Labor Digests 4kf5n

1. SANTOSA B. DATUMAN vs. FIRST COSMOPOLITAN MANPOWER AND PROMOTION SERVICES, INC., FACTS: Sometime in 1989, respondent First Cosmopolitan Manpower & Promotion Services, Inc. recruited petitioner Santosa B. Datuman to work in Bahrain as Saleslady for 1 year for $370. On April 17, 1989, petitioner was deployed to Bahrain after paying the required placement fee. However, her employer Mohammed Hussain took her port when she arrived there; and instead of working as a saleslady, she was forced to work as a domestic helper with a salary of Forty Bahrain Dinar (BD40.00), equivalent only to One Hundred US Dollars (US$100.00). This was contrary to the agreed salary of US$370.00 indicated in her Contract of Employment signed in the Philippines and approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment istration (POEA).3 On September 1, 1989, her employer compelled her to sign another contract, transferring her to another employer as housemaid with a salary of BD40.00 for the duration of two (2) years.4 She pleaded with him to give her a release paper and to return her port but her pleas were unheeded. Left with no choice, she continued working against her will. Worse, she even worked without compensation from September 1991 to April 1993 because of her employer's continued failure and refusal to pay her salary despite demand. In May 1993, she was able to finally return to the Philippines through the help of the Bahrain port and Immigration Department.5 In May 1995, petitioner filed a complaint before the POEA Adjudication Office against respondent for underpayment and nonpayment of salary, vacation leave pay and refund of her plane fare, docketed as Case No. POEA ADJ. (L) 95-05-1586.6 While the case was pending, she filed the instant case before the NLRC for underpayment of salary for a period of one year and six months, nonpayment of vacation pay and reimbursement of return airfare. In its Position Paper,7 respondent countered that petitioner actually agreed to work in Bahrain as a housemaid for one (1) year because it was the only position available then. However, since such position was not yet allowed by the POEA at that time, they mutually agreed to submit the contract to the POEA indicating petitioner's position as saleslady. Respondent added that it was actually petitioner herself who violated the of their contract when she allegedly transferred to another employer without respondent's knowledge and approval. Lastly, respondent raised the defense of prescription of cause of action since the claim was filed beyond the three (3)-year period from the time the right accrued, reckoned from either 1990 or 1991.8 On April 29, 1998, Labor Arbiter Jovencio Mayor, Jr. rendered a Decision finding respondent liable for violating the of the Employment Contract and ordering it to pay petitioner: (a) the amount of US$4,050.00, or its equivalent rate prevailing at the time of payment, representing her salary differentials for fifteen (15) months; and, (b) the amount of BD 180.00 or its equivalent rate prevailing at the time of payment, representing the refund of plane ticket, thus:

On appeal, the NLRC, Second Division, issued a Decision10 affirming with modification the Decision of Labor Arbiter Mayor, Jr., by reducing the award of salary differentials from US$4,050.00 to US$2,970.00 ratiocinating as follows: Accordingly, we find that the claims for salary differentials accruing earlier than April of 1993 had indeed prescribed. This is so as complainant had filed her complaint on May 31, 1995 when she arrived from the jobsite in April 1993. Since the cause of action for salary differential accrues at the time when it falls due, it is clear that only the claims for the months of May 1993 to April 1994 have not yet prescribed. With an approved salary rate of US$370.00 vis-à-vis the amount of salary received which was $100.00, complainant is entitled to the salary differential for the said period in the amount of $2,970.00. On August 7, 2002, the CA issued the assailed Decision15 granting the petition and reversing the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter, thus: Under Section 1 (f), Rule II, Book II of the 1991 POEA Rules and Regulations, the local agency shall assume t and solidary liability with the employer for all claims and liabilities which may arise in connection with the implementation of the contract, including but not limited to payment of wages, health and disability compensation and repatriation. Respondent Commission was correct in declaring that claims of private respondent "for salary differentials accruing earlier than April of 1993 had indeed prescribed." It must be noted that petitioner company is privy only to the first contract. Granting arguendo that its liability extends to the acts of its foreign principal, the Towering Recruiting Services, which appears to have a hand in the execution of the second contract, it is Our considered opinion that the same would, at the most, extend only up to the expiration of the second contract or until 01 September 1991. Clearly, the money claims subject of the complaint filed in 1995 had prescribed. ISSUES: WON respondent agency is liable to principal contract only NO WON cause of action of petitioner already prescribed NO RATIO: On whether respondent is solidarily liable for petitioner's monetary claims Section 1 of Rule II of the POEA Rules and Regulations states that: Section 1. Requirements for Issuance of License. (3) Shall assume t and solidary liability with the employer for all claims and liabilities which may arise in connection with the implementation of the contract; including but not limited to payment of wages, death and disability compensation and repatriation. (emphasis supplied) The above provisions are clear that the private employment agency shall assume t and solidary liability with the employer.

In the assailed Decision, the CA disregarded the aforecited provision of the law and the policy of the state when it reversed the findings of the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter. As the agency which recruited petitioner, respondent is tly and solidarily liable with the latter's principal employer abroad for her (petitioner's) money claims. Respondent cannot, therefore, exempt itself from all the claims and liabilities arising from the implementation of their POEA-approved Contract of Employment. We cannot agree with the view of the CA that the solidary liability of respondent extends only to the first contract (i.e. the original, POEA-approved contract which had a term of until April 1990). The g of the "substitute" contracts with the foreign employer/principal before the expiration of the POEA-approved contract and any continuation of petitioner's employment beyond the original one-year term, against the will of petitioner, are continuing breaches of the original POEA-approved contract. To accept the CA's reasoning will open the floodgates to even more abuse of our overseas workers at the hands of their foreign employers and local recruiters. Respondent's contention that it was petitioner herself who violated their Contract of Employment when she signed another contract in Bahrain deserves scant consideration. It is the finding of both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC - which, significantly, the CA did not disturb - that petitioner was forced to work long after the term of her original POEAapproved contract, through the illegal acts of the foreign employer. We look upon with great disfavor the unsubstantiated actuations of innocence or ignorance on the part of local recruitment agencies of acts of their foreign principals, as if the agencies' responsibility ends with the deployment of the worker. In the light of the recruitment agency's legally mandated t and several liability with the foreign employer for all claims in connection with the implementation of the contract, it is the recruitment agency's responsibility to ensure that the and conditions of the employment contract, as approved by the POEA, are faithfully complied with and implemented properly by its foreign client/principal. Indeed, it is in its best interest to do so to avoid being haled to the courts or labor tribunals and defend itself from suits for acts of its foreign principal. On whether petitioner's claims for underpaid salaries have prescribed It should be recalled that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC similarly found that petitioner is entitled to underpaid salaries, albeit they differed in the number of months for which salary differentials should be paid. The CA, on the other hand, held that all of petitioner's monetary claims have prescribed pursuant to Article 291 of the Labor Code which provides that: Art. 291. Money Claims. - All money claims arising from employer-employee relations accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three years from the time that cause of action accrued; otherwise, they shall be forever barred. (emphasis supplied) We do not agree with the CA when it held that the cause of action of petitioner had already prescribed as the three-year prescriptive period should be reckoned from September 1, 1989 when petitioner was forced to sign another contract against her will.

As stated in the complaint, one of petitioner's causes of action was for underpayment of salaries. The NLRC correctly ruled the right to claim unpaid salaries (or in this case, unpaid salary differentials) accrue as they fall due.24 Thus, petitioner's cause of action to claim salary differential for October 1989 only accrued after she had rendered service for that month (or at the end of October 1989). Her right to claim salary differential for November 1989 only accrued at the end of November 1989, and so on and so forth. Both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC found that petitioner was forced to work until April 1993. Interestingly, the CA did not disturb this finding but held only that the extent of respondent's liability was limited to the term under the original contract or, at most, to the term of the subsequent contract entered into with the participation of respondent's foreign principal, i.e. 1991. We have discussed previously the reasons why (a) the CA's theory of limited liability on the part of respondent is untenable and (b) the petitioner has a right to be compensated for all months she, in fact, was forced to work. To determine for which months petitioner's right to claim salary differentials has not prescribed, we must count three years prior to the filing of the complaint on May 31, 1995. Thus, only claims accruing prior to May 31, 1992 have prescribed when the complaint was filed on May 31, 1995. Petitioner is entitled to her claims for salary differentials for the period May 31, 1992 to April 1993, or approximately eleven (11) months.25 2. Catan vs. NLRC FACTS Petitioner, a duly licensed recruitment agency, recruited private respondent to work in Saudi Arabia as a steel man.The term of the contract provides for 1 year and with automatic renewal. It was renewed when private respondent was not repatriated by his Saudi employer but instead was assigned to work as a crusher plant operator and crushed his ankle by the machine he was operating. After the expiration of the renewed term, private respondent returned to the Philippines, had his ankle operated and incurred expenses.After, he returned to Saudi Arabia to resume his work and was repatriated. Upon his return, he had his ankle treated for which he incurred further expenses.On the basis of the provision in the employment contract that the employer shall compensate the employee if he is injured or permanently disabled in the course of employment, private respondent filed a claim, against petitioner with respondent Philippine Overseas Employment istration. The POEA rendered judgment in favor of private respondent. On appeal, respondent NLRC affirmed the decision. Not satisfied with the resolution of the POEA, petitioner instituted the instant special civil action for certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC. RULING 1.The court said that there is no merit in petitioner’s contention. A private employment agency may be sued tly and solidarily with its foreign principal for violations of the recruitment agreement and the contracts of employment. 2.Even if indeed petitioner and the Saudi principal had already severed their agency agreement at the time private respondent was injured, petitioner may still be sued for a violation of the employment contract because no notice of the agency agreement's termination was given to the private respondent:

3.Petitioner contends that even if it is liable for disability benefits, the NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it affirmed the award of medical expenses when the said expenses were the consequence of private respondent's negligence in returning to work in Saudi Arabia when he knew that he was not yet medically fit to do so. 4.The court said that there’s No evidence introduced to prove that private respondent was not medically fit to work when he returned to Saudi Arabia. Nowhere does it say it the medical certificate issued by the camp doctor that he was not medically fit to work. The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merits. 3. People vs. SADIOSA Facts: Arsenia Conse went to Bayombong, Nueva Ecija in early 1992 where she met Cely Navarro, Marcela Manzano, Erly Tuliao and Benilda Domingo. She enticed the four to apply for overseas employment informing them that she had a cousin who could send them to Kuwait as domestic helpers. Apparently convinced by Arsenia Conse, the four went with her on 5 February 1992 to Manila. Upon arrival, they proceeded to Room 210, Diamond Building, Libertad St., Pasay City where Arsenia Conse introduced the group to Delia Sadiosa. The four then applied for work as domestic helpers. On that occasion, Sadiosa assured the four that she could dispatch them to Kuwait and forthwith demanded P8,000.00 from each of them for processing fee and P1,000.00 for port (P1,500.00 from Cely Navarro). She assured the group that she would facilitate the processing of all the necessary documents needed by them. She further promised them that upon payment of the required fees, they would be able to leave for Kuwait immediately. The four did give Sadiosa the money demanded although on different dates. The latter issued the corresponding receipts therefor. Again, she assured them that they could leave for Kuwait on different dates: Cely Navarro and Erly Tuliao on 17 February 1992 which was rescheduled twice on 19 February 1992 and on 25 February 1992, and Benilda Domingo and Marcela Manzano on 17 March 1992 which was moved twice on 24 February 1992 and on 17 March 1992. However, not one of them was able to leave for Kuwait. When they asked for the return of their money, Sadiosa refused and ignored their demand. Consequently, the four filed the complaint for illegal recruitment against Sadiosa. The information read: "That on or about and during the period comprise (sic) from January 1992 to March 1992, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused Delia Sadiosa y Cabenta, well knowing that she is not a duly licensed job recruiter, by means of false representations and fraudulent allegations to the effect that she could secure employment as domestic helpers abroad for Benilda Sabado y Domingo, Marcela Tabernero y Manzano, Erly Tuliao y Sabado and Cely Navarro y Manzano, did then and there wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously recruit aforesaid persons and collected from them the amount of P8,000.00 each, which amount were given to the accused by the aforesaid complainants upon receipt of which, far from complying with her obligation aforestated, accused appropriated for herself the said amount and failed to deploy complainants abroad. Contrary to law." Upon arraignment, Sadiosa pleaded "not guilty." The trial court found Sadiosa guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale defined by Article 38 (b) and penalized under Article 39 (a) of the Labor Code, as amended by Presidential Decree 1920 and 2018, and sentenced her to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of

P100,000.00. The court also ordered Sadiosa to indemnify Benilda Sabado y Domingo, the sum of P8,000.00; Marcela Tabernero y Manzano, the sum of P8,000.00; Erly Tuliao y Sabado, the sum of P8,000.00 and Cely Navarro y Manzano, the sum of P8,000.00. To pay the costs. Sadiosa appealed. Issue: Whether the information was sufficient to allege illegal recruitment, and that said charge will not be confused with estafa by the facts stated therein. Held: The information is sufficient where it clearly states the designation of the offense by the statute and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. However, there is no need to specify or refer to the particular section or subsection of the statute that was violated by the accused. No law requires that in order that an accused may be convicted, the specific provision penalizing the act charged should be mentioned in the information. What identifies the charge is the actual recital of the facts and not that designated by the fiscal in the preamble thereof. It is not even necessary for the protection of the substantial rights of the accused, nor the effective preparation of his defense, that the accused be informed of the technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. He must look to the facts alleged. Herein, the information filed against Sadiosa sufficiently shows that it is for the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, as defined in Art. 38 (b) of the Labor Code and penalized in Art. 39 of the same Code although it is designated as for "illegal recruitment" only. Under the Code, the essential elements of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale are as follows: (1) the accused engages in the recruitment and placement of workers, as defined under Article 13 (b) or in any prohibited activities under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2) accused has not complied with the guidelines issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, particularly with respect to the securing of a license or an authority to recruit and deploy workers, whether locally or overseas; and (3) accused commits the same against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group." All these elements are to be found in the information. It alleges that Sadiosa, knowing fully well that she was "not a duly licensed job recruiter," falsely represented that she could "secure employment as domestic helpers abroad" for the four complainants. As such, the purpose of the requirement under Sec. 8, Rule 110 to inform and apprise the accused of the true crime of which she was charged, has been complied with. The main purpose of the requirement that the acts or omissions complained of as constituting an offense must be stated in ordinary and concise language is to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged so that he could suitably prepare for his defense. It is also required so that the trial court could pronounce the proper judgment. This gives substance to the constitutional guarantee that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Herein, Sadiosa was fully accorded the right to be informed of the charges against her. The fact that she put up the defense of having accepted the money only in her capacity as an officer of the recruitment agency shows that she fully understood the nature and cause of the accusation against her.Furthermore, it is incorrect for Sadiosa to maintain that the information filed against her contained conflicting and irreconcilable charges of illegal recruitment, estafa under Article 315 par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code and estafa under the same article but under par. 2 (a) thereof. While on its face the allegations in the information may constitute estafa, it merely describes how Sadiosa was able to consummate the act of illegal recruitment — through false and fraudulent representation by pretending that she

was a duly-licensed recruiter who could secure employment for complainants in Kuwait. These allegations in the information therefore do not render the information defective or multiplicitous. Sadiosa could have been validly charged separately with estafa under the same set of facts in the illegal recruitment case, but she was fortunate enough not to have been so charged. Nevertheless, there is no doubt from a reading of the information, that it accurately and clearly avers all of the ingredients that constitute illegal recruitment in large scale. The prosecutor simply captioned the information with the generic name of the offense under the Labor Code — illegal recruitment. Hence, to avoid misconception and misinterpretation of the information, the prosecutor should have indicated in its caption, the offense he had clearly alleged in its body, that the crime charged was for illegal recruitment in large scale. However, such omission or lack of skill of the prosecutor who crafted the information should not deprive the people of the right to prosecute a crime with so grave a consequence against the economic life of the aggrieved parties. What is important is that he did allege in the information the facts sufficient to constitute the offense of illegal recruitment in large scale. 4. People vs. Sagaydo Facts: Accused Linda Sagayado was convicted before the regional trial court of illegal recruitmentin large scale and fur charges of estafa. Complainants Gina Cleto, Rogelio Tebeb, Nata Pita and Jessie Bolinao recounted that theaccused Sagayado propsed and encourage them for employment abroad in Korea. Complainants gave their respective payments to the accused for the processing of their travel papers and port. They were assured of their flight and ofemployment abroad. However, months have ed but their flight never pushed through. They then inquired at the Baguio POEA office whether the accused was a license recruiter to which they receive certification that the accused was not a license recruiter. In her defense, the accused denied having recruited any of the private complainants. She claimed that they came to her voluntarily after being informed that she was able to send her three (3) sons to Korea. While accused itted having received money from complainants Gina Cleto and Naty Pita, she said she used their money to buy their plane tickets. Gina and Naty were not able to leave because the Korean government imposed a visa requirement beginning January, 1992. When asked why she was not able to return the money of Gina and Naty, accusedsaid that she returned the plane tickets to the Tour Master travel Agency for refund but said agency did not make reimbursements. With respect to complainants Jessie Bolinao and Rogelio Tibeb, the accused denied having received money from them. Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale. Held: Yes, Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three or more person, individually or as a group. This crime requires proof that the accused: (1) engaged in the recruitment and placement of workers defined under Article 13 or in any of the prohibitedactivities under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2) does not have a license or authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and (3) committed the infraction against three or more persons, individually or as a group.”

All the requisites are present in this case. Theaccused representations to the private complainants that she could send them to Korea to work as factory workers, constituting a promise of employment which amounted to recruitment as defined under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code. From the testimonies of the private complainants, there is no denying that accused gave the complainants the distinct impression that she had the power or ability to send them abroad for work such that the latter were convinced to part with their money in order to be employed. As against the positive and categorical testimonies of the complainants, mere denial of accused cannot prevail. As to the license requirement, the record showed that accused-appellant did not have the authority to recruit for employment abroad as the certification issued by the POEA in Baguio City. 4. People v. Laogo Facts: Susan Navarro invited Teodulo dela Cruz, Billy dela Cruz, Jr., Dante Lopez, Edwin Enriquez, Rogelio Enriquez, and Gary Bustillos and several individuals to her house in Bulacan, Bulacan to celebrate the town fiesta. Teresita “Tessie” Laogo, the proprietor and manager of Laogo Travel Consultancy, was among the several guests in Susan’s house during the said occasion. During the fiesta, Gary introduced Teodulo to Susan as somebody who could help him find work abroad. Since Susan was Gary’s aunt, Teodulo immediately trusted Susan. Susan told him he can apply as assistant cook and can work in Guam, USA. Upon Susan’s instruction, Teodulo filled out an application form and gave her P3,000.00 after the latter promised to process his application to work abroad. After several months, Susan accompanied Teodulo to Tessie’s travel agency office in Ermita where he paid an additional P15,000.00 for his placement fee. A receipt bearing the logo and name of Laogo Travel Consultancy was issued to him signed by Susan. Months later, when Susan’s promise to send him abroad remained unfulfilled, Teodulo, along with several other applicants, went to Tessie’s office and to Susan’s house to follow up their application, but the two always told them that their visas have yet to be released. Similarly, Billy also met Susan through Gary, who himself was seeking help from Susan to work in Guam. At Susan’s house, Billy saw Dante, Edwin, and Rogelio. Like him, the three were also seeking Susan’s help to work abroad. Susan introduced Billy to Tessie, who promised him that she will send them abroad within three months. After the meeting, Billy issued to Susan two Metrobank checks, dated March 11 and May 10, 2000, bearing the amounts P23,000.00 and P44,000.00, respectively, as partial payment for his placement fee. Billy also went to Tessie’s travel agency in Ermita and personally handed an additional cash of P6,000.00 to Susan, who thereafter gave the money to Tessie. Tessie issued a corresponding receipt for the P6,000.00 cash bearing her signature and the name and logo of Laogo Travel Consultancy. After several months, no word was heard from either Susan or Tessie. Sensing that something was wrong, Billy decided to report the matter to the authorities in Bulacan, Bulacan and filed a complaint against Susan and Tessie. Dante was also introduced by Gary Bustillos to Tessie and Susan. Susan identified herself as an employee of Tessie’s travel agency. The two told him that they can send him and his companions to Guam within the span of three months. Dante paid both Susan and Tessie P6,000.00 to process his papers, covered by a receipt dated May 19, 2000 showing Tessie’s signature. Tessie’s promise, however, turned sour after three months. When he confronted Tessie, the latter told him that he would be sent to a different country. Left without a choice, Dante waited. Again, the promise remained unfulfilled. Rogelio also met Tessie during the town fiesta when Susan invited him to cook for her guests. Susan

introduced Tessie as someone who could send him to work abroad. Eager about the prospect, Rogelio immediately gave his P3,000.00 cash to Susan for the processing of his visa and employment documents. He saw Susan hand the money to Tessie. A week later, Rogelio gave an additional P900.00 to Susan. No receipts were issued on both payments since Rogelio failed to complete the required P6,000.00 placement fee. Months ed but Rogelio heard nothing from either Susan or Tessie. Apprehensive, Rogelio verified the status of the Laogo Travel Consultancy with the Philippine Overseas Employment istration (POEA). From the POEA, Rogelio learned that Susan, Tessie, and Laogo Travel Consultancy did not have any license to recruit workers for employment abroad. Aggrieved, Rogelio, together with his six companions, filed a complaint against Susan and Tessie. Edwin also paid P12,000.00 to Susan as processing fee for his application to work in Guam. Tessie and Susan’s husband were present when he gave the money to Susan during the town fiesta. Susan issued a receipt dated May 16, 2000 to Edwin. The receipt contained the logo of Laogo Travel Consultancy and was signed by Susan with a description which says “Payment was for Placement Fee.” ISSUE: Was large scale illegal recruitment committed? RULING: Recruitment and placement refers to the act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not. When a person or entity, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons, that person or entity shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement. Article 38(a) of the Labor Code, as amended, specifies that recruitment activities undertaken by nonlicensees or non-holders of authority are deemed illegal and punishable by law. And when the illegal recruitment is committed against three or more persons, individually or as a group, then it is deemed committed in large scale and carries with it stiffer penalties as the same is deemed a form of economic sabotage. But to prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown that the accused, without being duly authorized by law, gave complainants the distinct impression that he had the power or ability to send them abroad for work, such that the latter were convinced to part with their money in order to be employed. It is important that there must at least be a promise or offer of an employment from the person posing as a recruiter, whether locally or abroad. In this case, Teodulo, Billy, Dante, Edwin, and Rogelio were promised to be sent abroad by Susan and Tessie as cooks and assistant cooks. The follow up transactions between Tessie and the five persons were done inside the said travel agency. Moreover, all four receipts issued to the said persons bear the name and logo of Laogo Travel Consultancy, with two of the said receipts personally signed by Tessie herself. Tessie and Susan could thus be said to have acted together in making them believe that they were transacting with a legitimate recruitment agency and that Laogo Travel Consultancy had the authority to recruit them and send them abroad for work when in truth and in fact it had none as certified by the POEA. The Supreme Court here ruled in the affirmative. Large scale illegal recruitment was thus committed