Ra 3019 Case Digests 5p3k2d

FRANKLIN P. BAUTISTA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 136082, May 12, 2000 BELLOSILLO, J: Facts: Petitioner Franklin P. Bautista, incumbent mayor of the Municipality of Malita, Davao del Sur, was charged for violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), of RA 3019. The letter-complaint, which was prepared by the Contractors Association of Davao del Sur and initiated by the Good Government Employees of Davao del Sur, alleged, among others, that petitioner caused the hiring of one hundred and ninety-two (192) casual employees in the municipal government for political considerations and that the payment of their honoraria and salaries was charged to the peace and order fund of the municipality. Despite arguing in his counter-affidavit that the hiring of 192 casual employees and the use of the peace and order fund for their honoraria and salaries did not justify the charges filed against him, Graft Investigation Officer (GIO II) Corazon A. Arancon, in his Resolution, found a prima facie case for violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), of RA 3019, which was approved by the Ombudsman. An Information for such violation was filed against the petitioner before the Sandiganbayan, which read – […] the abovenamed accused, a high ranking public officer, being the Mayor, Municipality of Malita, Davao del Sur, while in the performance of his official functions, taking advantage of his position and committing the offense in relation to his office, with manifest partiality, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally caused the hiring of some one hundred ninety-two (192) casual employees in flagrant disregard of Secs. 288 and 289 of the Government ing and Auditing Manual (GAAM), the honoraria and salaries of whom were charged to the peace and order fund and to the project component and other services activity fund, respectively and which represented 72.5% of the total personnel services expenditures, thereby giving unwarranted benefits, advantage and preference to the said casuals, causing undue injury to the Municipality of Malita. Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information, stating that the acts charged did not constitute the offense indicated in Sec. 3, par. (e), of RA 3019, and that more than one (1) offense was charged in the Information – the giving of unwarranted benefits, advantage and preference to the casual employees in question and causing undue injury to the Municipality. The Sandiganbayan denied the Motion by stating that all the essential elements for the crime charged were sufficiently alleged in the Information which charged only 1 offense. Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in denying the petitioner’s Motion to Quash the Information despite the fact that there were two (2) offenses charged, and as such, should be charged in separate Informations. Ruling: No, the Sandiganbayan did not err in denying the petitioner’s Motion to Quash the Information since the latter was only charged with 1 offense. There were two (2) ways of violating Sec. 3, par. (e), of RA 3019, namely, (a) by causing undue injury to any party, including the Government, and (b) by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference. The use of the disjunctive term "or" connotes that either act qualifies as a violation, or as different modes of committing the offense

(Santiago v. Garchitorena). This does not indicate that each mode constitutes a distinct offense, but rather, that an accused may be charged under either mode or under both. For hiring 192 casuals and the charging of their honoraria and salaries to the peace and order fund, the petitioner gave them unwarranted benefits, advantage and preference and caused undue injury to the Municipality of Malita; or thereby caused undue injury to the Municipality of Malita. In either case, the Information will not suffer any defect, as it is clear that petitioner is charged with violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), of RA 3019, as amended, with either mode of commission obtaining or with both manners of violation concurring.

JOSE REYES Y VACIO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. Nos. 177105-06, August 4, 2010 BERSAMIN, J: Facts: Belen Lopez Vda. de Guia (Belen) was the ed absolute owner of two parcels of agricultural land with an area of 197,594 square meters located in Santa Barbara, Baliwag, Bulacan and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 209298 of the of Deeds of Bulacan. On March 19, 1975, Belen's son, Carlos de Guia (Carlos), forged a deed of sale, in which he made it appear that his mother had sold the land to him. The of Deeds of Bulacan cancelled TCT No. 209298 and issued TCT No. 210108 in Carlos’ name. On March 20, 1975, Carlos sold the land to Ricardo San Juan (Ricardo). The latter ed the deed of sale in the Registry, which cancelled TCT No. 210108 and issued TCT No. 210338 in Ricardo’s name. He subsequenty mortgaged the land to Simeon Yangco (Simeon). Upon learning the transfers of her land, Belen filed a civil action for cancellation of sale, reconveyance, and damages against Carlos, Ricardo and Simeon, before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Baliwag, Bulacan but was dismissed. Her appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) was also dismissed for non-payment of docket fees. Ricardo executed a deed of reconveyence in favor of the tenants. Due to this, TCT No. 210338 was cancelled and TCT No. 301375 was issued in the names of the tenants. The land was subdivided into several lots, and individual TCTs were issued in the names of the tenants. Upon discovering for the first time that her appeal had been dismissed for nonpayment of docket fees, Belen filed a motion to reinstate her appeal. The IAC granted the appeal (AC-GR CV-02883), declaring as null and void the deed of sale executed by and between Belen and Carlos, ordering Ricardo to to reconvey to Belen the lands, and ordering the of Deeds of Bulacan to cancel and/or annul TCT No. 210338 and 210108 and to reinstate TCT No. 209298 in the name of Belen. The IAC decision became final on March 15, 1986. On December 18, 1986, Belen filed a motion for execution before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) which was subsequently granted. Upon learning about the deed of reconveyance, she also filed before the a motion to declare Ricardo and the tenants in contempt of court for circumventing the final and executory judgment. The RTC held the latter in contempt of court and ordered each of them to pay Php 200.00. Despite their appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC order with modifications. Meanwhile, Belen, through her daughter and attorney-in-fact, Melba G. Valenzuela (Melba), filed in the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) a complaint for ejectment and collection of rents against the tenants. Petitioner Jose Reyes Y Vacio, as Provincial Adjudicator, dismissed her complaint in favor of the tenants; the TCTs issued in the name of the tenants, respectively, were consequently affirmed (DARAB Case No. 034-Bul88). Despite the appeal and the urgent motion to set aside the writ of execution (following the

grant of the tenant’s motion for execution), DARAB Central Office affirmed the petitioner’s ruling on October 24, 1994. In due course, the CA reversed and set aside the decision, and was affirmed by the Supreme Court. On May 13, 1998, the Office of the Ombudsman filed two Informations in the Sandiganbayan, one charging the petitioner with a violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 for “acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality [when he] willfully, unlawfully and criminally render his decision in DARAB Case No. 034-Bul-88 favorable to the tenants […] thereby ignoring and disregarding the final and executory CA decision in AC-GR CV-02883 which declared [Belen] as the true owner of the lands subject of the litigation […]”. He was also charged with usurpation of judicial functions under Article 241 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Despite pleading not guilty to each Information, the Sandiganbayan found the petitioner guilty of both charges. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of violating Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 in rendering his decision in DARAB Case No. 034 BUL-88 when he disregarded the final and executory decision of the CA and declared Belen as the true owner of the 2 parcels of lands. Ruling: Yes, the petitioner is guilty of violating Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 when he disregarded the final and executory decision of the CA and declared Belen as the true owner of the 2 parcels of lands in his Decision. The essential elements of the offense under Section 3 (e) are the following: 1. The accused must be a public officer discharging istrative, judicial, or official functions; 2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence; and 3. His action caused any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions. The petitioner was a Provincial Adjudicator of the DARAB discharging the duty of adjudicating the conflicting claims of Parties when he rendered his decision in DARAB Case No. 034 BUL88. This establishes the first element. The second element includes the different and distinct modes by which the offense is committed, that is, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. Proof of the existence of any of the modes suffices to warrant conviction under Section 3 (e). Manifest partiality, which is synonymous with bias, exists when the accused has a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or one person rather than another. The petitioner was fully aware of the finality of the AC-G.R. CV No. 02883 Decision, having actually itted to having read and examined the following documents, to wit: (1) Belen's position paper in the DARAB Case in which she stated that the decision in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883 had become final and executory; (2) The entry of judgment issued in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883; (3) Belen's TCT No. 209298, reflecting the entry of judgment issued in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883 and the cancellation of the TCTs of the tenants, and (4) Addendum to Belen's position paper, mentioning the decree in the AC-G.R. CV No. 02883 Decision. He thereby

exhibited manifest partiality when he rendered his decision in the DARAB Case that completely contradicted and disregarded the decision in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883. His granting the tenants' motion for execution made his partiality towards the tenants and bias against Belen. Similiarly, the petitioner's evident bad faith displayed itself by his arrogant refusal to recognize and obey the decision in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883, despite his obligation as Provincial Adjudicator to abide by the CA's ruling. Lastly, the expenses incurred by Belen and the needless prejudicial delay in the termination of the cases unduly deprived her of exclusive ownership over the parcels of land. This sufficiently establishes the third element.

ROLANDO E. SISON VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. Nos. 170339, 170398-403, March 9, 2010 CORONA, J: On July 18, 1994, state auditor Elsa E. Pajayon conducted a post-audit investigation which revealed that during petitioner Rolando E. Sison's incumbency as municipal mayor of Calintaan, Occidental Mindoro, no public bidding was conducted for the purchase of a Toyota Land Cruiser, one hundred nineteen (119) bags of Fortune cement, an electric generator set, certain construction materials, two (2) Desert Dueler tires, and a computer and its accessories. Pajayon also found out that there were irregularities in the documents ing the acquisitions. Along with Municipal Treasurer Rigoberto de Jesus, petitioner was indicted before the Sandiganbayan in seven (7) separate Informations for 7 counts of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 to which the petitioner pleaded not guilty. Accused de Jesus has remained at large. During the presentation of evidence, the petitioner was called to the witness stand where he itted that no public bidding was conducted and that the purchases were done through personal canvass. He further stated that no public bidding could be conducted because all the dealers of the items were based in Manila; it was useless to invite bidders since nobody would bid anyway. The Sandiganbayan found petitioner guilty as charged. A warrant of arrest was also issued against de Jesus. Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court, praying for an acquittal because his guilt was not allegedly proven beyond reasonable doubt. Issue: Whether or not petitioner is guilty for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 when, during his incumbency as municipal mayor, personal canvass instead of a public bidding was effected by the petitioner for the purchase of the items. Ruling: Yes, the petitioner is guilty for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 for effecting a personal canvass instead of a public bidding for the purchase of a a Toyota Land Cruiser, 119 bags of Fortune cement, an electric generator set, certain construction materials, 2 Desert Dueler tires, and a computer and its accessories. To be found guilty under Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, the following elements must concur: 1. The offender is a public officer; 2. The act was done in the discharge of the public officer's official, istrative or judicial functions;

3. The act was done through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence; and 4. The public officer caused any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or gave any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference. It is undisputed that the first two elements are present in the case at bar. The third element may be committed in three ways, i.e., through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. Proof of any of these three in connection with the prohibited acts mentioned in Section 3 (e) is enough to convict. Bad faith imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong. It is a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will, and partakes of the nature of fraud. In this case, the petitioner’s ission that the canvass sheets sent out by de Jesus to the suppliers already contained his signatures and that he knew about the provisions of RA 7160 on personal canvass but he did not follow the law because he was merely following the practice of his predecessors was an ission of a mindless disregard for the law in a tradition of illegality, which is truly unacceptable. As municipal mayor, he should have been the first to follow the law and see to it that it was followed by his constituency to assure the public that despotic, irregular or unlawful transactions in the acquisition of government items do not occur. Lastly, the fact that the petitioner repeatedly failed to follow the requirements of RA 7160 on personal canvass proves that unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference was given to the winning suppliers. This establishes the fourth element.

ELIAS C. QUIBAL AND ANTONIO U. DENIEGA VS THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION) AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 109991, May 22, 1995 PUNO, J:

On November 27, 1987, the municipality of Palapag, Northern Samar, represented by its OIC vice-mayor Teodoro C. Bello, entered into a contract with the Floters Construction Company, represented by accused Eduardo C. Guevarra, for the construction of the municipal public market. The period for the completion of the project was one hundred (100) days and was set with a price of Php 652,562.60. From February 16 to April 12, 1988, petitioners Mayor Elias C. Quibal and Municipal Treasurer Antonio U. Deniega, issued four (4) PNB checks in favor of the contractor in the total amount of P650,000.00. However, sometime in June 1988, after receipt of said payments, the contractor abandoned the project. On August 31, 1988, a COA Special Audit Team inspected the progress of the construction of the market and found out that only about 36.24% of the construction of has been completed despite the lapse of the contract period. The actual cost of the finished work on the project was only P301,746.65, with the value of the unfinished work evaluated at Php 348,235.35. It was also established that the contractor had already been paid Php 650,000.00 despite the non- completion of the building; its accompanying disbursement vouchers were also not properly filled-up (e.g. unsigned by the Deniega) and the required ing documents were not attached. The disbursement vouchers. Likewise, the payment to the contractor in the amount of Php 340,000.00 was not accompanied by any Certificate of Acceptance issued by the COA, as required. After the submission of an inspection report by Provincial Auditor Marissa Bayona to the COA Regional Director, the Ombudsman informed petitioner Quibal of the charges filed against him by the COA. The latter’s request for a re-audit was also denied.

Sometime in November 1989, petitioners still continued the construction of the municipal market; this was completed at the end of December 1989. Petitioner Deniega itted that he disbursed P650,000.00 to the contractor but claimed that he submitted complete and signed vouchers and the required ing documents to the Office of the Provincial Auditor. Furthermore, he insisted that the unsigned vouchers presented in court by the prosecution were not the vouchers which ed the payments they made. For his part, petitioner Quibal explained that he paid the contractor more than his accomplished work to enable the latter to immediately purchase construction materials which were then selling at a low price and further maintained that the audit team should have included the value of these construction materials (still unused at the time of audit) in its evaluation of the project, which were worth approximately Php 348,235.35, justifying his payments to the contractor. After trial on the merits, respondent Sandiganbayan (Second Division) promulgated a Decision finding accused public officials guilty beyond reasonable doubt. In their petition before the Supreme Court, petitioners insist their guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt for they did not act with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross, inexcusable negligence nor did they cause any injury or damage to the municipal government for the construction of the municipal market was eventually completed. Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in not resolving that the guilt of the petitioners has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt because petitioners did not act with manifest partiality, evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence. Ruling: No, the Sandiganbayan did not err in not resolving that the guilt of the petitioners has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt because petitioners did not act with manifest partiality, evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence. Gross negligence is the pursuit of a course of conduct which would naturally and reasonably result in injury. It is an utter disregard of or conscious indifference to consequences. In cases involving public officials, there is gross negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable. Petitioners' acts and omissions demonstrated an utter lack of care in enforcing the contract for the construction of the public market and a reckless disregard of the COA rules and regulations regarding disbursement of municipal funds. Petitioners contend that they released P650,000.00 of the contract price to enable the contractor to take advantage of the low cost of construction materials prevailing at that time. Plainly petitioners' act violates the provision of the contract requiring that payment shall be made on the basis of the percentage of completion of the project. Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the Sandiganbayan, “The escalation of prices of construction materials which allegedly prompted Quibal to pay the contractor prematurely is not a justification that would absolve [him] from criminal liability. The parties could have included an escalation clause in the contract […] Moreover, there is a law which authorizes the adjustment of contract price (R.A. 5979, as amended by PD No. 454)”

ODON PECHO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 111399, November 14, 1994 DAVIDE, JR., J:

Odon Pecho, a Customs Guard of the Miscellaneous Bonded Warehouse Division, Bureau of Customs, along with private individual Jose Catre, went to the office of customs broker Constantino Calica and introduced themselves as duly authorized representatives of Eversun Commercial Trading. For an amount equal to fifty percent (50%) of the authorized brokerage fee, Pecho and Catre engaged with Calica to prepare and file with the Bureau of Customs (BOC) the necessary Import Entry and Internal Revenue Declaration covering Eversun's shipment, which was declared as two (2) agricultural disc blades and three (3) irrigation water pumps with the computed taxes and duties amounting to Php 53,164.00. On March 16, 1989 Dennis Calica, son of Constantino and also a custom broker, proceeded to the Entry Processing Division of the Bureau of Customs of the Manila International Container Port (MI) and filed the import entry and internal revenue declaration and other ive documents. On March 21, 1989 Dennis and Catre met for the processing of the examination request, which was addressed by BOC Chief Intelligence Officer Baltazar Morales to the BOC District Intelligence Officer for a one hundred percent (100%) examination of the shipment consigned to Eversun Commercial Trading. After a spot check on the questioned shipment by Customs Senior Agent Ruperto Santiago, it was discovered that the contents contained three hundred (300) units of automotive diesel engines, contrary to what was stated in the import entry and revenue declaration. The computation of the taxes made by Customs Appraiser Mamerto Fernandez also showed a discrepancy in the total amount of P1,027,321.00. Consequently, a hold order and a warrant of seizure and detention were issued by the District Collector of BOC. Their verification with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) disclosed that Eversun Commercial Trading is a non-existent firm and that the tax number used by Eversun in making the Import Entry Declaration was non-existent. After appropriate preliminary investigation, an Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan which concluded that all elements of Section 3 (e) of RA No. 3019 are present in the case, to wit: 1. The accused is a public officer or private person charged in conspiracy with him; 2. Said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his official duties or in relation to his public position; 3. He causes undue injury to any party, whether the government or private party; 4. Such undue injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such parties; and 5. The public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. Issue: 1. Whether or not the violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 committed by the petitioners reached only the attempted stage. 2. Whether or not an attempted violation of such provision subject the petitioners to the same penalty as if he had committed the consummated crime. Ruling: 1. Yes, the violation committed by the petitioners reached only the attempted stage because the perpetrators had commenced the commission of the offense directly by overt acts but failed to perform all the acts of execution which would have produced the felony as a consequence by reason or some cause other than their own spontaneous desistance, namely, the 100% examination and the subsequent issuance of a hold order and a warrant of seizure and detention of alert customs officials before the release of the cargoes.

2. No, an attempted violation of such provision does not subject the petitioners to the same penalty as if he had committed the consummated crime. It has already been established that the third element of the offense, which is "causing undue injury to any party, including the Government, was absent due to the timely intervention of the alert customs officials. There are two principal reasons why Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, can be said to penalize only consummated offenses. Firstly, the penalty imposed therefor per Section 9 is “imprisonment for not less than six (6) years and one (1) month nor more than fifteen (15) years, perpetual disqualification from office, and confiscation or forfeiture in favor of the Government of any prohibited interest and unexplained wealth manifestly out of proportion to his salary and other lawful income.” The imposable imprisonment penalty does not have the nomenclature and duration of any specific penalty in the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, there can be no valid basis for the application of, inter alia, Articles 50 and 51 on the penalty to be imposed on the principal of a frustrated and attempted felony. The penalty of perpetual disqualification is only from office, unlike either the perpetual absolute and perpetual special disqualifications under Articles 30 and 31 of the Revised Penal Code. Secondly, the third element of Section 3(e) used the word ‘causing’, which is the present participle of the word ‘cause’. As a verb, the latter means “to be the cause or occasion of; to effect as an agent; to bring about; to bring into existence; to make to induce; to compel.” The word ‘undue’ means "more than necessary”; And the word injury means "any wrong or damage done to another or the invasion of any legally protected interest of another." Taken together, proof of actual injury or damage is required. Thus, in Alejandro vs. People, which involves a prosecution for the violation of Section 3 (e) of RA No. 3019, as amended, this Court, in acquitting the accused declared, “there should be undue injury caused to any party [however] the decision of the respondent Sandiganbayan [recognized] that there was no proof of damage caused to the employees of the hospital […]”. Since no actual injury or damage having been caused to the Government due to the timely 100% examination of the shipment and the subsequent issuance of a hold order and a warrant of seizure and detention, the petitioner must, perforce, be acquitted of the violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. BELEN A. SALVACION VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (FIFTH DIVISION) AND LEO H. MANLAPAS G.R. No. 175006, November 27, 2008 CHICO-NAZARIO, J: Petitioner Salvacion, Bookkeeper of the Municipality of Baleno, Masbate, prepared all the pertinent documents and clearance for her permanent separation from government service, including an application for the payment of her retirement benefits and terminal leave pay filed on December 10, 2002. Said application was duly acted upon and approved by respondent Manlapas as the Municipal Mayor of Baleno, Masbate, and the authorized official to act upon it. On 18 March 2003, petitioner Salvacion submitted to the Office of the Municipal Mayor, for payment, a Disbursement Voucher duly signed and approved for payment by respondent Manlapas, and accompanied by ing documents, in the amount of Php 162,291.46 representing her Terminal Leave Pay for 815.226 unused leave credits. In the intervening time, the petitioner has made numerous follow-ups, including a letter requesting the release of fund for payment, saying “I will be going to Manila for medical check-up, so that I'm in dire need of money”. On February 17, 2004, petitioner filed a sworn Complaint before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, charging respondent Manlapas with violation of Section 3, paragraphs (e) and (f),

of R.A. No. 3019. In his Counter-Affidavit, the respondent stated that his refusal to immediately to order payment of the petitioner’s Terminal Leave Pay was because the latter due to the latter's supposed failure to remit the amount of P7,564.38 to the Municipal Government. The complaint was dismissed. Aggrieved, petitioner Salvacion filed a Petition for Review before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon which ordered the reversal of the finding of the Provincial Prosecutor, and declared that there was probable cause to hold respondent Manlapas liable for violation of the R.A. No. 3019 provisions. Respondent Manlapas moved for the reconsideration of the aforequoted Review Resolution, arguing that his refusal to release petitioner Salvacion's Terminal Leave Pay was essentially prompted by good faith, i.e., to protect the interest of the people of Baleno, Masbate, from being defrauded by petitioner Salvacion. He pointed out that the petitioner usurped the functions of revenue collectors by collecting tax payments from tax payers and issuing the corresponding Official Receipts on January 7 and 8, 2003, but failing to remit the same to the Office of the Municipal Treasurer. He presented, as newly discovered evidence, photocopies of such receipts. Furthermore, hepointed out that the certification issued by the officer-incharge (OIC) Municipal Treasurer Ismael C. Adoptante (Adoptante) that petitioner Salvacion had no more abilities with the Municipality of Baleno, Masbate, was invalid, considering that the same was issued at the time when Adoptante had already been relieved of his duties. Despite these arguments, the Ombudsman denied the Motion for lack of merit. On April 29, 2005, an Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan, charging respondent Manlapas with having violated Section 3, paragraph (f) of Republic Act No. 3019. Before arraignment, respondent Manlapas filed an Omnibus Motion on the ground that "new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced during the preliminary investigation and which, if produced and submitted during the preliminary investigation, would have certainly established the lack of probable cause and, therefore, would have changed the conclusions and findings of the investigating prosecutors." He claimed that he was recently informed that as early as September 1, 2003, petitioner Salvacion had already withdrawn her terminal leave application and its ing documents; thus, her terminal leave pay was not included in the budget appropriation for Calendar Year 2003-2004. In other words, complainant had no cause of action against him at the time of the filing of her complaint for the simple reason that it would have been physically impossible for herein accused to approve or even act upon a nonexistent application for terminal leave benefits. The petitioner denied the imputation that she withdrew her Terminal Leave Application; it it was only on January 27, 2004 that she took home her disbursement voucher after being told by the respondent that it could not be granted since her family will not be able to the latter in the 2004 elections. In its November 11, 2005 Resolution, Sandiganbayan denied the respondent Manlapas’ Omnibus Motion for lack of merit. However, after the respondent moved for the reconsideration of the Resolution, the Sandiganbayan reversed itself, therby dismissing the case against the respondent. According to the Sandiganbayan, there was no probable cause to hold respondent Manlapas liable to stand trial for the violation of Section 3, paragraph (f) of Republic Act No. 3019. Issue: Whether or not respondent Manlapas violated Section 3, paragraph (f) of Republic Act No. 3019 when he refused to order the payment of the petitioner Salvacion’s Terminal Leave Pay. Ruling:

No, respondent Manlapas did not violate Section 3, paragraph (f) of Republic Act No. 3019 when he refused to order the payment of the petitioner Salvacion’s Terminal Leave Pay. Section 3 (f) states,

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared unlawful: xxx (f) Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient justification to act within a reasonable time on any matter pending before him for the purpose of obtaining directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage, or for purpose of favoring his own interest or giving undue advantage in favor of or discriminating against any other interested party. The elements of the offense are as follows: 1. The offender is a public officer; 2. The said officer has neglected or has refused to act without sufficient justification after due demand or request has been made on him; 3. Reasonable time has elapsed from such demand or request without the public officer having acted on the matter pending before him; and 4. Such failure to so act is 'for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage in favor of an interested party, or discriminating against another The second element is absent. There is sufficient justification for Manlapas in refusing to release the monetary benefits in favor of the Salvacion after due demand by the latter because when OIC Municipal Treasurere Adoptante issued the Certification that Ms. Salvacion is free from money and/or property responsibility, he was no longer authorized to do so. The accused knew this fact at the time of the alleged commission of the crime. Knowing the lack of authority of Adoptante to issue the said clearance in favor of Salvacion, Manlapas was justified in refusing to pay her the terminal leave pay benefits. The absence of an essential element of the crime being imputed against the accused cannot sustain a finding of guilt of the accused.