Paternity And Filiation Cases 3m2pv

PATERNITY & FILIATION TEOFISTA BABIERA vs. PRESENTACION B. CATOTAL G.R. No. 138493 June 15, 2000 Facts: TeofistaBabiera claims that she was born to the spouses Eugenio and HermogenaBabiera then 65 and 54 years old respectively, at the time of her birth. PresentacionBabiera-Catotal, daughter of the late spouses Eugenio and Hermogena counters this claim, saying that she saw with her own eyes that Teofista was actually born to their housemaid named Flora Guinto. Presentacion testified that Teofista was born through the help of a “hilot” and that her mother Flora forged the Teofista’s birth certificate, making it appear that HermogenaBabiera was the mother by forging Hermogena’s signature. Presentacion further claims that Teofista’s real surname is Guinto, her mother being single; the father, a carpenter, refused to sign the birth certificate. Teofista on her defense, claims that Presentacion has no legal capacity to file the instant petition pursuant to Article 171 of the Family Code which states that only the father could impugn the child's legitimacy, and that the same was not subject to a collateral attack. Issue:

Whether or not such petition may prosper considering Teofista’s claim that Presentacion has no legal capacity to file the instant petition and can the presumption of regularity in the issuance of her birth certificate be upheld. Ruling: Yes, the petition may prosper. The case at bar is not covered by Article 171 for the prayer therein is not to declare that Teofista is an illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to establish that the former is not the latter's child at all. The present action does not impugn Teofista’s filiation to Spouses Eugenio and HermogenaBabiera, because there is no blood relation to impugn in the first place. Presentacion only aims to assail and cancel Teofista’s birth certificate for the void and simulated birth certificate of the latter would affect the former’s hereditary rights. Also, Teofista’s birth certificate cannot be taken into consideration for there were already irregularities regarding the birth certificate itself. It was not signed by the local civil registrar.More importantly, the Court of Appeals observed that the mother’s signature therein was different from her signatures in other documents presented during the trial. The most significant piece of evidence, however, is the deposition of HermogenaBabiera which states that she did not give birth to Teofista, and that the latter was not hers nor her husband Eugenio’s.

JANICE MARIE JAO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al. G.R. No. L-49162 July 28, 1987 Facts: In 1967, Arlene Salgado was introduced to PericoJao. After such introduction, Jao courted Arlene. Not long thereafter, they had sexual intercourse and subsequently, they lived together. 1968, Arlene became pregnant. Jao paid for all the expenses related to Arlene’s pregnancy but when the child, Janice was born, Jao insisted that she could not be the father of such child. When the case was filed with the RTC, the RTC ordered the NBI for a group blood testing. The group blood testing result showed that Janice could not have been the possible offspring of Jao and Arlene. Issue: Whether or not group blood testing could be conclusive evidence to impugn the legitimacy of Janice. Ruling: Yes, group blood testing could be itted as conclusive evidence to impugn the legitimacy of Janice. For the past three decades, the use of blood typing in cases of disputed parentage has already become an important legal procedure.

There is now almost universal scientific agreement that blood grouping tests are conclusive as to non-paternity, although inconclusive as to paternity — that is, the fact that the blood type of the child is a possible product of the mother and alleged father does not conclusively prove that the child is born by such parents; but, if the blood type of the child is not the possible blood type when the blood of the mother and that of the alleged father are cross matched, then the child cannot possibly be that of the alleged father. Medical science has shown that there are four types of blood in man which can be transmitted through heredity. Although the presence of the same type of blood in two persons does not indicate that one was begotten by the other, yet the fact that they are of different types will indicate the impossibility of one being the child of the other. Thus, when the supposed father and the alleged child are not in the same blood group, they cannot be father and child by consanguinity.

COMPULSARY RECOGNITION TAYAG vs. TAYAG-GALLOR GR. No. 174680 March 24, 2008

Facts: On January 15, 2001, respondent, Felicidad A. Tayag-Gallor, filed a petition for the issuance of letters of istration over the estate of Ismael Tayag. The respondent alleged that she is one of the illegitimate children of the late Ismael Tayag and Ester Angeles. On September 7, 2000, Ismael Tayag died intestate, leaving behind two real properties both of which are in the possession of petitioner, and a motor vehicle which the latter sold on 10 October 2000 preparatory to the settlement of the decedent’s estate. Petitioner allegedly promised to give respondent and her brothers P100, 000.00 each as their share in the proceeds of the sale. However, petitioner only gave each of them half the amount she promised. In a Motion dated August 31, 2001, petitioner reiterated her sole ownership of the properties and presented the transfer certificates of title thereof in her name. She also averred that it is necessary to allege that respondent was acknowledged and recognized by Ismael Tayag as his illegitimate child. There being no such allegation, the action becomes one to compel recognition which cannot be brought after the death of the putative father. To prevent further encroachment upon the court’s time, petitioner moved for a hearing on her affirmative defenses. The motion was denied.

Issue: Whether or not respondent’s petition for the issuance of letters of istration sufficiently states a cause of action considering that respondent merely alleged therein that she is an illegitimate child of the decedent, without stating that she had been acknowledged or recognized as such by the latter. Ruling: The appellate court held that the mere allegation that respondent is an illegitimate child suffices. Rule 79 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for the issuance of letters of istration must be filed by an interested person. The Court, applying the provisions of the Family Code which had then already taken effect, ruled that since Graciano was claiming illegitimate filiation under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code, i.e., open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, the action was already barred by the death of the alleged father. In contrast, respondent in this case had not been given the opportunity to present evidence to show whether she had been voluntarily recognized and acknowledged by her deceased father because of petitioner’s opposition to her petition and motion for hearing on affirmative defenses. There is, as yet, no way to determine if her petition is actually one to compel recognition

which had already been foreclosed by the death of her father, or whether indeed she has a material and direct interest to maintain the suit by reason of the decedent’s voluntary acknowledgment or recognition of her illegitimate filiation. RODOLFO FERNANDEZ, et al. vs. ROMEO FERNANDEZ, et al. G.R. No. 143256 August 28, 2001 Facts: The late Spouses Dr. Jose K. Fernandez, and Generosa A. de Venecia being childless by the death of their son, purchased from a certain Miliang for P20.00 a one month baby boy. The boy being referred to was later on identified as Rodolfo Fernandez, the herein appellant. Appellant was taken care of by the couple and was sent to school and became a dental technician. He lived with the couple until they became old and disabled. On August 31, 1989, after the death of Dr. Jose, appellant and Generosa de Venecia executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition dividing and allocating to themselves the estate left by the deceased. Same day, Generosa sold her share to Rodolfo’s son, Eddie Fernandez. After learning the transaction, Romeo, Potenciano, Francisco, Julita, William, Mary, Alejandro, Gerardo, Rodolfo and Gregorio, all surnamed Fernandez, being nephews and

nieces of the deceased Jose K. Fernandez, their father Genaro being a brother of Jose, filed on September 21, 1994, an action to declare the Extra-Judicial Partition of Estate and Deed of Sale void ab initio. They claimed that Rodolfo is not a legitimate nor a legally adopted child of spouses Dr. Jose Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia Fernandez, hence Rodolfo could not inherit from the spouses. Issue: Whether or not Rodolfo is a legitimate or a legally adopted child of Jose Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia Fernandez. Ruling: No, Rodolfo is neither a legitimate nor a legally adopted child of Jose Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia Fernandez. Rodolfo failed to come up with evidences to prove his filiation. The only public document he could show was the Application for Recognition of Back Pay Rights under Act No. 897. 897. Such is a public document but nevertheless, it was not executed to it the filiation of Jose K. Fernandez with him. Rodolfo also claims that he enjoyed and possessed the status of being a legitimate child of the spouses openly and continuously until they died. Open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child is meant the enjoyment by the child of the position and privileges usually attached to the status of a legitimate child such as bearing the paternal

surname, treatment by the parents and family of the child as legitimate, constant attendance to the child's and education, and giving the child the reputation of being a child of his parents. However, it must be noted that possession of status of a child does not in itself constitute an acknowledgment; it is only a ground for a child to compel recognition by his assumed parent. His baptismal certificate, although public documents, is evidence only to prove the istration of the sacraments on the dates therein specified, but not the veracity of the statements or declarations made therein with respect to his kinsfolk. It may be argued that a baptismal certificate is one of the other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws of proving filiation but in this case, the authenticity of the baptismal certificate was doubtful when Fr. Raymundo Q. de Guzman of St. John the Evangelist Parish of Lingayen-Dagupan, Dagupan City issued a certification on October 16, 1995 attesting that the records of baptism on June 7, 1930 to August 8, 1936 were all damaged. The pictures he presented do not also constitute proof of filiation. CAMELO CABATANIAvs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 124814 October 21, 2004 FACTS:

This controversy stemmed from a petition for recognition and filed by Florencia Regodos in behalf of her minor son, private respondent Camelo Regodos. During the trial, Florencia testified that she was the mother of private respondent who was born on September 9, 1982 and that she was the one ing the child. She recounted that after her husband left her in the early part of 1981, she went to Escalante, Negros Occidental to look for work and was eventually hired as petitioner’s household help. It was while working there as a maid that, petitioner brought her to Bacolod City where they checked in at the Visayan Motel and had sexual intercourse. Petitioner promised to her if she got pregnant. Florencia claimed she discovered she was carrying petitioner’s child 27 days after their sexual encounter. The sexual intercourse was repeated in March 1982 in San Carlos City. Later, on suspicion that Florencia was pregnant, petitioner’s wife sent her home. But petitioner instead brought her to Singcang, Bacolod City where he rented a house for her. On September 9, 1982, assisted by a hilot in her aunt’s house in Tiglawigan, Cadiz City, she gave birth to her child, private respondent Camelo Regodos.

Petitioner Camelo Cabatania’s version was different. He testified that he was a sugar planter and a businessman. Sometime in December, 1981, he hired Florencia as a servant at home. During the course of her employment, she would often go home to her husband in the afternoon and return to work the following morning. This displeased petitioner’s wife, hence she was told to look for another job. In the meantime, Florencia asked permission from petitioner to go home and spend New Year’s Eve in Cadiz City. Petitioner met her on board the Ceres bus bound for San Carlos City and invited her to dinner. While they were eating, she confided that she was hard up and petitioner offered to lend her save money. Later, they spent the night in San Carlos City and had sexual intercourse. While doing it, he felt something jerking and when he asked her about it, she told him she was pregnant with the child of her husband. They went home the following day. In March 1982, Florencia, then already working in another household, went to petitioner’s house hoping to be reemployed as a servant there. Since petitioner’s wife was in need of one, she was re-hired. However petitioner’s wife noticed that her stomach was bulging and inquired about

the father of the unborn child. She told petitioner’s wife that the baby was by her husband. Because of her condition, she was again told to go home and they did not see each other anymore. Petitioner was therefore surprised when summons was served on him by Florencia’s counsel. She was demanding for private respondent Camelo Regodos. Petitioner refused, denying the alleged paternity. He insisted she was already pregnant when they had sex. He denied going to Bacolod City with her and checking in at the Visayan Motel. He vehemently denied having sex with her on January 2, 1982 and renting a house for her in Singcang, Bacolod City. TC: gave more probative weight to the testimony of Florencia despite its discovery that she misrepresented herself as a widow when, in reality, her husband was alive. Deciding in favor of private respondent, the trial court declared:

“The child was presented before the Court, and if the Court is to decide this case, based on the personal appearance of the child then there can never be a doubt that the plaintiff-minor is the

child of the defendant with plaintiff-minor’s mother, Florencia Regodos. Issue: Whether or not respondent compulsorily be recognized by petitioner.

may

Ruling: No. Respondent failed to show conclusive evidence as to establish his filiation with petitioner. Aside from Florencia’s self-serving testimony that petitioner rented a house for her, private respondent failed to present sufficient proof of voluntary recognition. A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate. The local civil registrar has no authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child on the information of a third person. More importantly, the fact that Florencia’s husband is living and there is a valid subsisting marriage between them gives rise to the presumption that a child born within that marriage is legitimate even though Florencia may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. Only the husband or in exceptional cases, his heirs may impugned the presumed legitimacy of the child.

With regards the personal appearance of the child, the Supreme Court provided that in this age of genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis, the extremely subjective test of physical resemblance or similarity of features will not suffice as evidence to prove paternity and filiation before the courts of law. SAYSON VS CA FACTS: Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno died on November 10, 1952, and Rafaela on May 15, 1976. Teodoro, who had married Isabel Bautista, died on March 23, 1972. His wife died nine years later, on March 26,1981. Their properties were left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who claim to be their children. On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with Juana C. Bautista, Isabel's mother, filed a complaint for partition and ing of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. It was filed in the RTC of Albay. The action was resisted by Delia, Edmundo and Doribel Sayson, who alleged successional rights to the disputed estate as the decedent's lawful descendants. On July 11, 1983, Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint, this time for the ing and

partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, against the couple's four surviving children. And filed in the RTC of Albay. The complainants asserted the defense they raised , that Delia and Edmundo were the adopted children and Doribel was the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As such, they were entitled to inherit Teodoro's share in his parents' estate by right of representation.

from the estate of the deceased spouses Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, but is affirmed in all other respects.

Both cases were decided in favor of the herein private respondents on the basis of practically the same evidence.

On the question of Doribel's legitimacy, we hold that the findings of the trial courts as affirmed by the respondent court must be sustained. Doribel's birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence. It is one of the prescribed means of recognition under Article 265 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code. It is true, as the petitioners stress, that the birth certificate offers only prima facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence. However, such evidence is lacking in the case at bar.

The Judge declared in his decision dated May 26, 1986, that Delia and Edmundo were the legally adopted children of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson by virtue of the decree of adoption. Doribel was their legitimate daughter as evidenced by her birth certificate. Consequently, the three children were entitled to inherit from Eleno and Rafaela by right of representation. In his decision dated September 30, 1986, Judge Jose S. Sañez dismissed Civil Case, holding that the defendants, being the legitimate heirs of Teodoro and Isabel as established by the aforementioned evidence, excluded the plaintiffs from sharing in their estate. Both cases were appealed to the Court of Appeals, where they were consolidated and affirmed. In Civil Case, the appealed decision is modified in that Delia and Edmundo Sayson are disqualified from inheriting

ISSUE: Whether or not the birth certificate is a formidable evidence ? SC HELD:

Mauricio's testimony that he was present when Doribel was born to Edita Abila was understandably suspect, coming as it did from an interested party. The affidavit of Abila denying her earlier statement in the petition for the guardianship of Doribel is of course hearsay, let alone the fact that it was never offered in evidence in the lower courts. Even without it, however, the birth certificate must be upheld in line with Legaspi v. Court of Appeals, where we ruled that "the evidentiary nature of public documents must be sustained in the absence of strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity."

Another reason why the petitioners' challenge must fail is the impropriety of the present proceedings for that purpose. Doribel's legitimacy cannot be questioned in a complaint for partition and ing but in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party. The presumption of legitimacy in the Civil Code x x x does not have this purely evidential character. It serves a more fundamental purpose. It actually fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be attacked collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that by the proper parties, and within the period limited by law. The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a different purpose.

WILLIAM LIYAO, JR. vs. JUANITA TANHOTILIYAO, et al. G.R. No. 138961 March 7, 2002 Facts: Corazon Garcia alleges that she was cohabiting with William Liyao from 1965 up to William’s death in December, 1975 even though Corazon is still legally married but living separately to a Ramon Yulo. William Liyao himself was legally married to Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao at the time of his cohabitation with Corazon.

Corazon and deceased lived together with the company of Corazon’s two children from her subsisting marriage- Enrique and Bernadette, both surnamed Yulo. In 1974, they begot a child, William Liyao, Jr. It was alleged that William Liyao paid for all the expenses for the subsistence of William Jr. and also that of Corazon and her two children from her subsisting marriage during their cohabitation. William Jr. was said to be in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of the child of said William Liyao, having been recognized and acknowledged as such child by the decedent during his lifetime. Upon the death of his alleged father, William Jr. prays that he be recognized as an illegitimate child and an heir by the family of the deceased from his subsisting marriage. The deceased’s legitimate children on their part, alleges that the deceased could not have fathered petitioner for their father and mother have never been separated. Issue: Whether or not petitioner may impugn his legitimacy with that of his mother’s subsisting marriage and establish his claim of filiation with the late William Liyao. Ruling: Holding that Corazon’s marriage with Ramon Yulo is still subsisting, it is presumed that petitioner is the legitimate child of Ramon Yulo and not the illegitimate child of William Liyao. Under the New Civil Code, a child born and

conceived during a valid marriage is presumed to be legitimate. This presumption is grounded in a policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy. The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary. Article 255 of the New Civil Code provides: “Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.” No evidence other than that of physical impossibility of the husband having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child can be itted. Such physical impossibility may be caused by: (a) By the impotence of the husband; (b) by the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such a way that access was not possible; (c) by the serious illness of the husband. Petitioner cannot impugn his own legitimacy. Article 255 of the Civil Code provides that only the husband, or in proper cases, his heirs under the conditions set forth under Article 262 of the Civil Code can impugn such legitimacy. And, in the case at bar, the petition was initiated by petitioner himself through his mother, Corazon Garcia, and not through Enrique and Bernadette Yulo who are the undisputed children of Corazon

and Ramon Yulo. The child himself cannot choose his own filiation. JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS vs. ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN GAMBOA DIZON G.R. No. 142877 October 2, 2001 Facts: Danilo and Carolina de Jesus were married on 23 August 1964. It was within this marriage that the petitioners, Jinkie and Jacqueline were born. In 1991 though, Juan Dizon acknowledged petitioners as his own illegitimate children through a notarized document. Thereafter, Juan died intestate and petitioners filed a prayer that they be given their legitime and be recognized as illegitimate children by the surviving spouse and legitimate children of Juan Dizon. Issue: Whether or not petitioners’ legitimacy as children of Danilo may be impugned and they be recognized as illegitimate children of Juan Dizon. Ruling: No. The petitioners were born under the subsisting marriage of Danilo and Carolina. It is presumed that children born in wedlock are legitimate. This presumption becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300

days which immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact the husband and wife are living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. And only the father, or in exceptional instances the latter's heirs, can contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Since the petitioners failed to show records of the impossibility of their parents’ access to each other during the first 120 days of the 300 days which preceded their birth, they cannot assail their presumed legitimacy. Failing therefore to impugn their legitimacy, petitioners cannot claim that they are the acknowledged illegitimate children of the deceased, Juan Dizon.

Ma. Theresa had already married a Mario Gopiao nine years before their marriage. Such marriage of Ma. Theresa to Mario was never annulled. The trial court ruled that Gerardo and Ma. Theresa’s marriage was bigamous and that her marriage to Mario is valid and subsisting. It declared the child as being illegitimate. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision but on appeal, reversed its ruling and held that Jose Gerardo was not the son of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during her first marriage.

GERARDO B. CONCEPCION vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al. G.R. No. 123450 August 31, 2005

Ruling: Yes, a child born out of a bigamous marriage is considered legitimate. The legitimacy would come from the validity of the first marriage and not on the bigamous marriage for that bigamous marriage is void from the very beginning(ab initio). Ma. Theresa was married to Mario Gopiao, and that she had never entered into a lawful marriage with the Gerardo since the so-called “marriage” with the latter was void ab initio. Ma. Theresa was legitimately married to Mario Gopiao when the child Jose

Facts: Gerardo B. Concepcion and Ma. Theresa Almontewere married on December 29, 1989. A year later, they begot Jose Gerardo. On December 19, 1991, Gerardo filed a petition to annul his marriage to Ma. Theresa on the ground of bigamy. This was because it was found out that

Issues: a) Whether or not the child born out of a bigamous marriage is considered legitimate. b) Whether or not Gerardo could assail Jose Gerardo’s legitimacy.

Gerardo was born on December 8, 1990. Therefore, the child Jose Gerardo – under the law – is the legitimate child of the legal and subsisting marriage between Ma. Theresa and Mario Gopiao; he cannot be deemed to be the illegitimate child of the void and non-existent ‘marriage’ between Ma. Theresa and Gerardo.The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. Article 164 of the Family Code is clear. A child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate. As a guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code provides that the child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. No, Gerardo is not in a position to assail Jose Gerardo’s legitimacy. He has no standing in law to dispute the status of Jose Gerardo. Only Ma. Theresa’s husband Mario or, in a proper case, his heirs, who can contest the legitimacy of the child Jose Gerardo born to his wife.Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very beginning; he never became her husband and thus never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child.

ACTION TO CLAIM LEGITIMACY EDGARDO A. TIJING vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 125901 March 8, 2001 Facts: Edgardo and BienvenidaTijing are husband and wife, they have six children, youngest of whom is Edgardo Tijing Jr. In August 1989, Angelita Diamante fetched Bienvenida for an urgent laundry job. Bienvenida left to Angelita her 4-month old child, Edgardo Jr. as she usually let Angelita take care of her child while she was doing laundry. When Bienvenida returned from work to get her son, Angelita was nowhere to be found, and despite her and her husband’s efforts, they could not locate Angelita and their child’s whereabouts. Four years later, Bienvenida read about the death of Tomas Lopez, the common-law husband of Angelita, whose interment is in Bulacan. She went there and allegedly saw her son Edgardo Jr., now named John Thomas Lopez. John is now being claimed by Angelita as her own son, sired by her common-law husband Tomas Lopez during their cohabitation. Bienvenida now alleges that the child cannot possibly be born to Angelita and Tomas for it was the latter’s own brother who itted that Tomas was rendered sterile, caused by an accident. Tomas begot no children from his legal marriage nor with the cohabitation with

Angelita. Tomas’ brother even testified that Tomas himself itted to him that the subject child was adopted. Issue: Who among the claimants is the true parent of the subject child. Ruling: Bienvenida. It was Bienvenida who was able to produce the competent evidences to establish the child’s filiation with her and her husband. She substantiated her claim with sufficient clinical records, presenting the proper and credible witnesses who assisted her in her child’s birth. Not to mention the fact that it could be readily observed that Bienvenida and the child have strong similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes. Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is competent and material evidence to establish parentage. Whereas, Angelita had been known to have undergone ligation years before the alleged birth of the child and the ission of Tomas’ own brother that Tomas was sterile makes it impossible that he and Angelita could have produced subject child. More importantly, the birth certificate of the child stated Tomas Lopez and private respondent were legally married which is false because even private respondent had itted she is a common-law wife. This false entry puts to doubt the other data in said birth certificate.

AGUSTIN V. PROLLAMANTE

Facts: Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martin’s alleged biological father, petitioner Arnel Agustin, for and pendente lite before the Quezon City RTC. In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe, after which they entered into an intimate relationship. Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday but despite Arnel’s insistence on abortion, Fe decided to give birth to their child out of wedlock, Martin. The baby’s birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered the prenatal and hospital expenses but later refused Fe’s repeated requests for Martin’s despite his adequate financial capacity and even suggested to have the child committed for adoption. Arnel also denied having fathered the child. On January 2001, while Fe was carrying fivemonth old Martin at the Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club parking lot, Arnel sped off in his van, with the open car door hitting Fe’s leg. This

incident was reported to the police. Several months later, Fe was diagnosed with leukemia and has, since then, been undergoing chemotherapy. Fe and Martin then sued Arnel for . Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing, which Arnel opposed by invoking his constitutional right against selfincrimination and moving to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action. The trial court denied the MTD and ordered the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing at the expense of the applicants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, thus this petition.

Issue: W/N the respondent court erred in denying the petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss and directing parties to subject to DNA paternity testing and was a form of unreasonable search.

Held:

No. The trial court properly denied the petitioner’s motion to dismiss because the private respondents’ complaint on its face showed that they had a cause of action against the petitioner. The elements of a cause of action are: (1) the plaintiff’s primary right and the defendant’s corresponding primary duty, and (2) the delict or wrongful act or omission of the defendant, by which the primary right and duty have been violated. The cause of action is determined not by the prayer of the complaint but by the facts alleged. No. In Ople v. Torres, the Supreme Court struck down the proposed national computerized identification system embodied in istrative Order No. 308, we said:In no uncertain , we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that enhance public service and the common good... Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards that enhance public service and the common good. Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches and seizures, and the infringement of privacy of communication where

the constitutional right to privacy has been critically at issue. Petitioner’s case involves neither and, as already stated, his argument that his right against self-incrimination is in jeopardy holds no water.

For too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by fathers who choose to deny their existence. The growing sophistication of DNA testing technology finally provides a much needed equalizer for such ostracized and abandoned progeny. We have long believed in the merits of DNA testing and have repeatedly expressed as much in the past. This case comes at a perfect time when DNA testing has finally evolved into a dependable and authoritative form of evidence gathering. We therefore take this opportunity to forcefully reiterate our stand that DNA testing is a valid means of determining paternity. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Court of Appeals decision is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

IN RE: CHANGE OF NAME OF JULIAN LIN WANG

Facts: Petitioner Julian Lin Wang a minor represented by his mother Anna Lisa Wang filed a petition dated 19 September 2002 for change of name of entry in the civil registry of Julian Lin Wang. Petitioner sought to drop his middle name and have his ed name changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang. Petitioner theorizes that it would be for his best interest to drop his middle name as this would help him adjust more easily to integrate himself into Singaporean society.

Issue: Whether or not the law the law provides for his middle name to be changed.

Ruling: The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be proper and reasonable cause for which the change is sought. to justify a request for the change of name, the petitioner must show not only some proper reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true

and official name. Among the grounds for the change of name which have been held valid are: a.) When the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce. b.) When the change results as a legal consequence c.) When the change will avoid confusion. d.) When one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name and was not aware of the alien parentage. e.) A sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name and f.) When the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose. BRIONES V. MIGUEL

Facts: On March 5, 2002, petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus to obtain custody of his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda.The petitioner alleges that the minor Michael Kevin Pineda is his illegitimate son with respondent Loreta P. Miguel. He was born in Japan on September 17, 1996 as evidenced by his Birth Certificate. The respondent Loreta P. Miguel is now married to a Japanese national and is

presently residing in Japan. The petitioner prays that the custody of his son Michael Kevin Pineda be given to him as his biological father and has demonstrated his capability to and educate him. Issue: Whether or not the natural father may be denied the custody and parental care of his own child in the absence of the mother who is away. Ruling: Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed an illegitimate child of petitioner and Respondent Loreta. Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines explicitly provides that "illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to in conformity with this Code." This is the rule regardless of whether the father its paternity. Parental authority over recognized natural children who were under the age of majority was vested in the father or the mother recognizing them. If both acknowledge the child, authority was to be exercised by the one to whom it was awarded by the courts; if it was awarded to both, the rule as to legitimate children applied. In other words, in the latter case, parental authority resided tly in the father and the mother.

De santos vs Angeles Facts: -

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Antonio De Santos married Sofia Bona and had a child, which is herein petitioner (Maria Rosario De Santos) Their relationship became strained to the breaking point, thereafter Antonio fell in love with a fellow doctor, Conchita Talag (herein private respondent) Antonio sought a formal dissolution of his first marriage thru a divorce from a Nevada court, and aware that said decree was a worthless scrap of paper in our jurisdiction, they proceeded to Tokyo and got married, and they had eleven children Sofia died in Guatemala, and less than a month later, Antonio and private respondent got married in tagaytay under Philippine laws Antonio died intestate having properties with an estimated value of 15,000 Private respondent went to court asking for letter of istration in her favor and alleged that the decedent was survived by twelve legitimate heirs, namely, herself, their ten surviving children and petitioner, which were granted by the court there having no opposition. Six years after, petitioner decide to intervene and argued that private respondent’s children were illegitimate where the court ruled in favor of private respondent and declared the children

legitimated and thereupon instituted and declared them as heirs of Antonio Petitioner sought reconsideration but was denied, hence this petition

Issues: -

WON court erred in declaring the ten children of private respondent as legitimated

Held: -

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Yes Art 269 of the Civil Code provides that “only natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, are natural” In the present case, it is clear that all the children born to private respondent and Antonio were conceived and born when the latter’s valid marriage to petitioner’s mother was still subsisting. The marriage under question is considered void from the beginning because bigamous, contracted when a prior valid marriage was still subsisting. It follows that the children begotten of such union cannot be considered natural children proper for at the time of their conception, their parents were disqualified from marrying each other due to the impediment of a prior subsisting marriage.

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In this case, the term natural children by legal fiction was invented, thus giving rise to another category of illegitimate children, clearly not to be confused with natural children as defined in art 269 but by fiction of law to be equated with acknowledged natural children and consequently, enjoying the status, rights and obligations of the latter. Private respondent contends that, an acknowledged natural children have the right to be legitimated, hence respondent’s children have the right to be legitimated, as in fact they were deemed legitimated by the subsequent valid marriage of their parents in the Philippines This contention of private respondent is not meritorious, legitimation is not a right which is demandable by a child, it is a privilege available only to natural children proper, as defined under art 269. Although natural children by legal fiction have the same rights as acknowledged natural children, it is a quantum leap in the syllogism to conclude that, they likewise have the right to be legitimated. Art 269 itself clearly limits the privilege of legitimation to natural children as defined thereunder, there was, therefore from the outset, an intent to exclude children conceived or born out of illicit relations from the purview of the law. Much more is involved here than the mere privilege to be legitimized. The rights of other children like the petitioner in this case, may be adversely affected as her testamentary share

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may well be reduced in the event that her ten surviving half siblings should be placed on par with her, when each of them is rightfully entitled to only half of her share. Wherefore, petitioner is declared as the sole legitimate child of the decedent

ADOPTION Republic v. CA G.R. No. 92326 January 24, 1992 On February 2, 1988, Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat, then six (6) years old and who had been living with her family since he was four (4) months old, before the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City. The petition for adoption was filed by private respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles on February 2, 1988, when the law applicable was Presidential Decree No. 603, the Child and Youth Welfare Code. Under said code, a petition for adoption may be filed by either of the spouses or by both of them. However, after the trial court rendered its decision and while the case was pending on appeal in the Court of Appeals, Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code, took effect on August 3, 1988. Under the said new law, t adoption by husband and wife is mandatory. Petitioner contends that the petition for adoption should be dismissed outright for it was filed solely by private respondent without ing her husband, in violation of Article 185 of the Family Code which requires t adoption by the spouses. It argues that the Family Code must be applied retroactively to the petition filed by Mrs. Bobiles, as the latter did not acquire a vested right to adopt Jason Condat by the mere filing of her petition for adoption. Issues: 1.) Can the Family Code be applied retroactively to the petition for adoption filed by Zenaida C. Bobiles and;

2.) Granting that the FC should be applied retroactively should the adoption in favor of private respondent only, her husband not being a petitioner. Held: 1.)Article 246 of the Family Code provides for retroactive effect of appropriate relevant provisions thereof, subject to the qualification that such retrospective application will not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder. The term expresses the concept of present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice should be protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately just and imperative right which enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny. Vested rights include not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption from new obligations created after the right has vested. Under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, private respondent had the right to file a petition for adoption by herself, without ing her husband therein. When Mrs. Bobiles filed her petition, she was exercising her explicit and unconditional right under said law. Upon her filing thereof, her right to file such petition alone and to have the same proceed to final adjudication, in accordance with the law in force at the time, was already vested and cannot be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law. When private respondent filed her petition in Special Proceeding No. 1386, the trial court acquired jurisdiction thereover in accordance with the governing law. Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the jurisdiction of the court is

determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. We do not find in the present case such facts as would constitute it as an exception to the rule. 2.)Petitioner argues that, even assuming that the Family Code should not apply retroactively, the Court of Appeals should have modified the trial court's decision by granting the adoption in favor of private respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles only, her husband not being a petitioner. We do not consider this as a tenable position and, accordingly, reject the same. Although Dioscoro Bobiles was not named as one of the petitioners in the petition for adoption filed by his wife, his affidavit of consent, attached to the petition as Annex "B" and expressly made an integral part thereof, shows that he himself actually ed his wife in adopting the child. The pertinent parts of his written consent and the foregoing declarations, and his subsequent confirmatory testimony in open court, are sufficient to make him a co-petitioner. Under the circumstances then obtaining, and by reason of his foreign residence, he must have yielded to the legal advice that an affidavit of consent on his part sufficed to make him a party to the petition. This is evident from the text of his affidavit. Punctiliousness in language and pedantry in the formal requirements should yield to and be eschewed in the higher considerations of substantial justice. The future of an innocent child must not be compromised by arbitrary insistence of rigid adherence to procedural rules on the form of pleadings. HERBERT CANG vs CA G.R. No. 105308 September 25, 1998

Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano are married and begot 3 children Keith, Charmaine and Joseph. Anna learned of her husband extra marital affair hence filed a petition for legal separation which the court granted. Herbert went to the US to get divorce, the court granted it and granted sole custody of the children to Anna. Herbert took an American wife and thus became a naturalized American citizen. He divorced his American wife and never remarried. When Herbert was working in the US, he remitted money for his children's expenses and another, deposited in the bank in the name of his children. Ronald and Maria Clavano ( siblings of Anna ) filed for the adoption of the 3 children. Anna Marie likewise filed an affidavit of consent alleging that her husband had "evaded his legal obligation to " his children and that her husband had "long forfeited his parental rights" over the children. Upon learning, Herbert immediately returned to the Philippines and filed an opposition Pending resolution of the petition for adoption, Herbert moved to reacquire custody. Therefore RTC issued an order finding that Anna in effect relinquished custody over the children and, therefore, such custody should be transferred to the father. The court then directed the Clavanos to deliver custody over the minors to Herbert. Thereafter RTC issued a decree granting the petition for adoption of the 3 children to the Clavanos. Upon appeal, Herbert asserted that the petition for adoption was fatally defective and tailored to divest him of parental authority because: (a) he did not have a written consent to the adoption; (b) he never abandoned his children; (c) Keith and Charmaine did

not properly give their written consent; and (d) the petitioners for adoption did not present as witness the representative of the Department of Social Welfare and Development who made the case study report required by law. CA affirmed the decree of adoption on the ground that the consent of the parent who has abandoned the child is not necessary.

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Issue: WON Herbert’s consent is required for adoption to be valid? WON Herbert has abandoned their children w/c dispenses his required consent? Held: YES and NO When Clavanos filed the petition for adoption on September 25, 1987, the applicable law was the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 91. It is thus evident that notwithstanding the amendments to the law, the written consent of the natural parent to the adoption has remained a requisite for its validity. In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment imports "any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child." It means "neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and which parents owe their children."  Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment.

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He maintained regular communication with his wife and children through letters and telephone. He used to send packages by mail and catered to their whims. The conclusion of the courts below that petitioner abandoned his family needs more evidentiary other than his inability to provide them the material comfort that his ittedly affluent in-laws could provide. There should be proof that he had so emotionally abandoned them that his children would not miss his guidance and counsel if they were given to adopting parents. The letters he received from his children prove that petitioner maintained the more important emotional tie between him and his children. The children needed him not only because he could cater to their whims but also because he was a person they could share with their daily activities, problems and triumphs the actuality that petitioner carried on an affair with a paramour cannot be taken as sufficient basis for the conclusion that petitioner was necessarily an unfit father. "bad" husband does not necessarily make a "bad" father. The law is clear that either parent may lose parental authority over the child only for a valid reason. No such reason was established in the legal separation case.

Angelie CERVANTES vs FAJARDO G.R. No. 79955 January 27, 1989

Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon are common law spouses who had a daughter named Angelie Anne Cervantes. Fajardo offered Angelie for adoption to Cervantes spouses. Cervantes filed petition for adoption w/ the RTC w/c granted their petition. Then Cervantes, received a letter from the respondents demanding to be paid the amount of P150,000.00, otherwise, they would get back their child. Cervantes refused to accede to the demand. Gina took the child and refused to return Angelie saying that she had no desire to give up her child for adoption and that the affidavit of consent to the adoption she had executed was not fully explained to her. However, she would return the child to the petitioners if she were paid the amount of P150,000.00. Cervantes filed a petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Issue: WON the writ should be issued? Held: YES In all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the foremost consideration is the moral, physical and social welfare of the child concerned, taking into the resources and moral as well as social standing of the contending parents. Never has this Court deviated from this criterion.  Fajardos’ common law relationship will not accord the minor that desirable atmosphere where she can grow and develop into an upright and moral-minded person  Gina also has a child with another married man w/c became Angelie’s sister. For a minor (like Angelie Anne C. Cervantes) to grow up with a sister whose "father" is not her true father,

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could also affect the moral outlook and values of said minor. Upon the other hand, Cervantes who are legally married appear to be morally, physically, financially, and socially capable of ing the minor and giving her a future better than what the natural mother

Besides, Angelie has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge and consent of respondents. A decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the authority vested in natural parents over the adopted child, except where the adopting parent is the spouse of the natural parent of the adopted.  In this case, parental authority over the adopted shall be exercised tly by both spouses.  Adopting parents have the right to the care and custody of the adopted child and exercise parental authority and responsibility over him.

MACARIO TAMARGO vs CA G.R. No. 85044 June 3, 1992 Adelberto Bundoc, who is 10 years old, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. Damages was filed by by petitioner Macario Tamargo Jennifer's adopting parent against Sps Bundoc while they were still living. Prior to the incident, spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt Adelberto. The petition for adoption was granted after the said incident. In their Answer, spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the result of the foregoing petition for adoption, claimed that not they, but rather the adopting parents sps. Rapisura were indispensable parties to the action since parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the successful petition for adoption was filed. RTC dismissed the complaint ruling that natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not indispensable parties to the action. They filed an appeal. Spouses Bundoc argues that parental authority was vested in the latter as adopting parents as of the time of the filing of the petition for adoption that is, before Adelberto had shot Jennifer which an air rifle. The Bundoc spouses contend that they were therefore free of any parental responsibility for Adelberto's allegedly tortious conduct. Under Article 36 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, a decree of adoption shall be entered, which shall be effective he date the original petition was filed. Issue:

WON the effects of adoption, insofar as parental authority is concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to make the adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed against their adopted child, for acts committed by the latter, when actual custody was yet lodged with the biological parents? Held: NO The law imposes civil liability under vicarious liability, upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by a minor child who lives with them.  Parental liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities of parents — their parental authority — which includes the instructing, controlling and disciplining of the child.  The shooting occured when parental authority was still lodged in Bundoc spouses, the natural parents of the minor Adelberto.  It would thus follow that the natural parents who had then actual custody of the minor Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages. Under Article 58 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, Parents and guardians are responsible for the damage caused by the child under their parental authority in accordance with the civil Code. Article 221 of the Family Code of the Philippines has similarly insisted upon the requisite that the child, doer of the tortious act, shall have beer in the actual custody of the parents sought to be held liable for the ensuing damage.

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parental authority cannot be properly regarded as having been retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting parents at the time the air rifle shooting happened. retroactive effect may not be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when adopting parents had no actual or physically custody over the adopted child Retroactive affect may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child.

Under the above Article 35, parental authority is provisionally vested in the adopting parents during the period of trial custody before the issuance of a decree of adoption, precisely because the adopting parents are given actual custody of the child during such trial period.  trial custody period either had not yet begun or had already been completed at the time of the air rifle shooting  actual custody of Adelberto was then with his natural parents, not the adopting parents.

ISABELITA LAHOM vs JOSE SIBULO G.R. No. 143989 July 14, 2003 Spouses Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom are married but was not blessed w/ a child. They decided to take into their care Isabelita's nephew Jose Melvin Sibulo. After several years, they decided to file a petition for adoption. RTC issued an order granting the petition that made all the more intense than before the feeling of affection of the spouses for Melvin. A sad turn of events came many years later. Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption because Jose Melvin refused to take up the surname Lahom. Prior to the institution of the case, RA 8552 or the Domestic Adoption Act, went into effect. The new statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption. Therefore Jose Melvin moved for the dismissal of the petition on this grounds. Lahom argued that R.A. No. 8552 should not retroactively apply to cases where the ground for rescission of the adoption vested under the regime of then Article 348 of the Civil Code and Article 192 of the Family Code. Petition is ordered dismissed on the ground that RA 8552 deleted the right of an adopter to rescind an adoption earlier granted under the Family Code and it appears clear that the legal grounds for the petition have been discovered and known to petitioner for more than five (5) years hence, the action if any, had already prescribed. Hence appeal.

Issue: WON adoption decreed on 05 May 1972 may still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552? WON Lahom’s grounds already prescribed? Held: YES and YES R.A. No. 8552 secured these rights and privileges for the adopted. The new law withdrew the right of an adopter to rescind the adoption decree and gave to the adopted child the sole right to sever the legal ties created by adoption.  In Republic vs. Court of Appeals, the Court concluded that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. The Supreme Court ruled that the controversy should be resolved in the light of the law governing at the time the petition was filed.  It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new law, had already abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter under the Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind a decree of adoption.  While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a consequential right to rescind the adoption decree even in cases where the adoption might clearly turn out to be undesirable, it remains, nevertheless, the bounden duty of the Court to apply the law. The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the

requirements of a vested right entitled to protection. Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of an adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to regulation by the State. Concomitantly, a right of action given by statute may be taken away at anytime before it has been exercised.

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005 Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name Astorga be changed to "Garcia," her mother’s surname, and that her surname "Garcia" be changed to "Catindig," his surname. The court granted the decree of adoption but named Stephanie as “STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG.” Cantindig filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name. RTC denied this petition on the ground that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle name. The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees with petitioner that Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle name, the surname of her natural mother because it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanie’s filiation with her natural mother because under Article 189 of the Family Code, she remains to be an intestate heir of the latter. Thus, to prevent any confusion and needless hardship in the future, her relationship or proof of that relationship with her natural mother should be maintained. And there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name. What the law does not prohibit, it allows. Lastly it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily the surname of the mother.

Issue: WON an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father? Held: YES Law Is Silent as to the Use Of Middle Name. The middle name or the mother’s surname is only considered in Article 375(1) to identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, in which case, the middle name or the mother’s surname shall be added. Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use.  For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters  Justice Caguioa said that “it should be mandatory that the child uses the surname of the father and permissive in the case of the surname of the mother.” Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother  it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father

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Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent Hence, Stephanie can well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future

It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary and paramount consideration, hence, every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and comionate objectives of the law.  since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother’s surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.

PARENTAL AUTHORITY Libi vs IAC Facts: -

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Respondent spouses (Gotiong) are the legitimate parents of Julie Ann Gotiong while petitioners are the parents of Wendell Libi, then a minor between 18 and 19 years of age. Julie Ann and Wendell were sweethearts but the former broke up her relationship with the latter after finding him to be sadistic and irresponsible Wendell kept on pestering Julie Ann with demands for reconciliation until he resorted to threats against Julie Ann On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann and Wendell died each from a single shot wound inflicted with the same firearm, a smith and Wesson revolver licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi which was recovered from the scene of the crime.

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Parents of Julie Ann filed a civil case against the parents of Wendell to recover damages arising from the latter’s vicarious liability under article 2180 of the civil code which was dismissed by the trial court but reversed by the CA, hence this petition

2180 of the civil code covers obligations arising from both quasi delicts and criminal offenses. Court believes that the civil liability of parents for quasi delict of their minor children as contemplated in art 2180 of the civil code is primary and not subsidiary

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WON the court erred in making the parents of Wendell civilly liable

David vs CA Facts: -

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No, Under the present case, court correctly declared that the parents of Wendell are and should be held liable for the civil liability arising from criminal offenses committed by their minor child under their legal authority and control, or who live in their company, unless it is proven that the former acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent such damages. That primary liability is premised on the provisions of art 101 of the RPC with respect to damages ex delicto, such primary liability shall be imposed pursuant to 2180 of the civil code In imposing sanctions for the so – called vicarious liability of petitioners. Courts hold that the subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed by art

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Petitioner Daisie David worked as secretary of private respondent Ramon Villar, who is married man and a father of four children Their relationship became intimate and they had a child named Christopher J. and followed by two more children namely Christine and Cathy Mae Their relationship became known to private respondent’s wife and their children were eventually accepted by the legal family of private respondent Thereafter, private respondent asked petitioner to allow Christopher , then six years old, to go with his family to Boracay wherein petitioner agreed, but after the trip private respondent refused to give back the child and said that he had enrolled Christopher at the Holy Family Academy for the next school year

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Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus which was granted by the trial court but was reversed by the CA, hence this petition

Issue: -

WON the petition for habeas corpus was proper

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TENDER AGE PRESUMPTION RULE ESPIRITU vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 115640 March 15, 1995 Facts:

Yes, rule 102 of the rules of court provides that the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto In the case at bar, Christopher is an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception his father, private respondent, was married to another woman other than the child’s mother. As such, pursuant to art 176 of the Family Code, Christopher is under the parental authority of his mother, who as a consequence of such authority is entitled to have custody of him. Since ittedly, petitioner has been deprived of her rightful custody of the child by private respondent, she is entitled for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor child may be a ground for ordering him to give to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child.

Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding first met in Iligan City where Reynaldo was employed by the National Steel Corporation and Teresita was employed as a nurse in a local hospital. Teresita left for Los Angeles, California to work as a nurse. Reynaldo was sent by his employer, the National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania as its liaison officer and Reynaldo and Teresita then began to maintain a common law relationship of husband and wife. On 1986, their daughter, Rosalind Therese, was born. While they were on a brief vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married, and upon their return to the United States, their second child, a son, this time, and given the name Reginald Vince, was born on 1988. The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate. Instead of giving their marriage a second chance as allegedly pleaded by Reynaldo, Teresita left Reynaldo and the children and went back to California. Reynaldo brought his children home to the

Philippines, but because his assignment in Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was sent back by his company to Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children with his sister, Guillerma Layug and her family. Teresita, meanwhile, decided to return to the Philippines and filed the petition for a writ of habeas corpus against herein two petitioners to gain custody over the children, thus starting the whole proceedings now reaching this Court. The trial court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus. It suspended Teresita's parental authority over Rosalind and Reginald and declared Reynaldo to have sole parental authority over them but with rights of visitation to be agreed upon by the parties and to be approved by the Court. Issue: Whether or not the petition for a writ of habeas corpus to gain custody over the children be granted. Ruling: Supreme Court dismissed the writ of habeas corpus petition by the mother and retain the custody of the children to the father. The illicit or immoral activities of the mother had already caused emotional disturbances, personality conflicts, and exposure to conflicting moral values against the children.

The children are now both over seven years old. Their choice of the parent with whom they prefer to stay is clear from the record. From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit person. The children understand the unfortunate shortcomings of their mother and have been affected in their emotional growth by her behavior. TENDER AGE PRESUMPTION RULE SANTOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 113054 March 16, 1995 Facts: Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a nurse by profession, were married in Iloilo City in 1986. Their union beget only one child, Leouel Santos, Jr. who was born July 18, 1987. From the time the boy was released from the hospital until sometime thereafter, he had been in the care and custody of his maternal grandparents, private respondents herein, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia. On September 2, 1990, petitioner along with his two brothers, visited the Bedia household, where three-year old Leouel Jr. was staying. Private respondents contend that through deceit and false pretensions, petitioner abducted the boy and clandestinely spirited him away to his hometown in Bacong, Negros Oriental.

The spouses Bedia then filed a "Petition for Care, Custody and Control of Minor Ward Leouel Santos Jr.," before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, with Santos, Sr. as respondent. After an ex-parte hearing on October 8, 1990, the trial court issued an order on the same day awarding custody of the child Leouel Santos, Jr. to his grandparents, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia. Petitioner appealed this Order to the Court of Appeals. In its decision dated April 30, 1992, respondent appellate court affirmed the trial court's order. Petitioner assails the decisions of both the trial court and the appellate court to award custody of his minor son to his parents-in-law, the Bedia spouses on the ground that under Art. 214 of the Family Code, substitute parental authority of the grandparents is proper only when both parents are dead, absent or unsuitable. Petitioner's unfitness, according to him, has not been successfully shown by private respondents. Issue: Who should properly be awarded custody of the minor Leouel Santos, Jr. Ruling: The minor should be given to the legitimate father. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely

temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Only in case of the parents' death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent. The court held the contentions of the grandparents are insufficient as to remove petitioner's parental authority and the concomitant right to have custody over the minor. Private respondents' demonstrated love and affection for the boy, notwithstanding, the legitimate father is still preferred over the grandparents. The latter's wealth is not a deciding factor, particularly because there is no proof that at the present time, petitioner is in no position to the boy. While petitioner's previous inattention is inexcusable, it cannot be construed as abandonment. His appeal of the unfavorable decision against him and his efforts to keep his only child in his custody may be regarded as serious efforts to rectify his past misdeeds. To award him custody would help enhance the bond between parent and son. The Court also held that his being a soldier is likewise no bar to allowing him custody over the boy. So many men in uniform, who are assigned to different parts of the country in the service of the nation, are still the natural guardians of their children.

Also, petitioner's employment of trickery in spiriting away his boy from his in-laws, though unjustifiable, is likewise not a ground to wrest custody from him.

TENDER AGE PRESUMPTION RULE PEREZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R.No. 118870 March 29, 1996 Facts: Ray Perez is a doctor practicing in Cebu while Nerissa, his wife, (petitioner) is a ed nurse. After six miscarriages, two operations and a high-risk pregnancy, Nerissa finally gave birth to Ray Perez II in New York on July 20, 1992. Ray stayed with her in the U.S. twice and took care of her when she became pregnant. Unlike his wife, however, he had only a tourist visa and was not employed. On January 17, 1993, the couple and their baby arrived in Cebu. After a few weeks, only Nerissa returned to the U.S. She alleged that they came home only for a five-week vacation and that they all had round-trip tickets. However, her husband stayed behind to take care of his sick mother and promised to follow her with the baby. According to Ray, they had agreed to reside permanently in the Philippines but once

Nerissa was in New York, she changed her mind and continued working. She was supposed to come back immediately after winding up her affairs there. When Nerissa came home a few days before Ray II’s first birthday, the couple was no longer on good . They had quarrels. Nerissa did not want to live near her in-laws and rely solely on her husband’s meager income of P5,000.00. On the other hand, Ray wanted to stay here, where he could raise his son even as he practiced his profession. He maintained that it would not be difficult to live here since they have their own home and a car. Despite mediation by the priest, the couple failed to reconcile. Nerissa filed a petition to surrender the custody of their son to her. The trial court issued an Order awarding custody to Nerissa citing the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code which provides that no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. Upon appeal by Ray Perez, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order and held that granting custody to the boy’s father would be for the child’s best interest and welfare. Issue: Whether or not Nerissa has rightful custody of a child?

Ruling: Yes. Aside from Article 213 of the Family Code, the Revised Rules of Court also contains a similar provision. Rule 99, Section 6 (Adoption and Custody of Minors) provides: “SEC. 6. Proceedings as to child whose parents are separated.Appeal. - When husband and wife are divorced or living separately and apart from each other, and the questions as to the care, custody, and control of a child or children of their marriage is brought before a Court of First Instance by petition or as an incident to any other proceeding, the court, upon hearing the testimony as may be pertinent, shall award the care, custody, and control of each such child as will be for its best interest, permitting the child to choose which parent it prefers to live with if it be over ten years of age, unless the parent chosen be unfit to take charge of the child by reason of moral depravity, habitual drunkenness, incapacity, or poverty x x x. No child under seven years of age shall be separated from its mother, unless the court finds there are compelling reasons therefor.” The provisions of law quoted above clearly mandate that a child under seven years of age shall not be separated from his mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. The use of the word “shall” in Article 213 of the Family Code and Rule 99, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court connotes a mandatory character.

The general rule that a child under seven years of age shall not be separated from his mother finds its reason in the basic need of a child for his mother’s loving care. Only the most compelling of reasons shall justify the court’s awarding the custody of such a child to someone other than his mother, such as her unfitness to exercise sole parental authority. In the past the following grounds have been considered ample justification to deprive a mother of custody and parental authority: neglect, abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity and being sick with a communicable disease. It has long been settled that in custody cases, the foremost consideration is always the welfare and best interest of the child. In fact, no less than an international instrument, the Convention on the Rights of the Child provides: “In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, istrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration. In the case, financial capacity is not a determinative factor inasmuch as both parties have demonstrated that they have ample means. Nerissa’s present work schedule is not so unmanageable as to deprive her of quality time

with her son. Quite a number of working mothers who are away from home for longer periods of time are still able to raise a family well, applying time management principles judiciously. Also, delegating child care temporarily to qualified persons who run day-care centers does not detract from being a good mother, as long as the latter exercises supervision, for even in our culture, children are often brought up by housemaids under the eagle eyes of the mother.

named Valerie and Vincent by his common-law wife, Helen G. Belmes. Bonifacia obtained a favorable court decision appointing her as legal and judicial guardian over the persons and estate of Valerie and Vincent.

Although Ray’s is a general practitioner, the records show that he maintains a clinic, works for several companies on retainer basis and teaches part-time. He cannot possibly give the love and care that a mother gives to his child.

On August 13, 1987, Helen submitted an opposition to the subject guardianship proceedings asseverating that she had already filed a similar petition for guardianship before the RTC of Pagadian City. On June 27, 1988, Helen followed her opposition with a motion for the Removal of Guardian and Appointment of a New One, asserting that she is the natural mother in actual custody of and exercising parental authority over the subject minors at Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur where they are permanently residing. She also states that at the time the petition was filed, Bonifacia was a resident of Colorado, U.S.A. being a naturalized American citizen.

VANCIL vs. BELMES G.R. No. 132223 June 19, 2001

On October 12, 1988, the trial court rejected and denied Helen’s motion to remove and/or to disqualify Bonifacia as guardian of Valerie and Vincent Jr. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision reversing the RTC. Since Valerie had reached the age of majority at the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the issue revolved around the guardianship of Vincent.

Facts: Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a US Navy serviceman who died on 1986. During his lifetime, Reeder had two children

Issue:

Who between the mother and grandmother of minor Vincent should be his guardian? Ruling: Respondent Helen Belmes, being the natural mother of the minor, has the preferential right over that of petitioner Bonifacia to be his guardian. Article 211 of the Family Code provides: "Art. 211. The father and the mother shall tly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of disagreement, the father’s decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. xxx." Indeed, being the natural mother of minor Vincent, Helen has the corresponding natural and legal right to his custody. "Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the courts that ‘the right of parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incident to parenthood,’ a right ed by law and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not created by the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental relationship." Bonifacia contends that she is more qualified as guardian of Vincent. Bonifacia’s claim to be the guardian of said minor can only be realized by way of substitute parental authority pursuant to Article 214 of the Family Code, thus: "Art. 214. In case of death, absence or

unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent. xxx." Bonifacia, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority only in case of death, absence or unsuitability of Helen. Considering that Helen is very much alive and has exercised continuously parental authority over Vincent, Bonifacia has to prove, in asserting her right to be the minor’s guardian, Helen’s unsuitability. Bonifacia, however, has not proffered convincing evidence showing that Helen is not suited to be the guardian of Vincent. Bonifacia merely insists that Helen is morally unfit as guardian of Valerie considering that her live-in partner raped Valerie several times. But Valerie, being now of major age, is no longer a subject of this guardianship proceeding. Even assuming that Helen is unfit as guardian of minor Vincent, still Bonifacia cannot qualify as a substitute guardian. She is an American citizen and a resident of Colorado. Obviously, she will not be able to perform the responsibilities and obligations required of a guardian. In fact, in her petition, she itted the difficulty of discharging the duties of a guardian by an expatriate, like her. To be sure, she will merely delegate those duties to someone else who may not also qualify as a guardian.

There is nothing in the law which requires the courts to appoint residents only as s or guardians. However, notwithstanding the fact that there are no statutory requirements upon this question, the courts, charged with the responsibilities of protecting the estates of deceased persons, wards of the estate, etc., will find much difficulty in complying with this duty by appointing s and guardians who are not personally subject to their jurisdiction. Notwithstanding that there is no statutory requirement; the courts should not consent to the appointment of persons as s and guardians who are not personally subject to the jurisdiction of our courts here.

SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY ST. MARY’S ACADEMY vs. CARPITANOS G.R. No. 143363 February 6, 2002 Facts: Defendant-appellant St. Mary’s Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996. A facet of the

enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools from where prospective enrollees were studying. As a student of St. Mary’s Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group. Accordingly, on the fateful day, Sherwin, along with other high school students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School, Dapitan City. The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and a student of the same school. Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle. Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the accident. The parents of Sherwin filed a case against James Daniel II and his parents, James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio Villanueva and St. Mary’s Academy before the RTC of Dipolog City and claimed for damages. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner St. Mary’s Academy is liable for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos. Ruling: GRANTED and REMANDED to the RTC for determination of any liability of the school. The Court held that for the school to be liable there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because of negligence, must

have causal connection to the accident. There is no showing of such. Hence, with the overwhelming evidence presented by petitioner and the respondent Daniel spouses that the accident occurred because of the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, it is not the school, but the ed owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos. WHEN IS DEMANDABLE LACSON vs. LACSON G.R. No. 150644 August 28, 2006 Facts: The sisters Maowee Daban Lacson and Maonaa Daban Lacson are legitimate daughters of petitioner Edward V. Lacson and his wife, Lea Daban Lacson. Maowee was born on December 4, 1974, while Maonaa, a little less than a year later. Not long after the birth of Maonaa, petitioner left the conjugal home in Molo, Iloilo City, virtually forcing mother and children to seek, apparently for financial reason, shelter somewhere else. For a month, they stayed with Lea’s mother-in-law, Alicia Lacson, then with her (Lea’s) mother and then with her brother Noel Daban. After some time, they rented an apartment only to return

later to the house of Lea’s mother. As the trial court aptly observed, the sisters and their mother, from 1976 to 1994, or for a period of eighteen (18) years, shuttled from one dwelling place to another not their own. Issue: Whether or not petitioner is obliged to give . Ruling: Petitioner its being obliged, as father, to provide to both respondents, Maowee and Maonaa. It is his threshold submission, however, that he should not be made to pay in arrears, i.e., from 1976 to 1994, no previous extrajudicial, let alone judicial, demand having been made by the respondents. He invokes the following provision of the Family Code to complete his point:Article 203 – The obligation to give shall be demandable from the time the person who has a right to receive the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand. To petitioner, his obligation to pay under the afore quoted provision starts from the filing of Civil Case No. 22185 in 1995, since only from that moment can it be said that an effective demand for was made upon him