global (wholistic) perceptions through quaternary rather than primary reasoning.¹

Realists hold that our reasoning begins with our perception of wholeness (events), but all others assume that wholeness is ‘allness’, a view that is forced on anyone who accepts the empiricists’ assumption that we have only one kind of concept, the accretive concrete concept. Formalists happily confuse ‘All’ with ‘Whole’ in this way because this s their claim that our language constructs, which they erroneously assume begin from the concrete concept (the All) and its class , are the source of all our reasoning.

A tight chain of formalistic error that spanned three psychologic eras was forged by four famous nominalists: Occam (c.1285-1349), Luther (1483-1546), Hobbes (1588-1679), and Wittgenstein (1889-1951). Each, in the academic fashion of his time, opposed rationalism, empiricism, and realism. This is not easy to do through quaternary reasoning, for to defend their priority premise they must argue that no reasoning is ‘meaningful’ until it has been explicated. But this is nonsense, because our meanings don’t come from our formal constructs, they come from the psychologic process with which we build those constructs.

Formalism was advanced by the American pragmatists, headed by Peirce (18391914), James (1842-1910), and Dewey (1859-1952), who soon had prominent ers, including the young Wittgenstein, in Britain and elsewhere. The first principle of their pragmatism was the commonplace view that no notion is important unless it is useful; that is, unless it has what the academic psychologist James called a “cash value,” meaning a practical function. Not surprisingly, most

twentieth-century academics accepted this premise, even though it proposes no objective way, other than by a consensus of academics, to know what is or is not intellectually meaningful.

This claim that pragmatic reasoning has ‘cash value’ is in one sense true and otherwise false. Our practical goals are certainly furthered by our explicated constructs, for that is their purpose, but it is then absurd to claim that the psychologic causes of our languages are meaningless, for this means that our explicit constructs are also meaningless. We don’t suddenly have a construct and then acquire a goal because of it. We determine that goal before we build any formal construct, in the prior reasoning that yields our primary will intentions, secondary thoughts, and tertiary desires and beliefs.

We are not so imbecilic that we would build any tangible construct, of wood or words, with no motive for doing so. What else can a proposition’s practical ‘cash value’ be but the goal that one intends to achieve by proposing it? But a linguistic construct is not an intention, even though it synthesizes prior intentions, and every old construct that we adopt has motives, or intentions, that we never played a part in deciding. So whence its integrated intentions, why do they vary among us, and which are unacceptable because they are unrealistic, illogical, or immoral? These are the crucial issues that our pragmatists never address; no doubt because they don’t know how to correctly explain reality, logic, or morality.

Nothing can have any kind of value to us, not even a cash value, unless we have already evaluated it in the preformal psychologic functioning that our formalists ignore. Our values are products of our subjective tertiary reasoning; they don’t rise out of nothing in our objective quaternary reasoning. So if ‘cash value’ is important, then the process by which we determine that value is even more important, and therefore formalists, who deny that prior psychologic step, are not reasoning validly. In politics, this denial of the first three quadrants of our natural reasoning makes the ‘cash value’ perspective of our formalists excessively bureaucratic, opportunistic, collectivistic (anti-individualistic), traditionalistic,

and conservative.

To argue their case, formalists must shift the discussion away from the primary issues of reality and theory, the secondary issue of how we reason, and the tertiary issue of how we give our class meaning, so as to ensure that nothing will be discussed except the quaternary issue of our languages as preexisting traditions, which they can explore and argue with nothing more than the simplistic ex post facto descriptive reasoning they prefer. That done, they assume that the meaningfulness of any reasoning can be established merely by showing that most other of their academic or practical clique agree with their subjective opinion of it.

Our quaternary reasoning produces a final understanding that, when explicated as a construct, is what we mean by an ideology. An ideology is a set of hypotheses that s a pragmatic purpose (or ‘cash value’) that is a political, or power, end. So by ‘ideology’ we always mean a political construct, but it can be anything from a complete system by a realist that has a foundation in our prior reasoning to an incomplete knowledge system by a formalist that has no such foundation. It is the power part, the practical or political part, of any intellectual system.

In different contexts, our formalists’ concrete-conceptualism can be described as academic, nominalistic, pragmatic, linguistic, religious, bureaucratic, pluralistic, or collectivistic reasoning. But in any context they depend on deeper thinkers; mainly the tertiary reasoners who create the ideals and linguistic constructs that they reply upon.

A good example of this is Luther, the Augustinian monk, theologian, and religionist. When the classic era began in 1516, there was no German language as such; there were only disparate German dialects. Luther, who my psychologic theory shows was a pathological elitist and conservative, is credited with integrating these dialects into the modern German language, but in the process

he endowed it with his own prejudices, idealism, religionism, elitism, and maleficent political goals—which were directed broadly against the common people and particularly against all papists, revolutionists, Jews, and other ‘infidels’.

Seeing Luther’s major role in shaping the unified German language helps explain the long chain of confused German-speaking formalists throughout the classic and modern eras. Among those famous but misguided thinkers were the German Marx and the Austrian Hitler (1889-1945), who were rightist political formalists. Luther, like the Austrian Wittgenstein of the twentieth century who also put language before humanity, ired the nominalistic views of Occam, the English Franciscan theologian who fled to Munich after his excommunication and worked there for years until his death in 1349.

Religious corporations are widely accepted by the public primarily because the basic illogic of theism can be so easily disguised by a religionist’s language constructs. This gives us another, a truer, meaning to the New Testament’s claim (John 1:1), “In the beginning was the Word… and the Word was God.” How better to deny all the reasoning that we humans do before we speak, write, or read our bibles?

All religions are instances of formalism and its denial of complete reasoning. This is why they are all words and other symbols, or elaborate constructs of formal language and ritual with only one real meaning: their political goal, or ‘cash value’. History shows us that religious corporations have done nothing for humanity but bring it illusions and wars, while enriching themselves at the people’s expense in the hope of doing this to them forever. Interestingly, my study of the character of almost all the Catholic Popes in history shows that most of them were not theologians but practical politicians. And if we compare their characters to those of the famous theologians who we know were sincere, we have good reason to conclude that many of them, perhaps even most of them, weren’t even theists.

Figure 2 shows that the Cycle’s quadrants are either reductive or additive in their dynamics. This means that realists and formalists (quadrants I and IV) favor reduction and economy, while rationalists and empiricists (quadrants II and III) favor increase and expansion. This is another conflict among these four reasoning types, but it’s a matter of degree. For instance, rationalists are less wasteful than empiricists, and though realists and formalists are both economyminded, the realists oppose waste that the formalists accept without qualms— such as costly traditions, needlessly convoluted intellectual and bureaucratic constructs, and the destruction of life and our environment.

In their calls for economy, formalists often cite Occam’s razor, a maxim that was not original to him and that most editors observe anyway. It holds that we should not unnecessarily increase the number of things needed to explain something. This sounds good since superfluity hinders understanding, but they use it more often to rationalize their desire to have some necessary reasoning declared unnecessary. This ‘razor’ is like the sword that the pragmatist Alexander (356323 bce) used to chop the Gordian knot in half. Such blades, real or symbolic, are dear to the hearts of all pragmatists, who say that we must use them to economize in our reasoning, but who use them instead to chop off all of the essential basic reasoning that they prefer not to do, either because it is hard work or because it lets them propose ‘economies’ that will have the effect of denying the needs, judgments, and speech of others.

To apply our pragmatists’ notion of ‘cash value’ to their own proposals, then, we must look for the motive behind their truncated ideologies, and we find these ‘bottom-line’ motives in every case: (1) the political or material goal of denying the needs of others, and (2) the moral or intellectual goals of denying the judgments, beliefs, and free speech of others, especially entire classes of people other than their own class.

Class prejudices are inherent to all pragmatic ideologies, because in denying the three reasoning modes that precede their quaternary mode, pragmatists must also deny what makes people unique as individuals. As the cases of Luther, Marx,

and Hitler illustrate, this is the psychologic cause of all class prejudices. Formalists don’t see individuals as such, because their quaternary reasoning begins from tertiary class , and their desire to economize at others’ expense leads them to deny the needs of entire classes of people and turn a deaf ear to any judgments offered in of those needs.

People in a rush, as pragmatists always are, are quick to deny others’ needs and judgments. Formalists deny not only the deeper intellectual dilemmas that they refuse to confront, but also any moral judgments by themselves or others that obstruct achievement of their ‘bottom line’, which is always political control over others. One must deny all moral reasoning somehow before one can dare say to another person, “I can take anything that I want to take from you,” or “In these circumstances, the needs of your class are irrelevant, but the needs of my class are not.”

Formalists are men or women of action, in Dostoyevsky’s sense, and they are linguistically rather than realistically oriented. A formalist is any intellectual who denies the three prior modes of reasoning that produce our languages, and a nominalist is any formalist who studies language itself and then universalizes that quaternary study into a rationalization for those denials. So formalists are not necessarily nominalists, but they are when they make the epistemic claim that all of our reasoning is based on language or on linguistic constructs such as any sacred text, bible, or constitution. Do you love your bible or constitution? Then you are blind to the fact that it was created to rob you of your freedom and independence as an individual.

Nominalists deny that we need the ‘superfluous’ notion of a psychologic process to define our , and positively they claim that we can just skip (or bracket) that middle stage of reference and jump right to our ’ final referents in external reality. But the flaw in this argument is plain. Our linguistic process has three main stages: our words (symbols) refer back to our psychologic process (or internal reality) which can refer back to external reality. Nominalists truncate this to remove the middle step, our psychologic process, thereby denying the

internal reality (and hence the needs and judgments) of all individuals, and holding instead that all of our judgments should be guided by the established rule systems of our artificial collectives. As they see it, by a process they can’t explain, our words only refer back to external reality. This is why their constructs are nonhuman—or cold, materialistic, bureaucratic, and conservative —and why they only reason about people in intentionally unsympathetic class .

Shortly after the modern era began in 1762 most intellectuals were empiricists. Then, as the era advanced, they came to realize, belatedly, that the criticisms of empiricism by Hume could not be overcome, so they raced to embrace formalism and its pluralism. Thus the modern era gave us many negativistic constructs—such as the various forms of ‘positivism’ and pseudorealism, variants of Kantian or Hegelian idealism, nihilism, scientism, pragmatism, phenomenology, and existentialism—all of which led finally, in the midtwentieth century, to Wittgenstein’s resuscitation of Occam’s nominalism. As our academic formalists saw it, this was the coup de grace that allowed them to declare philosophy dead; a declaration that prepared the way for the modern era’s highly pragmatic, or theoryless, fourth quadrant (1972-2008).

Wittgenstein was born six days after Hitler, and they spent at least a year at the same school. Both had magnetic personalities and were considered brilliant by people who knew them, but they were also nihilists; that is, logically reversed in their judgment system and hence totally amoral and inclined to spitefully destroy things that others value. Wittgenstein was hailed as a genius by many famous intellectuals of his time, but, unlike Hitler, he was also reversed in his thought system. The thought reversal doesn’t limit intelligence, but it does invert one’s logic, and it explains why some people, even brilliant people, prefer to turn off their thought process altogether. Thus Wittgenstein—despite his fame as an academic ‘philosopher’ at the University of Cambridge where he misled and then succeeded Russell—denied philosophy and, just like Hitler in the political realm, purposefully tried to destroy its moral influence.

His chief maxim to this end concerned meaning, and it is the opposite of my view. He held that our words cannot be objectively defined, but that this doesn’t matter, since we all know how to use them in practice anyway. This is the classic embrace of ignorance by all formalists, or pragmatists, who say “Don’t ask what causes our , just use them in practice as you were taught to do.” By that maxim philosophy is indeed dead, but so too is everything that makes life tolerable for us—including the empathy and moral behavior from others that we all need and the greater understanding that alone can free us from the chains placed on us by nature and our maleficent rulers.

So it is not surprising that for many decades now our literature consists mostly of backward-looking histories and other merely descriptive, ex post facto works by uncreative academic or media formalists. This dearth of deeper thinking is why, as we say, we are going to hell in a handbasket. Our formalists insist that we shouldn’t try to understand how we reason, but should instead rely blindly on our past failures, meaning the old writings, systems, and laws that they consider ‘good enough for all practical purposes’. They tell us not to reason deeply, but to trust naïvely in the plurality of our disconnected logical, mathematical, scientific, academic, theistic, artistic, legal, governmental, economic, and other linguistic constructs—traditional constructs in which simple-minded people like them can become officially approved experts by mere memorization and literal application, which is the first purpose of the education they offer us.

Yes, they control all of our educational institutions, and their motive in this is plain; it is to make us ignorant formalists and collectivists (anti-individualists) like them. In trying to indoctrinate us, they say that we too should see people in class only and forget about reality, human nature, and the needs of all humans; that we too should deny that we are each unique and have inalienable rights, including the right to believe whatever we choose to believe; that we too should use the old texts and customs as our guide in the supposedly disparate things in our lives, without questioning how these enslave us and otherwise block our progress; that we too should give up hope for an improved world in the future; and that we too should ignore the fact that their reasoning perspective is the chief cause of the phony politics that is harming every living thing in the world.

It is our formalists (pragmatists, conservatives) who rationalize political thefts, immorality, murders, and oppression. And they do this through their ‘sacred’ texts, trite mottoes, or truncated ideologies, all of which are intellectually ed by nothing more substantial than a broad academic consensus or conspiracy.

Realism

We have played the formalists’ game for too long. It is time to see that realism is the only natural position on epistemic priority and hence on all other matters. I have defined it as an epistemic position, and later we will consider it in the metaphysical, psychologic, and political contexts, but I should make these two points about it now.

First, an ideology is a quaternary construct that is based on class and always has a political motive. Epistemically, it corresponds to the integrated understanding that we reach near the end of a consideration, just before we decide to act or not act. But it is only sound if its construction began in primary reasoning, and this means that only a realist’s ideology merits consideration. Politically speaking, our realists’ ideologies are progressive, while our formalists’ ideologies are conservative.

Second, the Cycle shows what motivates realists most. Because they begin their explicit reasoning from the complete percept (#1), they are our explorers and analysts of natural, social, political, intellectual, or psychologic events. They consider the old ideologies they were taught, but they will analyze these and deny any that conflict with what they personally will to be so in life.

To put it more fully, by definition realists have strength in their primary reasoning, so they are more aware than others are of their will, which I propose later as the first of the Cycle’s five psychologic systems and hence the source of realism. Unlike people with weaker wills, they know that their purpose as theorists is to affirm or deny events according to what they personally will to be so, on the whole. Thus, they will never embrace someone else’s false ideology. If they see basic flaws in a system, and they are best at seeing these, they will deny that system. Most of their intellectual efforts are therefore spent trying to

determine which of the formal constructs that affect their lives are the most essential and should be affirmed, and which are the most dangerous and should be denied. And if they are moral people who see that some traditional system must be denied, they may make it their goal in life to build a new system to replace it.

Natural versus Explicated Reasoning

Our symbols and language constructs benefit us in many ways, but contrary to what our formalists say, our failure to understand their psychologic origin has harmed us greatly. As we humans developed, these explicated constructs came to be seen, excessively so by those with much formal education, as more important than our natural reasoning, and as a result human society became increasingly less realistic and humanistic than it was in times that were more primitive, or less explicative.

In fact, the main reason why every ‘civilized’ society soon becomes a totalitarian one is psychologic, and basically it is that when we reason through symbols or a language construct, whether our own or one offered by others, we are detaching our reasoning from reality and our own nature. Detachment is the essence of explication. A speaker can give commands, cite rules and regulations, inspire others, lie, deceive, mislead, and even become personally alienated from his or her real self. Any form of explicated reasoning—such as jurisprudence, sculpting, graphics, music, literature, mathematics, science, technology, and so on—is artificial, not in spite of its tangible form, but because of it. So to be realistic, we must keep this distinction between our natural and explicated reasoning in our minds, and never let our preoccupation with the former, our languages, lead us to denigrate the latter, our common logic.

It follows that our states will never be humanistic or sane until their absolute ruler is our natural human logic, to which even their constitutions must be subordinated. But so long as the final authorities of our institutions are nothing but sets of empty (undefined) words—as our present constitutions, legal codes, linguistic references, encyclopedias, bibles, and other sacred texts are—we may be sure that our rulers will be quaternary reasoners, formalists or pragmatists, who are more robotic than human and so won’t hesitate to commit or tolerate

any terror they can imagine.

Chapter 3. Reality

Metaphysics

The first of all external subjects is Reality, and a metaphysics is a theory of Reality. One reference says that metaphysics is “the philosophical study whose object is to determine the real nature of things” and that, “although it has been subjected to many criticisms, it is presented by metaphysicians as the most fundamental and most comprehensive of inquiries, inasmuch as it is concerned with reality as a whole.”²

By the old description of the term, the study of first causes, any mystic or pluralist could propose a metaphysics, but our definition, a theory of Reality, lacks that vagueness because we have defined a theory and have observed that there is only one Reality that subsumes all subevents. And the Consideration Cycle tells us that a theory of that Whole must be analytic-reductive reasoning, by which we reduce it to its universal principles, the set of which is our metaphysics.

Traditionalists confuse metaphysics either with mysticism, mainly theism, or with science, mainly cosmology or physics. Logically, this is to confuse primary reasoning with its direct opposite, tertiary reasoning. But theism is not about Reality, if by this we mean an external event; its sole concern is a narrow set of internal psychologic events. And the sciences of cosmology and physics are each concerned with a narrowed set of external realities, so their principles pertain not to all events whatsoever, but only to some observable or inferable external events.

As realists, we will reject tertiary mysticism and, equally as important, we won’t confuse a primary metaphysical proposition with a tertiary proposition on cosmology or physics. Metaphysical principles are not scientific hypotheses derived from our microcosmic or macrocosmic observations; they are logical propositions derived from our reasoning about Reality before we make any

partialized observations. All scientists, like the rest of us, do some universal primary reasoning before they observe anything, but they don’t explicate it, and that omission is what a metaphysics corrects.

Except on epistemic priority, primary and tertiary reasoners are not in competition, because their opposite kinds of propositions, analytic principles and synthetic hypotheses, complement each other in our reasoning process. We can say that a scientific hypothesis is flawed when it doesn’t follow from sound universal principles, and that a primary or secondary metaphysical principle is flawed when it fails to imply substantiated hypotheses. And since sound metaphysical principles imply all language constructs, including mathematics, the only true tests of a metaphysics are that it denies all arealistic reasoning and implies or allows all proven hypotheses. But it is never proposed as a substitute for the tertiary or quaternary work of scientists.

A metaphysics is wholistic, but a science is partialistic, which is why scientific languages are logically disconnected. This poses a communication problem for us here, since traditionalist readers, whether specialists or not, will take the key of our metaphysics to mean only what they are said to mean by the academics who claim responsibility for the separate sciences involved. But a theory of Reality cannot be expressed in their partialistic , so I say again that to understand Reality and its parts in spite of all our academic specialties, we need a generic natural language, one that has priority over all synthetic terminologies.

So our goal here is not to develop competence in any of our specialists’ languages, but rather to correct the incompleteness of their class-based, tertiary reasoning so that we can draw valid quaternary (practical) conclusions from it. What we wish to express is an all-subsuming theory of Reality that, while it is not incompatible with any proven scientific facts, allows us to derive our first structurally complete explanation of human reasoning. Though this standard of reasoning is derived from our metaphysics, it is itself a tertiary hypothesis limited to the class of all humans, or in its elemental dynamics to the class of all

living things on earth. Still, any standard so derived will define the one logic that rules all of our synthetic constructs, including our sciences, languages, ideologies, and political structures.

A metaphysics is not disproven just because scientists disagree with it, and anyone who tries to judge it by their incomplete standards are making the mistake of seeing that theory as just another partialized scientific construct, which it is not. A theory’s first test is the internal consistency of its principles; after that, the only true test of a metaphysical theory is a plurality of tests; namely, whether it implies every sound hypothesis and practical construct we know.

In this work, that second test will be whether or not our metaphysics correctly explains how all humans reason, and hence how our psychologic perspectives and dispositions differ. But then others must also test it by how well it implies the synthetic constructs that I know little about or don’t consider here. For instance, for our purposes we must ignore the view of cosmologists that some 95% of ‘the universe’ consists of invisible dark matter and energy, at least until they can prove how these affect the 5% of normal matter. We can only propose an understanding of that which we know for certain does affect us, and if vague hypotheses on the visible effects of invisible causes are later proven, we can revise our metaphysics to suit these new facts.

Also, if some scientists think that one of the metaphysical principles below conflicts with the findings of their science, they should first ask if this is just a linguistic problem, for it can always be restated in narrower to fit their specialty’s hypotheses. For example, when our fifth metaphysical principle, correspondence, is restated in the narrower class of physics, it yields Einstein’s less universal proposition (which he mistakenly called an ‘axiom’) that “the laws of physics are the same in any inertial frame of reference.”

The only genuine theory is a metaphysics, and since all scientists, whether they

know it or not, derive their tertiary hypotheses from just such a theory, they shouldn’t dismiss any natural-language attempt to state Reality’s universal principles. Instead, they should first try to explicate, in a generic (nontechnical) language they wouldn’t use at work, those absolute principles of the whole Reality that they can accept as valid. If they tried this, they would soon see that the dilemmas we are trying to solve here with our metaphysics are broader and more fundamental than those of any science.

Reality defines the natural Law of all subcontexts, so it defines their common logic before we give each one its own relative (contingent, internal) logic with our descriptive and language rules. But to understand the Reality, we must first conceive and state its universal principles, which compose the theory on which our common logic and the generic language it implies are based. And the Consideration Cycle’s parts suggest that we need only five universal principles as the fundamental divisions of our theory.

So, as an overview before we consider each one in turn, here are my five metaphysical principles, in the sequence that the Cycle dictates as their natural and necessary (logical) relation. I have given each one a generic name to guide others in creating a theory for other contexts. You will see as we discuss each principle that it follows with more certainty than the one before it, which implies it. But this doesn’t mean, as some might assume, that the first principle is an unproven axiom. On the contrary, it is proven by the fact that we humans cannot do or say anything except through this common perception of the Whole of Everything, and by the fact that no matter how one might express a denial of that perception, it is presupposed in that proposition anyway.

Occurrence: Reality is the whole event.

Abstraction: Any subevent of Reality is a motion system.

Dimensionality: Any motion system consists of particles in helical motion.

Displacement: Any motion system shall be displaced.

Correspondence: Motion systems correspond in their dimensionality.

1. The Principle of Occurrence

Our first metaphysical principle is the simple boundary proposition that Reality is the whole event. We can assert this with confidence because we are introspectively aware that no reasoning arises within us without a context—a source assumption of wholeness and reality, or event occurrence—and that we all deduce from this that there is one real event that subsumes every other real event. So by ‘Reality’ we mean the Whole of Everything, of which nothing further can be said. It is what it is, the ultimate tautology on which all possible human reasoning, logic, and activity is based. But everything else that exists is a lesser event internal to Reality, a subevent, and every subevent differs from the Whole in that it is more than what it is in itself. We cannot say of any subevent that it is what it is, because it exists in some relation to every other subevent in Reality.

The failure to define this relation through a sound theory led some idealists, such as Berkeley (1685-1753) with his ‘idea in the mind of God’ and Hegel (17701831) with his ‘Absolute Idea’, to conclude that everything is only an idea. But this idealistic notion psychologizes (or personifies) Reality, which is the device by which mystics transform primary reasoning into tertiary reasoning, and then argue that what they don’t know, Reality, is like what they do know, people.

Since Reality is the cause of all that was, is, or will be, it is the limit of fundamentality in our reasoning. At this ultimate level, we encounter no dilemma, because what is, is, and we must accept it. If we even think that we could go farther than this, that there lies ‘beyond’ this Whole a cause of Everything, or a creator, then we are committing a logical blunder, or violating our context and universal Law. As the ultimate cause of everything, Reality itself cannot have a cause.

Others have put this universal insight differently. For instance, the famous Hindu guru Amma (or Ammachi) is realistic enough to have said (according to Wikipedia) what we all know fundamentally:

There is one truth that shines through all of creation. Rivers and mountains, plants and animals, the sun, the moon and the stars, you and I—all are expressions of this one Reality.

The traditional debate over our first principle, that there is one and only one Reality, is between absolutists and relativists. They are our two kinds of perceptualists: the realists who perceive a monistic absolute and the empiricists who deny that whole and perceive only its parts. Dualisms arise in our secondary reasoning and are given tangible form through our tertiary and quaternary reasoning, so while rationalists and formalists empiricists in dividing Reality into parts, it is the empiricists who offer the arguments for relativism, and the chief views that oppose our first principle are those of monotheists and relativistic scientists.

I defined idealism earlier as a fallacy of tertiary reasoning resulting from the prior denial of Reality or other whole contexts, and this denial is the essence of any form of relativism. Our tertiary reasoners begin reasoning not from the whole, but from their arbitrary selection of certain parts of that whole, which they then generalize to yield ideals, or Alls, that they name with class . They conceive any such All, or ideal, as a static state of being, which they then offer in opposition to the real and whole event proposed by realists. Then they believe in this ersatz whole and treat this belief thereafter as if it was the same as a primary affirmation of a real and whole event. This is all that any ideal is: a static ersatz reality, or fiction, that arealists need in their synthetic reasoning so that they can pretend to be reasoning as realists do.

For instance, monotheists believe in one god, but they believe in two realities. They are plainly not considering the Reality when they hypothesize a second

kind of ‘reality’ that is the home of a fictional deity that created the partial world they call ‘the universe’. Our physicists and cosmologists also do not consider Reality when they hypothesize about the nature or form of what they too call ‘the universe’.

The point is that their term ‘the universe’ refers to a belief, not to an affirmed real and whole event. It seems to be a proper noun, like the complete-percept ‘the Reality’ or ‘the Whole Event’, but it is born as a class term, so it is an All, or ideal, posing as a Whole. Realists and idealists are not referring to the same epistemic idea with these different nouns. What monotheists and physicists mean by ‘the universe’ is not an event, it is a being; that is, a class notion derived from their division of the Whole Event into whatever parts they selected to form their incomplete, or relative, ‘universe’.

Monotheists divide the Whole Event by juxtaposing the Reality we all perceive, which they call ‘the universe’, and an idealized realm that they call ‘heaven’, conceived as the place (which can only mean the space) where their idealized Supreme Being ‘resides’. They thus propose two realities with distinct sets of laws, natural Laws and divine laws, and they use ‘the universe’ to avoid saying ‘the Reality’, a term that doesn’t permit either the multiplication of realities or the possibility of a temporal Whole that can be created or destroyed.

Scientists also use ‘the universe’ to divide Reality into parts. What physicists mean by it is some All that excludes many external events and all psychologic events, which are as real as any external event. And the physicists who speak of ‘parallel universes’ or ‘multiple universes’ obviously don’t mean by ‘universe’ the Whole of Everything. Also, given their traditional misunderstanding of time, which I explain below, they imagine their ‘universe’ as existing in the present only, with its past gone and its future not yet here. But in Reality the past, present, and future are just different spaces of the Whole Event, or where within the Space a moving subevent was, is, or will be, as seen from its own relative position in the Space. In other words, we brought time into existence; Reality didn’t do it. Nevertheless, many physicists contradict this fact by assuming that

their ‘universe’ had a beginning in time—which can only be the case if what they mean by ‘the universe’ is just a part of the Whole of Everything.

We must beware the idealistic zeal that leads tertiary reasoners to universalize their partial perceptions and arbitrary selections of parts. They derived their ‘universe’ not from their true initial perception of the Whole Event, but from the synthesis of some parts that they selected to form a mystical or scientific area of study. This pluralistic source allows mystics to form weird worlds and theists to form multiple realities and supreme beings, just as it allows scientists to propose a relative ‘universe’ that doesn’t include all events.

“Time is relative,” our relativistic physicists say, following philosophic thinkers from ancient times to Hume and Kant in the first quadrant of the modern era, and we must agree with them on this. But if time is relative, then it cannot be predicated of Reality, and this means that the Absolute Whole cannot be said to have a beginning or an end, or a ‘time’ of its own. The tertiary scientists who hypothesize an absolute beginning of ‘the universe’ are thus committing the same logical error as our tertiary monotheists, who attribute a time to their ‘universe’ so that they can say that it has an omnipotent Creator and potential Destroyer.

Consider the claim of many cosmologists today, which the Vatican found acceptable, that there was a ‘Big Bang’ that began ‘Everything’. They see that all the cosmic parts they can perceive by technological means are moving away from each other. But this evidence for expansion can be veridic without being complete; that is, it may pertain only to a limited universe, not to the Reality. To claim otherwise they must also show that those expanding parts do compose the Whole Event, but since they can’t prove this, some of them propose that everything was created from nothing.

Maybe Reality was once just the size of a pearl, as some cosmologists who wish to avoid the absurdity of ‘something from nothing’ say, but even so it was still

the Whole of Everything, still eternal (timeless), and still a three-dimensional continuum. Size means nothing in metaphysical reasoning, because measurement is a tertiary reasoning process, not a primary one. If the Reality was once that small, it may have been larger before it reduced itself, so there is no necessary reason why that size was its beginning. It is more logical to propose a pulsating Reality than it is to attribute relative time to the Absolute Whole and say that something was created from nothing. If the ‘Big Bang’ hypothesis is proposed as a beginning of Everything, it is absurd. Otherwise, it is just a comment on size and motion from our relative position in the Space which can be useful to scientists as that, and as such it has no metaphysical meaning at all.

This wholistic view, that Reality always was and always will be, is not a new proposition; if it was, I couldn’t claim that it was a natural perception of all humans. Several pre-Platonic intellectuals of various cultures, disputing the idealists (relativists) of their day, proposed the timelessness of the absolute Whole, saying explicitly that it was not created and will never end. In fact, this was the general assumption in ancient Greece, and it explains why its theists were polytheists who, unlike the monotheists with their ‘heaven’, could say, “The gods live over there, on Mount Olympus.”

Thus, the most basic distinction among the forms of theism is whether a theist says that time is absolute or relative. This divides theism into two main branches: external theism, which holds that time is absolute and does apply to the Reality; and internal theism, which holds that time is relative and cannot apply to the Reality.

External theism, which we must reject for this old error on time, is monotheistic, but only because its ers cannot easily defend the claim that a Committee of Divine Creators agreed to make Reality exactly what it is; that is, their personification of Reality would logically require human-like conflicts among them. But internal theism, or pantheism, proposes no external cause, so we can’t reject it for an erroneous notion of time. It can be monotheistic or polytheistic,

depending on whether it proposes one or more natural Laws. Spinoza (1632-77), for instance, opposed Descartes’ dualisms by proposing only one such Law, or one deified substance within the Whole.

It is surprising, and to a degree conspiratorial, that all educated people today accept the claim of our relativistic physicists that Newton was in error for assuming that time is absolute, while so few of them will mention that monotheism makes this same error. If Newtonian physics is wrong on that point, then so is monotheism.

Augustine (354-430) dealt with the dilemma of time by holding that the issue is, so to speak, academic. He said that time couldn’t even have existed before his God created ‘the universe’, which merely states the relativity of time in different words. So he knew that time is relative, as earlier thinkers known to him did, but he ignored the fact that therefore there couldn’t have been a creative act that began Everything in time.

A creative act is always an event in time, so the term creation, like the term time, has no absolute sense. Everything that can be created or destroyed is relative, or a subevent of the Whole Event. To be consistent, which he often wasn’t, what Augustine should have concluded from the relativity of time is not an external Creator, but internal theism, such as the polytheism of ancient Greece or the pantheism proposed in India. The latter has the only valid conception of a deity, which is as something that pervades Reality internally and absolutely. But this is redundant, for anything it could mean is already implied by our nontheistic notion of universal principles, or the Laws of Reality, and no proof of it is possible that isn’t also a proof of those spatial Laws. I suspect that the realist Spinoza understood this, though in his time he would have been executed for saying it directly.

Kant regarded this dispute, whether Everything is eternal or was created, as an antinomy, meaning that both of its contradictory sides can be validly argued.

Though his argument on each side was later shown to be flawed, his seeing this as an antinomy correctly suggests the psychologic nature of this dispute. To put it in our : realists will never reason from the parts first, and arealists refuse to reason from the whole first because this contradicts their dualistic or pluralistic premise.

These views on time by Augustine and Kant were discussed by the cosmologist Stephen W. Hawking (b.1942) in his interesting book A Brief History of Time: From the Big Bang to Black Holes (New York: Bantam Books, 1988). As for his own view of time, his words show the confusion that results from thinking of this metaphysical issue as a tertiary physicist rather than as a primary reasoner. On page 46 he says:

if, as is the case, we know only what has happened since the big bang, we could not determine what happened beforehand. As far as we are concerned, events before the big bang can have no consequences, so they should not form part of a scientific model of the universe. We should therefore cut them out of the model and say that time had a beginning at the big bang.

This is the same as saying that with their big bang hypothesis physicists are referring to a partial ‘universe’ and not to the Whole of Everything—which, whether they like it or not, includes everything that existed before that event. The big bang hypothesis is useful in their work, but, even though they offer it as such, it isn’t a metaphysical proposal. Sensing this, Hawking saw the need here to say “As far as we are concerned… ,” which is also to say that he is not discussing metaphysics, or Reality.

Reality is singular and its Laws are plural, so we must be primary monists before we dissect Reality to see its natural Laws, deduce its parts, and reason about some of these as tertiary relativists. Only absurd conclusions follow from the claim that Reality is pluralistic and temporal rather than monistic and timeless. But tertiary reasoners make that claim because they can only see the Whole as an

All, or as the sum of a set of parts, and that’s why they believe that what is plainly absolute is relative instead.

I refer to this widely accepted tertiary proposition as absolute relativism. This is a self-contradictory term, but it follows from the total skepticism of Hume, who perhaps did more than any other intellectual to define the modern era (17622008). Hume proclaimed, to the applause of all doubters, that we humans delude ourselves if we think that we can know anything for certain. We think only what it arbitrarily pleases us to think, he said, and no more than that, and since nothing is absolutely certain, it follows that everything is relative.

This is the motto of all skeptics, including our relativistic physicists, some of whom (Einstein, for one) itted their debt to Hume. But if everything is relative, then this absolute proposition is itself false, which in turn means that an intellectual’s first task is not to deny absoluteness, it is to discover just what is absolute. We must doubt the soundness of any science that starts from the absurd contention that everything is relative, or that if something is absolute then we scientists have no idea what it is. Actually, all scientists do have a veridic epistemic idea of the Whole of Everything, for otherwise they couldn’t reason or speak intelligibly. The problem is that most of them are tertiary reasoners, hypothesists or believers, who, because they ignore theory (analytic reasoning), don’t see the hidden assumptions in their reasoning and so get lost in their own or others’ often-wild synthetic speculations.

Relativistic physicists of the modern era criticized Newtonian physics for assuming that time and space are absolutes. Then, guided by several philosophic intellectuals before them, they showed us once again, this time in their specialist language, that time is relative. But they erred by saying that this also proved what it doesn’t prove: that space is relative too.

In other words, they failed to notice that while generic ‘time’ has only a relative sense, resulting from the plurality and motion of Reality’s parts, generic ‘space’

is an ambiguous term with both a relative and an absolute sense. Time is linear, so we can only extend or reduce it quantitatively in its one dimension, but space is three-dimensional, so whenever we extend or reduce our view of it, we perceive a hierarchy of subsumed spaces, one of which is the greatest space. Their error was in failing to distinguish a space from the Space. Obviously any space but the ultimate subsuming Space is relative, but this doesn’t mean that there is no absolute Space. Their proof that a space is relative was as plain to us all as their proof that a time is relative, but it is irrelevant to the issue of generic space because, in the whole spatial hierarchy, relative spaces can’t exist unless there is an absolute Space that subsumes them all.

The proper nouns ‘the Space’ and ‘the Reality’ are equivalent ; their context-referents differ but they have the same idea-referent, the complete percept (#1). But there is no equivalent proper noun, ‘the Time’, because time is an abstract-concept term, or defining essence, not a complete-percept term, or event. And if we later derive a complete-percept term from any concept term, whether it is abstract or concrete, we are speaking of an ersatz whole, a fiction that only exists in our explicated reasoning. ‘The Space’ refers to a real external event, but ‘the Time’ does not. Our term ‘time’ presupposes both a subevent (or lesser space) and its relativity to all other subevents (or spaces), but this is not so with our generic term ‘space’, which requires us to specify just which space we mean. And if we mean the all-subsuming Space, then that is certainly absolute.

Also, if the Space was not absolute, physicists could not validly propose any absolute constant. This raises a question they need to answer. Do they hold that, say, the speed of light or the Planck constant are absolute constants or universal constants? If nothing is absolute, then there can’t be an absolute constant, but there could be a universal constant that applies in some space, or ‘universe’, that is only a part of the Whole. Since it is contradictory for relativists to claim that there are absolute constants, they speak of ‘universal’ constants instead. Relativistic physicists and mystics use the term ‘universe’ to make us think they are proposing a metaphysical (or absolute) truth, but in fact it is only a partial truth or they don’t know whether it is absolute or partial.

Those who claim that ‘everything is relative’ or that ‘theory is irrelevant’ are just trying to claim that there are no absolute Laws that bind them. Only realists consistently deny absolute relativism and respect the logical boundary of the Reality we all know. And the purpose of our first metaphysical principle, Reality is the whole event, is to state this boundary to all of our reasoning at the start, since everything else, including our common logic, depends on it.

Realists respect this primary boundary, first by denying that there can be anything beyond it, and then by denying any mystical or scientific universalization of its parts. Moreover, it is the paradigm for all of their other reasoning, since it tells them to begin reasoning in every lesser case only from the real and whole event that they have initially selected as their context of reference.

The Epistemic Refutation of Monotheism

What has been said so far contains the first epistemic refutation of monotheism and all other forms of mysticism by tertiary reasoners who propose multiple realities. Historically, with nothing but empiricism or rationalism to guide us, we didn’t know our epistemic process well enough to know for certain that any such proposal is illogical. But we now know that we cannot derive any notion of a nonspatial reality in our primary reasoning, even though this is the only part of our psychologic process in which we can consider what is real or whole.

This means that monotheists and other mystics never propose a metaphysics, or theory of Reality. Instead, they reason this way. First, in their primary reasoning they perceive the whole Reality (or the Space) just as we all do; then in their secondary reasoning they divide this into parts. But in their tertiary reasoning, they use some of those parts to hypothesize a fiction, or ideal, that pleases them, and they give this a class name. They then reify that ideal, or All, in their quaternary reasoning by transforming that class noun into a proper noun, such as Time, Heaven, Mind, God, Idea, Soul, Psyche, or Spirit. Then they use this proper noun as the whole context of some of their reconsiderations, and pretend not to notice that this new proper noun does not refer to a real event, but to a previously derived fictional ideal.

These monotheistic mystics deny our one Reality, but initially they must affirm it, as we all do, because otherwise they could not dissect it into parts. Here’s their root contradiction: to say that there are two kinds of reality, such as heaven and earth, denies that there is only one kind of reality, but we can’t say that there are two things of any kind unless we have first affirmed, either explicitly or by assumption, that there is a single whole that subsumes them both. In other words, we can only derive the number two from the number one, so their claim that the Whole of Everything consists of both a ‘heaven’ and the spatial world we all know presupposes that one Reality, which cannot itself be of two kinds. It can

consist of two or more parts, but in itself it is what it is, and that is the Whole. This contradiction is one between their natural reasoning, “There is only one Reality,” and their explicated reasoning, “And now we can divide it into parts.”

A monotheist may reply by saying, “I do start with only one reality, and it is god; then I divide his, her, or its reality into two worlds: heaven and our spatial universe.” The flaw in this, though, is that the term ‘god’ doesn’t refer to a cognition of the Whole, for we can only perceive the Whole of Everything as the greatest possible space. And this tells us that a monotheist’s god is not direct epistemic knowledge; it is an imitation of that, or explicated learning. We all perceive the spatial Whole early in life, but we only learn of ‘god’ afterwards, from the fictional and ever-unprovable stories told to us by our elders. Thus, monotheists cannot have known of a single whole called ‘god’ first, or at the start, because that ‘god’ is just a learned explication, or something that was added to their natural, or common sense, perceptions.

The third quadrant of our reasoning is the realm of synthesis and make-believe; of everything from children’s games and fictional art to the speculative hypotheses of mystics or scientists. Our tertiary mystics know, as we all do, that there is only one Reality and that it is spatial, but they deny this truth later when they create (synthesize) an ideal in their minds and then reconsider this hypothetical thing as if it was a real and whole event. And that fiction, like any fiction, can only be formed in their tertiary reasoning, which is not the primary reasoning from which all of our knowledge begins.

Mystical reasoning is born with people’s tertiary ions, which we will see later always pertain to selected parts and not to wholes. Monotheists choose to love certain fictions they have imagined—such as life after death, a benevolent god, or the ultimate defeat of evil—and to hate the Reality that denies these fictions, and each such ionate choice causes them to synthesize a fictional All, or hypothetical state of beingness, that they can consider real in their reconsiderations. This epistemic error is the source of all pseudometaphysical or mystical hypotheses and of many failed scientific hypotheses too. Therefore, the

burden lies with our mystics and our scientists to prove, by epistemic argument, that in their reasoning they can achieve these fictions by which they deny the one spatial Reality without assuming that Reality at the start. And I can assure you, as certainly as two must follow one, that they can never do that.

I should add that the best defense of theism I have ever read was in a letter by the pathological conservative Luther to the pathological liberal-conservative Erasmus, both of whom had the total illogic in their will system (or primary reasoning) that my psychologic theory shows is common in theologians and other sincere theists. Here Luther itted that he has no objective grounds whatsoever for believing in his deity, that this belief is based solely on his ions, and that it is these feelings alone that justify theism for him.

In this, at least, he spoke honestly. To put it in my , there is no universally logical argument in defense of theism, but there is this reasonable argument for it that can be offered by people whose will, or primary reasoning, is impaired. It is reasonable, and so it can be tolerated by the rest us if it doesn’t harm us, for two reasons: first, because those who deny the whole Reality in their primary reasoning can’t believe or have faith in anything except a fiction that their ions have caused them to create or adopt in their tertiary reasoning and, second, because both the primary reasoning impairment that causes that denial and a strong ionate nature that inclines them to tertiary, or synthetic, reasoning are just accidents of birth.

Though we can’t punish theists, mystics, or anyone else for being born sick, we must prevent them from harming others. A major step to this end was achieved at the time of the American Revolution, when progressive thinkers rightly proposed the absolute separation of church and state. But our confused theists, as they are still doing today, immediately started working to abolish this wise moral restriction on their right to impose their psychologic problems on the rest of us.

2. The Principle of Abstraction

All that we can predicate of Reality itself is that it is a Whole, that it is what it is, and that it always was and always will be. And we perceive its wholeness and timelessness even though we cannot cognize these remote attributes with any of our five senses. To reason further, then, our second metaphysical principle must be one that pertains, not to that Whole, but to the things contained within it, or to every subevent.

Reality is not the first context we consciously consider in our life, so we don’t reflect on it as if we were in a primitive state in which we have no prior knowledge of other contexts. In fact, we use our entire psychologic process when we consider any event completely. We cognize space as a percept, either the complete percept or the partial percept, and time as a concept, either one specific time (now) or all such times (forever), and our intermediate ideas mix these cardinal ideas. Thus we cannot perceive a whole without subsequently perceiving its parts, we cannot conceive a particular time without subsequently conceiving all time, and the combination of these forms of space and time gives us our cognition of motion, or process.

So the next logical step in our analytic reasoning is to assert that there are many spaces within the absolute Space. But we can only distinguish these lesser spaces from the Whole because they consist of particles, all of which are in motion, so I refer to these subevents as ‘motion systems’. This gives us our second metaphysical principle, the principle of abstraction: Any subevent of Reality is a motion system.

This second principle is simply stated, but it implies these fundamental proposals: that there are events subsumed by Reality; that they must all observe

the Laws of that timeless Reality; and that the most fundamental of these Laws for subevents can only be the dynamic Laws of motion, or of process rather than of static beingness.

Note that our first two principles resolve the ancient dispute of change versus permanence, simply by uniting these logically (sequentially) in the same theory. This dispute only arises among us because of the whole-part ambiguity between the Space and a space. All things within Reality are in flux, but reasoning more deeply, we see that nevertheless the Whole Event is permanent, timeless, and changeless. It is thus not an ‘event’ in the same sense that a subevent is. It is only an ‘event’ in what we might call the ‘psychologic’ sense, meaning a whole with internal moving parts. But any relative motion system, such as a person, is an ‘event’ in the common sense of this term, since it has moving internal parts and it moves as a whole in its subsuming space.

3. The Principle of Dimensionality

We can only advance our metaphysical reasoning now by predicating something of motion itself. We concluded that all subevents are moving, but now we need to know how they move, or what the essential elements of any motion system are. So we are now considering the universal term ‘space’ not as the Space but as any space, and we realize that any space is limited in its expanse, and that its extension is uniquely defined only by the things that move within it.

But what are those things? If the context of our metaphysical reasoning is a timeless, immovable, and indestructible Whole, and if it has moving parts, then either some of those parts are also eternal and indestructible, or else the Whole would have long ago or will eventually become a void, a completely empty Space.

We saw above that in our metaphysics we have no choice on the primary issue of whether or not to affirm a single Reality, or Whole, but on this secondary issue of its subevents we do have a choice. We must either affirm (1) that the Whole Space that we perceive will ultimately become void of all its subevents, or (2) that all the relative and temporal parts of the Whole must ultimately consist of timeless indestructible particles in motion, which I call ‘ultiparticles’ for short. So long as the second option is not conclusively disproven, I can see no logical argument for affirming the first option. But since Reality has made us want to preserve our lives and our world, there are two reasons why we should affirm the second option. These are that in any case we must deal with Reality as it is in our time, and that, as the Consideration Cycle confirms, we can’t succeed in this if we don’t have positive hopes for the future.

As its historical persistence testifies, this notion of indivisible ultimate particles

is a product of our natural reasoning, or common logic, and all who write about metaphysics have reached this conclusion, however they might describe it. But the tangible proof of this secondary choice is another matter. Whether there are indestructible particles or not, how many kinds there are or what they are like are not analytic matters of reason; they are synthetic matters of observation and speculation, and hence something we must let our tertiary physicists determine. But until their work disproves it beyond all doubt or speculation, our reason compels us to make the positive choice: that Reality contains timeless, indestructible, and indivisible ultiparticles in perpetual motion.

This choice establishes the two limits of our metaphysical reasoning, the greatest and the least, and now we must explain all the temporal motion systems that lie hierarchically between those limits, which can only be complexes of ultiparticles and the spaces they define. We must also propose the universal structure of their motion, the essence of which is its dimensionality. Hence our third principle: Any motion system consists of particles in helical motion.

An analytic principle must be universal to all parts of its context. Well, we know that everything in our galaxy moves helically, or in a three-dimensional spiral direction, so there is reason to propose helical motion as universal; at least until cosmologists find a contrary case, which for all I know might have happened already. This would alter our metaphysics to be sure, but so long as all things move helically in our galactic system, our psychologic theory, which is based on helical motion, will not be altered.

Figure 5 below diagrams helical motion in general. It is defined by two spinning motions, which are in turn defined by three analytic points, which we will distinguish as a particle, a center, and an origin (or P, C, and O). So, to see a helical motion system analytically—which is not to say geometrically, since quaternary mathematics plays no part in primary metaphysics—we must identify its three reference points. There is the object particle P that spins about a center C, which spins about that system’s final reference point, an origin O that we imagine as stationary. If we considered only P’s motion around C, then that

motion would be circular, not helical, and we deny that possibility because in a three-dimensional continuum, two-dimensional motion is impossible.

For the purpose of analysis, we must imagine the origin of this motion system as stationary, for otherwise our reasoning would shift from the whole event that we selected as our context to the motion system that subsumes it, where our static origin O becomes the higher system’s moving center C, and so on. That is, we pretend that a motion system is a whole, or an inertial frame of reference, in imitation of the absolute Whole that cannot move because there is no space beyond it.

This defines helical motion generically. Any motion system’s final point is the origin O, and its reference plane (which in three dimensions is twisted and not flat) is the one determined by the revolving axis that connects P and C. To avoid psychologic issues beyond our purpose here, we will ignore P’s motion in the third dimension.

An actual motion system that corresponds to Figure 5 is your system, in which P is you, the object of the system, C is the center of the earth about which you rotate, and O is the center of the sun about which you spiral continuously. This structure applies to everything on earth, so we will refer to it as the terrestrial system. Its proximate subsuming system, also shared by everything on earth, is the earth-sun system, where P is the earth’s center and the reference plane is the ecliptic plane, defined by the revolution of the earth’s center P about the center of the sun C. This higher system’s final reference point O is the galactic center, about which the sun revolves.

A proposition on the structure of any motion system is a dimensionality principle because it must be based on our definition of a dimension and our claim as to how many dimensions that structure has. By dimension we mean an imaginary and exclusive directional axis in space that es through a specified reference point. In this context ‘exclusive’ means an axis that is unique in its spatial direction, which is true of only three of the innumerable axes we can imagine as ing through a point.

We can now propose, as a corollary of our third metaphysical principle, the common-sense view that any motion system is three-dimensional. This places yet another border (or limit) on human reasoning, for it requires us to deny that any event, whether external or internal to us, can have either less than or more than three dimensions. And since no one seriously proposes less than three dimensions—except perhaps modern psychologists who regard internal events as linear, or moving through time only—what this corollary denies is both the ancient assumption that time is a fourth dimension and the claim of today’s superstring physicists that there are ten or even more dimensions.²¹

Traditional Confusions

To see why we must deny those claims, we must correct some errors in our traditional view of dimensionality. Few of us know much about the science of physics, but since all humans reason with the same dynamic logic, we can all judge fundamental reasoning, even in technical specialties and especially when the issue involves analytic theory. But we must accept our specialists’ views on synthetic issues, so here we will accept our physicists’ claim that they need more than three measurements in their microcosmic explorations.

This doesn’t surprise us, because we know that we need a fourth measurement to relate two three-dimensional motion systems or to analyze one such system at different static points in its path of motion. But the fact that physicists need more than three measurements to relate a microcosmic motion system to the higher level of our terrestrial motion system doesn’t mean that these additional measurements are dimensions. This assumption is what has led people to think that time is a fourth dimension. That is, the act of relating two motion systems to each other or two points within one system does nothing to define a motion system itself. Our disagreement here is over how we define a dimension, for though I have given our natural understanding of it above, our physicists’ quaternary explications (in mathematics, for instance) yield other definitions that they sometimes use instead of the common one that the rest of us use.

But even if we deny those other senses of dimensionality, we have been deeply confused about this issue since ancient times; mainly because of three old errors. The first is the confusion of a measurement with a dimension, the second is the illusion that time is something distinct from space, and together these yield the third error: the universalization that there are more than three dimensions in reality.

Extra

Dimensions. Let us start with the third one, the composite error of assuming four or more dimensions. Imagine, as one example, that our physicists could sit in the ultimate microcosmic space where ultiparticles move and make all of their measurements of that space from there. They would find, as we all do in our terrestrial motion system, that three measurements suffice to define their current space, or motion system. They wouldn’t need a fourth measurement until they wanted to relate their tiny motion system to another one, either a sibling system or the parent spatial system that subsumes all the tiny ones like theirs. But then they would also need a fifth measurement to relate their system to the one that subsumes the one that subsumes theirs, then a sixth, and so on, until their measurements from that tiniest level reach the terrestrial and earth-sun levels that yield our common time standards (days and years), or even beyond these.

But however many such measurements they make, this has nothing to do with the dimensionality of any motion system. All that this synthetic measuring exercise across different levels of reference tells us is that there is a Whole Event with a vast hierarchic chain of moving subevents, but we already knew that from the primary reasoning of our common logic. The only new knowledge that these measurements give us pertains to our perception of discrete events from our own relative and changing positions in Reality. This is important because, since any subevent of Reality is more than what it is in itself, we can’t define it unless we explain its relations to the Whole Event and to all of its subevents. But to relate a plurality of motion systems through measurements is not to define the dimensional structure of any one of them. That structure is inherent to any space per se, and our relational reasoning is a subsequent process that presupposes such universal spaces and their hierarchic structure as motion systems. Such relating, and relativism in general, is only about our perception of two or more subevents; it is not about the universal attributes of any space, such as its dimensionality.

Our analytic reasoning about any space shows us that it is a three-dimensional continuum, and that this is also the case with a particular space, all particular spaces, and the Space, or the Whole Event. And no observational complexities that we encounter in our synthetic technical efforts to measure and compare

arbitrarily selected motion systems can change this fact about dimensions. But now let us consider the two basic errors that make this composite error seem valid to most people.

Measurement. The first is the confusion of a measurement with a dimension. We measure things to meet our practical needs, so it was our tertiary hypothesists and quaternary pragmatists who taught us the many forms of measurement, equivalent for which are judgment, evaluation, relation, and comparison.

Some ancient measurements were sophisticated. For instance, we know from the Great Pyramid of Khufu (c.2680 bce) that the Egyptians had correctly calculated the circumference of the Earth and its distance from the sun, and this knowledge was probably available to the ancient Greeks in Alexandria—one of whom, Pythagoras, was credited by Copernicus for having first proposed that the earth and planets revolve about the sun. Today most of us know the Cartesian coordinate system of the classic era, which has the mutually perpendicular x, y, and z axes that are used in geometry. But Descartes’ coordinate system isn’t the cause of the confusion; it is caused by those who erroneously try to employ this measurement system in their analytic theorizing, where dimensions are allimportant and measurements are irrelevant.

When we reason analytically (universally) about any space, we know that its size is indefinite; this is so because measurements only arise in our tertiary reasoning, when we consider and evaluate a particular space as a part of our whole context. We also know from our new epistemology that ‘dimension’ is a universal term, born at the juncture of our primary and secondary reasoning. It is our abstractconcept term for our analytic reduction of any space to its defining essence, its dimensionality, which consists of three such dimensional axes, or six exclusive directions from any point in that space.

But we reach this universal conception without any measurements. In our analytic reasoning, we don’t think about measurement coordinates, but only about directions in space, exclusive or combined, and we call the exclusive axes ‘dimensions’. So, in speaking generically (analytically) of the dimensions of any space, we don’t mean the axes of some artificial coordinate system that we devised in order to measure particular spaces. The Cartesian coordinate system is

useful in tertiary reasoning because it imitates secondary dimensionality, or describes it hypothetically, but this doesn’t mean that it can be validly used to define dimensionality. Dimensionality is an abstract term (#2) and measurement is a concrete term (#4), and we have already seen that no consequent cognition in the Consideration Cycle can be validly used to define (that is, to show the cause of) an antecedent cognition.

In our natural reasoning, the term ‘dimension’ does not refer to the x, y, and z axes of our explicated reasoning, or the Cartesian coordinate system, for there are no straight lines in Reality. It refers to our natural reasoning; that is, to the three perpendicular, mutually exclusive curved axes though any reference point.

So, contrary to what our dictionaries tell us, the root sense of our universal term dimension is its analytic theoretical sense, not its synthetically derived mathematical sense. It is not a mathematical term, for it doesn’t mean a measurement, it means what is being measured, or what is real about any space we consider that allows us to evaluate its extension quantitatively. The ideareferent of our term ‘dimension’ is the essence of the Space that makes possible six and only six exclusive (uncombined) directional extensions from any point in any space. Any other sense or use of the term is imitative and relative, or synthetically derived, and hence potentially confusing.²²

To eliminate this ambiguity, we must use ‘dimension’ only to mean the three naturally curved lines that define the six exclusive directions from any point in any space. Otherwise, if we mean an artificial straight line, only the term ‘axis’ is correct. Of course, we can also use these curved coordinates of a real motion system for practical measurements, as we have been doing for millennia in measuring celestial events from the earth.

The broader distinction here is that our analytic reasoning is always universal and never relative, while our synthetic reasoning (including all science and mathematics) is always relative and never universal. In fact, relativism is

measurement, or the comparative evaluation of some spatial relation. Measurements are useful in practice, but they are artificial, or just instances of explicated reasoning in mathematics or another quaternary technical language. They are specific or vague quantifications used to compare (relate) the spaces of different motion systems perceived as subcontexts, and so they all presuppose a space’s dimensions, or the what that is being measured. The term dimension has a directly opposite idea-referent from that of the measurement and axis; the former is an abstract-concept term (#2) and the latter are concrete-concept (#4), and we err if we let our words confuse these opposite cognitions.

Because our conception of measurement is synthetic and arbitrary, we apply it to many cases other than spatial dimensions. We measure all real phenomena; not only objective things like distance, direction, temperature, mass, energy, velocity, and so on, but also psychologic events. We can refer to a measurement, or evaluation, in mathematical or in vague of degree, such as ‘she is very angry’, ‘he is mildly amused’, or any such use of our stock of tertiary adverbs.

Psychologically, as I explain later, all such evaluations in our reasoning are made in the third-quadrant, in what I call our ‘judgment system’, where we do the relational reasoning that yields our relative standards, such as ideals, morals, and values. And since our traditionalists are trained to see measurements mathematically rather than psychologically, they see measurements of subjective phenomena as being essentially nonspatial. But no measurement is nonspatial. Our metaphysics tells us that Reality is Space, so we realists expect that all measurements, including the evaluations of our psychologic functioning, are ultimately reducible to purely spatial .

The dimensionality of any space does not involve mathematics, not even geometry. Our analytic (primary and secondary) reasoning yields the universal Laws that imply all mathematics, but the converse is not so. Mathematics makes no direct reference to Reality, or the Space; its measurements only compare relative spaces. While they are practicing their quaternary specialty,

mathematicians are not concerned with Reality. Like theologians and other mystics, they are intellectually detached from it then, and nothing that they conclude through their specialty speaks directly to that primary subject that we all know instinctively.

It is true that our language constructs, such as mathematics and formal logic, can reflect absolute necessity and universal truths, but these are nature’s truths, which we know from the analytic half of our common logic. Our synthetic specialists, in their various language constructs, only explicate those truths for specific practical ends.

Time. The second ancient error that leads traditionalists to deny a threedimensional continuum is the illusion of ‘time’. We must reject this absurd old notion that time is something distinct from space. We don’t know for sure when this distinction first arose, but it was clearly expressed by Greek intellectuals before the sophist era. Some generations after they devised their alphabet, we find references to the dualistic notion that reality consists of two inherently different kinds of stuff, called ‘time’ and ‘space’. And from this schism several other fallacious dualisms of ancient Greek thought were proposed and became entrenched in Western traditions. They are in Eastern traditions too, but some differ in form, and we have no need to pursue the history of this here.

These ancient dualisms imitate the natural polarizations that, as I show later, occur in our psychologic process, except that they irrationally mix reality with fiction. That is, one of their polar refers to an objective external reality and the other to a fictional mystical hypothesis. Italicizing the mystical half again, examples are god-man, heaven-earth, spirit-substance, mind-body, and timespace. This illusion that time is a different kind of stuff from space is what allows all tertiary mystics to falsely claim, with just as much reasonableness as our scientists exhibit when they speak of ‘time’ as a fourth dimension, that other kinds of indefinable nonspatial phenomena—such as god, heaven, spirit, and mind—can also be objective realities.

Near the close of the modern era’s second quadrant, the physicists Lorentz (1853-1928) and Einstein (1879-1955) put these ancient misunderstandings of dimensionality and time into new scientific . In one of his popular writings, following Lorentz’ formula, Einstein said that we need four numbers (measurements) to define any event, and he illustrated this with a hypothetical particle in motion. He then applied the artificial Cartesian coordinate system to this motion by placing its origin at two different points on the particle’s path, Origin 1 and Origin 2, and then taking the difference between the three axial measurements (x, y, and z) from each origin. Then he said that to define this event, or motion, we also need a fourth number to reflect the difference in the time of the event at each origin point. And this difference, he and Lorentz imagined, was a ‘dimension’, even though it was only an extra measurement

taken along a hypothetical t axis—a ‘time’ axis that no one can sensibly conceive or diagram except as a spatial axis.

But this fourth number serves only one purpose in their example, which is to record the fact that these physicists moved their artificial coordinate system from Origin 1 to Origin 2. Thus, their t ‘axis’ is not an objectively real spatial dimension; it is just an imagined axis, or an explication that they need to record the spatial change not of their moving particle, but of their whole Cartesian coordinate system when they move it from one origin to the other. But their perceptual position on their hypothetical t axis has nothing to do with the reality of the event they are measuring. Their ‘fourth dimension’, or their idea of ‘time’, is just another spatial measurement that they arbitrarily added to the first three. Its only purpose is to relate one motion system to another one, or in this case to the same one as seen from a different spatial position, and that position is still a where, not a when.

So this fourth number doesn’t measure some mystical stuff called ‘time’; it merely measures a spatial distance in the next higher three-dimensional continuum, the motion system that subsumes the particle’s motion from Origin 1 to Origin 2. But logically speaking, these physicists committed a fallacious shift in their context of reference. That is, when they placed their axial coordinate system at Origin 1, they selected one motion system as their context, but when they put another coordinate system at Origin 2, they shifted their context of reference to the space of the next higher motion system, the one that subsumes both origins. And their failure to see and explicate this shift to a higher context, or space, is what deludes them into thinking that there is a separate kind of stuff called ‘time’. If they had specified that higher motion system as their context from the start and then used its three natural dimensions to measure that motion, they could have described that event fully with only three spatial measurements.

So let me be clear what I mean here; physicists aren’t wrong to use this method to relate different motion systems, they are only wrong when they tell us that this spatial distance between two systems is a different kind of stuff—that is, not

space but time.

Now compare their artificial four-term method of measuring to the realistic method that we all use in measuring an actual motion system, such as the rotating or revolving earth. Here we don’t need a fictional coordinate system, since we know this system’s three reference points (P, C, and O) and their directional extensions objectively, apart from our own relative position or imaginings, and we can measure everything in that system with respect to them. The time of the terrestrial motion system is thus a spatial measurement along any of its three dimensions, or naturally defined curved axes.

In that system, everything on earth, let us say you, defines a unique motion system with three distinct ‘times’. One of these ‘times’ measures the spatial distance you rotate around the center of the earth, or through our common day. Another measures the spatial distance you move with the earth’s revolution around the sun, or through our common year. And the third measures the spatial distance moved by you and the entire ecliptic (earth-sun) plane in the third dimension, for which we have no common ‘time’ name because we ordinarily ignore this larger motion of the solar system in our galaxy.

But these so-called ‘times’ in our terrestrial system are all spatial measurements, and we have no need for a fourth number if we are referring only to motions within that system. All that we need are our spatial clocks and calendars, which tell us our relative position in the space of our own motion system, or where we are located now in the subsuming day or year or in any arithmetic extension of those spatial distances.

Our scientists would never claim that a year means anything but the spatial distance traveled by the earth in one revolution about the sun, and yet, in plain contradiction, they call that spatial distance a ‘time’. A real, or natural, coordinate system with three axes suffices to measure our motion in our terrestrial system because we are not then comparing it to any other motion

system. Thus, each real motion system has its own unique ‘time’, but this is the same as saying that it has its own unique space.

We can call the three spatial coordinates of a motion system its ‘time axes’ if we wish, but this is redundant. In fact, I recall that the cosmologist Hermann Bondi (1919-2005) once wrote that physicists could dispense with spatial measurements altogether and use time measurements only—which, though the are reversed, makes my point here, that they are the same stuff. Anyway, since we now know explicitly that the stuff we have been calling ‘time’ is in reality space, we can define that term correctly, as another corollary of our third metaphysical principle: time is space specified.

More fully, our generic term ‘time’ is a universal term that we use in our explicated reasoning as a substitute for the universal generic term ‘space’. These two are equivalent because their idea-referent is the same, the abstract concept, even though their context-referent differs. The context-referent of ‘any space’ is the Space, and the context-referent of ‘any time’ is this particular space within the Space.

The Cycle shows how we reason here. From our complete-percept term the Space, we derive our abstract-concept term any space, then our partial-percept term a space, and then our concrete-concept (or class) term all spaces, after which we cognize a new and lesser whole: this particular space. So we derive this second complete-percept cognition from a part of the absolute whole, but to analyze it fully in a reconsideration, we pretend that this former part is now a whole, and hence the new context of an act of reconsideration. It too would be natural reasoning, except that we already assigned to our cognitions in our prior metaphysical consideration of the Space. And now in analytically reducing this lesser context, we realize that it is contradictory to say that the defining essence of this particular space is any space, so we say instead that it is its time. Thus, though it wasn’t done explicitly so that our dictionaries could report this fact to us, our generic term time was created to mean any relative space.

To put it yet another way, for any subcontext that we decide to analyze as if it was a whole context, we need derived ‘universal’ for that new context that also linguistically convey that it is a relative and not an absolute context. That is, the defining cause of any act of reasoning is our selection of a context of reference, but it can be the Whole Event or any subevent, and when it is a subevent we must convert the absolute universal that we coined earlier in our metaphysical reasoning into relative universal for this lesser context. And to meet this logical need for a relativized universal term, which is not as contradictory as it sounds, either we must use the old universal term ambiguously for both purposes or we must coin a new term.

So, to avoid the absurdity of saying that the universal defining essence of this particular space is its space, we coin an equivalent universal term and say that it is its time. In our metaphysical reasoning, ‘time’ means space, so we just say ‘space’. But since the context-referent of our abstract-concept term ‘time’ is always a subevent of the Space, it means that we are specifying a particular space. Hence our definition, that time is space specified. And from this reasoning—that is, not from physics but from the analytic reasoning that precedes physics—it follows that time is relative.

In our natural reasoning we don’t need this fiction, this separate stuff called ‘time’, but in our explicated reasoning it simplifies our numbers and references. Thus, like so many of our explications, including all mathematics, it is a fiction, but a useful one.

You can test this fact for yourself, as practice in your new perspective as a realist. Whenever you hear any reference to ‘time’, think ‘space’ instead, and as you become more familiar with this spatial conception of time, you will see that those two are equivalent universal and that all of our common temporal expressions could as well be spatial expressions.

For example, the phrase ‘I am X years old’ could also be ‘I am Y miles old’. To

give the age of anything on earth, it is arithmetically easier to speak of days or years than to calculate the miles that it and the earth has traveled in its spiraling course, but these are equivalents nonetheless. Or the cliché ‘at this point in time’ could as well be ‘at this point in space’, which is also disposable, for we can now say more economically ‘at this point’, which can only mean a point in space. And we can now correctly use the term farther, a spatial reference, in a temporal reference where convention dictates further. Or, instead of asking when Socrates died, we could ask where Athens and the earth were as he died.

Also, the old notion of time as used in our physicists’ definitions of velocity and acceleration is not essential; it is just a mathematical convenience. Physicists define velocity as distance divided by time, or v=d/t, but it can also be defined as a ratio of two spatial distances, as one distance divided by another distance, or v=d1/d2. And they define acceleration as a change in either velocity or direction. But this is redundant, for once we see that velocity is only a spatial proportion, it suffices to define acceleration solely as a change of direction.

For example, if you travel by car, the numerator of your velocity is the miles you travel on the earth’s surface and the denominator is the spatial distance in miles of the earth’s rotation during your trip. And since each spatial 15º that the earth turns is an hour, the phrase ‘miles per hour’ means the ratio ‘surface distance traveled per 15º of distance of earth rotation’. Your path in our terrestrial system’s space is thus a vector determined by those two motions (actually three, but physicists ignore the third dimension in defining velocity). As for acceleration, if you double or halve your velocity, you are said to be ‘accelerating’ or ‘decelerating’ your car, but actually you are only changing your vector, the spatial direction and length of your composite path of motion. So if two racers on the same track don’t arrive at the finish line at the same time, it is because the faster one took a shorter route in three-dimensional space, which is possible because during the race the finish line also moves.

In our explicated reasoning, we substitute the term ‘time’ for ‘space’ for two main reasons: for arithmetic simplicity and to communicate that we mean a

relative subevent and not the Whole Event. So now that we know what the term ‘time’ means, we can continue to use it for these purposes, but we should never use redundant like ‘space and time’ or ‘space-time’, because these falsely imply that time is something different from space.

This old false view of time as a mystical nonspatial stuff, or a magical ‘fourth dimension’, is one of the greatest errors in our traditional intellectual system. It is the source of the deceiving dualisms of traditional explicated reasoning, which idealists rationalize by pointing to this mystical ‘dimension’ that our scientists use. That is, if physicists can claim that a nonspatial stuff called ‘time’ is real, then with equal validity theists can claim that a nonspatial stuff called ‘god’ is real, mystics can claim that nonspatial ‘spirits’ are real, and modern psychologists can claim that our ‘mind’ is governed by nonspatial laws. Thus, as they have throughout history, our arealistic scientists continue to give essential to the arealistic mystics who promote these false and harmful delusions.

4. The Principle of Displacement

At this point, from our new understanding of time and our observations of events, we know that no motion system is permanent. Change at each instant is inherent to its motion, and sooner or later the entire system is terminated. Hence our fourth metaphysical principle: Any motion system shall be displaced.

This proposes that decay in or interference with the motion of every subevent occurs continuously, and that ultimately this structural (dimensional) displacement must be fatal to that motion system as a unique event. The greatest and, we assume, the smallest limits of Reality are absolutes and are forever preserved, but all subevents between those limits are relative and temporary. And just as we must accept our certain knowledge of the one Whole Event, so we must accept as certain the limited duration of any subevent’s unique space. What is born will die, and what is not born, which is only the absolute Whole and its spinning ultiparticles, will never die.

If we wonder why every motion system must be displaced, we are engaging in cosmological speculation on why all things within the Space are moving and where they are headed. Some cosmologists have speculated that their universe is pulsating, and others that all motion systems are moving toward the same ultimate destination, perhaps the ‘boundaries’ of the Whole, only to be hurled back to its ‘center’ to move away from it again. These are plausible guesses since the eternal regenerative cycle they propose does not deny the relativity of time as the big-bang hypothesis does, but we don’t know this for certain. What we do know, from our common logic, is that we can propose this displacement principle with confidence because no exception to it has yet been observed.

Our third principle told us that any motion system is unique because of its spatial

relativity (formerly its ‘space-time relativity’). This is all that anything’s uniqueness is, the where of it (formerly the ‘where and when’ of it). But to propose the uniqueness of each system does not deny that motion systems can be subsumed by other motion systems or that their spaces can overlap partially, for even then a motion system is defined by its own unique space. Though no two motion systems can share exactly the same space (formerly ‘the same space at the same time’), they can share some space.

To say that a three-dimensional system dies, or is totally displaced, is only to say that it has lost its unique identity as a motion system, and when this happens, one or more new motion systems are born from that displacement. Displacement is the cause of creation. Our third principle tells us that there are ultiparticles that will be preserved in their helical motion forever, so all that happens when a motion system is displaced is that its object particle P (or if that particle disintegrated, each of its constituent particles) s another motion system and then continues moving in response to either the same center C or a new C. The death of a unique event is just the disruption of its dimensionality, which can also be described as its sudden or gradual disintegration into energy. What is destroyed is not its ultiparticles, but its dimensionality, which is its defining essence and what identifies it as a unique motion system.

Since our fourth principle holds that this interference shall occur, it proposes that chaos is a consequence of the universal order proposed by our first three principles. We see this in our daily life; order it as we may, sooner or later it will be disrupted, and chaos will ensue. A political implication of this Law is that if we try to impose too much social order in a collective, meaning more than the least that is essential, we will increase the social chaos that is certain to follow because of that imposed order. Since both order and chaos are real, any theory must for both. No theorist or hypothesist can validly propose a state of reality or a political state that is all order or all chaos. Disintegration is a consequence of integration, but chaos then creates a new order, which in turn leads to new chaos, and so on infinitely.

Every event within the Whole Event encounters continual interference from other events that are either lesser or greater than itself in spatial expanse, and sooner or later this barrage of spatial displacements will terminate it as a unique motion system. This imposition may be a direct invasion of one motion system by another, meaning a collision of their particles or of their spatial fields only, or it may be the spatial distortion (formerly ‘gravity’) caused by near or remote motion systems, which causes some deterioration of the particle orbits of all motion systems within the affected field. In any case, every distinct event, our self included, will be continuously altered and then terminated by this Law of Reality, displacement, which is to say by some combination of impacting motion systems within or beyond its unique space.

5. The Principle of Correspondence

The final principle in our theory of Reality is its correspondence principle, our analytic principle of the universal relation of every motion system.

But first we should correct the ambiguity in what we mean by relation, which is currently used to refer to both an analytic and a synthetic cognition. Analytically, relations exist because all events correspond by universal internal criteria, which ultimately is their dimensionality and structure as motions systems. Synthetically, relations exist because some parts of a whole event are somehow externally tied to each other, as by sharing some space or by a causal or logical connection. Epistemically, relations arise only in our secondary reasoning, from our analytic division of a whole context into pieces, but relativity or a relationship arise only in our tertiary reasoning, after we have selected some parts to compare. So we can speak of the universal relation of cause and effect or of the class relation of sisterhood, but only specified parts can be relatives or have a relationship.

It is better, then, to use a term other than relation when we mean its analytic sense, or universal relation by internal criteria, and for this I use correspondence. And since metaphysics is our most inclusive subject, the broadest possible relation between motions systems is their dimensional correspondence. Hence our fifth principle: Motion systems correspond in their dimensionality.

In other words, motion systems are related by their dimensional structure and helical motion. Though every subevent is unique in its space, in its threedimensional structure as a motion system it corresponds to every other subevent, subject to the six permutations of helical motion described below. What this principle means in practice is that if we can identify the respective reference

points P, C, and O of two motion systems, then we can align their cycles and consider them equivalent in all essential respects, much as geometricians apply their narrower correspondence principles of congruence or similarity. This is also to say that any two subevents of the Whole correspond in their defining essence, wholly or partially depending on their type of helical motion. And just as all measurements are ultimately spatial, so all synthetic laws for any tertiary subcontext are derived from the Laws of Space, or motion.

Furthermore, since our metaphysics does not otherwise distinguish among events, it is a fundamental premise of realism that psychologic events, like external events, are also real three-dimensional events. This means that all human standards and rules are also ultimately reducible to metaphysics, or to the spatial Laws of Reality that define our universal logic.

It follows that our metaphysics, and proximately its principle of correspondence, is the only foundation in reality that we have for any synthetic construct or standard of judgment that we may later hypothesize and apply in practice. In fact, we considered metaphysics here mainly to see this conclusion clearly. In affirming this principle, we differ from all traditionalists, who hypothesize idealistically and preach pragmatically with no foundation in reality at all except for what is naturally embedded in the logic of their language constructs. And with no explicit theory of Reality to guide them, they cannot know for certain if any construct they propose is real or fictional.

The Six Forms of Helical Motion

We considered helical motion generically above, but now with the fifth principle we must consider its permutations, meaning the distinct patterns of motion taken by everything within the Whole Event. These patterns reflect the elemental structure of every tangible form that we hypothesize in our synthetic reasoning. And since there are only six possible forms of helical motion, there are six and only six elemental forms of anything that is conventionally called ‘matter’, ‘substance’, or ‘energy’.

If this is not so, then either my analysis of helical motion into six kinds here is flawed or helical motion is not an absolute reality. In the former case, the error can be corrected by whoever finds it. In the latter case, even if helical motion is not absolute, it is still universal to our galactic motion system, and this means that it is a valid principle from which we can derive our psychologic theory and any other synthetic hypotheses that apply only to our relative world and similar worlds.

Our generic description of helical motion said that P spins about C and C about O, but it did not specify the direction of their spin, clockwise (CW) or counterclockwise (CCW). The first permutation, shown earlier in Figure 5, applies to the terrestrial system. This is our personal motion system, so I propose it as the three-dimensional structure of our psychologic functioning, so long as our terrestrial system is not displaced or we do not travel to a different kind of motion system. This is the CCW-CCW case, where the object P on earth moves counterclockwise about C, the earth’s center, which moves counterclockwise about the origin O, the sun’s center. The second permutation is the CCW-CW case, an instance of which is the earth-sun system, where P is the earth’s center revolving counterclockwise around C, the sun’s center, which revolves clockwise about O, the galactic center. The third and fourth permutations, of course, are the CW-CCW and the CW-CW cases.

These first four permutations differ in P and C’s direction of spin, which is a fundamental aspect of space, but they are alike by virtue of another essential spatial criterion; namely, that in all four cases the distance between P and C is less than that between C and O—for example, you (P) are closer to the earth’s center (C) than it is to the sun’s center (O). We must ignore any case where distance PC is greater than CO, because then there is no helical motion, which violates our third principle.

This leaves only two other permutations, those where the distances PC and CO are equal. In these cases, P and C spiral together as siblings rather than as parent and child, and their motion system is a double helix—which logic tells us, even if observation has not yet done so, is probably the basic form of energy. To form a double helix, P and C must have the same direction of spin, CW or CCW; they can’t spin in opposite directions because that would dissolve their systemic relation and they couldn’t travel together.

So there are two kinds of double-helical motion, each with an opposite direction of spin and an opposite direction of motion in space from a given reference point, or source. And adding these double-helical forms to the four simple cases gives us six and only six kinds of motion systems. It follows from this and our correspondence principle that every subevent in Reality can be fundamentally compared to other subevents through the dynamics of one of these different kinds of helical motion.

Chapter 4. The Science of Human Nature

Metaphysics and Psychology

Our doctrinal dispute with traditionalists is the dispute between realism and idealism, which means scientific pluralism as well as mysticism. I have proposed that there is only one Reality and that its ultiparticles are the only permanent things in it, but our traditional sciences oppose this wholistic materialism. Though few scientists today believe in nonsensical dualisms like ‘heaven-earth’, ‘god-man’, and ‘spirit-substance’, most of them still rely on the equivalent dualisms of ‘time-space’ and ‘mind-body’, and this makes them idealists, for to be a realist one must reject all fundamental dualisms.

Our metaphysics holds that all is space; that all subevents within the Space are three-dimensional motion systems; and that any two events, whether external or internal to us, may be compared through their dimensional structure. So we can compare, say, ‘the event of the life of a plant’ with ‘the event of a lunar cycle’, and the dynamic structure of an external event with that of an internal act of consideration. In our new metaphysics, the old mind-body dualism (which some scientists criticize even as they use it daily in their reasoning) is at last dead, and we must not resurrect it. All events are related as events, and this means that the materialism of our academic sciences, be it dualistic or pluralistic, is the pseudomaterialism of the past.

To say this another way, I believe that our metaphysics here is the first realistic proposal of a bridge between the traditionally detached realms of physical and mental events. Contrary to traditional thought, there must be such a bridge, for otherwise we couldn’t explicate our reasoning, illustrate it graphically, or even say that a psychologic event ‘takes time’ to be completed. In fact, when modern psychologists ascribe ‘time’ to a psychologic event, they are defining that event as a spatial process. So, even though they couldn’t see it from their ancient premises, there has always been a real bridge between physical and mental events, and now that we know what it is, we must change our notion of just what kind of science we should call ‘psychology’.

The modern-era science of that name is based on the classic-era dualism of Descartes that reaffirmed the mind-body dualism of ancient intellectuals. Some scholars say that modern psychologists are much beholden to Spinoza’s work, but I don’t know any of them who ed him in denying Cartesian dualism and looking for a monistic solution. For instance, Freud and Jung (1875-1961) both described our mental functioning in the old dualistic that deny the Laws of Space, and hence our common logic. They believed, as Jung said explicitly, that our psychologic process follows different laws altogether, nonspatial laws that they could not define or describe realistically. But our metaphysics unites all of our physical and human sciences under one set of spatial Laws. And while we mustn’t ignore the practical work of those famous scientists and their leading disciples, a new psychologic science will have no place in it for their dualistic assumptions or structural hypotheses.

All of our traditional academic subjects, even physics and psychology, are related to each other. This must be, since everything is a part of the same whole. And as Socrates said long ago, we can only see this relation if we look beneath the surface of our perception of events to uncover their causes. Well, we have done that here, and we have found that their essential causes are their dimensional structure as motion systems, and that this is the universal relation that is shared by every relative thing in Reality.

Our problem historically was that our intellectuals couldn’t explain this universal relation. But now our correspondence principle lets us validly compare any two events, external or internal, on the most fundamental level, and from this we can derive a new logic and a new science of human functioning. There is no psychologic process that is not determined by the universal Laws of Reality, all of which pertain to space, so any claim that there are nonspatial laws is absurd. That term is self-contradictory, and it will remain so until some idealist proves to us, for the first time, that there actually is something in Reality that is not spatial. And since we know now that time is space, they can no longer say this of our ‘temporal’ mental processes, or our ‘mind’.

The New Science

We move now from analytic to synthetic reasoning, and our first subcontext is human nature, a term that has long referred only to our psychologic functioning and consequent behavior. This usage reflects the fact that the traditional views of human nature are based on mind-body dualism, which is why our two established psychologic sciences, astrology and modern psychology, could never adequately explain our nature.²³

We needn’t trace the history of our psychologic reasoning here, but generally it parallels the development of our philosophic and theistic thought. However, I disagree with those who see ancient Greek thought as its source. The Greeks are largely responsible for our Western intellectual system, but not for psychology, about which they said little. The first psychologist in history appears to have been Gautama, called ‘the Buddha’. Contrary to popular misconceptions about this creative intellectual from India, he was not a theist, philosopher, idealist, or mystic. Rather, just like our modern psychologists, he was a pragmatist (formalist) with no interest in theory.²⁴

Most of the major intellectuals since the seventh century bce contemplated some aspects of our reasoning process, so they were our earliest psychologists. And the first science of human nature was a branch of astrology known as genethlialogy, an early form of which can be traced to India centuries before Gautama.

Today, in the West at least, ‘astrology’ means horoscopic astrology, which was developed in Hellenistic Egypt in the late 2nd or early 1st century bce. This science, with its ‘hour scope’, differed from the previous efforts, initially in Babylonia, to interpret celestial events as omens. Its zodiacal signs were not

constellations of stars, but rather twelve 30° divisions of the ecliptic, the plane that es through the centers of the sun and the earth. Genethlialogy, also called ‘natal astrology’, uses the natal chart (which diagrams some celestial events at the time and place of an individual’s birth), mainly to determine the native’s congenital nature. But then it is used for continuous horoscopy, meaning charts based on it that seek to predict future psychologic, physical, or external events in the native’s life, and thus to say something about his or her developed nature as well.

By the time of the Neoplatonists Plotinus (205-70) and Porphyry (c.232-c.305) in Rome, horoscopic astrology had produced a well-developed science of genethlialogy. So whether we look to India or Rome, we can’t agree that modern psychology was the first psychologic science or that only its practitioners should be called ‘psychologists’. This may be a legal requirement in some places, but it is not a logical one. I define a psychologist as anyone who studies the process of consideration, in general or of any species, and this describes many intellectuals before the modern era.

Modern psychology was conceived in the first quadrant of the modern era (17621822), a time when leftist realism surfaced and many intellectuals in the West began to doubt theism and its religions, and it was formalized as a science later in the second quadrant of that era (1822-1913). It originally proposed to explain ‘the psyche’, which means our defining essence or innate nature, but which under academic control soon came to mean only ‘the mind’, especially as the dictator of our behavior. The rightist bias of these pragmatic academics doomed the science to failure; mainly because it was theoryless, or logically incomplete, but also because its political and moral failures cost it the of the general public. For instance, it was never a science of human nature dedicated to the people’s welfare rather than to governmental or corporate interests, and consequently it made little effort to explain the psychologic impairments of our immoral political, religious, academic, and business leaders.

So here too we must reject the traditional way. We need a dedicated science of

human nature for the new era (2008-2254), and since neither astrology nor modern psychology concerns itself primarily with that subject, I am proposing one now. This new science, let us call it ‘humanology’, will use any valid methods developed in those two old sciences, but it will sur them by studying the whole of human nature. We can refer to practitioners of those sciences who accept our principles as realistic psychologists or realistic astrologists, but we should refer to one who studies the relevant parts of both those sciences as humanologists.

The purposes of this new science can be clearly stated. They are to preserve our species and our environment; mainly by achieving a sound understanding of human nature and reasoning, by promoting the logic and sanity that is now lacking in our social and political institutions, and by helping all individual humans to understand and improve themselves.

Human

Nature. The term ‘human nature’ has a range of meanings. It can mean how all humans are alike, how each of us is unique within our species, or any of the aspects of our nature that are shared only by some people. But in all senses we must that the individual is the only objective reality, and that the species and all of its collectives and classes are conceptual, or artificial hypotheses. So we must be realists, not conceptualists. It is true that we must argue from the collective when we are trying to marshal for group purposes, but it is invalid to do this when we are trying to explain human nature or judge individuals. This distinction is ignored by our rightist collectivists, but in fact the only logical approach to understanding human nature is that of individualists—not extreme individualists, but those who realize that our relations to others and otherness are also an essential part of our nature.

We saw this earlier; that our formalists, being pragmatists who deny what is real or unique , are collectivists. As such, they reason in class and from group goals, and then they try to convince us that our collectives—from our family, culture, and race to our state and the religious and business corporations it sanctions—are more real and important than our individual lives, which they claim we must subordinate to, or even sacrifice for, those artificial collectives.

The formalists of modern psychology have made so much of our collectivistic (class, social) attributes that these are well known to us now, if only superficially. But we don’t understand our individuality anywhere near as well, and this is due mainly to our traditionalists’ failure to solve two basic problems : (1) how we reason, and (2) why we are each unique. We have considered the first problem, the standard of all human reasoning, and I will say more about it as we proceed. But now let us consider our uniqueness, since we must solve this old problem if we are to apply the Consideration Cycle to individuals as well as to our species.

The Dilemma of Uniqueness

We all know through our common logic that we are each unique as individuals. No one else is you. So we must wonder why our intellectuals haven’t yet explained what makes us unique. Modern psychologists never did, and our geneticists have only explained a small number of our relative, or shared, attributes. And though genethlialogic astrologers know implicitly what makes us unique, since it is the basis of their spatial analysis of a person’s congenital nature, even they have never explained it.

Some ancient Greeks dealt with this dilemma by positing the psyche, which literally means ‘to breathe’ and which is equivalent to mystical such as ‘soul’ or ‘spirit’. They believed that we are each unique because we innately possess this defining essence, which was god-given or forever unknowable. It was then long assumed by most people that this one internal thing caused our uniqueness, and that no other cause needed to be found. Astrologers adopted this mystical view of our uniqueness without analysis, and then came the modern psychologists, who soon divided into three conflicting schools of opinion on our uniqueness.

(1) The mystics propose a fiction to for it. This school includes the Freudians and Jungians, who accept the ancient assumption that we each have a unique ‘psyche’, ‘soul’, ‘spirit’, or ‘mind’ that somehow doesn’t observe the Laws of Space. (2) The negativists, who are mostly behaviorists or experimentalists, deny our uniqueness outright. They do so because they can’t accept any mystical explanation and because, as pragmatists, they don’t want to consider this theoretical dilemma anyway. (3) The positivists also reject any form of mysticism, but they differ from the negativists because their common logic tells them, first, that we are each unique and, second, that they cannot build a valid psychologic construct without explaining this fact.

Unfortunately, the positivists’ consensus explanation fails, and sensing this, they rarely mention it anymore. Nevertheless, if pressed to answer the question, it is how they explain our uniqueness, and since it is the only nonmystical explanation offered by modern psychologists, we should understand its errors. They first denied all of the old claims by mystics that there is only one thing that causes our uniqueness, but then they universalized that denial by asserting that ‘therefore’ no single attribute can be the cause of our uniqueness. This is a non sequitur, but it suits their formalism because it denies theory and its universal , and lets them proceed with their constructs and research with hypothetical class only. Here is their ‘solution’.

From their invalid assumption that there is no single thing that causes our uniqueness, they reasoned that the cause must be a set of things , all of which are descriptive attributes with class names. But then they realized that no limited set of descriptive attributes could confer uniqueness on us, because it is conceivable, even if less probable, that a partial set of attributes could be duplicated in another person. So they corrected this to reach their final hypothesis on uniqueness, which is that duplication is impossible if they select the set of all possible attributes of a person.

But they failed to see that this is a truism, since such a total summation will refer to our uniqueness whether their basic premise is true or false. If it is false, if there actually is only one cause of our uniqueness, then it will be one of the innumerable attributes that they never identified but that is included in their calculus, their hypothetical sum of all possible attributes. So they never explained our uniqueness, they just presupposed it. And since this was the only nonmystical view of uniqueness in their field, they agreed as academics to accept this class conception, or hypothetical summation, as the explanation of a human’s uniqueness, and to refer to it thereafter as our personality.

But that term is ambiguous and has many conflicting senses and uses. You can see this clearly in the now-classic text, Theories of Personality, by Calvin S. Hall and Gardner Lindzey (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., second edition

1970), where more than a dozen different hypotheses on ‘personality’ used in modern psychology, starting with Freud and ending with ‘existential psychology’, are summarized. The authors themselves never defined their title term; instead, they just described how various practitioners used that term in their different hypotheses on human nature.

Interestingly, the positivists made the same error here that yields Russell’s paradox, which pertains to class theory. In one of its verbal (or nonsymbolic) forms, the paradox that Russell (1872-1970) posed is this: Does not the class of all classes, since it too is a class, contain itself as well? No it doesn’t, the Consideration Cycle tells us, because any set of context-related classes can only be subsumed by a whole event; that is, by the initial context that one has selected and that relates all of its parts and classes as siblings.

The Cycle shows us that the tertiary conception of a class is always a class of parts, which we can only select after we have a primary perception of the whole event to which all those parts belong. Every All is a class (#4) that is derived from the Whole (#1), the One (#2), and the Parts (#3) that yield it. For example, if we select a pasture as our initial whole context of reference, then all the things in it can be classified, but the pasture itself cannot be, because we selected it as our context, or the hypothetical whole that we intend to analyze. So to propose the class of all classes whatsoever, as Russell did, is to propose an absolute collection of all parts, but that collection of classes cannot be subsumed by any other class. It can only be subsumed by Reality, the Whole that encomes all parts whatsoever, and our perception of the Reality is plainly not a class cognition. Russell overlooked that, by definition, a class can only be a set of parts, and that, by definition, our notion of parts presupposes our notion of a whole that includes them all; a whole that, also by definition, cannot itself be a class.

By the same reasoning, then, the class term ‘personality’ cannot mean the sum of all descriptive class and of all the universal , such as uniqueness or self, that pertain to a whole person, because a class term can only subsume a set

of preselected parts. So the positivists’ explanation of uniqueness begs the question, since any tertiary class cognition we have has already presupposed both our primary cognition of the whole event that we selected as our initial context and our secondary cognition of that event’s uniqueness. We can’t describe anything unless we first distinguish it as a unique context, and by that initial act, by pointing to this thing rather than to some other thing, we affirm its wholeness and its uniqueness before we can select or sum any of its parts.

Here’s another way to see the positivists’ illogic. They claim that a person is unique only by virtue of being a certain unique collection of descriptive class attributes, but if no single attribute can cause our uniqueness, as they claim, then no sum or product of such attributes, none of which is unique, can magically introduce uniqueness into their total. Uniqueness is in their total, but it gets there another way. By the very act of hypothetical summation, they drag in through the back door, unannounced, the one attribute that causes anything to be unique. But they never explicitly identified that attribute; so, excluding those who saw the need to study astrology, they couldn’t see why the genethlaic methods of astrology were indispensable to a sound understanding of human nature, and consequently the human science that they constructed was incomplete and otherwise fallacious from the start.

The solution to the dilemma of uniqueness is so well known to us all inexplicitly through our common logic that I was surprised to find in my readings that no one had stated it directly. The ancient Greeks were correct in assuming that only one attribute makes a person unique, but it is not the mystical psyche or soul, or any of the equivalent coined later. The concrete term ‘personality’ refers to a set of descriptive essences (#3), but the abstract term ‘uniqueness’ refers to only one thing, a person’s defining essence (#2). People are not unique because of, say, the color of their eyes, their race, their gender, or any summation of such shared attributes. They are only unique because each person is a distinct event, a motion system that occupies a unique position in space, which is the one attribute that makes anything in the world unique.

Nothing is unique to us until we identify its position in space. Since no two things can occupy the same space (formerly, the same space at the same time), our space is our defining essence, and it is necessarily unique. We share some spaces with other things, but not our space, which is defined by the spatial point (formerly, time) at which we leave our mother’s womb, and then by our own zenith and nadir as we move on the earth as an independent event. Every other property of anything in Reality is shared with some other things, and yet, amazingly, a plurality of these relative things is all that any formalist in our human sciences can propose as constituting our uniqueness, either as a species or as individuals.

Character vs. Personality

The Cycle shows that in every complete act of consideration we use two concepts: an abstract concept reached by the reduction of a whole, and a concrete concept reached by an accretion of parts. It follows that our new science must have an abstract term that refers to our essence, or congenital nature, and a concrete term that refers to the sum of all our attributes at any later position (time) in our life. From the analysis below, I believe that character and personality, respectively, are the best for this distinction, even though modern psychologists, astrologers, and the general public have long used these ambiguously and interchangeably.

The conventional vagueness of these two is shown in any dictionary. My unabridged RHD, for instance, gives twenty-four senses of the noun character that have various context-referents, but only two of these are relevant to our context here:

n. 1. the aggregate of features or traits that form the individual nature of some person or thing. and 8. a person, esp. with reference to behavior or personality.

On the other hand, that dictionary, reflecting the influence of academic psychologists, gives five senses of personality that are relevant to our context:

n. 1. the visible aspects of one’s character as it impresses others… 2. a person as an embodiment of a collection of qualities… 3. Psychol. a. the sum total of the physical, mental, and social characteristics of an individual. b. the organized pattern of behavioral characteristics of the individual. 4. the quality of being a person; existence as a self-conscious human being; personal identity. 5. the

essential character of a person… .

Note that both senses of the term character above have the same meaning that modern psychologists assign to personality. Plainly there is no essential distinction between those senses and the first three senses given for personality. But why should we use ‘character’ at all if it is just a synonym for ‘personality’? In its supplemental discussion of these as synonyms, this dictionary could only suggest that we should use character to emphasize one’s “moral qualities, ethical standards, principles and the like,” and personality to refer “to the combination of outer and inner characteristics that determine the impression that a person makes upon others.” But this is no distinction at all, since our moral qualities (etc.) are also “characteristics that determine the impression a person makes.” So once again we must ignore our dictionaries and on our own authority define character anew for our context here.

But that dictionary is more helpful with personality, for the Cycle shows that the five context-related senses above (which use the old synonymous word ‘character’ twice) have three distinct idea-referents; that is, they refer to three different cardinal ideas.

The first three senses are obviously proposed by modern psychologists, for they all use personality as a concrete-concept (or class) term. Sense 1 expresses the negativists’ view of the term, sense 2 expresses the summation view of the positivists, and then two different descriptions are added in senses 3a and 3b to express the positivist-negativist disagreement on what the term means. The negativists see ‘personality’ as meaning “behavioral characteristics” only, while the positivists take it to mean all human characteristics. But since “the sum total of” (in 3a) and “the organized pattern of” (in 3b) are equivalent phrases, personality to them is a hypothetical class term either way—one that lets both schools describe a person’s behavior or appearance at great length without ever having to explain his or her innate nature.

This vagueness is common to all of that science’s references I have seen; for example, the International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences (2001) says, “Personality, defined psychologically, is the set of enduring behavioral and mental traits that distinguish human beings.” Note that ‘enduring’ means continuing on after some initial event, and conveniently we’re not told whether that event was prenatal, natal, or postnatal. Anyway, this description of ‘personality’ also takes it to be a concrete-concept term, since ‘the set of’ means ‘the class of’.

But the fourth and fifth senses in our dictionary don’t refer to the concrete concept (#4). Sense 5 says that personality means “the essential character of a person,” and since this means a person’s essential nature, its idea-referent is the abstract-concept (#2). Many people use the term in this analytic sense exactly because it contradicts the concrete senses used by academic psychologists; that is, they reject the unproven assumption that we are shaped only by our postnatal experiences, and so don’t have a congenital nature that stays basically unchanged throughout our life. This is a common flaw in that science, but we must reject sense 5 anyway because it makes personality an abstract-concept term, and we know that modern psychologists will never stop using it oppositely as a concrete-concept term. I redefine character here because we need an abstract-concept term for that universal meaning that is not the same word that modern psychologists use to mean its opposite, the concrete-concept meaning.

Sense 4 is the most encoming sense of personality in that dictionary: “the quality of being a person; existence as a self-conscious human being.” Obviously to use the term in this sense, to mean a whole, unique, and existent person, is to use it as a complete-percept term (#1), and not as the abstract-concept term (#2) that it is in sense 5 or the concrete-concept term (#4) that it is in senses 1, 2, and 3. We can call sense 4 its ‘common-sense sense’, because it means a person’s complete nature, or wholeness and realness as an event, and this wholeness includes both a person’s innate nature and all of his or her private or shared experiences after birth up to some specified later time.

So our problem with personality is this. If we agree with modern psychologists to use it as a concrete-concept (class) term, then we are ing them in using it to refer to a preselected sum of parts, or described postnatal attributes, that don’t include the abstract-concept notion of a person’s congenital nature and uniqueness. Modern psychologists accept this illogic in their sum-of-allattributes method because they want to confine their study to behavior only and continue to presume that our congenital characteristics are solely the business of the science of genetics.

We can understand that in their intentionally narrowed science they need a class notion that excludes all innate attributes, but the rest of us can’t go along with them on this usage—first, because we want to know not only how humans behave, but also why they behave as they do and, second, because we know that today the science of genetics, though technologically advanced, is as theoretically incomplete as modern psychology.

So as humanologists we will reject sense 5 because we will use character for that sense, but we will use personality in two other senses. Normally we will use it in sense 4, its common-sense sense, to mean the whole of one’s attributes whether congenital or postnatal, but we will also use it as psychologists do at present, to mean our developed nature as distinct from our congenital character.

Of course this complete-percept sense of ‘personality’ is reductive, for it doesn’t mean the whole person we first perceived, but only the whole of his or her complete nature as we have come to understand this. For example, we first perceive John as a real and whole event, but in our reconsiderations we perceive (not conceive) John’s personality, just as we do any other lesser whole that we have derived.

As for character, we will no longer use this as a synonym for personality. Instead, we will note that in its original Greek sense it meant an engraving tool or its mark, which implies both an initial act and a permanent mark to record it.

It is therefore appropriate to use character as the abstract-concept term (#2) that means our defining essence; that is, our inherent uniqueness and all of the characteristics and instincts that we have at birth and carry with us, in a more or less marked fashion, throughout our life. Some equivalent notions for it are our self, dignity, innateness, oneness, essentiality, uniqueness, natural rights, and the continuity of our basic nature.

Characteristics vs. Traits

To maintain our distinction between character and personality, we also need that distinguish the attributes we are born with and the ones we acquire after birth. We can do this simply by using characteristics to mean the congenital attributes and traits to mean the postnatal ones. Most modern psychologists ignore this distinction, which for one thing lets them pretend that they are dealing with our essential nature when they aren’t. That is, their class term ‘personality’ not only drags our uniqueness into its hypothetical summation, but also all of our other innate qualities. A congenital characteristic can be described ex post facto just as any postnatal trait can be, so descriptive reasoners can’t distinguish the one from the other or determine the cause of either.

For example, later I define a certain congenital disposition in politics with the class term ‘conservative’, and one who believes the Jesus myth is described with the class term ‘Christian’. We can even combine these to coin the narrower class term ‘Christian conservative’. But people who don’t know that conservatism is a congenital, or innate, characteristic will erroneously assume that we call people ‘conservatives’ by the same logic that we describe them as Christians, and then conclude that, just as we can indoctrinate a Jew to make a Christian or vice versa, so we can indoctrinate a conservative to make a progressive. But that will never happen, for (as many of us know from observing people) the psychologic impairment that we call ‘conservatism’ is a congenital lifelong characteristic, not a trait acquired after birth. All that happens after birth is that some conservatives learn to explicate their innate disposition better.

Manipulation

Since most modern psychologists can’t distinguish our innate dispositions from the ones we acquire later in life, they assume that everything as individuals is collectivistic, or social, and subject to alteration by experience; either by our will or by socially imposed indoctrination, rules, discipline, punishments, rewards, or other manipulations.

This is why two widely embraced premises in their science are (1) that all people are manipulable, and (2) that people, children and adults, who disobey a society’s rules should be controlled by state-condoned manipulations or institutions. But our psychologic theory rejects this universal cynicism, for it shows clearly that only some people are manipulable, and only in some respects that not all people share. If you intentionally limit the scope of your science, as modern psychologists have done, you can’t avoid universalizing your classbased biases and other narrow conclusions.

Genetics

Just as it is illogical of astrologers to study spatial displacements as if there was no hereditary process being affected by them, so it is illogical of geneticists to study the hereditary process, which is more than just the genetic process, as if space and spatial displacements didn’t exist. Plainly, there’s no such thing as a hereditary factor that does not occur in space and is not affected by spatial displacements, both those that affect the parents before conception and those that affect the mother and a prospective child before birth. It is thus invalid to speak of ‘the influence of heredity’ on an organism if one means by this only a genetic process that functions without being affected by the spatial Laws of Reality. Since we know for certain that spatial displacements, including celestial ones, affect people and their traits after birth, it is reasonable to assume that their effects are even greater on a more-sensitive embryo or fetus.

Those who believe that the genes cause a given situation in our brain or body are making the same logical error as those psychic determinists in psychology who say that a childhood trauma caused some particular symptoms in an adult. Just as no one can prove that any earlier trauma is the cause of a later psychologic problem, we cannot prove that our genes alone are the sole cause of anything . Isn’t it possible that a gene, during its formation and thereafter, is shaped in part by environmental displacements from various sources, including celestial ones? And wouldn’t any such displacements then be among the causes of the gene’s later effects on a subject? The mistake in both cases is in not going back as far as possible in the chain of linked events to uncover all the causes and the most fundamental cause of the situation being studied, as we rightly expect our scientists to do. In that chain of reasoning, if any earlier cause is even possible, then no later event that influences that situation can be blindly assumed to be its final cause.

But heredity is not our subject here, so let’s just say that by ‘character’ we mean

what the genetic and birthing processes, as affected by environmental displacements, have made of us by the time of our birth and personhood. Our geneticists have made great strides in their science as it affects health care, but they’ll never be able to explain enough about our innate character to make a difference to us until they include in their science the study of the effects of our broader environment on the genetic process itself. There is nothing about our formation or our later life that is not affected by those natural displacements which they have chosen to ignore.

Studying Character Backwards

Let me modify my criticisms a bit by noting that at least one team of modern psychologists has vaguely suggested that we humans do have a congenital nature. This team used puppet-show tests on six- and ten-month old babies that seemed to indicate that all humans have an innate moral sense, since babies of that preverbal age couldn’t have acquired from their life experiences the sense of good and bad that they displayed in these tests.

This narrow study was reported in Nature magazine in November 2007 by three Yale University psychologists, and if you wish to compare their conclusions on our moral reasoning with with those that I offer later, you can read that article online. You will see there that they reached this partialized conclusion backwards. That is, not as I did forty years earlier, from a theory that implies and explains our congenital nature and its causes, but from the same quaternary, ex post facto research that has always limited their science.

Thus their summary said, “This capacity may serve as the foundation of moral thought and action, and its early developmental emergence s the view that social evaluation is a biological adaptation.” Though it’s not clearly stated here, apparently they mean that our “social evaluation” abilities (whatever those are) result solely from “developmental,” or postnatal, “biological adaptation.” If that’s what they mean, that conclusion wasn’t ed by their tests. In fact, nothing in those tests indicated the cause of the babies’ decisions, so why, but for an academic bias against innate causes, would they presume to suggest any cause? And what about the individual differences in our moral reasoning? Should we assume that these differences arise only after birth, and indeed after the age of this test’s subjects, who it seems showed no such differences? What their tests actually suggest is that this moral “capacity” is more likely to be innate than postnatally acquired. Fine, now let them expand their perspective to explain that fact, which they can do more fully and objectively by holding, as I

do, that besides the personality that we develop after birth, we all have at birth a congenital character that influences how we reason, both similarly and differently, on moral issues throughout our lifetime.

Our Need for Astrology

Our two old sciences of human nature, astrology and modern psychology, are empiristic (synthetic, nontheoretical) disciplines that observe some parts of events, describe and speculate on them, and then test their hypotheses in practice. But astrology also uses analytic (definitive) methods to study character, which modern psychology ignores, except for some bits of knowledge proposed by geneticists. I don’t advocate either science as against the other. Instead, I hold that we need a new science because neither one can meet our urgent need to understand human nature. Humanology won’t replace them, it will just supersede them by proposing the analytic theories they lack and by assuming responsibility for intellectual progress in its two main contexts: the psychologic in general and human nature in particular.

Nevertheless, because some people don’t accept the validity of any astrological premise or method, I must defend those assumptions and methods of genethlaic astrology that my metaphysics defines as realistic and sound.

In 1975, an obscure academic magazine printed articles attacking astrology, clearly with its editor’s foreknowledge that The New York Times would this conspiracy against free thought in science by reporting those opinions as a firstpage event, a placement that ensures that this ‘news’ will be noticed and echoed by many other media corporations. This effort was unusual because academics rarely offer explicit arguments against astrology, since this would only expose their own illogic, and though it was a poor attempt to prove their case, I know of no better one to mention in their behalf. (See The Humanist, September/October 1975, published by the American Humanist Association and the American Ethical Union; editor, Paul Kurtz.)

The first article, Objections to Astrology, was just a short statement denying astrology’s validity signed by 186 “leading scientists,” mostly astronomers. This was followed by an article entitled A Critical Look at Astrology written by the astronomer Bart J. Bok, whose science qualifies no one in the epistemic and psychologic issues that alone tell us how to define a science and judge the validity of its reasoning. He began with the naïve argument from substance:

The foundations of astrology began to crumble when we came to realize how vanishingly small are the forces exerted by the celestial objects on things and people on earth—and how very small are the amounts of radiation associated with them received on earth.

Beyond this, he offered a straw-man argument against mystical astrologers only. He thus ignored the fact that every science has mystical as well as realistic practitioners, and that a science must be judged by its best practitioners, not its worst ones. He then appended to his article an irrelevant opinion by a modern psychologist who railed against this “magical practice” without mentioning that by then, thanks in part to Jung’s influence, many modern psychologists were already using astrology.

The next article, Astrology: Magic or Science?, was written by Lawrence E. Jerome, a freelance writer who offered a narrowed history of the science to buttress his claim that the roots of astrology lie in primitive magic. His basic argument was this: magic uses “the principle of correspondences” and so does astrology; therefore, astrology is like magic, and since we all know that magic is inane, it follows that astrology is also inane. The illogic here is plain; first, astrology and magic are not equivalents and, second, we can show that the historical source of any basic science today was just such primitive reasoning, or ‘magic’. From his reasoning it follows that our geometricians, psychologists, physicists, and other scientists are also practicing magic, since they all use some form of the real principle of correspondence (similarity, equivalence, congruence) daily in their work.

This conspiracy didn’t work because not all astrological practice is mystical and illogical, and because many intelligent people, including modern psychologists, know this by their common logic or their study of astrology. They also know that none of astrology’s fundamental assumptions were ever refuted by any science. Moreover, no science has yet had the epistemic foundation that would make it competent to judge the logical validity of any science, or of any theory for that matter.

Though most of the old arguments for or against astrology are made irrelevant by the theories we’ve considered so far, I should still state here the conclusive argument that follows from them. Our metaphysics holds that the defining essence of any event is its spatial field, and that every motion system shall be disrupted and ultimately destroyed by the influence of other motion systems within it or around it. But it defines this influence as solely spatial, so that motion systems will ‘collide’ merely if their spaces overlap, even if their defining particles (substance) never touch each other. Therefore, any interference in the space of an event is a displacement of that whole event, which is also to say that any overlapping of the spaces of two or more motion systems must cause mutual alterations in those systems.

Reality’s extremes, the greatest and the least possible space, mark the limits of our displacement principle. Reality has no space beyond it in which to move, so it cannot be displaced, and while we can split an atom, we cannot divide or internally alter the smallest possible space. This smallest space I leave for physicists to identify, but I believe that it can only be altered externally, in its direction of motion, as when light waves bend. So we can accept Heisenberg’s (1901-76) interference hypothesis, so long as we understand that it doesn’t apply to those two spatial limits of Reality.²⁵

So our premise in this debate on astrology is a corollary of our displacement principle, one that has been confirmed by quantum physics and should be accepted by psychologists and geneticists: Any interference in the space of a motion system alters that system. But if this is so, then astrology is a

fundamental science, because its method is to define the spaces of major objects moving around us and to study those spaces as the causes of displacements that alter all motion systems in their range, including our internal processes before, during, and after birth.

Most of astrology’s truths result from its analysis of the terrestrial and the earthsun motion systems, two spatial fields that are continually altered by their own motion and that of major bodies of or intruders in our solar system. I know of no astrologist who has ever made the absurd claim that celestial bodies emanate particles (or “radiation”) that affect us on earth. That’s merely what ignorant scientists from other fields assume that astrologists believe. As their methods prove, astrologists have always known that the only effects that celestial bodies have on us result from changes in their spatial position. And, much as physicists hold that gravity is a warping of space rather than a ‘force’ of radiating particles, those effects on us occur solely because our personal spatial field is being continually displaced by the movements of all bodies in the space around us.

Astrology doesn’t study substances, it studies spaces, or dimensionality, and this requires the analytic reasoning that alienates all synthetic reasoners. Our astronomers’ dislike of astrology arose this way: originally there was only one science, astrology, but it split into two because those astrologers who broke away to make astronomy a distinct science were formalists who disliked doing primary, secondary, and tertiary reasoning.

Far from “crumbling” in the modern era, astrology’s foundation as a science has been confirmed by modern physics: first when it restated the ancient views that time is relative and that our common notion of substance is an illusion, and then, more recently, by its proof of its interference principle.

But astrology is also unique among our sciences for another reason: because it tries to relate the apparently discrete realms of internal and external events. The critics of astrology are advocates of ignorance, for what they are arguing in

effect is that we humans must never try to relate these realms, both of which consist of real events. But they can only deny that there is a bridge between these two kinds of events with arguments based on the mystical dualisms of timespace and mind-body, which are the truly inane notions in this debate. And because those old dualisms also deceived traditional astrologers, they were unable to defend their science against these dogmatic attacks properly.

Astrologers over millennia failed to bridge our psychologic and nonpsychologic worlds because this cannot be done through our traditional intellectual system. So the most damning criticism of traditional astrology by its critics is one that I agree with; namely, that its practitioners cannot explain why the spatial displacements they study have the psychologic meanings they attribute to them. But, then, neither can modern psychologists substantiate their speculations on how external events affect our internal processes. This same basic flaw also exists in theology, which proposes a supernatural external ‘reality’ without explaining how it could possibly be linked to our internal realities—or, for that matter, to the external realities of our spatial world.

But our new science changes this, for astrology at least. With its new standard of human reasoning, it can give true meanings to the ancient invalid meanings that astrologers have long been repeating and using to relate external displacements to internal events.

The main reason why some astrological methods work in practice is that they analyze certain spaces of Reality and their displacements. That understood, we can now end the old confusions about astrology’s psychologic premises by stating its actual theory, which I do below. But we can only do this in the context of humanology. Neither astrology nor modern psychology can be our science of human nature because they both deal with other subjects; because they have no theory, no standard of reasoning to explain our common logic; and because they are incomplete—that is, they don’t include all the methods and disciplines, including genetics, that we need in a sound science of human nature.

Recognizing these weaknesses, some practitioners proposed merging astrology and modern psychology to yield what some call ‘astropsychology’ or ‘psychological astrology’, but this couldn’t work. It’s easy to see why they would propose this merger. As they became more aware of their own science’s limitations, they realized that something had to be done to improve it, but as formalists they didn’t see that its chief failing was its lack of a sound theory. So they tried to paste both sciences together, which let them continue their work without changing the synthetic way of reasoning, called ‘the empirical method’, that had blocked the progress of both sciences all along.

This ‘solution’ does nothing but give us another incomplete science that ignores its fundamental theoretical dilemmas. Two wrongs cannot make a right, so such a merger still leaves us with no science that deals with our whole nature, that has a sound theory, and that gives true meanings to its old descriptive .

The Theory of Humanology

As with our metaphysics, the theory of any science begins with the principles of occurrence and abstraction, or the propositions that ‘Context X is the whole event’ and that ‘Any subevent of Context X is a motion system’. So in expressing a science’s theory, we don’t need to state these primary principles each time. But when we reach the abstract concept, which begins our secondary reasoning, we have distinctions to make in the science, so we must always state the last three principles.

For example, physicists might propose the following principles as their science’s theory. Third, as its dimensionality principle, their belief (if they can actually state it) that any motion system has four or more dimensions, with a corollary on how its parts move. Fourth, as its displacement principle, a broader statement of Heisenberg’s interference principle. And fifth, as its correspondence principle, Einstein’s statement that the laws of physics are the same in any inertial frame of reference, or motion system.

The theory of humanology is similarly analytic, and for that reason it will seem more like the premises of astrology than those of modern psychology.

3. The Principle of Unique Character

This is our dimensionality principle stated in characterial : Any thing is uniquely defined by its spatial position.

From this it follows that a diagram of the major overlapping spatial fields at the birth of any event, living or nonliving, is a dynamic illustration of that event’s character, or spatial relativity. Every event is stamped at its birth with the character of its space (formerly space-time). Nonliving events also have such characters, and a psychologic science must consider these to the extent that they affect living things. Astrologists have always studied the character of nonliving events, especially human creations (like a state, family, corporation, or constitution) that affect human affairs, and our new science must do this also. When an event begins, it starts to acquire its personality, but this doesn’t alter what it was at first: a distinct spatial event with a limited life and range of motion. Some old confusions are clarified by this third principle, mainly these four.

Conception versus Birth. Critics of astrology have argued that the true beginning of any event is its conception and not its birth, but this is not so. Since the uniqueness of an event is its spatial position, any reference that we make to the formative process that created it refers to a different spatial event, and it is fallacious to mix two contexts of reference in an argument. If we don’t consistently hold that the point of birth is the true beginning and distinct identity of any creation, such as a new organism or a new notion (idea), then either we are accepting an infinite regression of causes or we are arbitrarily selecting as its immediate cause one event in the entire chain of prior events.

This is why it is contradictory for one who accepts astrology to oppose abortions. Astrologists know that a distinct, unique person only comes into existence at birth, but antiabortionists (who to be consistent must also oppose natal astrology) assume that a distinct person is created solely by an act of conception and nothing further. This is nonsense, of course, for much more is needed after that initial act to make a distinct person, after which it is the birth alone that sums all this up and makes a real and whole individual, or a unique motion system.

For example, imagine a case where a fetus develops normally until a day shortly before its birth, when it acquires a major disease or defect that will affect the person to be born from birth to death. Can we say that the act of conception caused that defect, or must we wait until the infant is delivered to see how its innate character is affected by all the prenatal events it has experienced— including its mother’s health and good or bad habits, physicians’ interventions, and internal or external accidents? We must wait, of course, for it is irrational to claim that this person who was just born was shaped (or formed into a being) by the act of conception alone. Until the birth has occurred, we can’t speak realistically of that being-in-formation as a real and whole person.

Our metaphysics keeps our thinking straight on this, for it tells us that a whole event is defined only by its spatial relativity. Nothing is a distinct event or a valid context of reference until it has been born and exists separately. So when you

refer to either a notion in your mind or a fetus in your womb (which in this context are equivalents), you are not referring to the future notion or child that later might exist independently. Until an idea or a fetus has been born into its own space and path of motion, it is not a distinct event, or motion system; it is just an internal part of its carrier’s space and path. The error here is that one cannot validly speak of the birthing process and the process of a thing’s postnatal life as if they were the same process. They are distinct processes by definition. An event’s conception is always internal to its conceiver, so while we can speak hypothetically of an idea or a fetus as if it had been born, it is not yet a unique external event. Any internal event in our mind or body that has not been externalized has no life of its own. Strictly speaking, then, to study the prenatal development of an organism is not to study life; it is to study the formation of life in a totally different motion system.

As for the specious arguments by the conception-is-personhood advocates that a fetus ‘feels’ pain or pleasure and therefore is ‘alive’ before its birth, this is just wordplay. The fact that fetuses can be stimulated by events in the womb and will move in response to provocations doesn’t mean that they are feeling sensations as wholly formed organisms do. By definition, a feeling or sensation requires consciousness, and yet no one has proven that a fetus has that essential quality of life. Consciousness is an awareness of self, and there is no ‘self’ for any thing that does not exist in space independently. Our common sense tells us that we acquire consciousness and are a unique self only at the moment of our birth and not an instant before.

Accordingly, any social science, including jurisprudence, must begin its reasoning about a person from the point of his or her birth in space and independence from the mother’s space, for otherwise it is not reasoning logically. Until it has a time of birth, no real person, legal person (corporation), or fictional character can exist.²

Destiny. It is an ancient belief that the birth of an event determines its destiny, or fate, meaning a future end that is a consequence of its beginning in space. This is true in one sense and not in another. We are fated from birth by the character we were born with, which we cannot change, so our flaws and strengths of character are with us in every decision we make in our lives, and over the long run these have some predictable consequences. On the other hand, our power of locomotion (acceleration) lets us change our direction, so in some respects we can alter the path of motion on which we were dispatched at birth, and external forces can change our future path no matter what we may be or decide. So the term ‘destiny’ is ambiguous. Some events that affect us result from our inalterable congenital characteristics, and in that sense we can say they are destined to be, but most events that affect us lie with others or nature, or beyond our control, and these cannot be said to be destined in any personal sense.

Forecasting. A methodological issue in our new science is how best to predict future changes in a person’s personality and situation. Psychologists seldom try to do this and generally have no objective method for it. Astrologists attempt it with various kinds of postnatal charts, some of which are and some of which aren’t scientifically acceptable. But no astrological chart in itself, apart from the intuition of its interpreter, can predict changes that are caused by external interferences or our will, because any forecast assumes either that a current trend will continue uninterrupted or that an anticipated disruption of that trend will probably occur.

For instance, an astrological chart for a future date assumes that our solar system will be basically unchanged then, but nothing precludes a celestial cataclysm that alters it. Similarly, our learning experiences include many interferences that cause us to accelerate (change direction). Forecasting changes in people’s personality is thus largely a matter of making educated guesses, or synthetic speculations, about future events and their external or internal effects on us. And the opposition between character and personality tells us that in some areas astrologists will make the better guesses and in other areas modern psychologists will.

Essentially, all forecasters can only track changes of direction (acceleration). But astrologists differ in this because, rather than just tracking changes in ex post facto statistics (such as population shifts, market indexes, opinion surveys, and so on), they first track events like the seasons and planetary motions—broad spatial trends that have been proven to affect our inner and outer experiences. These celestial trends are also altered by interferences, but far less often than the human affairs we measure, which are manipulated daily by proactive conspirators. It is this longer time, or distance, between disruptions in their basic assumptions, and only this, that gives astrologists a greater power to predict future events than nonastrological forecasters have. Free Will

Free Will. Our metaphysics tells us that any organism is free only to the extent that it has the power of locomotion and acceleration; that is, the ability to change the direction of its present path in space, physically or psychologically. We know, for instance, that some people stay in one area all their lives and travel only ively, as the spinning earth or other people dictate, and that some, in the same ive way, never alter the direction of their reasoning. Both kinds of change alter our perspective and give us a new personality, but everything beyond our personal power of acceleration is determined for us, either ultimately by Reality or relatively by other motion systems (including people) that dictate our motion or otherwise interfere with it.

As for absolute determinism, or fatalism, there is an element of truth in this, but only in the ways that we are subject to the inalterable Laws of Reality that rule every subevent, such as our spatial relativity and our termination as a unique event. Anything else that affects us is relative, so it is subject to interference and alteration. Nothing relative is fixed forever, so our path in life, like the direction of a market or our politics, is merely our current trend. We can alter it voluntarily in some respects, but not in others, and it is a task of our new science to distinguish these cases.

4. The Principle of Spatial Interference

Our science’s displacement principle, which has been observed in astrology since its inception, is this: Any interference with the space of a motion system alters that system and its environment.

Astrologists use the same coordinate systems and methods used in astronomy. By these objective methods, they track the motion systems in our field of experience and then, with the hypothetical reasoning used in every science, they study the effects of these motions on us. They study a person’s motion on earth, the motions of the earth itself, and the motion of all significant bodies within the solar system. Some also look for the effects on us caused by more-distant spatial events such as constellations, fixed stars, black holes, supernova, and so on.

No one knows for certain how far beyond the earth the spatial displacements that affect us extend. But in an organic science it is invalid to speak of environmental influences on an organism when what we mean by this is arbitrarily restricted, as it is in modern psychology, biology, and genetics, which at present study only an organism’s social and proximate natural environment. There is no good reason why an arbitrarily selected piece of the earth or even the whole earth should be considered the upper limit of environmental influences on terrestrial organisms. Those who use such a narrowed limit have the burden of proving that it actually is the upper limit of effects. But they have never done that, and they have ignored all the empirical evidence offered by astrologists which proves that the limit of spatial displacements that affect us lies far beyond the earth. And until we know that limit for certain, any science is unsound if it narrows this distance merely to make the work of its practitioners easier.

5. The Principle of Event Relation

The correspondence principle of humanology is: Every event is related to every other event in its dynamics as a motion system.

Both astrology and modern psychology observe this principle, but they don’t express it. It is plainly used in astrology, which tracks motion systems and uses this principle to relate various systems to their different psychologic effects on people. Its use in modern psychology is less obvious, but just as a physicist cannot study events in the Andromeda galaxy without assuming that the universal laws of physics (its theory) that hold in our galaxy will also hold there, so a psychologist cannot study humans without assuming that the universal laws of psychology (its theory) will hold for all of them. We can’t avoid using this relational principle because then we would have to reason without our concepts, or our universal and class ideas.

Humanology also disputes modern psychology and biology on another limit, for it holds that any organism’s relations extend even beyond the limits of its species or genus. Since every subevent of Reality is subject to the Laws of Reality, each has a dynamic relation to every other subevent. As individuals, we are each related in different ways to all other humans, all living things, and all nonliving processes in Reality. If we think that we’re not related to these other things, it is only because we have chosen to ignore the patterns of motion that do relate us to them.

The Study of Human Nature

Following the theory just described, humanologists will reason about human nature from these premises: (1) Individuals are unique and are the only reality in any collective, so we must understand them before we speculate about the nature of their artificial collectives or classes. (2) To understand the uniqueness of individuals we must consider the spatial factors that cause it and then distinguish its opposite senses, character and personality. (3) Our character is caused by all the prenatal factors of heredity and space (environment) that shape it, and it is complete only at the instant of our birth as an independent motion system. (4) Every postnatal factor that affects our developed personality does so not by itself, but through our congenital character.

Our first methodological question is how to determine an individual’s character. When we learn that genetic factors cause our gender, the color of our eyes or hair, our propensity to certain illnesses, and so on, we learn something about human nature, but very little, and nothing at all about how we reason. The belief that genetic factors alone will someday tell us all that we need to know about our character is wishful thinking, for they are the substance of the matter, not the dynamics of it. To understand a person, we must consider genetic and other prenatal factors in the context of the spatial displacements in the environment, and this requires astrological methods of some kind.

Our work as humanologists would be easier if we could assume that a natal chart shows only the inalterable characteristics of a person, but this is not so. It diagrams the major spatial fields at birth, but these record both inalterable factors of character and alterable factors of personality that start changing immediately after birth. Astrologists therefore supplement the natal chart with other charts based on it, such as progressed, relocation, and return charts for later times. The natal factors that are altered with aging or relocation must also be

considered.

The four intellectual dispositions that we considered earlier are determined by some natal factors that are inalterable and by some that can be changed by relocation. But the four permutations in each of our five psychologic systems (which I define later), such as our four basic moral attitudes or political attitudes, are inalterable characteristics—not in the sense that their effects cannot be modified by experiences and decisions after birth, but rather in the sense that their directional impulses in our reasoning never change. Each such impulse is like a tide against which we must swim or to which we must surrender. And to determine these distinct dispositions of character, humanology will use, for as long as it seems valid, a new astrological method that I derived from the Consideration Cycle; one that employs only a subject’s natal chart.

Besides the new methods introduced here, our science must also use the valid methods of astrology and genetics that reveal factors of character, and those of modern psychology, astrology, neurology, and other human sciences that reveal factors of personality. But since geneticists don’t consider the effects of spatial displacements on the processes they study and may not do so for some time, we must start by studying congenital character without them, or with astrological methods only.

As for modern psychology, on the whole it has already excused itself from any concern for what a human’s congenital character might be. Also, neurologists and related scientists are doing some extraordinary work today in studying our brain’s functioning, but they are doing it logically backwards. That is, because they have no analytic theory on the subject, they too are ignoring spatial displacements and are working backwards from the ex post facto study of this tangible object, the brain.

We must also break our bad habit as traditionalists of trying to explain people partialistically, in congenital or postnatal only. Our new science will

correct those traditional astrologers who ignore the valid findings of modern psychologists. It will also correct the narrow perspective of those modern psychologists and other human scientists who use ex post facto class reasoning to explain people solely through their education, family history, cultures, religions, ideologies, political opinions, and other postnatal experiences.

Humanology will also free us of the illogical conception in modern psychology known as psychic determinism. That hypothesis, which Freud borrowed from others, holds that traumatic experiences in early life shape our later choices and personality. Of course they do, for that’s what we mean by ‘a traumatic experience’. But what caused that experience in the first place? To what extent was it caused by a subject’s congenital character, by postnatal spatial displacements, or by other people? Though this old assumption is circular, vague, and plainly wrong, it is deeply imbedded in all modern thought about human nature. Indeed, as far as I know and excluding those that explain nothing, there isn’t a single biography, novel, play, or movie of the past century that has not used it, and only it, to give its audience this simplistic, always incomplete explanation of the ‘causes’ of its characters’ nature, situation, or behavior.

There are numerous logical errors in this basic assumption of psychoanalysis, and hence in every academic study, news article, court decision, biography, or fictional work that relies on it. The first is the question begging just noted. There are always earlier events in our life that influenced our present personality, but pointing to and merely describing them after the fact doesn’t tell us their cause or their relative importance to us. The second is its causal assumption, for the claim that an earlier experience caused a later effect must be proven in each case, and not just assumed from an unsubstantiated general hypothesis on psychologic causation. The third is that an analyst cannot know whether both events, the traumatic one and any later one said to be caused by it, were not the effects of some earlier cause that he or she is ignoring, such as a congenital characteristic. The fourth is that at all times in an analysis, it ignores spatial displacements. The fifth is that it applies determinism to relative life events, which is to universalize a synthetic hypothesis and invalidly use it as if it was an absolute analytic principle. The sixth is that it fails to acknowledge congenital character. In a

world where innate character, or uniqueness, is not understood, an analyst has no basis for concluding that any kind of early ‘traumatic’ event will cause the same kind of psychologic problem, or any problem for that matter, in everyone.

But the chief error of psychic determinism, and of historical, economic, biological, environmental, and political determinism as well, is its denial of our free will. It denies our power to accelerate, to change our direction psychologically or physically, and it doesn’t for the power of others to force or entice us to do so against our will.

Determinism applies only to our universal attributes, not to our relative ones, which are alterable and subject to interferences. For instance, as a subevent of Reality our death is predetermined, but how, when, and where we die is not. And if we were affected by a major event early in life, we may no longer be; we may have suppressed it, true, but we may also have sured it. Psychoanalysts propose both psychic determinism and the power of their therapy to overcome its harmful effects, which is to it that with some individuals those effects might be avoided. But this we all know anyway from the many healthy people around us who have overcome such early-life traumas without their help, and the new astrological method that I present later tells us objectively just which individuals are most or least likely to do that.

Psychic determinism is also cynical, for it universalizes the fact that almost all of us had some unpleasant experiences in childhood in order to conclude the universal ‘principle’ that we are all sick. Freud, a conservative, expressed this absolute cynicism in his ‘Oedipus complex’. Here again he borrowed from ancient Greek literature; this time from a play that expresses the strict view of justice, or criminal liability, that no sane society would ever impose on its people. This fictional ‘complex’ of his is a nontheistic form of the unsubstantiated religious doctrine of original sin, which suggests that, like religion and behaviorism, psychoanalysis was intended by him to serve rightist social and political ends.

It is question-begging and arbitrary for a psychoanalyst to ignore character and spatial displacements, to search for early-life experiences that may have influenced later events, and then to assert that genetics plus one or a few of these traumatic experiences suffice to define someone’s personality. Modern psychologists who use this incomplete and unscientific method will prejudge a patient at the first interview to determine the kind of early events they are searching for, hence the question begging, and then they can only select those events from an incomplete list in the patient’s memory or records, hence the arbitrariness. Any composite picture of a person that they reach in this way is thus subjective and seriously incomplete.

As I said above, in seeking the causes of someone’s personality, it is invalid to stop wherever one chooses in the backward chain of causation; such a search must go back at least to that person’s birth, and sometimes before that. Modern psychology tells us nothing of our innate character; at best it can only give us, ex post facto, a small piece of the picture of our present personality. And any conclusions that jurists, politicians, social scientists, or others reach from its arbitrary snapshots are similarly fallacious, and hence unjust.

Astrology and modern psychology are both theoryless sciences, so they are often unrealistic. Some have suggested that we should merge them, but two wrongs cannot make a right, as misguided attempts to do this have already proven. Each science has different goals, methods, and patrons, and is not dedicated to understanding psychologic processes in general and human nature in particular. Their lack of theory and logic blocked their progress in many areas, so they contributed to the failures of the other human sciences, which in a vicious circle then blocked further progress in them.

Still, you might note as we proceed that while the psychologic facts uncovered here cannot be explained through experiential or genetic events, they are explained by astrological events. Suddenly, then, at the dawn of the new era, the role of astrology has become more important to our sciences and our social and political systems than it ever was. Moreover, any person who is ignorant of its

realistic premises and methods will not be able to participate in the progressive thinking of their time.

This is another reason why we can only solve the problems of understanding human nature by establishing a new science such as I am proposing here. It may be a while before humanology is accepted and coopted by our rightist academic institutions, but we can establish it now in our minds, work, and intellectual networks without academia—the thinking of which has always been in need of a revolution. Only such a science will be able to explain our whole nature as humans and individuals, and if we structure it soundly, it will then be difficult for any state, religion, science, communication medium, or other corporation or social institution to manipulate us.

They do this, , in two time-tested ways, the purpose of which is to make us all irrational. Their blunt way is to promote fears in us, through words or terrorist acts. Their other way, which is more effective in the long run, is to teach and continually repeat false notions about reality, our species, our individual and social nature and the proper role of science in our entire reasoning process.

Chapter 5. Our Psychologic Process

General Issues

We have examined the Consideration Cycle analytically to see its structure, cardinal ideas, and quadrantal modes, but now we must consider it synthetically, or psychologically, to add to that framework some of the intermediate ideas that we cognize within the quadrants. People vary in how many such ideas they cognize, as I said, but since we must keep our standard universal to our species, we’ll consider here only those intermediate ideas that, barring physical damage, are cognized by us all.

The Cycle’s structural elements and cardinal ideas are defined by our terrestrial motion system, but our major intermediate ideas are defined by the spatial displacements caused by the ten main astrological planets. I’m sure that displacements caused by other celestial bodies also affect us, but to date too little empirical evidence has been offered for us to promote these influences to the level of universally held epistemic ideas. Also, before our various kinds of historians assume that people’s character in the past was the same as it is today, they should that our solar system itself changes over time and that people change accordingly.

Subject to the empirical evidence I offer later, my tertiary hypothesis here is that because we distinctly cognize the spatial displacements caused by the ten main astrological planets, the universal Consideration Cycle has ten major epistemic ideas that perform some of our most important psychologic functions. Though we must take many other factors into also, these ten cognitions and the five conscious psychologic systems that we construct from them, which are shown in their logical order in Figure 6, are the heart of my psychologic theory. We will consider each of those five systems in turn in the next chapter; here our task is to understand some general issues that apply to all of them.

The Whole Cycle

Each turn of the Consideration Cycle proceeds in the same way, and the entire process is basically this. An act of consideration begins with our perception of an external or internal event, and if we consider that whole event further, we next cognize what I call a ‘wish response’ relative to it. In the rest of that cycle, we transform this initial global wish into a specific personal power to act. Thus the Cycle as a whole is a wish-to-power cycle, and we all experience this perfectionistic drive continuously. Our goal in any consideration of an event is to achieve an understanding of it that will give us the power to act with respect to it, either immediately or in the future. But whether our power is immediate or potential, it is an understanding, or the integrated physical and mental learning, that we achieve before we decide to act or not act. In a sense, then, our power is our understanding.

But let us that, because our metaphysics holds that all motion is helical, the form of our whole Consideration Cycle is a spiral—which, like the shell of a snail, begins at a center and expands outward as it moves farther from that center. This is why for some purposes, such as analyzing the differences in how children and adults consider reality, we must visualize the Cycle not as shown in Figure 6, but as having two turns rather than one. The inner turn is how the young reason, and it consists of only the first pole of each system (points 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9), and the outer turn, which shows how older people reason, adds in due time the second pole of each psychologic system (points 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10) to the first turn. Thus, in distinct stages as they age, people who mature normally come to reason as Figure 6 shows.

This point is important for another reason also. Recently psychologists studying the structure of the brain tried to quantify its various functions, which is illogical since they have no overall conception of the entire process. This led some of them to claim that the parts of the brain that affect our emotions are more active

than the parts that control other functions. This is a convenient notion for modern psychologists because most of them overemphasize the role of our emotions in our psychologic, but the Cycle shows that we mustn’t draw any conclusions from a mere quantitative analysis of the functioning of the brain’s parts.

It also shows that their claim that there is more activity in our feeling system than in our other systems is partly true and partly false. It may be true for most of us with respect to our will and thought systems which function before our feeling system, but only because those systems deal with primary and secondary issues, which, since they are more fundamental, we don’t need to consider as often as we consider emotional issues. But it is not true with respect to our judgment and power systems, which function after our feeling system, because these systems are less fundamental and so deal with far more issues than our feeling system does. In a typical day, we are far more active in deciding whether we should do something and how we should do it than we are in reflecting on the feelings we had before we made any such moral or practical decision.

Impulses

As our focus advances in the Cycle, we experience the ten major epistemic ideas mentioned above and numbered in Figure 6, each of which has what I call an ‘impulse’. These congenital impulses are among the most important of our characteristics. They reflect the fact that an epistemic idea has only two possible directions of cognition; that is, we can cognize it either by projecting (creating, transmitting) it from our internal reality or by assimilating (observing, receiving) it from external reality. So most of us are both creator-transmitters and observerreceivers, and an ordinary act of communication is not, as we say, a two-way street, but rather a four-lane highway, where each party is at all times both sending and receiving.

These two cognitive directions are alternatives, but not choices. As our birth in space determines and as our natal chart indicates, every time we arrive at a certain epistemic idea, we always use the same impulse to consider it and never the other.

I refer to these impulses as the polarity or charge of our reasoning at each numbered point in the Cycle. If we are impelled to transmit a cognition from our internal reality, we speak of that impulse as projective and say that it has a positive charge (+). But if we are impelled to receive a cognition from outside ourselves, we speak of it as assimilative and say that it has a negative charge (–).

So we function with either a positive or negative charge at each of these ten major cognitive points; that is, we are naturally impelled to transmit (project) it or receive (assimilate) it and we cannot do the opposite. The best we can do if we realize that our natural impulse at a point is the opposite of what our standard defines as the logical charge there, is to impose on our reasoning some conscious artificial steps, or explicated reasoning, that may lessen some of its harmful effects. Any ability we have to overcome a point of illogic in our natural reasoning is therefore due to our learning and languages, which we use more often to rationalize our illogical reasoning.

Systems and Phases

The next question is, How do these ten sequential cognitions relate to each other as adjacent pairs in the Cycle? This is important because it is as pairs that they define ten intervals of considerational space—except that, because the Cycle is a helix and not a circle, in a single act of consideration the topmost interval functions like two spaces. In Figure 6 the Cycle is shown open at the top to reflect the fact that one half of the top interval is connected to the previous act of consideration and the other half to the next act. This top interval differs from the Cycle’s other intervals for three reasons. First, no other interval is directly connected to any prior or later act of consideration or to any nonpsychologic event; they are all confined to our reasoning about the current context. Second, its halves have opposite functions: starting or ending an act of consideration. Third, it is divided by our most powerful cognition, the complete percept by which we perceive events (or whole contexts) and begin a reasoning act.

All ten of the Cycle’s intervals are defined by a polar pair of epistemic ideas, and when we consider the plus or minus charges of these polar cognitions, shown in Figure 6 as the standard Cycle prescribes them, we see that these ten spaces are of two kinds, depending on whether their two cognitions have like or unlike charges. From our metaphysics, which sees ‘charge’ as a matter of spatial direction, and from the familiar example of magnetic impulses, we will hypothesize that like charges repel and unlike charges attract. Subject to empirical testing, then, we will hold that the two cognitions of each such space either cohere as attracting ideas to form a tight bipolar system or they will repel each other to prevent the formation of such a system.

The standard Cycle thus has two basic kinds of psychologic space. In the four spaces with cognitions of like charge, ( – – ) or ( + + ), their repulsion moves our consideration rapidly from the first to the second pole. But in the six spaces bordered by unlike charges, ( – + ) or ( + – ), their attraction delays our

consideration, and we can’t move on in our reasoning until we have reconciled these opposite polar impulses.

I distinguish these ten psychologic spaces with these names. The Cycle’s top interval is the prime interval, the halves of which in a single act of consideration are the initiating and the terminating intervals. The other five cohering spaces, shown as boxes in Figure 6, are our psychologic systems, and the four repelling spaces shown as lines between these systems are our psychologic phases.

The prime interval is of great psychologic significance, but I won’t discuss it in detail in this work because we aren’t considering how successive acts of consideration affect each other. It is a system when it relates two events, or contexts, but in a single consideration each of its halves functions like a phase.

We normally move quickly through a phase, but not a system. It takes a conscious effort to propel our reasoning out of each cohering system, and we exert that effort when we conclude that we have lingered there long enough to satisfy our present purpose. We all have some power to hasten, slow, or abort most acts of consideration, and we might linger in a system for several reasons— such as the importance of the context to us, our inability to handle that system’s logic, a difficulty in reconciling its two ideas, and the conflicts or harmonies of its ideas with those of our other systems.

In our logical standard, the two cognitions of a phase have the same charge, so that we either receive-receive ( – – ) or transmit-transmit ( + + ) there. These impulse directions, inward and outward, are respectively the reality-referents of our subjective and objective. Figure 6 shows that in our standard the phases in the first and third quadrants are subjective, or projective ( + + ), while those in the second and fourth quadrants are objective, or assimilative ( – – ). A mixed permutation, ( + – ) or ( – + ), makes a phase illogical in some way.

In the standard Cycle, the two poles, or cognitions, of a system have opposite charges that impel us to transmit-receive ( + – ) or receive-transmit ( – + ) there. A system functions wholly logically when it is both subjective and objective in the order shown in Figure 6, and if that order is reversed, then it functions wholly illogically. So Figure 6 shows that three of our systems are wholly logical only when we receive-transmit ( – + ) there, and that two of them are wholly logical only when we transmit-receive ( + – ) there. The other permutations, ( + + ) and ( – – ), make a system half illogical, in opposite ways.

The natural function of a psychologic system, and of the intellectual or social systems that we construct in imitation of it, is to reach a conclusion that reconciles some state of objectivity with some state of subjectivity. And the natural function of a phase is to serve as a memory bank in which we store some of the conclusions we reached in the psychologic system that precedes it.

Objectivity and Subjectivity

As Figure 6 illustrates, the memory functions of the six phases—that is, the four phases and the two halves of the prime interval that function as phases—reflect three different states of objectivity and three different states of subjectivity. This is contrary to our traditional notion, which has always held, for no particular reason, that there is only one kind of objectivity and only one kind of subjectivity.

Following that figure in counterclockwise order starting from the top, the first kind of objectivity is objective initiation, which is our first-quadrant mental awareness of the objective world in the form of events. The second kind is objective analysis, which is our second-quadrant physical awareness of the objective world, mainly through our senses. And the third kind is objective synthesis, which is our fourth-quadrant awareness of the objective world as being the combination of mental and physical objectivity, as in our ideas of substance and form. So the objective world is not just ‘mind’ and ‘body’, as we’ve long been told, but also their combination. It is obvious that we can’t understand substance or form with our senses alone, for we must also understand the event of the thing before us, which we can only do with our ‘mind’. For instance, to understand a person we need not just our senses but also our ‘mind’, which informs us of the real and whole event of that person and the situation in which he or she is appearing to us.

We also have three kinds of subjectivity: subjective analysis is our first-quadrant mental awareness of our internal functioning, subjective synthesis is our thirdquadrant physical awareness of that functioning, and subjective termination is our fourth-quadrant awareness of ourselves as the combination of our mental and physical functions, which we know as our powers or abilities.

Our Five Conscious Systems

After considering the most appropriate conventional for the functions of the five psychologic systems, I named them, in their natural and unvarying order, our will, thought, feeling, judgment, and power systems, abbreviated W, T, F, J, and P.

The prime interval differs from those systems because it bridges a current act of consideration to the previous and subsequent acts. So it is not a ‘system of reasoning’ in the sense that its reasoning is confined to only one context of reference. In its initiating half we store and relate past acts and events and our responses to them, and the better we are at this, the stronger our instincts are. In its terminating half, we store the memories of all our understandings, and the better we are at this, the greater our powers are. In each of the four other memory banks, or phases, we store some of the consciously reconciled conclusions that we produced in the preceding system. In those systems, we assign degrees of personal importance to each memory that we store in its memory bank so that we can more efficiently decide later whether or not to recall it.

It is speculative but not unreasonable to further propose that the hereditary process somehow causes individuals to begin life with a set of cultural and (to coin a needed adjective) specieal instincts that are already implanted in their prime interval’s memory bank. This is the only reality referent I can grant to Jung’s poorly named notion of a ‘collective unconscious’, which is better called a specieal or cultural instinct, since ‘unconscious’ in this sense only means more deeply subconscious. Something similar may also occur in our other memory banks, the Cycle’s four phases.

This explains (1) why so many false traditions persist in spite of our common

logic and the advent of new psychologic epochs or eras, (2) why it so difficult to uproot them in the public consciousness, and (3) why so many old mystical proposals (such as god, spirits, soul, innate ideas, the unconscious, reincarnation, or other worlds or dimensions) seem plausible today even to people who can consciously reason well. It also explains why none of the sacred texts of our religions reflect conceptions that were new when they were written. Given the extreme illogic, contradictions, fictions, lies, and myth-swapping of all those texts, it is inconceivable that any one of them was solely the product of someone’s conscious reasoning. Perhaps specieal or cultural instincts are not transferred through generations by the hereditary process, but it is hard to imagine anything else that can explain the persistence in our species over millennia of so many completely irrational notions.

Consciousness and Subconsciousness

Our distinction between the Cycle’s systems and phases also lets us define two other that traditionalists know only as ex post facto descriptions: consciousness and its opposite subconsciousness. In a psychologic system, we need time to reconcile its polar cognitions and move on, so we must either make a conscious effort to complete the reasoning of that system or we must abort that act of consideration there. This is not true of a psychologic phase, for its repelling poles force us through it too quickly to notice the age of any space there. We can store a memory there, but then we move on without focusing on its contents. By this factor of charge, then, the Cycle defines the five psychologic systems and the prime interval as the only intervals in which we are conscious of our reasoning.

Consciousness is caused by charge, but descriptively it is just a more intense focus, or extra step in our reasoning that is not much different from straining our muscles in physical work. This extra intensity is required to reconcile a system’s poles, the objective idea (–) and the subjective idea (+) that define it as a system. It is also why when we reach a system in a reconsideration we can withdraw (recall) a past experience from the prior phase. It is only this extra step and focus that lets us form a tangible conclusion that we can store in memory, which works much as photons paint on photographic film or as electric impulses fix a binary charge in a computer’s memory. Our conscious systems create or recall specific images; our subconscious phases merely store them.

This means, however, that our psychologic theory its no hypothetical state of unconsciousness; that is, no ‘unconscious’ or ‘collective unconscious’. We cannot have unconscious ideas or reasoning, because we define an idea as a psychologic impression, and we can’t have that impression without some part of us being aware (conscious) of it. So the issue is not whether we are aware of our ideas or reasoning, for we are always aware of them in some sense; rather, it is

whether we are aware of the extra step that we use to make them mentally tangible, which we must do to memorize them or explicate them. The notion of unconsciousness doesn’t contradict the notion of consciousness, it denies it, and so, as we saw earlier in discussing logic, they are not opposites.

Strictly speaking, the notion of an unconscious realm of memories is as absurd as the rationalists’ notion of a priori ideas, but if one only means by this that something that was previously conscious is now forgotten, then it is just a poor choice of words. It is common knowledge, and not the discovery of any modern psychologist, that we can forget by suppression or disuse something we once knew consciously, and that prodding by ourself or another may help us recall it. But anything that we concluded in a system was a consciously formed tangible notion at that time; otherwise we couldn’t recall it from its memory bank, not even with the best psychoanalyst to prod us.

The notions of ‘consciousness’ and ‘subconsciousness’, however, are opposites. But they don’t refer to epistemic ideas; they refer to our reasoning, or to the psychologic spaces that connect our cognitions, each of which has a distinct function. Our reasoning in a system is cohesive, which is why we can make tangible products there that we can use in speech and store in memory, but our reasoning in a phase is so fleeting that we can create nothing in it. Moreover, it must be the case, as the Cycle proposes, that we store different kinds of memories in separate subconscious spaces, for otherwise all our memories would rise to our consciousness when we try to do any sequential reasoning, which would then be impossible.

The distinction here is between reasoning that we do or don’t take extra time to notice. And we can only explicate our reasoning with symbols because our psychologic has these systems and phases that function together. That is, we first create or adopt a tangible conclusion in system A, then we store it in phase B, and later, when we reconsider that context, we recall it in system C.

Consider that sequence throughout the Cycle. For instance, if in a certain context you form a tangible motive (plan) in your will system, you will store it in the phase that follows, subjective analysis, and then, either immediately or later in reconsidering that event or one like it, you can recall it in the next system, your thought system. Or if in your feeling system you form a desire as a tangible conclusion, you would store it as a memory in the subjective synthesis phase, and later recall it from there in your judgment system. And so on. This confirms the sequence of the five psychologic systems, for we know that our will shapes our thoughts, which shape our ions, which shape our beliefs and other judgments, which shape our power and our behavior.

The Cycle’s notion of subconsciousness suggests that it is correct to claim, as we all do in some way, that we have ‘instinctive’ or ‘intuitive’ faculties. Traditionalists are aware of our conscious systems because these are amenable to explication and mere descriptions, but our subconscious phases mystify them because they don’t see our psychologic as the whole process that it is; nor do they see that our distinct subconscious functions must be directly connected to specific conscious functions. If they did, they would see that some people, including those we call ‘psychics’, have an exceptional sensitivity, or intelligence, that gives them a greater power than others have to sense the contents of their subconscious phases and to recall the memories stored there. In fact, there are people for whom acute memory is a serious psychologic problem. And some people also have more strength than others in the instinctive functions of one or both halves of the prime interval.

The Impulse Pattern

The Consideration Cycle gives us a new and powerful analytic tool; one that proves much of my psychologic theory. Specifically, we can determine the congenital charge at each of these major epistemic ideas from a person’s natal chart, record these impulses to form a pattern of ten charges, and get the equivalent of a psychologic X-ray of that person. But even though this picture is derived from a natal chart, it is not just a snapshot of one instant, for it reveals how that person will handle those psychologic functions throughout life. I refer to this full string of ten symbols as our Impulse Pattern.

To derive the Impulse Pattern, we refer to a natal chart and, using the method explained in Appendix A, we determine the charge for each of the ten numbered cognitions in Figure 6. We then arrange the ten symbols for those charges in their numbered order there and consider them two at a time, which pairs them by psychologic system. Since there are two cognitions and two possible charges for each, a psychologic system has one of four impulse permutations: ( + + ), ( – + ), ( – – ), or ( + – ), and we can simplify the string of ten symbols by using only one symbol for each of these four permutations. That gives us five symbols in an Impulse Pattern, which we should always put in parentheses in the logical order prescribed by the Cycle, or (W T F J P).

We will indicate the impulse of a system as follows. If both its poles are positively charged ( + + ), we will say that it is projective, and symbolize it with a single +. If both poles are negatively charged ( – – ), we will say that it is assimilative, and symbolize it with a single –. Otherwise the impulse is either ( – + ) or ( + – ), and for each system one of these is the logically balanced impulse, symbolized with B, and the other is the reversed impulse, symbolized with R. As Figure 6 shows, the balanced impulse in our will, feeling, and power systems is ( – + ), while it is ( + – ) in our thought and judgment systems. The reversed

impulse for each system is, of course, the opposite.

Using my own natal chart in example, the string of ten symbols has six projective and four assimilative points, which in their one-to-ten order are ( + + + + + – – – – + ). Pairing those symbols gives us the impulses of all five systems ( + + ), ( + + ), ( + – ), ( – – ), and ( – + ), and in the simplified form just described, we would write this as ( + + R – B ). Verbally we would say that I am projective in will and in thought, reversed in feeling, assimilative in judgment, and balanced in power. And this, as you will see in the next chapter, tells you more about my character than you would now think possible.

The most extreme Impulse Patterns are those in which all five systems have the same impulse. The most impulsive people are totally projective ( + + + + + ) or totally assimilative ( – – – – – ) because these patterns have no opposite charge to restrict the impulses. This gives us an objective definition of impulsiveness. Commonly, only highly projective people are called ‘impulsive’ because they are quick to act, but highly assimilative people, though slow, are also impulsive. Projective people want to give or do things to others, and assimilative people want to accept or take things from others.

A balanced (B) system is not impulsive, so the only non-impulsive people are those with the totally balanced ( B B B B B ) pattern, which occurs when all ten charges are the same as in Figure 6, our universal standard. People with the same charge in six to nine of their ten impulses are slightly to very impulsive. Those who have the totally reversed pattern ( R R R R R ) are in the most trouble, psychologically speaking. Besides being congenitally pathological, they are erratically impulsive in all areas because they are very slow in their systemic reasoning and yet always in a rush to get out of it. The totally balanced pattern is the most logical, and the totally reversed pattern is the most illogical because none of its impulses agree with our standard. The other two extremes, ( + + + + + ) and ( – – – – – ), are only illogical at five of the ten cognitions.

The number of possible Impulse Patterns is limited, of course. Since the ten points can have either one of two charges, the possibilities are 2¹ permutations, or 1,024 distinct patterns. So with respect to this one congenital factor only, the Impulse Pattern, there are 1,024 basic character types. We are each born with one of those 1,024 patterns, and its impulses direct our natural reasoning, or logic, forever. As we mature, we can strengthen some of the positive areas and compensate for some of the negative ones, but we cannot alter the basic reasoning impulses that we were born with.

Because these ten impulses control the logic of our reasoning and are basically inalterable, our Impulse Pattern reflects some of our most important innate characteristics. Our reasoning-mode and cardinal-idea preferences are important too, but they can be altered in some respects by relocation after birth. Other factors, such as our congenital intelligence and learning experiences, also affect how well or poorly we reason, but they don’t influence our dynamic approach to it, which doesn’t vary in its logic or illogic no matter what we reason about or when we do so.

Also, since highly intelligent people can share an Impulse Pattern with unintelligent people, even imbeciles, we must not assume that our intelligence determines our logicality. Indeed, many highly intelligent people are very illogical (our idealistic philosophers and formalistic scientists, for instance), just as many people of normal or less intelligence are, by virtue of their common sense, quite logical. Our intelligence only influences our Impulse Pattern indirectly, by affecting how well we can see and explicate our natural reasoning. Though we can sharpen our reasoning and logic through learning experiences, our basic predispositions in reasoning are not learned, they are congenital, and they are determined first by our Impulse Pattern and then by our reasoning-mode and cardinal-idea preferences.

Of course, the Impulse Pattern is not all that we must know to understand someone’s psychologic, but it is of primary importance in this because it is the dynamic background against which all other aspects of our nature operate and all

of our later life experiences occur. As astrologists understand, there are many other elements of a natal chart that we must know to have a well-rounded picture of someone’s character, but those elements will mislead us if we don’t first use the Consideration Cycle and the Impulse Pattern to give them their whole context and true psychologic meanings.

The rate at which a particular Impulse Pattern occurs is one case in 1,024, which is not really so rare. We all know people who are excessively projective and won’t stop to assimilate anything in their reasoning, and people who are excessively assimilative and reluctant to project anything from themselves. In our broadcast media, for instance, we know projective interviewers who rarely let their guests finish a sentence, and assimilative interviewers who seldom interrupt their guests and have a knack for ‘drawing people out’. But we also know these types from our own circles. Surely we have all argued with projective people who distort something we said to make it into something that they assume we said instead. That’s projection. And we’ve all known taciturn people who will give other people no words, or anything else for that matter, unless they are asked or compelled to do so.

This clear difference between people and other animals—being highly projective, highly assimilative, or some combination of both—has been labeled by biologists and modern psychologists with arbitrary, subjective descriptive names that are now widely used in ordinary speech. For instance, animals have been classified as alpha, beta, or omega males, females, or pairs, and people as extroverts or introverts, Type-A or Type-B personalities, and so on. But we must reject all such merely descriptive classifications. The scientists who proposed them observed some behavior, described it, and then fallaciously used these incomplete descriptions as if they were basic principles of human or animal nature. But the problem is not how to describe these behavioral differences after the fact; it is how to know, in a predictable sense, the causes of these opposite impulses in people and other organisms.

A serious social problem revealed by the Impulse Pattern is that in any system

only one of the four permutations is the wholly logical one. In other words, by hypothetical count only one-fourth of all people handle that system logically, while three-fourths do so with either half or total illogic. And if we apply this fact to all five systems, we can see the basis in reality for the common complaints that “All humans are crazy,” or that “People are no damn good.” It also shows us that those who wish to build a logical, sane, and just society must fight the massive wave of our species’ irrationality, which is increasing exponentially with our mindless overpopulation. Indeed, it will be a miracle of human will if their efforts succeed or if our species even survives much longer.

The Standard Pattern

We can list the 1,024 permutations of the Impulse Pattern, but this doesn’t tell us which one of those patterns represents the universal standard of all human reasoning. To have such a standard, we must find the universally logical impulse for each of the ten cognitions, and we can only do this one point at a time, by making a speculative guess informed by our common logic and subject to confirming empirical tests.

For instance, take point 1 in Figure 6, labeled wish, which begins our will system. This is our first response to the whole event we have just perceived, and it cannot be logical (realistic) to project here, because then we would be trying to tell that event what it is, when the only correct way to reason at this point is to let that reality tell us what it is. Therefore, the logical impulse at the first pole of our will system is to assimilate the perceived event objectively, and the impulse that half of us have to project our subjective notion of that event is unrealistic, or illogical.

This is the only sensible way to proceed here, by asking which charge is universally appropriate for all humans at each of the ten points. It is not difficult or arbitrary to do this, since there are only two possibilities, projection or assimilation, and if we use reality as our standard it is plain that only one answer is acceptable at each point. I won’t explain here how I decided the logical charge for the other nine cognitions, because this is made clear in the discussion of each system in the next chapter.

But I think it will help you to know the origin of the Consideration Cycle, meaning the problem that I saw for which it is the solution. In my early twenties, I began to sense clearly from my readings, schooling, and socializing that all intellectual disputes were psychologic, or decided by something besides the

words being spoken. I noticed that when I tried to reason on certain issues with my friends or acquaintances, they were biased and couldn’t be swayed by good logic. But several years later, after I had studied the moral, political, epistemic, metaphysical, and emotive disputes in traditional philosophy, I saw that the most ardent debaters in each of those five areas throughout history were polaropposite extremists, and that this fact was already reflected in the traditional names by which these disputants were classified. Though a reconciliatory position was usually granted also, we have long been told that the extreme antagonists in moral issues are egoists or altruists, in political issues individualists or collectivists, in epistemic issues rationalists or empiricists, in metaphysical issues realists or idealists, and in feeling issues emotionalists or aesthetes.

So I was not alone in seeing that these particular polarized disputes occurred continuously throughout our intellectual history, but then I saw what apparently no one before me had noticed: that these polar disputes were somehow similar across all five of those major philosophic areas. It was this wholistic perspective that led me to my notion of cognitive charge, for it made me ask why, across all intellectual works ever, there seemed to be one psychologic quality shared by egoists, individualists, rationalists, realists, and emotionalists, and an opposite quality shared by altruists, collectivists, empiricists, idealists, and aesthetes.

Now a traditionalist might, as ancient astrologers did, try to explain this with some distorted use of the masculine and feminine, but I went deeper than those gender and concluded that the first five groups just listed were basically projective in their reasoning, and the second five were basically assimilative. Perhaps this difference in our characters was what the pragmatic psychologist William James sensed to reach his oft-quoted but merely descriptive distinction between ‘tender-minded’ and ‘tough-minded’ thinkers, though I think his innate bias led him to apply these in reverse. Anyway, in early 1971, I completed a formal explanation of these psychologic polarizations that I had first sensed only vaguely, and this hypothesis was the Consideration Cycle, with its five systems and their impulses as shown in Figure 6.

As for my , I speak of the charge or impulse of a unit cognition, but by a system’s impulse I mean both of its charges, and by Impulse Pattern or pattern I mean the impulses of all five systems in their logical order. Only one of the 1,024 possible patterns is the standard Impulse Pattern of the Cycle, but this is not a normative pattern, for it isn’t determined by ex post facto count or statistics. Since over time it occurs in people as often as the other 1,023 permutations do, it is not the norm; it is the logically balanced pattern, reached by the method just described.

I settled on this pattern of charges as our universal standard of logic because if the opposite charge is assumed at any point, it violates what is objectively necessary for all humans in the exchanges between their internal and external realities. I then tested this hypothesis over the ensuing decades with the help of friends and former students, and today we all consider the Consideration Cycle soundly confirmed in practice. So I now take it to be the long-missing standard for judging people’s logic or illogic, and as such it gives us a map of anyone’s innate psychologic health or sickness.

Applying the Standard

We must avoid some of the confusions that arise because reasoning about the Cycle theoretically is not the same as applying it to a real person.

First, we must not confuse our standard’s universal pattern for our species in its present home and epoch with the case of an individual with the same pattern ( B B B B B ), because real people have many other characteristics that modify their Impulse Pattern positively or negatively. For instance, people with this pattern often adopt their society’s conventional beliefs and practices, and since these are usually illogical, those people are rarely as realistic and logical as our abstract standard proposes that they will be.

Second, since all humans inherit their species’ physical equipment, our individual variations of character and personality are circumscribed by our specieal nature, and so cannot be total departures from the Cycle’s standard pattern. This is why, as I’ve seen in all the private consultations I’ve done, people with an illogical impulse in a system will almost immediately agree that they are illogical there, even before I’ve explained its error more fully to them. We can deviate widely from the Cycle’s logic in a system, because our conscious control there lets us use our explicated reasoning to replace our natural reasoning with illogical reasoning, but deviations are less marked in the subconscious phases. In our standard, a subconscious phase has like charges, but this doesn’t mean that people born with unlike charges there can perform its function consciously; it only means that they are slightly more conscious of it, and slightly illogical there too.

Third, as I suggested earlier in speaking of Luther’s theism, we should not confuse the logical and reasonable. ‘Logical’ means what is universally valid for us all, while ‘reasonable’ means what is valid relatively, for only one or

some of us. Individuals or collectives may act illogically and still be acting reasonably in the particular circumstances they face.

The failure to observe this distinction has caused many arguments and miscarriages of justice. Traditionalists don’t see this clearly because they don’t distinguish our thought and judgment systems, as the Cycle does. What they don’t realize is that we all have not one but two natural standards for judging a person or collective: a universal standard of thought and a relative standard of judgment, and that we must be clear in our mind and statements just which one we are using at any time. Our legal systems recognize this distinction in holding that ‘insane’ people are not responsible for committing an illegal act, but they usually apply this rule arbitrarily and don’t consider, or even know, the many different forms of psychologic impairment.

For instance, young people have undeveloped brains until their mid-twenties, dull-witted people have undeveloped or damaged brains, and both have inadequate experience or ability, so they can’t soundly judge a situation they’ve encountered. But seeing this, unjust guardians or courts punish them as severely, if not more so, as fully developed adults who are not so impaired and can play a productive role in their own defense. Though logicality is the standard for all universal judgments, in individual cases we must use the less-strict standard of reasonableness, since the logic that applies for all humans in general cannot apply for anyone who, through no act or omission of theirs, is by nature or by an inadequate education impaired in that logic.

In writing laws, it is impossible for legislators to take all possible relative cases into , so they have to use their analytic, universal thought system. But judges hearing a specific case, like a sympathetic analyst, must subordinate their universal logic to the relative standard of reasonableness, or judgment, and appeal courts must permit this. More personally, this is like the difference between your deciding what all people should do in a certain case and what you should do in a similar situation.

Contrary to the claim of rightist extremists such as Justices Thomas and Scalia, the literal application of an explicit law to a specific case is always invalid. This is so because we cannot logically apply our universal thoughts to individual cases as if relativity didn’t exist in Reality. This is also why we must completely separate the functionally distinct legislative and judicial branches of government. The truth is that we are all relative things in relative circumstances, and if we are not judged as such, which we cannot be when any abstact universal law or rule is applied literally to an individual case, then there is no justice.

Speed

A psychologic system functions with a speed that varies with the impulse, as follows.

The balanced impulse (B) makes one proceed logically at a proper pace, so any limitation in a balanced system is caused by other factors, and not by the charges of its poles.

The projective impulse (+) makes one proceed in a system very rapidly and half illogically, since it is illogical at one pole. This is the impulse of precocious children who seem mature and accomplished in some area or areas of reasoning.²⁷ People who are projective in a psychologic system hardly need it explained to them. Whether they are intelligent or not, they are too fast and closed in its functioning to listen tolerantly to slower people speak about it, and unless a personal need is involved, they don’t want to assimilate what others say there anyway.

The assimilative impulse (–) makes one proceed in a system slowly and half illogically, since it too is illogical at one pole. Assimilative people say that they need time to ‘study the matter’, but what they mean by this is that they need more time to receive ideas from external sources at the system’s subjective pole, where they should project their own idea instead. Unlike projective people who answer a question quickly, they want to go to school or consult with a friend or a socially approved reference before answering, and they often go out their way to accumulate academic or professional honors to rationalize their right to speak to us as authorities, however illogically.

The reversed impulse (R) makes people slowest in a system. They proceed there backwards, or with total illogic. At one pole they fail as projective people do and at the other they fail as assimilative people do. They can’t get that system’s reasoning straight, and (as I explain in the next chapter) they reach their conclusions there through the logical error of petitio principii, or begging the question. Since this inverted logic blocks their progress in the system, they search for rationalizations with which to deny or ‘turn off’ that area of reasoning altogether. They go to schools for social advancement, but even if they achieve every possible academic honor, as they often do, they make no forward progress on the issues of that system after their schooling or in their professions. Though most of them try to avoid dealing with that system altogether, some give it much consideration, and so may become perceptive academics, judges, editors, or other kinds of critics in that particular area. That is, since a reversal makes one a negativist in a system, intelligent people can use this negativism, or their deep dislike of reasoning in that area, to develop critical powers there.

Congenital Pathology

The reversed impulse is the chief indicator of arealism and irrationality in a system’s functions. People with this impairment go to extraordinary lengths to impose their system’s illogic on others, because the only way they can defend this innate irrationality is to claim that it is common to many others, which is true but irrelevant. They can’t build a logical construct in that system and they fear that others will notice this, so they fabricate a substitute for it. I call this fear-based artifice an ‘avoidance structure’, and many of our intellectual, social, and practical systems are manifestations of it. In its simplest form, it consists of a word or other signal that triggers a defense mechanism or escape plan. But it can also be a harsh political agenda, a form of monastic retreat, or any way of keeping others at a distance—such as silence, fences, security forces or devices, or associating only with people who have similar fears, as in cults. Or it can be a lifework; that is, a rationalizing intellectual system that offers convoluted reasons why we all should avoid, deny, transcend, or go beyond that entire area of our psychologic functioning.²⁸

Though a reversal in a system doesn’t let people ignore its psychologic functions, it does prevent them from completing those functions. And while others store healthy defense mechanisms and positive memories with constructive future uses in a system’s memory bank, people with a reversal store rationalizations there for denying, avoiding, or minimizing that system’s functions in their psychologic.

People who are projective (+) or reversed (R) in a system have a psychologic need for shortcuts there, but the former use shortcuts for speed and the latter use them for denial. This is why, though their motive differs, both pathologically reversed and pathologically projective people prefer abrupt, brutal, or military answers to social problems rather than discussion, compromises, or fair negotiations.

In its general sense, ‘pathology’ means deviation from healthy functioning. So I define congenital pathology as a majority deviation in one’s Impulse Pattern, by which I mean having the same impulse in three or more of the five psychologic systems. It thus has four forms—pathologically balanced, projective, assimilative, or reversed—each of which is found in about 2.6% of us.

Its most illogical form is three or more reversals (R), which causes a weak personality that makes one, in the functions performed by the reversed systems, irrational, past-oriented, manipulable, slow, negativistic, skeptical, cynical, fearful, defensive, and interested in denying the common understandings there. If such people are also selfish (that is, + or R in judgment), then they may also be bitter, untruthful, vulgar, sarcastic, cruel, vengeful, spiteful, intolerant, and impositional, as we see in the cases of Nixon ( R R – R – ), Milosevic ( R R R + + ), and Bush II ( R + + R R ). Not everyone with this pathology is socially harmful, but the only exceptions I have found are people who are intelligent and unselfish (meaning – or B in judgment), who were raised with comion rather than with hate or indifference, and who later retreated to some insular world such as art, religion, jurisprudence, science, academia, or nature.

People with one reversal, about 40% of us, are impaired in that system, but while they may have a neurosis in that area, they can usually control or disguise this in society and appear as logical as the 24% who have no reversals. This can be so also of the 26% who have two reversals, but they usually have clear behavioral flaws and an inclination to negativism that when provoked (say, with alcohol, drugs, or threats) makes them behave like the congenitally pathological type. I call them ‘borderline pathological’, by which I mean people who function in society, but who will become irrational whenever the right kind of triggering event for them occurs in their life. These people often develop some form of experiential pathology, which is my term for the postnatal disorders described by modern psychologists.

The next form of congenital pathology, having three or more projective systems,

makes one very self-centered and unreceptive, or close-minded with respect to other people and their views. This form of pathology is worse when the other system or systems are reversals, just as the reversed form is worse when the other system or systems are projective. It is easier to manage if there are two balanced or assimilative systems, but far harder to correct if there are four or five projective systems, as with the elitist conservative Ho Chi Minh ( + + + + R ) and the selfist radicals de Gaulle ( R + + + + ), Bill Clinton ( B + + + + ), and Chris Matthews ( R + + + + ). And if you’ve ever wondered why the radical TV host Matthews so often tries to impose his theistic beliefs on us, his will reversal explains the metaphysical irrationality that led him to be a theist, and his four projective systems explain his eagerness to impose it on the rest of us without embarrassment or apology.

A selfist radical who falls between those two types is Rachel Maddow ( B R + + + ). She is helped much by her considerable intelligence and her balanced will system, but she is limited by her pathological projectivity and her thought reversal. Though this reversal led her to seek advanced degrees in her schooling, it also causes her to avoid theory and deeper thinking in general. This weakness in analytic reasoning and the projective impulses in her three synthetic systems (feeling, judgment, and power) led her to choose a career in our pragmatic media, which doesn’t tolerate the discussion of analytic theory anywhere, and especially not in politics.

Having a majority of assimilative systems makes one impulsively ive, taciturn, receptive, and acquisitive or even greedy in those areas. Examples are Napoleon Bonaparte ( – B – – B ), U.S. Grant ( – B – + – ), Joseph Stalin ( B B – – – ), Mayer A. Rothschild ( R – – B – ), Jack Welch ( – – R – R ), and Ross Perot (– + R – – ). This pathology is easier to deal with if there are only three assimilative systems with two others that are balanced or projective, as in the cases of Napoleon, Grant, and Stalin.

Finally, though we normally don’t regard good logic to be a fault, a pattern with a majority of balanced (B) systems is pathological because it makes one

excessively conventional. Such people must be illogical when the conventions that they adopt are unsound, which sadly is true of virtually all of our traditions to date. Some examples are George III ( B B – B + ), Chamberlain ( B – B BR ), Krushchev ( B B B + + ), Buckley ( – B B – B ), Kissinger ( + B B B B ), Paul Newman ( – – B B B ), and Bush I ( + B B B + ).

When we don’t qualify the term ‘pathological’, we must take it to mean, as the context indicates, either the generic sense (any form of it) or the worst case, which is three or more reversals. For the three other types, we should state the form we mean.

Psychologic Strength and Weakness

The four possible impulses of a psychologic system go from greatest strength to greatest weakness in this order: projective (+), balanced (B), assimilative (–) and reversed (R). Generally, I refer to a system with a (+) or a (B) impulse as strong, and one with a (–) or an (R) impulse as weak. But many other elements of a natal chart also contribute to making a system strong or weak, and since this is a major factor in character interpretation, we must study that chart before we can say with any certainty which of a person’s psychologic systems function well or badly or are best or worst.

Political Attitudes

This is a good point to define some of our basic political , which I’ve already begun to use here. Since politics is power, these eight (italicized below) are objectively defined by the polar impulses of our fifth system, power. The psychologic dispositions to which they refer are explained in the next chapter.

Our reasoning at the first pole of our power system (point 9 in Figure 6) deals with external power, and its charge divides all humans into two classes, moderates (–) and extremists (+). As regards externality, the moderates are tolerant and the extremists are intolerant of others and otherness. Our reasoning at the second pole (point 10) deals with our internal, or personal, power, and its charge divides all humans into leftists (+) and rightists (–), or individualists (+) and collectivists (–).

Taking both charges together defines our four basic political attitudes, each of which is shared by a hypothetical fourth of all people. A progressive ( – + ) is a moderate leftist. A radical ( + + ) is an extremist leftist. A liberal ( – – ) is a moderate rightist. And a conservative ( + – ) is an extremist rightist. Simplifying these notations by using only one symbol, in their power system progressives are balanced (B), radicals are projective (+), liberals are assimilative (–), and conservatives are reversed (R).

These , which are now objectively defined, agree more or less with the descriptive conventional , except in one case. This is that, contrary to the prevailing view, liberals are not leftists because they are not individualists. On political issues they are just as rightist, or collectivistic, as conservatives. They disagree with conservatives mainly on social issues, where they are tolerant and conservatives are intolerant of others, and perhaps on the type of collectivistic

tyranny they prefer, which is often a form of socialism.

Since these eight are now causally, or psychologically, defined distinctions, we must reject their old descriptive meanings, and this gives them a new function, one that lets us relate the previously separate studies of character and politics. In other words, now that we have a valid bridge between those two contexts, we can use these political meaningfully in our psychologic discussions also.

For example, ‘liberal in thought’ is no longer a complimentary phrase, since it now means the half-illogic of being totally assimilative, or ive, in thought. Similarly, ‘conservative in feeling’ means being reversed in feeling, ‘radical in judgment’ means being projective in judgment, ‘predominantly rightist’ means being either assimilative or reversed in three or more of the five systems, ‘predominantly extremist’ means being either projective or reversed in at least three systems, and so on.

Memory

For millennia the notion of mind meant little more than our conscious explicated reasoning plus our memory, and the notion of idea meant little more than one of the tangible images, symbols, or statements that we store in memory. But our memory itself was only vaguely described, so we need to propose a new view of it.

In any psychologic system we cognize each polar cognition in its turn, but at the second pole we reconcile those two cognitions to form a tangible reasoned conclusion, which we can then store in the subconscious phase that follows that system. As in our metaphysics, which suggests that the smallest tangible form in nature is two ultiparticles in double-helical motion, every tangible notion that we form, before we it to other pairs, consists of two unit cognitions. Thus, the process of memorization begins when we form a tangible compound idea in a system and concludes when we store it in the following phase, where we cannot pause and so cannot create or edit our memories.

This new conception of our memory thus proposes six discrete memory banks: the four phases and the two halves of the prime interval. The names of these six intervals, three of which store the different kinds of objective conclusions and three of which store the different kinds of subjective conclusions, are shown in Figure 6. This rejects the traditional view that we have only one memory bank. That old view denies process, and it fails to explain how we form different kinds of memories in our psychologic and how it can be possible for us to store them all in the same place. It therefore requires us to assume that every memory we have has the same source, nature, and logical status, even though our common sense tells us that this cannot possibly be the case.

The validity of any reasoned conclusion that we form depends on the impulse of

the system that yields it. For instance, a reversed system yields bogus reconciliations, or rationalizations for jumping ahead to the next system without having reconciled its polar ideas. Our memory banks can’t store unit cognitions because these are too fleeting; they can only store compound images, which are tangible and can be complex or as simple as a single symbol. Only in our conscious systems can we recall, edit, and structure the conclusions that we stored in our memory banks, and our main criterion for storing them in the first place is their suspected future usefulness to us. Our six memory banks develop over time, but not uniformly so, since our different systems and phases vary widely in their strength, their logicality, and how we use them.

Because our pragmatists (formalists) don’t reason analytically, they ignore our dynamic psychologic process, and so they continue to make the old error of equating our psychologic, or ‘mind’, to our memory bank, which but for our withdrawals and deposits is considered static. This is why so many human scientists assume that anything of importance is linguistic and social rather than congenital, and so is determined mostly by our practical reasoning. This may be so of the notions we store in memory, since we store many of them solely because we think they’ll be useful later, but it is not true of our dynamic psychologic process and all the other tangible notions that we form in our five systems as we try to decide what is or is not practical for us.

This assumption that our ‘mind’ is little more than our memory is why our human scientists over the centuries in effect denied our dynamic reasoning and never even tried to explain our whole reasoning process to us.

Our memory functions are improved when we create any external object, such as a writing, drawing, building, mathematical calculation, or work of art. This is so because that act, even when the object is not before us, concretizes and makes more useful what we previously stored subconsciously. This is a form of ‘speaking to ourselves’, which is as much a function of a language system as is communicating with others. We start constructing formal systems from the material stored in our memory banks, and then in our reconsiderations we use

our five psychologic systems to test each of these constructs by correcting its errors and omissions, adding new images to it, discarding old ones, or changing its priorities, structure, and signals. This explicated operation in individuals is also the psychologic model for our social traditions; that is, for the customs, collectives, and institutions that, with their own tangible rules, imitate our memory banks.

But as we age we do more reconsidering than new considering, and this focus on the past then hardens both our subconscious memory banks and the formal systems we have constructed from them. And as this hardening increases in a psychologic system, we engage less and less in new considerations there. Our traditional educators encourage this bad habit, but most of us succumb to it anyway because it is easier to use our bank of past conclusions in a context than to reason anew about it. We say, “I don’t have to perform this system’s reasoning in this case again, since I did this before and now I can just make a withdrawal from its succedent memory bank,” and then we settle on a signal or code word that tells us when to do that thereafter. People of normal or high intelligence who age into this inflexibility become like people of low intelligence, because they have lost their inclination and power to use their reasoning as a moving process in the present.

This involutionary direction of reasoning, looking first to what we have already reasoned about and stored in a memory bank, blocks us from creating or accepting any new reasoning in that system. This is another flaw in Freud’s psychic determinism: it denies our psychologic process by assuming that we all rely more on our static tangible memories than on new reasoning. Whenever we call on our personal traditions, meaning our habits and stock of ready answers, rather than reasoning anew in a system, our reasoning in the next system begins with no force of intellect. There is just the simple stimulus-response mechanism of our memory banks, sans the systemic dynamics that formed and repeatedly tested our reasoning systems in our youth, when we often considered things in an evolutionary direction that freely allowed new motives, thoughts, feelings, beliefs, abilities, and associations to happen in us or to us.

This hardening of the systems occurs to us all as we age, but sooner and more often to people with one or more reversed, or conservative, systems. We’ve all known children and young adults who are conservative in some respects, so this hardening isn’t solely age-dependent. It’s caused sooner than usual when a system’s impulse is a reversal, for this forces one to reason backwards or to find a shortcut to avoid reasoning, and the shortest way to do that is to call up what one has already learned and memorized. This is why schooling is so important to people who have psychologic reversals.

In an argument, the typical shortcut reply by someone who is reversed in a system always says less than is necessary under the circumstances and it tries to terminate all further discussion of the matter. And many people with reversals value formal education and academic degrees precisely because they rely blindly, with an unbelievable degree of arrogance and unreasoned faith, on their academic lessons, tangible memories, social traditions, established dogma, awards, bibles, habits, all kinds of histories, and repetitious retrospective rituals. They also fill their memory banks with nonsense; with distractions such as the frivolous products of our news, music, entertainment, sports, art, and gaming industries until it is soon the case, quite literally, that they are ‘out of their minds’, or disinclined to reason about anything.

As I said, our social constructs imitate our psychologic systems and their memory banks, so this same hardening also occurs in our states, institutions, corporations, families, and so on. The social memory of a collective—its traditions, rules, and bureaucracy—soon becomes dominant and permits no new reasoning to alter it. In primitive times, this social memory consisted of rituals and spoken stories, but today it is mostly written down in formal codes and histories that serve as the fixed precedents, legal or otherwise, that close-minded bureaucrats substitute for the dynamic reasoning that characterized the institution at its birth and for a short time thereafter.

To put this hardening in equivalent political , all of our social systems begin as a new event from leftist (progressive or radical) principles and actions,

which is to say from our natural perfectionistic need for change and new thinking, but soon after their formation they become hardened rightist (liberal or conservative) constructs. Accordingly, there is not a single rightist intellectual or social construct that was not born as a leftist construct and that is anything more than a reaction to it and a hardening and corruption of it. And any historical or political analysis that ignores this natural implicatory relation is invalid. Political rightism is subsequent; it is always reactionary and never creative; always rigid, inflexible, backward looking, and ignorant of process; and hence always robotic and never human.

But in spite of its inflexibility, immorality, and inhumanity, political rightism is inevitable as a psychologic era advances. This is partly because all new systems deteriorate and become inadequate in time, but mostly because rightist bureaucracy, the formalistic hardening of a social or political system, is simpler than refreshing earlier principles through new leftist reasoning—a practice that rightists avoid because it means sharing power with leftists. This won’t change until the core illogic of both forms of rightist reasoning, liberalism and conservatism, is widely known and accepted. The old expression, “That’s how it has always been done, so it’s good enough now,” is just a rightist rationalization for not thinking freshly. It is easier to use a tangible memory or old written code than to reason from scratch in each case, so in individuals and their institutions, the letter of a rule soon replaces its initial spirit. But the rightist ‘letter’ is just a static memory, while the leftist ‘spirit’ is the moving process of current reasoning that causes all memories and speaks to what is real and fundamental in life, which is first and foremost the well-being of all individuals of all species.

The impulse of a psychologic system reveals an individual’s logic or illogic there, but it also tells us something about the conclusions stored in its succedent memory bank. A memory bank that follows a balanced (B) system consists mostly of valid conclusions with appropriately assigned significance, while one that follows a reversed system (R) consists mostly of contradictory conclusions with inappropriately assigned significance. But we can reach no general conclusion on the validity of memories stored after a projective (+) or assimilative (–) system, other than to say that the former are mostly one’s own constructions and the latter are mostly constructions adopted from others. The

soundness of a memory bank that follows a radical (+) system depends most on how logical the individual is, and the soundness of one that follows a liberal (–) system depends most on how logical the person’s adopted opinions or traditions are. And the fact that an academically inclined liberal system depends almost entirely on reasoning from multiple external sources explains why assimilative, or liberal, reasoners are almost always unprincipled, inconsistent, and unreliable as regards that system.

In speaking, we must take pains to distinguish among the different conclusions stored in a memory bank. For instance, our will system produces our long-term motives, and our judgment system produces our beliefs and morals, so when we mean those specific kinds of memories produced by our will or judgment system, we can instead speak of our motivational system or our belief or moral systems. And with equivalent we can do this also with our thought, feeling, and power systems.

The prime interval is a special case. Our primary instincts and our memory of significant events are stored in the objective initiating interval that follows the complete percept and precedes our will system, while our developed skills and understandings are stored in the subjective terminating interval that follows our power system. But when we consider two consecutive events, the prime interval functions like a psychologic system, because then we are also reasoning between two poles: a developed personal power and the new wish that this new power causes us to have.

Social Implications

The Consideration Cycle and its Impulse Pattern tell us much about our social problems. Let me illustrate this with comments on two major social issues today that threaten our individual and social progress: improper education and overpopulation.

Education

Most educators’ efforts to improve our educational systems fail because they overlook the two most essential problems, both of which are more fundamental than any of the practical problems of how to teach students or ister schools.

1. The first is the political problem, or who controls our schools. We must ensure that they are not controlled by the wrong interests, as they are now and almost always have been. In every form of government, rightist politicians either establish or eventually control all public and private schools. As collectivists, they believe that a school’s first purpose is social, and that therefore the needs of their collectives (such as the state, its religious or business corporations, and their social clubs or private cliques) must take precedence over the needs of the individual students. Throughout history, in the name of some deity or collective, their systems have been designed to suppress the slightest thought of individual dignity and rights. And as pragmatists, they believe that their collectivistic priorities can only be preserved by indoctrination, manipulation, and punishment. To our rightists, education is not about teaching individuals, it’s all about society; that is, about how to control people, about who will control the money to be spent and determine the needs to be met, and about which doctrines and lies will be preached to the ever-gullible students, parents, and teachers.

This has always been the politics of traditional education, and it polarizes our educators. The rightists (liberals and conservatives) among them accept those collectivistic goals and then can’t understand why their schools fail anyway, while the leftists (progressives and radicals) know that a program that doesn’t put the needs of individual students before the needs of any collective is not education but indoctrination and conformity.

To facilitate their reversed purpose, rightists must centralize their school system, which makes indoctrination and conformity easier to achieve and maintain. Our first remedy for their failures, then, is to decentralize the control of school budgets, goals, and programs to the maximum degree possible. Political theorists have long known that decentralizing authority, even though it is impractical on the broadest levels, yields the best possible government on local levels. That suggests this solution for educating our children: home control for the pre-school years, neighborhood control for elementary education, community control for secondary education, and more-centralized control only for the higher educational levels.

As for pre-school education, we must ignore the false claims by rightist politicians (Obama, for one) that federal funding, and hence control, of that early education is essential. What they really mean by this is that they need this early schooling to by leftist parents in order to produce, not well-rounded individuals with dignity and independent minds, but compliant robots who know only what rightist corporations and governments want them to know.

All children should be educated as early as possible, but the question is how. The classic rightist position on this is reflected by the words of the pathological conservative Augustine ( 3 5 4 - 4 3 0 , + R R B R ) and by how the Catholic Church used his advice over the centuries. He said that if you gave him a child for its first four years, he could control its thinking for the rest of its life. Of course this isn’t always possible, since some children have a strong character that won’t permit such manipulation, but it holds widely because children need much external input in their early years. Anyway, that is the purpose of all our rightists’ pre-school programs: to control our children throughout their life no matter how we, their parents, prefer to raise them. And they disguise this intention by saying, quite truly in itself, that every child can benefit from preschool education.

So the real issue is not whether we should educate our children early, for of course we should. Rather, it is whether we can trust any government,

corporation, religion, sect, politician, or educator to give our children the earlylife input that determines so much in their later development, and our history shows that we are fools if we do so. On the other hand, some parents are also bad educators. So saving children from life-long harm in their early years is not an easy matter, but politically it begins by opposing centralized education until they are old and wise enough to resist rightist propaganda.

If others do educate our pre-school children, they must be comionate realists and must do their work in our neighborhood, in schools that are governed by the parents of that neighborhood or by advisors they select. Then it is up to the parents to ensure that their children are being educated only in what is real and what benefits them personally as individuals. For instance, they must not be instructed in any patriotic or religious dogma, for such collective issues must be left to them to decide freely later in life.

The greatest enemy of good schools is centralized control by the rightists who run our governments and our business and religious corporations. That control is what they mean every time they speak to us of ‘better education’. But it doesn’t have to be their way anymore. Their old arguments for restrictive educational systems, standardized tests, and Augustinian mind control are just rationalizations for the worst kind of political corruption, the kind that makes children its victims. And since we now know what motivates our rightists, we shouldn’t listen to any of their arguments for this old approach. In other words, we must stop them from making our children into robots with a narrow purpose in life.

For instance, today our rulers claim that our nation desperately needs a technological elite, but we have no overriding need for this. If profit-making corporations need skilled workers, they should pay the full bill from the start for training people in those specialties. Prior to such specialized training, children only need to learn what, given their individual natures, will make them better people with a broad understanding of life. Personally and collectively, we owe this to every child. And new technologies now let us do this for less money and

in fewer years than it currently takes.

Early in the modern era, private corporations wrested control of our public school systems from the churches, and ever since then they’ve carried on as if our schools belong to them. Their game all along, which in the past century was buttressed by the arguments of elitist economists, was to control our public schools and claim that what is good for their businesses is good for our whole society, and that therefore our public schools must serve those businesses first, and do so at our expense.

The issue of who should pay for public education is complex, but it becomes simpler when we start thinking of a new society that establishes the more efficient new-era ways of teaching, and that, for many other important reasons as well, taxes all excess income by individuals and all excess profits by corporations. Here we might disagree on just what amount constitutes an excess, but we can’t validly argue, as rightist economists do, that no amount is excessive. But more on this later.

2. The second fundamental problem is individual motivation, without which there can be no real education under any system. That is, sound education requires us first to understand the character and personality of each student and educator.

Educational success depends in part on the student, but also on the educators’ purpose, which affects a student’s motivation. For instance, a student’s Impulse Pattern can conflict with a school’s purpose. If that goal is to ensure the memorization of facts and different language systems, as it usually is today, the assimilative (liberal) students are favored by the school; if it is to impart logical reasoning, the balanced (progressive) students are favored; if it is to promote creativity, the projective (radical) students are favored; and if it is to help illogical students or to impose illogic on them, as religious and military schools do, then the reversed (conservative) students are favored.

Students don’t learn well when what is expected of them conflicts with their innate logic and preferences, so this motivational problem exists mainly because traditionalist educators don’t understand individual character. They reveal this ignorance by imposing the same educational goals on all students and teachers, even to the absurdity of standardized state or national tests, which cannot possibly be designed without putting the needs of some artificial collective (such as a corporation, state, or nation) before the needs of the individual students. How do we standardize anything? Only by assuming, as military and religious trainers do, that everyone in the selected collective is the same, or has no individuality. True education is that which motivates students to learn on their own initiative throughout their life, and it cannot be achieved by collectivistic goals and standardized tests, for these are the antithesis of individual development and they make schooling detestable for most students. They can sometimes succeed, at least in part, but only if they are buttressed by external rewards and punishments, in which case the entire system is all about the payoff and not about the education.

True education requires educating all the unique individuals in a class, but this can’t be done if the educators don’t know them as individuals, so a large part of the solution to rightist pseudoeducation—that is, to indoctrination, conformity, and institutional corruption—is to prepare the natal chart of each student and ensure that everyone responsible for educating that student knows how to read it and how to plan a distinct learning program to fit it. For some students punishments are meaningless; for others rewards are meaningless. Students are motivated first by their own character, and only secondarily by payoffs or by what other people think they should learn.

We must know someone’s character and personality before we can teach them anything, but in our ignorance, we’ve always done the reverse, and the result is pure prejudice. Traditionally, we’ve been teaching all students what we want them to know, and we assume that the type of people that we like most will have the qualities that are needed to learn that well. It is also important to know the congenital character of the teachers and s, since the evaluation of

their performance cannot be meaningfully done through standardized tests or subjective guesses by their supervisors.

Overpopulation

The Consideration Cycle shows us that as our population grows the total human force for all forms of illogic or pathology increases exponentially. From the perspective of the Impulse Pattern, 99.9% of us have from one to ten points of illogic in our five psychologic systems, and when we consider the other elements of a natal chart, there are many times when anyone who is born will have other kinds of serious impairments. In a future world where our leaders understand the major role that our innate character plays in determining our physical and psychological health, research will be done and people will be told the best times to have or avoid births. But until we establish such a world, we must accept the simple fact that the more our population grows, the more sick or crazy people we will have all around us. Thus, no problem we have today is greater that this one.

Our propagation problem is actually two problems: excess births and random births. Both threaten to harm vast numbers of people, in some cases all of us, by reducing our collective ability to solve our problems sanely. Excess births have made democratic governments that respect individual rights a thing of the past, even as more people in the world are demanding it, and random births have ensured throughout our history that the majority of people under any form of government will not be rational.

The complaints about overpopulation by a few thinkers have given rise to a chorus of skeptics who say that we shouldn’t worry about it, which is like the skeptics who say that we humans aren’t responsible for climate change and the destruction of our environment. Actually, our overpopulation is a major cause of our environmental and climatic disasters, and we must control it for those and many other reasons.

The skeptics offer two main arguments here. One is that we shouldn’t worry

about overpopulation because we can easily sustain more than the present seven to eight billion people, but for each point that s this argument there are several points that refute it. The other argument is that, yes, we know the world’s population is growing, but its rate of growth has recently slowed, and if we statistically project the causes of this downward trend into the future, our population will probably peak at nine to twelve billion sometime later this century or early in the next one, and then it will decline dramatically; perhaps falling to as far as to one billion, or maybe even (some say) to our extinction.

But that kind of probabilistic reasoning is always unreliable, and even the skeptics it that no one can know for certain what our global population will be in the next few decades, let alone in a century. As for the slowing rate, its causes are real but not in themselves threatening. They include the decline of the fertility rate in many nations, the wider education of girls, the wider availability of contraceptive aids, women’s desire for more interesting work or better pay, and the costs, bother, and restrictions imposed on men and women who have many, or even any, children. Our problem today is that this slowing is itself too slow, since seven billion people is already too many, and adding a few billion more later this century will bring us great environmental and man-made disasters well before that, some of which are in process now.

Traditionalists since ancient times have suggested that the only way to create a saner world is to improve people after birth through education and other social programs. This is necessary in any case, but it doesn’t address the primary causes of our ignorance, illogic, and congenital pathologies.

Some traditionalists have also suggested that the social problems caused by our sick majority might someday be solved through genetics, but that science is useless for this purpose now, and later it will be a partial answer at best. And as for the genetic ideal, cloning better people, that wouldn’t work if it could be done, since even a clone will have a unique character and good or bad reasoning and health because of its time and place of birth—which, unlike genes, can never be duplicated. The simple reality here is that there are times when it is bad for

anyone or anything to be born. Genetic manipulations can help us medically, but they can’t significantly reduce our vast majority of psychologically unhealthy people. The belief that they can stems from the absurdity of imagining a genetic process that is not affected by external spatial displacements and so acts all by itself to determine our congenital character.

Nontheistic traditionalists who reject astrological methods are forced to assume that our innate intelligence and good health come solely from genetic factors. But from this unproven hypothesis they can’t explain why so many intelligent or healthy people come from parents or grandparents who are unintelligent or unhealthy, why intelligent or healthy parents often produce mentally or physically impaired children, why siblings can vary so widely in their innate strengths and weaknesses, or why parents can be, for instance, selfish or unselfish when their children are the opposite. Something more than genetics is clearly at play here, and we shouldn’t listen to any geneticists or other scientists who are too close-minded to ask what it is.

Overpopulation is not a measure of human progress; it is a measure of human decline. Yes, it is certainly the chief cause of economic growth and of everincreasing markets and profits, but it is also one of the major causes of our increasingly irrational societies and the destruction of our environment, both of which are threatening our species’ survival now. Without quibbling over the exact numbers, I believe that our present goals should be (1) to halve our population and maintain it at about three to four billion healthier people, and (2) to leave unused by us, for the benefit of all living things, about a half of all the earth’s land, air, water, and coastlines in all latitudinal and longitudinal zones. The latter shouldn’t be difficult, for I’ve read recently that most of the people in the world live on only two percent of its land.

Contrary to the lies we hear repeatedly from narrow-minded politicians and economists, the greater profits that overpopulation creates are not a blessing, and our present well-being and future survival depend on all nations, collectives, and individuals abandoning profit as their first goal—which of course won’t happen

until we come to our senses and prohibit all excess income and wealth.

In 1960 our population was three billion and only forty years later it was six billion. Imagine, then, the world that our children and grandchildren will have when, as expected, it is nine billion in 2043 and ten billion in 2083. You might reflect on your own role in causing or permitting these twin disasters that they shall suffer; namely, the environmental destruction and wars that overpopulation always causes. Then consider this new argument I am adding: that as we mindlessly multiply ourselves, we also multiply our congenital impairments and the insanity of our collectives—of our governments, religions, schools, and businesses of course, but also of our own families.

The threat that overpopulation poses doesn’t lie only in the deterioration of our ecosystem, the destruction of tens of thousands of other species, and insufficient habitable land and consumable water and food for humans and other life forms. It also lies in its psychologic consequences; especially the fact that it makes human beings one of the cheapest, and hence most disposable, commodities on earth. It’s no wonder that we have so many needless wars and that we can’t stop slave trading by our entrepreneurial kidnappers and corporations. It is idiocy to let mere quantity, like the desire for more people or more profits, destroy the quality of our lives.

Long before there are ten billion people, in fact it’s already happening, our overpopulation and the shortages it causes will create uncontrollable thievery, criminality, and terrorism by the strong and the weak, as well as mass emigration from ecologically or politically undesirable areas. Indeed, allowing for humanitarian exceptions, all nations must start protecting their citizens from unrestricted immigration. Why? Because healthy people try to solve their problems, not run away from them, and no nation needs more unhealthy people than it already has, but that’s exactly what it gets from the random immigration that we now permit, where the innate character, personality, and sanity and the current physical health of its newcomers are not tested. Some nations do impose a test, but usually it is only whether or not the immigrants can serve the current

needs of its corporations or governments. Whatever nation we live in, can we accept millions of such immigrants when we know that they weren’t invited here to serve our most urgent common needs, and that they will very likely exacerbate all of our public problems?

Witnesses of my generation can testify that even the doubling of our population from 3 billion in 1960 worsened the quality of our lives by the year 2000. Individuals are now less valuable to each other—in general or as mates, lovers, partners, friends, leaders, employers, or employees—and their rulers and bosses are more contemptuous of them than ever. We must realize that as we increase or decrease our population, many other things about our societies and our behavior are changed accordingly.

For instance, today it is easier than ever to find a superficially attractive person as a lover, so why should we work to create a deep love relationship that will fulfill us forever? If the one we have now ends, or even it doesn’t, there’s always someone else around the corner, and then someone else, and so on. The world has changed in this respect; not entirely but severely. Are our poets and psychologists wrong to say that having a truly deep love is psychologically essential for us? I think not, and I suspect that most people today who claim to prefer trivial relationships know that they are missing something very important in their lives.

As for our rulers today, they see true democracy, national borders, and our cultural differences as absurd notions, mere ideals from the past, and their immorality, crimes, and heinous cruelties are widely tolerated, as they once were not, even as recently as the sixties. And the chief culprit in this, besides a public that has been persuaded to ignore politics in favor of a never-ending rush of inane distractions, is greed—that is, the quest for rising profits by nations, corporations, and individuals that is destroying us all. Greed has always existed, but until the technological, commercial, and population explosions of the modern era (1762-2008), it didn’t threaten our species’ extinction as it does now.

But in spite of these grave threats, many people still think it chic to have more than two children. Surely one or two vital births is the moral maximum for anyone today, so we shouldn’t congratulate those who impose on us and on the earth by intentionally having more than that. If people don’t observe this limit voluntarily, then our governments, after they put an end to random immigration of course, will have no choice morally speaking but to impose periods in which few or no births are allowed. And let us hope that in doing this they will consult with humanologists who, using realistic astrology and any other methods available, can tell them with a high degree of reliability which time periods are most or least likely to yield intelligent and psychologically and physically healthy babies.

Yes, astrology can tell us that, especially now that the Consideration Cycle has given that old science its first psychologic theory, one that shows us more clearly than ever why we and our nations shouldn’t trust random births as we have foolishly done throughout our history. And since we have this knowledge now, not fully but to a sufficient degree to make a difference, we should start using it today and not wait, as selfish people do, for laws to be ed that will force us to act wisely and morally.

Chapter 6. Our Five Psychologic Systems

Discussing the Five Systems

We must now consider how the five psychologic systems of the Consideration Cycle function and how we humans differ basically in that functioning. This brings us to the heart of our psychologic; that is, to the parts of it that we must know well to use the Impulse Pattern for character analysis.

But note that as we discuss each point on the Cycle here, we are also explaining the meanings that our new theories assign to the planet that governs that point as shown in Figure A. I will therefore start including the planetary symbols in our discussions, because this will help you associate the astrological planets with the psychologic functions they affect. The symbols for the ten planets and twelve signs are listed in Appendix A, and if you don’t know them, I suggest you memorize them now; it’s not difficult. In fact, you should read Appendix A and the text pages in Appendix B before you move on to the next section of this chapter.

Note also that the Consideration Cycle gives us compelling reasons for regarding 0° Capricorn () and not 0° Aries () as the true beginning of the zodiac. Also, I am introducing a new symbolic notation for astrology, one that combines a planet with its charge. Thus, – means ‘the moon in a negative sign’ or ‘the moon with a negative charge’, + means ‘Mars in a positive sign’ or ‘Mars with a positive charge’, and so on.

Appendix A explains how to calculate the Impulse Pattern from a natal chart. Its Figure A shows something that you need to know: how the elements of astrology relate to the corresponding parts of the Consideration Cycle. Since that figure relates the planets, signs, and houses of astrology to our psychologic Cycle, it tells us which of these elements strongly influence, or ‘rule’ the various parts of our reasoning.

If you have the natal charts, you should now calculate your own Impulse Pattern and those of your family and the other people you know best, for there is no better way to follow the discussions here or to judge the Consideration Cycle and the Impulse Pattern. The only sure way to learn the method is to learn to calculate Impulse Patterns yourself. If you don’t have a natal chart you need, you can get it free from several online sources. A popular source is www.astro.com, which has a link to Lois Rodden’s astro-databank.

The tables of 904 individuals in Appendix B constitute empirical proof of my psychologic theory; they also provide real examples for the discussions below. We need fuller empirical studies, of course, but they require more time and resources than one individual can provide. You probably know something about many of the famous people listed in those tables, and this should be enough to convince you of the value of the Impulse Pattern as a psychologic tool. In any case, as you read about the twenty systemic impulses below—four for each of the Cycle’s five systems—you should look for instances of each case in these tables. This is important, for it will help you understand and confirm what I say about each of those impulses.

But that no single impulse defines any real and whole person. Also, since by hypothetical count each of these twenty sections on innate impulses applies to five percent of all humans of our epoch, you must understand all twenty of them to have a good general understanding of human character.

In Appendix B there are some newly defined that I will now assume you understand, such as a person’s political type and political perspective. Since our perspective distinguishes our political disposition more fully than the power impulse alone does, I will use it instead of the power impulse from this point on. Thus, as explained in Appendix B, a one-term political perspective will be written in italics or with the qualifier ‘straight’, and a two- or three-term perspective will be abbreviated as indicated there; for example ProLib, RadCon, LibConRad, and so on.

To achieve our potential as an individual or a society, we must know our strengths and our weaknesses. But most of us know our strengths rather well, so our main reason for wanting to understand human nature is to correct our faults and to see the faults and strengths of others whose character can affect us. This fact has led me to say more here about the illogical people of each type than the logical people.

We will consider each of the Cycle’s five systems in turn, starting with the whole system and then discussing its four impulse permutations in the following order: B, +, –, and R. These four discussions can be redundant at times because two of the four permutations in each system have the same charge at each pole, but this should help you understand each impulse better.

In the heading for each of these twenty impulses, I’ve added a descriptive keyword that I use for people with that impulse. These twenty keywords, shown in Table B below, are very useful in our discussions of people, as you will see. Also, it gives us a verbal way to express someone’s entire Impulse Pattern. Thus, my pattern ( + + R – B ) could also be expressed in keywords as “creatorspeaker-spectator-altruist-progressive,” and Bush II’s ( R + + R R ) as “denierspeaker-emotionalist-nihilist-conservative.”

Table B. Descriptive Keywords for the Systemic Impulses

Impulse B + – R

Will Planner Creator Follower Denier

Thought Reasoner Speaker Listener Skeptic

Feeling Judgment Harmonist Moralist Emotionalist Egoist Sybarite Altruist Spectator Nihilist

Power Progressive Radical Liberal Conservative

To understand someone’s character, we must look at the whole pattern; in fact, we must consider the entire natal chart. So that in these twenty sections we are only considering one impulse at a time, and that this only tells us how that one impulse inclines people to a certain set of dispositions in one psychologic area. It doesn’t tell us how these qualities affect or are affected by any of a person’s other characteristics, or whether the subject will use them productively or destructively. To know this we must judge that person’s whole natal chart, which requires one to study astrology, preferably in works that are more realistic than mystical.

The Impulse Pattern is a tool of analytic reasoning, so it is necessarily incomplete, but it is not just added data about someone; it is essential dynamic information. Its logic or illogic affects every conclusion that a person reaches in life, so my claim for it is not that it tells us everything about a person, but rather that we can’t truly explain anyone’s innate character or postnatal personality without it.

The Consideration Cycle is the theoretic standard that is missing in every human science, so practitioners in those sciences need to know it, and if they don’t, then it is their duty to their science to create a sound replacement for it. Its dynamic factors determine our reasoning in psychology, astrology, sociology, political science, and economics, and in the writing of biographies or fictional stories about people. In all such cases, it gives us more valid classifications of people and nuances of character than traditionalists ever had at their disposal. It will therefore change much in our scientific, artistic, or ordinary discussions of people. For one thing, we won’t speak as often now of ‘the human’ in a universal sense, as in ‘all humans are X’, because we can no longer assume that all people share any psychologic attribute other than this universal process itself, our common logic.

1. Will [–,+]

The impulse of our will system is determined at its first pole by the charge of the moon () and at its second pole by the charge of Saturn ().

We must assimilate (–) rather than project (+) at our will system’s first pole, because its function is objective, or to take in any external or internal event we perceive. I call this first cognition a ‘wish response’. By wish we usually mean an imagined state of events we would prefer, but this implies projection and denies assimilation, which is to confuse the first pole of this system ( – ) with its concluding pole ( + ). A wish is our first response to an event, and it is not logical (realistic) unless it is an assimilation. It is how we greet an event—say, meeting an interesting stranger—that we decide to consider further because it has some relevance to us. But it is not a desire, which is the opposite kind of wanting, a ionate wanting, for there’s nothing emotional about our will process. It is at first instinctive and then entirely cerebral and analytic.

The wish response is prompted by the prime interval and its complete percept, the cardinal idea that told us that something has happened, and our wish is then both a vague expectation and our ive decision to let this consideration continue so that we can determine what has happened. But half of us perceive events by projection, not assimilation, and consequently—reminiscent of Don Quixote by Cervantes ( R B – + B ), who was reversed in will—they illogically interpret an event as being not what it is, but what they would prefer it to be. A projective wish response thus serves as a strict guardian at the gate of our will system, and indeed of the mind as a whole, preventing us from considering any event further that does not affect ourself or our personal realm or our instinctive or previously stored criteria of personal interest.

We are perfectionists whichever charge we have at the first pole, for we will either try to assimilate (–) the event perfectly or project (+) our own picture of it as more perfect than it is. Assimilative perfectionists like to test their objective awareness, while projective perfectionists are those we call ‘creators’ or ‘dreamers’, as the case may be. The latter want to change and order the events around them, which can be anything from their immediate environment to the state of the world. Intellectuals or political leaders who are projective at this first pole ( + ), and hence projective (+) or reversed (R) in will, often force us to contend with fictions like religious and political myths, but our world would be bland indeed if we were all assimilative in our wish function. There would then be no grand motives and no progress, for people would ively accept the events around them, even harmful ones. This illogical impulse at the first pole ( + ) is thus both beneficial and harmful. But no benefits, other than pleasing fictions, result if it is combined with the illogical impulse at the second pole ( – ).

At the second pole ( + ), we should project an idea from inside ourselves that meets what we have just taken in at the first pole, for this is how we begin the process by which we form our subjective will conclusions, or primary motivations and plans of purpose. We must project these conclusions ourselves because no one else can know what it is possible for us to achieve. So our will system as a whole is not our ‘wish’ structure; it is our ‘I will do this’ structure. Our reconciliation of its two poles, the wholistic wish and how we think we may achieve it, yields a personal plan regarding the initial event, and that plan is a reasoned conclusion that we may then store and retain in the succedent memory bank as a motive. My shorthand for the poles of our will system, as shown in Figure 6, are wish and plan, the idea-referents of which are polar opposites because they are a direct implication; that is, a wish causes a plan.

By shorthand term I mean any keyword that unambiguously points to a specific epistemic idea in the Cycle, a term that we accept as having no other cognition as its idea-referent. Any term can be a shorthand term if we agree on its ideareferent, and we do this because otherwise we would continually have to list several equivalent .

The logical relation of the two cognitions of a psychologic system is a polar opposition. This is our third type of idea opposition in our reasoning cycle, for it is neither a direct opposition (180º) nor a quadrantal opposition (90º). Instead, it is the opposition of two sequential ideas with an immediate causal implication, as in what we mean by term pairs such as ‘wish-plan’, ‘concept-implication’, or ‘act-consequence’.

Our reasoned conclusions in will are our wholistic (analytic) motives, as opposed to the partialistic (synthetic) motives that we form later in our judgment system. The chief function of our will system is to create a long-term plan of purpose, or strategy, with respect to the event being considered, which could be the event of our whole life. This is the direct opposite of a short-term plan of action, or tactic, that we form in our tertiary reasoning to achieve a partialized desire. Our will system’s long-term strategy is thus the direct opposite of our judgment system’s short-term tactics.

Our primary and tertiary reasoning produce directly opposite types of wants, which I distinguish strictly with the wish and desire respectively. Only the gratification of our wishes can give us what we call ‘happiness’, an overall psychologic state that is not affected by whether we do or don’t gratify our tertiary desires. For instance, you may desire a person for sex, but he or she might not make you happy in the long run; or you might desire a particular food that will be harmful to your health. It follows that our life and health are best when our wishes govern our desires, or our will governs our feelings, and this is more likely to be the case with people whose will impulse is strong (+ or B) rather than weak (– or R).

Now let us consider how each of the four impulse permutations works in our will system. For this purpose we will ignore reconsiderations, because when we reconsider any event, our other four systems can affect our will system’s functioning.

Balanced Will (–, +), The Planner

The hypothetical fourth of us who are balanced (B) in will handle the logic of that system realistically without special effort. They take in a whole event as it is, and then project their notion of their personal possibilities regarding it, and so they shape a realistic and usually culturally acceptable long-range plan with respect to that event and their global wish pertaining to it.

These people are our most realistic people in their wishes and plans of purpose, because they reconcile the polar extremes of their will system logically and then create a motivational system that consists mostly of healthy and sane long-range plans based on reality as it is. The only problem is that these plans usually don’t include any socially controversial ones, which could be more realistic, or logical. The motives of our ‘planners’ are conventional because they aren’t as creative at the first pole, in their wish responses ( – ), as they are at the second pole, in their long-range planning ( + ).

This is one reason why many of them work on the higher governmental or corporate levels, more often as advisors than chiefs, where their main job, after their chief states the wish, is to devise or ister long-term plans, or strategies, for preserving traditional ways or institutions. Because they take these old ways to be the facts of any planning problem they face, they rarely ‘rock the boat’ in social or personal matters; instead, they work with reality, their social and legal traditions, and other people just as they find them, so they are realists without being revolutionists.²

Thus, what our ‘planners’ wish to do, more perfectly than before if possible, is what their society or people in power expect of them. This makes them wary of other people or classes of people who seek to overturn tradition or the conventional ways. Even so, they may respect people who are brave enough to

do or risk what they would never do or risk. In dealing with others, caution is their byword, and they have an often-uncanny instinct for detecting individuals who will be ‘troublemakers’, meaning unwilling to help them advance their personal plans of purpose. This political instinct, combined with their strength in seeing whatever real and whole situation is before them, is why they often succeed in business or government while many others do not.

By nature, planners take their responsibilities seriously. They are manipulable at the first pole ( – ) but not at the second ( + ), so any attempt by others to influence their long-range plans won’t succeed unless it is logical or how they decided to proceed anyway.

Advice to Planners. Your will system functions logically, but you tend to ively accept external events and situations just as you find them. This restricts your planning because it rules out all that might be possible if you were to see an event from a new perspective. In other words, you are less creative than you could be, especially as regards global perspectives. More often than not, the only problem that you pose to your will system is the relatively simple one of how to deal with whatever situation is before you. Thus, your motivations and life plan focus more on how to deal with the status quo than with trying to change that situation to make it one that is truly worth the sacrifice of your time, energy, or life.

You should be more critical of the proposals of your elders, society, or culture as to what your life motives should be, and more willing to propose needed changes in the status quo. When new ideas are proposed, throw caution to the wind more often and risk ing them if they seem sound. Stop and ask if what is written in old texts or if what people say from their own motives really is a primary goal to which you should dedicate all or much of your life. Don’t just adopt conventional proposals or situations or other’s pictures of them; judge them critically and morally first, for your talent at planning means nothing if it serves the wrong end for you or your society.

You could benefit by avoiding your conventional acquaintances and replacing them with creative people who challenge conventions with new ideas. You know that progress is essential to life, so you should either create it or it. In short, don’t help the defenders of the past, for you can do better than that.

Projective Will (+, +), The Creator

People who are projective (+) in their will system are logical only at its second pole, in their plans. At the first pole, they fail to see an event they have just perceived for what it is, mainly because they don’t want to ‘waste time’ by absorbing it fully. Their eagerness to get to their own motives, or plans of purpose, at the second pole causes them to pay little attention to the initial event itself, so they develop these two bad habits at the first pole: hurriedly dictating to external and internal events what they think these are, and rejecting other people’s interpretations of them.

The main flaw in having a projective impulse in will is not assimilating events as they are, so our creators often posit fictional events at the start of an act of consideration and then make these the subject of all the reasoning that follows. But then at the second pole ( + ) they get realistic by projecting what they can personally do to achieve their often-unrealistic wish regarding that event. They say in effect, “Don’t tell me what is happening, for I know what is really going on here, and I know just what I intend to do about it.” We are usually referring to these people who are projective in will when we describe someone as ‘willful’ or ‘strong-willed’.

Being projective in will gives one even more personal strength there than those who are balanced. They are stronger in their political instincts and more capable of perceiving others’ true motives, long-range plans, and general reliability than any of the other types. They are wholists who see and focus on the larger picture, or global situation, and they do this better than others. Moreover, they are the only ones who propose new ideas with respect to our broadest issues and problems. Other people are partialists, more or less, so the solutions they propose, if any, are incomplete ones at best.

This projective, or creative, impulse at both poles of their will system leads our subjects to take full responsibility for their own life plan, as one should, but it also inclines them to assume personal responsibility for external events that are beyond their control. So, not only are they the most willful and perfectionistic of people, they are often the most responsible, even to the point of psychologic harm, as in thinking that they must try to cure the world’s ills. Nevertheless, unless their other characteristics prevent it, they are our most original wishers and planners of long-range perspectives and goals, our true visionaries, and they have no tolerance for imperfections of will (purpose, motives) in themselves, others, or society. They are strongly driven to become more mature personally and to help others and their society do so also.

The projective impulse in a system blocks all direct manipulation by others in that system, so those who are projective in will can only be manipulated there indirectly, as through an illogical impulse in another psychologic system. They focus intensely on their life goals and long-range plans, and they are more stubborn than all others in not changing these objectives to suit other people.

Though the projective impulse in any system indicates self-centeredness, there’s a difference between being self-centered in one’s will system and in, say, one’s judgment system. This is so because in will one’s context is always the whole event, while in judgment it is always some arbitrarily selected piece of that event. In judgment this piece is just a personal desire or choice, while in will one’s context could be the whole world, humanity, or an entire society. Thus, one who is a self-centered (+) in will can be a humanitarian or a dictator; usually the former if one is unselfish (– or B) in judgment and the latter if one is selfish (+ or R) there.

Advice to Creators. By nature you become dissatisfied with almost every event and situation you observe, so try to keep an even keel in personal and social situations; that is, don’t announce your criticisms to others too often or too vociferously, for this lets them claim that you aren’t reasonable, even when your criticisms are sound. This is one of your chief problems in dealing with others;

another is the fact that you seem intractable in your overall perspective and long-range goals. It is better not to instantly display your stubbornness or critical ability on issues of will; instead, invite those who need to know your views to discuss them with you, so you can show that your position is based on sound reasoning and, if it is the case, that you are concerned with many more people than just yourself. This is important if you want others to respect you, although the people close to you probably know this about you already.

Of course, if you have weaknesses elsewhere, anger may come to you quickly anyway. For one thing, nothing that partialists, idealists, or pragmatists propose can escape your criticism, and little that they say is acceptable to you. This distresses you, but it doesn’t make you pessimistic, since you soon see how to improve the situation.

It is probable that your life motives and plans are about improving the social or political circumstances that you think most need correction. If so, you will develop a plan for your community or the world that you mean to effect, and since this is seldom a conventional plan, your society probably won’t reward you for your sacrifices. As a rule, our societies only reward conventional people who make the same mistakes that everyone else is making and whose ideas of progress will change nothing fundamentally.

You may have difficulty finding others to share your goals, for most people don’t have your foresight, instincts, vision, will power, or willingness to put broader social goals ahead of material rewards. But this usually won’t stop you, for you’ll carry on alone if necessary and try to do something to bring those changes about in the future.

Assimilative Will (–, –), The Follower

People who are assimilative in their will system are half-logical there, in their wishes. At the first pole ( – ) they take in events as these really are, without rushing, so they those who are balanced in will in being conventional in how they see events. But they differ at the second pole ( – ), where they don’t project their own plans of purpose. Rather than subjectively asserting the possibilities for handling an event, they turn outwards—usually to others they trust, to widely respected gurus, or to their culture’s traditions—hoping to acquire external guidance in their planning, including their life plan. This assimilative impulse gives them that common but inappropriate expectation that the outer world is somehow obligated to tell them what they should do with their life, what they should say to the world, or what their role in society should be. That is, since they don’t realize that this is something they must do for themselves, they just wait for it to happen to them. This other-dependence makes them manipulable in their plans, and that of course can make them irresponsible and unreliable also.

At the second pole ( + ) it is logical to say, “This is what I can do to achieve my wish regarding that event.” But those who are assimilative at this pole, or (–) or (R) in will, say instead, “Help me, for my happiness depends upon what you tell me to do with respect to this event and my wishes regarding it.” The illogic here is evident, for no one else can give us a sound plan that is suitable for us in particular. Only we can know what our own internal and external reality is, so only we are responsible for our plans and motives. And even if others do give us advice on this, they cannot be responsible for what is under our daily control.

Our life plan must come from our own projections, but those who are assimilative at the second pole ( – ) externalize the subjective half of their will function as if it too was an objective issue, and consequently their purpose in life becomes only what others have planned for them. It is these people, the

assimilative (–) or reversed (R) in will, who will go to Tibet to find a lama or who, like Guido in Fellini’s movie 8½, seek out a religious leader to tell them the meaning of life and what will make them happy. But the answer to those questions does not lie outside of us. As Guido came to see, we must design our own life plan and then be maturely responsible for whatever we have devised.

People who are assimilative in will are open-minded in the pejorative sense that they will fill their will system’s succedent memory bank with many opinions by others on wishes and plans. But this flood of external opinions isn’t really helpful. Because they are objective (–) here, they have no subjective (+) basis for editing what they take in, so they can’t see any life plan or motive as being best for them or binding on them. Thus, in their youth they search hard for socially approved sources of indisputable wisdom, which may be their parents, their rulers, or various academics, scientists, gurus, or revered texts. But this search almost always leads them to adopt inappropriate motives, so that later in life, when their will system hardens, they have no plan of purpose that is not conventionally accepted by their society. And though they may be rewarded for this choice, it leaves them with no natural defense against the motive manipulators all around them.

Ordinarily, these followers won’t revolt against their political rulers or their society’s traditions, not unless those who they respect most do so first or an opportunity for personal gain arises. In any case, they have no new wishes, purposes, or creative plans for the future to offer society. They may become academics, but not intellectuals, for they propose no original theories, though they will take pains to search for others’ original ideas that could increase their own understanding or status. Since acquisition and assimilation are equivalent , people with an assimilative (liberal) impulse in any system are natural seekers, collectors, and even hoarders in that psychologic area.

This illogical impulse to assimilate others’ plans of purpose at the will system’s second pole ( – ) is also psychologically convenient, for it gives one a scapegoat for every motivational or planning mistake that one makes in life. So those who

are either assimilative (–) or reversed (R) in will tend to assert, in the most important personal and social matters, that they are not responsible, or that the blame lies elsewhere.

Here’s how this works for them. Logic requires them to project their personal goals in life, but they don’t, so they assume that this refusal to take a stand lets them off the hook for the condition of their psychologic realm and their political or natural environment. They take no responsibility for the condition of their society or the world at large because they don’t even consider themselves responsible for their own life decisions. This is one reason why they often become clerics, politicians, judges, or teachers of old views, or else pursue some other profession that, while it may help individuals, does little to improve their society as a whole.

Followers don’t live their own life; they live others’ notion of what that life should be, and then they become confused about the social world in general. They say early on, “What I personally want in life is not important, at least not as important as what others want me to do with it,” and so they are forever engaged in a search for external surrogates—for relatives, friends, lovers, gurus, politicians, religionists, educators, or social authorities—who will give them ersatz solutions to the basic problem of our will, which is how to personally form a sound and meaningful life plan. But this advice often comes with a price, sometimes their life or freedom. Their assimilative charge at the second pole ( – ) leads them to settle on traditional work and a traditional way to live—one that was created by others, that is still approved by others, and that won’t provoke disputes with others or their social institutions.

The life ambition of those who are assimilative in will, other than the gratifications of submitting to the will of others and not being responsible, lies in quantitative expansion, or in wanting more instead of what is better. This is also to say that they are not creative on any broad or whole issue. Since they can’t easily posit the qualitative plan, or meaning, that is the function of their will, they habitually ignore quality and focus on quantity instead. To them, like

‘improvement’, ‘progress’, and ‘maturity’ too often mean only numerical increase. They are compliant ‘team players’ who follow the path laid out for them by more willful people, their ‘coaches’, but even on a team their opportunism tends to emerge in some form.

Adding to their manipulability is the fact that, because their will system is weaker than it is for the projective or balanced types, they aren’t as capable of seeing the whole picture instantly or of instinctively sensing other people’s true motives. A weak will system always indicates weak instincts, or gullibility, in those respects.

Advice to Followers. Your main difficulty is in not seeing the whole of a current situation, so don’t accept any plan of purpose, or long-range goal proposed by collectivists who defend tradition in order to oppose progress. That is, don’t follow a herd; you are a real individual, so no artificial collective or other person has a right to direct your life goals. Also, reality is not mystical; though it is vast and we can’t see it all, we see its laws in everything around us, and no guru or religion knows these laws better than you do from your common logic. When you consider your work or life plan, be alone and without references. Try to consult only your own thoughts, feelings, judgments, and powers, and that a life devoted to material gain, or excessive accumulations of any other kind, is a life devoted to others’ demands; this may please them, but it won’t make you happy. The purpose of your will system is to determine your place in the world, or how you fit into the whole picture, so if you deny your will by letting others dictate your course, then you have no place in that picture.

Though this is good advice, you may find it too difficult to follow. If so, then try to find the best possible thinkers and advisors to follow and learn from their example. These will be unselfish realists who are strong in will (+ or B), who have a wholistic perspective, who seek and speak the truth, and who pursue universal moral goals. And this work can help you judge if that is or isn’t the case with anyone you read, meet, or hear about.

Socially, you have less difficulty with others than those who are projective in will. Your natural amiability and reluctance to express any disagreement with others, which many view as social assets, serve to disguise the flaws just listed. You might even be deceived by this yourself, for you might conclude from it that you don’t need improvement. If this makes you happy, fine, but inside you probably know that you’ve purchased this social peace by complying with the dictates of the corrupt people, businesses, systems, traditions, and governments all around you. Whether or not you work to correct this depends on your other systems. If you’re a moral leftist, you’re probably doing so already; otherwise you probably aren’t but you should.

Reversed Will (+, –), The Denier

The will reversal (R) is totally illogical because it has the inappropriate charge at both poles of the system. We can see this impairment easily in individuals and intellectual works because its illogic causes one to propose some form of arealism, fantasy, or delusion that is the opposite of the realism of the balanced impulse.

People with a will reversal transmit rather than receive at the first pole and receive rather than transmit at the second pole, so the entire system fails to work for them. At the first pole they see a real event as they wish it to be rather than as it is, and then they compound this denial of reality at the second pole, where they can’t project a personal plan of purpose to achieve that unrealistic wish. Thus, they lack the instinctive perception of others’ motives that people who are strong in will have; they can only store unrealistic motives and plans in memory; and their primary reasoning, which deals with the most fundamental issues of life, is all about denial and fiction. That’s why so many of these ‘deniers’ become fictionists of some kind.

The only advantage of any reversal is that intelligent people can use its innate negativism to develop their critical skills there, which is why reversals are commonly found in the patterns of academics, jurists, journalists, psychologists, and other critics.

The will reversal makes people contradictory in that they assume responsibility for external events that they didn’t cause, but won’t take responsibility for decisions that were within their control. They might say, “I will use my life to improve society in this way, so now you must tell me how to go about it.” This reversal makes one’s motives ultimately self-defeating. In fact, the five systemic reversals explain the old references in our literature to people who are possessed

by a devil, demon, or dybbuk that sooner or later undoes what they want most to achieve.

Being subject to this illogic daily, our deniers try to turn off their will system by denying it and the realities with which it deals. They may even deny their own survival, saying that it too is irrelevant. When we speak of ‘a failure of will’, we are probably referring to this impulse in a fourth of us. We see the extreme cases of it in those who sacrifice or risk their lives in work or play; who destroy their health by the addictions, diets, habits, desires, games, or pleasures that their weak will cannot control; or who rationalize or universalize their denial of reality or life—a task to which intellectuals with a will reversal can dedicate their entire working life. This is so, for instance, of most theologians, as Table 14 confirms.

Bearing in mind that we are only considering one characteristic here and not anyone’s total character, we find the will reversal in most people who commit suicide. We can’t say that it’s a direct cause of suicide, but it’s close, for it makes either suicide or martyrdom for some cause seem reasonable. And the forms of social suicide, such as war and the destruction of our natural environment, fit its illogic perfectly. That is, not only do many people with a will reversal deny their own life and that of others, they are easily manipulated into doing so, especially if they have been indoctrinated to believe some fictional ideal.

Intellectuals with a will reversal threaten us all, for they are arealists who insist that we should ‘turn off’ our will, as well as reality, life, theory, and primary reasoning in general. They ask us to deny our will or to ‘go beyond’ reality to some transcendental state, or they say that we should rise above this earthly coil by denying our lives, usually for some fiction such as God, Country, Family, or Revenge.

The chief source of all mystical beliefs, including theism, is a weak (– or R) will, because this weakness causes the total or partial denial of our primary reasoning,

which is the only part of our psychologic that deals with what is real and whole. This denial becomes negativism in general, so that our deniers never doubt the fictions that they create or adopt, and if they were traditionally educated, they won’t see this flaw for the congenital impairment it is. Instead, they assume that this is a natural urging that is speaking truth to them. And since they ‘feel’ this illogic inside, they assume that all humans have it, except that others don’t see it while they do, by some special gift. It’s then but a short step for some of them to think that they hear the voice of ‘God’ or ‘the Devil’—neither of which, of course, is required speak to us logically. Bush II ( R + + R R ) is a case in point, as are the many fanatic religionists who have other reversals also.

This view is ed by the evidence provided in this work that most theists and other mystics are among the 37% of people who have two or more reversals, and that the exceptions to this rule are usually people who are weak in will only.³ We know from our common logic that these people are impaired. We must know this, for it’s no accident that whenever our fiction writers want to portray insane people in their stories, they make them religious or mystical fanatics. This device works because it communicates clearly to us all that these are characters who deny reality, as many people do.

Following is a list of the chief illogical points of the will reversal. I number them here, and later in discussing the four other systemic reversals, to show that, their differences aside, all five reversals function in the same dynamic way.

1. Arealism. Our subjects have no personal philosophy of life because they deny all primary reasoning and theory. A personal philosophy is initially structured in our will system, but their will system is confused and its memory bank is filled with illogical conclusions. They can be quick to religions and other collectives or clubs that are based on fictions rather than reality. The will reversal is a reliable sign of a mystic, an escapist, or anyone else who opposes theory and the primary reasoning that includes survival and life prolongation through good health, environmental sanity, and peace. They are the first among us to seek escapes from reality, so they often have major illnesses of their own

making, become addicts of some kind, or will immerse themselves overly in the past or in the fictions of theoryless science or meaningless (will-less) entertainment, such as music, novels, games, parties, movies, television, sports, and so on.

2. Antiphilosophy. This reversal makes unintelligent people into antiintellectuals, and it causes intelligent people to deny primary reasoning and begin their reasoning with no theory; that is, from the secondary, tertiary, or quaternary mode instead. We hardly need the Cycle to see the will reversal in the work of highly intelligent theists such as More, Luther, Hobbes, Leibniz, Berkeley, and Kant, or in highly intelligent atheists such as the academic Russell and the existentialist Sartre. Intellectuals with a will reversal always ignore the reality that we perceive and consider only in our primary reasoning, where we construct our survival and motivational systems, and they have never offered us a theory of Reality, as distinct from repeating some of the old assumptions concerning it.

3. Manipulation. People who need others to give them a life plan are manipulated by those others, such as their parents, teachers, preachers, or friends, or some media celebrities or social, intellectual, or political leaders. Depending on how gullible they are, this susceptibility to motivational manipulation, which often leads them to sacrifice their resources and some or all of their life, is characteristic of about half of us, those who are either reversed (R) or assimilative (–) in will. To paraphrase Barnum’s old saw in this context: You can fool half of the people all of the time.

4. Self-Undoing. Because our will system determines our motives and a reversal makes people unrealistic in that function, their decisions are self-defeating. And if we can live with their irrational acts for a while, we can bank on that fact. We see this plainly in the three worst US presidents yet: Wilson ( R – R B R ), Nixon ( R R – R – ), and Bush II ( R + + R R ), all of whom were pathological, reversed in will, and later undone by their innate characters. This self-undoing occurs with any reversal, of course, but its effects are less global as we move from the

will system to the power system.

5. Academicism. In any system, a reversal inclines people to pursue some kind of academic, theological, juridic, journalistic, or critical career. In will, it makes one eager to project one’s subjective opinion ( + ) on the meaning of past and current events, and to adopt plans of purpose ( – ) from respected others or their society’s historical or sacred texts, which requires the exhaustive research that pleases most academics.

6. The Gap. A reversal in a system causes one to fill the succedent memory bank with invalid conclusions that cannot be objectively prioritized and consistently structured as a formal system, and so the entire system functions as a hole, or gap, in one’s subsequent reasoning. This is so because its memory bank, which consists of contradictory conclusions that confuse one when they are recalled, cannot be logically ordered.

7. Inner Peace. Our subjects’ total illogic in will makes any rationalization that denies that system seem like a godsend to them. They eagerly embrace such a lie or delusion as the path to what they call ‘inner peace’, but they don’t realize that this is only needed by impaired people, since healthy people have it naturally. Then they universalize this conclusion that calms them and project it on us all, insisting that the only delusion here is our good health, since ‘in reality’ everyone needs relief from this illogic that they suffer.

8. Shortcuts. The will reversal makes people seek shortcuts to avoid reasoning about their motives and plans because they find it difficult to complete their will system’s functions. Since this irritates people who aren’t reversed in will, they will withdraw from others or find some abrupt way to avoid the issue altogether.

9. Failure to explain. Because their daily functioning in matters of will (wishes

and plans) is unsuccessful and confusing for them, our deniers are reluctant to speak about their motives and broader plans of purpose. On these matters they try to be silent, though they will criticize others who do this because they recognize this flaw in them. Thus, our deniers are rarely forthcoming on the real reasons why they are forming a partnership, pursuing a particular profession, participating in social events, or giving in to addictions and other practices that are harmful to them or others. And often, if pressed by anyone, they will lie about it or prevent the conversation from continuing. Since they can’t explain it realistically, they don’t want to talk about it at all.

10. Begging the Question. This is an important general aspect of the five reversals, but I didn’t discuss it in the last chapter as a general issue because it has two forms that are better explained in the context of two different systems, an open ( – + ) and a closed ( + – ) one, such as will and thought. We can detect a reversed system by formal logic also, simply by showing that one consistently begs the question there. In fact, I consider the systemic reversal to be the chief cause of that particular logical error.

Many unknowing people today will say that a statement ‘begs the question’ when they only mean that it prompts or raises a subsequent question, but this distortion of the term’s original meaning shows their ignorance and should be avoided in the name of valid reasoning. My OED and RHD dictionaries say, respectively, that this term’s sole meaning is “to take for granted the matter in dispute, to assume without proof,” or “to assume the truth of the very point raised in a question.”

That is what our logicians mean by ‘begging the question’; it is the logical error known as a circular argument or petitio principii, or petitioning the principle. It means presupposing what one is trying to prove, or more fully, asserting as the conclusion of an argument something that one has already assumed in an explicit or implied premise. This is a classic logical error, but now the Consideration Cycle explains it, and in the process shows us that we can ‘beg the question’ in two opposite ways.

I distinguish those ways as petitioning the premise and petitioning the conclusion, and I use our psychologic term ‘reversal’ and the old logical term ‘begs the question’ generically, to mean either or both of these errors. So ‘begging the question’ is now a psychologic term also, for it means any case of circular reasoning that results from the inverted reasoning of an innate systemic reversal, as described below. Anyone can commit this error by mistake, but it is characteristic of people with a reversal because they always consider the two poles of their afflicted system in the wrong order. It’s a common error and an important one, for in any system a fourth of us beg the question habitually, and over all five systems 76% of us do so somewhere in our psychologic.

The type of question begging depends on the type of system. In our two closed systems (thought and judgment) the balanced impulse is ( + – ), and in our three open systems (will, feeling, and power) it is ( – + ). Well, a reversal makes one petition the pole that should be projected (+) but is assimilated (–) instead. So, in a closed system one petitions (assimilates, adopts, borrows, or steals) the premise, which in thought is a principle and in judgment a need. And in an open system one petitions the conclusion, which in will is a plan, in feeling a desire, and in power an understanding.

People with a reversed system soon learn from experience that they have the wrong impulse at its first pole, so on each occasion they approach it with caution and temporarily suspend their reasoning there—or they bracket it, to use the evasive term of Husserl ( + R – – + ) who had a thought reversal. But they know that they must return to the first pole later in a reconsideration, after they have jumped ahead to the second pole, where in an open system they will borrow (–) someone else’s conclusion and in a closed system they will project (+) a conclusion that they should have assimilated. Those are the general points about question begging; I will explain it specifically for each reversal as item 10.

In the case of the will system ( – , + ), the reversal causes people to petition the conclusion ( – ), or search outside themselves for it. They don’t pause at the first

pole to assimilate the event being considered because their impulse there is to project their own notion of that event, and in the first go-round they don’t yet know enough to project anything about it. So they suspend (or bracket) their reasoning there and jump ahead to the system’s subjective second pole. But now they face their next problem, which is that they can’t project this plan themselves because they are assimilative here. So they must suspend their reasoning at this pole too, while they search the external world, for as long as it takes, to find someone else’s second-pole plan of purpose (or motive) that seems suitable for them. Then, in a reconsideration, they return to the first pole with this borrowed conclusion in mind and project this alien plan as their ‘premise’ at the first pole, or as the wish that they should have assimilated at the start.

This begs the question because now one’s premise is one’s conclusion; the wish is the plan, though not one’s own plan. Now, over two acts of consideration rather than one, the wish is an assimilation from the outer world, but it is an assimilated plan, not an assimilated wish, and plans for ourselves should always be of our own design. Needless to say, reasoning in this convoluted way is a very slow process.

A common instance of this is when young people with a will reversal try to decide their life work but don’t, because they assimilate from their parents, teachers, or other authority figures a life plan that they ‘should’ follow. After adopting this advice, they reconsider the matter and say, “This is what I wish to do with my life.” But it isn’t a wish, it’s a plan, and someone else’s plan at that. The event that should have given rise to their wish response is a proposed plan and not a wish, so the whole process is reversed. And since this borrowed plan wasn’t theirs, they end up pursuing occupations in life, possibly many of them, that are inappropriate for them and can’t make them happy, which is what a plan of purpose is meant to do for all of us.

Advice to Deniers. Read the advice above to creators (+) and followers (–), both of which apply to you in part, though combined they make you want to deny your will altogether. You do this by escaping somehow from the realities you face, or

you face those realities only after you have turned off your will system’s primary reasoning. Either way, this feeds your problem rather than solving it.

To compensate for your illogic here, you must impose controls, especially since the self-undoing that results from the will reversal is more global than that of any other reversal. For instance, you must (1) take especially good care of your health; (2) reject theism or any other form of mystical reasoning; (3) know the theory behind any ideology proposed to you and reject it if it is not realistic; (4) study human nature; (5) avoid impaired people and irrational leaders, for their advice or commands will harm you; (6) explicitly define your life strategy and your place in the whole of things, and repeat this process at each Saturn cycle (ages 29½ and 59); and (7) be more tolerant of others’ uniqueness and goals. If you work on these matters, you’ll be less inclined to withdraw from society or to quit a present situation or a relationship over minor issues.

Try to control your temper and your appetites. This is especially important if your thought system is also weak (– or R) and your feeling system is strong (+ or B), for then you will have much trouble controlling your emotions, as we all must from time to time. Also, be tolerant of people, especially those who are trying to help you rather than manipulate you. Stop undervaluing your life, which you do because your long-term goals are confused or unclear to you, and work daily on your survival. That is, avoid dangerous endeavors, pleasures, or habits; pay more attention to proper diet, exercise, and your behavior toward others; and avoid everyone who encourages you to do otherwise.

One of the greatest dangers of your will reversal is that it weakens the instincts that warn you of others’ intentions, and this prevents you from seeing the harm in associating with people who are as unrealistic as you are, just as it leads others to consider you naïve. Try to ensure that all of your partners, friends, and advisors have healthy will and judgment systems.

Another great danger of the will reversal is the occurrence over time of creeping

doubts about life, usually accompanied by periods of depression and often followed by a direct or indirect suicidal effort. As it becomes ever clearer to our deniers that they cannot assimilate ( –) a fitting purpose for their whole life in spite of their misguided attempts to do so, they conclude that the rest of us are fools because, in reality, there is no purpose to life. Their profound error here, logically speaking, is that their projective wish response ( +) to the perceived event of their whole life prevents them from seeing themselves as they really are. If they were realists, they would have known from the start that Reality has no purpose, or at least none that we can understand, but that in any case they were born as a unique being that needs its own purpose—a self-determined purpose— in order to be truly happy and to be so as long as possible.

You must accept the facts that Reality is what it is and that you are what you are. Then you will see that it is your job alone to form a personal purpose for your whole life and thereby give it a meaning. Reality can’t do this for you.

2. Thought [+,–]

The impulse of our thought system is determined at its first pole by the charge of Mercury () and at its second pole by the charge of Uranus ().

Our will system leads our reasoning into the subconscious phase of subjective analysis, and we exit that phase by cognizing the abstract concept, our second cardinal idea. This cognition is the defining essence of the initial event, or context, and it is the beginning of our conscious thought system as such. Thought is a closed system; its balanced impulse is ( + – ), which means that it begins with a personal projection and concludes with assimilation from outside the self. So this system works deductively from its first pole ( + )—which is epistemically the abstract concept, logically a principle, and linguistically an abstract term—to its second pole ( – ), where we cognize the objective implications of that concept, principle, or term. My shorthand for our thought system’s polar cognitions are principle and implication, which in other contexts might be premise and conclusion or concept and fact.

Our thought system thus begins with a powerful cardinal idea, the abstract concept that is our cognition and affirmation of our context’s defining essence, such as its existence, oneness, space, uniqueness, or dignity. This derived concept is only logical if we project and affirm it, but at the second pole, where we deduce its many objective implications, only assimilation is logical.

It is in this system that we organize and logically structure the parts of any whole we consider, including the conclusions we reach in our four other psychologic systems. For example, we make moral decisions in specific cases in our judgment system, but later, in our thought system, we decide the universal moral codes that we think everyone should follow in all cases. Thus, the strength or

weakness of someone’s thought system is a major indicator of how well organized that person’s reasoning is on the whole, or on just about everything.

But the implicatory chain of the Cycle is important here, for we can’t tell how well our thought system’s secondary reasoning works from its impulse alone. We must also know the impulse of our primary will system, because a weak impulse (– or R) in will limits our secondary reasoning to some degree even when our impulse in thought is strong (+ or B).

Balanced Thought (+, –), The Reasoner

To be balanced in thought is to reason from a subjective principle or abstract term to its multiple objective implications, which is to dissect a One into a Some. People with this impulse are natural reasoners, in the sense of ‘reason’ described as follows in Webster’s Dictionary of Synonyms (Springfield, MA: G. & C. Merriam Co., Publishers, First Edition, 1942, p.680).

the term is often used in a very general sense to note the power of arriving at knowledge or truth by logical processes, whether one starts with observed facts, with principles regarded as axioms or necessary postulates, or the like; thus, in Kant’s definition “pure reason” does not start with facts derived from experience or observation, but with truths derived through the medium of a higher intellectual power.³¹

People with this balanced impulse normally have no difficulty with deductive thinking, for they usually understand the thought process well, they can organize ideas coherently, and they can communicate abstract notions effectively. They also have a strong sense of their individual uniqueness and personal dignity ( + ). Unlike people who are assimilative at the first pole ( – ), they rarely appear insignificant, embarrass themselves, diminish their physical attractiveness or their status in others’ eyes, or act like buffoons either professionally or in private. But at the second pole, where it is appropriate to assimilate the implications of a principle or abstract concept, they are conventional. So unless they are projective (+) in their will system, our ‘reasoners’ will apply their logical thinking mainly to socially accepted tasks and will seldom upset their society’s intellectual traditions with new thinking.

Advice to Reasoners. Be sure that any abstract notions you project as the start of your secondary reasoning have been properly derived from sound primary

reasoning or plans of purpose (motives). Take more risks in your thinking; that is, challenge any principle that leads to inconsistent conclusions, no matter how popular it is with academics or the public, and seek out intellectuals who do the same. If your thinking on a subject is mistaken, this is less often due to your illogic than it is to the fact that you adopted without analysis some conventionally accepted thinking—that is, some abstract principle, theory, term, or deduced opinion that wasn’t sound when it was first proposed but is still being widely used.

Other people appreciate your sound thinking and willingness to listen to their opinions on a subject being discussed, and though they often respect you for your dignity and for not uttering absurd opinions or arguing unreasonably, they don’t look to you for original thinking. This suggests that you should challenge yourself more by seeking out people and groups who, rather than being tied to the past, to established ways, or to academic conclusions generally, are proposing new thinking in some area. Though you are open-minded, it is quite likely that you are too complacent in assuming that what you’ve learned to date is sound and sufficient.

Projective Thought (+, +), The Speaker

This impulse is illogical only at the second pole ( + ), where one does not objectively assimilate what a principle implies. People who are projective in thought talk or write much and have a strong sense of their personal dignity and uniqueness. They construct their thought system with little help from others or tradition, and, depending on their other characteristics, their conclusions in that system can be new and valuable or arbitrary and opinionated. Their illogic at the second pole ( + ) makes them overconfident in those opinions, which may be fictions that they equate to facts, and they might be so impressed with their projected subjective conclusions that they stubbornly refuse to assimilate any factual evidence or reasonable arguments that might contradict them.

To be projective in any system is to be half-illogical there, so this impulse produces two different kinds of ‘speakers’. The first kind are the close-minded and opinionated people who are seldom productive in their thinking because they use their reason as a weapon to ‘mow down’ or ‘close out’ all who disagree with their opinions. The other kind are the intelligent people who make good use of the creativity that results from being projective at both poles of thought; that is, both in forming abstract concepts and in drawing their implications. They can be exceptionally insightful in those two tasks, so that in retrospect most people can’t see how they could have projected that concept or seen those implications of it. It is such people, especially those who are also strong in will and comionate in judgment, who make the most important and original intellectual contributions to human thought.

This distinction between the two major types of ‘speakers’ is usually revealed by the strength of the will system. People who are weak (– or R) in will are usually confused and manipulated there, so they can’t make their thought system sound even if they are balanced in thought, and if they happen to be projective there instead, they will be opinionated. A good example is that paradigmatic

opinionator, Bush II ( R + + R R ). Being reversed in will, his projective thought system isn’t structured by a sense of reality, theory, or personal motives, so there is no logic there. His opinions are based on the motives he was manipulated into adopting, first by his willful father ( + B B B + ) and later in life, he claimed, by his “higher father,” meaning the imaginary deity that he said speaks to him and that he uses in lieu of logic. He projects thoughts freely and often; in fact, it is hard to quiet him or to get him to listen to anyone. But given his weak will, his thoughts don’t mean anything, and he defends these arbitrary opinions not with logic, but with mystical arguments or sheer stubbornness.

The tables of Appendix B list many people who are strong (B or +) in both will and thought, as Bush I is, and they all think and speak with meaning. Other characteristics also affect this ability significantly, but strength in both will and thought is commonly found in our best thinkers, because a strong will prevents a strong thinker from initially denying reality and primary reasoning. A good example is the purposeful conservative Einstein ( + B R – R ), who achieved much in analytic thought for society in spite of his weak reasoning in his three synthetic systems: feeling, judgment, and power.

Advice to Speakers. You think fast and you are eager, often too eager, to project your thoughts. As your impulses in will and judgment indicate, you will do this either to help people with your strong thinking or to advance your selfish ends. that you can’t develop a full line of reasoning in ordinary conversations, and that when you try to do this, people usually consider it didactic or rude, which can defeat your purposes. Don’t interrupt people while they are speaking; let them finish their sentences, and hear them out fully even when you know what they’re going to say.

Curb your urge to be the first to say something, and be careful not to gossip, for that’s a common fault of our ‘speakers’, at least those of the negative type. Generally, you talk too much. If you’re a moral person, you are very eager to give others the benefit of your new thinking, but even when you do this with the best of motives, they won’t see it that way if you dominate the conversation or

express yourself too forcefully.

Also, since you often rush to say whatever comes to your mind, you probably have to revise what you say or write more often than you first assume is necessary. Reconsider any conclusions, or opinions, that you take to be facts, for your tendency to rush your thinking causes some or many of them to be untrue. Two useful rules to follow before you speak or write are (1) have a clear and good purpose for doing so, and (2) give more thought than you usually do to the effects your statements will have on others. The Cycle shows that after we reach a thought conclusion, it must through our feeling, judgment, and power systems, so a sound opinion must feel right, be moral, and work well in practice. But most projective thinkers don’t take the time to make it so.

Assimilative Thought (–, –), The Listener

The illogic of this impulse is at the first pole ( – ), where one should subjectively project principles or one’s dignity but doesn’t. Since these assimilative ‘listeners’, unlike the ‘reasoners’ and ‘speakers’ we’ve just considered, begin thought without forming an abstract conception, they must adopt principles and abstract from others. This means that their thought process always begins slowly, and it continues slowly too, for at the second pole ( – ) they will, appropriately, take time to find and assimilate the objective implications of those principles.

Being assimilative at the first pole impairs people’s sense of personal dignity and uniqueness because their self-concept is weak ( – ). It may sound contradictory to say that a person’s self-concept can be adopted from others, but about half of all people—the assimilative (–) or reversed (R) in thought—do just that. That is, they can only derive their sense of dignity from what others say about them or people like them, so they continuously seek praise and make much of the honors and awards ceremonies by which their peers or rulers express approval for anyone. This deficiency in dignity lets others manipulate them through criticism or flattery, and that makes them inconsistent and unreliable in their dealings with others. Thus, the person they are today is often not the same person they were yesterday.

Though our listeners don’t posit abstract concepts, they are natural students, researchers, and scholars because they must adopt a principle from tradition or others ( – ), and then search for its objective implications ( – ). This assimilative impulse in thought causes the familiar academic-scientific disposition in people. It is illogical because whenever one adopts rather than creates a principle, one detaches it from its psychologic causes—that is, from the realism, theory, and motives of its creator—and this leaves one with no basis in primary reasoning for determining if it is valid or not.

Being assimilative in thought makes people dependent on the principles and opinions of others, so they are usually collectors of both and enjoy studying others’ thinking. Jefferson ( + – – B B ) was a listener in this sense, and reflecting his academic nature, he filled his life with reading intellectual and scientific works, collecting facts and others’ opinions, and building his vast library, which he bequeathed in parts to the Library of Congress and to the great university that he founded in Charlottesville. So it is not surprising that the key principles he used in the Declaration of Independence were not original to him but were borrowed from earlier writings by others—from the radical Hutcheson ( B R – + + ) and the liberal Locke ( – B – – – ) to the leading leftists of his time, notably Tom Paine ( B B B – + ), Sam Adams ( B + – B + ), and George Mason ( – B + + B ).

Because our listeners borrow others’ principles rather than affirm their own, they devote most of their thinking to research and to objectively deducing new implications from old established principles. This is the focus of most academics and journalists, especially those who deal with thinkers and generally accepted thoughts. If they achieve any fame as intellectuals, as many have, it is due to having studied and used others’ principles, and perhaps deducing some new implications from them.

Needless to say, this impulse to assimilate and then retain (memorize, collect, or store) thoughts makes people more conventional in their thinking and opinions than the other three types. Their thought system’s memory bank consists mostly of traditional conceptions, learned historical or scientific facts, multiple language systems (including mathematics and music), and current public or peer opinions, which together are the woof and warp of all their thinking. Because they never affirm abstract principles on their own authority, they speak cautiously and with many qualifications or citations, and so they seldom express themselves. That is, they are taciturn as well as pedagogic.

The tables of Appendix B list many people whose social prominence derived

from this liberal (–) weakness in thought, especially from promoting others’ principles or opinions as one’s own or establishing academic institutions or procedures. In fact, their participation in collective intellectual effort is just a disguise for this other-dependence in thought. Though their ivity, lack of boldness, and team participation may lead others to like, praise, and reward them, we mustn’t assume from this social approval that they are original thinkers. As regards abstract concepts, their role is that of sponges, not creators. Even so, they often devise new research methods, develop new ways to test opinions for their factuality, and find new uses for others’ concepts.

As with the projective ‘speakers’, our assimilative ‘listeners’ are of two types. The negative type consists of plagiarists, brokers, or opportunists who profit from borrowing others’ thinking or controlling its use. The positive type consists of students, experimenters, collectors, explorers, and researchers who excel at any of the professions and tasks that require such abilities and who willingly take on this tedious intellectual work. These positive assimilative thinkers are most productive as intellectuals if—like the famous listeners Jefferson, Gandhi, Hegel, Lenin, Proudhon, Darwin, Ellis, Freud, and Ricardo—they also have a strong will and comion in judgment.

Advice to Listeners. Don’t let your self-concept be shaped by what others think of you or by the material or social distinctions you achieve, for these only result in self-deception. You must define your own essence without relying on what others think, even your peers at work. This is important because our will and dignity do the most to save us from being manipulated and misused by others.

You are happiest doing work that doesn’t require original thinking, such as teaching, detecting, researching, or judging facts or others’ thoughts and reporting on them, but be sure to identify your sources as you do this. Don’t think less of yourself for doing this kind of work, for while you didn’t create the concepts you have adopted, you can still take pride in uncovering them or in seeing their relevance to a new situation. Of course, if you lack a strong will or good judgment, you may not be able to edit, or decide the value of, the opinions

you’ve collected. Recognize this problem so that you don’t opinions just because they are popular or are favored by ‘experts’. it that this is not valid grounds for accepting a thought, and then use your research talents to prove or disprove it. This will help you see traditional nonsense better and overcome your reluctance to express yourself.

This reluctance is something you need to correct. Your thought system controls your deductive reasoning, your self-image, and your habits of speech—which may be somehow impaired, as with George VI ( R – + + B )—and your ive impulse at its first pole ( – ) is why you are weak in those areas and reluctant to assert your opinions. So you live in a pluralistic universe where you continually vacillate in your opinions, and you stay silent because you don’t want others to know that you can’t pick a side on an issue with any certainty. This can make you unreliable, and because many people might notice it, it causes social and vocational problems for you. The solution is to try to take a stand on all universal (theoretical) issues; in short, be more principled, in the intellectual, moral, and practical senses. This is difficult for you, so try to follow the most moral and realistic creative thinkers you can find. But don’t assume that such thinkers exist in academia, politics, religion, business, or the major media.

You are usually liked by most people in your social circles, but even though this may work for you socially, it isn’t a virtue, for it is due largely to the fact that you seldom express new or controversial opinions that upset others. So you often face this choice: Is it better to be liked or to be right? I say the latter, but most listeners would probably say the former. Think it over before you them.

Reversed Thought (–, +), The Skeptic

The thought reversal also causes academic or journalistic other-dependence because it too leads one to adopt principles from external sources at the first pole ( – ). But unlike the assimilative impulse, it is also illogical at the second pole, which makes one subjectively project ( + ) rather than objectively deduce ( – ) the implications of those adopted principles. This illogic at both poles produces skeptics, meaning people who can’t validly deduce thought conclusions and who therefore form unusual or even weird subjective opinions, which they still take to be ‘facts’ because that’s what a notion would be at this point of the Cycle if it had been objectively deduced.

One of the most important aspects of this illogic, as distinct from that of the four other reversals, is that it causes one’s sense of personal worth, or dignity, and perhaps one’s speech as well, to be impaired or even crippled. This is the same problem that many ‘listeners’ have, but it is more severe here because one is also illogical at the second pole ( + ). The double lack of dignity that results from the combination of an assimilative first pole ( – ) and a projective second pole ( + ) leads many ‘skeptics’ to act like clowns, comics, or buffoons, or to otherwise behave in undignified ways.

People with a thought reversal don’t have a natural sense of dignity, so they expend much effort trying to establish objective proof of their personal worth. That’s why, in spite of the apparent contradiction, they try to excel academically and to distinguish themselves in public as intellectuals, which as regards creativity and sound logic they never are. And unlike people who are strong (B or +) in thought, they are defensive when anyone criticizes their thinking because they take this as a comment on their inherent worth, which is not usually what a critic intends.

Except in the type of question begging used, the ten general flaws of the will reversal also apply to the thought reversal. So, following our list above and bearing in mind throughout that a strong will system (+ or B) will lessen the impact of these effects somewhat, we can say the following of our skeptics.

(1) They cannot structure a realistic and sound explicit system. (2) They are antiintellectuals, and since they even deny their own thought system, they try to deflect any discussion of theory or correct thinking to make it about emotive, personal, mystical, or practical issues instead, and this sometimes requires rude interruptions. (3) They are easily manipulated by thinkers who are more logical or socially esteemed than they are. (4) Their illogic in thought is their undoing; either because they aren’t thinking correctly or are plagiarizing their key ideas from the past or their peers. (5) They prefer professions that are academic, journalistic, or juridic in nature because these require them to research others’ principles and opinions and project their own arbitrary, or even foolish or comedic, opinions ( + ) as if these were valid deductions from true principles. (6) When they try to present a complete line of reasoning, there is a gap where the theories and deductive logic of their thought system would normally be.

(7) They are the leading advocates of mystical, scientific, practical, or satiric formal systems that extol the benefits of not thinking; that is, of suspending, transcending, or ‘going beyond’ thought, or universal thinking. And because our thought system includes our self-concept, or dignity, they may express weird opinions in public without caring what others think of them. Like our assimilative listeners, and even though they fervently defend their thinking against all criticism, their individuality and their own or others’ dignity mean nothing to them. Only the collective or the traditions of their culture are important to them, and they consider individuals who are not socially esteemed to be irrelevant. (8) Since they try to avoid logical thinking, they seek shortcuts in reasoning or distractions that will fill their mind with nonsense instead.

(9) Our skeptics are averse to any discussion of abstract or universal thought, which is to say theory, and their only purpose in learning it or discussing it is to

criticize it. They can be active talkers or writers, but what they say is confined to pragmatic subjects or to the criticism of other’s opinions on synthetic subjects such as politics, law, science, art, history, religion, business, and so on. However intelligent or educated they may be, they will refuse to explain their innate self or the theory behind any of their personal opinions, and they often use joking to change the subject. Similarly, they have difficulty grasping the concept and nature of their uniqueness and character, so all their talk about themselves, and there may be much of it, is likely to be only about their experiences in life and how these led to their present traits or situation.

And (10) they consistently beg the question by petitioning the premise, which in our thought system is its first pole ( + ), a universal principle or abstract term. To beg the question in a closed system ( + – ) is to petition the premise rather than the conclusion, and I’ll explain this second type of question begging now. People who are reversed in thought ( – , + ) cannot project at the first pole as they should, so when they initially consider a context, they suspend consideration there and leap ahead to the second pole, where they will project rather than assimilate a conclusion (implication, fact, opinion, joke) that is vaguely related to that context. Then, holding this subjective conclusion in mind, which they erroneously take to be an objective fact, they revisit the first pole in a reconsideration. But on this next visit they still can’t project a principle, so they must look for someone else’s principle to adopt, and this time their search is simpler, since they now know just what deduced ‘fact’ they want that principle to imply. This is question begging, for the universal principle wasn’t adopted because it follows validly from primary reasoning, but only because it implies the subjective opinion that they projected at the second pole in their initial consideration.

Here’s a familiar example of this common error. Say that I have a thought reversal and I arbitrarily conclude that the black people I know are less intelligent than other people I know. To defend this subjective opinion ( + ) in my debates with others, I will search for a universal principle ( – ) that implies this ‘fact’. But all that I can find are mere opinions ( + ) by scientists or other academics that are as arbitrary as mine, because these are also based on partialized observations and because no antecedent principle can be validly

induced from consequent observations of or statistics on those observations. But if I can find some scientist who proposes a ‘principle’ of genetics or statistics that seems to imply my opinion, I will argue that, “Because scientist X has said Y, it follows that black people are intellectually inferior.” But this is not a premise and a conclusion; it is the same conclusion twice, the scientist’s mere opinion and mine, and so my ‘argument’ is circular, or begs the question.³²

Both forms of question begging—begging the premise or the conclusion—result in ersatz justifications, or rationalizations, chief among which are opinion polls and the circular self-promoting awards that our academic, professional, news, entertainment, corporate, military, and governmental institutions ceremoniously dispense. Polls can only tell us what people think or did, and never why they think it or did it or whether it is or isn’t a valid thought or moral act. That’s why polls and statistics are indispensable tools for all people with reversals. The same is so of honors and awards, which prove nothing but social acceptance. Their purpose is collectivistic, not individualistic; it is to make a public statement that begs the question of the worth of some person, property, or political program because it asks us to accept an evaluation of this on no better grounds than the subjective opinions of some narrow group of people. These deceiving award ceremonies are common in our societies because people who are assimilative or reversed in a system can’t function there without some peer or public consensus that uses the same illogical way of reasoning that they use to reach their arbitrary opinions.

Advice to Skeptics. Learn to distinguish between an abstract universal conception and the implications that follow from it, for this will help you see the illogic of your inverted impulse in thought. that facts are not asserted opinions, they must be proven to be facts, and that this requires objective testing and not faith or beliefs, which are the conclusions of our synthetic judgment rather than of our analytic thought.

If you don’t understand the illogic of your thought system, which you’ve already found ways to ‘turn off’, you will stop using it, and then you’ll be continually

manipulated by the thinking and logic of others. This is all the more likely because you lack dignity ( – ), or don’t assert your self-concept. You should understand that it’s better to try to correct your thinking than to skip, bracket, deconstruct, or deny it. that turning off your thought system by any means is equivalent to taking drugs to ‘lose your mind’. And don’t try to get relief from it by relying on your emotions or your sense of humor, as many theists, athletes, performers, and artists with a thought reversal do, for this is just another way to escape from the reality of our common logic. We humans have a thought system for good reasons, so it is self-defeating to deny it.

Refer to the advice I gave above to speakers (+) and listeners (–) in thought, for you have the faults of both. Also, you can benefit from studying the work of intellectuals who are strong (+ or B) in thought, and by detecting the logical errors in the works of those who, like yourself, are weak (– or R) there. But in spite of your illogic in this system, you have some assets in it. These include your eagerness to search out others’ principles ( – ), your ability to reach new and unexpected conclusions ( + ) from their principles, and your ability to criticize others’ thinking. Your problem is how to use these assets constructively so that you don’t become a wholly negative person, for total skeptics harm themselves, their families, their friends, and their society. This is a serious social problem that you should try to correct before it’s too late to do so.

3. Feeling [–,+]

The impulse of our feeling system is determined at its first pole by the charge of Venus () and at its second pole by the charge of Neptune ().

We store our thought system’s conclusions in the subconscious phase of objective analysis, which leads us to the first pole of our feeling system. To be logical, we must assimilate the objective cognition at this pole ( – ), which is mainly sense data. Then at the second pole we must project a subjective response ( + ), or internal decision, regarding the data we have just taken in. Keywords for these polar cognitions are sensations and desires, or in another context affections and ions. The distinction here is clear: our affections are our pleasures; our ions are our addictions.

Our feeling system is an open system ( – + ), so it is illogical to project at the first pole or assimilate at the second pole. At the first pole, it is unrealistic to project our own sensual or aesthetic criteria upon any external reality. Being projective in sensation ( + ) is like having a strict guardian at the gate of our feeling system, which can also happen in our will and power systems. This appears to be a defensive measure, but since it can’t be controlled, it causes one to reject otherwise rewarding experiences. People who project at this first pole (those who are + or R in feeling) say, “You can come into my emotional ground only if you first meet my personal aesthetic criteria.” Those who are assimilative here ( – ) also reject unpleasing sensations, but they are more tolerant of them than projective ( + ) people are. They choose partners or experiences for deeper reasons than mere appearance or other superficial issues.

But assimilation is illogical at the second pole. Here selfishness is appropriate, since we must make a subjective decision ( + ) on each objective thing we have

assimilated at the first pole. I refer to these concluding decisions as our desires or ions, or our ion determinations. These are binary in nature because we must either love or hate what we have just taken in; if we don’t, then we reach no feeling conclusion and the current consideration is aborted. There is no middle ground here; there’s only the subjective love-hate, pro-con, or have-avoid dualism of a ion. To continue considering whatever part or parts we have selected, we must decide here subjectively whether we desire to have or to avoid that part. In this our feeling system is like our digestive system, for when we eat we have an internal reaction, a ‘gut reaction’ as we say, by which our body rejects or accepts what we have consumed.

Of course, our ion to have any concrete and complex thing is a conclusion we reach over time by separately considering many of its attributes. This is the case when we are deciding how we feel about a potential mate or friend. And contrary to a popular misconception, true and deep love for another person is not based solely on our judgment of that person’s virtues. It is also based on our ion for his or her faults, which incite our desires primarily because of our own faults.

Our desires (ions) are implied by our sensations (affections), which can only tell us the superficial nature of something. It is here in the midst of our feeling system that we reach our third cardinal idea, the partial percept with which we select the part or parts that begin the second half of the Cycle, our synthetic reasoning. Our ion determinations will confirm or contradict our sensual, or affectional, determinations, but all that they can store in the succedent memory bank is a desire to have or to avoid the selected part, along with some memories of the sensations that led us to that decision.

The heart of woman and the heart of man seem like mysteries to us, but contrary to much of our literature they are essentially the same, for both are conceived in affection and can live on only as a ion. In other words, our many fleeting affections mean little to us unless we later choose (+) to make them into ions. Indeed, the function of our third cardinal idea, the partial percept, is to

force us to select which affections we will transform into ions, or desires. Thus, midway through the Cycle, people whose will is weak will surrender control of all their synthetic, or practical, reasoning in the second half of the Cycle to their ions. This is important, for it means that our practical, or synthetic, reasoning—unlike our theoretical, or analytic, reasoning which is based on a global wish—is always based on a selected ion, or specific desire.

We can see this clearly in how children develop. At first their feeling systems are all about affections, not ions. Then, throughout their teens and early twenties, they become preoccupied with deciding their ions; that is, with discovering in all areas of life just which kinds of experiences and people they will love or hate. Then, usually sometime in their thirties, they feel satisfied that they know what they need; whereupon their feeling system starts to harden and functions more rapidly and automatically, though usually not more wisely.

I can now clarify something that I couldn’t in our discussion of will. Our wants are either wishes or desires, each of which is our first response to a percept, but to opposite percepts. A wish is a response to a whole event and a desire is a response to a part or parts of that event; a wish begins analysis and a desire begins synthesis; a wish is validly cognized by objective assimilation ( – ) and a desire is validly cognized by subjective projection ( + ); and a wish pertains to our survival and long-term objectives, while a desire pertains to our partialized needs, pleasures, and short-term objectives.

Traditionally, the wish and desire are confused with each other and with our ambiguous term need, but in fact we can only validly associate a desire with our partialistic feeling system and a wish with our wholistic will system. Every wish is a power wish, and it is our principal type of wanting because it is global; that is, it implies all the little wants, or desires, that arise later in its context. To gratify a desire is merely to satisfy an appetite, or a partialistic want formed by our ions, but unless that desire stems from a prior wish and act of will, its gratification will give us no power over broader events. In our ignorance of how

we reason, too many of us take the easy way here; that is, we work harder to develop the narrow powers with which we can satisfy our desires than we do to develop the wholistic power over events that we must have to be happy. And we are encouraged in this by selfish manipulators—politicians, religionists, rs, and so on—who openly urge us to ignore our wishes, or happiness, and gratify our desires instead.

I quote Plato later where he says that the greatest of all plagues in a state is not faction, but rather distraction. This is true of individuals as well, but we should complete the point by adding that our distractions are the desires of our feeling system, not the wishes that we shape in our wholistic will system.

In analyzing people, we must that the soundness of the feeling system, whatever its impulse may be, depends largely on the strength or weakness of the two prior systems, will and thought. Though our ion selections determine our practical choices, they are themselves based on the condition of our analytic will and thought systems. If either of those systems functions illogically, there will be directly related flaws in our feeling system and its memory bank, and therefore in all of our synthetic reasoning. When our will system is strong, we can see easily if a particular emotional display will serve no purpose or be counterproductive, and when our thought system is strong, we can see in advance that an inappropriate emotional display makes no sense, or is illogical. If both are strong we can, as we say, “keep our emotions from getting the better of us,” but if both are weak, the opposite is so.

Balanced Feeling (–, +), The Harmonist

Those who are balanced in feeling have a logical emotive system, taking in freely with their senses at the first pole ( –), and then at the second pole ( + ) projecting their ion response to what they have assimilated. Their tastes are conventional, so in their first-pole cognitions they usually defer to the aesthetic opinions of experts or their peers, but at the second pole their inner responses to their sensations are personal and even creative, and they can express their feelings well. All their synthetic reasoning is therefore based on a feeling system that is logical and has few superficial biases.

There is a qualification here, though. If their prior systems, will and thought, are weak, our harmonists may distort the importance of their feeling system by seeing it as primary when it is not. As the Cycle shows clearly, our feeling system is tertiary, and therefore it has no role in our broader, or more fundamental, analytic reasoning.

Advice to Harmonists. Though you handle your emotions well, there are times when you play it too safe. That is, you tend to accept the tastes and emotional customs of your society without question, and you may even be ‘straight-laced’. One problem with this is that you can’t have rewarding new experiences without taking some emotional risks. Another is that the conventions you are adopting may have been decided by people who are not as rational as you are.

Your conventionality in feeling inclines you to accept rather than challenge some old notions regarding our emotions that your society should have changed long ago but hasn’t. These include the outmoded conceptions of masculinity, femininity, marriage, childbirth, and family that are defended by most religions, which like to pretend that they have some formal responsibility for how we individuals handle these personal matters. They also include the view of most

modern psychologists that all of our reasoning on any subject begins from our emotions, which the Cycle tells us is not so. If it were, they should be able to show us a cycle of their own design that illustrates how an emotion must be the source of all the other kinds of reasoning that we humans do.

Your parents’ religion may be another emotion-based institution that you blindly accept or won’t oppose. If so, then you aren’t using your natural good logic; nor are you considering all the women, children, and poor people who have long been morally and politically oppressed by those old institutions and their fictions.

Projective Feeling (+, +), The Emotionalist

The illogic of this impulse is at the first pole, where one projects one’s subjective sensual or aesthetic criteria as if these were objective facts. This is the creative charge here, suitable for tasks like descriptive communication or deg things, but it is not realistic. This reality distorting urge at the first pole ( + ) can then negatively affect the ions at the second pole ( + ), mainly by limiting them.

The projective impulse here makes people highly emotional; their feelings are of immense importance to them, often to the exclusion of all other experiences. They are those who ‘wear their heart on their sleeve’. They are romantics who brook no interference from others or their society in expressing their emotions, both their surface sensations and their deeper ions, and they may do so brashly or at inappropriate times. They often try to become writers, musicians, exhibitionists, performers, or other types whose private feelings must be heard, even if it means imposing their feelings on others. Had Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet been real people, they would have been projective in feeling, for theirs was not a balanced desire guided by their primary global wishes; it was an idealized love that denied all else, even their lives.

Contrary to what our emotionalists and many psychologists believe, our emotions are not the whole of us and they are not our most fundamental faculties; rather, they are logically derived from our prior instincts, motives, and thoughts. So whether the projective impulse in feeling is healthy or not depends largely on the two systems that precede and imply it. People who are strong in will and thought have control over their emotive process and its memory system, but emotionalists who are weak in those two prior systems may unrealistically risk everything on their emotions. Their desires—for pleasures, possessions, life after death, or the gratification of their ions—will then become ersatz wishes that they use as substitutes for their global motives to their delusion that

their feelings come before all other things.

We all know emotionalists well, both personally and in most of the fictional stories that we watch in movies, plays, and television. These are the people who are easily upset emotionally and who can’t control themselves as they lash out at others physically or verbally, or throw or destroy things around them to show others that they are emotionally pained. This is immature and antisocial behavior, and something that most of us cannot tolerate. In fact, it is probably not wise for us to associate with emotionalists who don’t have sufficient strength in their will or thought system to control their urge to overreact emotionally.

Our ions are the source of the hypothetical ideals that we create in our synthetic scientific, artistic, or mystical pursuits and in any purposeless or frivolous activities that are not based on will or thought. When those two prior systems are weak, our emotionalists will urge others to embrace theism, romanticism, or other harmful escapes from reality, which is also to say that they are perpetually adolescent. They function best as performers, artists, or designers of some kind, but they are not good teachers, for children are ultimately harmed by fictions and escapes from reality.

Advice to Emotionalists. Try to remain calm, even in situations that upset you. Your extreme subjective reactions will cause many people you meet or know to want to avoid you, perhaps out of fear of being near you the next time you inappropriately display your ions. And don’t confuse the two poles of your feeling system, which you do because you’re projective at both poles. Your affections are not your ions and vice versa, so what you appreciate sensually is not necessarily something that you must desire and possess, and what you dislike superficially at the first pole is not something that you must hate with a ion at the second.

Also, that while your superficial tastes and affections at the first pole are objective issues ( – ) that can be discussed with others, your ion

determinations at the second pole are private matters ( + ) that you shouldn’t share with anyone who, now or later, might not have your best interests at heart. Though our media ignore this fact and you’re impelled to do it anyway, telling others your deepest feelings is more information about you than most people want or need, and because it is irrelevant to them, many resent it as an imposition. Your ions are personal, and since they are subjectively derived, they mean nothing to people who are not close to you.

Putting this in another context, the purpose of true art is, through some form of communication, to transform one’s personal ions into something that is objectively meaningful to everyone. And in the story-telling arts, for example, this can only be a universal moral conclusion. So, with no fear that others will think you unemotional, you should restrain your feelings, be a more private person on deeper issues, and try to find what you probably need most in life: an objective way to express your ions that also benefits others. But don’t be misled by those psychologists who say that our ions come first, for this view fails to distinguish our affections from our ions and it invalidly confuses our tertiary ions with our primary instincts and will.

Assimilative Feeling (–, –), The Sybarite

People who are assimilative in feeling are logical at the first pole, but at the second pole they fail to project their ion. Instead, they want to know what other people’s ions are, so they will seek love, try to provoke others’ ions, and lose themselves in romantic fictions. They ask how they should feel about something, but that is a senseless question, for no one else can know what our ions should be. Thus, the old maxims that we must love our parents or our country are nonsense, because love and hate are always personal decisions. Our ions are relative reactions that aren’t subject to universal rules, so no one has a natural right to expect our love, loyalty, or respect, or that we swear oaths or allegiance to any person or collective.

Because the assimilative impulse here inclines people to accept public or peer opinion on emotive issues, they are conventional in their aesthetics and ions. They will eat, drink, inhale, watch, or hear what others expect them to take in, even if they don’t like it, merely because others are doing it or say that it is pleasurable or good for them. So in this conventional sense they are sybaritic, which means being acquisitive in feeling. They will collect sensations, ions, lovers, and other stimulants or objects that please them or evoke memories of prior feelings, and they do this by searching far, wide, and often for these throughout their lives. And if their will and thought systems are weak, they can’t decide if some person they meet or thing they acquire is good for them. Their emotions are quantitative, not qualitative.

Unlike the emotionalists (+) who heed no one’s advice on their feelings, sybarites (–) are easily manipulated through their emotions. Their emotive defenses are slight because they have no ‘guardian at the gate’ at the first pole, and because their inability to project their ions at the second pole makes them dependent on others for this and generally unable to refuse harmful sensual stimulants. If their will or thought system is strong, they can mature past these

adolescent weaknesses in time. If not, they may become dependent on whatever affections or desires others have led them to adopt.

Advice to Sybarites. You have difficulty deciding what you love or hate or want to have or avoid, and this puts you in doubt as to which people suit you emotionally and which desires you should or shouldn’t gratify. Consequently, you can be manipulated by the friends, lovers, relatives, authors, gurus, psychologists, and other advisors to whom you refer for emotional guidance. Given this inner uncertainty, you postpone emotional decisions, and this can cause you to lose things you desire or people you wish to be with. Unless you learn to project your true ions ( + ) sooner, convincingly, and more often than you naturally do, you may go haphazardly from person to person or thing to thing and be unable to build a stable emotional structure in your life.

Your assimilative nature in feeling is why you are often a victim of external events, such as being in unsuitable relationships or affairs, ing groups that don’t interest you, purchasing things that don’t really satisfy you, and so on. Your emotional indecision—that is, your inability to declare your ions valid just because they are yours—makes you vulnerable to any sales pitch. You listen to politicians, rs, and the appeals of would-be lovers or friends who are inappropriate for you because you can’t decide on your own authority what you should desire. Rather than projecting your feelings as emotionalists do, you want to provoke and soak up others’ feelings. So, whether you are attractive or not, you may indiscriminately seek out people who will say, truthfully or not, that they ire or love you. And if that isn’t likely for any reason, you will collect other things instead, such as foods, collectibles, or money.

Considered from the other side, those who are close to you or who you find attractive may not understand either your fickleness or your emotional reticence, and they will respond to you accordingly. You may learn to deal with these problems better over the years, but only from your past mistakes. With any person you truly love, you must do much more than you are naturally inclined to do to let him or her know your feelings in tangible ways.

You must learn to be more selective in the sensations or affections that you assimilate and more confident in your subjective reaction to them, which is often just a matter of how much you trust your intuition. However outgoing you may be in other psychologic areas, you are taciturn and ive in emotional matters, so this is where you are vulnerable and develop bad habits, or even addictions or obsessions. But your psychologic need to provoke others’ ions can make you manipulative also, a real emotional game player.

You can improve these negative qualities over time, but only if you have strength in will or thought and enough good sense in judgment to avoid making emotional choices that will harm you or are inappropriate for you. You need to be highly selective before letting any person or thing become one of your ions. One corrective for your tendency to love or hate excessively and indiscriminately is to decide your ions in private. You only create problems for yourself if you invite others into that personal second-pole process, for this helps to make you a perpetual victim. Don’t confuse deciding your ions with the act of expressing them to others after you have decided them.

Reversed Feeling (+, –), The Spectator

This is the totally illogical impulse in feeling, since one inappropriately projects affections as if they were ions and then tries to assimilate their subjective desires from what others say or do. People with this impulse deny their own and others’ feelings, and they often try to restrict other people’s freedom of choice in emotional matters. This reversal is common in people who like to toy with others’ emotions, and in strict parents, bureaucrats, wardens, torturers, and such who get a perverse pleasure in preventing others from having what they need or desire.

Like our emotionalists, they make much of their personal aesthetic criteria and have a guardian at the gate of their feelings ( + ). But like our sybarites, they don’t decide their own ions ( – ), so they are easily manipulated and can be trapped in unsuitable love or hate relationships. It takes them much longer than others to love or hate people or things, but when they finally do, it is usually irreversible. Anyone who is courting such a person must be patient, for if it succeeds at all, which it may, it will take a while.

The feeling reversal makes people detached spectators in emotive matters. They can be devoted to sensual pleasures ( + ), but they usually make no commitment to the people or things that provide these pleasures. They are truly empathetic ( – ), but hesitant to it this, and they act as if no one’s feelings, not even their own, are worth considering. This is less often the case if they are moralists (B) or altruists (–) in judgment, for then they are comionate as well as empathetic. And people who are strong in will and thought, Einstein ( + B R – R ) for instance, tolerate this reversal better than others because it helps them deny pleasures, ions, or interruptions that distract them from their thinking and life purposes.

Now let us apply our ten general points on reversals to these people. (1) They cannot structure a realistic feeling system. (2) They are anti-emotionalists; that is, they deny their own feelings and try to divert any discussion of feelings to make it about abstract or practical issues instead. (3) They are easily manipulated through their ions. (4) Their handling of emotional matters is their undoing. (5) They prefer professions of a detached or academic nature that remove them from emotive issues or displays. Still, they often work as psychologists, as Freud ( + – R B R ) and Ellis ( + – R B + ) did, or as artists or artistic critics, because such work requires them at one pole to project their subjective opinions on aesthetic matters ( + ), and at the other pole to study and assimilate other peoples’ ions ( – ).

(6) When they try to present a complete line of reasoning on a subject, there is a gap where feelings should be mentioned. (7) Often, especially if this is their only reversal, they oppose theism and other forms of mystical reasoning because these are based on emotional premises. They judge art and entertainment mainly by its social value, and so, like the great novelist Tolstoy ( B – R R – ), they believe that any artistic work that lacks a larger social purpose is meaningless. That is, they reject the shallow view that the purpose of art is merely to exhibit one’s emotions.

(8) They devise or adopt rationalizations for avoiding emotive experiences, and if they have some other reversals, as the pathological conservative Eichmann ( – B R R R ) did, they may be capable of unbelievable cruelties. Still, they have empathy, because, like our sybarites who are also assimilative at the second pole ( – ), they feel others’ ions more acutely than their own. This can be an asset for psychologic therapists, social critics, writers of fiction or biography, prostitutes, performers, and penalists or torturers, who can do their work better because they sense what will please or pain people most.

(9) Like our sybarites, our spectators don’t know for sure what their ions are, and so they dislike analyzing, explaining, or discussing their deeper feelings about anything. Though they will analyze and criticize the deeper feelings of

others, they will resent any efforts to inquire into theirs. Given their silence here, it’s not easy to get to know their real ions, and it will take some time to do so. The problem for a friend, lover or therapist, then, is how to help them figure it all out without provoking their resentment.

And (10) they beg the question in their feeling system by petitioning the conclusion. The question begging of the feeling reversal works as follows. At the first pole, our spectators project sensations or affections, but at the second pole they can’t project their own ions, so they must halt their feeling process in order to search for or provoke others’ ions that might be suitable in such a case. And when they have begged this conclusion by adopting an appropriate ion from others or fictional works or their social customs, they return to the first pole in a reconsideration and then tie their sensual impression ( + ) to this adopted ion ( – ).

This is emotional self-deception, and since they don’t assume responsibility for their ions, they can blame others for their negative ones. Their assimilative impulse at the second pole ( – ) means that the only ions they will it to having are conventional ones approved by their friends, peers, or society. This reversal causes emotional blockage, or backwardness or immaturity, that makes them act more like spectators than participants in emotional matters. Even at major emotional events that involve them personally, they may freeze as if in shock rather than risk expressing an inappropriate emotion in front of others. But this reaction can also be due to the fact that they haven’t yet decided what their true feelings are.

Unless they understand their impairment and work to compensate for its effects, which is unlikely if they are weak in will or thought, our spectators will build past-oriented, biased, and contradictory desire systems, and will use various avoidance devices to rationalize their escapes from emotional commitment.

So the old inquiry in psychologic therapy, “How do you feel about that?” is only useful with those who don’t project their ions at the second pole because they are spectators or sybarites; that is, reversed (R) or assimilative (–) in feeling. We must project a personal desire at the second pole because it is we alone who are doing this desiring. In our open systems (will, feeling, and power), the projective impulse at the concluding pole ( + , + , + ) gives us human motives, ions, or strengths, while the assimilative impulse there makes us like vulnerable sheep who follow the herd.

Modern psychologists have described this particular emotional blockage in people, but the Cycle defines it, and it shows us the problem from birth, without therapy. It also tells us that there are four other kinds of psychologic blockage, two of which are more fundamental. The other psychologic systems yield similar blockages, and each produces its own type of immaturity, denials, and avoidance devices. A system affects one’s decisions and behavior according to its sequence in the Cycle, so the most serious reversal for us as individuals is the will reversal, followed by the others in turn. But the inverse order holds in our social world, where we must be more wary of people with a judgment or power reversal (nihilists or conservatives) because those two synthetic systems play a greater role in determining how one behaves toward others.

Advice to Spectators. Read my advice above for emotionalists and sybarites, for you have the faults of both, and be sure to read the last section in this chapter on the messiah complex because it discusses some other aspects of your reversal. You tend to deny your feelings, but try not to denigrate emotions in general because this can offend people for whom they are important. Don’t try to escape from emotive experiences; instead, participate in them and make a conscious effort to decide what you truly like or dislike about each one. Then, on your sole authority, if it can be achieved without harmful consequences, rid yourself of what you dislike or hate and work to have what you desire or love no matter what others say you should do.

that your ions begin all of your synthetic reasoning, and that

your failure to decide them for yourself can seriously hinder your practical achievements by making you misunderstand the subjective source of all synthetic judgments, morals, and social rules. It also makes you too formal and a bit inhuman in dealing with people, and so they won’t be as comfortable with you as they are with others. This is one reason why, though both were rightist liberals and hence true socialists, Trotsky ( + B R – – ) lost out to Stalin ( B B – – – ) in the inner circles of their party.

Though you are more comfortable in the company of sybarites (–) or other spectators (R), you can learn more about handling your emotions from harmonists (B). In any event, be clear with people with whom you start any kind of relationship so that they will know just what you believe that relationship to be, and so that you can benefit (as you usually do not) from being emotionally honest with them.

Is this an important goal for you? Yes, for a reason that younger people with a feeling impairment won’t understand until they are older. This is that those who don’t express their emotions properly throughout their life are haunted in their closing years with many regrets over those mistakes. Most of us understand this point as it pertains to immoral acts we have done, but even if we live morally, we can have deep regrets later in life over our earlier emotional errors or omissions. In the reflections that fill our thoughts in our later years, we regret our significant emotional failures as much or even more than our immoral deeds, especially as regards the people we loved deeply.

4. Judgment [+, –]

The impulse of our judgment system is determined at its first pole by the charge of Mars () and at its second pole by the charge of Pluto ().

We store the desires that conclude our feeling system in the next subconscious phase, subjective synthesis. This leads us to our judgment system, the opposite poles of which, in shorthand , are need and consequences or, in the traditional moral that I redefine below, egoism and altruism. As in thought, our other closed system, the balanced impulse in judgment is projection and then assimilation ( + – ). So at the first pole we must subjectively assert our own ion-based need and devise a plan of action to achieve that need ( + ), and at the second pole we must objectively evaluate the consequences—on ourselves, others, and our environment—of acting on that need ( – ). This reconciles the two poles and produces reasoned conclusions that we store in the succedent memory bank as beliefs, values, ideals, forms, morals, hopes, anxieties, or regrets.

I call our first cognition in judgment a ‘need’. This is no longer a specific desire, but rather a constructed general notion of the desire that yielded it. Though we conventionally confuse these , our feeling system’s desire is our ion to have or avoid a specific thing, while our judgment system’s need is to have or avoid all things like that one. This tertiary generalization begins our judgment process, where we liken or contrast things in order to evaluate them. The reason we must pluralize our desire in this way before can we assign a value to it is that we can only value a class of things. This is so because a particular thing that we desire is what it is, and though it may have a price as decided later in our quaternary reasoning, its value is general; that is, it derives solely from its being a member of the class of all such things, or from its being a kind of thing that we decide we need. Value is not price, but it implies a price to be agreed on later.

In our judgment system we evaluate the kinds of things that we desire to have or avoid, one kind at a time, and the risks or costs of acting to acquire them, which are part of their value. We create a need ( + ) by generalizing a desire we created in our feeling system ( + ), and after this we speculate on future acts we could perform to gratify that need and on the possible consequences of performing those acts. This speculative process quantifies the degree of our need, so what we mean when we say that something is ‘worthless’ is that we don’t need that kind of thing enough to assign any value to its class. The basic elements of a thing’s value, then, are that it is of a kind that is desired by one or more persons, that it is possible for us or others to acquire it, and that the consequences, the risks or costs, of acquiring it are acceptable to us or to others.

We determine this value subjectively for ourselves ( + ) and then assign it to the generalized need, and indirectly to the initial desire. Over time, this point in the Cycle (along with other factors in the natal chart that influence it) has the function of building our inner list of things that we do or don’t value or will or won’t do in the future. And because tertiary reasoning is accretive, we tend to believe that what we subjectively value highly or lowly in this way should be similarly valued by others. So it is here in our judgment system that we often erroneously assume that our subjective valuation of a need has objective validity, sometimes to the point that we will fight others to our biased beliefs. This transference of our personal evaluations to many or all other people is how we begin to rationalize our needs, or contemplated acts.

So our judgment system tells us which classes of things we deem worth having or avoiding, and to what degree. This is where we make quantitative judgments that reflect our biases as to what is or is not worthy or valuable, what we do or do not need, and what we will or will not risk. And if our selected subcontext is a person, we see that person now only as a member of a class, or a descriptive kind, and then we make hypothetical assumptions on how different kinds of people might judge our evaluations. This system is thus the source of our social biases and other prejudices, and of our later power decisions to fight for or against entire classes of people.

In our judgment system we plan our acts, and in this we use our subjective, or biased, valuation to tell us how ardently or mildly we should act thereafter to acquire or avoid a thing of that class. If this is confusing, it is because some of our key conventional fail to make the distinctions we need, so let me correct this now.

The subjective conclusions of our feeling system are our desires, which are the direct opposites of the wishes that begin our will system. Our wishes and desires are both wants, but neither is a need. Though we conventionally use those four as synonyms or equivalents, their idea-referents are distinct cognitions, for we have two kinds of wanting (wishes and desires) and a kind of needing that results from each. To avoid ambiguity in speaking of our needs, then, we should use motive to mean a plan of purpose () that we derive in our will system from a wish, and need to mean its direct opposite, a plan of action () that we form in our judgment system from a desire. So our motives are our long-term plans; they compose our life strategy, the framework that gives structure to all that we do. And our needs are our short-term plans, or our tactics for gratifying the partialized desires that we have generalized into class notions.

Both our global motives and our partialized needs are driving forces within us, but if we are logical, our motives command the needs by which we decide how much we want certain things and how we might act to get them. Our desires (ions) directly imply our needs, and we often judge that the risks or costs are too great for us to let a particular desire become a personal need. In that case, we won’t act on that need no matter how strong the initial desire was, and then we say that we don’t need things of that type. Again, a need is not a desire; it is a speculative plan of action by which we hope to get or avoid some kind of thing, and we can retain a desire in its memory bank even if we reject the need, or plan of action, that we imagined would gratify it.

But when we do this, retain a desire that we won’t or can’t gratify, it produces anxieties and frustrations in us, which in some people become neuroses. This

short-term neurosis is distinct from the more fundamental long-term one that arises in our will system when we retain a global wish in our memory but won’t or can’t adopt a motive (plan of purpose, way of life) that could achieve it. People with either of these neuroses will then sublimate their tensions in their tertiary reasoning through fictions. Indeed, fictionists of any kind—mystics, liars, performers, artists, and so on—often have one or both of these neuroses and prefer to associate only with similarly neurotic people.

The reasoned conclusions of our judgment system are the various forms of our fourth cardinal idea, the concrete concept, as described earlier. So what we store in its memory bank are our methods of evaluation, our specific evaluations of the classes of things we have considered, and our beliefs, ideals, morals, values, prejudices, hopes, anxieties, class , and fictions of any kind, including hypothetical conceptions of any static state of beingness, or substance. The latter are the fabricated forms (or Forms) and other fictional beings (or Beings) that we can only hypothesize in our synthetic judgment system. Every fiction we devise is a sum-of-the-parts hypothesis, and the best liars know that some of those parts must be real if people are to believe the basic fiction.

At the second pole of our judgment system, we reach a conclusion on the probable internal and external consequences of a hypothetical act. Here we even imagine acts that are vile to us, for this is where we judge that they are detestable deeds that we must avoid. Then we modify our previous action list, which is the editable list that we retain in our memory of the types of acts that we should aspire to do or should never do.

But these judgmental conclusions are of two basic kinds. If we believe that an act we plan to perform can affect others, then it is a moral judgment; otherwise, it is an amoral value judgment. We maintain this major distinction between morals and values in our belief system where we store these conclusions, and we carry it forward into our quaternary reasoning when we create formal languages or legal codes, where it appears as the traditional distinction between criminal and civil codes.

So we all have both a personal value system and a personal moral system, but these are seldom complete or shaped into formal constructs. Most of us leave that task to our secondary or tertiary intellectuals. The former are analytic theorists who use their thought system to propose universal moral or valuation principles, and the latter are synthetic hypothesists who use their judgment system to propose a partialized value code or social code. A social code is any explicit list of ‘thou shalts’ and ‘thou shalt nots’ that is merely the personal moral code of some hypothesist who asked whether it would be better or worse for society if—hypothetically, since this is impossible in reality—everyone had the same personal moral code. This method only produces fictions, but it is how most traditionalists try to universalize their values and morals.

Of course, they can’t do this correctly unless they reconsider the issue in their analytic will and thought systems, which is where our common logic decides all universal issues. And those who don’t do this will universalize their personal codes in their judgment system instead, and then falsely assume that it is not wrong for them to arbitrarily impose their relative value and moral codes on all others, or for their state to do the same thing to everyone through its civil and criminal legal codes.³³

Our needs ( + ) are amoral when we first create or adopt them because we haven’t yet judged them ( – ). They are just possible acts, mere plans that we seldom perform as we conceived them in our judgment. And though our expressions of need can reveal our ions and our creativity in imagining things, they don’t tell us how we will act after we consider the consequences of those possible acts. This is why it is wrong for a legal system to punish people for their plans rather than for their deeds. But our paranoiac states, which consider all speculative plans by the public to be ‘conspiracies’, do just that, because it is a way to invade and control our moral reasoning.

When we evaluate potential acts in our judgment system, we don’t yet know how we will act at the quaternary point of decision, so we consider all possible

acts, even the worst ones. This lets us compare ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ acts later in our judgment and thought systems. So what we call our ‘conscience’ is not a mystical thing within us, it is just our common logic working normally. It is the clash between the relative of our judgment system, where we decide specific cases, and the universal of our thought system, where we analyze and order all the judgments we stored away. It is our moral regret, or the sense of contradiction that arises in our thought system (the home of our dignity) when we act, as we all do at times, in a way that we think is wrong for anyone. We always act from a judgment, but if that judgment contradicts a universal moral principle of our thought system on how anyone should act, we are uneasy in our minds, and we call this uneasiness our ‘conscience’, ‘shame’, or ‘sense of guilt’.

This is an important distinction in our psychologic functions: in our synthetic judgment system we imagine and evaluate acts that we might or might not perform in the future, and in our analytic thought system we analyze and criticize acts that we or others have already performed or proposed. Together these two closed systems, thought and judgment, function as the harsh critic, moral preacher, and stern editor within us that brooks no superfluity, laxness, or immorality in any of our memory banks.

But those systems are always subject to our will system’s control or lack of it. It is a matter of our will that economy rules in our motives, and if our will system is strong, this principle of parsimony influences the rest of our psychologic. In that case, especially if we are also strong in thought, we will have what only the best thinkers have: a sharp sense of the essential that keeps our reasoning on track and stops us from praising or tolerating contradiction, waste, illogic, confusion, or immoral decisions in any psychologic system or in any intellectual, legal, social, or political construct.

In sum, we use our judgment system to expand our desires into generalized needs, to speculatively evaluate and quantify those needs, to imagine acts that will gratify them or fictions that will sublimate the wishes or desires underlying them, to deduce the internal and external consequences of performing or not performing those potential acts, and to create hypothetical standards of all kinds —such as our moral codes and value codes, our works of art, and our standards of behavior, language, reasoning, work methods, or performance—that we believe will be more perfect or ideal. But we don’t decide there which act we will perform; this we do subsequently, for such decisions are quaternary and reductive, not tertiary and accretive. Our judgments don’t determine our acts; they only propose the possible consequences of imagined acts or fictions that seem relevant to our present context. Our actual acts are always quaternary power conclusions that are determined by our final understanding of a context, such as it may be.

Before we consider the four permutations of judgment, we should define three

old merely described that are used vaguely and synonymously in discussing our feelings and judgments. These are empathy, sympathy, and comion, which I define, in the sense that refers to our innate characteristics, as follows.

Symbolically, empathy is caused by –, sympathy by –, and comion by – in a natal chart; so those who have a projective charge for these planets in that chart will have, respectively, no innate empathy, sympathy, or comion. Verbally, empathy is the assimilation of others’ ions, sympathy is the assimilation of others’ needs, and comion is the assimilation of others’ objective situation, whatever has caused it. And the dynamics of our tertiary reasoning tells us that empathy is personal (or one-to-one), sympathy is generalized as any need is, and comion applies only to some entire class of people, whether small or vast.

The Cycle tells us that empathy ( – ) and sympathy ( – ) are illogical, since we should project rather than assimilate our ions and needs. If we’re confused on this, it is only because we ire people who act unselfishly even when it is illogical to do so. But we can avoid the confusion here by observing this distinction: that while it is logical and kind for people to express their empathy or sympathy with an act, it is illogical for them to be empathetic or sympathetic, as about half of us are.

I mention this here mainly because it is the half-truth in the argument of the preachers of selfishness, such as Ayn Rand ( + B R R + ) and Max Stirner ( R R R B – ). These thinkers also said, as I do, that empathy and sympathy are illogical, but this fact doesn’t imply what they concluded from it: that there is no objective basis for morality and that therefore we should decide all moral issues subjectively, with no concern for others. They then expand this argument for selfishness by mixing it with specious political arguments that they falsely propose as individualism.

For instance, the pathological rightist Stirner (1806-1856) argued, as I have, that only the individual is real, but then he concluded that individuals shouldn’t form states and other collectives. I disagree, for the true issue isn’t whether we should form collectives, since we must, for more reasons than can be briefly enumerated. Rather, it is whether we should permit any of those collectives, once formed, to supersede and limit the inalienable rights of individuals—natural rights that Stirner had to deny in order to justify his overall egoistic message. Obviously, if all real individuals have natural, inalienable rights, then any act by anyone that imposes on one of those rights is immoral, and hence illegal. And that fact severely restricts the number of selfish acts that a defender of selfishness can claim are morally and legally permissible.

His is an interesting case because, unlike the selfist Rand (1905-82) who was reversed (R) in judgment and a preacher of selfishness, he was balanced (B) in judgment but nevertheless advocated egoism. This contradiction resulted from his congenital pathology; that is, from the reversals in will, thought, and feeling that caused him to deny the logic of all the analytic and synthetic reasoning that precedes his judgment system. As a denier, skeptic, and spectator, he had no sound conception of reality, dignity, uniqueness, or natural rights before he considered moral issues. And being balanced in judgment gave him the liberal form of the messiah complex, which I explain at the end of this chapter. This psychologic disorder made him impervious to all criticism and hence confident that he could propose any opinion that came into his mind as if it was a universal law. Rand, however, was strong in will and thought, so her illogic only began with her feeling and judgment reversals, which caused her to universalize her personal selfishness and nihilism.

True individualism is like the individualism advocated by egoists, nihilists, and libertarians in that it too proposes the independence of individuals from all artificial collectives. But unlike those false views it also requires, for the sake of all individuals ever, mutual tolerance of others, collective efforts to meet our broader survival needs and common goals, moral living, and humanism in general. ‘Individualism’ can only mean universal humanism, since we can’t validly say that we individualism and then say, “But only for some individuals,” which—by reasoning such as Spencer’s (1820-1903, B+RB–)

survival-of-fittest argument—means only those individuals who have the power to oppress others.

We have both selfish and unselfish extremists, but neither has proven their claim that all people are naturally egoistic or naturally altruistic and that therefore it is morally correct for individuals or a state to be wholly one way or the other. The Cycle resolves this bipolar extremism by showing that judgment is both; that our judgment process is properly subjective (egoistic, projective) at its first pole and objective (altruistic, assimilative) at its second pole. It also tells us that only a fourth of us naturally have this balanced (B) way of judging, and I call these people moralists. Another fourth are subjective egoists (+), another fourth are objective altruists (–), and the rest are amoral nihilists (R). But virtually all of our states are egoistic or nihilistic, for greed makes our rulers and the rich people they serve the lying gurus of selfishness even as they hypocritically ask the rest of us to be moral, unselfish, and obedient, and to produce profits for them.

Balanced Judgment (+, –), The Moralist

This impulse works logically as just described. Reasoning from a desire, one subjectively projects a speculative need, or plan of action, at the first pole ( + ), and then objectively assimilates its possible consequences at the second pole ( – ).

People with this impulse have no difficulty in handling their judgmental functions, but it does make them conventional at the second pole, or in their conclusions and memory bank—that is, in their ideals, fictions, class , languages, work methods, moral codes, value codes, notions of the consequences that will follow various acts, and sense of justice. Ordinarily they are comionate, they try to judge others fairly, and they are genuinely concerned with justice and the rationality of moral or value decisions. But there are exceptions. If they have the messiah complex or if their four other psychologic systems are mostly reversed (R) or projective (+), they may be moralizers, meaning people who preach their own or their society’s moral opinions in a selfrighteous way. Otherwise they will handle the logic of their judgment system correctly, without haste or delay, and they are not easily persuaded to act immorally or cruelly.

Advice to Moralists. Given the mistaken views of morality and justice that humans have held for millennia, it is fair to say that people with a balanced impulse in judgment have been far too conventional; that is, insufficiently critical of theistic or political moralizing and the poor judgment of egoists, altruists, and nihilists generally. If this is so in your case, you must stop accepting the customary views on judgment and morality, for these harm you, the people you care for, and your whole society.

For instance, you may your government because it is too risky or

difficult to change it for the better. Or you may your religion or all religions because so many people in your society claim that our moral reasoning must be decided by words attributed to imaginary deities, fictional figures like Jesus or Moses, or religious politicians or fanatics. But the Cycle shows us that all moral judgments are part of our individual reasoning, or common logic, so the relevant issue is not who said what in the past, but rather whether anything that someone has said at any time is logical or illogical, and this we are now able to determine objectively.

Fictions and myths are not only unrealistic, they are intentional shortcuts in reasoning that are meant to avoid the truth of an issue. So, if arealists want us to believe their fictions, they owe us a complete line of reasoning that proves their conclusions, starting from their metaphysical and epistemic premises.

Since your impulse in judgment is more logical than that of our egoists, altruists, and nihilists, you should be leading the way in your society to realism and to common sense on judgment, justice, morality, prejudice, theism, and any kind of chauvinistic or partialistic reasoning. So stop tolerating your culture’s old arealistic views on these issues; they’re not benign, they’re malignant, and they do more than anything else to maintain our societies’ collective ignorance. If anything is certain, it is that our species cannot survive if sound judgment, which you have naturally, doesn’t prevail when we need it.

Projective Judgment (+, +), The Egoist

Egoists appropriately project a personal need at the first pole ( + ), but at the second pole they subjectively project rather than objectively assimilate the consequences of that need ( + ).

The positive aspects of this impulse are generosity and creativity in judgment. Because projection is giving and assimilating is taking, egoists are usually more generous than the other judgmental types, though often only with people who are close to them or who serve their needs. Their creativity in judgment gives them originality in organizing complex tasks that consist of many fragments or departments and in formulating tertiary standards that in our quaternary reasoning become social codes, language rules, organizational efforts, legal systems, or work methods.

The negative side of this impulse is that our egoists have no objectivity in reaching their judgmental conclusions, for they routinely exclude others and the outer world from that process. Taken to its extreme, this is solipsism, the view that only the self exists or is important. Usually egoists fashion plans and rationalizations for selfish acts only; their values and beliefs are arbitrary, personal, and often arrogant; and they seldom discuss moral issues objectively or work to ensure that others are judged fairly. The exceptions are those egoists who have learned, perhaps only after many mistakes, the importance of living morally and judging others fairly.

The creativity of this impulse is often misused, so that it becomes not an aid to strong and healthy reasoning, but a weapon against others. Any projective ( + + ) system is self-oriented and wholly subjective, and in judgment this can blind one to the effects of one’s beliefs and standards on others, and it can preclude any objective consideration of the value of things or of others’ needs and beliefs. The

illogical charge at the second pole ( + ), which egoists (+) share with nihilists (R), indicates people who can delude themselves with false hopes for the future, who have no comion, who ignore their conscience, who won’t it to error in what they believe or say, and who may, if they have the power to do so, bully others to get their way.

The first moral rule of an unenlightened egoist is that we are always free to gratify our own needs as we decide these, even if this means, as it can, deceiving, robbing, harming, killing, or otherwise imposing on others. This intrusiveness is also the operating rule of salespersons and the essence of all advertising. As for justice, most egoists believe that their society’s legal system should be unjust and that the powerless in society should not be heard. In other words, they are our natural ‘survival-of-the-fittest’ advocates. They dismiss the need for fairness and consider any legislation or juridic process to be deficient if it doesn’t allow them to use other people, other living things, and our natural resources solely for their own ends.

This self-centeredness and arrogance can lead them to the political forms of egoism—principally capitalism, libertarianism, and anarchism—the basic premises of which require us to turn a cold shoulder to the needs and beliefs of others. These political views cloak themselves in the language of individualism, but only in a form of it that ignores that individualism can only mean equal rights for all in a society and a fair share of its natural resources for everyone.

Advice to Egoists. Try to reverse your illogic in all the respects just mentioned. For instance, don’t ignore or denigrate others, understand that each person is unique, and don’t see them only as a descriptive type or class. And though it’s proper to assert your own needs at the first pole, this doesn’t justify imposing your second-pole beliefs or evaluations on others, which you assume are correct just because they are yours.

You are often misled because you are inclined to rush to judgment on the issues

you consider. Resist this urge to make an instant judgment, for it doesn’t give you the right answers; it just lets you avoid good reasoning and makes you try to prevent others from expressing their needs and beliefs.

If you must judge other people, give them a full and fair hearing first. In fact, it’s best if you don’t work at a job that requires you to judge others, because, though you expect these qualities in those who judge you, you have no natural ability to be fair, objective, or comionate in judging them. You can minimize the harmful effects of your self-centeredness in judgment by making the most of your creativity there. This means being more deliberate than you are naturally inclined to be, being less eager to pronounce judgments of any kind, and looking for other ways to compensate for this serious character flaw, which can give many people you meet good reason to dislike you.

You have probably rationalized your many judgmental faults—such as mistreating others, selfishness, unfairness, prejudices, contempt for valid moral principles, of corrupt juridic and political systems, and so on—by observing that most people of your generation have these same faults, and that therefore you must be that way also to defend yourself and those who depend on you. Well, though this conclusion is incorrect, its negative view of your generation is not. As I explain more fully in the next chapter, your entire generation is affected by this illogical charge at the second pole of their judgment system ( + ), just as the previous and next generations have the logical charge ( – ) there. But the fact that your generation consists only of egoists (+) or nihilists (R) who are willing to harm people and their societies is not a valid excuse for behaving badly yourself. Rather, it is a compelling reason why you must try to counter this innate impulse in yourself and be more moral than others of your generation are.

Egoism is your problem, but you’re not responsible for having it; you’re only responsible for trying to correct it now that you know that you have it. If you help others when you can, take more care in your judgments, and control your self-centeredness and urge to ignore or abuse people, your life will be more

fulfilling as the years . Egoists lose other people’s respect easily, and their boast that they don’t care about this is just a pretense. Our common goal in life is to be happy, but no one can be happy without sincere, mutually sustaining relationships.

Though it is true that we are each a unique individual event, it is also true that we have no choice but to live and work among many other such events. Is it really wise, then, to be selfish and so create hostilities with others? Obviously not, for no one has ever soundly explained why this is how everyone should be. You have a giving nature, so help yourself by using this generosity as broadly as you can.

Assimilative Judgment (–, –), The Altruist

Altruists are assimilative at both poles, so they are the opposite of our projective egoists. They are reluctant to assert their personal needs or beliefs, they are not rude, crude, or pushy, and they are not bullies. They are considerate of others, and are usually advocates for the needs of other people or living things because they assimilate those needs and adopt them as their own.

Like our moralists, altruists have the correct impulse at the second pole ( – ), so they have comion, judge others fairly, and objectively consider the consequences of the needs they adopt. But because they are illogical at the first pole ( – ), they don’t judge their own needs subjectively ( + ) as they should.

Altruism, coined in the nineteenth century, is a moral term, but in my psychologic definition it means an assimilative, or ive, disposition in all judgments, not just moral ones. Traditionally it means putting others’ welfare before one’s own, which is a narrow sense because it refers to only one pole of our bipolar judgment process. But my definition gives it another sense. Of course it means that altruists ( – – ) are the polar opposites of egoists ( + + ) in judgment and that altruists have an objective rather than a subjective attitude in judging others, but it also refers to a failure of altruists: that they don’t make their own personal needs a part of their final judgments.

My new definitions here show an apparent contradiction, which is that egoists (+) are impelled to give (project) things and ideas to others, while altruists (–) are taciturn and hesitate to part with anything they have. Altruists do consider others’ needs first, but they can be materially acquisitive or ungenerous at times, and they don’t always act morally because they’re not confident about their judgments. They differ from egoists in wanting to acquire and collect things, in being slower to reach judgments, and in being easily influenced, morally or

immorally, by others at both poles. But unlike egoists (+) and nihilists (R), they suffer pangs of conscience if they do act immorally, and that often leads them to act more morally later in life.

To our assimilative altruists, everything in a class of things can be relevant because they have no subjective (+) basis for preferring one thing over the others. Unlike moralists and egoists, they are often slow to dismiss an incompetent advisor or specialist and so they end up accepting bad advice for too long. Also, since young altruists don’t know which of the moral principles preached by their mistaken or lying elders they should observe, they are mostly undecided about moral issues in their youth and have an amoral disposition then. Their inability to see why any moral principle is necessarily valid causes many of them to believe through their early adult years that no moral principle or no promise they make is binding on them, and that therefore they can behave immorally whenever they wish, subject only to the possibility of punishment.³⁴

So we have two main classes of altruists: those who see, rarely from the start but in time, that they must have some binding moral principles to guide them in their practical decisions, and those who never mature and so remain morally untrustworthy until they die. Of the latter type there is little more to add by way of definition, so let us focus on those altruists who try to become mature, many of whom, like Kant ( R B R – R ) with his specious ‘categorical imperative’, seek universal moral truths that they can claim, correctly or not, are binding on all humans alike.

Only an altruist has both sympathy ( –) and comion ( – ), but since sympathy is illogical, this produces some psychologic conflicts in altruists who try to find binding moral principles. First, because they are assimilative (liberal) in judgment, their search is quantitative and collectivistic. Though some have countering characteristics, their common moral premise is, “We are social animals, so nothing that we do is moral or justified unless it serves our society or our species.” This leads them to the self-deluding creed that to be moral we must each do what benefits others and not ourselves, and from there, perhaps, to the

quantitative conclusion of the utilitarians that our moral choices must be decided by which ones benefit the greatest number of others.

The basic error in this position is that the utilitarians failed to define morality psychologically. To them and most other altruists, this term means only a calculus, or an objective quantitative process that they have stripped of all the subjective psychologic elements that have a role in our moral decisions. They thus deny the natural right of individuals to have, as about half of us do, needs (plans of action) based solely on our own judgments, and from there it is but a short step to the irrational collectivistic view that we must all obey the customs and formal rules of our state or other collectives even when these are immoral or will harm us or others.

To establish the universality of this anti-individualistic approach to moral reasoning, altruists objectify and thereby de-psychologize the personal process of needing. Usually they think that only those needs that are shared by all humans or all of their own society are worth considering. And then, mainly because they fail to project their own needs, they assume that our needs and moral reasoning are not psychologic issues at all. This may then lead them to the conclusion that our needs, and hence the value and moral codes we derive from these, are not really decided by us individually but are determined by some god, natural Law, or cultural or evolutionary force that, by some unknown mystical means, commands all humans alike. There is such a force, of course, but it is just our long-undiscovered common logic, many parts of which are relative because they vary naturally and often oppositely in individuals.

This collectivistic view leads many altruists to believe that a society’s morality, as made tangible in its myths and legal system, is more important than the moral decisions of its individuals, or that we should take our personal morals from our social customs and laws. Thus our altruists propose the shallow principle that individuals should be restricted so that they are not free to make their own decisions on moral issues. But there’s no basis for concluding that a society’s moral decisions—as reflected in its laws, opinion polls, elections, court or jury

decisions, religious edicts, or cultural traditions—are better than those of individuals. In fact, since all collectives are artificial and since moral decisions are psychologic issues, there is no such thing as group morality. Groups of people can make rules, but they cannot decide any psychologic issue.

But in spite of their collectivism in judgment, many altruists believe that no individuals should be punished by a society if its legal system is unjust. This is correct, for while it is sometimes reasonable for an individual to disobey a society’s law, it is never reasonable for a society to be unjust, since its laws are invalid if they are not objective, impartial, and universally enforced. Many altruists (–) and moralists (B) believe this, that people or legal systems that cannot judge fairly have no right to judge at all. And contrary to the assumption that we all desire a just legal system, in fact only this half of us do. Most of the others, the projective (+) or reversed (R) in judgment, actually want an unjust legal system, such as we have always had.

Being assimilative, altruists hope to receive social approval for their selfless efforts, but if they never get it, many will still seek just, or even ideal, societies. We see this attitude in the assumption of the ProLib Gandhi ( + – B – B ), an altruist who as a young man thought that he could help the people of colonial India by going to their rulers’ homeland to study the elitist legal system known as ‘English law’. He soon learned otherwise and saw that he had to try a different way.

Many altruists make this mistake, at least at first, which is why so many of them become lawyers, jurists, politicians, or other participants in their society’s legal system. Mature altruists enter these professions because, being conventional in judgment, they believe that a society must have a just legal system, but immature altruists also gravitate to those professions because they usually pay well and facilitate sly thefts. As for theft, while egoistic thieves will blast open a safe or start a war of aggression, altruistic thieves prefer indirect thefts, such as embezzlements and the many forms of theft that are permitted by our corrupt legal systems.

Most altruists reject the cure for their moral conflicts that Gandhi, with his projective will, found for himself; namely, the surrender of all interest in material things. We see people’s character best in their contradictions, and this is the defining contradiction of our altruists. They are psychologically conflicted between serving others selflessly and acquiring (legally or not) personal possessions with a socially determined value. And as we can see from both the wealthy and unwealthy altruists listed in our Appendix B tables, there are many different ways to deal with this inner conflict. How they do so is determined by their other characteristics and by the type of moral guidance, if any, that they received in their youth. But there is no evidence to the claim that a religious education makes them more moral; in fact, because they often see the hypocrisy in that education, the opposite result is more common.

Advice to Altruists. Accept the fact that you were born amoral, and then study moral issues so that you can mature beyond this condition sooner than you might otherwise. That is, search for realistic sources that will give you sound moral principles and then follow these in practice. But don’t believe any of the old nonsense, all of which is based on traditional misconceptions that can’t withstand logical analysis. For instance, don’t believe that moral behavior consists of blindly serving your society; of preserving its old traditions, religions, or biases; of doing the greatest good for the greatest number; or of making sacrifices for others or for any artificial collective. And contrary to Kant’s misguided ‘imperative’ which merely states the old ‘golden rule’ in different words, we don’t always have to act as our analytic thought system tells us that all people should act, for in some circumstances it is more correct to act in another way. And deciding when this is or isn’t the case is one of the functions of our judgment system.

The key here is to see this fact: that our first (or first-pole) moral question is always about self-care. It is, What should I do to preserve myself and my health with the least possible harm to others or nature? Only then should we ask about our moral responsibilities. But be careful here, for traditionalists confuse our moral responsibilities with our social responsibilities. A moral responsibility is

what we owe to others who were or will be negatively affected by our judgments or acts; a social responsibility is what we owe to the individuals or collectives that have helped us. We always have these two kinds of responsibilities since we can’t avoid harming or being helped by others, but the issue is more complex with people or things that have never helped us or try to harm us. We have no social responsibility to them, but we do have a moral responsibility, which is to avoid harming them if they are not immorally imposing on us or the people we depend upon.

Of course, since judgment is tertiary and hence relative, it can sometimes be difficult to decide these responsibilities. For instance, what do you owe socially to family who have helped you, and how do you balance this with any moral debt you have for having harmed them, if you did? Or consider a situation we all face, where our state distributes rights and resources inequitably among its citizens. Surely the rich or privileged have more obligations to such a state than do the people it treats unfairly—the poorest or weakest of which have little responsibility to it and should never pledge their allegiance to it, let alone give their time or lives for it.

Our common logic requires us to make a tertiary moral judgment of people or collectives before we make any quaternary promises or oaths to them. For example, you must first decide that a given war is moral before you the soldiers or leaders who wage it. You must ensure that all your obligations are voluntarily assumed, and that they are fair exchanges of promises by both sides and not sacrifices on your part only. And don’t be misled by rightist slogans like, “Our country right or wrong.”

Contrary to a lie that has deceived many altruists, such as John F. Kennedy ( – R + – B ) who famously echoed it, you should ask what your country, family, churches, and other collectives will do for you before you serve them or pledge allegiance to them. There is no universal moral principle that requires your subservience to or sacrifices for any collective—all of which are artificial, unnatural constructs that we humans, in virtual ignorance of our own nature,

have created. So why should you ‘ask what you can do for your country’ when from its beginning that nation never fully committed itself to protecting your life, property, health, privacy, freedom, and all of your other natural, inalienable rights as an individual? On the contrary, that elitist government has always served the superrich first, as we see all too clearly in every nation today.

The only valid grounds for social cooperation are current, voluntary, and explicit contracts between real people, and since unjust governments want to have the fewest possible obligations to us, they try to avoid negotiating such contracts with us, usually on the grounds that their old laws or customs commit us to accept their unjust systems just as these are. To avoid this deception, be an individualist and judge your own needs before you adopt those of your family, church, nation, or any other collective. Our collectives are supposed to strengthen us, and when they weaken us instead, they have declared themselves our enemies and we have no rational choice but to oppose them.

Reversed Judgment (–, +), The Nihilist

The reversed impulse is totally illogical. At the first pole ( – ) our nihilists fail to project their own needs, and so, like our altruists, they reason about needs and values collectivistically rather than individualistically. So at this point they depend on others and are likely to be manipulated by them. But this illogic is then compounded at the second pole ( + ), where they subjectively project rather than objectively assimilate the probable consequences of their adopted needs. Thus, people with a judgment reversal (R) combine the faults of altruists (–) with the faults of egoists (+) without having the healthy side of either, and as a result the judgmental conclusions that they store in their belief system consist mostly of guesses and fictions that can’t be substantiated.

Applying our ten-point list for a reversal, we can say this of the type. (1) They cannot structure a realistic and sound belief system. (2) Whatever their practical field, they can’t create new realistic hypotheses for it, and so they must an established profession that either deals with fictions or rarely requires new thinking. (3) They are manipulated by those to whom they turn for help with their needs, or plans of action. (4) Their bad judgments are their undoing. And since they can’t judge people fairly, they often become antisocial cynics who believe in false hypotheses such as ‘original sin’ and ‘people are no damn good’. (5) Their illogic here leads them to work in some juridic, governmental, religious, academic, commercial, artistic, communication, law enforcement, military, or scientific field where as social authorities they can judge others from some preexisting social standard or book of rules. Their motives in this are to impose their subjective beliefs on moral or evaluative matters on others and to prevent healthier people from gratifying any needs that they assert on individual grounds rather than on collective, or social, grounds.

(6) Their complete reasoning on any context usually lacks judgment and morality or is highly judgmental but invalid. (7) They have difficulty with

systemic constructions, or the ordering of many fragments into cohesive new wholes, so their belief system is chaotic, which is why they often advocate anarchism or nihilism. So unless they have a strong will, we won’t find them, say, creating complete intellectual systems, conducting a symphony orchestra, or organizing any complex venture.

(8) Other factors permitting, however, they can be good critics of others’ work and can become proficient in creating rationalizations for rushing to judgment or leaping to conclusions. Being projective at the second pole ( + ), they egoists in having no comion, so they may become cruel prosecutors or judges or their intellectual antecessors in jurisprudence or philosophy. Their denial of judgment and their need to find shortcuts to avoid making or suffering full and fair judgments may also cause them to be hypocritical and to harbor class prejudices. Though many nihilists believe that a legal system is valid only if it follows the letter of the law, many others believe that its first purpose is to dispense injustice; that is, to be cruel and to deny justice to all classes but the ruling class, which they see as beyond judgment by ordinary folk.

This contradictory view, that justice is injustice, is implied by every rationalization they create for their moralizing. Egoists can share this view, but unlike our nihilists, they don’t insist on a more unjust legal system if the one that they have now works to their advantage. As I explain more fully in the next chapter, every alternate generation consists solely of egoists (+) and nihilists (R), both of whom are projective at the concluding pole of judgment ( +) and so have no comion and therefore can’t develop a valid sense of justice. Both types see others only as of descriptive social classes, and they know that, short of brute force, class prejudice is the fastest way to deny the needs of large groups of people; especially their need for social justice, or protection from selfish generations composed wholly of egoists and nihilists.

(9) Nihilists won’t voluntarily explain their judgments, beliefs, morals, values, or other decisions. They don’t explain these things because they can’t trust their judgment process and they fear that any such discussion will just give

ammunition to their potential critics. They will criticize others’ judgments, but they can’t judge their own and they don’t want anyone else to do it. In fact, if they think that a decision they’ve made will upset someone they respect or love, they may withdraw from the relationship without notice rather than explain the decision to that person. But sooner or later this failure to explain themselves may cause others to judge them as generally devious and untrustworthy.

And (10) they consistently beg the question in their judgments by petitioning the premise. Since they are assimilative at the first pole ( – ), they can’t project a personal plan of action there as they should ( + ), so they suspend or ‘bracket’ that task and leap ahead to the second pole ( – ). But being projective rather than assimilative there, they will assert some imagined consequences of their contemplated act, all of which are just expressions of hope, or preferred outcomes. The judgment process is speculative for everyone, but many people with a reversal use it to retreat into a fantasyland where they dream of the best possible outcomes for themselves, and their anxiety is high because they know that these hopes are unrealistic and may not be achieved.

We call this dwelling on unrealistic hopes ‘wishful thinking’. Many nihilists are habitual risk takers because they deny judgment and seize on this desperate shortcut, this mere faith or hope that the best result for them shall occur. With this projected consequence in mind, they then return to the first pole in an act of reconsideration, and though they still can’t project a personal need here, they now know the result they want, and this narrows their search for a plan of action to adopt. But these adopted needs are all socialized ones; for example, voting, praying, or gambling. They reason that if they ritualistically perform some such social act, the consequences that they imagine could occur, but then they distort this could into a shall, as in “If I vote, then my society shall be better,” or “If I pray, then my prayers shall be answered,” or “If I gamble, then I shall be rich.” Thus their adopted need is the very consequence they are hoping for, and that is begging the question.

Though a reversal can make one a good critic in its system, it also inclines one to

avoid self-criticism there. And in our thought or judgment systems, it prevents one from doing the cleansing of cluttered internal systems that we must all do to keep our reasoning functioning well. This is why when nihilists are given any judgmental authority in society, as they often are (our current Supreme Court has three nihilists), their orders make the existing mess worse; that is, nothing that they decide will alter any legal or political system fundamentally enough to make it more logical, ordered, realistic, just, or sane.

We saw earlier that theism is invalid because it claims to be a primary metaphysics, or theory of Reality, when it is in fact just a tertiary mystical speculation, and also that theists usually have a weak (– or R) impulse in will or in two or more of their five systems. And now we see that people with a judgment reversal are inclined to oppose fair judgments and unjust legal systems. It follows, then, that those theists who have a judgment reversal will probably social injustices with the same fervor that they their religion’s illogic and myths. Given this fact, which is well confirmed by history, it is foolish of us to expect that any religion can help us achieve justice in our world.

The difficulties nihilists have in judgment lead most of them to search for some rationalization by which they can deny judgment and morality altogether. We saw the negative side of this denial of judgment in the LibPro nihilist Hitler ( B + B R – ), and we all know the insanity of his political hopes or dreams. And we saw its positive side, its critical power, in the work of the ProRad nihilist Nietzsche ( + + B R B ), which was willful, thoughtful, realistic, and creative, even though it was in systemic disarray and illogically denied all moral reasoning, as nihilists do. To his credit, though, Nietzsche did expose the hypocrisy of Judaic and Christian (and hence Islamic) moralizing, but he never defined our moral reasoning, so he too came to the absurd nihilistic conclusion that we must deny or ‘go beyond’ this real part of our psychologic.

Advice to Nihilists. Try to stop being amoral; that is, don’t deny your judgment faculties or your moral reasoning, and don’t look for shortcuts to avoid them.

Read the advice above for egoists and altruists carefully, for you have the illogic of both. Though your inverted perspective can make you a good critic in the judgment area, it is best to avoid work that requires giving people advice on moral or value issues. There’s a great difference between criticizing bad judgments, which you can do well, and proposing sound judgments to replace them, which you can’t do. This handicap has been clearly demonstrated by many famous nihilists, including Hobbes, Washington, Madison, Nietzsche, Hitler, and Justices John Marshall and Holmes.

To put it another way, don’t assume that you have the correct answers to judgmental issues and therefore must proselytize them. If you want to ‘spread the word’ on moral or value judgments, first make sure that your conclusions are objectively confirmed. For instance, if you are drawn to a religion because it offers a moral message that some say is universal and irrefutable, then you’ve been misled by theists, who offer no such message in any of their religions.

Also, you can harm yourself and others with your tendency to construct false rationalizations for your acts or false hypotheses in your science or other work. Some good rules to follow are: never rush to judgment on any issue, reconsider a judgment or belief often before you make it public, and make it a habit to give people a full and fair hearing before you judge them. These rules will counter your impulse to declare all judgments bad, to declare people wrong or guilty rashly, and to try to quiet them before they can refute you or educate you.

Your illogic in judgment causes you to create fictions and harbor unrealistic expectations of situations and others, and this sets you up psychologically for repeated falls when the realty of a matter appears later, as it usually does. It is therefore important for you to associate with people who have good judgment, for they can help you see this impairment in practice. And if you bear in mind that no traditionalists have ever correctly understood our common logic or our judgment process, you may be able to resist the urge, as so many nihilists before you could not, to use their historical failures as a rationalization for denying those processes.

Our Four Judgment .

The names I have given to our four judgmental dispositions are described in our dictionaries, but here they are objectively defined for the first time. This means that we can no longer misapply them in speaking of individuals, and that they now refer to every kind of evaluation or judgment and not only to our moral attitudes.

The egoist and altruist, coined early in the modern era, fit the judgmental attitudes caused by the projective (+) and assimilative (–) impulses rather well, but we have no conventional for the dispositions caused by the balanced (B) and reversed (R) impulses, so I should explain why I chose moralist and nihilist for them.

I mean moralist not in its common sense, but in our new psychologic sense. Moralists (B) form healthy but conventional belief, value, and moral systems. They differ from nihilists (R) in not being habitual negativists who reject every positive proposal that is made, and also in not trying to divide people. In fact, one of their great talents is putting chaotic things into order to resolve contradictions and heal breeches.

And nihilist is appropriate for people with a judgment reversal. In my OED, the judgmental sense of ‘nihilism’ is, “total rejection of current religious beliefs or moral principles,” but this is too narrow. I’ve defined it as the judgment reversal, so we can now say more broadly that it means the denial of logical beliefs or moral conclusions. This improves on the Oxford’s description in two ways. First, we now know what it means to ‘deny logical beliefs’ because we now have the first standard of human logic and an unambiguous definition of a ‘belief’. Second, psychologic nihilism applies to all judgmental conclusions, not just to moral conclusions or theistic beliefs (which I don’t call “religious beliefs” as the

Oxford does because religions are corporations, not beliefs).

Using those objectively defined definitions of these two , it confirms my theory that the three best US presidents were surely the moralists Jefferson ( + – – B B ), Lincoln ( B – + B B ), and Franklin Roosevelt ( – B R B B ), while the long list of our worst presidents contains all of the nihilists since Washington ( B + + R R ), including Nixon ( R R – R – ) and Bush II ( R + + R R ).

With these four new judgmental we can now define, rather than merely describe, two traditionally vague psychologic : generally speaking, selfishness is the judgmental attitude of egoists (+) or nihilists (R), and unselfishness is the judgmental attitude of moralists (B) or altruists (–). This narrows the meaning of those , but the old descriptive meanings were too vague and ambiguous anyway. Selfish cannot mean self-centered or egotistic because unlike those egocentric it refers to the self and others; that is, to a comparison of our needs with others’ needs. So unselfish and selfish, like moral and immoral, are ethical that pertain only to our judgments and not to our self-image, and clarity requires us to maintain this distinction, as well as that between egoism (selfishness) and egotism (self-centeredness).

It is psychologically important to know our four judgmental attitudes, but it is also socially important, for these tertiary dispositions directly shape people’s quaternary reasoning, including their power proposals on legal codes and political structures.

5. Power [–, +]

The impulse of our power system is determined at its first pole by the charge of Jupiter () and at its second pole by the charge of the sun ().

As Figure 6 shows, from our judgment system we through the subconscious phase of objective synthesis, our third state of objectivity, where we store our beliefs and ideals, our evaluative and moral conclusions, our class notions, and our concrete conceptions of substance, beingness, otherness, and static form. This phase leads us to our power system, where the balanced impulse is ( – + ), or assimilation at the first pole and projection at the second. My keywords for these poles in the epistemic context are external power and internal power, in the psychologic context otherness and self, and in the political context collectivism and individualism.

At the first pole of power ( – ), the world of otherness, we face practical questions such as these. Can this person be useful to me? Can this doctor cure me? Can this group help me? Will my state protect and help me? Can this animal, plant, mineral, or other thing be a resource for me? Can this Supreme Being give me all that I wish for in life? But then at the second pole ( +) we must project what we can personally contribute to achieve our wishes. So our power system is where, in specific cases, we reconcile our changing notion of all the power that we have not ( – ) with our changing notion of all the power that we personally have ( + ). And this reconciliation is a tangible power conclusion, an understanding that we store in the system’s succedent memory bank, anywhere from briefly to a lifetime.

Since our power system is synthetic reasoning, it too, like our judgment, is hypothetical and prospective, but it is reductive rather than accretive. At the first

pole, we don’t consider things in their true nature or complexity, but only relatively, as class ideas or synthetic beings that we have fabricated from our own desires, needs, and evaluations. This is why there is always a subjective bias underlying our quaternary practical reasoning, where our only interest, reductively, is what there is about these external beings—such as other people or living things, our collectives or institutions, or imagined deities or mystical forces—that might help us achieve the motive, or plan of purpose, of our present act of consideration.

Every synthetic hypothesis refers to a static state of beingness, not to a real and whole process, so we are entirely practical here, considering things only in of their utility. We can only consider the reality of a person or thing when we perceive it as a whole event, or a complete percept, but in our quaternary reasoning we conceive a thing as a member of a class of useful or nonuseful things that might increase or limit our powers. Our deities are such conceptions, for they are just fictional beings that we imagine could empower us, which is what we request in any prayer.

As we begin our quaternary reasoning, our perspective is objective, so our view of other people in our power system will be cold and heartless unless our four prior systems made it otherwise. We can’t feel or judge in our power system, which works from the morals, values, and class of our tertiary reasoning. So if we are egoists (+) or nihilists (R) in judgment, we don’t have comion for others or otherness, in which case our social, political, or practical decisions will be selfishly inclined no matter what our impulse in power is.

The external sources of power that we cognize at the first power pole include nature, sunlight, animals, plants, the nutrients we need, the work of others, and our relatives, partners, and larger collectives. And mystics will include here their imaginary deities, spirits, or forces. The internal sources of power that we cognize at the second pole are our congenital or acquired talents, abilities, attractiveness, physical strength, and intelligence. At any given time, then, our developed power system is the integrated whole of our internal power, by which

we understand, decide, and then act to achieve our primary wishes ( – ) and motives ( + ), as these were transformed in our tertiary reasoning into our desires ( + ), needs ( + ), and beliefs, hopes, or ideals ( – ).

The Cycle shows us that external power implies internal power, so if we receive blessings from nature and heredity (including exceptional intelligence or health or compelling beauty) or gifts from other people (including profits, an inheritance, or an elevation in prestige, fame, or employment rank), our potential for personal power is greater for those blessings or gifts. But it is only a potential, for no matter what advantages we receive from external sources, we may still fail to achieve greater understanding and personal power. We must ensure this development, this maturity, at the second pole by our own projections ( + ), for we cannot transfer to any external thing the basic internal tasks of reconciliation, integration, and retention that compose our understanding.

We can refer to our power conclusions with such as understandings, individual powers, potential powers, or abilities, but whatever we call them, they are the integration of both our received gifts and our individual will to perfection. In the Cycle’s entire wish-to-fruition process, it is only at this final cognition that we know if we have sufficient personal power to manifest our original wish with respect to the event that we selected as our context. We may find here that our new understanding gives us the power that we first wished for or even more than that, or we may find that we don’t have or can never have that power over events. In any case, we will revise our will system in our subsequent considerations so that it accords with our new heightened or lessened expectation as to which wishes ( – ) it is possible for us to achieve ( + ).

We all do this and we all must do it, because this direct implication from a power in one act of consideration to a new wish and intent in another such act is how we any specific act of consideration to the next related one. We learn much when we are young and we become stronger for that, but as we age we gain some new powers and lose some of our old ones, and as we experience these changes in our powers, we must alter the motives in our will system accordingly.

There’s an important political lesson here; namely, that if we let others restrict our powers, we are also letting them restrict not only our personal freedom, but also our will system, which is the source of our sense of reality, our global motives, and our drive to survive. And if we are foolish enough to do that, then we are giving others our freedom and our life to dispose of as they wish. Therefore, as a fundamental principle of all our social and political acts and constructs, we must each insist that, regardless of any prior contracts we have made, we have no debt or obligation to any nation, corporation, group, or person that, with or without our consent, tries to restrict us, weaken us, harm us, endanger us, or take our personal property or our fair share of the common property.

Our freedom is our power to act without restraints, so in a sense our freedom is our power, which we make anew every day. It is thus not something that our rulers have a right to bestow on us or not as if it was a mere civil liberty, over which they claim absolute power. Except on valid moral grounds, which in each case is the point that must be proven, no artificial state or other collective has the right to restrict the powers or freedom of any individual.

On the other hand, we can’t become stronger without the help of nature, other people, and other living things. It is thus our lot in life to struggle daily with the horns of our natural power dilemma: external power versus internal power, otherness versus self, or collectivism versus individualism. We must oppose all unreasonable impositions on us by others, to be sure, but we must also accept our responsibilities to all of the external sources of power that have helped to strengthen us. To be healthy, we must be self-reliant, but we cannot be selfsufficient, at least not for long.

Obviously, the descriptions of the four power impulses that follow are incomplete because a real person is not just a power type. We aren’t considering here how to combine the impulses of the five systems to understand someone’s total character, for we can only do that when we are interpreting an entire natal

chart. Logically speaking, we must first consider each system as if it worked independently, which we know it doesn’t. Nevertheless, there are times when discussions of our power system require us also to observe the important distinction between judgmentally selfish and unselfish people, as defined above. This distinction is also an oversimplification, but it does let us distinguish broadly between people of a given power type who do or don’t have good intentions towards others.

In any psychologic system, the impulse at each pole divides all people into halves, and taking both impulses at both poles together divides all people into fourths. So in our power system, by hypothetical count, the impulse at the firstpole defines half of us as logical moderates ( – ) and half as illogical extremists ( + ), while the second-pole impulse defines half of us as logical leftists ( +) and half as illogical rightists ( – ). And we can use these four class to define each power type more clearly.

Balanced Power (–, +), The Progressive

This impulse makes one logical at both poles of the power system, so progressives are moderate leftists. They are moderates ( – ) because they logically assimilate external power at the first pole, and leftists ( + ), or individualists, because they logically project their personal power at the second pole.

As moderates, progressives don’t force their views on others. Like liberals, our rightist moderates, they are usually well-liked by others and accept their environment and situation, which makes them conventional in dealing with the outer world. The exceptions are progressives who are projective in will and have more leftist than rightist systems. For example, the ProLibs Jefferson ( + – – B B ) and Gandhi ( + – B – B ) were initially conventional but ultimately rebellious, while the ProLib Obama ( R + – – B ), being weak in will and more rightist than leftist, will always be more conventional than rebellious.

This preference for conventional policies is why progressives are more often advisors than leaders, even advisors to extremist leaders. In fact, the real managers of the world, as distinct from the nominal leaders who are publicly in charge, are often progressives who serve as shrewd advisors to pathological rightist leaders and then may become like zealous rightists themselves. Examples are Kissinger ( + B B B B ) and Cheney ( – B – + B ), who advised two pathological presidents, Nixon ( R R – R – ) and Bush II ( R + + R R ).

As moderates, most progressives reject the violence that extremists favor, but they rarely nonviolence for its own sake, probably because it isn’t conventional to do so. Absolute nonviolence is ed mainly by religious liberals, not by realistic progressives. Gandhi for instance, though conventionally religious, didn’t absolutely oppose violence to end political oppression, as his

for Britain against Hitler testifies. As a realistic progressive with a purpose, he just understood tactically that many Hindus would never use violence, not even to end British terrorism.

As leftists, or individualists ( + ), progressives (B) are self-reliant; they try to increase their physical and mental abilities, and then they trust their powers. Like their fellow leftists, the radicals (+), they are all about improvement, especially self-improvement. But in this they are more susceptible than radicals to the conventional biases of their elders and educators. Still, they differ from rightists ( – ) because they don’t rely unduly on their collectives. Instead, they prefer not to ask others for help, they try to be independent, and they don’t expect power to come to them as a gift. What they do expect is to have greater power in whatever areas they work to perfect their world or themselves, so they are our natural learners, whether formally educated or not.

Progressives neither ignore nor worship the past. They accept the present, but they oppose unrealistic people who try to keep us in the past or who try to drag us back there by proposing old solutions to current problems. They look to the future to define its possible perfection, and this, along with their desire to learn, reflects their mature attitude to power. That is, they see life as a process in which they are supposed to become better people with each opportunity, and they expect, as a matter of common sense, to find this perfectionistic drive in other people and in any society.

This form of opportunism, looking for chances to make oneself or one’s collectives more perfect, is more common in leftists (progressives and radicals) than it is in rightists (liberals and conservatives), and this is why more leftists than rightists are dissident activists. Activism to correct individual or social wrongs is what responsible people do—meaning self-reliant people who won’t tolerate errors, won’t wait for others to act first to improve things, or won’t blame others for their own failures. The political principles to which progressives are naturally inclined can be classified as those of toleration ( – ) and individualism ( + ), but these principles have both positive and negative

forms, and which form progressives embrace depends on their other characteristics and the opinions of the elders, educators, or thinkers they most respect.

The progressives’ political message is usually an appeal for unity, for they are psychologically driven to bring all conflicts, contradictions, and disparate things into an integrated whole, or total understanding ( + ). So unless they were indoctrinated as rightists in their youth, they are naturally impelled to be advisors, healers, or builders.

Advice to Progressives. Your impulse in power makes your practical reasoning more realistic and logical than that of the other three power types, who often turn to you for political or practical advice, which you are usually willing to give. The problem is that your moderate side ( – ) makes you too conventional, or too willing to tolerate erroneous traditional ways and to accept what you are taught, which is almost always traditional and rightist. You need to challenge all such poorly considered teachings and leave room in your reasoning for creative new ways to handle problems, for otherwise you will end up opposing progress, which you know we need continually and hope to bring about.

You also know that your childhood lessons included many fictions and lies, especially from deluded parents, theists, or thieving politicians or businesses, and if you lack creativity in your other systems, you have probably accepted these false views and repeated them to others, maybe even to your own children. Avoid working for rightists, or collectivists, because the purposes they will ask you to serve are against your nature and may cost you much in the long run, if only in your self-respect.

For example, don’t be like our ProRad Chief Justice Roberts ( – B + + B ). Though he is an 80% leftist and has no reversals to impair his logic, because he is a follower in will, an emotionalist in feeling, and an egoist in judgment—that is, a manipulable, selfish person with no empathy or comion—he was easily

indoctrinated by rightists in his early years and became as much an enemy of progress and the common people as the pathological conservative president who appointed him. There’s still a chance that he might mature, but that’s unlikely since his Impulse Pattern is much like Cheney’s ( – B– + B ), who clearly never did mature.

You should participate more than you probably do in collective efforts for social improvement, and generally speaking, you need to be more daring than you are. If you are committed to conventional groups and behavior, as many progressives are, you may fail to oppose people who try to promote social intolerance or restrict individual freedoms. It would be good for you, then, to reduce your rightist social ties, form more friendships with intelligent leftists, and start acting to combat the social plans of all selfish people. The world can use your help now, since for many decades it has been more rightist than leftist, and therefore has had many more harmful changes than beneficial ones.

Projective Power (+, +), The Radical

The projective impulse makes one illogical at the pole of external power ( + ) and logical at the pole of personal power ( + ), so radicals are extremist leftists. As such, their power functions are conflicted, because as extremists they reason incorrectly in social matters, and as leftists they reason correctly in political matters.

Their negative side is the extremism ( + ) they share with conservatives, for this impels them to impose on others or otherness, and often leads them to with conservatives to extremist social policies. Like conservatives, radicals believe that whatever doesn’t fit the ideals of their judgment system must be changed; this is intolerance, of course, since tolerance of a thing is not wanting to change it. We all expect external things to fit the standards we derived in our judgment system, but our power extremists, our radicals and conservatives, will openly criticize any person or thing that doesn’t fit those standards. This dissatisfaction with people or classes of people for not being what they ‘should’ be then leads them to form prejudices that shape their social and political opinions. This is less severe, though, with the unselfish extremists, meaning those who are altruists or moralists in judgment.

All extremists assume that they have the right to command or impose on others, but they differ in how they go about it. Radicals do it as individuals, or “Because I said so,” and conservatives do it as collectivists, or “Because this is what our rules or customs say.” So radicals try to develop their power over others by personal means, such as physical or mental training, while rightists try to do this socially, as with legislation, their social s, their cliques or gangs, or by becoming bosses or bureaucrats. The radicals’ positive side is the leftism ( + ) that they share with progressives, which often puts them in the thick of a struggle to make a present situation better and to oppose the rightists’ refusal to change. Still, our attitude to change is only partly decided by our power system;

a greater role is played by the preceding systems, especially our will.

Most radicals try to increase their control over others by becoming stronger or wiser, and they are often self-improvement gurus. Many of them have multiple talents, which, depending on their intelligence, can be anything from solving complex problems in science or philosophy to becoming proficient in the nonintellectual activities that distract ordinary people daily. In this they differ from the conservatives, their fellow extremists, who only study things that confirm the traditional beliefs or distractions that they adopted in their youth. That’s why, to the amazement of most leftists, conservatives can actually be enthusiastic about repetitious religious rituals, social ceremonies, parades, circuses, fairs, memorials, and historical retrospectives.

Since radicals usually dislike people who refuse to improve themselves or their society, they are intolerant of rightists (liberals and conservatives) and those conventional progressives who adopt rightist ways. In spite of this, many radicals conservatives in political efforts, such as the Republican Party and other extremist organizations. The most likely explanation for this mistake, other than a limited intelligence, is having rightist impulses in two or more of their other psychologic systems.

Speed and action are a radical’s bywords, so they seek shortcuts for solving practical problems. This rushing can make them careless or impolite almost as a way of life, and it makes many young radicals so eager to engage in adult activities that they often cut their formal learning short. In any case, they work hard to develop their personal powers, and in this they rely more on the speed of their practical reasoning than on organization and method. In fact, because they are self-reliant, many radicals dislike social organizations and will resist organization and order in their personal life as well.

Radicals don’t need statistics or a carefully drawn blueprint to figure out what other people are trying to do socially or politically. If they are intelligent, they

will know this instantly, and if not, they will assume that they know it. Intelligent radicals are our most precocious and capable people in practical (quaternary) matters, and if this is a fault, then it is one that puts them in front of the rest of us there. But if they do become leaders, their disdain for organization makes them disinclined to build formal systems to concretize their insights for the future. They prefer to leave such follow-up work to others while they look for new things that need improvement or will excite them.

The eighteenth-century radicals in America showed us this fault clearly. Though they were chiefly responsible for causing and fighting our revolution against Britain, most of them later refused to participate in the work of writing and ratifying a constitution. In fact, as if this behavior could somehow result in victory for their individualistic perspective, many major radicals of the time, though invited, refused to attend the Constitutional Convention.

Still, radicals are creative in power, and they are always busy trying to learn more or making deals or alliances that will increase their personal power. And whether they can expand their mental powers or not, they usually work to increase their physical strength. But intelligent or not, they prefer activities that require a fast mind. They ‘think on their feet’, as they put it, though often this is just rushing to a conclusion, and, with the true or false belief that their intuition is sufficiently reliable, they rarely have fully reasoned proposals to offer. They also prefer one-way communication from themselves to others, and so they are, as the case may be, natural leaders, supervisors, dictators, imposers, or bullies.

Radicals are often criticized for wanting ‘too much change too fast’, but this is just a digressive complaint by rightists who seek to slow or prevent needed changes in society. Our proactive leftists are more creative, insightful, and prophetic in their social and practical visions than our reactive rightists are, if only because people who are always looking backwards, including overly conventional progressives, can’t predict anything correctly. Leftists develop their personal powers better than rightists do, and those powers include anticipating the future events that are most likely to follow from present trends.

Though most radicals have many talents, their lack of social skills limits their success in their practical or political objectives. This is due mainly to their intolerance toward others ( + ), which inclines them to restrict their work teams and socializing to other extremists. This clannishness has led our media, since the sixties at least, to describe radicals in of their associations rather than their true character, with the result that most of them falsely assume that ‘radicals’ are always leftist fighters for social change. Though it is true that the more-intelligent radicals leftist cliques to protest harmful policies, far more of them belong to two other kinds of cliques.

One of these consists of apolitical radicals who have little or no interest in politics or in improving their society, and who in the sixties were euphemistically described as ‘cultural rebels’. These cliques can be anything from anarchistic cabals or macho street gangs to groups of artists, performers, musicians, fictionists, athletes, risk-takers, exercise enthusiasts, motorcyclists, racers, sports buffs, laborers, hippies, addicts, sybarites, gamblers, prostitutes, or criminals. The other clique consists of the less intelligent radicals who are exploited by conservatives through their common macho attitudes and social intolerance ( + ), and who then the rightists in serving their society’s thieving rulers. Because this group of radicals seeks quick solutions, are prone to violence, and yearn to harm, discomfort, or impose on others, they eagerly a society’s extremist parties or its police, military, investigative, or security forces.

Another reason why radicals fail in their practical or political pursuits is their excitability, which leads many of them to become addicts of some sort. Other reasons are rushing to a decision without adequate preparation or a clear blueprint; revealing their intentions or attitude prematurely with boasts, threats, or other displays; openly showing their intolerance of or disdain for others; disliking long-range plans and durable structures; refusing to appear appealing or conventional in their grooming, dress, speech, or behavior; gratifying their desires without regard for what others need or think; offending people with their rudeness, abruptness, disorganization, vulgarity, or self-centeredness; resorting to threats or violence when it isn’t necessary; and being stubbornly unwilling to

negotiate middle-ground solutions.

This is a formula for social failure that is difficult to overcome, and radicals do so only if they have qualities such as intelligence, comion, and dignity. Many conservatives have these same social flaws, which is why extremist political parties (like the Republican and Libertarian parties) consist of both rightist conservatives and leftist radicals. But since conservatives are dependent on others, most of them try to disguise these flaws. That’s why, unlike many radicals, they are usually fastidious about their appearance, speech, and conforming to social customs, which in turn is why they usually have many friends to them when they do fail.

The victories that radicals achieve are tactical and not strategic ones. Since they dislike being in one place or doing the same thing too long, they travel often and usually surrender to rightists the control of any organization or movement they have begun. This is their greatest failing as activists or commercial innovators, for it allows rightists to coopt their creative efforts or inventions and put these to a contrary purpose. That’s why a rebellion led by radicals soon comes to naught and is forgotten. It lives on only if progressives give it a sound form or if it is coopted by rightists who make it into what it was never intended to be. As I said, this happened with the eighteenth-century leftists in America and who fought for individual liberties, and it is happening now in the many revolutions that have marked the start of the new era (2008-2254).

Radicals focus primarily on the future; their main interest in the past is in what they might learn from history to improve their current understanding. As extremists, they are dissatisfied with the present, but they don’t deny society or withdraw from it as many conservatives do; instead, they try to improve it—for themselves or others, as determined mainly by their impulse in judgment, which also tells us whether they see themselves as benefactors or bullies. In either case, the first ‘solution’ they consider for improving something is one that imposes on others. This is the chief contradiction of many radicals: as leftists ( + ) they hope to be mature and more perfect, but as extremists ( + ) they mistakenly assume

that they can become this without treating others fairly.

Advice to Radicals. Recognize that your leftist political views are superior to those of all rightists, and then stop being their dupe. Liberals and conservatives will try to convert you to collectivism by using your intolerance and your militaristic, macho, or vengeful dispositions ( + ) to get you to them in working against the principles of individualism ( + ) to which you are psychologically committed.

Give your instinctive responses to events more thought; don’t assume that these reflect certain knowledge just because they are your experiences, and find ways to slow yourself down and relax, without drugs. Also, force yourself to listen carefully to what others say and to what they mean by it. In general, stop thinking that your needs and activities automatically take priority over those of the people around you, and that therefore you may impose on them without asking their permission. And stop judging people in of the classes you assign them to; treat each person you encounter as a real individual, not as a type. Like our conservatives, you are projective at the first power pole ( + ), so you tend to see people as types rather than as unique individuals.

If you are a typical radical, it is likely that your intolerance of and rudeness towards others or classes of others, your refusal to allow that their reasoning might be more correct than yours, and your reluctance to study new ideas offered by them cause most of your social problems and intellectual limitations. The rest are caused mostly by your rush to decisions and your general prosecutorial, or impositional, attitude to others or to classes of others ( + ).

Accordingly, you should stop associating with people who have a crude, abrupt, or ‘macho’ social manner, for this clannishness only feeds your own weaknesses. Also, unless you have the necessary countering characteristics, you probably narrow your social and circles by speaking impulsively or vulgarly, ignoring your appearance, not controlling your anger, and offending or

threatening people. And though risk-taking excites you, you should avoid doing immoral work for any government, corporation, friend, clique, or gang. If you must be a politician, judge, prosecutor, enforcer, or investigator in any sense of these words, try to be the fairest one in the world. This won’t make your work easier and you may not succeed at it, but otherwise you will become a bully, a criminal, or something else that will cost you your self-respect.

Your best course in any dispute is to champion the moral side, which is usually the weaker one. You’ll want to do this anyway if you are a moralist or altruist in judgment, but not if you are an egoist or nihilist—at least not until later in life when, confronted by your many regrets, you will see more clearly how you could have been a better person.

Assimilative Power (–, –), The Liberal

The assimilative impulse makes one logical at the first pole of external power ( – ) and illogical at the second pole of personal power ( – ), so liberals are moderate rightists. Like radicals, their power functions are conflicted, but in the opposite way: as moderates they reason correctly in social matters, but as rightists they reason incorrectly in political matters.³⁵

Our liberals’ positive side is the moderatism they share with progressives. This makes them reluctant to impose their views on others and willing to accept their situation realistically. Unless they are extremist (+ or R) in their other systems, liberals have an easy-going manner that contrasts sharply with the rude social style of most radicals and conservatives. Such liberals are appealing; they invite others to be their trusted friends, partners, or confidants, and they devote much effort to socializing.

But this healthy social impulse at the first pole can be corrupted by their illogic at the second pole; that is, by the rightism ( – ) that they share with conservatives. As a result, their social and professional relationships are often insincere, since one can hardly be a good friend or partner if one’s main motive in socializing is to receive or take things from others. This psychologic dichotomy defines all liberals, more or less so as other factors indicate, and we should understand this about them. In general, they are tolerant and fair towards others when an issue doesn’t affect their material or political interests, including the interests of any state, corporation, or other collective upon which they depend for their power, comfort, or material success.

Though I have offered a new definition of liberals, some of my criticisms of them are not new. In the second quadrant of the modern era (1822-1913), ‘liberal’ replaced the older term ‘Whig’ in British and American politics, and in

the fourth quadrant (1972-2008) of that era, liberalism was attacked by Republican extremists (radicals and conservatives) who wanted to impose less tolerant social policies in the US. Their media campaign led many people to start calling themselves ‘progressives’ instead of ‘liberals’, as if these were synonyms, which they are not. Unlike progressives, liberals are normally avaricious, and they have a psychologic hunger for power as well as for wealth.

Though it’s not widely known today, European liberalism was attacked a century earlier by the ConLib historian and theologian Bruno Bauer ( 1 8 0 9 - 8 2 , R – +– R ) , and in this he anticipated the chief criticisms of liberals made in our time, some of which may have been taken from his work. His main criticism, as the many liberal dictators in our history confirms, was that greed is the motive behind every liberal proposal for social or political ‘reform’. But as I see it, greed is essentially just a thirst for more power, and only liberals are excessively assimilative in power.

In spite of their friendly manner, liberals are often described by their critics as duplicitous, foxy, opportunistic, unreliable, or two-faced; qualities that may explain the great number of liberal generals and irals in history. This unreliability stems mainly from their double assimilation in power ( – , – ), which leads them to take in, collect, or befriend many different opinions, things, or people, the multiplicity and differences of which leave them continually undecided as to which are best. That is, they collect but they can’t edit, so they have no choice but to be cautious and duplicitous in dealing with others.³

Being sneaky, indirect, and untrustworthy are characteristics of power liberals, as we see in that world-famous advocate of deception, the LibCon Machiavelli ( R + R – – ). But these liberal characteristics and an indirect thirst for power are also found in people of any power type who have two or more liberal ( – ) systems in their Impulse Pattern. Some examples are the ProLibs Napoleon ( – B – – B ) and Obama ( R + – – B ), and the ConLibs Lyndon Johnson ( B – – R R ), James Baker ( – R – B R ), W.R. Hearst ( – R + – R ), J. Edgar Hoover ( – – B R R), H.R. Haldeman ( – – + – R ), Condoleezza Rice ( – – B + R ), and Jack

Welch ( – – R – R ). And since they have more rightist than leftist systems, the ConLibs are worse in these respects than the ProLibs and RadLibs.

This uncertainty and the vacillation it causes explains those liberals and partliberals in politics, academia, and the media who take great pains, even to the point of lying, not to offend large groups of people. Their caution in that respect is one reason why political, social, and religious fictions are preserved in a society long after they are proven to be false. Their acquisitive impulse in power makes them want to collect people too, so in their collectives they try to make everyone else supplicants and themselves the ultimate controller and dispenser of all rights and resources. Being dependent on their collectives, they will scheme to receive promotions, inheritances, donations, or gifts and will try to become the dictators of their families, associations, businesses, cults, churches, parties, armies, nations, and so on.

Since all rightists (liberals and conservatives) are unsure of their personal powers, they have a psychologic need for the input of others on practical issues. They ask others, “What is this about?” and “How should I decide this matter?” This is what it means to be a collectivist, or other-dependent in power ( – ): one hesitates to project a decision on any matter on one’s own authority, and yet can’t trust anyone who does. Rightists are never self-reliant; they are government-dependent, rule-dependent, friend-dependent, or even therapistdependent. And yet they always doubt what their governments, rulers, friends, or therapists tell them. This is why they strive to rule their collectives. “No one knows anything on their own authority,” they reason, “So, since I could gain from it, why shouldn’t I be the one who decides everything?”

In politics, liberals grant that people should have equal rights under the law, such as religious freedom or due process, but they work to get the political power needed to determine what those laws say and mean. In their family, club, business, church, nation, or union of nations, liberals oppose any policy that limits their power to control all of its resources, which obviously can only be achieved by centralization, the anti-individualistic organizing principle that

underlies every rightist political proposal. The issues of their own power, property, and wealth are of immense psychologic importance to our acquisitive liberals, so they stubbornly defend their right to keep anything that they have earned, received, or stolen.

The poles of our power system tell us to distinguish between social and political issues, and unless we do this we can’t see our four power types truly. For instance, the moderate liberals and the extremist conservatives loudly oppose each other in public, but only on social issues—such as abortion, immigration, religion, welfare, education, the economy, the environment, how different classes of people should live or be treated by the government on any issue, and so on. But in private they conspire together as rightists without hostility to decide the all-important political issues—such as how the government is structured, who rules it, which individual rights are affirmed or denied by it, who bears the burdens of ing it, and who will benefit most from it and how.

Liberals will pretend to be progressives when they need leftist ers, as they do in elective politics, but, depending largely on their impulse in judgment, their greed and anti-individualism can make them as intolerant and cruel as any extremist. Liberals who are unselfish (moralists or altruists) prefer nonviolent solutions to all problems, and the mystics among them may even absolute nonviolence, as the moralist LibPro Martin Luther King ( B + – B – ) did. But then there is the contrary case of the altruist LibPro John Brown ( B B R – – ), who chose violence over inaction in order to end slavery in the US immediately. On the other hand, selfish liberals will use whatever violence is necessary to keep their power, property, profits, or status, which is another reason why so many military leaders in history were liberals.

Being assimilative in power, liberals are ‘laid back’ rather than ‘on edge’ as extremists are, and generally they have little to no creativity in their politics. That is, other than observing the traditional ways, they can only borrow or plagiarize intellectual, social, economic, and political proposals from old and new sources. They accept their society for what it is, and then try to benefit from

it with the least effort possible. As rightists, they have a compulsive need for collectives to them psychologically and materially, and yet, hypocritically, they often conservatives in working against all the poor or helpless people who, as chance would have it, are most in need of from their state.

All rightists ( – ) assume that their power comes from their external associations and not from what they have made of themselves ( + ), and this explains their opportunism. Leftists are self-reliant, so they’re not constantly on watch for external events that may increase their power, for they believe that they can achieve this power whenever they choose. But other-dependent rightists fear that there may not be another opportunity to acquire the personal power that a present situation offers, so they think that they must seize each opportunity before it es, as if it was what rightist rs call ‘a once in a lifetime offer’.

This externalized notion of their personal power makes rightists work hard to build, maintain, and defend all kinds of social, economic, and political structures. This is why more rightists than leftists vote in our pseudodemocracies. That’s what collectivists do; they maintain the systems that are psychologically and materially important to them. And those who also lack personal dignity ( – ) will go further by idiotically displaying flags, corporate logos, icons, or other symbols on their bodies or property to publicize this major weakness of theirs, their dependence on artificial collectives.

Liberals often say that they want to improve, or ‘reform’, things, but in practice they conservatives in trying to preserve every system they have studied and learned to manipulate. Liberal legislators, lawyers, or ants, for instance, don’t propose any basic structural change in their state’s legal or tax codes; the most they will do is to propose slight changes that will benefit them or their power cliques. They study the old ways diligently and learn how to profit from these through academicism, the law, plagiarism, and a show of compliance with established rules, customs, and conventions. As assimilators of the traditional

ways, they want no change, but as the most opportunistic and grasping of the four power types, they welcome any ‘reform’ that will increase their own wealth, status, comfort, or fame. And liberal intellectuals have written volumes of social and scientific nonsense to rationalize their collectivism; works that other liberals in academia and the media praise highly as being what we must all read and believe.

We can understand a liberal truly just by extracting all the meanings of the assimilation and acquisition. Their power dynamic shouts “Come to me!” They judge anything good if it accrues to their s or personal credit and reputation, and bad if it doesn’t. They are the collectors and scorekeepers of the power spectrum, more so than conservatives and far more so than leftists, and their appetite for acquisitions knows no limit. Generally speaking, as either owners or overseers, they want to have under their personal control more and more land, property, collectible items, fame and repute, wealth, children, servants, slaves, workers, friends, and lovers. As rulers, they want to control more nations and acquire more legal authority and military power than anyone now has or has ever had. They are our natural ants in the broadest sense of this term, for they habitually quantify every personal, social, economic, military, or political policy that they consider, and they put quality in the back seat every time.

This is why, as the liberals listed in the tables of Appendix B confirm, they always centralized political systems, for under any economic system the centralization of power makes their control of and thefts from the public easier. Their quantitative bias makes them want to incorporate all lesser collectives under ever-greater ones; master collectives that can expand without limit, at whatever cost or means. Whether they are socialists or capitalists, liberals are the driving force behind state or corporate capitalism and the destructive political and economic globalization that is smothering the world today.

Their fellow rightists, the conservatives, usually cooperate with them in this, but they are less certain about it. They too want the security of centralization and

powerful rulers like monarchs or popes, but they also appreciate economy of scale, so they oppose the liberals’ wasteful expansionism, or their additive ‘at all costs’ approach to every social or political problem. But liberals have no qualms about the cost of continual expansion, because they feel psychologically fulfilled with each increase in size, power, or centralization that is achieved in their family, corporation, or government, merely for the fact of that addition.

Since all rightists, unlike leftists, look to their collectives for their security in life, they busy themselves with socializing in every sense. It starts in childhood with family, clubs, gangs, teams, parties, and college fraternal groups, and extends to the adult forms of socialization. Each such social activity is in effect just a rule system that tells them how to behave in different social circumstances. They are psychologically dependent on these fixed rules and are lost without them, which is why more rightists than leftists the military, the clergy, the judiciary, or other collectives that are controlled by strict rules. But rightists differ in this socializing as they age. Most conservatives either limit their socializing to other extremists or withdraw from some or all social activities, and consequently the liberals are our paradigmatic socializers and the dictators of fashion.

Rightists see the source of new conceptions as external rather than internal, so they distrust any proposal for change because they didn’t create it and can’t trust their own logic in judging it. Conservatives deny a new proposal instantly, because they fear anything new, but liberals will delay their decision to get the external opinion of ‘experts’ or to take a poll that gives them a quantitative reason for accepting it. Both distrust individualists because leftists make new proposals on their own authority as logical thinkers. Some people ire creativity and others resent it, and the general rule on this is that the irers are leftists and the resenters are rightists.

As collectivists, rightists tend to deny the possibility of individual creativity, and so they conclude that since there is no such thing as a new idea, plagiarism can’t be wrong. They may change in this if they acquire their own patents or

copyrights, but initially, since they see a collective as the reality and an individual as its insignificant consequence, they regard anyone’s new conception as public property. This is also why they prefer to reason in groups or committees, where they can either steal another’s idea on a topic or at least pretend that they participated in its creation.

Thus, our scholars should be more cautious before they credit any rightist’s intellectual works or social proposals with originality. Many rightists listed in our tables achieved fame merely for collecting and restating what others before them have said. The truth is that leftists are the first to make every logical and beneficial proposal for society, but we lose sight of this fact because rightist academics routinely seize any new leftist notion to distort and coopt it or lie about its source.

Liberals are keen to exploit the talents of others, so they are often power brokers or agents of some kind. Conservatives are similarly acquisitive, but they lack the ease and tolerance, and usually the duplicity, one must have to be a successful mediator or agent. Liberals seek to please all sides well enough to net some personal credit or commission, their concern for which explains their bias in disputes for the more wealthy, powerful, or famous party. So unless they have strong opposing characteristics, which some of them do, they are often obsequious as well as acquisitive, and just as compulsive about form and mere appearances as conservatives are. They epitomize the grasping professionals who dominate the banking, brokerage, real estate, advertising, journalistic, legal, medical, ing, and political trades. And on the highest economic levels, many of the foremost capitalists and socialists in history are or were liberals.

As our natural assimilators, liberals are patient. They are on the scene long after radicals and progressives, and even conservatives, have left it, and they work tirelessly at managing the alliances needed to maintain their collectives and social institutions. If they hear that a change is coming, they don’t rail against it as conservatives do; rather, they befriend and coopt it while they try to get the most that they can from it. But this takes time, so their first response to any call

for change—even by their friends, children, or lovers—will be to delay a decision and counsel patience.

Being taciturn opportunists in power, liberals demand secrecy in all their personal relationships and social dealings. People who continually steal other people’s ideas, time, rights, bodies, or property live in constant fear that others may steal what they have stolen. And while brutal police and military forces are the invention of intolerant extremists, it is the moderate but devious, in fact Machiavellian, liberals who conceive and manage the secret police of their societies or corporations and otherwise conspire to deprive us all of our privacy, or sacred selfness. Such organizations as the FBI, CIA, NSA, MI-5, MI-6, DGSE, KGB, FSB, Gestapo, Mossad, and the ‘mind police’ of any rightist state, party, cult, or corporation are liberal constructs, not extremist ones.

Because they are doubly assimilative in power, liberals seek the power to pry into others’ lives and plans before deciding anything. In the last half of the modern era there was an exponential growth in domestic and international spying agencies and networks, led by liberal dictatorships and pseudodemocracies such as the US and UK, and by the most powerful international corporations. Taking governmental and corporate spying together, and they are virtually one already, no individual has any privacy today; not at home, at work, at play, or in the public streets or parks. This means that no state or corporation respects any individual, a situation that most liberals and conservatives consider ideal. They can now say, “At last, the individual is meaningless in society!” This has always been our collectivists’ political agenda; not only for their state, but for their businesses, clubs, and families as well. But our individualistic leftists make new codes and rules as the need arises, and that’s unacceptable to any collectivist. And obviously this natural difference between people will cause continual disruptions in any family or other collective in which the are not all leftists or all rightists.

In considering an action, liberals will argue that success and efficiency require a careful plan, but what they mean by this is that they need more time to ensure

greater benefits for themselves from it. In their personal life they’ll delay commitment to a lover, partner, or business deal until they are certain that they have the best one they can get. The liberal impulse for acquisition is often just greed, and while unselfish liberals can overcome this fault in time, its combination with their social tolerance makes selfish liberals supreme hypocrites. If they don’t seek greater wealth, then they seek another form of personal gain, such as public honors or an imagined ‘place in history’.

Liberals see time as conservatives do; they prefer the past and fear the future. But as our natural acquisitionists, they accept the present as it is and they don’t want to change it because they have studied it, adapted to it, and are usually doing well by it. If they aren’t, then they will act like extremists to improve their situation.

Advice to Liberals. You need to control your appetites. Besides your greed, which is not a great problem for you if you are unselfish, any other assimilative systems you have will give you the appetites appropriate to their functions, as listed earlier. If you are innately selfish, meaning (+) or (R) in judgment, you should avoid politics and fiduciary positions, and work in areas related to your stronger psychologic systems.

In any case, it is therapeutic for you to practice charity for the poor and to get by with less yourself; that is, to emphasize your socialistic side rather than your capitalistic or libertarian side. Also, you will benefit from time spent enjoying or protecting nature and wildlife. Exercise your strengths as a power liberal, which are considerable, such as your tolerance for and understanding of others, and your ability to communicate with them or negotiate productively for them. If you work for a government or corporation, it will be easier to counter your collectivistic (anti-individualistic) illogic if you work on its local rather than its centralized levels.

A good rule for you to observe in all cases is to always judge qualitatively before

you judge quantitatively. In politics, follow your moderate impulse and with unselfish progressives. Let them decide your coalition’s political goals, while you help them shape its social programs, organize its efforts and social events, communicate to the public, and raise funds. But dissolve your political alliances with conservatives (R), even if these benefit you materially. Conservatives share your illogic as a political rightist, but not your logic as a social moderate, so they may obstruct your social goals and lead you away from common-sense solutions. You can avoid many of the problems that you cause for yourself by working to moral ends only, by being truthful, direct, and open with others, and by not prying into their private lives.

Reversed Power (+, –), The Conservative

The reversed impulse makes one illogical at both power poles, so conservatives are extremist rightists. Since they inappropriately project at the first pole and assimilate at the second pole, they are the most troubled of the four power types. We’ve already considered them indirectly, for they have the social illogic of radicals and the political illogic of liberals without the radicals’ good political sense or the liberals’ good social sense. It only remains to see how those two weaknesses work together in one person.

Because our power system is where we conclude each turn of the Cycle, the main psychologic problem of many conservatives is immaturity. People who cannot properly conclude their reasoning on issues they consider are hindered in developing new personal powers. That is, their reversal prevents them from integrating the conclusions of their will, thought, feeling, and judgment systems into sound understandings and practical decisions, and as a result their power system is a psychologic area that they fear, try to avoid, and refuse to develop. Unlike other people, as they age they have difficulty forming new personalities to fit the new situations they encounter, and so increasingly they live in the past and maintain an outmoded personality; either that or they may create fictional personae with which to escape their real situation at different times. This arrested development in power, or practical affairs, will be less severe if some of their other systems are strong, but it’s hard to change one’s personality as needed when a second system is also reversed, and it’s all but impossible for pathological people with three or more reversals.

Objective discussions with many conservatives on social or political issues are difficult because they derive their views on these from their psychologic impairments and the narrow-minded thinking of prominent conservatives before them. Not only does the power reversal make them habitual negativists, or naysayers; it also makes them unusually stubborn about it. Since they don’t

adopt any view because it is logical (realistic), over time they develop no political skills, except perhaps a critical ability in practical matters and the power to influence others who are equally irrational in their sociopolitical reasoning.

This problem was put aptly centuries ago by the pathological conservative Luther ( R + B R R ), who wrote ruefully, “In civil matters, I am such a child.” That was an accurate self-description, but it applies to all conservatives because some immaturity in their social and political reasoning always results from their power reversal.

We can see Luther’s immaturity clearly in his theism and in the rarely mentioned fact that it was not he, but Frederick the Wise ( 1 4 6 3 - 1 5 2 5 , B – B R B ), the progressive ruler of Saxony, who created the Protestant Reformation, mainly by manipulating Luther through his three reversals, or points of immaturity.

That ‘Reformation’, and perhaps the communistic proposals of the moralist More ( R B R B + ) in his Utopia (1516), provoked the revolts against Catholicism that began the classic era (1516-1762). I said that we must expect political revolts in the first quadrant of any psychologic era, and given the fact that Catholicism was the dominant political force in Europe before the classic era, we must see the Reformation as a political revolution and not as a superficial theological one. Anyway, it happened first in Frederick’s realm, Saxony, then in other northern German electorates, and then in England and elsewhere in Europe. But reflecting the judgment reversal, or nihilism, that Frederick and Luther shared, its real purpose was to let secular monarchs in their separate domains end the centralized political power of the papacy so that they could steal the wealth that it had stolen from the people in the preceding millennium.

The main reason why most conservatives don’t mature in their understandings and decisions is that they build avoidance structures that deny their own power functions. They decide, usually in adolescence or early adulthood, that because

they can’t handle the logic of this practical concluding system, especially the personal obligations that it places on them, they must try to turn its functioning off, and so they become negativists with respect to nearly all understandings and practical decisions. Even as children they react habitually to any new proposal or understanding with some type of negative response. This continual negativism, which annoys logical people, can take the form of instant denial, changing the subject, carping over words or details instead of addressing the real issue, randomly distorting the reality of situations, physical retreat, transcendentalism, withdrawal into fantasies or mysticism, usually theism, and embracing irrational political views that range anywhere from monarchism to classic anarchism (no rulers). Though the power reversal causes the denial, its form depends on the person’s other characteristics or traits.

The Consideration Cycle shows us clearly that conservatism is not an ideology, it is a psychologic disorder, and a more severe one than liberalism or radicalism. But because it had never been objectively defined as being that, it was difficult for our conservatives to correct its harmful psychologic symptoms. In our universal ignorance of human nature, they ed everyone else in seeing conservatism as an ideologic issue and not as a psychologic problem. Thus, they never saw the connection between this so-called ‘political ideology’ and some of their deepest psychologic problems, and so they felt justified in defending it by denying all criticisms of it and of their own illogic.

To see this more clearly, we need only apply to power conservatives the ten points of innate illogic that we applied above to people with the other four reversals.

1. Arealism. However our conservatives might reason to get to their power system, once they are there they cannot be realistic. At the first power pole ( + ), they have unrealistic expectations of others and otherness, and hence of societies, governments, and laws. Thus, they foolishly expect people to act as they believe all such people should act, and they expect their government, family, or society to cure all social ills. But their impulse in judgment plays a

role here too. If they are impaired in judgment, they will cynically believe that people are sinful and cannot be trusted to govern themselves, and if they are not, their beliefs and moral conclusions will still be confused because their power reversal makes them irrational in their subsequent reasoning.

Being extremists ( + ), our conservatives see others as they want them to be, not as they actually are. For example, they may expect an employer to reward them for their diligence or their mate to love them always and help ensure their security and safety, and if they are later disappointed in this, they can’t see that the fault was largely theirs for not appraising those people realistically at the start. So they usually won’t it their own role in a conflict and they will blame the other party or parties, often for the rest of their lives. And many are led to immature retaliations against someone who was either not to blame or not as much to blame as they imagined.

2. Antiphilosophy. We’ve seen what a reversal in the other four systems causes one to deny. In will one denies reality, purpose, and primary theory; in thought one denies one’s own dignity and uniqueness, analytic activity, and universal reasoning; in feeling one denies the important role of the deeper ions; and in judgment one denies morality, realistic beliefs or hopes, sound plans of action, comion and fairness, and the needs and beliefs of other people. In power, conservatives deny the need to complete their practical reasoning, to see others as unique individuals rather than as descriptive types, to treat all other people or living things fairly, to develop their own abilities, powers, and understanding to the highest level possible, to improve their personalities to fit new and changing conditions, to respect intellectual reasoning, to accept fair criticisms from others, and to explain their actions to others. Conservative judges, for example, make our legal system even more contradictory than it already is because instead of fully explaining a decision they make, they rationalize that decision with any specious shortcut that comes to mind.

So most conservatives are at root anti-intellectuals who, even if their formal education is extensive, cannot create and will not adopt a realistic and coherent

political theory. Many of them fear such a theory, since its principles might expose the confused practical reasoning that they developed or adopted from old sources. Instead, they reason politically solely with ex post facto descriptions and terse maxims, which they mislabel as ‘principles’ to imply that they or their favorite gurus of the past had once reasoned validly from a political theory, which we now know is not the case. And conservative academics continually propose hypothetical ideals that they claim have social or political significance, but that in fact have no theory to them.

Being ever in need of shortcuts, conservatives will collect clever quotations to cite in various practical situations. Even their intellectuals speak to us not from sound theories, but from pithy mottoes. Their ‘explanations’ of their views, which they presume we all accept as valid, are little more than repetitious references to false ‘principles’ or ‘laws’ that serve as the shortcut answers to current problems. Some examples in the US are the free-market principle, traditional values, family values, religious values, divine will, in god we trust, the social contract, the general will, original sin, we the people, the American dream, the American way, god bless America, our troops, united we stand, e pluribus unum, the criminal class, justice is punishment, the system works, the rule of law, and so on. I could go on, but this list suffices to make my point, which is that most conservatives habitually utter their name for an unexplained and unproven hypothesis and then use this as a substitute for the missing theory; that is, for the full reasoning that one needs to substantiate a hypothesis or justify a decision to act.

3. Manipulation. Since conservatives don’t create their own social or political proposals, these have another source. This might be an honored thinker of the past, someone from an institution they revere, or someone they ire for superficial reasons such as status, wealth, formal education, fame, military or professional success, and so on, but it is always someone who they respect enough to become his or her messenger. They adopt others’ social and political opinions because they can’t reason well on these practical matters themselves, and then they do what most collectivists do: a herd of rightists and worship the Judas goats who lead it. Those who can’t create original notions have few options; they must reason in committees, make new hash of old leftovers, or

follow the lead of more-original thinkers. To paraphrase Barnum again with only a slight exaggeration, “You can fool almost all of the conservatives all of the time,” and sharp opportunists do this to them continuously. You would think that sooner or later they would see how often they are manipulated, but they don’t.

Let me say this again for the emphasis it deserves: any reversed system is an area in which one is manipulated by others. Unless one has withdrawn completely from human society, there’s no ‘maybe’ about it. This is also true of an assimilative (–) impulse in a system, but less so because that impulse isn’t entirely self-defeating.

4. Self-Undoing. Given their power impairment, conservatives seldom have longterm victories. They are their own undoing. Their most ambitious projects fail because they blindly follow the lead of political manipulators or because their own social and political reasoning is so confused and unrealistic that little they try in practice works for them. And if we add to this their unrealistic expectations of others, we see both the social daze they are in and why they are impelled to observe all the rules laid out for them by society, their elders, or their favorite conservative gurus.

At the first pole ( + ) they are as prosecutorial and inconsiderate of others as radicals are, and at the second pole ( – ) they need other people as desperately as liberals do. But unlike liberals, their rudeness, intolerance, and frequent inexplicable outbursts turn people away, so they often end up alone, a prospect that most rightists fear but that conservatives will spitefully suffer if they must and then blame others for it. Social success is only easy for them if they start life with wealth, intelligence, or beauty, if they have strength in their other systems, if they the right clubs, if they find a caring and successful partner, and or if they are fastidious and cautious in their appearance, speech, and social dealings. But even then they can, at any moment, be their own worst enemy.

5. Academicism. Many conservatives are led by their illogic in power to become academics, jurists, writers, journalists, pragmatic pundits, religionists, or politicians. Such pursuits attract them because they require them to study others’ thinking on practical subjects, which they do anyway. But even when their study is extensive, it is usually restricted to a narrowed field, especially one with premises that are not widely challenged in their society.

6. The Gap. Because they deny their power system and its logic, conservatives have a hole in their psychologic process, and unfortunately it is at the end of it, where their integrated understanding of all matters would normally be. Logically speaking, they fall off a cliff. Since they can’t structure their power system consistently, which logical people do to integrate many varied theories and hypotheses into a mature global view of life, that system and its memory bank become increasingly cluttered and unmanageable, and people near them may wonder if they know what they’re doing. Soon they just stop trying to organize their power system and turn it off instead, and so they instantly deny, without due consideration, all statements by opponents or critics.

Because conservatives can’t order the issues of their practical reasoning, they must rely on others to do this while they escape from the distress that practical affairs cause them. But the more people they call on for advice, the more confused they become, so they limit their advisors to the one or few they trust most. They can’t deal with multiple sources of practical advice because their power reversal prevents them from handling even a small plurality of views in their practical reasoning.

In fact, this is the psychologic source of their innate antidemocratic attitude. The essence of democracy is tolerance and an accommodation of the natural variety of personalities, opinions, beliefs, classes, and cultures in a population. But conservatives are intolerant of others to start with, and then the less intelligent ones can’t integrate multiple views in their reasoning anyway. As the old joke has it, they can’t walk and chew gum at the same time. That’s why they prefer dictatorial political structures where there is only one leader, viewpoint, way to

behave, or cultural type, and only one set of social rules that allow no deviations from ‘the norm’ or the literal statements of it—any instance of which can infuriate them. It’s also why they don’t want change, for thinking of both their old political system and a potential new one at the same time is beyond them.

In the US, for instance, most conservatives speak of their constitution as if it was an unchangeable holy document written by unselfish patriots, but the ‘founding fathers’ who actually devised it, in private and in the absence of most of the leading leftists of the time, were elitist rightists who feared and detested democracy. Several legal scholars have recently written works that prove in detail that we can’t have a genuine democracy unless we totally revise that constitution. As it is, in both its original and its modified forms, any oath to it is just an immoral promise to the rich and oppress the poor, here and elsewhere in the world.

The power reversal also explains their stubbornness. People who can’t follow a number of mental subjects at the same time in a system are always immovable there, as Bush II demonstrated to us daily. Such conservatives are rigid because to replace any notion they have with a new one, they must consider both at once, and this they can’t do without confusing the two. That’s why they detest people who can do two things at once. It’s also why unintelligent conservatives become anti-intellectuals, while the intelligent ones prefer to work as narrowly focused intellectuals, specialists, jurists, clerics, artists, or detectives or researchers who single-mindedly explore nothing but ex post facto evidence or data.

Given this difficulty in relating disparate things, our conservatives can’t achieve an integrated understanding of reality. And this is so even of deep-thinking idealists such as the unselfish power conservatives Berkeley ( R B R B R ), Rousseau ( B B R B R ), Kant ( R B R – R ) and Hegel ( B – R B R )—all of whom had a specific impairment in their Impulse Pattern that I define below as the messiah complex.

7. Inner Peace. Because the limitations caused by their power reversal heighten their anxiety over outcomes, many of them seek ‘inner peace’, or surcease from the stress of dealing with their inner conflicts and with people who aren’t limited in the same ways they are. Their dislike of those who can do or think of two things at once is one reason why many of them avoid partnerships and become monks, nuns, hermits, academicians, jurists, or fictional artists, or find some other way to live on their own or to escape from society or reality. If it is true, as I’ve read, that psychologic stress produces unhealthy hormonal imbalances, then this withdrawal from society—provided it doesn’t involve alcohol, drugs, or religion—may be beneficial for them.

The rest of us can tolerate such confused conservatives so long as they don’t try to impose their escapes from reality on those of us who have no need for them or, worse yet, on our impressionable children. Conservative religionists often complain about smut and vulgarity in the media, but these are less harmful to children and weak adults than their own religious rituals, which profanely promise the impossible in order to keep us content with what we should see as totally unacceptable in our lives, politics, and societies. The first goal of every religion, cult, or sect is to keep its ‘true believers’, most of whom are conservatives or people with other reversals, in a trance of some sort so they won’t even try to see reality or improve themselves or their societies.

8. Shortcuts. Their need to deny their power system leads conservatives to search for shortcut solutions to social or political problems that they can impose on the rest of us—usually with some slogan or rhetoric that suggests that these are real solutions that were fully thought out by great intellectuals of the past, which we now know never happened. It couldn’t have happened because, as I explained earlier, there were no genuine philosophers in the past. There were many intellectuals, of course, but almost all of them were partialists, idealists, or pragmatists, not realists.

9. Failure to Explain. Conservatives dislike discussing the various practical areas, such as their politics, skills, or relationships, in which they are

incompetent. If pressed, they will either cite trite slogans or change the subject. Basically, most of them refuse to explain the true causes of their decisions or acts to anyone because they don’t understand these themselves.

10. Begging the Question. Since power is an open system ( – + ), a reversal there causes one to petition the conclusion, which is the pole of personal power ( + ). It is unrealistic to project rather than assimilate at the first power pole, so before conservatives know the others or otherness that they are considering there, they leap ahead to the second pole to anticipate the personal power that they should project. But they can’t project this at the second pole because they are assimilative there, so they must search the external world to see what others or their society’s traditions say is an appropriate power solution in that kind of situation. Then, when they find something that seems to fit the need, they return to the first pole in a reconsideration and apply this general rule to their reasoning there.

For instance, in deciding what they think another person should be or do, they ignore that person’s unique nature and situation and beg the conclusion, by saying that he or she must be or do what some general social rule—such as a legal edict, a respected guru, or a divine ‘commandment’—prescribes for all such cases. This question begging in power is why conservatives tend to see their relationships to others not as the unique cases they are, but rather as some general condition of relationship that is caused by the existing social rules or roles. And then in short order they will assume that the roles we play in society and the rules that our society expects us to follow are extremely important, while any individual to whom such a rule applies is insignificant. So now this other person is the general rule or social role that the conservative adopted from others, and this is question begging, or petitioning the conclusion as to what that person should be or should do in such a situation.

This inverted reasoning in which conservatives assume with no proof that a social or cultural effect is the cause of people’s behavior, is why, even more than liberals, they insist in each case that we must all do what our society’s rulers

expect of us, and only then do what is right for us as individuals and morally right in its effects on others.

Most people who witness an instance of this attitude to others will assume that it is a personal assertion of what a conservative wants of some person, but in fact it is just a projection of some general rule that he or she previously adopted from others. This projection is always inappropriate because it ignores the logically prior issue of whether the person in question ever could or would meet that expectation. It is like expecting people to ire you before you know them well enough to know why they will or won’t. Such an unrealistic expectation is your fault, not theirs, because even if you did consider some general grounds for social iration, you never considered their nature or how, for their own reasons, they would be most likely to judge you.

Because this question begging, this searching for an external general rule before the real person involved has been understood, is how conservatives reason in all practical matters, many of them soon develop socially to be little more than walking and talking rule books. For the knowledge of a person that they should assimilate at the first pole ( – ) in each case, they substitute their learned social maxims for all such cases. Thus, they don’t relate to another person as one human to another, because in all their relationships they refer to their collectivistic education and to their bibles of inconsistent general maxims on human behavior or roles, which they can often quote by chapter and verse.

So, as the old joke has it, a conservative man will say, “This isn’t a woman, this is my wife.” In other words, conservatives are inclined to judge others as parents, spouses, children, friends, enemies, bosses, and so on, rather than as real individuals with their own wants, innate character, and changing personality. This is a common attitude among children of any power type who typically think of others as, say, their mother, father, sister, brother, teacher, or friend, but rarely as whole individuals with personal needs and problems of their own. This happens with children because, being confined to first-pole reasoning, they have not yet matured, and the power reversal (which is projective at the first pole)

makes many adult conservatives similarly immature. A child is only capable of seeing another person in a general role () that relates to his or her own needs ().

Though there are some exceptions, most conservatives of any age consider the role or rule as more important than the real person before them. They use this class judgment in their criticisms of others to conclude something like, “You were not the parent (child, spouse, lover, friend, etc.) that you should have been.” This unrealistic judgment is convenient for them, since it lets them blame the others involved for what they personally failed to do to improve a relationship or to live a healthy life after it. They even judge strangers discussed in the media in this unrealistic way.

This illogic is natural in rightists, though it is more severe with conservatives than liberals. For example, a conservative may say to a parent, “You hurt me badly (in this or that way) when I was a child, so you were a bad parent.” Except for its failure to consider the parent’s personality and the whole situation at the time, this comment may be unobjectionable, but most conservatives don’t stop there because they are past-oriented. Thus, any parent (sibling, friend, spouse, lover, or so on) who made a mistake in the past, even if they have long since corrected that error, will never hear the end of it so long as they associate with the offended conservative.

Most conservatives never truly forgive anyone, for even if they say at the time that a harm done to them is unimportant, they store each one in their memory as a frozen-in-time picture, and they never ask if the offending party was really not wrong then or has since become a better person. They these old offenses better than most other events, because they intend to call them up later whenever they need either a weapon to use against one of their ‘offenders’ or a rationalization for their own shortcomings and failure to mature. This is but one form of what we call ‘living in the past’.

Thus, the memory of most conservatives overflows with events from their childhood that they never forget. Like “Rosebud” in Citizen Kane—a character based on the ConLib William Randolph Hearst (–R+–R)—such memories live with them every day until the end, and that too is a sign of immaturity. Unlike progressives who focus on the future, such conservatives cherish every offense done to them in the past, most of which they can recite in detail even on their deathbed. Then they use these retained offenses to forge a master rationalization that blames their own mistakes and failures in life on other people. Are they sick? “Of course not,” they reply, “Everyone else is.”

Most of us know conservatives who reason in reverse in social affairs, and we are repelled by their immaturity, lack of common sense, and inability to see the whole picture. And because they sense this reaction from the more logical people around them, they restrict their social life to their own kind; that is, to those who won’t criticize them because they have the same faults.

This cronyism is understandable, but harmful. Many conservatives have a rule for every situation, but it’s never their own rule, which is why they are robotic ‘groupies’ or precisely what we mean by a ‘collectivist’. They are drawn to any kind of political, juridic, medical, ing, academic, journalistic, or bureaucratic profession that expects them to learn an established set of general rules for individual behavior without requiring them to understand human nature. Nothing is more illogical than this, but they just don’t see it.

We have probably all witnessed a conservative who is outraged because someone refuses to comply with his or her expectation that some general rule adopted from others and now expressed as a command must be obeyed. Most people don’t understand this hostility, for when they see conservatives demanding compliance—such as parents commanding a child under the threat of punishment, employers firing an employee in anger, or cops arresting, beating, or even executing someone on the spot for not obeying some minor regulation in their rule book—they assume that the expectation is personal. But it’s not personal; it’s a group expectation. That’s what the cliché “It’s not personal”

means: that the person about to be punished has violated some arbitrary rule of some artificial collective.

Those who don’t see this distinction will blame the perpetrators and not notice that the deeper cause is the unrealistic expectation of social conformity that rightists share because they are assimilative at their second power pole ( – ). Though our states may punish the perpetrators, they never condemn the legal code, bible, academic text, or educational system that teaches this irrational and dictatorial expectation of social conformity; on the contrary, they actively promote that collectivistic reasoning in order to achieve their own antiindividualist ends. Some conformity is rational, of course, but since real individuals are unique, most of it is not, and that’s why we must judge each situation carefully before we even think of conforming to what others expect of us.

As most leftists know from experience, a traditional education is not about how we should reason; it is about how we must conform. This indoctrination early in life at home, school, or church is why most rightists feel justified in holding people strictly to ‘the letter of the law’ without even asking if there’s a good reason why they refuse to conform to it. Generally, rightists believe that a social rule must be observed just because it is a rule, while leftists believe that no rule should be observed if it is illogical or unjust, and that everyone must personally judge any social rule before obeying it.³⁷

Liberals are also illogical at the second pole, so they too expect people to conform to traditions, customs, rule books, bibles, or ‘social norms’. But they don’t beg the question. As moderates ( – ), they see realistically at the first pole what others are or aren’t willing to do, but at the second pole they contradictorily say that nevertheless there exist these ‘good reasons’ why we must all conform to our society’s rules and traditions. Rightists just don’t see the illogic of assuming the right to impose rules on others unilaterally and of expecting people to conform to them.

We should conform to general rules when they are sane and in our best interests, as they often are for common goals and when we are children or infirmed. But to grant this in those cases is not to grant in other cases that anyone else has the right to decide what we should do or what our best interests are. As sane and adult individuals, we are always free to decide against our own best interests, as altruists often do, or to decide our interests in some unique way that others don’t use or understand.

And if we do delegate this right by election, appointment, or contract, this doesn’t mean that we have obligated ourselves ever after. Since our consent is only validly given on our own authority, our right to withdraw it when a contract is broken is perpetual. Our present consent to a government or any other collective isn’t a blank check to its leaders, and contrary to the artificial hypotheses of ‘the social contract’ and ‘the rule of law’, people of prior generations never had the right to give our consent to our present government for us. The right to impose on others is a moral issue, and it is distinct from the authority to do so, which is a legislated legal issue that can always be changed. And our common logic tells us that since judgment precedes power, the moral right to impose on others must be established for certain in each case before anyone can validly assume the legal authority to do so.

Advice to Conservatives. Try to minimize the damage that your illogic in your power system does to you and to others. Review my advice above to radicals (+) and liberals (–), for you have the faults of both without the virtues of either. Then, when you understand these impairments, try on each occasion to catch your illogic in practice. If you work at this, you won’t rush to conclusions or beg the question as often, and then you can begin to improve yourself. In the meantime, though this may be difficult for you, you have a moral obligation not to impose your illogic in power on anyone in your family, community, or society, and not to vote for selfish politicians.

Don’t rely on alcohol, narcotics, deity worship, or other forms of denying reality. Also, control your impulse to command people; don’t cite rules to them, as if

they had no choice but to follow some old code or slogan that you believe we should all observe. Anyone can utter commands, but, subject to the risks involved, we all have the right to disobey them, and we all should disobey illogical or immoral commands no matter who utters them. For example, why should we ‘ our troops’ if they are fighting for the immoral purposes of a corrupt government? How does that make us moral people? Or are our governments correct in holding that our being moral is less important than following their rules? Of course they think that, for otherwise they must it that Reality has higher rules than any that are written in their laws or codes.

Speak to others with requests rather than commands, and with politeness, respect if it is due or if you don’t know that it isn’t, and a willingness to hear their views. And do so without rude interruptions, vulgarity, or signs of contempt, for these reactions only display your own limitations. Civil speech is as essential for healthy thinking as it is for healthy relationships. When we hear it from people we meet, it is our first sign that they are trying to mature, just as rude, vulgar, or ignorant speech is our first sign, a warning in fact, that the speaker has no intention of ever becoming a better person.

Your conservative political attitude can harm you and vast numbers of others now and in the future who are unknown to you. If you any immoral collective—which today means virtually any traditional state, institution, business, or religion—you are ing the enemies of real individuals and hence of humanity, and so you have no reason to respect yourself. And when you display, on your person or on things you own, any symbol of your allegiance to a nation or corporation, you are displaying your ignorance as surely as vulgarity, addiction, or superstitious deity worship does.

Our dignity isn’t derived from our patriotism, awards, or association with any nation, corporation, club, school, church, team, or other artificial collective; it comes only from how we see ourselves and what we make of ourselves. You can’t and won’t mature if you don’t respect yourself, and to do that you must be moral and fair in spite of ancient texts, current rule books, or the immoral

commands of your leaders. And be especially critical of their wish to start a war, for wars rarely have a moral purpose.

In politics, that only progressivism is logical. So if you can’t its individualism, tolerance for others, and insistence on real democracy, which means a decentralized and just political structure, then your only moral choice is to withdraw from politics altogether. Ignore appeals for from all liberal, conservative, or radical parties or partisans; only healthy and mature leaders, as described herein; and unless you are sure that you are an unselfish realist, don’t run for political office yourself. Your immaturity in power suggests that it is best for you to leave politics to others.

As positive goals, devote your efforts to your stronger psychologic systems, give direct aid to individuals in need, and only organizations that promote local improvements, progressive politics, or disaster relief, or that oppose policies that harm individuals, groups, humanity, other species, or our ecosystem. But don’t centralized religious or charitable corporations, for they are a symptom of, rather than a cure for, our social and political problems. Institutional charity is properly a job for our governments, the failures of which we should not excuse by asg it to private persons or corporations. We should all know by now that, with few exceptions, rich people or corporations put their own needs first, so we must never give them this power to define the common good for the rest of us.

Your power reversal makes you prefer old solutions to new social or political problems, but this makes no sense, for if there had been sound answers to our present problems in the past, we wouldn’t have those problems today. New problems require new solutions, and romanticism can’t help us find them. You have more difficulty than others do in moving beyond past experiences that affected you positively or negatively. So, considering what was said above about this, you must try to cleanse your memory banks of every grudge you harbor for past insults or immoral impositions, for otherwise their active presence in your mind will keep you immature until you die. Judge those who have offended you

in the past fairly; not as examples of forever-fixed social roles, but as people with changing personalities. Sometimes forgiveness is appropriate, especially for those who are or were close to you, but even when it isn’t, you mustn’t let that past event injure you further, as it will if you keep it alive in your memory. We don’t forget the harms done to us to forgive them; we do it to heal ourselves.

The social activities that are the most rewarding for you are those that help others or nature without requiring your involvement in politics. Because you will be deceived, exploited, and manipulated if you don’t, you must avoid active participation in politics and focus instead on what you can do personally to improve things around you. Your plans needn’t be ambitious, but they must be moral, or fair to all others.

Note also that you are naturally inclined to break up relationships of any kind, whether they involve you directly, incidentally, or not at all, and that giving in to this destructive urge can harm you personally and socially. This is why it is essential that you find the one person, the one healthy person, who wants to be your partner and helpmate for life. And if you do, be careful not to lose him or her with the irrational arguments, sarcasm, fits of temper, or other forms of immature behavior to which, probably, you were prone in your youth and still may not have overcome.

Because conservatism is the most illogical impulse in our power system, I have spoken quite critically of it here. But that I said that I will speak more of our faults than our virtues, and that we can’t judge anyone’s character by the impulse of any one psychologic system, since that is never the whole picture and many people have major countering characteristics—such as intelligence, strength in some of their other systems, a healthy upbringing, a good education, helpful friends, and positive factors in their natal chart that we are not considering here.

Indeed, I have known many conservatives who are realistic, moral, and kind

people and good friends in spite of their sociopolitical illogic and the neuroses it sometimes causes. I have even known some who sincerely progressive political goals. This is more often the case if they are strong in will or thought, unselfish in judgment, and not pathological, but there are even exceptions to this. These exceptions exist because a drive to perfection is part of our nature as humans, and because working to become a better person can produce some positive results no matter what our Impulse Pattern is.

The Messiah Complex

We’ve considered the four permutations of each psychologic system, but this hardly exhausts the innate characteristics that can be determined from a person’s Impulse Pattern. There’s an entire area of study, too broad to pursue here, that explores how our characters differ not because of the impulse of each system, but because of specific combinations of impulses that give us different sets of characteristics.

We’ve seen that a psychologic system is affected by the other systems in the Cycle. It follows that various sets of two to five impulses in the Impulse Pattern cause different innate characteristics, and these combinations, along with the twenty single impulses we have just discussed, explain many of the phobias, complexes, neuroses, manias, and so on that modern psychologists have observed and recorded in their references over the years. Indeed, had their science been founded on our theory rather than on the disconnected descriptive hypotheses that are still its only foundation, we might have had by now a more realistic psychologic science and language than we do.

This is still possible, but now psychologists who agree with me that their science needs a universal theory will have to work backwards. That is, they’ll have to review the merely descriptive, unproven symptoms that are listed in their encyclopedias of disorders, select those that they consider real and possibly innate, and then study the Impulse Patterns of individuals to find which combination of innate impulses might be their cause. Or they’ll have to create a whole new theory of their own and work backwards from that to explain those symptoms that their colleagues have observed randomly, with no theory or empirical verification. It’s their science, so it’s up to them to make it make sense, but I doubt that they can do that until they have a sound general theory of how all humans reason.

In my research and consultations over the years I’ve given much thought to the combinations of impulses, but the most I can do in this work is to discuss a typical case with ample empirical evidence that s my claim that some disorders our psychologists have observed and catalogued are caused by congenital factors and not, as they propose, by life experiences. I use their name for this disorder, the messiah complex, but they know it by other names also. In its broadest sense they refer to it as Narcissistic Personality Disorder (NSD) and to people who have it as narcissists, but they also use other names—such as megalomania, hubris, a god complex, delusions of grandeur, and so on—for special cases of it.

Since we know now what our psychologists actually mean by ‘personality’, we know that their term narcissistic personality disorder flatly states that this disorder is not innate but is acquired after birth. We must ask, then, what grounds they have for asserting that narcissism is a personality rather than a character disorder, and the answer is that they have none. Because their science has no universal theory, they can’t say for sure whether any symptom they observe in a person is congenitally or postnatally caused, and so, if only to defend their key premise of psychic determinism, they assumed the latter. But as it became evident that this view clashed with advances in genetics, they had to modify it, or at least express it more vaguely. So today they reaffirm their old dogma that only postnatal events cause psychologic disorders, but they add the caveat that if we do have an innate character, it’s up to geneticists to explain it, which of course they haven’t done and don’t intend to do.

So it may surprise them to see, as I’m sure they will increasingly in the near future, that a great many of the major disorders listed in their references today are innate and not postnatally acquired. If they believe otherwise, it’s probably because they confuse the different effects that our life experiences can have on us. Postnatal effects can cause new traits in us or they can modify both our innate characteristics and any developed traits that they didn’t cause. But observing people’s symptoms after the fact can’t tell them whether they are seeing a congenital characteristic being modified or a postnatal trait being

formed or modified, so their belief that postnatal experiences are the sole cause of our symptoms is clearly an unwarranted assumption.

If you’re not familiar with the views of modern psychologists on the disorders mentioned here and wish to compare their views to mine, you might start with a short article in Wikipedia entitled Narcissistic Personality Disorder. By reading this and following its links to other sources as you wish, you can see how our psychologists view what they call ‘personality disorders’, many of which are actually character disorders. You will also see there that, even though they and I use different and opposite reasoning methods, we end up seeing many of the same observable symptoms.

The chief conflict between us, plainly, is whether these symptoms are congenital as I contend or postnatally acquired as they contend. Beyond this, the symptoms I see are deduced from a theory and so hold in all cases at all times, while the ones they see are speculations on ex post facto observations that are often contradicted by their later observations. Thus, my theoretical method is more useful than their empirical, or merely descriptive, method. For instance, if we know the correct birth data, then my method, unlike theirs, can tell us whether anyone who once lived or is now alive (even a newborn infant) had or has this disorder. And this fundamental difference between our two methods is too great to ignore.

As for the symptoms that messianists display, our separate lists generally agree, but with two major exceptions. They say that messianists lack empathy and are selfish, while I say that they have empathy but can’t or won’t express it, and that, while they may be egotistical or self-centered as many people are, they are not egoists, or people who are too selfish to consider others’ needs, beliefs, or situation.

Definitions.

In my theory, the messiah complex is revealed by four patterns of impulses in a person’s last three psychologic systems: feeling, judgment, and power. The two clearest cases, which first alerted me to the disorder decades ago, are suffered by power conservatives whose last three systemic impulses are (. . RBR) or (. . R– R). Liberals also have this disorder, though it may be less obvious to us because they are usually more moderate than conservatives in their behavior towards others. The two liberal patterns are (. . RB–) and (. . R– –). So when you see any one of these four patterns, you know that the native, to a greater or lesser degree as other natal factors will reveal, has the messiah complex, or (to use an old term in a new sense) is a messianist.

Though we won’t be discussing these here, four other such patterns produce a related disorder that differs only in the impulse of the fourth system, judgment. I have defined a messianist as innately unselfish, or as a moralist (B) or altruist (–) in judgment, but in these other four cases, the native is selfish, or an egoist (+) or nihilist (R) in judgment. The two conservative patterns are (. . RRR) and (. . R+R), and the two liberal patterns are (. . RR–) and (. . R+–). And since we must distinguish these four selfish disorders from the four unselfish ones above, I will refer to them as narcissism and to their subjects as narcissists.

Symptoms.

Since all eight patterns above begin from a feeling reversal, people with those patterns are, using the keyword I introduced earlier, spectators. If you recall, I said that people with a feeling reversal begin all their synthetic reasoning not correctly from their personally projected ions, but illogically from ions that they assimilated from others and take to be socially acceptable. As a result, in personal matters they are uncertain about their ions and hesitate to speak of them or to commit themselves on deep emotional issues, and socially they show no concern for others’ feelings. Thus, although no one actually does, they appear to lack feelings, even in shocking situations where people of the other feeling types would consider such detachment impossible. As for empathy, our spectators are among the roughly half of us who have it, but they don’t express it as other people do because their feeling reversal blocks them from seeing their true feelings or itting these to others.

Over time, especially if they were raised in hard conditions, our spectators become emotionally detached because from an early age they teach themselves to turn off their deeper feelings, or ions. However, and this is the contradiction that misleads us about them, they don’t turn off their affections, or sensual pleasures, at the first pole, where they are illogically projective ( + ) rather than assimilative ( – ). In fact, since modern psychologists have never been able to explain the difference to them, they habitually use their first-pole affections () as substitutes for their second-pole ions (), as if these polar opposite types of feelings were the same thing.

We all do this as children, and it is why all children need to be loved, but our spectators usually don’t mature past it. And because we have these two kinds of feelings, our affections and our ions, we must stop using the word feeling when what we mean specifically is either an affection or a ion. The feeling reversal makes people disionate, to be sure, but it also makes them strongly

driven by their superficial affections, sensual pleasures, and hedonistic urges. And because they assert their affections ( + ) strongly, it is incorrect to say that they deny their feelings; we can only say that they deny their ions ( – ), the concluding half of their feeling process.

What this reversal in feeling means is that when they move on to the next system, their judgment, they will evaluate situations and others there with no personal emotional opinion, as distinct from a ion they have adopted from others. Thus, at the second pole of judgment where we consider the possible consequences of a contemplated act, they have no realistic sense of how others will respond to any act they might perform. And if they happen to be moralists or altruists, their natural comion for others ( – ) may be displayed as abstract, cold, and class-based rather than as personal, warm, and directed toward real people. This is another reason why we find it hard to understand them, and often see their well-intentioned judgments as socially inappropriate.

Messianists are not immoral as our psychologists claim; they are moralists or altruists who are illogical in feeling and, as rightists, in power also. A moral sense is essential to the messiah syndrome, for immoral people are not so blind to their own selfishness that they will consider themselves exceptional and hence messianic. Only moral people will adopt some old moral code that lets them think that they are superior to others and beyond criticism by anyone, which are the chief characteristics of a messianist. It is exactly this concern for morality that makes them angry or even outraged when their practical affairs don’t turn out as they had hoped because others failed to meet their judgmental, or moral, expectations.

Though messianists can be as self-centered or egotistical as anyone else, that is not egoism, for even self-centered people can act morally toward others. They would hardly consider themselves superior, as they do, unless they were more concerned with moral reasoning and the display of it than most other people are. And given our traditional ignorance of our moral reasoning, they have no choice but to adopt some distorted traditional view of morality, but this doesn’t mean

that their judgment itself is impaired. Their feeling and power systems are impaired, and these adjacent impairments prevent them from using their moral reasoning effectively even though it is sound.

So the three essential parts of the messianic syndrome are (1) that it starts from a feeling reversal, (2) that the subject is unselfish in judgment and much concerned with issues of right and wrong, and (3) that he or she is a rightist and not a leftist in power.

On that third point, it is our subjects’ rightism ( – ), or other-dependence in power, that makes them incompetent in practical matters. People who believe some old moral code they were taught are likely to believe that all people or some particular class of people should see moral issues as they do; hence their unrealistic expectations of others’ actions. This, plus the fact that they are rightists and not creative leftists, is why they are frustrated in practical affairs and have no choice but to adopt conventional methods and occupations. Accordingly, their first hope is to excel in their formal education, and their second is to become famous preachers of some kind—perhaps writers, theologians, religionists, journalists, business leaders, jurists, lawyers, scientists, teachers, politicians, or media celebrities. And if they can’t succeed in that first hope, their education, they’ll settle for less in the second, their profession, and so may become mystics, bureaucrats, or cult, gang, or political party leaders or such.

Though messianic rightists realize that they are uncreative and even incompetent in practical affairs, they still have an inflated sense of their abilities and worth. This is caused mainly by their faith that as good patriots, which only unselfish rightists can be, they will act morally in matters that are important to their nation, race, gender, creed, or collectives. And if they are strong in will or thought, they may also believe that they have a unique character that gives them a specific mission in life, a destiny of some kind. This can lead them to think that they are infallible, or Pope-like, and hence beyond criticism by anyone, and so they are indignant when criticized, they ignore others’ advice, and they retaliate

against their critics harshly and often inappropriately. This is the opposite of how progressives respond to criticism, for progressives want to improve themselves and, in spite of their often-considerable competence in practical affairs, they don’t think that they could ever be perfect.

Regarding their rightist power system, messianists have most of the symptoms that psychologists attribute to dissocial personality disorder or sociopathy, though these symptoms are more obvious in those who have a conservative form of the messiah complex rather than a liberal form of it. Of all messianists, we can only say for certain that, because they are reversed in feeling and impaired in power, they are in some ways and to some degree antisocial. The difference between them in this respect is that conservatives are more likely than liberals to display their antisocial nature publicly.

For a more complete picture of the symptoms that I attribute to this disorder, you might review the earlier sections in this chapter on the feeling reversal, on moralism and altruism in judgment, and on liberals and conservatives in power. But then in Chapter 7 note my definitions of otherists and patriots, and in Chapter 8 my comments on the pathological conservative Woodrow Wilson ( R – R B R ), who perfectly illustrated this psychologic disorder and so since his death has been much discussed, if not really understood, by modern psychologists.

Examples

Here, in the order of the tables of Appendix B, are some conservatives who were or are messianists: Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, Antonin Scalia, Michael Dukakis, Karen Hughes, Ted Kennedy, Carl Levin, Jane Addams, Clara Barton, Eugene Debs, Ralph Nader, Bobby Seale, Eric Alterman, George Clooney, Clement Attlee, George Berkeley, G.W.F. Hegel, Immanuel Kant, Hermann Keyserling, Jean Rousseau, Albert Einstein, Sigmund Freud, Hendrik Lorentz, Henry Kaiser, James Dobson, Philipp Melanchthon, Pope Pius XII, Joseph Smith, Thomas Aquinas, Augustine, and Timothy McVeigh.

And here are some liberals in those tables with the disorder: Andrew Jackson, William H. Taft, Gerald Ford, Elena Kagan, John Boehner, Cory Booker, John Mitchell, Rand Paul, John Brown, Tucker Carlson, Bill Cosby, Rupert Murdoch, Brian Williams, Saddam Hussein, Henri Petain, Leon Trotsky, Duke of Wellington, John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer, Niccolò Machiavelli, Robert Owen, Max Stirner, Albert Camus, Warren Buffett, Ross Perot, Marshall Applewhite, James Jones, Ste. s Cabrini (Mother Cabrini), Jimmy Swaggart, and Desiderius Erasmus.

Chapter 7. Judgment and Power

The Hypothetical Judgment-Power System

In our ordinary discussions of people we speak far more often of their quaternary behavior than their primary motives, secondary thoughts, or tertiary feelings and beliefs. This is understandable because even though we know that we aren’t speaking of a real person unless we have considered all of his or her attributes, we also know that we can’t do this perfectly and that we must decide in each case how many of a person’s attributes we must consider to achieve the degree of realism that is adequate for our present purpose. And since each attribute we consider in this calculus makes our reasoning more realistic, it is relevant to ask anyone who expresses an opinion about one or more persons just how many attributes they are considering.

Seen from that perspective, the Impulse Pattern with its five psychologic systems is a rather simple construct. Though it doesn’t tell us everything about a person, it tells us many fundamental truths about human character that we didn’t know before. Even so, most people will simplify it further in their general discussions by distinguishing people solely by their power, or behavioral, type; that is, as progressives, radicals, liberals, or conservatives. This is better than the traditional way which is based on the old ‘political spectrum’ that refers to only two types: rightist conservatives and ‘liberals’ who are naïvely assumed to be leftists. But whether we use two or four power types, these distinctions are useful in our informal discussions because they describe not what people are, but how they are likely to behave.

It is often useful for us to speak of people as power types rather than trying to explain their whole personality, but to do this correctly we must understand first, that there are four power types, not two; second, that in using the ‘leftist’ and ‘rightist’ we must agree that there is a moderate and an extremist view on each side, so that leftists are progressives or radicals and rightists are liberals or conservatives; and third, that for each power type we must also distinguish between the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ people of that type.

So the issue now is how to meet this third requirement. Though people are tolerant or intolerant of others because of their impulse at the first pole of their power system (), the major cause of their being ‘good’ or ‘bad’ people is the impulse of their judgment system, which makes them unselfish or selfish, or moral or immoral. It follows that anything we say about people of a particular power type will be misleading unless we also indicate their judgmental type.

One way to do this is to use hyphenated , but this won’t work well because like nihilistic-progressive (. . . R B ) or altruistic-conservative (. . . – R ) are too complex for nontechnical speech. Then I thought that rather than combining our judgment and power impulses in that way, it might be better to merge them as if we humans had a single judgment-power system. And indeed this hypothetical approach does give us four simple, but still objectively defined, that can improve our abbreviated general discussions of people as power types because they refer to their differences in judgment as well as in power.

We can merge any two psychologic systems to make an imaginary polar system, but since our systems have only two poles, we must merge either their first poles (governed by the planets , , , , or ) or their second poles (governed by , , , , or ). To merge our judgment and power systems, then, the first way gives us two poles governed by Mars () and Jupiter (), and the second way gives us two poles governed by Pluto () and the sun ().

Which way should we use? Well, the first-pole method is best for analyzing children, since my research shows that they don’t begin to develop their reasoning powers at the second pole of their five systems until after puberty, and they don’t complete this process until sometime in their twenties. But for analyzing adults, as we are doing here, we must merge the second poles, for that’s where they reach the tangible conclusions of a system that they store in memory, edit regularly, and use thereafter.

So, referring to Figure 6 now, our hypothetical judgment-power system will ignore points 7 and 9 in the Cycle (governed by and ) except for research on children or child-like adults, and for normal adults it will consider only points 8 and 10 (governed by and ). This gives us a hypothetical open system ( – + ) that consists of both the unselfish-selfish distinction in judgment as determined by the charge of Pluto, and the leftist-rightist distinction in power as determined by the charge of the sun.

In judgment, I defined egoists and nihilists as selfish because respectively they put their own needs or the needs of their power clique before the needs of all others, and I defined moralists or altruists as unselfish because respectively they give others’ needs due respect or too much respect. In power, I defined our collectivistic rightists as liberals or conservatives and our individualistic leftists as progressives or radicals. We can now use those four italicized to define our four new judgment-power (J-P) , which are humanist, selfist, otherist, and elitist.

These four refer to sixteen different permutations of judgment and power impulses, and each term refers to any one of the four permutations that fits its definition. We must use the sixteen , such as altruistic-conservative ( . . . – R ) or egoistic-progressive ( . . . + B ), in analyzing individuals because they are more precise, but our four simpler will suffice in our less technical discussions of people. In the J-P column of the tables of Appendix B, these four are applied to each person listed, so if you have any doubt about how well they apply to real people, just check that column for the people you know best there. I have found no case yet where the term shown didn’t seem applicable to the individual listed, but perhaps you can. Anyway, here are the definitions of these four new .

A humanist is an unselfish leftist, meaning an individualist who is a moralist or altruist in judgment and a progressive or radical in power. So the last two symbols in a humanist’s Impulse Pattern are ( . . . B + ), ( . . . B B ), (. . . – + ), or (. . . – B ).

A selfist is a selfish leftist, meaning an individualist who is an egoist or nihilist in judgment and a progressive or radical in power. A selfist’s Impulse Pattern ends with (. . . + + ), (. . . + B ), (. . . R + ), or (. . . R B).

An otherist is an unselfish rightist, meaning a collectivist who is a moralist or altruist in judgment and a liberal or conservative in power. An otherist’s Impulse Pattern ends with (. . . B – ), (. . . B R ), (. . . – – ), or (. . . – R ).

And an elitist is a selfish rightist, meaning a collectivist who is an egoist or nihilist in judgment and a liberal or conservative in power. An elitist’s Impulse Pattern ends with (. . . + – ), (. . . + R ), (. . . R – ), or (. . . R R ).

Three of these newly defined —selfist, humanist, and elitist—generally agree with our dictionaries’ descriptions of them, except that here they are objectively defined rather than subjectively described. But I had to coin the term otherist. This is a variant of otherism, a nineteenth-century synonym for altruism to which I give a distinct meaning. I chose ‘otherist’ because it says ‘the opposite of a selfist’ and because no conventional word means what I mean by it: a political rightist (liberal or conservative) who, though illogical in power, is moral and has comion for others.

One thing these definitions tell us is that all messianists are otherists and all narcissists are elitists. I mention this now to emphasize that our messianists and narcissists are, respectively, the more severe cases of otherism and elitism. The worst cases of course are those where a messianist or narcissist is also pathological, or has three or more reversals.

Note that each of our conventional leftist, individualist, rightist, and

collectivist now refers to two of our four J-P types. That is, a leftist, or individualist, is either a humanist or a selfist, and a rightist, or collectivist, is either an otherist or an elitist. Here’s how the four types differ in their basic behavior.

Humanists, or unselfish leftists, act in the best interests of all individuals in the world, individually and totally, with no concern for the interests of any artificial collective aside from how these affect individuals or humanity as a whole.

Selfists, or selfish leftists, put their own interests before all other interests, including those of any collective or other person whatsoever.

Elitists, or selfish rightists, form small private cliques that serve only the interests and power needs of a carefully delineated club hip, and beyond this they have little or no concern for the well-being of any other persons or collectives. They are thus distinct among all four J-P types in being our natural, paradigmatic conspirators. That is, they can’t function in practice without conspiring, since their impairment in judgment makes them distort the purposes of any collective, including those of their own family and nation. Elitists are rightists who, for their own gain, assemble in small private meetings to devise secret plans to control other people and collectives, and perhaps the political and economic power of their society or other societies. Since the success of any conspiracy depends on avoiding genuine democracy, they oppose democracy at every turn and use lies, deceptions, threats, or terrorist acts to coerce people into serving their clique’s goals. And the worst elitists are those who are also narcissists or pathological.

Otherists, or unselfish rightists, work only for the best interests of the collectives to which they personally belong, which they usually put above their own interests and those of any individual or clique. Being either moralists or altruists in judgment, otherists are naturally inhibited, even when competing for internal control of one of their collectives, from conspiring against the best interests of its

entire hip. This may not be so, however, of those who are also messianists or pathological.

Both otherists and elitists are illogical collectivists and hence antihumanists, or anti-individualists. Real individuals aren’t considered in their rightist systems; the otherists care most for the collectives to which they belong, and the elitists care only for their private power clique. Otherists aren’t naturally immoral, but being collectivists they will put their family, club, team, school, religion, business, community, and nation before all other such collectives, and in defending their artificial collectives, as rightists always do, they don’t hesitate to fight other people or collectives, deny individual rights, or act against the broader interests of humanity and nature.

Note that of the four J-P types, only otherists can be patriots or chauvinists, which I see as pejorative because both those attitudes are narrow-minded. The other three types can’t be patriots in a nationalist sense because their natural loyalty lies elsewhere. Selfists always put their own interests first, elitists always put the interests of their private power clique first, and humanists always put the interests of all real individuals before those of any artificial collective and the interests of the whole of humanity or of all life before those of any gender, race, party, nation, or other part of that whole.

Otherists are more moral than selfists or elitists, but, as with our messianists, this isn’t always the case because of their illogic in power. That is, as rightists ( – ), their collectivism often causes them to undo any good they intend for others, and the conservatives among them, who are extremists, can also undo any good they intend by their intolerance of others at the first power pole ( + ).

Because elitists are selfish in judgment, they are more illogical than otherists. This is so even of those who improved themselves by helping others, as these elitist power conservatives in our tables did: Hugo Black, Thurgood Marshall, Muhammad Ali, Oskar Schindler, Chiune Sugimara, William Godwin, Simone

de Beauvoir, Michel de Montaigne, Mary Shelley, Stephen Hawking, Dorothy Day, and Mother Teresa. These elitists all had difficult psychologic flaws to deal with, but they sured these in some respects by withdrawing from or rebelling against their society in order to serve others. For instance, Day ( B – + R R ) and Mother Teresa ( – – R R R ) helped the needy directly, but they never overcame the basic illogic of their theism. And Godwin ( + – + R R ) renounced his earlier theism, left the clergy, and then wrote more common sense on people and politics than any rightist has in the two centuries since.

But they are the exceptions. The true nature of an elitist is better seen in these and the other elitist liberals or conservatives in our tables. In the US government, Nixon, Bush II, John Ashcroft, John Boehner, James Brady, Andrew Card, Richard Clarke, Barry Goldwater, J. Edgar Hoover, Karen Hughes, Joseph McCarthy, Mitch McConnell, Richard Perle, Condeleezza Rice, Nelson Rockefeller, Karl Rove, Kenneth Starr, Robert A. Taft, Charles E. Wilson, and Paul Wolfowitz. In the US media, Pat Buchanan, Father Coughlin, Steve Forbes, Tom Freidman, Christopher Hitchens, Brit Hume, William Kristol, Rush Limbaugh, Dennis Miller, Charlie Rose, and Ted Turner. And in academia, Alan Dershowitz, H.L.A. Hart, Marshall McLuhan, Samuel Morrison, Robert Nozick, Willard Quine, B.F. Skinner, and Leo Strauss, the Zionist father of neoconservatism, which means elitism even when it doesn’t mean Zionism.

The Generational Clash

Now let us consider an extremely important social aspect of our judgment system to which only astrology can alert us, one that gives us convincing empirical proof of our psychologic theory’s premises. This is that the planet that determines the charge at the second pole of our judgment system makes entire generations of humans alternately selfish or unselfish! In other words, on all issues of judgment everywhere in the world, there is a natural dislike and hostility between people of alternate generations.

The planet that causes this broad character clash is Pluto (). Pluto’s sidereal cycle is 247.7 years, so its time in one zodiacal sign has an average length of 20.6 years. Actually, due to the high ellipticity of its orbit, it es through a single sign (and so keeps the same charge) in anywhere from 12 to over 30 years. Since this is a reasonable range for the purpose, I use Pluto’s transits through each astrological sign to define our generations, and I believe that they are better defined in this objective way than by any of the methods that others have used; all of which are fallacious.

For instance, many people believe that a generation should be defined by some hypothetical average age of child bearing. Jefferson assumed this in proposing a period of 19 years for the automatic constitutional conventions he wanted. His idea was to let each generation shape its own government, since only this would give some reality to the wholly fictional social contract—an ancient and classicera notion that was needlessly revived by the messianist Rousseau ( B B R B R ) in 1762. But this arithmetic approach to defining a generation can’t achieve that purpose; in fact, it could be disastrous because then every alternate convention would be dominated by selfish people, as was our original constitutional convention in 1787.

But the most popular method of distinguishing our generations is even more arbitrary than that. This is where one observes some random behavior of people of a certain age group, describes that behavior, and then proposes this subjective description as a real feature of that entire ‘generation’, which cannot possibly be the case.

Another approach was taken in the mid-twentieth century when some academics used statistics on world population to propose the dates of a so-called ‘baby boom’ generation. This improved on the earlier methods by giving approximate dates for the start and end of its hypothetical generation, but it fails otherwise because population changes up or down don’t define any characteristic or trait; that is, human nature is irrelevant in this method. Though we do behave differently in some ways when there are more or less people around us, these merely descriptive differences can’t be defined for certain, and so they are superficial effects that won’t be experienced by everyone of that proposed generation. Still, this so-called ‘generation’ was heavily publicized by our media, and many writers in different fields felt a need to add their own arbitrary desciptions of the ‘baby-boomers’ to the general discussion.

But those authors couldn’t find anything in the world-population figures to justify using them for other generations, so everyone soon reverted to the old descriptive method. Then, noting that the generation just before the babyboomers had suffered through two world wars and the great depression, they labeled it the great generation and labeled later generations with empty names such as generation X, generation Y, the now generation, the millennials, and the post-millennials. In doing this, these authors—who were mostly media figures, psychologists, sociologists, or other academics with a need to publish anything —weren’t bothered by the fact that this approach gave them no objective way to define the start and end of any of these merely descriptive ‘generations’.

That’s it; no other way has been proposed. But there must be a better way to identify our generations, one that lets us see them realistically. What we need to speak meaningfully of our generations is a method that gives us objective dates

for the beginning and end of a proposed generation, and specific psychologic distinctions that hold for everyone in that generation. That’s the whole point of defining a generation: to explain how and why all the people of a proposed generation differ psychologically from all the people of other generations, and then to show that those characteristics or traits hold for all similarly defined past and future times. And if we can’t do that, then there’s no sense in trying to distinguish our generations at all.

Anyone who proposes that a specific generation differs psychologically from another generation is making one of two assumptions. The first is the character assumption, which is that all people who are born in the defined generation have certain congenital characteristics because of their birth in that period. The second is the personality assumption, which is that all people who lived during some past period have experienced global events—such as cultural changes, wars, environmental disasters, or depressions—that had significant postnatal effects on their personalities.

The first assumption, which can be used predictively, is favored by astrologists, and it can be empirically verified or refuted by examining similarly defined generations of the past. The latter assumption, which is ex post facto, is favored by most modern psychologists and academics. Its flaws as a generational indicator are that its generations are not objectively defined, that it lacks predictive value, and that there is no conceivable global event that can affect the personality of everyone of one generation but of no one of any other generation living at the same time.

Given these serious problems in their reasoning about our generations, we must wonder why people throughout history have even tried to explain them. Well, the answer is that, even though no one has yet objectively defined a distinct generation with psychologic characteristics that apply to all people born in that period, we all know from our common logic and our observations of people that there are significant psychologic differences between people of different age groups and that each such age group does have some common characteristics or

traits. The problem is that no philosopher or scientist has yet explained this common perception to us.

As it happens, the only solution to this problem is astrological, or congenital, and my new theories allowed me to solve it, as follows.

First, it is clear that there is no internal event (other than those that make us humans) that can cause every person born during a specific generation to have a common psychologic characteristic. The universal psychologic characteristics that we do have, such as our common logic, are common to all humans born on earth and so are not confined to one generation. It follows, then, that to solve this generational dilemma we must know which event that is external to us (1) best corresponds to the length of a human generation and (2) causes all people born during that specific period to have one or more significant and common psychologic characteristics.

Well, if we take all the evidence I’ve provided here to show that the ‘charge’ of each of the ten main astrological planets does cause distinct characterial differences in all people born during its period, and add this to the fact that only Pluto (), with its average time in one sign of 20.6 years, corresponds to our common-sense notion of the length of a human generation, we have the answer we need. Anyone who doubts that this is the correct solution to this dilemma must prove either that it is impossible to define psychologically distinct generations or that some other external event satisfies those two conditions as well as or better than the Pluto cycle does. And until someone gives us one of those proofs, it is only logical to proceed from the solution offered here.

It follows from this solution and the Cycle that the congenital psychologic factors that affect an entire generation are those of the second pole of our judgment process (point 8 in Figure 6), which vary primarily by whether Pluto’s charge is assimilative or projective. This pole is where, among other things, we form our morals, values, ideals, class , beliefs, hypotheses, languages, ways

of speaking, fictions, speculations, our comion or lack of it, and our notions of the consequences of potential acts—each of which we might suspect from our readings and our observations of people of different ages are characteristics that do indeed vary by generation.

Depending on Pluto’s charge, then, our psychologic theory tells us that we have two basic types of generations that alternate in our species throughout its current epoch: an unselfish one that consists entirely of moralists (B) and altruists (–), and a selfish one that consists entirely of egoists (+) and nihilists (R).

This is not to say, though, that a given generation doesn’t also have congenital effects caused by the charges of other planets. For instance, our feeling system differs in its second-pole charge (point 6) by Neptune’s regular transit through a sign every 13.7 years, and the second pole of our thought system (point 4) changes in its effects on us about every 7 years. As for the seven faster planets, they can’t help us analyze an entire generation, since Saturn’s time in one sign is only about 2.5 years, Jupiter’s is 1 year, and so on down to the moon, which es through a sign in about 2.5 days.

The next issue is how to name our generations, for we must avoid the old practice of using vague, merely descriptive names like those mentioned above, and the least confusing solution is to name each generation by the sign that Pluto occupies during it.

Accordingly, the newly defined generation that corresponds most closely in time to the ‘baby boom’ generation is named the Leo generation. More fully, we will understand this name to mean Pluto in Leo and also that, since Leo is a projective (+) sign, it is what we have defined as a ‘selfish’ generation. This won’t confuse us because there’s only one Leo generation in each psychologic era of 247.7 years, and if we want to refer to the Leo generation of another era, we can specify the century or our descriptive name for that era. For example, if today in the new era (2008-2254) we say “the Leo generation,” we mean the last

one, the one in the modern era that began in mid-1938, and not the one in our current era that will begin in 2182. Or if we mean the one that began in 1447, we would call it ‘the 1447 Leo generation,” “the fifteenth-century Leo generation,” or “the Leo generation of the scholastic era.”

Unfortunately, all of our human scientists, even astrologers, have overlooked this obvious fact that all people of the same generation have some psychologic similarities in their judgment process. That is, they must be of either an unselfish generation of humanists and otherists or a selfish generation of selfists and elitists, and we can abbreviate here by calling the former an ‘H&O generation’ and the latter an ‘S&E generation’.

So, contrary to all prior views on this confusing matter of our generations, we now know that the broad and endless struggle in our world between selfish and unselfish people is at root a generational conflict.

This explains why, in judgment at least, children are often more like their grandparents than their parents. Consider in example people born in the H&O Cancer generation of 1913-38, which some call ‘the great generation’. Most of their parents were born in the S&E Gemini generation of 1883-1913, and so were egoists or nihilists with no comion. Perhaps some of those S&E parents were otherwise well-balanced people who emotionally or culturally felt a sense of duty to their children, but still they seldom put their children’s interests first, and many used their children for selfish ends or even treated them cruelly.

Though I’ve confirmed this fact only in individual cases that came to my attention, I am confident that statistical studies of children who were significantly abused by their parents, stepparents, foster parents, older relatives, guardians, state or local officials, teachers, or other adults with some control over them will correlate highly just as my theory indicates. That is, though there are people in every generation who are sick or who act wrongly for other reasons, abused children will be far more numerous when the adults controlling

them were born in a selfish S&E generation. Such children are likely to have been victims of some forms of abuse, neglect, punishment, or deprivation for as long as that control prevailed. Though there are exceptions near the borders of a generation, the most likely situations are that H&O children were controlled by comionless S&E adults, and that S&E children were controlled by comionate H&O adults. Not surprisingly, then, selfish children are more likely be ‘spoiled’ by their parents or guardians than unselfish children.

Speaking both generally and from personal experience, H&O children of the 25year Cancer generation (1913-38) who had S&E parents of the 30-year Gemini generation (1883-1913) probably disliked their parents or guardians and so may have left their home scene whenever possible; perhaps to visit their grandparents or elderly neighbors who were comionate H&O people of the 31-year Taurus generation (1851-83). And since their own children were probably born in the next S&E generation, the 19-year Leo generation (1938-57), they may have been disappointed to see in them the same selfishness that their parents had. But Pluto’s sign-periods were shortening then, so those born within ten years or so before 1938, as I was, may not have had children until after mid-1957, as I did, and these unselfish H&O children of the 15-year Virgo generation (1957-72) were probably fonder of their H&O parents than their S&E grandparents.

It should be clear even from these few comments that psychologic and social analysts could benefit greatly by studying the generational facts defined here, for they bring into question most of our traditional assumptions about families. These include the foolish expectation that all children must love and honor their parents and grandparents or vice versa—as well as every academic study of sibling and child-parent relationships and every biography or psychobiography ever written that discusses its subject’s family relations from the false perspective of psychic determinism. There are always exceptions to the rule, since people aren’t governed solely by their judgment and may have other characteristics or traits that alter the degree of their selfishness or unselfishness. Still, this is a major new factor in the analysis of families and other transgenerational personal or political relationships that we must no longer ignore.³⁸

This generational fact is also very important in considering world events and political relationships, because we are all negatively affected when an S&E generation reaches the age when it controls most functions in a society. Selfish politicians and judges are always a danger, but so are the selfish professionals, doctors and nurses, teachers, bankers, bureaucrats, police, employers, clerics, merchants, and other service people that we must deal with routinely. It was the S&E ‘baby boomers’ in Congress, the courts, and the presidency as well as those in the banking and investment industries whose greed gave us the unnecessary second war in Iraq and the predictable 2008 economic crash and governmental crises, and their selfishness is still harming us today. Life is more difficult for everyone when comionless egoists and nihilists of an S&E generation are the majority of adults, and things are especially difficult in such times for children, the sick, and the elderly, all of whom need comion and continuous help.

The twelve sign-periods of Pluto’s cycle vary widely in length because while Pluto is usually beyond Neptune’s orbit, it crosses that nearly circular orbit and travels inside it for about a fourth of its own highly elliptical orbit. This fact, that Pluto is not always the farthest planet from the sun, explains why its sign periods in recent years—as they are in or near the last quadrant of every psychologic era listed in Appendix C—are short periods of 12 to 14 years.

Note that we can’t give a single date for Pluto’s entry into a sign because all astrological planets except the sun and moon go retrograde for a part of their cycle, which means that as seen from the earth they move backwards in the zodiacal signs. Appendix C lists all of Pluto’s sign transitions from 587 bce to 2254, but the dates given are only for its first ingress into a new sign. It later retrogrades back into the prior sign, goes forward again into the new sign, and may go back and forth yet again. This means that its sign transitions are uncertain for many months or even a year around the first-ingress date. Only Pluto’s exact longitude and the anticipation rules in Appendix A can tell us its correct charge for any date within a year or so of the first-ingress date.

For quick historical reference, here are Pluto’s sign transits from 1724 to 2043, with the first-ingress date rounded to the nearest January 1st. The destructive, war-mongering, and comionless S&E generations are 1725-37, 1749-62, 1777-97, 1822-51, 1883-1913, 1938-57, 1972-84, 1995-2008, and 2023-43, and the constructive, peace-loving, and comionate H&O generations are 173749, 1762-77, 1797-1822, 1851-83, 1913-38, 1957-72, 1984-95, and 2008-23. The new era began on January 25, 2008.

All the events of those periods, including the people born during them, have the character of their time. A full history of our current epoch proves this, but it should suffice here to mention four of the harmful S&E generations whose effects in history are probably well known to us all. The first two are the short Libra and Sagittarius generations near the end of the classic era (1725-37 and 1749-62 respectively) that gave us most of the men who, in the 1780s, wrote or worked to ratify the elitist US Constitution. The third is the Gemini generation of mid-1882 to late-1912, which I refer to descriptively as the fascist generation because its chief political contribution was the establishment across the world of many rightist—that is, fascist, theocratic, or Marxist—dictatorships. And the fourth is the nineteen-year Leo generation of mid-1938 to mid-1957, which I refer to as the baby-boom generation even though my dates for it are earlier than those of the world-population model that proposed a period of similar length from 1946 to 1964 that is psychologically worthless.

Let’s start with the Leo baby boomers, noting first that Pluto causes different kinds of changes as it transits each projective or assimilative sign, and then that astrologers have long associated both the sign Leo () and the planet Mars () —which the Cycle regards as the true ruler of Leo—with (among other things) egoism, combativeness, and sexual fervor. And a sure effect of Pluto, which corresponds to the All in the Cycle, is expansion. Therefore, when Pluto is in Leo (where it functions worst because Leo is the sign ruled by its polar opposite Mars) we can expect sexual excesses and a population surge, as well as wars, rapes, plagues, and other global conflicts, diseases, or disasters that affect masses of people if not all of humanity.

Even if you weren’t alive in the politically explosive 1960s, you probably know that the young selfists and elitists born in the Leo generation, in spite of the good advice of their unselfish parents and teachers of the H&O Cancer generation, made many bad judgments then. Well, they continued doing that later as adults when they ruled most of our nations, corporations, and institutions. Indeed, we are still suffering today from their very bad judgment as leaders and from the lingering effects of all the harmful events that occurred when they were born; that is, when Pluto transited through Leo.

Among the terrible but predictable events during that transit of Leo (1938-57) were World War II, insane genocide across the globe, food and other shortages, rationing, the cruel use of atomic bombs, the Cold War, extreme overpopulation, the Korean War, Republican McCarthyism, the sharp decline in the quality of every form of music and art, the increase in idiotic plays, movies, television shows, and advertising, the herpes, aids, and narcotics epidemics, and the plagues of breast, prostate, and other cancers that suspiciously coincided with the invention of plastics, pesticides, other chemicals, and radioactive materials. Though there were some positive events then also, such as the development of modern heart () surgery (), this was not a good time to live in. Nor, as baby boomers like Bush II, Cheney, Blair, Netanyahu, and Putin have proven to us since, was it a good time in which to be born.

So to study the causes of human events in any period properly, we must consider at least two generations: the one that includes the events we are analyzing and the one in which the ruling adults of that period were born. For instance, to understand the true causes of the dreadful events that occurred with Pluto’s transit through Leo (1938-57), we must realize that most of the people who were ruling the world then had bad judgment simply because they were born in the fascist generation, or during Pluto’s 30-year transit of Gemini (1883-1913). And then, as Pluto moved through Cancer (1913-38), people of that S&E Gemini generation also caused or ed World War I, the Russian revolution, the Roaring Twenties, financial swindles, organized crime, rampant murders, the Great Depression, and the theories of dictatorial rule proposed by the fascist Gentile, the Marxist Lenin, and others.

We should also note the judgmental similarities in people of alternate generations. For example, in being selfish with no comion or sound judgment, the elitist Bush II of the Leo baby-boom generation was like the elitists Hitler and Mao of the Gemini fascist generation. All three were nihilists who flouted their prejudices and amorality, continually lied to their people, opposed individual rights, and invaded other nations just because they wanted to.

Though the Nazi party of the thirties and forties was ruled by people of the S&E Gemini generation, Germans born before or after that, in the H&O Taurus or Cancer generations, were not such selfish beasts. They can no more be blamed for being ruled by the fascist majority in their state than old and young people today can be blamed for the crimes of their leaders of the judgmentally impaired baby boom majority, a large group that as this is written consists of all people who are about 57 to 76 years old.

Further evidence for my hypothesis here is that, in all our history, rulers born in an S&E generation have never produced a sane and moral government or tried to preserve life and maintain peace and prosperity! This is a shocking fact of human history, and yet it has been totally ignored by our historians, scientists, intellectuals, and political leaders, none of whom saw this truth because they were locked into our traditional way of thinking, which never had a sound notion of why and how our generations differed.

In 2004, the final nine Democratic candidates for US President were baby boomers, and hence selfists or elitists. But since most voters then were of that same generation, it was impractical for the Democratic Party to offer unselfish candidates against the elitist Bush II and the selfist Cheney, so it nominated the selfists Kerry and Edwards. S&E voters won’t tolerate the comionate message of H&O candidates because they actually want an immoral government that will make the rich richer, oppress the poor, wage wars, rape the environment, suppress dissent, privacy, and individual liberties, and impose the fictions and political agenda of business or religious corporations on everyone.

And though the number of Leo baby-boomers has diminished since Reagan was elected president in 1980 (when they were 23 to 42 years old), they were still a significant factor in the 2008, 2010, and 2012 elections, and they will continue to be an influential minority at least until 2020, when they will be 63 to 82 years old. In any case, since they are no longer the largest age group, the political influence of their Tea Party and their other selfish, extremist, and terrorist groups in the world is rapidly declining.

In the 2008 election, twelve of the initial fifteen presidential candidates of both parties were Leo baby boomers who should have been rejected merely for being selfists or elitists. Some of those candidates have strong will systems that give them good intentions, but their impaired judgment defeats those intentions. Hillary Clinton ( B R B + R ), for instance, is not unlike Bush II ( R + + R R ) in that both are elitist power conservatives who conspire against the people for their opposed wealthy cliques. The chief political difference between them is that she is 60% leftist while he is 60% rightist. And if she wins the Democratic nomination for President in 2016, it will be mainly because, as an elitist, she can raise more money from private interests than any of her opponents.

Rejecting that S&E dozen in 2008, all of whom were rightists in perspective, left us with only three candidates to choose from: the otherist McCain ( – B – B R ) and the humanist Ron Paul ( – – – – B ) from the H&O Cancer generation, and the humanist Obama ( R + – – B ) from the H&O Virgo generation. But the ProLib Paul had to be rejected for his inconsistent ideology that, following his selfist guru Ayn Rand ( + B R R + ), distorts what individualism means; the ConLibPro McCain for the conflicted political perspective that makes him a confused maverick and (absurdly) a war-mongering moralist; and both for ing the Republican Party, which has opposed liberty, equal rights for all, humanism, and genuine democracy since Lincoln’s death, after which it was dominated by leaders of one or another selfish generation.

So our theory showed Obama to be the best choice available in that undistinguished field, which says something positive about him but more about

the corrupt process by which candidates are offered to us by those two private corporations that we call ‘political parties’. Many leftists ed Obama because sensible people must always oppose the ideologically vacuous, uncaring, dictatorial, and extremist Republican Party, but the more-perceptive leftists that I know saw his limitations all along. We knew from the start that, like all the other candidates, he too wouldn’t try to change the elitist US Constitution that imposes corrupt federal and state governments on the people and legalizes an inequitable distribution of wealth, resources, and essential human services.

And I knew from my psychologic theory that as a 60% rightist—meaning one who is weak (– or R) in three of his five systems—he would vacillate, rightist candidates and policies, fail to negotiate from strength at home and abroad, harm the poor to benefit the rich, deprive all individuals of their privacy, defensive weapons, and other inalienable rights, and be fundamentally unreliable in defending the people’s interests. And his making a public show of his religiosity was evidence of those rightist weaknesses, as was his meek subservience to Wall Street and to the global banking and war industries.

On the positive side, though, he is an altruist and humanist with empathy and comion, so he did some things that were helpful. And he was the only 2008 candidate who saw that his generation doesn’t have the bad judgment of the baby-boom generation that gave us Bush II, both Clintons, and the corporate and congressional leaders who worked to defeat any progressive program that he tried to achieve. But he didn’t know this well enough to avoid appointing the fourth straight baby boomer to the Supreme Court. Though his second appointment to that court was an otherist and not an elitist, both women are 80% rightists who won’t leftist (individualist) policies. He promised his istration would introduce new ideas, but with his three rightist systems, he is incapable of doing that himself. He is a mediator, not a creator, and he has no theory of government except the corrupt one he learned in school, which is why his presidency is ruled by the same kind of opportunists who have controlled nearly all previous istrations. In short, he takes great pains not to make any fundamental change in our corrupt nation or its elitist constitution.

Table 16 of Appendix B, entitled Nazis of WWII, provides a striking confirmation of my hypothesis on our generations. That table, which is based on correctly timed birth data provided by the French psychologists Michel and Françoise Gauquelin, shows that 96% of the major Nazi leaders of World War II were selfists or elitists, as these are defined here. Of the seventy-three names there, only three (Frick, Keppler, and Krupp) were not born in the fascist Gemini generation.

The humanists Franklin Roosevelt ( – B R B B ) and Churchill ( B R + B + ) were also born before the fascist generation, but most other Allied leaders in WWII were born during it. This includes the selfists Eisenhower ( R + + R + ) and de Gaulle ( R + + + + ) and the elitists Patton ( – + – R R ) and Truman ( B B – + – ). Truman was probably the worst, because he didn’t have to drop atomic bombs on Japanese civilians. Japan would have surrendered just as quickly if he had demonstrated the bomb in an unpopulated part of their nation. He used it not to end the already-won war with Japan, but only to terrorize the world with US power, at the expense of Asian people.

Since any table of recent world leaders would consist mostly of Leo baby boomers, it would be like Table 16’s list of Nazis. The main difference in these two S&E generations is not just about character, for both have displayed their impaired judgment; it’s that the baby boom generation spanned 19 years while the fascist generation was more deadly because it spanned 30 years.

Needless to say, Jews of the fascist generation were just as impaired in judgment as their Nazi oppressors were. This explains the elements of truth in the charges by some, such as Ben Hecht in his book Perfidy, that Zionist leaders knowingly betrayed all the Jews in Nazi Europe in their secret bargains with Eichmann and other Nazi leaders that allowed many wealthy Jews to escape the continent. We should also note that the State of Israel, declared such by the pathological Zionist Ben-Gurion ( R R R + + ) in 1948—which, like 1789 when the US Constitution was ratified, was a bad year for any birth—was founded entirely by selfish,

militaristic thinkers of the fascist generation.

But as always there were exceptions to this fascist insanity then, such as the conflicted elitists Oskar Schindler ( + B R + R ), whose story was told in the movie Schindler’s List, and Chiune Sugimara ( B + + R R ), a Japanese diplomat in Lithuania who was sent home in disgrace because he disobeyed orders by issuing visas that let some 6,000 Jews escape the Nazis. Note, however, that both those men had strong will and thought systems and more leftist psychologic systems than rightist ones—characteristics that incline anyone, even elitist conservatives, to be ruled more by universal principles than by the insanities of their time. So all that we can fairly say is that most people born in an S&E generation are selfish, dictatorial, and militaristic; the minority who are not will have other characteristics that give them some power to control their impaired judgment.

These truths about the selfish Gemini and Leo generations hold for every such generation that historians can accurately describe, as we see clearly from the two short generations that gave us the elitist US Constitution. These S&E generations, the 12-year Libra generation of 1725-37 and the 14-year Sagittarius generation of 1749-62—which sandwiched between them the 12-year H&O Scorpio generation of 1737-49 in which leftist humanists such as Paine, Hancock, Jefferson, Livingston, and Martin were born—produced the majority of older, established adults in the late 1780s when the US Constitution was conceived, written, and with some difficulty ratified, thanks mainly to the conspiratorial elitists Washington, Hamilton, and Madison.

To this claim, here is an excerpt from a fuller description of the adults of the 1780s that one highly respected historian assembled from many sources of that time. But for their temporal coloring, these words would apply as well to our baby-boomers today and to any other S&E generation in history:

By 1780 Patrick Henry “feared that our Body politic was dangerously sick.” The

signs of disease spread everywhere. Merchants and farmers were seeking their own selfish ends; hucksters were engrossing products to raise prices. Even government officials, it was charged, were using public positions to fill their own pockets. The fluctuation in the value of money was making “every kind of commerce and trade precarious” . . . and was putting a on selfishness. Everyone was doing “what was right in his own eyes,” and “thus the whole of that care and attention which was given to the public weal is turned to private gain or self preservation.” That benevolence among the people had not grown as a result of the Revolution was measured in the frightening increase in litigation… . Vices now seemed more prevalent than before the war. Virtue was being debased by “the visible declension of religion, . . . the rapid progress of licentious manners, and open profanity.” Such symptoms of degeneracy threw the clergy especially into confusion. Instead of bringing about the moral reformation they had anticipated from victory, the Revolution had only aggravated America’s corruption and sin. The Americans, they said in sermon after sermon throughout the eighties, could only be an ill-tempered and unrighteous people, so soon forgetting the source of their deliverance from British tyranny.—Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776-1787, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1969), 416417.

Some Political Implications

These revelations about human generations should change our thinking on many personal and social issues. We can’t explore them all here, but I can illustrate the point with one very important issue; namely, how this new knowledge about human character will correct our conventional thinking on the issue of proper government.

Mainly from the example of the American Revolution, most people in the world today agree that the best form of government is a democracy. But what that term means to them is not always clear, since it has two conflicting senses. It can mean the fundamental principles of proper government that were stated by leftist thinkers before that revolution, or it can mean the type of electoral government that elitists, or selfish rightists, established after it. The term has been dichotomous in this way ever since that revolution because, as our dictionaries show, it refers to both a leftist and a rightist view.

In its leftist sense, one who refers to ‘democracy’ is speaking of at least two fundamental principles of government that were fixed in our minds by a few great leftists (individualists) in the first quadrant of the modern era; namely, that all humans are created equal and that each and every individual has, to the same measure, certain natural and inalienable individual rights. We know these principles from Jefferson’s world-famous statement in the US Declaration of Independence: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights… .”

These leftist principles weren’t new to the modern era, for they were written into various legal systems, though without including women or slaves, since the third century bce, and they were much discussed by Cicero (106-43 bce), who

influenced many intellectuals of the scholastic, classic, and modern eras on the issues of natural law and innate individual rights. Though the liberal Locke (1632-1704) is credited with inspiring the UK’s Bill of Rights of 1689, it was the views of the radical Hutcheson (1694-1746), the RadPro Paine (1737-1809), and the ProRad Mason (1725-92), that were echoed by the ProLib Jefferson in the Declaration. And shortly thereafter their views were needfully supplemented by those of the modern era’s first prominent feminist, the LibRad Mary Wollstonecraft (1759-97).

The fundamentality of those two ideas, which were given concreteness by a nearly impossible victory in a great revolution, made them the key political ideas of the entire modern era; ideas that made the modern era politically unique and certain to produce many further statements of individual rights that soon applied to all people, including women and slaves and sometimes children, such as the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights ( U D H R ) and its Convention on the Rights of the Child ( C RC ). Those efforts, though incomplete, were valuable, but many nations have still not ratified them. Muslim governments, which are ruled by rightist religious fictions and therefore cannot be democracies in the leftist sense, deny many of those individual rights by subordinating them to discriminatory Islamic laws, and even the US has shown its primitivity by refusing to ratify the CRC.

But let us be careful here, for when we mean the natural rights of all individuals in the world, we must say individual rights and not human rights. Why? Because ‘human rights’ is ambiguous, and so it is always used by rightists who deny natural law in order to the legal or ‘divine’ laws by which they rule their various collectives. By saying ‘human rights’ they can imply ‘individual rights’ while what they are in fact proposing is that leftist individualism and its natural law—which can only mean the pre-legal moral reasoning of all humans—should have no standing in our legal systems. What they hope to achieve with this linguistic device is to prevent our natural moral reasoning and common logic, over which they have no control, from determining any of our collectives’ laws. Law is their province, our elitists insist, not ours.

In spite of their efforts, though, these two natural-law notions remained vital throughout the modern era, and we are carrying them forward today in the new era as the most essential principles of any proper government. It only remains for the people of the new era to expand these universal humanist principals fully and to ensure that they are formally established and faithfully observed by every government in the world.

Our second basic understanding of the term democracy today is the pragmatic, or less fundamental, rightist sense. It refers solely to government structure; specifically, one where the only condition required to call a government a ‘democracy’ is that its principal leaders are chosen by a majority (or plurality) of eligible voters. Beyond this requirement, it is assumed that the rightists who establish any such ‘democracy’ are free to define, however they choose, its election rules, the eligibility of its voters, the laws and details of its government, and all of the duties and natural and civil rights of the individuals within its domain.

This second sense, the rightist sense, is what people mean when they speak of a ‘democracy’ in the context of structure. But our new understanding of human reasoning shows the flaw in this, which is that this premise and all the subsequent laws of such a state are just theoryless practical rules with no force of logic or morality behind them. Indeed, if we ask those who use the term in this sense what theory of democracy they embrace, they have to it that they’ve never had such a theory. There’s been much talk about ‘democracy’ since Western culture began in ancient Greece, but little discussion if any of what universal principle or principles will cause a state to be that.

The truth is that these majority-vote states are all pseudodemocracies, not genuine democracies. Each one is just a type of oligarchic tyranny (theocracy, plutocracy, or such) that is on the path to becoming an open dictatorship. And the oldest governments in the world, the UK and US, which claim to be models of ‘democracy’, are far along on that path to tyranny. Most leftists today agree that those two nations are plutocracies that no longer honor

their own Bills of Rights, let alone all of the other individual rights that a genuine democracy would protect over all other provisions of its constitution.

So, contrary to what we were taught in our rightist schools, the revolutions of the early modern era did not teach us how to make a democracy; they only taught our elitists how to make a pseudodemocracy; that is, a state that would appear to be serving all the people while it actually served the same selfish interests that were served by the classic-era monarchies they replaced. There’s a lesson here for leftists now, in the new era, and this is that we can only solve the grave problems that threaten our species’ survival today by discarding our modern-era pseudodemocracies just as the classic-era monarchies were discarded in the modern era, and by then establishing the first genuine democracy in history as a paradigm for all people now and hereafter.

To be clear on the chief distinction I am making here between a pseudodemocracy and a genuine democracy, both must have elections or they wouldn’t be a democracy of any kind, but a true democracy, drawing from our improved understanding of human nature, will impose severe but realistic restrictions on who can vote or run for public office in those elections. Thus the elections of a genuine democracy will be decided objectively and fairly, all people considered, but not by a majority of the voting-age public. If we’ve learned nothing else from the modern era, it is that we must have such restrictions because there is no other way to be certain that the essential leftist purpose of a true democracy—which is to protect the natural rights and liberties of all real individuals—cannot be subverted by selfish or intentionally evil people.

Of course, we can’t have this better government until some leftist thinker proposes a sound theory of genuine democracy. I’ll try to start this in my next work, but since I may not succeed, other leftists should also try to do it. The important point is that the time to do it is now, in the creative first quadrant of the new era, or else we’ll reach the end of this era in 2254 without having achieved it, in which case our descendants will have been the slaves or fodder of

the ultra-rich for yet another 247 years.

That said, we can see now how our alternately selfish and unselfish generations affect every pseudodemocracy that ever was or will be, and how we cannot have a genuine democracy unless we revise our traditional notion of proper elections.

First, because we have established that every second human generation consists entirely of innately selfish people, the modern-era assumption that a majorityvote system yields the best form of government, or even an acceptable one, is totally shattered. It was never sound for several reasons, including those offered by Madison, an elitist who distrusted democracy and feared the possibility of rule by an irrational majority, as did most political thinkers from the autocratic eras before him.

The modern era was the era of pseudodemocracies, and it proved to us many times over that the old majority-vote notion was always flawed. The rightist ‘democratic’ governments that it produced became, sooner rather than later, totalitarian states in which elections didn’t matter. But most people need more than historical evidence to see this; they also need to see its cause, or why every such state has to become a dictatorship, and this is shown to us by our new understanding of our generations.

That cause has two parts. The first is that, in alternating periods of twelve to thirty years, a pseudodemocracy (or majority-vote government) must give political power to selfish voters, and such a majority will always try to elect selfish rulers with bad judgment who want to have an immoral and thieving government, which is to say a tyranny. Its second part is that whatever those selfish elected rulers or their nonelected appointees do while they are in office cannot be easily undone later by the unselfish majority of the next generation when they take office.³

This is due to several things about these governments. Chief among these is the notion of a virtually permanent constitution that is not easily or regularly changed. Then there is the fact, which I explained earlier, that rightists always control the structuring of the governments we establish. Well, in doing this they take pains to ensure that great obstacles to any future progress by leftists are permanently enshrined in their constitution, which as rightists they hope will rule us forever. These obstacles to change, along with a small appointed ultimate court, were put in the US constitution by our elitist ‘founding fathers’ for that very purpose, and they are the two main ways that a pseudodemocracy limits the power of unselfish voters even when they are a majority. But our moral voters are chained to their society’s immoral past by other things also. For instance, they must deal with the old cultural or common-law precedents that pit everything else in their society against them, and then, when they do win election, they can hardly suggest changing the very laws that put them in power. And if they overcome those obstacles, most of the established institutions of their society—its political parties, businesses, religions, universities, media, and so on—are controlled by rightists who will fight any change they propose.

Rightists always control most of a society’s collectives. Why? Because they are collectivists and that’s what collectivists do; they make their purpose in life to preserve, manage, and fine-tune their existing collectives to suit their needs. Being other-dependent, they see this as an essential function of life, just as leftists see self-development as essential. In any case, the fact that most of a society’s collectives are controlled by rightists is an immense barrier to any society’s progress, and it only gets greater as time goes by.

So, short of some natural catastrophe, popular revolution, or universal strike that makes any governing impossible, a pseudodemocracy’s unselfish, or moral, people have little choice but to honor the selfish rulers and the corrupt laws and customs of the past. And when they do gain power, the selfish minority will point to the immoral precedents of the past and claim that these must be obeyed as if they were current laws.

So it isn’t enough that unselfish people can be elected to seats of power in such a state; to have morality in a pseudodemocracy, an unselfish generation must also have the power to eradicate all of its immoral laws and precedents from the past. But thanks to its elitist founders, its constitution will make this impossible. One reason why Jefferson proposed a constitutional convention every generation was to give the people this power to change the bad laws of the past. This won’t work in a pseudodemocracy as he proposed it, but it could work over a period longer than a generation—say, shortly after the beginning of the second and fourth quadrants of an era, when the unselfish people of the first and third quadrants will probably outnumber the selfish people. This is explained by Appendix C, which shows that an era’s first and third quadrants have two unselfish (H&O) generations and one selfish (S&E) generation, while its second and fourth quadrants have the opposite imbalance.

Today, a few years into the new era, our population is weighted in favor of the last three selfish generations of the modern era, which, starting with the 19-year Leo (or baby boom) generation, have given us an immoral majority for decades now. But it will soon change, as the old Leo generation diminishes further and the first generation of the new era, the H&O Capricorn generation (2008-23), reaches maturity. Humanity’s most important theoretical advances in all areas always occur in the first quadrant of an era because Pluto’s effects in that quadrant—when it es through what my theory holds are certainly the zodiac’s first three signs (Capricorn, Aquarius, and Pisces)—force us to attend more fully than we do at other times to our will, our long-range motives, and our universal principles.

We are fools if we continue to allow a majority with bad judgment to rule us. But it’s not easy to do otherwise when we live in a pseudodemocracy, where we have only three reasonable ways to avoid selfish rulers and their destructive laws.

Our first option, which we can now do more objectively than we could before, is to refuse to vote for any candidate who was born in an S&E generation or who serves a political party (such as the Republican or Libertarian parties) that

s selfishness ideologically. Our guiding rule here, then, is never vote for a selfist or elitist. This can improve things significantly, except when there are just too many selfish people voting.

Our second option is to disobey any corrupt laws or precedents that a selfish majority or court imposes on us. We call this ‘civil disobedience’, but it’s a higher duty than that, for we now know that all our past literature on proper governmental structure was nonsense just because our tertiary moral reasoning precedes any quaternary legal or political system ever devised, and that this fact logically requires us to disobey all immoral laws or commands on the grounds that they are de facto illegal. As the Cycle shows us clearly, morality implies legality and the converse is not true. Therefore, a government that is not moral is not truly legal, and no number of constitutional lawyers can prove otherwise. They may start talking from their written law, but that’s not the beginning of anyone’s reasoning about law.

The third option is our new-era purpose and ultimate goal; namely, to replace the elitist constitution of our nation with a moral one and thus discard our pseudodemocracy and institute a genuine democracy in its place. This will be difficult, of course, but it’s the only way we can achieve a true democracy. For many decades now well-intentioned leftists have proposed various practical steps that could improve our government, but all of their suggestions missed the mark because they presumed our present corrupt constitution or sought only minor reforms to it. Either because they stopped discussing political theory many decades ago or because they fear the rightist majority that has been in control for so long now, they don’t tell us that what we must do is trash our elitist constitution and put a humanist one in its place. That, and not minor reforms, is how we must measure our political progress from now on. And if we really want to make a better world across the globe, nothing will achieve this except the example of our making our own government a genuine democracy. Doing this is not as impossible as it seems now, for in another decade or so leftists will be in the majority, and we’ll just have to convince them not to desert the leftist campaign as they have done so often in the past, for according to my understanding of our psychologic eras, our next chance to make fundamental changes probably won’t come for another 240 years.

To define a true democracy, we must begin critically by itting that all of our old notions of a democratic government were wrong. For instance, we should have known from experience that letting every adult have the right to vote and to hold office is harmful, because that has never given us a sane, moral, and just government. This is a fact of history that no rational person can deny. So is the fact that we must have a government, indeed several levels of government, to meet our common needs and to protect us all from the impositions of the immoral individuals, cliques, corporations, or nations that are more powerful than we are.

This imbalance of power is a fact of life, and it is immoral for anyone who has the greater power to use it to oppress weaker people. It follows that those anarchists or libertarians who propose no government or less government are in fact putting morality aside and proposing that there should be no governmental agencies to stop powerful people from oppressing less-powerful people in our societies. That’s what the whole Tea Party debate about ‘small government’ and the need to reduce deficits and taxes (and hence government itself) really means, and the proof of this is that unselfish people never them in those arguments. Their true goal is to cripple our government so that it can’t interfere with their thefts from poor or weak people in our society or elsewhere.

In writing a new constitution, we must first propose the priority of the two leftist principles mentioned above and all of the specific natural rights of individuals that have been validly proposed to date. Then we must address the problem that what we write in our laws is no guarantee that our officials will observe them. So our next step in outlining a new governmental structure must be to ensure that anyone who is to have a direct or indirect role in governing our democracy is a sane and just person.

Interestingly, our new understanding of people s the claim of elitists over the ages who said that democracy cannot work because the public at large isn’t fit to rule us. But we would put this differently by saying that the majority of

people are psychologically impaired in significant ways, and that we cannot allow such people to control our collective power, especially since that power is now so vast that its misuse is a threat to our planet and to our survival as a species. Should we elect another Hitler, Nixon, Bush II, or Putin? If not, then how do we avoid giving our collective power to such sick people? Obviously not with the same old ideas on elections that we have always had.

We should start by barring anyone from voting or holding public office if they are under the age (currently thought to be twenty-four or twenty-five) that neurologists agree is required for the full development of a normal person’s brain. More important than this, though, we must prohibit all selfists and elitists from holding public office and voting in public elections. If this rule had been in effect in in the thirties, the Nazi party could never have achieved power by legal means; instead, they would have been branded as outlaws as soon as they tried to seize power. This restriction won’t create an imbalance between leftists and rightists, for rightists (conservatives and liberals) can vote and rule if they are otherists and not elitists, and leftists (progressives and radicals) can do so if they are humanists and not selfists.

In other words, since people with impaired judgment cannot lead us wisely or morally, they must not be allowed to lead us at all, or even to choose the people who do lead us. This policy won’t guarantee that we’ll have a perfect government, but it will at least prevent our giving power to innately immoral rulers or voters. Selfists and elitists will criticize it as discriminatory, which it is in their case but must be. They will also say that it is impractical because it may not always be feasible to deny an entire generation certain roles in government, but there are ways to handle this problem that don’t require us to turn over control of our collective power to people who can’t judge well and won’t judge fairly. This provision doesn’t harm our selfists and elitists; it merely limits them to working in the private sector or in non-elective public positions as consultants to unselfish leaders, whose more sensible rule will benefit all of us.

In addition to these restrictions on age and innate bad judgment, we must deny a

role in government to pathological people with three or more reversals. These three restrictions, I think, should solve the larger part of the problem of how to avoid establishing unfair or insane governments such as we have always had. Moreover, they are all determined by totally objective means. As with determining someone’s age, which we do now to restrict voting and eligibility for office, there is no subjective or partisan element involved.

I think I’ve said enough now to make my point above, which was that our new knowledge of human nature will have profound effects on our practical political reasoning. All that I’m trying to do with these proposals, as promised, is to let our knowledge of human nature define our government, for our long history of doing the opposite, of letting our government define our nature, has never given us a just and sane society.

Political theorists have long argued that a democracy can only work if the best people rule, but these were just empty words so long as no one understood human nature well enough to show us how to identify the best and worst, and the most moral and least moral, people among us. Well, we have this understanding now; perhaps not perfectly, but with sufficient logic and empirical verification to start acting on it.

As an individualist and humanist, I believe that the highest purpose of a state, or of any other collective formed by the free consent of all the parties involved, is to protect all of its real individuals from harm and from impositions by any other persons, collectives, or nations. This, and not the legal right to vote or to hold public office, is what a moral, and hence truly legal, government will always guarantee its citizens.

Chapter 8. Applying the Theory

About the Tables

I included the sixteen tables in Appendix B mainly to show how the Impulse Pattern reveals the character of the individuals listed, for this is empirical proof of the Impulse Pattern and my psychologic theory in general. But beyond this, listing these people in appropriate classes and summing each table’s data sometimes yields interesting conclusions about the class as a whole. So here, to illustrate both those purposes, I’ll discuss a few prominent individuals listed and some general issues and conclusions that follow from the data of some of the tables.

Table 1. US Presidents

Since this table is complete, its typical pattern, ( – – + R R ) or ( – – – R R ), tells us something about the class as a whole. Our typical president to date is a ConLib male who is manipulable and 80% or 100% rightist. He is weak in will and thought, and so allows others to direct his purposes, plans, and opinions. These weak areas, along with his two reversals, tell us that he has never really matured. As an elitist, he is a born conspirator; as a power conservative, he is socially intolerant and politically irrational; and as a nihilist in judgment, he is amoral and comionless.

This typical pattern over more than two centuries suggests that our voters can’t distinguish the best from the worst candidates, and that our elitist constitution works against our ever having a good president. But if we’re speaking of the persons rather than the presidents, the best were undoubtedly the eleven humanists listed in this first table. The other thirty-two were on balance not even decent men, and the worst of them, psychologically speaking, were the six with three reversals in their Impulse Pattern.

We’ll consider those pathological presidents below because it confirms our theory as regards the severity of this impairment and because rightist historians, biographers, and teachers have routinely misinformed us about these six men. My concern here, of course, is that this myth-making by our rightist academics could lead some readers to doubt my claim that the Impulse Pattern is an objective and reliable predictor of mentally healthy or sick people.

It is no accident that our theory’s general descriptions of the sanest people among us apply to those men who are widely considered to be our best presidents, such as the humanists Jefferson, Lincoln, and Franklin Roosevelt, while its descriptions of the sickest people among us apply to those who are

widely considered our worst presidents, such as the elitists Nixon and Bush II.

Jefferson

As you may recall, I defined the conflicted political perspectives in Appendix B. Well, an excellent example of the two-term conflict in perspective is the ProLib Jefferson ( + – – B B ), who equivocated on such major issues as slavery and the federalist-antifederalist dispute over the provisions and ratification of the US constitution.

As a 60% leftist and individualist, Jefferson had always opposed the “infamous practice” of slavery, but as a 40% rightist liberal, he profited from it throughout his life and blamed its continuation on providence or the political opposition of others. We must expect such hypocrisy from anyone, even a moralist like him, who has a conflicted left-right political perspective. Part of his conflict was that he was an other-dependent rightist liberal (–) in thought and a self-reliant leftist progressive (B) in judgment. This put his intellectual and moral parts in conflict, and his rightist thoughts, which were usually borrowed from his readings, at times overruled his innate good judgment.

Politically, his progressive views until age 33—when he wrote the Declaration of Independence, the key parts of which were borrowed from Hutcheson, Paine, and Mason—were discarded in his forties as regards the elitist Constitution of 1787. His liberal side dominated his reasoning then, so he was seeing true democracy and individual rights as less important than his own political status and property, including his slaves. He was suspiciously absent from the entire process of writing and ratifying the constitution, and later he gave no to the leftist antifederalists who rejected it because it lacked a bill of rights, even though he had always championed those inalienable rights. But he did write to Madison and Washington from Paris urging them to correct the omission of those rights from their new constitution, and to heed “the general voice from north to south, which calls for a bill of rights.”

This raises a major question that historians have never answered about him: Why did he accept Washington’s request to serve in Paris for those five crucial years in which, as he certainly knew, the fate of the revolution was to be decided in Philadelphia and later in the States’ ratifying conventions? Either he thought that accepting that commission would ensure the General’s future for his own career or he was duped into doing so by the conspiratorial elitists Hamilton, Washington, and his friend Madison, who later realized that the other two had also duped him. Given his brilliance, I doubt the latter option, so it’s reasonable to assume instead that he struck a deal with Washington on this, one that required him to absent himself in Paris for as long as it took to write and ratify the constitution, and that required Washington in turn to his candidacy for president after John Adams had served. (Washington considered Adams too unpredictable to be involved in drafting the constitution, so he sent him away then also, to London.)

Jefferson returned from Paris in September 1789 after the constitution had been ratified, and he didn’t openly the antifederalists on individual rights even then. Instead, he publicly echoed Madison who said that we can’t win all the rights that we want, so we must be satisfied with “half the loaf”—though what the elitist Madison ( B R R R – ) wrote in the final Bill of Rights was far less than all of the individual rights that a genuine democracy would protect. In fact, his ten articles were based on, but were an emasculation of, the articles of the Virginia Declaration of Rights that was proposed and written by the ProRad George Mason ( – B + + B ) who was Governor of Virginia then. Significantly, that Declaration was ratified on June 12, 1776 by a state convention that Madison actively participated in and that Jefferson, who was in Philadelphia working on the Declaration of Independence, followed closely by post.

But Jefferson’s conflict led him to vacillate in favor of his leftism also. For instance, when he was Vice-President and had no role in the Federalist istration of Adams I—which was long ruled from New York by Hamilton through his cohorts in Adams’ cabinet—he anonymously opposed the Federalists’ Alien and Sedition Acts and defended states’ rights as against the arbitrary powers assumed by the federal government with those acts. And in 1816, eight years after his presidency, his progressivism resurfaced strongly and

he defended local governments against centralized federal or State rule— pointedly saying that the wards or townships of America “have proved themselves the wisest inventions ever devised by the wit of man for the perfect exercise of self-government.”

So, just as our theory would have predicted of him at his birth, Jefferson was at times a leftist and at times a rightist. Though his 60% leftism was dominant, his liberal (–) impulses in thought and feeling gave him a tendency to plagiarism and opportunism, hypocrisy on slavery, and a thirst for wealth, sensual pleasures, and tangible possessions. Though he accepted the need for a strongly centralized government in his rise to the presidency, he had the good judgment to oppose it when he was free to do so earlier and then later in his life. As president, we also see his left-right conflict in his Louisiana Purchase, for as a liberal he more than doubled the nation’s territory for a small price, and as a moralist and progressive he did so without war.

The Pathological Conservative Presidents

We’ve had six presidents who were pathological because they had three reversed systems. Their shared characteristics because of this include being rightists, opponents of democracy, champions of the rich, and easily manipulated through their reversals. Four of them are elitists and two are otherists, and though all are conservatives in perspective, in power four are conservatives and two are liberals. I will ignore Garfield ( – + R R R ) here, for he served for only six months and was not otherwise noteworthy, not even to academics.

Madison

Reflecting his manipulability, the LibCon Madison ( B R R R – ) was a different person at different periods of his life, depending on who was directing him at the time. I mentioned the chief instance of this earlier, which was that he gullibly conspired with his fellow elitists Hamilton and Washington to produce an elitist constitution, and then he ed Hamilton in the campaign to ratify that document by writing many of the specious newspaper articles known collectively as The Federalist. But shortly after that, aided by his strength in will and his considerable intelligence, he changed, for in 1789, when the new constitution was already in force, he broke with Hamilton, Washington, and their federalist (centralist, rightist) policies and thereafter followed the lead of the humanist Jefferson, his friend and neighbor who had just returned from five years of diplomatic service in Paris. This change, along with the later ones that followed his successful marriage and presidency, show that, unlike the others in this impaired group, he did eventually mature.

Nixon

The LibCon Nixon ( R R – R – ) was a typical elitist liberal, for throughout his political life he conspired with a clique of wealthy friends and opposed the people’s interests at every turn. He resigned as president to avoid impeachment, but only after privately ensuring that his vice-president, Ford, would on becoming president pardon him fully for his crimes. The Watergate fiasco shocked his ers, but not his opponents, who felt that he hadn’t lived an honest day in his life. He first achieved national prominence as a lying, overly zealous prosecutor in the anti-communist witch hunts of the narcissistic elitist liberal McCarthy ( + – R + – ). During his presidency the leftist press published part of a letter written in his behalf by his first vice-president, Agnew, which revealed that he, Nixon, had hired the Rand Corporation to devise a strategy by which he could suspend the Bill of Rights and thus establish an imperial presidency that could ignore all individual rights. Your natural rights are always at stake when you have a rightist government. If you weren’t here to witness Nixon’s rise and reign, you need only imagine someone who, though shrewder, was as deranged as Bush II.

Bush II

We all know the ConRad, elitist, and 100% extremist Bush II ( R + + R R ) well, for he recently plagued us all with his illogic, Jesus-based mysticism, warmongering, international and domestic terrorist acts, opposition to democracy and individual rights, incredibly bad istration and court appointments, stubbornness, dimwittedness, cruelty, and for unrestricted thefts from the people by the superrich and their corporations. And in retirement he still has no logic, comion, or sense of shame. Knowing this, that he was always a devoted servant of Big Oil, that some of his closest advisors had worked for Nixon, and that our intelligence network in 2001 could not possibly have been as incompetent as his story on the September 11, 2001 attacks asks us to believe, it is quite logical to suspect that he and his elitist cohorts were advised of this attack in advance and deliberately did nothing to prevent it.

As the Rand Corporation probably told Nixon, and as Rand or any other thinktank would have told Bush II, only a severe terrorist attack would allow him and his elitist conspirators to suspend the Bill of Rights, which he did with his socalled ‘Patriot Act’. That his Attorney General John Ashcroft ( B + R R R ), also a conspiratorial elitist and pathological conservative, had the full text of that act in his hands at a press conference on September 12th proves that this complex bill was written well before September 11th, no doubt because he and Bush knew they would have occasion to use it. It’s even possible that its first draft was written three decades earlier, in Nixon’s time. But Bush and his selfist VicePresident Cheney ( – B – + B ) had to find the idea of a terrorist attack in the US attractive for another reason: because it would create the atmosphere of crisis that they needed to drag us into the unnecessary war against Iraq that, as Bush announced at his first Cabinet meeting in January 2001, he was determined to wage at any cost.

T. Roosevelt and Wilson

But Nixon and Bush II may have learned something about presidential scheming from the two otherists in this pathological group, the conservatives Theodore Roosevelt ( B R R – R ) and Wilson ( R – R B R ). We might expect otherist presidents to be better than elitist presidents because their judgment and moral reasoning is superior, but it didn’t work that way with these men, mainly because both were pathological conservatives with a messiah complex. Though Roosevelt was an altruist and Wilson a moralist, they had multiple reversals that transformed their otherwise healthy moral sense into hubris and moral indignation, which explains their fierce tempers. Immorality is bad enough in egoists or nihilists, but it is also hypocrisy in confused altruists or moralists who rationalize their immoral acts on the grounds that they were trying to do the right thing for others.

Unfortunately, these two conservatives have been favorably described by rightist historians in spite of their serious psychologic impairments and the general knowledge of their critics at the time that they were both racists, militarists, opposed to democracy, oppressors of the people, and defenders of oligarchic rule by the superrich through powerful private corporations, including those that we call ‘the major political parties’.

T. Roosevelt

We can appreciate Teddy Roosevelt’s love of nature and need to withdraw from society because, as explained earlier, many conservatives, especially pathological ones, need some such escape from human society. Though many saw this as publicity mongering, we can also ire his work to establish more national parks, his minor campaigns against corruption, and his occasional acts of comion. But no praise at all is due for his militarism, his continual political scheming against the people, or the other manifestations of his messiah complex.

For instance, most historians credit him with breaking up Rockefeller’s Standard Oil monopoly, but in praising him for this and actions against other ‘trusts’ (the term then for big businesses), they fail to mention that he did this mainly to help his friend J. P. Morgan and other anti-Rockefeller monopolists, and that otherwise he was a stubborn defender of big business as against the people. Morgan was a co-founder of the anti-union industrial behemoth US Steel, which Roosevelt’s istrations protected rather than attacked; usually on the grounds that, unlike Standard Oil, it was a ‘good’ trust.

But Wilson was the more fanatic of the two, and it is informative to study him as a psychologic case. In fact, since his death he has been more frequently analyzed and written about by modern psychologists than any political leader except Adolf Hitler.

Wilson

The case against Wilson ( R – R B R ) is clear, and yet it is the opposite of what all rightist historians have written about him. For instance, they praised him for starting the League of Nations, but he should be criticized for this rightist attempt to impose on all the people of the world a centralized government that was, and that in the form of the United Nations still is, totally undemocratic. The more power we let our leaders cede to an elitist world government, the less power, or freedom, we retain for ourselves.

Wilson was an Anglophile who called the elitist British system “perfected party government.” He lied to the people ceaselessly, promising peace and reforms while enriching the trusts, forcibly suppressing honest populist movements in the western and southern states, establishing private party rule nationally and locally over every formerly democratic function of government, and continuing the program of his immediate Republican predecessors McKinley, Teddy Roosevelt, and Taft to establish in the southern states—for the first time ever since it was not there before, not even when slavery was legal—the segregation of the black and white races.

No less evil was his invention of false reasons for the US to enter World War I. Setting a precedent for all rightist presidents after him, he claimed that our participation in that European war was necessary to ‘save the world for democracy’. But that was a lie, for in his twisted mind, we had to enter that war simply to help Britain’s aristocrats defeat ’s aristocrats. He also intervened militarily to suppress popular revolutions against brutal dictators in Latin America, filled his cabinet with racist machine politicians from the South (who hadn’t had such federal power since before the Civil War), strengthened his national party, and instituted a broad reign of terror in the US.

To that end, he proposed and signed the Espionage Act of 1917 as amended by the Sedition Act of 1918, which was later upheld unanimously by the Supreme Court in Schenck v. United States (1919), which I discuss below. If you look up this and related cases online, you will see that Wilson’s attempts to laws that restrict all speech or actions that were critical of his government or his war were extreme and despicable.

Like any collectivist, especially a pathological conservative, Wilson had no respect for any law or constitutional amendment that was intended to protect individuals from their governments or the various corporations it sanctions. Even Madison, who wrote our ‘Bill of Rights’, did so reluctantly. In his campaign against all opposition to his Democratic Party, Wilson—who anticipated Hitler in this—created a vast network of official federal and local agencies and private vigilante groups, including boys clubs, that spied on, beat up, tarred and feathered, imprisoned, or murdered citizens for opposing his falsely justified intervention in Europe’s war, and even for refusing to buy the so-called ‘Liberty Bonds’. His Attorney General boasted in 1918 that never before in our history has this country been so thoroughly policed.

All this could have been prevented if the voters had understood Wilson’s true character in advance. Why didn’t they? Because neither they nor their scientists understood human nature. Not surprisingly, all the works about Wilson’s psychologic problems, including the one that Freud ( + – R B R ) co-authored,⁴ were just ex post facto studies written years after his death. Had any of those psychologists understood human nature as we do now, they would have known from the day of his birth that he should never have been given any responsibility for other people’s lives.

The disagreements in modern psychology over Wilson’s psychologic problems are shown in four articles of an interesting anthology on psychobiography.⁴¹ These articles can’t be fairly summarized here, but together they show that no modern psychologist can explain why Wilson, or anyone else for that matter, was innately pathological. They discuss how he was studied posthumously by

psychologists in the different technical proposed by Sigmund Freud, Alfred Adler, Harold Lasswell, Karen Horney, and other hypothesists in the field. And they argue over whose hypothesis applies best, over whether Wilson was a neurotic, compulsive, or aggressive type, and over what those mean and how they apply to his stunted childhood (he couldn’t read until he was nine), his father-fixation, and other facts of his youth.

The psychologists who contributed to this anthology all agree that his strong moral sense was somehow related to his incredible stubbornness, his refusal to consider others’ opinions, and his seeing anyone who criticized him, no matter how slightly, as a deadly enemy who was instantly rejected and ever after the object of his scorn and derisive outbursts, but they don’t explain why. And yet that behavior, plus an inflated sense of personal worth, is exactly what my psychologic theory says is true of anyone who is born with the messiah complex as I have defined it.

Though those psychologists tried to find the causes of Wilson’s apparent failures and impairments, they couldn’t prove any cause they proposed, and their various descriptions of compulsive or neurotic types all fail to explain why some people are this way while others aren’t. And even if they had realized that their descriptions applied to other presidents also (like Teddy Roosevelt, Nixon, and Bush II), they can’t tell us why this is so, as my theory does. For one thing, they can’t explain why Wilson was compulsively moralistic while Bush II, who could also be described by them as ‘compulsive’ or ‘neurotic’, never gave a damn about any moral issue. They don’t know this because they have no theory that defines what causes one to be a moralist, egoist, altruist, or nihilist.

One of those authors proposed that Horney’s work applied well to Wilson; especially her now-popular hypothesis that neurotic individuals are continuously at war with themselves because they fabricate an “idealized self” which contradicts and then battles with their true or “empirical self,” which they inwardly despise, and have probably done so since childhood. This descriptive hypothesis makes sense as far as it goes, but it overlooks an important fact

proposed in my theory, which is that in our judgment system (which is the home of our perfectionism and synthetic fabrications) we all create an idealized self in opposition to our true self. But if we all do this in our third-quadrant tertiary reasoning naturally and necessarily, then it is a truism and so it cannot be a criterion for deciding that anyone is, say, ‘neurotic’ as opposed to normal.

Modern psychologists have no sensible answers to such questions. They are forced to use merely descriptive like ‘compulsive’ or ‘neurotic’ because they’ve never had a full, empirically verified psychologic theory like the Consideration Cycle that identifies the causes of our innate psychologic impairments.

The psychologists who followed Jung’s ( B R – B + ) lead by studying astrology were on the right track, but they ed him in his thought reversal and confused things further. That is, they failed to see what I saw soon after I started studying astrology; namely, that astrology can’t help psychologists until they have given their science a sound and complete theory, rather than the set of logically unconnected hypotheses that has guided it from the beginning. And psychology must be set right theoretically before astrology can be. It can’t be done the other way around, but that’s what Jung’s thought reversal led him to conclude. In assuming that ancient astrology and symbology could give him clues on how our psychologic functioned, he put the cart before the horse. But it should be obvious to all that the elements of astrology can have no meaning until we give them meanings from a prior theory of all human reasoning.

Table 2. US Supreme Court

This table lists the 55 justices of the Supreme Court appointed since 1900. It is extracted from my larger table of all 112 justices in history, which I made to analyze the character of those who were on the courts that made the worst and the best decisions in history. The number column starts with 58 because it shows the order in which each justice took office. This table is useful for evaluating specific decisions by the court, and I will make the full table available to readers on request. Look in the table for the justices who made a decision you want to analyze, and you’ll see it is often one that was predictable from their Impulse Patterns.

But this isn’t always a clear-cut issue of justices being leftists or rightists, conflicted or unconflicted, or selfish or unselfish. It seems to be a leftist-rightist matter in Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857), where every justice on the court was a rightist, even the two who didn’t the majority. Leftists consider this one of the worst decisions the Court ever made, but it was literally correct because it was fully consistent with the original racist constitution that we had before the Civil War.

A far more illogical decision was Schenck v. United States (1919), which upheld Wilson’s Espionage Act of 1917 that curtailed free speech, in this case speech against the extremist federal government that needlessly involved us in WWI. In writing the court’s unanimous opinion, Justice Holmes ( R B B R R ), yet another elitist and pathological conservative, said that our freedom of speech doesn’t give us the right to cause panic by shouting “Fire!” in a crowded theatre. But this was a specious argument because it proposes a false general rule, one that even Holmes retreated from in his later decisions. The true issue here isn’t whether a “clear and present danger” exists or an unlawful act of civil disobedience is encouraged; it is whether or not what has been said is true and moral. That is, is there a fire in the theatre, and has that speech wrongfully

harmed any real person, as distinct from an artificial collective such as a government?

It has long been established that we must be free to speak the truth about the policies of our government or other artificial collectives, or to offer our personal opinion on the truth if it hasn’t been proven by either side. How else can we the people oppose the power of strong collectives that preach untruths? Or are they, in the face of human reason, to be allowed to put their fabricated untruths on a par with our certain truths? In this case, the socialist Schenk distributed a pamphlet that truthfully said that Wilson’s war was unjust and that conscription in any war, especially a contrived and unnecessary one like his, constitutes involuntary servitude, which is prohibited by Lincoln’s Amendment 13.

Moreover, since we now know that morality precedes legality in human logic, advising others to disobey an immoral law is always right, and so it should be legal in any state that purports to be moral. Like our laws, our speech and public protests can be moral or immoral, and a government in its protective function has a right, in fact a duty, to prohibit the seriously immoral ones. But what it never has, logically speaking, is the right to declare itself the sole arbiter of moral issues. In this same way, it is our innate sense of morality—that is, our refusal to harm real people or to cause other negative consequences—that determines our daily judgments on what speech is or is not culturally appropriate or ‘in good taste’.

But as I see it, the worst decision of all was Bush v. Gore (2000), which was decided not by any valid constitutional or juridic reasoning or even by the justices’ characters, but only by the party affiliation of the deciding majority. Those five Republican justices decided against states’ rights, which they had long claimed to , solely to back their party and to put Bush II, the loser of the popular-vote, in office. Thus, their blind allegiance to the elitist Republican Party overcame both their juridic training and their previously stated ‘principles’—including the right of a state under the federal constitution to decide its own electoral procedures, which incidentally they have since

reasserted.

Of course, we occasionally do have leftist courts. For instance, there were six leftist justices on the Warren Court, which favored individual rights in landmark cases such as Gideon v. Wainright (1963), Griswald v. Connecticut (1965) and Miranda v. Arizona (1966). In Miranda, the five-member majority included three rightists and two leftists, and Griswald, where the issues were personal privacy and the use of contraceptives, was decided by seven , five of whom were leftists. Though we can’t explain the court’s decisions without considering the legal and political issues involved, most of those decisions throughout its history have ed collectivism, anti-individualism, state and corporate power, selfishness, and elitism, and only rarely have they defended or expanded the rights of individuals. This is so because our constitution was written to ensure that the process for selecting justices would yield more rightist than leftist .

Confirming this original intent, of the court’s 112 justices, the rightists exceeded the leftists by 55% to 45%, which isn’t surprising because the presidents and senators who appointed them were typically rightist elitists ( . . . R R ) who didn’t know how to judge anyone’s character correctly. For instance, reflecting his 60% rightist Impulse Pattern, Obama’s two nominees are 80% rightists. But Bush II’s two appointees are 80% and 60% leftists, which means that their being manipulable selfists with bad judgment outweighed their innate leftism. The US Supreme Court is an abomination, as its recent Citizen’s United v. Federal Election Commission (2010) and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby (2014) decisions prove decisively, but it is exactly the elitist institution that it was designed to be. It could be greatly improved and it should be, as soon as possible.

Table 3. US Governmental Figures

This table lists a variety of people who held or hold some government office, so it has a balance of types with no significant class conclusions, except that 58% of them are selfists or elitists, the very people who care least about giving us a sane government.

Table 4. US Non-Governmental Political Figures

In this table we have noteworthy people of various types who participated in political activities without holding a major governmental office. Given the variety of people here, the summary is not significant, except for the fact that 78% of these activists have empathy or comion or both.

Table 5. US Revolutionary Figures

This is a short but significant list of American revolutionists. I tried to make it longer to strengthen its general conclusions, but I had to omit dozens of names because our academic references have inadequate birth data for the less-famous figures of that time. Most of those references show nothing but the year of birth and don’t mention the calendar used when the date is ambiguous.

By ‘Fed’, or federalist, I don’t mean a member of the elitist Federalist Party of Washington, Hamilton, and Adams I, but rather anyone who ed the rightist constitution drafted by the 1787 convention and worked for its ratification by the states before the Bill of Rights was added to it in 1789. So an ‘Antifed’, or antifederalist, is anyone who opposed that 1787 document and its ratification by the states. Most rightists, being collectivists and antiindividualists, favored the original draft with no bill of rights, while most leftists, being individualists, detested it because it didn’t protect individuals from the absolutist powers given to the new federal and state governments. The wards or townships that Jefferson praised, for example, were robbed by this constitution of nearly all the powers they had before it was ratified.

But for a few exceptions due to pragmatism, the political position of the individuals listed here is just what our theory predicts from their Impulse Patterns. It is confirmed by the predominance of power leftists (individualists) among the antifederalists and of power rightists (anti-individualists) among the federalists. Not surprisingly, the dominant impulse here is projection (+), which is characteristic of most dissenting activists on the left or the right. Of the seventeen federalists listed, thirteen were rightists in power, and only four were leftists. Of these four, the only humanist was the conflicted RadLib John Jay (+ R– – +) who was 60% rightist, while the other three were opportunistic selfists who knew that they would profit more by being on Washington’s side whatever their ideology. Ten of the eleven antifederalists were leftists, the only

rightist being the otherist Gerry ( – – – – R ), and two of the three equivocators listed were conflicted as to leftism and rightism.

This table confirms my psychologic theory rather clearly. I know of no other theory or hypothesis in any human science that can correctly categorize and predict the different political views of people, let alone people of past centuries. Astrologers never had such a theory, and our modern psychologists and other human scientists can only distinguish our political views by studying or questioning people after the fact, which does nothing to explain the causes of those views.

Table 6. US Media Figures

This table lists 84 people who are related in a narrow class, so its typical pattern, ( R R + + + ), and the low number of balanced systems confirm what we know to be true of our opportunistic, pragmatic media as a whole. This pattern is that of conflicted radical-conservatives who, like the ConRad Bush II ( R + + R R ), are opinionated, comionless, overemotional, and 100% extremist. It indicates rushing to judgment and superficial pragmatic reasoning that begins from the denial of will and thought, and hence of theory and principles. There are slightly more leftists than rightists on this list (52% to 48%), but many more extremists than moderates (61% to 39%). The radical (+) nature of media people shouldn’t surprise us, for projection is their business, but it’s unfortunate for us that balanced (logical, unbiased) reasoning is so low in this class.

These excesses—projection, superficiality, and unbalanced reasoning—explain why our media today are no more ired by the public than Bush II or Congress are. You can’t expect popularity if you are superficial and biased and continuously ignore general principles, the causes of things, and people’s feelings. But this is so of most media spokespersons, whose pragmatism causes them to understand nothing deeply. As a result, their work only preserves the corrupt institutions of the past and the political factions created by those institutions. The best of them, as this table shows, are those humanists with analytic strengths who reason more deeply about the issues they report, and so don’t buy the rightist lie that our constitution is wonderful and doesn’t need to be replaced.

Table 7. World Political Figures

This list of 130 world, or non-US, political figures tells us little about the class as a whole, but it does our theory’s view of political dispositions; in particular its claims that socialism in any form is a rightist ideology (liberalism) and that the worst political leaders are elitist rightists (liberals or conservatives). Check it out in this and the other tables, for it may surprise you to see just how accurate those statements are.

Table 8. Philosophic Intellectuals

This is a list of 26 intellectuals with a philosophic bent. It is short for three reasons: (1) because reliable birth data isn’t available for most intellectuals born before the modern era, (2) because few people in the last half of the modern era (1913-2008) considered philosophy important, and (3) because we must exclude from this group all of those academics who call themselves ‘philosophers’ because of what they have studied and taught rather than what they have created. The typical patterns here, ( B B R – – ) or ( B B R – R ), are the opposite of the typical pattern of the media figures in Table 6, because they indicate persons who are strong in analysis (will and thought) and weak in synthesis (feeling, judgment, and power), and who therefore prefer to deal with universal issues rather than partialized issues or practical matters.

The fact that projection is low and reversals are high for this class s one of our theory’s more important conclusions; namely, that our arealistic idealists usually have multiple reversals while our realists usually have no reversal or one at most. We can see this here, for if we divide these intellectuals into two groups, those who do and those who don’t have two or more reversals, we get a basically idealistic group and a basically realistic group.

The thinkers with two or more reversals here are Berkeley, Comte, Fichte, Hegel, Hobbes, Hume, Kant, Keyserling, Leibniz, Mill, Rousseau, Sartre, Schopenhauer, and Wittgenstein. Of these fourteen, none were realists and only two, Keyserling and Rousseau, were strong in analytic reasoning, or will and thought.

The twelve others, those with no reversal or only one, are Bacon, Descartes, Feuerbach, Heidegger, Hutcheson, Locke, myself, Moore, Nietzsche, Schelling, Spencer, and Spinoza. These are the more realistic intellectuals in this table,

especially the seven who are strong in both will and thought. Descartes is the only one of the twelve who is weak in those two systems, and suitably enough, as a dualist he is the furthest in this group from being a realist.

Note also that 57% of these intellectuals are humanists or otherists rather than selfists or elitists, and that 50% have both empathy and comion. We should judge our intellectuals in these respects also, for they reveal people’s motives and explain why someone would even try to solve the riddles of the ages.

Table 9. Political Intellectuals

This table lists intellectuals who were concerned mainly with sociopolitical issues. Not surprisingly, 70% of them are either humanists or otherists and not elitists or selfists. This is the only table in which the number of reversals is much less than the mean, which indicates that the class as a whole is more realistic than idealistic. As in Table 11, Academics and Scientists, the assimilative impulse is most frequent, and 42% of these intellectuals have both empathy and comion.

In the fifth column, where I indicate the person’s political leanings, the conventional for these views are not always clear. For instance, we can credit Godwin’s work in 1793 (cited earlier) for the birth of modern anarchism, but after Proudhon described himself as an ‘anarchist’ in his famous 1840 work What is Property?, that term was applied to so many hyphenated ideologies that it was hard to distinguish anarchism from socialism, communism, libertarianism, unionism, and so on. As in any era, intellectuals of the second quadrant of the modern era (1822-1913) borrowed their basic political ideas from the more creative thinkers of the first quadrant (1762-1822) and then bifurcated and confused the basic issues of political thought. But then that’s what secondary reasoning is supposed to do, divide primary principles in order to delineate their different parts and forms.

The typical patterns for this table, ( – – B B – ) and ( R – B B – ), both indicate a LibPro perspective that is academic and 60% rightist. And since these intellectuals are weak in their analytic reasoning and strong in their synthetic reasoning, their work is basically the opposite of that of the philosophic intellectuals in Table 8.

Proudhon

The LibPro Proudhon ( B – B B – ) illustrates his left-right conflict clearly, but because he was a 60% leftist, or progressive, he is perhaps better described not as an anarchist, but with the contradictory term libertarian socialist. In traditional , a libertarian form of socialism is impossible, since socialism is collectivism and libertarian views express principles of individualism. But in our system such a label is proper because it identifies a psychologic conflict. In Proudhon’s case, his rightist liberalism (–) in thought and power inclined him to be a socialist, or collectivist, while his leftist progressivism (B) in will, feeling, and judgment inclined him to be an individualist.

As a LibPro, or liberal-progressive, Proudhon was consistently moderate on social issues but had a left-right conflict on political issues, such as how to structure a government and distribute its resources. With no discussion of its psychologic causes, this conflict was described as follows in Wikipedia’s article on Proudhon.

Towards the end of his life, Proudhon modified some of his earlier views. In The Principle of Federation (1863) he modified his earlier anti-state position, arguing for “the balancing of authority by liberty” and put forward a decentralised “theory of federal government”. He also defined anarchy differently as “the government of each by himself”, which meant “that political functions have been reduced to industrial functions… .” This work also saw him call his economic system an “agro-industrial federation”, arguing that it would provide “specific federal arrangements… to protect the citizens of the federated states from capitalist and financial feudalism… and so stop the re-introduction of “wage labour.” This was because “political right requires to be buttressed by economic right.”

This says what I have said about all two-term perspectives: that they usually lead one later in life to change one’s earlier views. And to say that Proudhon modified his “anti-state position” in 1863 means that he changed his 1840 position on anarchism. Thus, appropriately for one with three balanced (B) systems, Proudhon ultimately expressed the ideology of a progressive rather than that of an anarchist, socialist, communist, libertarian, radical, liberal, conservative, or so on. But his followers continued to describe themselves as ‘anarchists’, and that’s why this previously clear term became ambiguous after Proudhon.

Progressivism is unlike classic anarchism (no rulers) because it doesn’t deny the authentic need for centralized authority. But it is still antifederalist because it insists that all authority, especially the ultimate economic power, must be decentralized. The key point is that true progressivism is always individualism (or leftism) and never collectivism (or rightism), which history shows is the foundation of every form of feudalism and totalitarianism and the stupid wars to which they lead.

True progressives understand that these opposite notions coexist in a society because the issue is not one instead of the other, it’s one before the other. They see clearly that only individuals are real, that all collectives are artificial constructs, and that therefore the inalienable rights of any individual must not be subordinated to the rights of any collective, including the state, unless it is for an overriding moral reason that is in the best interests of humanity, or all individuals. They don’t propose the end of the state as true anarchists do; they simply recognize the logical priority of our moral reasoning over our legal reasoning and of individual rights over collective rights. So progressives do indeed deny the statism of our rightists, but only in that basic sense.

Accordingly, our theory shows that the prominent intellectuals who were most influenced by Proudhon in the second quadrant of the modern era weren’t anarchists at all; they were either straight progressives or mostly progressive, as Proudhon ( B – B B – ) himself was. So the famous ‘anarchists’ of the mid-

nineteenth to the early twentieth centuries—thinkers and activists such as Bakunin ( R B + – B ), Engels ( B + R B B ), Kropotkin ( – B B + B ), Malatesta ( R B R – B ), and Tucker ( + B – B B )—were progressives in power and usually in perspective too. They all borrowed from Proudhon to a degree, just as he, being a liberal (–) in thought and power, borrowed from first-quadrant thinkers such as the progressive revolutionists in America, , and even England.⁴²

Table 10. Political Literary Figures

This table lists some well-known literary figures who were concerned with social and political issues. Since a broad range of political views is represented here—everything from the fascism of the pathological and narcissistic liberal elitist Ezra Pound ( R R R + – ) to the individualism of the humanist ProLib Joseph Conrad ( – B – B B )—this table yields no significant general conclusion, except that, fittingly, 83% of these famous writers had empathy or comion or both.

Table 11. Academics and Scientists

This table is useful mainly for referring to the individuals listed on it. It doesn’t offer many general conclusions because its 85 people are in different fields. This problem can be overcome by making separate tables for any fields of interest. For instance, I found it useful at times to have separate tables for psychologists, economists, physicists, and historians.

The typical patterns here are complex, as you see, but they all have a majority of liberal (–) systems, which reflects the pathological rightism and high assimilation (–) that characterizes what I call ‘the academic-scientific disposition’. Note also that Alfred Adler is the only total progressive ( B B B B B ) in our tables, and indeed he writes with the predictable combination of good logic and pathological conventionality.

Table 12. Business Leaders

This table lists 68 people who were successful in business. Its typical pattern, ( R R B + – ), is just what we would expect for this class. That is, these practical ‘men and women of action’ deny primary and secondary reasoning, or theory and essential issues ( R R … ), but they are creative in their tertiary speculative reasoning (feeling and judgment) and, like many power liberals (–), they can credit their wealth to their innate greed and to what they inherited, borrowed, or stole from others.

A high percentage of them (57%) have a conflicted political perspective, which is typical of unprincipled opportunists. Though some of the humanists listed here tried to make their businesses serve broad social purposes, some of the others— the selfists, elitists, and otherists—used their excess wealth to establish ‘charitable’ foundations that did more harm than good, because their main purpose was to preserve rightist and elitist governments and institutions, even though this meant continuing the oppression of their workers and the general population.

Though other factors in a natal chart are better indicators of creativity, generally speaking the more creative entrepreneurs are those who have more strong (leftist) impulses than weak (rightist) ones. One exception to this here is the pathological selfist Disney ( R R R R B ), whose four reversals led him to deny reality personally and in his creations, which were based on the immature desire to escape from reality that reversals cause in people of any age.

Table 13. Religionists and Other Mystics

By ‘religionist’ I mean anyone who forms or s a religion or other mystical sect, and by the more general term ‘mystic’ I mean one who proposes any arealistic explanation of Reality whether it is or is not associated with a religion. In any case, this table of 76 such people does yield some meaningful general conclusions.

First, its most significant deviation from the mean is a very low number of balanced impulses, which confirms the illogic of the whole class since only the balanced impulse can add unimpaired logic to our reasoning.

As our theory predicts, the most frequent impulse for of this class is the reversal, which shows an area of reasoning where one is inclined to deny reality. The most extreme cases of this impairment here, four reversals, are the mystic Blavatsky ( R R R R + ) and the Ayatollah Khomeini ( R R B R R ). The remaining pathological cases here, those with three reversals, shouldn’t surprise us. They are Jim Bakker ( + B R R R ), Cardinal Richelieu ( B – R R R ), James Jones ( R R R B – ), Johannes Kerri ( R R R + – ), Mother Teresa ( – – R R R ), Henry Olcott ( – R R R B ), the WWII pope Pius XII ( R + R – R ), Joseph Smith ( + R R – R ), and Ste. Bernadette ( R B + RR ).

The typical pattern here is ( – R R – – ). This is a 100% rightist pattern that indicates a weakness in will, the denial of thought and feelings, altruism in judgment, and a pathological liberal (collectivistic, expansionistic, acquisitive, and opportunistic) bias in politics. This liberal ivity in power is appropriate for this class because it causes one to assume that personal power doesn’t come from the self, but from external sources, such as other people and their resources or imagined deities, spirits, or forces. The two weak, or rightist, impulses (– and R) occur most frequently in this class of religionists or mystics. And their

dominant political type is the worst one, the rightist-extremist type, which indicates people who feel that their mission in society is to impose their unrealistic beliefs on others.

Table 14. Theologians

This table lists 16 prominent theologians, and here we can say for certain, as we cannot of all the religionists, that their theism was sincere. Their typical pattern is that of a pathological conservative, ( R B R – R ) or ( R + R – R ), and in both patterns the sole point of leftist strength and creativity is in the thought system, which explains why these men became theologians and not just pragmatic religionists.

Those patterns also show: (a) the messiah complex; (b) a denial of personal will, of Reality, of metaphysics, and of primary reasoning and theory; (c) a feeling reversal that makes most people deny that their beliefs are based on their ions; (d) assimilation in judgment that makes one a comionate altruist, a denier of people’s personal needs, and a receptacle for others’ beliefs and established traditions; and (e) a power reversal that causes one to deny one’s personal powers and to assume that all control over events, and all blame for them too, lies outside the self. The power reversal is also a cause of the irrational collectivism, or anti-individualism and antihumanism, that characterizes every religion.

As with the religionists in the previous table, the power rightists outnumber the power leftists (69% to 31%), and 63% are extremists in political type. Here too the dominant (44%) type is the rightist-extremist, the worst type. There are only two leftist-moderates here, the progressive Duns Scotus ( R B B + B ) and the RadPro Francis of Assisi ( B B B – + ), both of whom, in spite of their theism and because of their three balanced (progressive) systems, were often praised as realists.

This and the prior table confirm that the principal reason why people become religionists or theologians is that they are innately illogical, or impaired in their

ability to perceive reality. That is to be expected, for as we saw in discussing metaphysics, one must be illogical to be a theist in the first place. This arealism, or denial of reality, is why theists are often negative agents in our societies. But the general public, being deceived for millennia by their rulers and the academics who serve them, came to regard these ‘servants of god’ as good people who try to help us all. But that is far from the truth, as many of them have demonstrated. Let us consider one of the worst of them in that respect.

Luther

Protestant academics have written volumes in praise of the thinking, character, and historical achievements of Martin Luther ( R + B R R ), but he was not the hero they made him out to be. In fact, he epitomized pathological conservatism and all that I have said here of amoral nihilists, elitists, and people with no empathy or comion for others.

He was indeed highly intelligent, creative in thought, and a major historical figure in both a positive and a negative sense. His greatest achievement was his role as an intellectual who helped to end the millennium of Catholic tyranny in parts of Europe. I respect his honest defense of theism as being a matter of ion rather than intellect, but this view is natural given his strong (B) feeling system. I especially ired his sound arguments in defense of free thought, which were sincere and not surprising because his thought system (+) and his innate abilities with language were his strongest psychologic areas. But his good sense in those two leftist systems made his rightist position on issues of will, judgment, and power (society and politics) hypocritical, and this was his chief psychologic conflict.

He struggled with that conflict early in his work when he faced the contradiction between the leftism (individualism) of the Gospels and the rightism (collectivism) of all established religions—including the one that he established with the help of his extremist acolyte, the pathological ConRad Melanchthon ( + + R R R ). But given his character and his Augustinian training, his ultimate position was never in doubt. Though he initially ed the individualistic message of pre-Catholic Christianity, he chose collectivism and elitism whenever the chips were down. Here’s one of the best examples of his perfidy, or his betrayal of the people for personal gain.

The Peasant’s War in , as it came to be called by authors like Engels and Wilhelm Zimmermann (1807-78), occurred, appropriately enough, in the first quadrant of the classic era (1516-77). It began in 1524 when many common people in Europe started to protest their worsened exploitation by the nobles and princes, who were increasingly ignoring their traditional responsibilities to the peasants under the feudal system of the previous millennium. In the German states, the peasants based their appeals to the nobility largely on Luther’s most revolutionary view: his insistence as a point of Christian dogma that each man is his own church. But if this is so, then it implies, if only from the example of the all-powerful Catholic Church, that each man is also his own political ruler. The peasants’ demands were mild enough, but since the knight class was already being squeezed from above by the increasingly greedy princes, they wanted to punish the peasants swiftly and brutally for demanding anything at all of them.

Luther’s reaction to their movement wasn’t hostile at first, but it hardened as their protests became more forceful and widespread. He was very obedient to the Elector of Saxony, Frederick the Wise ( B - B R B ), the progressive but selfist prince who had protected him from the start against both the papacy and the powerful Catholic King of Spain and Holy Roman Emperor Charles V ( – R – – – ).

But in early May of 1525, Luther suddenly sided strongly with his political masters in their campaign against the common people. To that end, he wrote an infamous pamphlet published under the title Against the Robbing and Murderous Peasant Hordes. Here he unfairly portrayed the rebels as being in the wrong and then literally guaranteed the nobles eternal salvation and great rewards in heaven if they would “slaughter and slay” these peasants, and he did this on no better grounds than his personal opinion that “there is nothing as obnoxious as a revolutionary man.” Then, immediately after this pamphlet was distributed, the carnage began in earnest, and soon the nobles had slaughtered or maimed hundreds of thousands of peasants and ended the uprising in most areas.

This pamphlet—with its crude reasoning, intemperate language, lies, total lack

of comion, and its rejection of the principles of free speech that he had promoted earlier—is seldom mentioned by historians or other academics who ire Luther, and the few who do mention it don’t note the political circumstances that led to it; circumstances that reveal his innately hypocritical and duplicitous character.

First, the pamphlet was undated, which was never his practice. This was necessary to hide the direct relation between its writing and the death, on May 5, 1525, of his protector Frederick the Wise. Second, the progressive Frederick had long refused two requests made of him. One was by his LibPro brother, John the Steadfast ( B + R B – ), who had been urging Frederick for more than a year to take stern military action against the peasants, and the other was by Luther, who several times in the past had unsuccessfully asked Frederick’s permission to marry a former nun who had been living in Luther’s house for years—at first with several other nuns who had been ‘rescued’ from their Catholic convent. But all this changed on May 5th when Frederick died. Duke John became the ruler of Saxony, and he saw to it that Luther’s pamphlet, undoubtedly written at John’s request, was immediately distributed, whereupon he ordered the nobles to slaughter the rebelling peasants.

One of the peasants’ prominent leaders was Thomas Münzer of Thuringia, who was a priest and briefly a Lutheran preacher until he came to oppose Luther’s views on nearly everything. Münzer preached a future coming to the world of the kingdom of God, where all people would be politically equal and all property would be held in common. He may have been influenced in this by More’s communistic proposals in Utopia, published in 1516 as the classic era began, or perhaps he read similar proposals in the classic sources available to them both. Anyway, he was captured on May 15, 1525 at the Battle of Frankenhausen and executed on May 27th.

Then, with the slaughter ended, John gave Luther the permission to marry that Frederick had refused to give him. He married on June 13, 1525, almost before the peasants’ blood had dried on the fields. This permission to marry was clearly

the quid pro quo for his having written that vile pamphlet at John’s request, since both men got what they wanted but couldn’t get while Frederick lived. That pamphlet was so plainly hypocritical and antihumanist when compared to his earlier works that Lutherism never spread in southern where the slaughter was greatest, and in the rest of Luther was thereafter respected only by the noble and bourgeois classes. This is but one example of how elitism and pathological conservatism can corrupt our societies, especially if we give credence to its religious lies, myths, and moral pretenses.

Luther was both born and raised to be the elitist bigot and enemy of the people and humanity that he was openly after he achieved fame, and his profound influence on the German language—and therefore on virtually every Germanspeaking intellectual in the five centuries after him—must be seen in that light.

Realists vs. Religion

As realists, we know that all religions and their myths are false. We know this because our first metaphysical principle, Reality is the whole event, makes multiple realities and hence mystical deities impossible. And it follows from this principle, which cannot be refuted without contradiction, that no real person can communicate with an imaginary deity who is said to reside in some imaginary second kind of reality.

We are thus not surprised to find that Christians, Jews, and Muslims have no sound historical evidence that proves that either Jesus or Moses was a real person. On the other hand, there is acceptable evidence that Buddha and Confucius were real people. Even so, many tall tales were told about Gautama by his followers, who, over the six centuries before the Christian era, had established many Buddhist sects in North Africa and the eastern Roman Empire. And those fables, which are virtually identical to the ones told later by Christian authors in their stories about Jesus, are clearly fictions.⁴³

Because we are realists, we can dismiss all religions and their myths as mystical speculations, but if we are also humanists, we can’t just leave the matter there. We can’t because, as unselfish leftists, we are morally and hence politically impelled to rid the world of all sicknesses or lies. And the objective data provided in Tables 13 and 14 tell us that all the world’s religions were established and maintained by the least realistic, if not the sickest, people among us. Therefore, we must speak out against all religionists, because we can’t have the just and sane societies that we need to be safe and happy until those people either change their beliefs or learn to keep their personal ions and religious rituals private.

Most religionists are offended when nontheists or people of other religions mock

their beliefs, deities, or prophets, and yet they are insensitive to the pain that they inflict on those people regularly with their theistic displays in the media, in public during their religious holidays, or at other public events or civil ceremonies. Many of them are even pleased to inflict such discomfort on “infidels” or “non-believers.” But as Matthew advised (Matthew 6:5-6), speaking through the fictional character Jesus:

And when thou prayest, thou shalt not be as the hypocrites are: for they love to pray standing in the synagogues and in the corners of the streets, that they may be seen of men. Verily I say unto you, They have their reward. But thou, when thou prayest, enter into thy closet, and when thou hast shut thy door, pray to thy Father which is in secret; and thy Father which seeth in secret shall reward thee openly.

I agree; theism is a private, wholly personal matter, and if its unsubstantiated beliefs and myths are not offered publicly as proven facts, we realists have no reason to object to them. But any theist who wants to be a moral person—which means one who refuses to impose on others without their free consent—must not discuss his or her theistic beliefs in public or try to impose them on others, and those who a religion should practice its rituals only in nonpublic places. A similar moral burden falls on any public officials and media outlets that promote religious practices or myths which are denied by realists or people of other religions. The assumption by our politicians and media spokespersons that we are all deceived by the old religious fictions is false, so they must be impartial on these subjective matters.

The immorality here is not the belief; it is the imposition. And since this imposition places a moral burden on us all, theism is a political matter also; one that a society can settle easily with a constitutional provision that prohibits its government from ing or even appearing to any theistic belief.

Table 15. Non-Governmental Assassins or Murderers

This is a short list of 20 assassins, murderers, or serial killers who held no major governmental office, although they may have been the agents or dupes of people who did. Though the feeling system varies, the typical pattern here is that of an elitist LibRad who is assimilative in thought and power and projective in will and judgment. It is significant that none of these murderers are humanists or straight progressives, that the aggressive projective impulse (+) dominates, that 65% of them are rightists in power, 75% are selfists or elitists, and 55% have neither empathy nor comion. Of course, in some of the other tables we find these same impairments in those far-worse murderers who performed their immoral deeds as heads of state or high officials in a government, business, or religion.

Table 16. Nazis of WWII

This table only exists because the Gauquelins collected and published detailed birth data for the major criminals of the Third Reich. The typical pattern here is ( R B B + – ) or ( R – B + – ), which shows an elitist liberal who denies will and reality, is conventional and manipulable in thought, and is an egoist in judgment. It is important to note that in both this table and the previous one that lists murderers, the typical pattern is that of an elitist liberal, and that this impairment occurs in every power liberal who is born in any selfish generation. Note also that the elitist liberal Hitler ( B + B R – ) was strong in will, thought, and feeling, which made him a natural leader for his selfish generation.

Because its class of subjects is narrow, this table strongly confirms some of my psychologic theory’s main conclusions. For one thing, the summary indicates what no one disputes, that Nazi was a rightist state, but it was a liberal state, not a conservative one. This should put to rest any remaining thought that liberalism is a leftist and not a rightist disposition. In fact, Nazi gives us a perfect picture of the greedy expansionism and anti-individualistic extremes to which liberals, whatever their business, are capable of going if they are elitists; that is, if they are rightists who are born in the wrong generation and so have impaired judgment also.

We might be surprised to see that 96% of these 73 Nazis were either elitists (60%) or selfists (36%), but this is due to the fact, explained in Chapter 7, that all the people of that 30-year Gemini, or fascist, generation (1883-1913) were egoists (+) or nihilists (R) in judgment. There are only two humanists and one otherist in this table—Krupp, Keppler, and Frick—and they were all successful businessmen before the Nazis came to power. Though these men of the prior generation had comion, the others in this table did not, which is why morality, justice, and kindness were flatly denied by the Nazi rulers of . This general callousness in all the people of the thirty-year Gemini generation is

why many other nations in the world also became fascist states as that generation reached adulthood.

Afterword

I have made some suggestions on how to achieve a sane society, and since social sanity is the broader purpose behind any psychologic work, I think I should close with some further thoughts on that subject as seen in the light of our new theory.

The first step to that goal, as I’ve said, is to understand human nature truly. The second step is also intellectual; it is to create sound new moral, political, and economic theories based on that understanding of people. And the third step is practical; it is to replace our present governments across the globe with genuine democratic governments that observe those new principles. We can’t reverse this order as our pragmatists might propose, for if sound new theories don’t come first, nothing important will be changed. In the meantime, as I said earlier, we must not vote for or follow selfish people, we must prevent excess births and random immigration and try to halve our present population, and we must work to set aside about a half of all the earth’s land, air, and water as undisturbed preserves.

If we don’t make progress on some such principled plan soon, we may not make it through the new era (2008-2254), at least not in any way we would consider tolerable today. From my years of practicing predictive astrology, I have no doubt that there will be severe human and natural catastrophes in the second half of this century. We can see these disasters taking shape today, both in nature’s wrath and in ominous political events across the world. And it may well be that even the horrors of the first half of the twentieth century will be eclipsed by those that will occur within our children’s lifetime if we remain as ignorant, greedy, and misgoverned by selfish rulers as we are now.

So we have less time than we might assume, probably just the next four decades, to establish environmental and infrastructural programs that will mitigate the

damage of the natural disasters and sane governments that will prevent the human-caused ones. Government is not the problem; insane government is. And that’s what we will have as long as so many of us oppose progress, common sense, and universal fairness.

Our new understanding of human nature shows us how to shape the better political system that we need; first with respect to the conflicts between leftists and rightists and selfish and unselfish generations, and then with respect to the basic economic principles that determine who gets what in our society. I planned at first to say little about these issues here because they require full discussion in a separate work, but then I thought it would be helpful to conclude this work by discussing two practical issues in particular. The first is an ethical policy I have always ed, and the second is the solution of a fundamental politicoeconomic problem that has confused all of our intellectuals in the past in their discussions of economics. As you will see, these two discussions are related.

Poverty and Excess Wealth

I proposed the following economic policy in my classes decades ago, and I still think we must demand it of our governments immediately, if only to show them that we know that there is a simple solution they are refusing to put on the table. I consider this proposal the sine qua non of any plan one could possibly devise to create a sane and just society. The basic idea is not new, for it was suggested by Plato in his final work, and probably by others before that. As he put it:

In a state which is desirous of being saved from the greatest of all plagues—not faction, but rather distraction—there should exist among the citizens neither extreme poverty, nor, again, excess of wealth, for both are productive of both these evils. Now the legislator should determine what is to be the limit of poverty or wealth. Let the limit of poverty be the value of the lot;⁴⁴ this ought to be preserved, and no ruler…will allow the lot to be impaired in any case. This the legislator gives as a measure, and he will permit a man to acquire … as much as four times the amount of this. But if a person have yet greater riches [by any means], if he give back the surpluses to the state, and to the Gods who are the patrons of the state, he shall suffer no penalty or loss of reputation; but if he disobeys this our law, any one who likes may inform against him and receive half the value of the excess… ⁴⁵

Here Plato warns that poverty and excess wealth are the causes of the factions and distractions that can destroy a society. This warning applies in our social life, but also in our personal life, where most people are engaged in purposeless distractions rather than in trying to improve themselves and our world, or at least their corner of it.

Eliminating those causes will require major political changes, but nothing else makes sense, least of all our former and current economic systems. It’s hard to believe that none of the revered or prize-winning economists of the modern era (1762-2008) were able to imagine a better economic system than those old criminal systems; all of which perpetuate, above all else, an unfair distribution of income, of nature’s resources, and of our individual obligations to perform labor; much of which is so difficult, unpleasant, or dangerous that it is not willingly performed by anyone. Indeed, that is why we have not been able to end slavery in any of its forms—including prostitution and (in many cultures) marriage, child labor, forced labor, and military conscription.

Poverty is just another name for global slavery. It is not an accident, it is intentional; designed by greedy people who will do anything to become and stay rich and avoid the hardest work. But if we ever do have an unselfish government, here’s how we can end poverty.

Because the state that rules us has the right to restrict births for the common good, it is responsible for every birth it allows. Accordingly, we and it are morally obligated to ensure that every person to whom we allow birth, regardless of age, will live in a safe environment and will receive free and equivalent educational, health, and legal services, and that every adult will also receive— either through work or government subsidy as he or she alone may from time to time decide—a fair livable income throughout life.

This stipend must exceed the poverty level of each locality involved by a good measure, be exempt from taxation and any other attachments, and be increased for inflation and each dependent child permitted by law. It will of course replace all other income programs. And since it is a large part of their budgets, our governments will try harder than ever to ensure that their economy offers all of its citizens desirable work, pay, and working conditions so that they are eager to work for extra money when they have no reason for not doing so—such as incapacity, caring for loved ones, or serving the public interest in ways that normal employment does not permit.

We must also eliminate excess wealth, which throughout our history has created a tyranny of the rich that curtails our freedom, creates poverty and an elitist class, corrodes our moral sense and social cooperation, and trashes our ecosystem, our unique cultures, and our natural right as individuals to decide how we will live and what work we will or won’t do. The poor don’t choose to be slaves, so it is the rich who cause slavery, exploitation, class warfare, and political chaos across the world.

Another cause of class conflict is the claim by the rich that they have a right to own our natural resources, including land, air, and water. This is hard to swallow, for from the realistic observation that the earth’s resources can only belong (in a sense) to all living things together, it follows that any person or collective that profits from those resources has conspired to steal our common wealth. Our natural resources cannot be the private property of any individual, collective, or species because there is no original title of ownership for them. Who could have issued such a title? An imaginary ‘god’ who is said to have been here before us? No, all such titles were issued by us, or more precisely by powerful people for powerful people. And since no one can rightly own those resources, their use hereafter should be approved, licensed, and regulated by independent elected trustees for the good of all people and other things on earth.

Plato’s proposal is correct in principle, but it is incomplete for our times. He proposed minimum and maximum levels for wealth, and for free males only, but we must eliminate poverty for all individuals and then set two annual maximums for income and two for accumulated wealth; in each case, one for individuals and one for state-sanctioned collectives (corporations, religions, and partnerships of any kind). We needn’t debate now how to set these levels or other istrative rules. We could set the annual income maximums by estimating a fair multiple between them, say, one to five million dollars for any individual and one to five billion dollars for any collective.

Then, in addition to regular taxes and exempting only the antipoverty stipends,

our governments would tax 100% of all annual income or accumulated wealth that exceeds these maximums. And judging by the vast income inequality today in nations across the world, I suspect that these taxes on excess income and wealth will far exceed a government’s new costs for eliminating poverty.

Note also that if the legal maximums for collectives are fairly set, we will not have any too-big-to-fail collectives in our societies. If a business, religion, or other collective believes that it will earn multiples of its income maximum, it may prefer to stop growing, to divide itself into smaller independent units, to raise wages, to lower its prices, to increase its free services to all, or to sell off income-producing parts of its business rather than paying more taxes in a year than it earned that year. Or it may choose to pay those taxes knowing that now they will be serving the common good.

This leftist, decentralizing effect of our new rules will create more businesses, increase the number of wealthy people, spread the availability of the newest technologies more widely, lower prices, and prevent big collectives, whether acting alone or in collusion, from controlling our governments, our people, or our resources as they do now. Their current master plan is transparent. It is to eliminate all present governments in which real individuals have any power, however slight, to limit their actions and profits. As for the maximums on individual income and wealth, these will not only produce more rich people than we have now, they will also restrict our greediest people by making it impossible for them to become anything close to billionaires.

If properly set, both of these maximums will greatly expand private initiative, but they will do so without creating monopolies or a class of wasteful, superrich individuals, and without giving the world’s richest people or collectives other unfair advantages in society, as our current economic systems are intentionally designed to do. And let us note especially that any economist who has not or does not propose the elimination of poverty and of excess wealth is serving the ruling class and not the public interest.

Capitalism vs. Socialism

Our psychologic theory tells us that we cannot create a better political system unless we also create a better economic system for it. This is so because these subjects, politics and economics, differ only in their contexts of reference; otherwise, they are equivalents because we reason about them in the same part of the Consideration Cycle, our power system. In the political context, the poles of that system are otherness and self, and in the narrower economic context, they are all other wealth and my wealth.

Our theory tells us that people who seek practical solutions will refer first to their innate impulses, which they see as their psychologic certainties. Thus, most individualists ( + ) will favor leftist politics, most collectivists ( – ) will favor rightist politics, and both will favor either capitalistic or socialistic economics. And since they are either extremists or moderates, the extremists will defend their favored poles vigorously and deny the opposite poles, while the moderates will see some truths at both poles and realize that they can’t proceed in their reasoning until they reconcile these opposed notions. This moderatism can infuriate the extremists, but in reality it’s the only way that we can solve any practical problem, as we can see most clearly in the case of economics.

First, though, I should clarify what I mean by the socialism and capitalism, which only entered our economic discussions in the second quadrant of the modern era (1822-1913). Since we are discussing that subject here causatively, or from a psychologic perspective, we don’t mean these in their current academic sense. Instead, we are using them as keywords to refer to their idea referents; that is, to the epistemic ideas at the poles of our power system. They are just two of the many words that we use in various contexts to refer to those polar ideas that all humans have in their power system, and when we recognize this fact, we see something very basic about any economic proposal that might

be described as ‘socialistic’ or ‘capitalistic’.

The chief benefits of pure capitalism are that it spurs individual initiative, productivity, and entrepreneurism, and its chief failings are that it promotes poverty, excessive wealth, all forms of slavery, corrupt governments, selfishness, inhumanity, all kinds of criminal acts, political deceptions, and lies and immorality in general. The chief benefits of pure socialism are that it seeks to share a society’s total wealth, resources, and responsibilities fairly, while its chief failings are that it imposes collectivism, or anti-individualism, on everyone and immorally uses the principles of that rightist political ideology to deny many if not all of the natural rights of real individuals.

So while both these extreme systems have benefits, neither one is a valid system because it has fatal flaws as well, as it must because all systemic reasoning requires two poles. The fatal flaw of capitalism is that it tolerates immoralities, or the right of the strong to impose upon, destroy, or enslave the weak. And the fatal flaw of socialism is its anti-individualism and rejection of the inalienable rights of all real individuals, which most people today know was the greatest achievement of our political reasoning in the entire modern era—one that was proposed shortly before the American Revolution and hence well before the modern era’s second-quadrant forms of socialism and capitalism were even conceived.

Each of these extreme views, capitalism and socialism, is invalid because it denies the other, but neither one can be totally denied because they are both real and necessary parts of our practical reasoning. The Consideration Cycle tells us that to reason correctly in any psychologic system, we must affirm the reality of both its poles, acknowledge their polar opposition, and then try to find their perfect reconciliation.

This is so in all five of our psychologic systems. In our feeling system, it’s like the problem of perfect love. Here you are the subjective pole (+) and your

potential lover is the objective pole (–), and when everything about your relationship is right for both of you, there is no clash or conflict; there is only perfection. Though everything is rarely right in a relationship, that’s the goal we seek when we search for what we call ‘true love’. And if we see that we can’t achieve that ideal, then we usually compromise on some of its parts; often with the hope of making it a more perfect relationship later.

The same is so in judgment. We know that a morally perfect person cannot be an egoist or an altruist, but must be an egoist and an altruist; that is, a perfect reconciliation of selfishness (+) and unselfishness (–). And in power, a perfect political system is not leftism or rightism, or individualism or collectivism; it is the perfect reconciliation of both those poles. Similarly, a perfect economic system is not capitalism or socialism; it is capitalism and socialism if we reconcile those extremes perfectly. If we don’t, then we have a corrupt economic system like the ones we’ve had throughout our history.

For example, you probably know that when an extremist rails against either capitalism or socialism and says that everything that is wrong in our society is due to people who favor that detested system, this is a half-truth at best. Those who favor socialism (–) say that everything that is wrong in our society is due to selfishness, greed, and immorality, which are the basic faults of capitalism. And those who favor capitalism (+) say that everything that is wrong is due to the rightist, collectivistic state and its immoral disregard for individual rights and freedoms, which are the basic faults of socialism. But the real and whole truth is that both those systems have grievous faults, just as they have obvious and necessary benefits.

The Consideration Cycle has taught us, better than any hypothesis offered before it has, that every tangible (utterable, memorable) thing that we do or say requires us to reconcile some state of subjectivity (+) with some state of objectivity (–), and that the perfect reconciliation, or balance, of a psychologic system’s two poles—which is a fleeting condition because those states change continuously— is only achieved when none of the parts clash or are contradictory. The Cycle

goes even further than that, however. It has also taught us that those who will perform this reconciliation best in any system are those who are balanced (B) there and that those who cannot or will not reconcile its poles are those who are reversed (R) there.

The reversal aside, the chief mistake that most traditionalists made in the past when they discussed economics is in assuming, from their congenital or learned bias for one pole over the other, that we must replace capitalism with socialism or vice versa. But we can’t replace either one because they are polar ideas and are equally parts of our psychologic. We can only modify them through reconciliation. This is proven by history, for no pure form of capitalism or socialism has ever existed in our world; all that we have ever had in our societies are reconciled economic systems. Today, we have collectivistic governments that also use capitalistic methods, and individualistic governments, like the US, that also use socialistic methods. This transformation began early in the US when, over the objections of the humanist progressive Jefferson ( + – – B B ), the elitist liberal Hamilton ( – – B + – ) showed his greedy clique on Wall Street that government intervention in their hypothetical ‘free market’ through a centralized banking system lets them steal far more from the public than pure capitalism does.

So the true solution is plain: it is to achieve a more perfect reconciliation of capitalism and socialism than we have ever had. But this raises the question of what we mean by ‘more perfect’, and the Cycle answers this also. It tells us that we do all of our reasoning about perfection, or ideals of any kind, in our tertiary judgment system, and from this it follows, in the political context, that more perfect can only mean more moral. Our economic goal, then, is not to expose the flaws of capitalism or socialism intellectually; rather, it is to eliminate by law all of the immoralities in the reconciled economic systems that we are actually using at any time.

Many reformers in the past understood this, so they proposed changes that would eliminate some of their state’s immoral rules. But some is not enough; we must

eliminate them all to achieve a perfect reconciliation of the power poles, and almost all of them to produce a mostly sane government. But they couldn’t do this correctly, because as traditionalists they never understood human reasoning as a whole or our moral reasoning in particular. Also, many governments are still corrupted by old religious institutions that claim to know everything we need to know about morality, when in fact they could never explain how we humans actually reach our judgments.

But we have this understanding now, so we can begin to transform our unethical governments and economies into ethical ones. This is what I have been proposing all along, for by definition the ethical politics that we seek requires us to eliminate all poverty and all excess income and wealth. We have no choice here; either we do that now or we lose all the liberties that we gained in the modern era. Today, in the new era, there’s no going back to any of the old forms of political corruption and slavery. We know better now.

Of course, we need political safeguards as well as economic ones. These include laws that prohibit any artificial collective from participating in our political process or institutions, and laws that require all individuals and collectives to confine their business communications with our government officials to public letters or public assemblies. In this new era, our societies need not only the total separation of church and state that was proposed early in the modern era, but also the total separation of all other artificial collectives from any of our governmental processes.

A truly democratic government consists of we the people, or of all real individuals, and not of we the businesses, religions, and other fabricated collectives. Thus, lobbyists for any personal or collective cause must not be allowed to meet with, speak to, or write to our officials in private, and our officials must be penalized if they permit this. This isn’t a perfect barrier, but it will make conspiratorial lobbying more difficult, and that will put our politics on a more level playing field. In any form of government, until we have such laws, we cannot have confidence in any of our elected or appointed officials.

It should be clear to us now, even if it isn’t to the rightist US Supreme Court, that our governments and institutions belong to real people only, and not to artificial ‘persons’ such as corporations, perpetual trusts, estates, or religions that—if only because they are allowed to outlive us all, even for centuries or millennia—can accumulate far more wealth and political power for the selfists and elitists who rule them than real citizens or even many governments can. This threat was well explained in economic by the distinguished economist Irving Fisher ( R – B – R ) in his classic work The Theory of Interest (1930). He also showed there the great harm that is done to us all when our state permits long-term trusts and large inheritances.

Morally speaking, because none of us live on another planet, the first purpose of a corporation or other artificial collective is not to benefit any individual or family or any elite group of founders, stockholders, heirs, ideologues, or special persons. Rather, it is to benefit all the real persons and other living things in the world, and if it isn’t doing that, then it has no reason for being and we must not let it exist. So we must ensure that the charter of all collectives (other than marriages) will explicitly require that purpose, even above profit, and will expire automatically after, say, twelve years, when their existence and legal rights must be approved anew by the people’s elected representatives, who in a true democracy will be unselfish humanists or otherists.

These proposed changes are reasonable and realistic, and something like them must be implemented if we are ever to have a sane and just society. They are far more logical and moral than the alternative: the de facto illegal rules that govern every nation today. Skeptics may say that in this insane world of ours no such changes will ever be implemented, but that’s what the monarchists said at the end of the classic era (1516-1762). I say that if some of them are implemented, even in only one nation, other nations will follow in time. There’s a precedent for this in the steady increase in the number of elective governments in the world since the American Revolution, with the result that when the modern era ended in 2008, most governments on earth were pseudodemocracies with some type of elective process.

Conclusion

What I’ve proposed politically in this work is not the fear-based extremism of rightist conservatism or liberal socialism, the absurd negativism of anarchism, or the conceptual confusions of all forms of libertarianism. It is leftist individualism, or more precisely humanism, as I defined these earlier.

We know now, if only from the theory and empirical evidence offered here, that while people may be superficially irrational because of what they think or were taught, they are innately irrational because of when they were born. Knowing this, we must be astonished by all the politicians, academics, media spokespersons, and other pontificators who claim to know our politics and how to organize our societies and economies properly when, as their speeches and writings attest, they haven’t the slightest idea of why and how we humans differ innately, especially in our moral, political, and economic views. And because nothing in our traditional system of thought and belief was able to teach them that, they never had an objective basis for determining if any proposal made by them or others is valid or invalid. As a result, they were all confined to a murky world of subjective opinions and personal squabbles with others where little is known for certain by anyone.

A deep truth that I suspect we all know is that no master plan or social system that excludes or oppresses some kinds of people for the benefit of other kinds of people will ever be able to prevent social and economic turmoil and unite all people in their common goals as individual humans. That is why all people must find a way to live together sanely and without conflict even though they are born with sharp psychologic differences and hence conflicting moral and political attitudes. But they can’t do this until someone has soundly explained those differences and potential hostilities to them.

I have tried to do that with this work, and if I have failed in any significant way, I hope that I have at least shown the best way to proceed and that some other creative leftists will pick up the challenge and succeed. If not, then all that we have now—our lives, our very few remaining liberties, and our hopes for our own and our children’s future safety and happiness—will be lost to us sooner than we now think possible.

Appendix A: Calculating the Impulse Pattern

A correct Impulse Pattern depends on a correct natal chart. Besides showing the planets’ positions in a zodiacal wheel, that chart normally shows the celestial longitude of the ten planets, expressed in degrees and minutes (and perhaps seconds) of arc within the 30° of the indicated sign; for example, 28°54´. This gives you the planet in sign (here, the moon in Leo) that you need to determine that planet’s charge.

In my theory, a planet’s charge is determined by the ancient astrological distinction between ‘feminine’ and ‘masculine’ signs, but these gender are misleading. It is more precise to refer to the signs, respectively, as assimilative (–) or projective (+).

I also dispute traditional astrology on the true beginning of the zodiac. I say that it is 0° Capricorn, or 90° behind our astronomers’ annually calculated point of 0° Aries. So, in their true order, which corresponds to our Consideration Cycle as shown in Figure A below, the six assimilative signs are Capricorn (), Pisces (), Taurus (), Cancer (), Virgo (), and Scorpio (), and the six projective signs are Aquarius (), Aries (), Gemini (), Leo (), Libra (), and Sagittarius ().

As explained in Chapter 5, we assign a negative charge (–) to a planet if it is in an assimilative sign, and a positive charge (+) if it is in a projective sign. That’s simple enough, but there’s a complication, which I call ‘anticipation’. Early astrologers noticed this sign anticipation and so spoke of the cusp between two signs, which they held to be a range of one or two degrees before and after 0° of a sign; a range in which they assumed that there was some vague mixture of the

meanings of the adjacent signs. But I reject that view and propose instead these more-precise anticipation rules, which have been well tested for the Impulse Pattern and seem to hold well for all other interpretative purposes also.

The General Rules. (1) If the moon is in the last degree of a sign, meaning at or after 29°00´, its charge is changed to that of the next sign. (2) But all other planets, which move more slowly than the moon, are given the charge of the next sign only if they are at or past 29°20´ of their sign.

The Retrograde Rules. As seen from the earth, all planets except the sun and moon appear to move backwards in the heavens for a part of their cycle, and this retrograde motion—symbolized after a planet’s zodiacal position with — changes the second general rule above in two cases. (1) If a planet that is at or after 29°20´ of its sign is retrograde, then its charge is changed to that of the following sign only if it does not move back to less than 29°20′ of its current sign within the next thirty days. (2) If a planet that is in the first degree (00°xx ´) of its sign is retrograde, then its charge is changed to that of the previous sign only if, within the next thirty days, it does move back to less than 29°20′ of that previous sign. You’ll need an ephemeris to apply these thirty-day rules, but you can usually tell if the sign should be changed just by looking at the planet’s position thirty days later.

However, in applying these anticipation rules we must always consider the number and the interpretive weight of other planets in the two signs in question. For instance, I don’t change the sign of a forward-moving planet that is in the last degree of a sign when there are other planets in that same sign and fewer or no planets in the following sign, but I do so confidently when the interpretive weight of other planets favors the following sign.

Now, after we determine the correct charge of all ten planets, we need to know which planet determines the charge of each of the ten epistemic points around the Consideration Cycle, as numbered in Figure 6 and shown in Figure A by the

planets’ positions. Point 1, the first pole of the will system (keyword wish), is given the charge of the moon (), then each point in order is given the charge of Saturn (), Mercury (), Uranus (), Venus (), Neptune (), Mars (), Pluto (), Jupiter (), and the sun (). Thus, the impulse of the will system is determined by the charges of and then , of the thought system by the charges of and then , of the feeling system by the charges of and then , of the judgment system by the charges of and then , and of the power system by the charges of and then .

In example, consider President Zachary Taylor’s natal chart. The software I use prints the celestial longitude of the ten astrological planets in the following order, starting with the moon: 04°09´, 03°07´, 29°05´, 00°37´, 14°21´, 29°43´, 20°32´, 15°56´, 13°52´, 09°30

1. The first step, always, is to scan the list to see if any planet is in the last degree (29°xx´) or first degree (0° xx´) of a sign and whether or not it is retrograde (). Then, if necessary, we must apply the anticipation rules above. Taylor’s chart has two 29° planets that are not retrograde, and , so by General Rule (2) above, ’s charge is unchanged but ’s projective charge in Aquarius (+) is changed to the assimilative charge of Pisces (–).

2. Next we write the charges of all ten planets in the order of the epistemic points of the Consideration Cycle as shown in Figures 6 and A, which is , , , , , , , , , and . Writing Taylor’s ten charges in that order gives us: – – – – – + – + – +.

3. Then we pair this string of ten charges. This gives us ( – – ) ( – – ) ( – + ) ( – + ) and ( – + ), which respectively are the impulses of Taylor’s will, thought, feeling, judgment, and power systems. And when these pairs are shortened to one symbol for each system, as described in Chapter 5, his Impulse Pattern is ( – – B R B ). Of course, before long you’ll be calculating the Impulse Pattern quickly each system in turn.

As another example, consider President Hoover’s chart. His planetary positions are: 07°07´, 18°19´, 00°01´, 29°26´, 07°05´, 00°46´, 10°24´, 11°22´, 00°49´, and 22°41´. First we check the one 29 planet and see that is past 29°20’ of Virgo and is not retrograde, so we consider it to be in the next sign () and change its charge from – to +. Then we check his three planets in the first degree (0) of their signs and see that and are not retrograde and so require no change of charge, while is retrograde and may require a change from Taurus (–) to Aries (+). But, following Retrograde Rule (2), when we check ’s position thirty days later, we find that it didn’t go back beyond 2920’ of Aries by then, so we don’t change its charge. This yields these five pairs of charges, ( + + ) ( + + ) ( + – ) ( + – ) and ( + + ), which when simplified makes Hoover’s Impulse Pattern ( + + R B + ).

Planetary Cycles. It is sometimes useful to know the time it takes the planets to travel through one sign. Dividing a planet’s sidereal cycle by twelve gives us its average time in one sign, and hence with one charge. Pluto () is in one sign for an average period of 20.6 years, Neptune () changes its sign regularly every 13.7 years, Uranus () changes its sign about every 7.0 years, and Saturn () changes its sign about every 2.5 years. The average sign-transit period of the faster planets are: Jupiter () one year, Mars () 57.2 days, the sun () 30.4 days, Venus () 18.7 days, Mercury () 7.3 days, and the moon () 2.3 days.

Figure A. This figure shows the Consideration Cycle with the ten astrological planets and the twelve signs superimposed on it. A principle of my epistemic theory is that nothing can have any meaning to us that is not derived from that Cycle, so the purpose of this figure is to show us, through our correspondence principle, how the various elements of an astrological chart correspond point by point to the different parts of the Consideration Cycle.

So our psychologic theory lets us do what traditional astrologers had never done: objectively define all issues of planetary or sign ‘rulership’ and all the meanings of the planets, the signs, the diurnal divisions called ‘houses’, and the quadrants and hemispheres of a chart. But if my theory is in error on this, it doesn’t mean that the

merely descriptive meanings of traditional astrology are correct, for in major respects they are not. It just means that someone else, someone who also reasons from causes rather than effects, must develop the new philosophic and psychologic theories that will give all things, including the elements of an astrological chart, their true meanings.

Appendix B: Tables of Individuals

The Impulse Patterns of 904 individuals are provided here, in sixteen distinct tables to permit class analysis. The following list shows the number of names on each table, but these include 41 duplications since some names are included in more than one class. See Chapter 8 for general comments on each table and discussions of some individuals listed in them.

Table 1. US Presidents (43)

Table 2. US Supreme Court Justices Appointed Since 1900 (55)

Table 3. US Governmental Figures (117)

Table 4. US Non-Government Political Figures (55)

Table 5. US Revolutionary Figures (31)

Table 6. US Media Figures (84)

Table 7. World Political Figures (130)

Table 8. Philosophic Intellectuals (26)

Table 9. Political Intellectuals (36)

Table 10. Political Literary Figures (30)

Table 11. Academics and Scientists (85)

Table 12. Business Leaders (68)

Table 13. Religionists and Other Mystics (76)

Table 14. Theologians (16)

Table 15. Non-Governmental Assassins or Murderers (20)

Table 16. Nazis of WW II Era (73)

Understanding the Tables

The Birth Date Issue. The first four columns of the tables are Number, Name, Birth Date, and Died. The fifth column is Data that varies with the table, such as the person’s political party, birth place, affiliation, field, or ideology. The main complication here is with the birth date, which must be correct for a correct natal chart and Impulse Pattern. There are two basic problems.

First, the date is not always available. This may be due to lost birth records, especially in past centuries. Often we know the date of a famous person’s death, but not the date of birth, and some people won’t disclose their birth data voluntarily. In Table 10, we might like to know the Impulse Patterns of Shakespeare, Dante, and Molière, but we’d have to guess at their birth dates from other records, and that could mislead us.

Second, our traditionalist encyclopedias and biographical references are lax to the point of negligence in their editorial policy regarding birth data. Some report the year only, while others merely echo a date taken from another source, often without specifying that source or indicating the date’s accuracy or the calendar used. For instance, in its articles on individuals, the Encyclopedia Britannica often ignores the issue of calendar changes in presenting birth or death dates. Also, nonastrological references rarely mention the birth time even when it is known, and many fail to mention the birth place or do so too loosely to determine its longitude and latitude, which are needed to calculate an astrological chart.

Some of this sloppiness stems from the general academic bias against astrologers, an attitude that is less extreme in Europe and Asia. For centuries astrologers had to maintain their own birth records of famous people as best they

could, especially since religious corporations, whose business is mysticism and not realism, controlled almost all academic institutions for centuries. Astrologists today owe much to the efforts of the French psychologists and statisticians Michel Gauquelin (1928-1991) and his wife Françoise (b.1929), who collected much data on European births for their research. Michel’s book The Scientific Basis of Astrology (New York: Stein and Day, Inc., 1969) is still required reading in the field.

Another noble attempt was made by Lois Rodden (1928-2003), who digitized the birth data that she and others had collected over many years. The result was a filterable database of about 30,000 persons with birth and biographical data, some or all which is now available free on Wikipedia. Many of the births are precisely timed, and the data sources are discussed and rated—with the so-called Rodden Rating of birth-data reliability, which goes from best (AA) to worst (XX). I used this database when I could, but its over-emphasis on socially irrelevant sports and entertainment celebrities makes it of less value than it could have been for serious psychologic, social, or medical studies, so I often had to use our inadequate academic references.

The calendar problem is severe as regards many persons born after the Gregorian calendar replaced the Julian calendar in Europe in 1582 and before the former finally became the global standard when Greece converted to it in 1923. The astrological software that I use treats all dates entered in it up to October 5, 1582 as Julian or Old Style (OS) dates, and all dates from October 15, 1582 forward as Gregorian or New Style (NS) dates, which requires its s to convert some dates between 1582 and 1923 to the NS date.

The Encyclopedia Britannica tells us that Italy, , Luxemburg, Spain, and Portugal converted on that first date, losing ten days on their calendar. But all nations did not convert then, mainly because of issues related to religious holidays. In 1584, the Catholic German states converted, and Switzerland did so piecemeal from 1583 to 1812. In 1699 and 1700 Denmark, Holland, and the Protestant German states converted. Britain and its colonies made the change

only in 1752, when the day after September 2nd was designated September 14th, the difference now being eleven days rather than the ten that it was at first. Sweden converted in 1753, Alaska in 1867, Japan in 1873, Egypt in 1875, China in 1912, and the nations of Eastern Europe did so variously from 1912 to 1917. Complicating the situation in , the Republican calendar was used from September 22, 1792 to January 1, 1806. Russia converted to the Gregorian calendar in 1918, but then the difference had to be twelve days, so that the day after February 1st was named February 14th. I found more details on this on the web at tondering.dk/claus/calendar.html.

Speaking now only of those cases where the birth would have been initially recorded with an OS date, I handled this situation as follows. The birth date shown in my table is the date I used to calculate the Impulse Pattern shown. Whenever this date could have been OS but was given by all references with no indication of OS or NS, I put an asterisk after the year to note the uncertainty. When any reference specified that the date it gives is NS, I used that date and put an ‘n’ after the year. I did this also where I could deduce from other facts just which calendar applied for the date given by all references, none of which specified OS or NS. If we know that the date was taken from written birth records before the conversion, it will be OS, but if the individual was the source after the conversion, it will probably be the NS date, since people start using a new calendar to which they are legally subject immediately.

The Time Issue. In the small unnamed column after the Data column, I put a ‘t’ if the time of birth was known. But this notation doesn’t mean that the time used is exact, though it is in most cases, especially for births in Europe, where recording the time on a birth record has long been the rule. When the time is unknown or its accuracy is doubtful, I calculate the chart for noon. Though we lose knowledge of a person’s character in a natal analysis when the time of birth is not known within a half-hour or so, a noon chart seldom yields an incorrect Impulse Pattern. This is so because a planet’s charge is determined by the sign it is in, and because the fastest planet, the moon, stays in the same sign (and so has the same charge) for 2 to 2 ½ days.

I show the use of a noon chart here in three ways: (1) if the moon could not possibly have changed its sign at any time in the day shown, the Impulse Pattern is correct and I leave this space blank; (2) if the moon’s sign could have differed if the birth time was sufficiently before noon, I put an ‘a’ there, for am; and (3) if the moon’s sign could have differed if the birth time was sufficiently after noon, I put a ‘p’ there, for pm. In the two latter cases, the moon would have the opposite charge from the one in the Impulse Pattern shown. The charges of the other nine planets are seldom affected by a 12-hour difference before or after noon, but in such a case (and I recall only one here), we should assume an earlier or later time if we have objective reasons to judge which charge fits the person’s life and statements better.

The charge of the moon determines the charge of the first pole of the will system, so if it is incorrect because the real time is unknown, only the impulse of the will system is incorrect. A simple rule tells us quickly how the impulse of the will system (shown in the W column) would differ if the moon at the true time was not in the sign it was in at noon. If an ‘a’ or a ‘p’ appears in this space, first note if the will impulse shown is strong (+ or B) or weak (– or R), and then understand that the opposite charge for the moon would change the will impulse shown to the other strong or weak impulse. So if the impulse shown for the will system is strong, a ‘+’ becomes a ‘B’ and vice versa, and if the impulse in will is weak, a ‘–’ becomes an ‘R’ and vice versa.

The Impulse Pattern. The next five columns, labeled W, T, F, J, and P, show the Impulse Pattern for the five systems, as explained in the text and Appendix A.

Political Attitude. This column, labeled ‘Attitude’, is the impulse of the power system only, shown here in two columns to allow a count of the power leftists and rightists in the table. In this and the following column, I abbreviate the four power attitudes as Rad, Lib, Con, and Prog (or Pro in combination).

Perspective. Next is the political perspective, by which I mean one’s overall

disposition to practical matters as revealed not just by the power system, but by all five systems. The name of the perspective tells us more about a person’s full political disposition than the power attitude alone can, so it is the best term to use to refer to the political disposition of specific individuals. Accordingly, I use the perspective rather than the power attitude here and in the main text from Chapter 6 forward. The three columns under this heading show if the individual is leftist, conflicted, or rightist in his or her overall perspective to sociopolitical issues, and they count how many people of each type are listed in that table. I devised this tool because the perspective is a better way to refer to our social and political dispositions, and because it is the quickest way to see the often-serious psychologic conflicts that the impulses of all five systems can cause.

The name of a person’s political perspective will have one, two, or three , as determined by these four rules. (1) For this purpose and in certain general discussions, it is best to substitute four words for the four impulse symbols; that is, we should use progressive for B, radical for +, liberal for –, and conservative for R. (2) If the impulse of the power system is the only impulse that is repeated in the whole Pattern, then the perspective has the same one-term name as the power attitude. (3) Otherwise, any impulse that is repeated in the Pattern must also be included in the perspective’s name, and in that case the name of the power attitude is always the first term. (4) And if that rule requires a three-term name, then the name of the will system’s impulse is always its second term.

If rule (2) doesn’t apply, then the perspective’s name will be a hyphenated term (like liberal-progressive or radical-conservative) or a combination abbreviation (like LibPro or RadCon). If rule (2) does apply, I distinguish the perspective from the power attitude either with italics or with the qualifying term ‘straight’. For example, in Table 1 in the Leftist column under ‘Perspective’ we see that the only progressives, or straight progressives, are Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt, and that the only radicals, or straight radicals, are Tyler, McKinley, Hoover, and Bill Clinton. And in the Rightist column, the only liberals, or straight liberals, are the Generals Jackson and Grant, and the only conservatives, or straight conservatives, are Garfield, Cleveland, Theodore Roosevelt, and Wilson.

The Leftist and Rightist columns also show the four two-term labels that are wholly leftist or rightist. Bearing in mind that the first term is always the power attitude, the two such leftist labels are ProRad for progressive-radical and RadPro for radical-progressive, and the two such rightist labels are LibCon for liberal-conservative and ConLib for conservative-liberal. In these four cases, the leftism or rightism of the power system is reinforced by other systems in the Pattern, so there are no conflicts in one’s leftist-rightist political reasoning. But there are conflicts in one’s social reasoning, since each of those perspectives is partly moderate and partly extremist.

The middle column here, labeled ‘Conflicted’, is a very important indicator, for it shows major conflicts in one’s innate character with respect to one’s power, understanding, practical decision-making, and actions. That is, it shows any of the twenty-four cases of conflicted three-term perspectives and any of the eight other two-term perspectives. The two-term labels that are not all leftist or rightist are the four that reveal leftist-rightist conflicts only (ProLib, LibPro, RadCon, and ConRad), and the four that reveal both leftist-rightist political conflicts and moderate-extremist social conflicts (ProCon, ConPro, RadLib, and LibRad).

All twelve of the two-term psychologic conflicts cause confusion in one’s practical reasoning, but the first four, which are only conflicted with respect to the moderate-extremist social polarity, are not as seriously conflicted as the four that involve a leftist-rightist political polarity or the four that involve both conflicts. A common result of all these conflicted perspectives is that the subjects become vacillators, opportunists, or otherwise untrustworthy in their practical decisions and behavior. As I mention at several points in the text, these people often embrace one set of political or social opinions in their youth and change to the other set as they approach mid-life, and then perhaps back again in old age. But more often they hold these contradictory opinions at the same time and jump from one or the other as their personal needs dictate.

As for the three-term perspectives, all twenty-four cases have a ‘1-2-2’ form, where the first term is the power impulse, the second term is the duplicated

impulse that includes the will system, and the third term is the other duplicated impulse. This type of psychologic conflict indicates one who is very confused in his or her basic social and political assumptions, decisions, and behavior, far more so than those with a two-term conflict. It is the sign of a natural maverick or flip-flopper; that is, a person who works for one political program, then switches to another, and perhaps back again to the first or to yet another one, and without ever understanding why.

For instance, the humanist Thomas More ( R B R B + ) was a confused RadConPro, or radical-conservative-progressive—the ‘Rad’ because he was a radical in power; the ‘Con’ because he had two reversals, one of which was in his will system; and the ‘Pro’ because he also had two balanced, or progressive, systems. This confusion is why he was beheaded by the conflicted ConRad (conservative-radical) Henry VIII ( + B + R R ). More was a leftist in power, thought, and judgment, but a rightist in two systems, and those reversals in will and feeling made theism and martyrdom seem reasonable to him. Also, he was an extremist in will, feeling, and power, but a moderate in thought and judgment. Like others with a three-term perspective, he was a maverick because he couldn’t reconcile all these competing impulses, and so couldn’t reach a consistent political position when he needed it most; that is, his rightism and theism restricted his leftist realism and humanism. A true realist would never sacrifice his or her life for any mystical conception.

In the 2008 campaign for US President, two of the prominent candidates were mavericks with a three-term perspective; namely, the ConLibPro McCain ( – B – B R ) and the LibProCon Biden ( B R B R – ), neither of whom should ever have been elected or appointed to any public office. Another such maverick is the ProConRad Charlie Christ (R++RB), a former governor of Florida who quit the Republican Party, was an independent briefly, and then ed the Democrats.

Conflicted people of the three-term types try to hide their basic confusion and opportunism by pretending in public that they have unshakable convictions, but

if they ever wrote out their fundamental political principles, their stark contradictions would be evident. Every day they are ‘winging it’ and there’s no telling where they will be next on any issue. McCain, for instance, has referred to himself as a ‘straight talker’ because he can’t call himself a straight thinker.

Anyone with a three-term political perspective, even if it has no reversals, is seriously confused psychologically, intellectually, and politically. These cases are 6.8% of the 904 people in our tables, but taken with the two-term perspectives that are also conflicted, they are over 49% of all the cases there. And if this conclusion from our tables can be validly extended to the entire population, it means that—contrary to any analysis by power attitude alone, including the many efforts by our academics to describe how ‘liberals’ and ‘conservatives’ differ—about half of all people are neither rightists nor leftists in their overall perspective, but instead are naturally confused over basic social and political issues and are unpredictable in practice regarding these matters.

The hypothetical normal distribution for the three Perspective columns in our tables is about 25% leftist, 50% conflicted, and 25% rightist. This means that any strictly rightist or leftist message by a politician or political party appeals to only one-quarter of the population. The remaining 50%, who we describe as ‘the uncommitted’ or ‘the undecided’ when in fact they are the psychologically conflicted, are indifferent until they have been swayed to one side or the other by the arguments of rightists or leftists, after which they are quite unreliable in their commitment to that side. They are also the people who are most likely to believe that our social and political attitudes are determined by external influences (such as our parents, schools, literature, and media) rather than by our own character and decisions.

Political Type. The political type gives us an overall picture of a subject’s social and political nature before we analyze its parts. One might be a leftist or rightist by attitude (power) and still have the opposite cast to one’s overall disposition, and the perspective doesn’t always show this since its name could be determined by as few as two or three systems. With the political type, each half of its two-

term name refers to a majority of the five systems. Separately, the first term tells us whether three of more of the five systems in the Impulse Pattern are leftist (B or +) or rightist (– or R), and the second term tells us whether three or more of the five systems are moderate (B or –) or extremist (+ or R).

The most logical type is ‘LM’, for leftist moderate, which means that most of the five systems are leftist and, in a separate count, most are moderate. The betterknown leftist-moderates in Table 1 are Jefferson, Adams II, Lincoln, F. Roosevelt, Truman, Carter, and Bush I. ‘LE’ means the half-illogical leftistextremist type, such as Washington, Eisenhower, and Bill Clinton. ‘RM’ means the half-illogical rightist-moderate type, such as Grant, J. F. Kennedy, L. Johnson, Reagan, and Obama. And ‘RE’ means the worst case, the totally illogical rightist-extremist type, such as Adams I, Madison, Monroe, Van Buren, T. Roosevelt, Wilson, Nixon, Ford, and Bush II. And if you’re surprised how well this tool seems to work in the case of our presidents, you won’t be after you’ve applied it to people who you know well personally.

Judgment-Power. The ‘J-P’ column indicates whether one is a humanist, otherist, selfist, or elitist. These revealing moral-political are explained and objectively defined in Chapter 7.

Empathy and Comion. The last column, ‘E/C’, shows if the subject has empathy (e), comion (c), both (ec), or neither (•). As discussed in Chapter 6 in its section on our judgment system, my theory defines empathy as the assimilative impulse at the second pole of the feeling system (point 6 of the Cycle), so only those who are assimilative (–) or reversed (R) in feeling are naturally empathetic, or receptive of others’ ions. And it defines comion as having the assimilative impulse at the second pole of the judgment system (point 8 of the Cycle), so only those who are assimilative (–) or balanced (B) in judgment are naturally comionate.

These indicators are invaluable, because they tell us—quite reliably, as you can

see with your own tests of specific cases—whether one who speaks to us actually does have empathy for our pains and pleasures or comion for our general situation. People who lack both empathy and comion (•) as herein defined, have no innate, or natural, ability to be concerned for others, and their decisions rarely reflect the best interests of other people or living things. Conversely, people with both empathy and comion (ec) can’t live their lives without being naturally concerned for others and otherness. In the two other cases, those with empathy alone (e) naturally care only for people or living things close to them, while those with comion alone (c) naturally care only for classes of people or living things, including humanity as a whole. So empathy is personal and comion is general, and we should , as I discuss in Chapter 7, that humanists and otherists are comionate, while selfists and elitists are not.

Summary. Below the lines of individual data, the columns are totaled and evaluated. On the line headed “Deviation from 25%” I summarize verbally (without showing the totals) how often each impulse (B, +, –, or R) occurs in that table. I consider a variance of 4% or more from the 25% mean to be significant, and I indicate the significant differences, if any, here. For example, in Table 14 which lists theologians, I say “Reversals Very High; Projections Very Low,” which is just what the Cycle tells us we can expect of any group of theologians: many reversed (R) and few projective (+) systems.

The bold-faced box below the count of all impulses is of special interest because it gives us the typical pattern of the individuals in that table, the significance of which, as with all the other numbers in this summary, varies with the relative narrowness or completeness of that table’s class of subjects. To the right of this are the number and percentage of the leftists and rightists in attitude, and of the persons with leftist, rightist, or conflicted perspectives. Then the Type, J-P, and E/C columns are summed and analyzed.

Appendix C: The Psychologic Eras

Table C below lists the psychologic eras and their quadrants for those who wish to do historical research along the lines suggested in the text. I explained there why the twelve periods of Pluto’s cycle are not of equal length and why, due to retrograde motion, its change of signs cannot be given with only one date of transition. The date shown in this table is for the first ingress of Pluto into the sign indicated, but in each cycle it retrogrades back into the prior sign and then reenters the sign shown, sometimes more than once. So, for borderline birth dates falling within months or even a year of the ingress date shown, it is best to confirm Pluto’s longitude with an ephemeris or astrological software and then apply the anticipation rules discussed in Appendix A. The temporary names that I use in the text for six of these eras are also indicated here.

The Sophist Era

The Christian Era

The Scholastic Era

The Classic Era

The Modern Era

The New Era

ENDNOTES

1 But there’s another possibility. If it is so, as some suggest, that the ellipticity of a planet’s orbit indicates how long it has been a planet, then the newest planet is not Venus but Neptune, whose orbit is closer to a perfect circle. In that case, Neptune became a planet in a more-recent cataclysmic event. And if that distant cataclysm, perhaps a ‘collision’ with Pluto, was great enough to be visible from earth, Neptune’s birth or repositioning as a planet may be yet another candidate for the legendary Star of Bethlehem, and we would have to consider that time the beginning of our current epoch and the Venus event as the start of the brief previous epoch. 2 In August 2006, The International Astronomical Union changed its definition of ‘planet’ and now calls Pluto a ‘dwarf planet’ instead. Contrary to what some astronomers have suggested, this change in what they mean by ‘planet’ has no effect at all on astrology. That word, which literally means ‘wanderer’, has had two meanings ever since astronomy was separated from its parent science, astrology: (1) an astronomical planet, or the heliocentric meaning of astronomers, and (2) an astrological planet, or the geocentric meaning of astrologists, which is the correct way to study terrestrial events. In the seven decades that astronomers said that there were nine heliocentric planets (Mercury to Pluto), astrologists claimed that there were ten geocentric planets: the eight astronomical planets besides the earth, plus the sun and the moon, which are also ‘wanderers’ around the earth. But many astrologists also track the dwarf planets and the larger asteroids as astrological planets. We accept astronomers as our authorities on the physical issues they study, but since their science doesn’t study how celestial events affect living things, they are not qualified to criticize a biological science like astrology that does. 3 I coin the term arealism, meaning ‘without realism’, to refer to all constructs that are not realistic, or philosophic, in origin. These include most scientific and all mystical ideologies, including theism, which term I use generically to mean all views that propose one or more deities. Arealism is like the word atheism, coined in the sixteenth century, in that realists and theists both assume a single standard of belief—reality or divinity, respectively—by virtue of which all

contrary beliefs are deemed fallacious. And since the first principle of realism is that reality is the only natural and proper standard of all human reasoning, it is the true opposite of theism and any other mystical view. So a realist is not a theist, but is also not an atheist, since we need this old term now to distinguish arealistic nontheists from realistic ones. 4 Two otherwise outstanding works, Godwin’s An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, and Its Influence on General Virtue and Happiness (1793) and Condorcet’s Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind (1795) were among the several works of the modern era’s first quadrant that led nineteenth-century intellectuals to embrace the unrealistic doctrine of our continual incremental progress, which was then proposed in some form in biology and all the other human sciences—including modern psychology and our social, economic, and political sciences. No intellectual notion is more characteristic of the modern era than this unproven linear conception of our species’ development and progress in general. And yet, showing the regression involved, many academics still insist that the unoriginal and partialistic thinking on evolution by Darwin and Wallace in the second quadrant (1822-1913) of that era was the greatest intellectual achievement of our time. 5 In my psychologically based political theory, as you will see, leftism means individualism and rightism means collectivism. Therefore, contrary to the prevailing view in politics, academia, and the media, any form of collectivism, socialism as well as capitalism, is a rightist and not a leftist political ideology. 6 In the sixties, I noticed that the rightist The New York Times began to encourage its reporters to start their news articles with descriptions of the ‘case history’ of some individual involved, so that it was many paragraphs later before there was any news, which can only be the general conclusions that have meaning for the rest of us. This method is logically backwards, for our general reasoning precedes our particular reasoning; nevertheless, nearly all reporters in the US have adopted it. Examples are helpful, but not until after the general rule they has been stated. The rule is the news; the facts are just some of the anecdotal events that it. 7 Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Notes from Underground, 1864, translated by Jesse Coulson in Notes from Underground/The Double (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1972), p.26-27. Though mere description is the chief method of all literature, great literature like his employs definitive reasoning also. Here

Dostoyevsky validly and insightfully proposed a psychologic cause for people’s habitual mindless acts. 8 Except that any pragmatic theory is in fact a hypothesis that was derived in its subsuming context. Because traditionalists rarely track whole contexts of reference, they unwittingly use the term theory when what they mean is hypothesis. A theory of Reality, or the Whole Event, is not a pragmatic theory; it is the ultimate and only true theory. When anything else is called a ‘theory’, this merely refers to what is a hypothesis in its causatively prior context. For instance, we can speak of a psychologic theory as a whole system, but actually it is born as a partialized hypothesis in a subsuming theory of Reality, which traditionalists don’t try to explicate when they propose a psychologic hypothesis. 9 I reject the old definition of an epistemology as a theory of knowledge, and say instead that it is a theory of reasoning. Knowledge is static, but reasoning is a process, and the process is what we must explain. This change makes the seldom-used adjective epistemic useful to us now, since we never had a good adjective for the noun ‘reasoning’; that is, ‘reasoned’ is often inappropriate, and the adjectival form of ‘knowledge’ is the same as that of the noun and is equally ambiguous. Moreover, epistemic lets us refer to a more fundamental level of human reasoning than the adjectives psychological and logical do; namely, to our secondary reasoning rather than to the tertiary or quaternary reasoning that is derived from it. 10 Note that traditional epistemologists proposed only two epistemic ideas that could be called ‘cardinal’: their notion of a particular idea that they call ‘a percept’ and their notion of a universal idea that they call ‘a concept’. As Figure 1 shows, this is the assumption of extreme empiricists, or tertiary reasoners, who see only the Cycle’s third quadrant and its two cardinal ideas (#3 and #4) and so fail to see our complete reasoning process, which our common logic tells us must have two other cardinal ideas and three other reasoning modes. 11 If we consider the third dimension also, which we are not doing in this work, we would say instead that there are six cardinal ideas, and that each intermediate idea occurs between three cardinal ideas, and so is one of eight kinds, as in the octants of a sphere that result when it is thrice divided into halves. 12 See L. S. Vygotsky, Thought and Language (Cambridge, MA: The M.I.T. Press, 1962), specifically Chapter 5, An Experimental Study of Concept

Formation. 13 We can’t call denial ‘negating ’ because we must distinguish between the complete negations of analytic reasoning and the partial negations of synthetic reasoning. Our traditional of negation are vague and ambiguous, since we never had a universal standard by which to distinguish them. They permit us to say indiscriminately that we ‘deny’ or ‘negate’ either a whole or a part, but now we must observe this semantic distinction: that we deny whole contexts only and negate their parts only. 14 Since this basic distinction must be reflected in our speech, we must use denial to mean complete (analytic) negation and contradiction to mean partial (synthetic) negation. For example, in the square of opposition of traditional logic (where S is any subject and P any predicate), ‘All S is P’ and ‘Some S is not P’ are contradictory propositions, as are ‘No S is P’ and ‘Some S is P’. But this old propositional logic presupposes that every statement exists, so the relations it calls ‘contradictions’ are not complete denials. In that logic, the ‘no’ or ‘not’ compare existents but do not deny an existent, as ‘nothing’ does. So a contradictory of ‘All S is P’ is ‘Some S is not P’, but its denial is no statement at all. 15 I last saw it mentioned in print decades ago, in philosophic works written before the sixties. But in spite of its fundamentality, it is not even an entry in the philosophic encyclopedias I have seen since. It was also mentioned years ago on television, on The Dick Cavett Show, by Paul Weiss, a professor of philosophy who cited it as one of the three major dilemmas of philosophy. (To his credit, one of his others was the problem of finding the missing standard of all human reasoning.) 16 Our logicians should compare this new relational conception to their own square of opposition, in either its Aristotelian or its Boolean form. But we won’t bother doing this here, since the dynamic notion of ideational opposition presented by the Consideration Cycle supersedes those old static notions, which were limited conceptions because they were not psychologically defined. 17 It follows that when Gödel (1906-78) proposed his incompleteness theorems, which held basically that a knowledge system always has propositions that cannot be proved by its own axioms, this was not the universal condemnation of all systems that he and other formalists took it to be. The dilemma his theorems

posed is a synthetic dilemma pertaining only to artificial language constructs (like mathematics) derived from subcontexts, not to a metaphysical system derived from the Whole context. Since his theorems denied the theories, from metaphysics to psychology, that implied his own science, he ignored the distinction between natural and explicated reasoning, and also the fact that all of our language constructs are related by a natural theory that subsumes them and dictates their common logic. No metaphysical principle, such as one proposing that all systems whatsoever are unprovable, can be validly proposed through mathematics, because mathematics is a quaternary language system derived from metaphysics and its abstract . 18 The first quotation is from my Random House Dictionary of the English Language, Second Edition, Unabridged (New York: Random House Inc., 1987), abbreviated as RHD. The second one was by Steven T. Kuhn in his brief entry on formalism for The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 19 This was illustrated by the gestalt psychologist Wolfgang Köhler in his The Place of Value in a World of Facts (New York: Liveright Publishing Company, 1938). Reflecting any formalist’s need to refute empiricism, he offered an excellent criticism of ‘the empirical method’ in his first chapter, The Case Against Science. But then he tried, unsuccessfully, to defend our primary wholistic reasoning, which is the true foundation of gestalt psychology, with the evasive quaternary arguments of phenomenology. 20 “Metaphysics,” Encyclopædia Britannica, from the Encyclopædia Britannica Ultimate Reference Suite 2004 DVD. Copyright © 1994-2003 Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. May 30, 2003. 21 To consider the perspective of a superstring physicist on this issue, I recommend the clearly written popular work Hyperspace, by the physicist Michio Kaku (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). Hawking, in the 1988 work cited above, expresses objections to the superstring view, but that is a debate for physicists. We can only object, from our common logic, to its erroneous claim that there are more than three dimensions in reality. 22 For instance, my Random House Dictionary says of ‘dimension’ that in mathematics it means a property of space, which falsely implies that space results not from nature, but from the quaternary explications of mathematicians.

It then expounds only on the senses that equate the term to measurement, or evaluation. My Oxford English Dictionary (Glasgow: Oxford University Press, 1971), or OED, erroneously proposes measurement as its first meaning, and then gives its second, or derivative, meaning as “Measurable or spatial extension of any kind.” Unlike the RHD, this shows some awareness of the real idea-referent of the term ‘dimension’, but then that notion is overpowered in the OED by our long history of confusing it with measurement, and hence with mathematics— which is a quaternary language that cannot be validly used to define ‘dimension’ or any other abstract term, not even its own foundational ‘one’ and ‘zero’, which can only be defined though our premathematical reasoning. 23 The word psychologic is conventionally used only as an adjective, but I will now use it also as a noun, to replace the phrase ‘psychologic functioning’. This avoids the ambiguity in the term ‘psychology’, which means both that functioning in us and a field of study or professional practice. Literally it means ‘the study of the mind’, which fits the latter senses only, and since ‘mind’ has only been vaguely described to date, I suggest that we use psychology to mean the study of the process of consideration in any organism, and the psychologic as our generic name for that process itself. 24 Gautama was born as Prince Siddhartha, and, unlike Jesus or Moses whose lives have never been proven for certain, he was a real person and not a myth. Scholars agree that he lived for eighty years, but they put his birth year anywhere from 623 to 560 bce. It says something of his time that he was a contemporary of several famous seers, including Thales of Miletus (630?-546? bce), who many scholars regard as the first philosopher. 25 Like Einstein’s correspondence (or relativity) ‘axiom’, Heisenberg’s hypothesis is not a metaphysical principle; it is a ‘principle’ only in the narrowed context of physics. And like our fourth principle, displacement, it only applies to relative motion systems between the limits of Reality, the greatest and the smallest spaces. It is better called the ‘interference’ principle of physics, since ‘uncertainty’ and ‘indeterminacy’ refer only to states of mind, while ‘interference’ and ‘displacement’ can refer to external conditions also. 26 Hence the US Supreme Court’s confusions in its abortion decisions. Solely to serve the religions it favors, this rightist court once again introduced contradictions into our legal system; this time by clouding the established legal definition of a person, as recorded by a birth certificate (which this court also did

in its absurd decisions to give corporations, or fictional ‘persons’, the same legal rights that real individuals have). And rather than continuing to grant legal protection against murder only to a person, it granted it to a nonperson, to a thing being formed. This decision was also wrong because, like all religions in history, it subordinates women to men, who have no such issue, and it intrudes on a female’s natural right to control her private space and internal processes. Moreover, we cannot equate a woman’s choice to terminate her fetus to the murder of a living person, for these are fundamentally different acts. As even the father must recognize, a woman’s womb is not a public matter, no more so than is her mind. A just state must have an overriding social justification for denying our natural rights as individuals, which include the sanctity of our mind, body, or womb. In the case of a womb, this justification does exist in our insanely overpopulated world, but for preventing births, not for requiring them. The Court claimed that the state has a legitimate interest in regulating abortions to protect women’s health and “prenatal life” (as if ‘life’ can mean something that was never born), but this claim is specious. It is true that the state has a duty to protect its people’s health, but a fetus is not yet a person, and that’s the issue here. Also, this duty doesn’t give it a right to oppose what real persons want for themselves or their inner processes, and especially not by discriminating against half of them. To grant our state that right in even one case is to concede its universal right to control the minds, beliefs, and bodies of all of us, and that is a terrifying precedent. 27 A good example is Shirley Temple Black, whose pattern is ( + + + – R ). Her projective impulses in will, thought, and feeling made it possible for her to be, from the age of three, an unbelievably precocious movie star. And as an adult she showed both the altruism caused by her assimilative judgment and the total illogic in power (R) that made her a conservative and a Republican. 28 The conservative behaviorist Skinner is a case in point. In his book Beyond Freedom and Dignity (1971), he seriously proposed that we must all go beyond those two notions, which he said were meaningless. Since I knew from the Cycle that dignity is our abstract self-concept and that the only real meaning of freedom is the power to achieve our wishes, I concluded while reading that book, before knowing his birth data, that he had a reversal in his thought and power systems. And indeed his Impulse Pattern is ( B R – + R ). Another example is the progressive-radical and far better thinker Nietzsche

( + + – R B ), who perfectly displays his judgment reversal—both his nihilism and his critical skills—in Beyond Good and Evil (1886) and other works, where he said we must go beyond all moral judgments. 29 The pathological radical Bill Clinton ( B + + + + ) illustrates this well. With four projective systems he is very self-centered and could have been a creative revolutionist, but his being balanced in will tells us that he has always depended on social approval, which made his long-range motives conventional from an early age. As president, he used this political instinct and his creativity in his four other systems not to change things fundamentally, but rather to maintain an old and corrupt political system ruled by the wealthy, as he is still doing today in the name of his “global initiatives.” 30 We can quantify the social problem of the psychologic reversal as follows. From the 1,024 possible Impulse Patterns, we see that only 24% of us have no reversals, while 76% have one or more—that is, 40% one, 26% two, 9% three, 1% four, and 0.1% five. 31 The Consideration Cycle agrees with Kant on this, that our reason is not a faculty that functions from our partialized observations and fact determinations, but rather one that leads us to them. However, the Cycle identifies the “higher intellectual power” that provokes this faculty, which Kant did not do, by holding that it is our primary reasoning, with its instincts and will system. Also, though traditionalists don’t make this distinction, the nouns reasoning and reason refer to different things: our reasoning is our entire psychologic, or common logic, and our reason is just one part of that process, our thought system. It is therefore incorrect to say, as some of their references do, that our reasoning is the use of our reason, a mere part of it. The verbal term ‘to reason’ is thus ambiguous, since it can mean to use our thought system only or any of the other parts of our psychologic, such as our emotions or judgments. When we mean reasoning in a specific psychologic system, we should use more precise , such as ‘to will’, ‘to think’, ‘to feel’, ‘to judge’, or ‘to decide’. 32 Let’s consider this more generally. The term intelligence was originally coined to mean an attribute of any individual, so it is a universal term in the context of living organisms. But it is a vague descriptive term because we don’t know all the factors that cause it in an organism. We also use it narrowly in speaking of a hypothetical class of living things, let us say people, but here we can only mean the ‘intelligence’ of all people with no discrimination. If we

attempt to measure differences in ‘intelligence’ within that class, then our conception of it ceases to be a universal term and becomes instead a class term; that is, a partial range of intelligence, which we can’t identify without examining all the individuals of that class to measure this thing about people that we have never defined. But since such an examination is impossible with any broad class such as a gender, race, or culture, we must arbitrarily select a small ‘typical’ group in that class; a sampling that cannot truly represent all humans unless (at the least) its are of both genders, of all ages, races, and ethnicity, and of all generations and other time periods that affect our intelligence and reasoning. But even if we ignore that insurmountable problem, we can’t measure ‘intelligence’ until we have defined it, or know all of its causes—some of which are congenital or postnatal astrological factors, all of which are universal abstract factors that can never discriminate by class. So, until we have defined the term causatively, we cannot propose a valid hypothesis, statistical or otherwise, on the so-called ‘intelligence’ of any gender, race, or culture. And anyone who thinks that we can is putting the cart before the horse, or begging the question. 33 The Consideration Cycle makes some distinctions that traditional ethicists haven’t made, but we can’t pursue all these here in our context. I’ll say more on this in a later work when I offer my new moral theory, which was derived from the Cycle. And though that theory confirms some ancient and modern maxims, it is critical of most traditional moral views, especially those that see the source of morality as divine, mystical, or cultural rather than psychologic. Our rightists don’t it that morality is psychologic because that would make it subject to the variations in individual reasoning, and this would invalidate their collectivism and the religious or collectivistic biases in their moral or legal codes, none of which are sound because they are not based on a universal standard of human reasoning. 34 Parents and educators must deal with this problem specifically when they teach the young. Children who are initially amoral cannot be made moral with bibles, myths, fairy tales, fictions, or other lies. How and why we reason morally must be taught to them directly and truthfully, or else they may never have a valid moral code or will develop one too late to be of help to them. The blame for this educational failure lies largely with the arealistic philosophies, religions, and sciences that have long kept us ignorant of human nature.

35 Since my objective definition of the noun ‘liberal’ is any person born with two assimilative impulses in their power system, it contradicts most of the merely descriptive senses (thirteen in one of my dictionaries) of the adjective ‘liberal’. For instance, we can no longer use this adjective in a sense that means generous, favoring progress, or favoring individual freedom, since liberals are acquisitive and so are often not generous, and they are rightists who put artificial collectives, which they oppose changing, before real individuals. But we can allow any sense that suggests open-mindedness or tolerance if it doesn’t suggest having a positive attitude to political progress or liberty, and also reform, if by this we mean what liberals mean by it: an incremental or superficial alteration that changes nothing fundamentally. 36 Some liberal rulers of the past century were: Truman, Nixon, bin Laden, Chiang Kai-Shek, Dayan, Fox, Tojo, Hitler, Hussein, Lenin, Mao, Nehru, Petain, Pol Pot, Salazar, Stalin, Sun Yat-Sen, and Trujillo. As you see, this list includes some of the worst dictators of any time, as would any such list for previous centuries. The three other power types also produce terrible rulers, but not as many and none worse than our compulsively power hungry liberals. 37 The great hypocrisy of the Nuremberg trials after World War II was that the Allies punished Nazis for obeying the immoral orders of their legal superiors even though they expected people of their own nation to obey every command from their leaders without judging its morality. I doubt that any prosecutor there returned home enlightened enough to say, “Our own nation and military must hereafter encourage disobedience whenever a law or command is immoral.” The Cycle’s logical sequence shows us that the fundamental principle morality implies legality is the essence of all law, and that in a sane society morality, and not the literal law or rule, is the only acceptable justification for criminal prosecutions. Since no immoral command can in fact be legal, the person who gives it is as guilty as the person who executes it. 38 But let me make an important point that is not part of our discussions here. This is that, besides the fact that Pluto acquires one charge from six alternate signs and the opposite charge from the other six signs, each sign—as every astrologist knows—is unique in its other qualities and influences on us. So there is a considerable difference in any two ‘selfish’ generations or any two ‘unselfish’ generations even though they are alike in the charge at the second pole of our judgment system. For instance, Pluto in Gemini gives an entire generation many innate characteristics that the Pluto in Leo generation does not

have, and vice versa. Accordingly, there is much more to be studied by our new “generational analysts” if they intend to learn most of the major, innate characteristics that each of our generations acquires from the different position of the major planets in their time. 39 Because pseudodemocracies invariably have more appointed officials than elected ones, which wouldn’t be the case in a genuine democracy, we can’t say that a majority-vote state is a representative government. In the US, for instance, its small unelected Supreme Court—which today has some shameless, openly corrupt rightist justices who are known to have associated with and been compensated by elitists—has power over the entire nation and all of its officials, and this alone requires us to describe this country since its inception as a pseudodemocracy. At any given moment, that court can make our pseudodemocracy an elitist plutocracy, as our present rightist court has already done. It is the antithesis of both a democratic institution and a representative government, and it has the power to keep things that way until we make a wholly new constitution. 40 Sigmund Freud and William C. Bullitt, Thomas Woodrow Wilson, Twentyeighth president of the United States: A psychological study. (London and New York: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1939, 1966). 41 Psycho/History: Readings in the Method of Psychology, Psychoanalysis, and History, edited by Geoffrey Cocks and Travis L. Crosby (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987, ch.10-13.) 42 The British ers of the American and French revolutions came to be known as the British Jacobins, who were mainly an influential literary-political circle in London that included such notables as William Godwin, his wife Mary Wollstonecraft, Thomas Paine, William Blake, Thomas Holcroft, Samuel Coleridge, and William Wordsworth. Wikipedia’s articles on Godwin and his exceptional wife are illuminating on both the political and the emotional levels. They were both emotionalists (+) with judgment problems, and are worth studying further as examples of those two impairments as well as of their basic left-right character conflicts. 43 On the direct relation between Buddha’s teachings and early Christianity, and on the Christians’ use of the Gautama myths to create the Jesus story, I refer you to the interesting work by S. M. Melamed entitled Spinoza and Buddha

(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1933). The author was a Jewish scholar who for cultural or characterial reasons was critical of the ProLib, humanist Jew Spinoza ( B B – – B ). He objected, as Judaism does emphatically, to the realism and individualism that Gautama and Spinoza shared. Though not a Christian, Spinoza seemed like one at times because, like the early Christians, he adopted Buddha’s individualism. In his bibliography, Melamed names several other scholars who saw both the strong Buddhist influence on early Christian thinkers and the fact that the Jesus myth merely parrots, point for point, lies that were told about Gautama for centuries before the Christian era. Those stories include Gautama’s feeding of multitudes, his curing of the sick, his walking on water, his raising the dead, his resurrection after death, his ‘immaculate conception’, and so on, and even that he was born on his mother’s trip away from home, and that his birth scene was visited by distinguished sages who gave him gifts and predicted that this infant would become either a great monarch or, if he left home, a buddha. 44 By ‘the lot’ he meant a unit share of the land, which was the measure of wealth then. 45 Laws, Book V., as translated by Benjamin Jowett. `