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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 201061

July 3, 2013

SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Petitioner, vs. BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR., Respondent. DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 17 August 2011 Decision2 and the 14 March 2012 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226. The Antecedent Facts On 15 March 2004, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin) filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43 (trial court). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 04109401. Benjamin alleged that on 10 September 1973, he married Azucena Alegre (Azucena) in Caloocan City. They had three children, namely, Rizalyn, Emmamylin, and Benjamin III. In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally GoBangayan (Sally) who was a customer in the auto parts and supplies business owned by Benjamin’s family. In December 1981, Azucena left for the United States of America. In February 1982, Benjamin and Sally lived together as husband and wife. Sally’s father was against the relationship. On 7 March 1982, in order to appease her father, Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a purported marriage contract. Sally, knowing Benjamin’s marital status, assured him that the marriage contract would not be ed. Benjamin and Sally’s cohabitation produced two children, Bernice and Bentley. During the period of their cohabitation, they acquired the following real properties: (1) property under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 61722 ed in the names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses; (2) properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 ed in the name of Benjamin, married to Sally;

(3) properties under Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) Nos. 8782 and 8783 ed in the name of Sally, married to Benjamin; and (4) properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 ed in the name of Sally as a single individual. The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when Sally left for Canada, bringing Bernice and Bentley with her. She then filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public documents against Benjamin, using their simulated marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court on the ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage. Benjamin also asked the trial court for the partition of the properties he acquired with Sally in accordance with Article 148 of the Family Code, for his appointment as of the properties during the pendency of the case, and for the declaration of Bernice and Bentley as illegitimate children. A total of 44 ed properties became the subject of the partition before the trial court. Aside from the seven properties enumerated by Benjamin in his petition, Sally named 37 properties in her answer. After Benjamin presented his evidence, Sally filed a demurrer to evidence which the trial court denied. Sally filed a motion for reconsideration which the trial court also denied. Sally filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals and asked for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or injunction which the Court of Appeals never issued. Sally then refused to present any evidence before the trial court citing the pendency of her petition before the Court of Appeals. The trial court gave Sally several opportunities to present her evidence on 28 February 2008, 10 July 2008, 4 September 2008, 11 September 2008, 2 October 2008, 23 October 2008, and 28 November 2008. Despite repeated warnings from the trial court, Sally still refused to present her evidence, prompting the trial court to consider the case submitted for decision. The Decision of the Trial Court In a Decision4 dated 26 March 2009, the trial court ruled in favor ofBenjamin. The trial court gave weight to the certification dated 21 July 2004 from the Pasig Local Civil Registrar, which was confirmed during trial, that only Marriage License Series Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the month of February 1982 and the purported Marriage License No. N-07568 was not issued to Benjamin and Sally.5 The trial court ruled that the marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office because it could not be ed due to Benjamin’s subsisting marriage with Azucena. The trial court ruled that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not bigamous. The trial court ruled that the second marriage was void not because of the existence of the first marriage but because of other causes, particularly, the lack of a marriage license. Hence, bigamy was not committed in this case. The trial court did not rule on the issue of the legitimacy status of Bernice and Bentley because they were not parties to the case. The trial court denied Sally’s claim for spousal because she was not married to Benjamin. The trial court likewise denied for Bernice and Bentley who were both of legal age and did not ask for . On the issue of partition, the trial court ruled that Sally could not claim the 37 properties she named in her answer as part of her conjugal properties with Benjamin. The trial court ruled that Sally was not legally married to Benjamin. Further, the 37 properties that Sally was claiming were owned by Benjamin’s parents who gave the properties to their children, including Benjamin, as advance inheritance. The 37 titles were in the names of Benjamin and his brothers and the phrase "married to Sally Go" was merely descriptive of Benjamin’s civil status in the title. As regards the two lots under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860, the trial court found that they were bought by Benjamin using his own money and that Sally failed to prove any actual contribution of money, property or industry in their purchase. The trial court found that Sally was a ed co-owner of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 61722, N-193656, and 253681 as well as the two condominium units under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783. However, the trial court ruled that the lot under TCT No. 61722 and the two condominium units were purchased from the earnings of Benjamin alone. The trial court ruled that the properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720, and 190860 and CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were part of the conjugal partnership of Benjamin and Azucena, without prejudice to Benjamin’s right to dispute his conjugal state with Azucena in a separate proceeding. The trial court further ruled that Sally acted in bad faith because she knew that Benjamin was married to Azucena. Applying Article 148 of the Family Code, the trial court forfeited Sally’s share in the properties covered under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 in favor of Bernice and Bentley while Benjamin’s share reverted to his conjugal ownership with Azucena. The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads: ACCORDINGLY, the marriage of BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR. and SALLY S. GO on March 7, 1982 at Santolan, Pasig, Metro Manila is hereby declared NULL and VOID AB INITIO. It is further declared NONEXISTENT.

Respondent’s claim as co-owner or conjugal owner of the thirtyseven (37) properties under TCT Nos. 17722, 17723, 17724, 17725, 126397, RT-73480, and RT-86821; in Manila, TCT Nos. 188949, 188950, 188951, 193035, 194620, 194621, 194622, 194623, 194624, 194625, 194626, 194627, 194628, 194629, 194630, 194631, 194632, 194633, 194634, 194635, 194636, 194637, 194638, 194639, 198651, 206209, 206210, 206211, 206213 and 206215 is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The ed owners, namely: Benjamin B. Bangayan, Jr., Roberto E. Bangayan, Ricardo B. Bangayan and Rodrigo B. Bangayan are the owners to the exclusion of "Sally Go" Consequently, the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City and Manila are directed to delete the words "married to Sally Go" from these thirty-seven (37) titles. Properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720 and 190860, CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 are properties acquired from petitioner’s money without contribution from respondent, hence, these are properties of the petitioner and his lawful wife. Consequently, petitioner is appointed the of these five (5) properties. Respondent is ordered to submit an ing of her collections of income from these five (5) properties within thirty (30) days from notice hereof. Except for lot under TCT No. 61722, respondent is further directed within thirty (30) days from notice hereof to turn over and surrender control and possession of these properties including the documents of title to the petitioner. On the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and N-253681, these properties are under co-ownership of the parties shared by them equally. However, the share of respondent is declared FORFEITED in favor of Bernice Go Bangayan and Bentley Go Bangayan. The share of the petitioner shall belong to his conjugal ownership with Azucena Alegre. The liquidation, partition and distribution of these two (2) properties shall be further processed pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-10 of March 15, 2003. Other properties shall be adjudicated in a later proceeding pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-10. Respondent’s claim of spousal , children and counterclaims are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Further, no declaration of the status of the parties’ children. No other relief granted. Furnish copy of this decision to the parties, their counsels, the Trial Prosecutor, the Solicitor General and the Registry of Deeds in Manila, Quezon City and Caloocan. SO ORDERED.6 Sally filed a Verified and Vigorous Motion for Inhibition with Motion for Reconsideration. In its Order dated 27 August 2009, 7 the trial court denied the motion. Sally appealed the trial court’s decision before the Court of Appeals. The Decision of the Court of Appeals In its 17 August 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals partly granted the appeal. The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court did not err in submitting the case for decision. The Court of Appeals noted that there were six resettings of the case, all made at the instance of Sally, for the initial reception of evidence, and Sally was duly warned to present her evidence on the next hearing or the case would be deemed submitted for decision. However, despite the warning, Sally still failed to present her evidence. She insisted on presenting Benjamin who was not around and was not subpoenaed despite the presence of her other witnesses. The Court of Appeals rejected Sally’s allegation that Benjamin failed to prove his action for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Court of Appeals ruled that Benjamin’s action was based on his prior marriage to Azucena and there was no evidence that the marriage was annulled or dissolved before Benjamin contracted the second marriage with Sally. The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court committed no error in declaring Benjamin’s marriage to Sally null and void. The Court of Appeals ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally was governed by Article 148 of the Family Code. The Court of Appeals ruled that only the properties acquired by the parties through their actual t contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contribution. The Court of Appeals ruled that the 37 properties being claimed by Sally rightfully belong to Benjamin and his siblings. As regards the seven properties claimed by both parties, the Court of Appeals ruled that only the properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 ed in the name of Benjamin belong to him exclusively because he was able to establish that they were acquired by him solely. The Court of

Appeals found that the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 and under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were exclusive properties of Sally in the absence of proof of Benjamin’s actual contribution in their purchase. The Court of Appeals ruled that the property under TCT No. 61722 ed in the names of Benjamin and Sally shall be owned by them in common, to be shared equally. However, the share of Benjamin shall accrue to the conjugal partnership under his existing marriage with Azucena while Sally’s share shall accrue to her in the absence of a clear and convincing proof of bad faith. Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that Sally failed to present clear and convincing evidence that would show bias and prejudice on the part of the trial judge that would justify his inhibition from the case. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Order dated March 26, 2009 and August 27, 2009, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43, in Civil Case No. 04-109401 are hereby AFFIRMED with modification declaring TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 to be exclusively owned by the petitioner-appellee while the properties under TCT Nos. N193656 and 253681 as well as CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 shall be solely owned by the respondent-appellant. On the other hand, TCT No. 61722 shall be owned by them and common and to be shared equally but the share of the petitioner-appellee shall accrue to the conjugal partnership under his first marriage while the share of respondent-appellant shall accrue to her. The rest of the decision stands. SO ORDERED.8 Sally moved for the reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’ decision. In its 14 March 2012 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied her motion. Hence, the petition before this Court. The Issues Sally raised the following issues before this Court: (1) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the trial court’s ruling that Sally had waived her right to present evidence; (2) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the trial court’s decision declaring the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and non-existent; and (3) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming with modification the trial court’s decision regarding the property relations of Benjamin and Sally. The Ruling of this Court The petition has no merit. Waiver of Right to Present Evidence Sally alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s ruling that she waived her right to present her evidence. Sally alleges that in not allowing her to present evidence that she and Benjamin were married, the trial court abandoned its duty to protect marriage as an inviolable institution. It is well-settled that a grant of a motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right but is addressed to the discretion of the trial court.9 In this case, Sally’s presentation of evidence was scheduled on28 February 2008. Thereafter, there were six resettings of the case: on 10 July 2008, 4 and 11 September 2008, 2 and 28 October 2008, and 28 November 2008. They were all made at Sally’s instance. Before the scheduled hearing of 28 November 2008, the trial court warned Sally that in case she still failed to present her evidence, the case would be submitted for decision. On the date of the scheduled hearing, despite the presence of other available witnesses, Sally insisted on presenting Benjamin who was not even subpoenaed on that day. Sally’s counsel insisted that the trial court could not dictate on the priority of witnesses to

be presented, disregarding the trial court’s prior warning due to the numerous resettings of the case. Sally could not complain that she had been deprived of her right to present her evidence because all the postponements were at her instance and she was warned by the trial court that it would submit the case for decision should she still fail to present her evidence on 28 November 2008. We agree with the trial court that by her continued refusal to present her evidence, she was deemed to have waived her right to present them. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals, Sally’s continued failure to present her evidence despite the opportunities given by the trial court showed her lack of interest to proceed with the case. Further, it was clear that Sally was delaying the case because she was waiting for the decision of the Court of Appeals on her petition questioning the trial court’s denial of her demurrer to evidence, despite the fact that the Court of Appeals did not issue any temporary restraining order as Sally prayed for. Sally could not accuse the trial court of failing to protect marriage as an inviolable institution because the trial court also has the duty to ensure that trial proceeds despite the deliberate delay and refusal to proceed by one of the parties.10 Validity of the Marriage between Benjamin and Sally Sally alleges that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals recognized her marriage to Benjamin because a marriage could not be nonexistent and, at the same time, null and void ab initio. Sally further alleges that if she were allowed to present her evidence, she would have proven her marriage to Benjamin. To prove her marriage to Benjamin, Sally asked this Court to consider that in acquiring real properties, Benjamin listed her as his wife by declaring he was "married to" her; that Benjamin was the informant in their children’s birth certificates where he stated that he was their father; and that Benjamin introduced her to his family and friends as his wife. In contrast, Sally claims that there was no real property ed in the names of Benjamin and Azucena. Sally further alleges that Benjamin was not the informant in the birth certificates of his children with Azucena. First, Benjamin’s marriage to Azucena on 10 September 1973 was duly established before the trial court, evidenced by a certified true copy of their marriage contract. At the time Benjamin and Sally entered into a purported marriage on 7 March 1982, the marriage between Benjamin and Azucena was valid and subsisting. On the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally, Teresita Oliveros (Oliveros), Registration Officer II of the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig City, testified that there was no valid marriage license issued to Benjamin and Sally. Oliveros confirmed that only Marriage Licence Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the month of February 1982. Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the series issued for the month. Oliveros further testified that the local civil registrar of Pasig City did not issue Marriage License No. N-07568 to Benjamin and Sally. The certification from the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license and absent any suspicious circumstance, the certification enjoys probative value, being issued by the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.11 Clearly, if indeed Benjamin and Sally entered into a marriage contract, the marriage was void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license.12 It was also established before the trial court that the purported marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. The lack of record was certified by Julieta B. Javier, Registration Officer IV of the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Pasig;13 Teresita R. Ignacio, Chief of the Archives Division of the Records Management and Archives Office, National Commission for Culture and the Arts;14 and Lourdes J. Hufana, Director III, Civil Registration Department of the National Statistics Office.15 The documentary and testimonial evidence proved that there was no marriage between Benjamin and Sally. As pointed out by the trial court, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally "was made only in jest"16 and "a simulated marriage, at the instance of Sally, intended to cover her up from expected social humiliation coming from relatives, friends and the society especially from her parents seen as Chinese conservatives."17 In short, it was a fictitious marriage. The fact that Benjamin was the informant in the birth certificates of Bernice and Bentley was not a proof of the marriage between Benjamin and Sally. This Court notes that Benjamin was the informant in Bernice’s birth certificate which stated that Benjamin and Sally were married on 8 March 198218 while Sally was the informant in Bentley’s birth certificate which also stated that Benjamin and Sally were married on 8 March 1982.19 Benjamin and Sally were supposedly married on 7 March 1982 which did not match the dates reflected on the birth certificates. We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and, at the same time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a license, except those covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary, "shall be void from the beginning." In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a license. It was duly established that no marriage license was issued to them and that Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the marriage license numbers issued by the local civil registrar of Pasig City for the month of February 1982. The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article 3520 which made their marriage void ab initio. The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. Applying the general rules on void or inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely simulated or fictitious are "inexistent and void from the beginning."21 Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the trial court’s ruling that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was null

and void ab initio and non-existent. Except for the modification in the distribution of properties, the Court of Appeals affirmed in all aspects the trial court’s decision and ruled that "the rest of the decision stands."22 While the Court of Appeals did notdiscuss bigamous marriages, it can be gleaned from the dispositive portion of the decision declaring that "the rest of the decision stands" that the Court of Appeals adopted the trial court’s discussion that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally is not bigamous. The trial court stated: 1âwphi1

On whether or not the parties’ marriage is bigamous under the concept of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the marriage is not bigamous. It is required that the first or former marriage shall not be null and void. The marriage of the petitioner to Azucena shall be assumed as the one that is valid, there being no evidence to the contrary and there is no trace of invalidity or irregularity on the face of their marriage contract. However, if the second marriage was void not because of the existence of the first marriage but for other causes such as lack of license, the crime of bigamy was not committed. In People v. De Lara [CA, 51 O.G., 4079], it was held that what was committed was contracting marriage against the provisions of laws not under Article 349 but Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code. Concluding, the marriage of the parties is therefore not bigamous because there was no marriage license. The daring and repeated stand of respondent that she is legally married to petitioner cannot, in any instance, be sustained. Assuming that her marriage to petitioner has the marriage license, yet the same would be bigamous, civilly or criminally as it would be invalidated by a prior existing valid marriage of petitioner and Azucena.23 For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity except for the existence of a prior marriage.24 In this case, there was really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a purported marriage contract without a marriage license. The supposed marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. In short, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived together and represented themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. Property Relations Between Benjamin and Sally The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code which states: Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual t contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to t deposits of money and evidences of credit. If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community of conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article. The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith. Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired by them through their actual t contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Thus, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly excluded the 37 properties being claimed by Sally which were given by Benjamin’s father to his children as advance inheritance. Sally’s Answer to the petition before the trial court even itted that "Benjamin’s late father himself conveyed a number of properties to his children and their respective spouses which included Sally x x x." 25 As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that the decision of the Court of Appeals is more in accord with the evidence on record. Only the property covered by TCT No. 61722 was ed in the names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses. 26 The properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 were in the name of Benjamin27 with the descriptive title "married to Sally." The property covered by CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were ed in the name of Sally28 with the descriptive title "married to Benjamin" while the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 were ed in the name of Sally as a single individual. We have ruled that the words "married to" preceding the name of a spouse are merely descriptive of the civil status of the ed owner.29 Such words do not prove co-ownership. Without proof of actual contribution from either or both spouses, there can be no co-ownership under Article 148 of the Family Code.30 Inhibition of the Trial Judge

Sally questions the refusal of Judge Roy G. Gironella (Judge Gironella) to inhibit himself from hearing the case. She cited the failure of Judge Gironella to accommodate her in presenting her evidence. She further alleged that Judge Gironella practically labeled her as an opportunist in his decision, showing his partiality against her and in favor of Benjamin. We have ruled that the issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge.31 To justify the call for inhibition, there must be extrinsic evidence to establish bias, bad faith, malice, or corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable error which may be inferred from the decision or order itself.32 In this case, we have sufficiently explained that Judge Gironella did not err in submitting the case for decision because of Sally’s continued refusal to present her evidence. We reviewed the decision of the trial court and while Judge Gironella may have used uncomplimentary words in writing the decision, they are not enough to prove his prejudice against Sally or show that he acted in bad faith in deciding the case that would justify the call for his voluntary inhibition. WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 17 August 2011 Decision and the 14 March 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226. SO ORDERED. ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice WE CONCUR: ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice LUCAS P. BERSAMIN* Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division. ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice Chairperson CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division. MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO Chief Justice

Footnotes

*

Designated additional member per Raffle dated 8 October 2012.

1

Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

2

Rollo, pp. 29-40. Penned by Associate Justice (now Supreme Court Associate Justice) Estela M. PerlasBernabe with Associate Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes (now also a Supreme Court Associate Justice) and Samuel H. Gaerlan, concurring. 3

Id. at 52. Penned by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan with Associate Justices Amelita G. Tolentino and Ramon R. Garcia, concurring. 4

Id. at 107-123. Penned by Presiding Judge Roy G. Gironella.

5

Records, Vol. 2, p. 461.

6

Id. at 122-123.

7

Id. at 124-128.

8

Id. at 40.

9

See Bautista v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157219, 28 May 2004, 430 SCRA 353.

10

Id.

11

Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño, 403 Phil. 861 (2001).

12

Article 35 of the Family Code states: Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: (1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of parents or guardians; (2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such marriages were contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do so; (3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding Chapter; (4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 41; (5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other; and (6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.

13


14

Id. at 459.

15

Id. at 460.

16

Rollo, p. 112.

17

Id.

18


19

Id. at 66.

20

Supra note 12.

21

Article 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning: xxxx (2) Those which are absolutely simulated or fictitious; xxxx

22

Rollo, p. 40.

23

Id. at 112-113.

24

See Nollora, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 191425, 7 September 2011, 657 SCRA 330.

25


26

Id. at 23.

27

Id. at 24-26.

28

Id. at 27-28.

29

Acre v. Yuttikki, 560 Phil. 495 (2007).

30

Id.

31

Kilosbayan Foundation v. Janolo, Jr., G.R. No. 180543, 27 July 2010, 625 SCRA 684.

32

Ramiscal, Jr. v. Hernandez, G.R. Nos. 173057-74, 27 September 2010, 631 SCRA 312.

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 183805

July 3, 2013

JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI, PETITIONER, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SHIRLEY TISMO-CAPILI, RESPONDENTS. DECISION PERALTA, J.: Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Decision 1 dated February 1, 2008 and Resolution2 dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 30444. The factual antecedents are as follows: On June 28, 2004, petitioner was charged with the crime of bigamy before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City in an Information which reads: On or about December 8, 1999, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused being previously united in lawful marriage with Karla Y. Medina-Capili and without said marriage having been legally dissolved or annulled, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with Shirley G. Tismo, to the damage and prejudice of the latter. Contrary to law.3 Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging that: (1) there is a pending civil case for declaration of nullity of the second marriage before the RTC of Antipolo City filed by Karla Y. Medina-Capili; (2) in the event that the marriage is declared null and void, it would exculpate him from the charge of bigamy; and (3) the pendency of the civil case for the declaration of nullity of the second marriage serves as a prejudicial question in the instant criminal case. Consequently, the arraignment and pre-trial were reset by the RTC of Pasig City, in view of the filing of the Motion to Suspend Proceedings filed by petitioner. In the interim, the RTC of Antipolo City rendered a decision declaring the voidness or incipient invalidity of the second marriage between petitioner and private respondent on the ground that a subsequent marriage contracted by the husband during the lifetime of the legal wife is void from the beginning. Thereafter, the petitioner accused filed his Manifestation and Motion (to Dismiss) praying for the dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy filed against him on the ground that the second marriage between him and private respondent had already been declared void by the RTC. In an Order4 dated July 7, 2006, the RTC of Pasig City granted petitioner’s Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss, to wit: The motion is anchored on the allegation that this case should be dismissed as a decision dated December 1, 2004 had already been rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72 in Civil Case No. 01-6043 (entitled: "Karla Medina-Capili versus James Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo," a case for declaration of nullity of marriage) nullifying the second marriage between James Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo and said decision is already final.

In the opposition filed by the private prosecutor to the motion, it was stated, among others, that the issues raised in the civil case are not similar or intimately related to the issue in this above-captioned case and that the resolution of the issues in said civil case would not determine whether or not the criminal action may proceed. WHEREFORE, after a judicious evaluation of the issue and arguments of the parties, this Court is of the humble opinion that there is merit on the Motion to dismiss filed by the accused as it appears that the second marriage between James Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo had already been nullified by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 72 of Antipolo City which has declared "the voidness, non-existent or incipient invalidity" of the said second marriage. As such, this Court submits that there is no more bigamy to speak of. SO ORDERED. Aggrieved, private respondent filed an appeal before the CA. Thus, in a Decision5 dated February 1, 2008, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC’s decision. The fallo reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated 07 July 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 152 in Crim. Case No. 128370 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. No costs. SO ORDERED.6 Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration against said decision, but the same was denied in a Resolution[7] dated July 24, 2008. Accordingly, petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari alleging that: THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO DISREGARD EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE PRONOUNCED BY THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT AND TO REVERSE THE ORDER DATED JULY 7, 2006 OF THE TRIAL COURT (REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, PASIG CITY, BRANCH 152) ISSUED IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 128370 GRANTING THE MOTION TO DISMISS THE CASE OF BIGAMY AGAINST PETITIONER, INASMUCH AS THE ISSUANCE OF THE SAID ORDER IS BASED ON THE FINDINGS AND/OR FACTS OF THE CASE IN THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72, IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043 AND THE CONCLUDING AND DISPOSITIVE PORTION IN THE SAID DECISION WHICH STATES THAT, AFTER PERUSAL OF THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD AND THE TESTIMONIES OF WITNESSES X X X, THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT SHIRLEY G. TISMO, IS HEREBY NULL AND VOID. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT THE DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND SHIRLEY G. TISMO BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72 IN ITS DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043, IS ON THE GROUND THAT IT IS BIGAMOUS IN NATURE, DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF ANY SUCH FINDINGS OR FACTS ON WHICH IT IS BASED IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 14 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, AND IN CONCLUDING THAT THE SAID DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS NOT A GROUND FOR DISMISSAL OF THE BIGAMY CASE AGAINST THE PETITIONER, WHICH RULING IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FACTS OF THE CASE OF THE SAID DECISION AND WHICH IS CONTRARY TO APPLICABLE LAWS AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE. THE CASE OF TENEBRO V. COURT OF APPEALS SPEAKS FOR ITSELF. IT IS AN EXCEPTION TO EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE INVOLVING DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE AND IS APPLICABLE ONLY TO THE SET OF FACTS IN THE SAID CASE, AND THE GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY, HENCE, THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR ABANDONING EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE AS WHERE IN THE INSTANT CASE THE GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 3 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 4 OF THE FAMILY CODE. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE USE BY RESPONDENT SHIRLEY G. TISMO OF THE SURNAME "CAPILI" IS ILLEGAL INASMUCH AS THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72 IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043 DECLARING NULL AND VOID THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND SHIRLEY G. TISMO HAD LONG BECOME FINAL AND UNAPPEALABLE AS OF THE

DATE OF THE SAID DECISION ON DECEMBER 1, 2004 AND DULY RECORDED IN THE RECORDS OF ENTRIES IN THE CORRESPONDING BOOK IN THE OFFICE OF THE CIVIL REGISTRAR OF PASIG CITY AND THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE.8 In essence, the issue is whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage is a ground for dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy. We rule in the negative. Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes the crime of bigamy as follows: Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are: (1) the offender has been legally married; (2) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. 9 In the present case, it appears that all the elements of the crime of bigamy were present when the Information was filed on June 28, 2004. It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and private respondent was contracted on December 8, 1999 during the subsistence of a valid first marriage between petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-Capili contracted on September 3, 1999. Notably, the RTC of Antipolo City itself declared the bigamous nature of the second marriage between petitioner and private respondent. Thus, the subsequent judicial declaration of the second marriage for being bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution of petitioner for the crime of bigamy. Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may still be charged with the crime of bigamy, even if there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second marriage, so long as the first marriage was still subsisting when the second marriage was celebrated. In Jarillo v. People,10 the Court affirmed the accused’s conviction for bigamy ruling that the crime of bigamy is consummated on the celebration of the subsequent marriage without the previous one having been judicially declared null and void, viz.: The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioner’s assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that. The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to [private complainant] had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted. Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.11 In like manner, the Court recently upheld the ruling in the aforementioned case and ruled that what makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid first marriage. It further held that the parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.12 Finally, it is a settled rule that the criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense, and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law.13 It is clear then that the crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner from the time he contracted the second marriage with private respondent. Thus, the finality of the judicial declaration of nullity of petitioner’s second marriage

does not impede the filing of a criminal charge for bigamy against him. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated February 1, 2008 and Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30444 are hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Abad, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur. July 16, 2013 N O T I C E OF J U D G M E N T Sirs/Mesdames: Please take notice that on ___July 3, 2013___ a Decision, copy attached herewith, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on July 16, 2013 at 2:30 a.m. Very truly yours, (SGD) LUCITA ABJELINA SORIANO Division Clerk of Court

Footnotes 1

Penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo, with Associate Justices Regalado E. Maambong and Sixto C. Marella, Jr., concurring; rollo, pp. 44-54. 2

Id. at 56-57.

3

Records, p. 1.

4

Rollo, p. 58.

5

Id. at 44-54.

6

Id. at 52. (Emphasis in the original)

7

Id. at 56-57.

8

Id. at 20.

9

Mercado v. Tan, 391 Phil. 809, 818-819 (2000).

10

G.R. No. 164435, September 29, 2009, 601 SCRA 236.

11

Id. at 245-246. (Emphasis in the original.)

12

Merlinda Cipriano Montañez v. Lourdes Tajolosa Cipriano, G.R. No. 181089, October 22, 2012.

13

Teves v. People, G.R. No. 188775, August 24, 2011, 656 SCRA 307, 314.



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January 9, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. CESAR ENCELAN, Respondent. DECISION BRION, J.: We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines challenging the October 7, 2005 amended decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) that reconsidered its March 22, 2004 decision 3(original decision) in CA-G.R. CV No. 75583. In its original decision, the CA set aside the June 5, 2002 decision4of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 47, in Civil Case No. 9574257, which The Factual Antecedents On August 25, 1979, Cesar married Lolita5 and the union bore two children, Maricar and Manny.6 To his family, Cesar went to work in Saudi Arabia on May 15, 1984. On June 12, 1986, Cesar, while still in Saudi Arabia, learned that Lolita had been having an illicit affair with Alvin Perez. Sometime in 1991,7 Lolita allegedly left the conjugal home with her children and lived with Alvin. Since then, Cesar and Lolita had been separated. On June 16, 1995, Cesar filed with the RTC a petition against Lolita for the declaration of the nullity of his marriage based on Lolita’s psychological incapacity.8 Lolita denied that she had an affair with Alvin; she contended that Alvin used to be an associate in her promotions business. She insisted that she is not psychologically incapacitated and that she left their home because of irreconcilable differences with her mother-in-law.9 At the trial, Cesar affirmed his allegations of Lolita’s infidelity and subsequent abandonment of the family home. 10He testified that he continued to provide financial for Lolita and their children even after he learned of her illicit affair with Alvin. 11 Cesar presented the psychological evaluation report12 on Lolita prepared by Dr. Fareda Fatima Flores of the National Center for Mental Health. Dr. Flores found that Lolita was "not suffering from any form of major psychiatric illness," 13 but had been "unable to provide the expectations

expected of her for a good and lasting marital relationship";14 her "transferring from one job to the other depicts some interpersonal problems with co-workers as well as her impatience in attaining her ambitions";15 and "her refusal to go with her husband abroad signifies her reluctance to work out a good marital and family relationship."16 The RTC Ruling In its June 5, 2002 decision,17 the RTC declared Cesar’s marriage to Lolita void, finding sufficient basis to declare Lolita psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed to the CA. The CA Ruling The CA originally18 set aside the RTC’s verdict, finding that Lolita’s abandonment of the conjugal dwelling and infidelity were not serious cases of personality disorder/psychological illness. Lolita merely refused to comply with her marital obligations which she was capable of doing. The CA significantly observed that infidelity is only a ground for legal separation, not for the declaration of the nullity of a marriage. Cesar sought reconsideration19 of the CA’s decision and, in due course, attained his objective. The CA set aside its original decision and entered another, which affirmed the RTC’s decision. In its amended decision, 20 the CA found two circumstances indicative of Lolita’s serious psychological incapacity that resulted in her gross infidelity: (1) Lolita’s unwarranted refusal to perform her marital obligations to Cesar; and (2) Lolita’s willful and deliberate act of abandoning the conjugal dwelling. The OSG then filed the present petition. The Petition The OSG argues that Dr. Flores’ psychological evaluation report did not disclose that Lolita had been suffering from a psychological illness nor did it establish its juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability; infidelity and abandonment do not constitute psychological incapacity, but are merely grounds for legal separation. The Case for the Respondent Cesar submits that Lolita’s infidelity and refusal to perform her marital obligations established her grave and incurable psychological incapacity. The Issue The case presents to us the legal issue of whether there exists sufficient basis to nullify Cesar’s marriage to Lolita on the ground of psychological incapacity. The Court’s Ruling We grant the petition. No sufficient basis exists to annul Cesar’s marriage to Lolita on the ground of psychological incapacity. Applicable Law and Jurisprudence on Psychological Incapacity Article 36 of the Family Code governs psychological incapacity as a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage. It provides that "a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization." In interpreting this provision, we have repeatedly stressed that psychological incapacity contemplates "downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations";21 not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.22 The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the juridical antecedence (i.e., the existence at the time of the celebration of marriage), gravity and incurability of the condition of the errant spouse.23

Cesar failed to prove Lolita’s psychological incapacity In this case, Cesar’s testimony failed to prove Lolita’s alleged psychological incapacity. Cesar testified on the dates when he learned of Lolita’s alleged affair and her subsequent abandonment of their home,24 as well as his continued financial to her and their children even after he learned of the affair,25 but he merely mentioned in ing Lolita’s alleged affair with Alvin and her abandonment of the conjugal dwelling. In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity; these are simply grounds for legal separation.26 To constitute psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations of a disordered personality that completely prevented the erring spouse from discharging the essential marital obligations.27 No evidence on record exists to Cesar’s allegation that Lolita’s infidelity and abandonment were manifestations of any psychological illness. Cesar mistakenly relied on Dr. Flores’ psychological evaluation report on Lolita to prove her alleged psychological incapacity. The psychological evaluation, in fact, established that Lolita did not suffer from any major psychiatric illness.28 Dr. Flores’ observation on Lolita’s interpersonal problems with co-workers,29 to our mind, does not suffice as a consideration for the conclusion that she was – at the time of her marriage – psychologically incapacitated to enter into a marital union with Cesar. Aside from the time element involved, a wife’s psychological fitness as a spouse cannot simply be equated with her professional/work relationship; workplace obligations and responsibilities are poles apart from their marital counterparts. While both spring from human relationship, their relatedness and relevance to one another should be fully established for them to be compared or to serve as measures of comparison with one another. To be sure, the evaluation report Dr. Flores prepared and submitted cannot serve this purpose. Dr. Flores’ further belief that Lolita’s refusal to go with Cesar abroad signified a reluctance to work out a good marital relationship30 is a mere generalization uned by facts and is, in fact, a rash conclusion that this Court cannot . In sum, we find that Cesar failed to prove the existence of Lolita’s psychological incapacity; thus, the CA committed a reversible error when it reconsidered its original decision. 1âwphi1

Once again, we stress that marriage is an inviolable social institution31 protected by the State. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of its existence its existence and continuation and against its dissolution and nullity.32 It cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties nor by transgressions made by one party to the other during the marriage. WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and SET ASIDE the October 7, 2005 amended decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 75583. Accordingly, we DISMISS respondent Cesar Encelan's petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lolita Castillo-Encelan. Costs against the respondent. SO ORDERED. ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice WE CONCUR: ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice Chairperson MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE Associate Justice ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division. ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice Chairperson, Second Division CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VI II of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division. MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO Chief Justice

Footnotes 1

Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; rollo, pp. 9-37.

2

Penned by Associate Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion, and concurred in by Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and Lucas P. Bersamin (now a member of this Court); id. at 39-42. 3

Id. at 43-50.

4

Records, pp. 436-438; penned by Judge Nimfa Cuesta-Vilches.

5

Id. at 6.

6

Id. at 7-8.

7

Id. at 2 and 73. Also stated as "1989" and "1990" in other parts of the record and the TSN; rollo, pp. 44 and 92; TSN, August 22, 1996, p. 36; records, p. 119. 8

Records, pp. 1-4.

9

Id. at 165-167 and 313-318.

10

Id. at 115-119.

11

Id. at 104-114.

12

Id. at 243-245.

13

Id. at 245.

14

Ibid.

15

Ibid.

16

Ibid.

17

Supra note 4.

18

Supra note 2.

19

CA rollo, pp. 87-93.

20

Supra note 2.

21

Kalaw v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 166357, September 19, 2011, 657 SCRA 822, 836-837.

22

Agraviador v. Amparo-Agraviador, G.R. No. 170729, December 8, 2010, 637 SCRA 519, 538; Toring v. Toring, G.R. No. 165321, August 3, 2010, 626 SCRA 389, 405; Paz v. Paz, G.R. No. 166579, February 18, 2010, 613 SCRA 195, 205; Navales v. Navales, G.R. No. 167523, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 272, 288; Paras v. Paras, G.R. No. 147824, August 2, 2007, 529 SCRA 81, 106; Republic of the Phils. v. Iyoy, 507 Phil. 485, 502 (2005); and Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 664, 678 (1997). 23

Kalaw v. Fernandez, supra note 21, at 823; Republic v. Galang, G.R. No. 168335, June 6, 2011, 650 SCRA 524, 544; Dimayuga-Laurena v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159220, September 22, 2008, 566 SCRA 154, 161-162; Republic v. Cabantug-Baguio, G.R. No. 171042, June 30, 2008, 556 SCRA 711, 725; Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, 377 Phil. 919, 932 (1999); and Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals, supra, at 676. 24

Supra note 10.

25

Supra note 11.

26

The Family Code, Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds: xxxx (8) Sexual infidelity or perversion; xxxx (10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year.

27

Toring v. Toring, supra note 22, at 406.

28

Supra note 13.

29

Supra note 15.

30

Supra note 16.

31

Bolos v. Bolos, G.R. No. 186400, October 20, 2010, 634 SCRA 429, 439; and Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes, G.R. No. 185286, August 18, 2010, 628 SCRA 461, 464. 32

Ochosa v. Alana, G.R. No. 167459, January 26, 2011, 640 SCRA 517, 524; Republic v. Cabantug-Baguio, supra note 23, at 727; and Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 23, at 676.



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July 17, 2013

PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. EDGARDO V. ODTUHAN, Respondent. DECISION PERALTA, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner People of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, against respondent Edgardo V. Odtuhan assailing the Court of Appeals Decision 1 dated December 17, 2009 and Resolution2 dated March 4, 2010 in CA-G.R. SP No. 108616. The assailed decision granted the petition for certiorari filed by respondent, and ordered the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 27, to give due course to and receive evidence on respondent's motion to quash and resolve the case with dispatch, while the assailed resolution denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The facts of the case follow: On July 2, 1980, respondent married Jasmin Modina (Modina).3 On October 28, 1993, respondent married Eleanor A. Alagon (Alagon).4 Sometime in August 1994, he filed a petition for annulment of his marriage with Modina. 5 On February 23, 1999, the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 70 granted respondent’s petition and declared his marriage with Modina void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license.6 On November 10, 2003, Alagon died. In the meantime, in June 2003, private complainant Evelyn Abesamis Alagon learned of respondent’s previous marriage with Modina.7 She thus filed a Complaint-Affidavit8 charging respondent with Bigamy. On April 15, 2005, respondent was indicted in an Information9 for Bigamy committed as follows: That on or about October 28, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused being then legally married to JASMIN MODINA and without such marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second or subsequent marriage with ELEANOR A. ALAGON, which second/subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. Contrary to law.10 On February 5, 2008, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion11 praying that he be allowed to present evidence to his motion; that his motion to quash be granted; and that the case be dismissed. Respondent moved for the quashal of the information on two grounds, to wit: (1) that the facts do not charge the offense of bigamy; and (2) that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished. 12

On September 4, 2008, the RTC13 issued an Order14 denying respondent’s Omnibus Motion. The RTC held that the facts alleged in the information – that there was a valid marriage between respondent and Modina and without such marriage having been dissolved, respondent contracted a second marriage with Alagon – constitute the crime of bigamy. The trial court further held that neither can the information be quashed on the ground that criminal liability has been extinguished, because the declaration of nullity of the first marriage is not one of the modes of extinguishing criminal liability. Respondent’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in an Order 15 dated February 20, 2009. Aggrieved, respondent instituted a special civil action on certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court 16 before the CA, assailing the denial of his motion to quash the information despite the fact that his first marriage with Modina was declared null and void ab initio prior to the filing of the bigamy case.17 On December 17, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The RTC, Branch 27, Manila is hereby ordered to give due course to and receive evidence on the petitioner’s motion to quash and resolve the case with dispatch. SO ORDERED.18 The CA applied the conclusion made by the Court in Morigo v. People,19 and held that there is cogent basis in looking into the motion to quash filed by respondent, for if the evidence would establish that his first marriage was indeed void ab initio, one essential element of the crime of bigamy would be lacking.20 The appellate court further held that respondent is even better off than Morigo which thus calls for the application of such doctrine, considering that respondent contracted the second marriage after filing the petition for the declaration of nullity of his first marriage and he obtained the favorable declaration before the complaint for bigamy was filed against him.21 The CA thus concluded that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying respondent’s motion to quash the information, considering that the facts alleged in the information do not charge an offense.22 With the denial of the motion for reconsideration before the CA, petitioner filed a petition before the Court in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court based on the following grounds: THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RENDERED ITS DECISION DATED DECEMBER 17, 2009 GRANTING RESPONDENT’S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND THE RESOLUTION DATED MARCH 4, 2010 DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, CONSIDERING THAT: I. THE INFORMATION CHARGING RESPONDENT OF BIGAMY SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGES ALL THE ELEMENTS CONSTITUTING SAID OFFENSE. II. THE SUBSEQUENT COURT JUDGMENT DECLARING RESPONDENT’S FIRST MARRIAGE VOID AB INITIO DID NOT EXTINGUISH RESPONDENT’S CRIMINAL LIABILITY WHICH ALREADY ATTACHED PRIOR TO SAID JUDGMENT.23 The petition is meritorious. The issues are not novel and have been squarely ruled upon by this Court in Montañez v. Cipriano, 24 Teves v. People,25 and Antone v. Beronilla.26 In Montañez, respondent Cipriano married Socrates in April 1976, but during the subsistence of their marriage on January 24, 1983, respondent married Silverio. In 2001, respondent filed a petition for the annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the ground of psychological incapacity which was granted on July 18, 2003. On May 14, 2004, petitioner filed a complaint for bigamy against respondent. The latter, however, moved for the quashal of the information and dismissal of the criminal complaint alleging that her first marriage had already been declared void ab initio prior to the filing of the bigamy case. In Teves, petitioner married Thelma on November 26, 1992. During the subsistence of their marriage on December 10, 2001, he again married Edita. On May 4, 2006, petitioner obtained a declaration of her marriage with Thelma null and void on the ground that the latter is physically

incapacitated to comply with her marital obligations. On June 8, 2006, an Information for Bigamy was filed against petitioner. The court eventually convicted petitioner of the crime charged. In Antone, petitioner married respondent in 1978, but during the subsistence of their marriage, respondent contracted a second marriage in 1991. On April 26, 2007, respondent obtained a declaration of nullity of her first marriage which decision became final and executory on May 15, 2007. On June 21, 2007, the prosecution filed an information for bigamy against respondent which the latter sought to be quashed on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. The present case stemmed from similar procedural and factual antecedents as in the above cases. As in Antone and Montañez, respondent moved to quash the information on the grounds that the facts do not charge the offense of bigamy and that his criminal liability has been extinguished both because of the declaration of nullity of the first marriage. The RTC refused to quash the information. On petition for certiorari, the CA, however, reached a different conclusion. As defined in Antone, "a motion to quash information is the mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint or information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the information." It is a hypothetical ission of the facts alleged in the information. The fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the material averments in an Information is whether or not the facts alleged therein, which are hypothetically itted, would establish the essential elements of the crime defined by law. Evidence aliunde or matters extrinsic of the information are not to be considered. 27 To be sure, a motion to quash should be based on a defect in the information which is evident on its fact.28 Thus, if the defect can be cured by amendment or if it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution is given by the court the opportunity to correct the defect by amendment.29 If the motion to quash is sustained, the court may order that another complaint or information be filed 30 except when the information is quashed on the ground of extinction of criminal liability or double jeopardy. 31 An examination of the information filed against respondent, however, shows the sufficiency of the allegations therein to constitute the crime of bigamy as it contained all the elements of the crime as provided for in Article 349 32 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit: (1) That the offender has been legally married; (2) That the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. 33 Here, the information contained the following allegations: (1) that respondent is legally married to Modina; (2) that without such marriage having been legally dissolved; (3) that respondent willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously contracted a second marriage with Alagon; and (4) that the second marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. Respondent’s evidence showing the court’s declaration that his marriage to Modina is null and void from the beginning because of the absence of a marriage license is only an evidence that seeks to establish a fact contrary to that alleged in the information that a first valid marriage was subsisting at the time he contracted the second marriage. This should not be considered at all, because matters of defense cannot be raised in a motion to quash.34 It is notproper, therefore, to resolve the charges at the very outset without the benefit of a full blown trial. The issues require a fuller examination and it would be unfair to shut off the prosecution at this stage of the proceedings and to quash the information on the basis of the document presented by respondent.35 With the presentation of the court decree, no facts have been brought out which destroyed the prima facie truth accorded to the allegations of the information on the hypothetical ission thereof. Respondent’s motion to quash was founded on the trial court’s declaration that his marriage with Modina is null and void ab initio. He claims that with such declaration, one of the elements of the crime is wanting. Thus, the allegations in the information do not charge the offense of bigamy, or at the very least, such court decree extinguished his criminal liability. Both respondent and the CA heavily relied on the Court’s pronouncement in Morigo v. People36 where the accused therein was acquitted because the elements of the crime of bigamy were incomplete. In said case, the first marriage was declared null and void, because the parties only signed the marriage contract without the presence of a solemnizing officer. Considering, therefore, that the declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage, the Court held that there was no marriage to speak of when the accused contracted the second marriage. Logically, the accused was acquitted. The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense.37 It has been held in a number of cases that a judicial declaration of 1âwphi1

nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral.38 What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.39 Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.40 If we allow respondent’s line of defense and the CA’s ratiocination, a person who commits bigamy can simply evade prosecution by immediately filing a petition for the declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage and hope that a favorable decision is rendered therein before anyone institutes a complaint against him. 41 Respondent, likewise, claims that there are more reasons to quash the information against him, because he obtained the declaration of nullity of marriage before the filing of the complaint for bigamy against him. Again, we cannot sustain such contention. In addition to the discussion above, settled is the rule that criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law and that the time of filing of the criminal complaint or information is material only for determining prescription.42 Thus, as held in Antone: To conclude, the issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent only after the latter contracted the subsequent marriage is, therefore, immaterial for the purpose of establishing that the facts alleged in the information for Bigamy does not constitute an offense. Following the same rationale, neither may such defense be interposed by the respondent in his motion to quash by way of exception to the established rule that facts contrary to the allegations in the information are matters of defense which may be raised only during the presentation of evidence.43 In view of the foregoing, the CA erred in granting the petition for certiorari filed by respondent. The RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion to quash and to allow him to present evidence to his omnibus motion. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated December 17, 2009 and Resolution dated March 4, 2010 in CA-G.R. SP No. 108616 are SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 05-235814 is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27 for further proceedings. SO ORDERED. DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice WE CONCUR: PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice Chairperson ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA Associate Justice MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN Associate Justice ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice Chairperson, Third Division CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division. MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO Chief Justice

Footnotes 1

Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, with Associate Justices Isaias P. Dicdican and Romeo F. Barza. concurring; rollo, pp. 37A-47. 2

Id.at48-49.

3

Records, p. 8.

4

Id. at 7.

5

Rollo, p. 144.

6

Records, pp. 15-19.

7

Id. at 5.

8

Id. at 4-6.

9

Id. at 1-2.

10

Id. at 1.

11

Id. at 66-71.

12

Id. at 66.

13

Branch 27, Manila.

14

Penned by Judge Teresa P. Soriaso; records, pp. 104-105.

15

Records, pp. 121-122.

16

CA rollo, pp. 2-26.

17

Id. at 9.

18

Rollo, p. 46. (Emphasis in the original)

19

466 Phil. 1013 (2004).

20

Rollo, p. 44.

21

Id. at 44-45.

22

Id. at 46.

23

Id. at 16-17.

24

G.R. No. 181089, October 22, 2012, 684 SCRA 315.

25

G.R. No. 188775, August 24, 2011, 656 SCRA 307.

26

G.R. No. 183824, December 8, 2010, 637 SCRA 615.

27

People v. Balao, G.R. No. 176819, January 26, 2011, 640 SCRA 565, 573; Go v. The Fifth Division, Sandiganbayan, 549 Phil. 783, 805 (2007). 28

Santos v. People, G.R. No. 173176, August 26, 2008, 563 SCRA 341, 368.

29

The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 117, Section 4.

30


31


Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. 32

33

Nollora, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 191425, September 7, 2011, 657 SCRA 330, 342; Teves v. People, supra note 25, at 312; Antone v. Beronilla, supra note 26, at 627-628. 34

Antone v. Beronilla, supra note 26, at 628.

35

Id. at 627.

36

Supra note 19.

37

Teves v. People, supra note 25, at 313.

38

Id. at 313-314.

39

Montañez v. Cipriano, supra note 24, at 325.

40

Id. at 325-326.

41

Teves v. People, supra note 25, at 314.

42

Id.

43

Antone v. Beronilla, supra note 26, at 632. (Italics in the original)



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June 26, 2013

MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER, vs. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE,RESPONDENTS. DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon City, through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure question of law. The petition assails the Order1 dated 31 January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and its Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition. The Facts Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines 2 on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost with each other. In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to Fujiki.3

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.4 On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines;5 and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO). 6 The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the petition and withdrawing the case from its active civil docket.7 The RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC): Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. – (a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. xxxx Sec. 4. Venue. – The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or in the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner. x x x The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation" of the above provisions. The trial court based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for immediate dismissal of the petition."8 Apparently, the RTC took the view that only "the husband or the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki. Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of foreign judgment is a special proceeding, which "seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact,"9 and not a civil action which is "for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong."10 In other words, the petition in the RTC sought to establish (1) the status and concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of the Japanese Family Court judgment declaring the marriage between Marinay and Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines11on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine courts.12 In any case, it was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void marriages under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages may be filed solely by the husband or the wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would be absurd because only the guilty parties would be permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course, difficult to realize that the party interested in having a bigamous marriage declared a nullity would be the husband in the prior, pre-existing marriage."14 Fujiki had material interest and therefore the personality to nullify a bigamous marriage. Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural implementation" of the Civil Law (Act No. 3753)15 in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code.16 The Civil Law imposes a duty on the "successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy of the final decree of the court to the local registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or annulled marriage was solemnized."17 Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil registry relating to "marriages," "judgments of annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning" are subject to cancellation or correction.18 The petition in the RTC sought (among others) to annotate the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the certificate of marriage between Marinay and Maekara. Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court "gravely erred" when, on its own, it dismissed the petition based on improper venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may be confusing the concept of venue with the concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of jurisdiction which allows a court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court19 which held that the "trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant’s prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the

case."20Moreover, petitioner alleged that the trial court should not have "immediately dismissed" the petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-1110-SC because he substantially complied with the provision. On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. In its Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10SC applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree of absolute nullity of marriage.21 The trial court reiterated its two grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third person"22 in the proceeding because he "is not the husband in the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially recognized, x x x."23 On the other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground of impropriety of venue. It only said that "[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a ground for dismissal of this case[,] it should be taken together with the other ground cited by the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x."24 The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental.25 The Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x x."26 Braza emphasized that the "validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through a collateral attack such as [a] petition [for correction of entry] x x x."27 The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage between Marinay and Maekara. The trial court held that this is a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the petition.28 Moreover, the verification and certification against forum shopping of the petition was not authenticated as required under Section 529 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also warranted the "immediate dismissal" of the petition under the same provision. The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and the Letters of Marinay and Maekara On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the petition for review.30 The public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the and Civil Registrar General of the NSO, participated through the Office of the Solicitor General. Instead of a comment, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion.31 The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTC’s "pronouncement that the petitioner failed to comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and that the case be reinstated in the trial court for further proceedings.32 The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as the spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General cited Juliano-Llave v. Republic33 which held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this Court explained: [t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered during the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it would not be expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by the Constitution.34 The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding.35 In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,36 this Court held that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact."37 WhileCorpuz concerned a foreign divorce decree, in the present case the Japanese Family Court judgment also affected the civil status of the parties, especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen. The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to record "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons" in the civil registry as required by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon a person’s legal capacity and status x x x." 38 The Japanese Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and should therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding. Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castro39 and Niñal v. Bayadog40 which declared that "[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked." 41

Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the directive for them to comment on the petition. 42 Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him the fact that she was previously married to Fujiki. 43 Maekara also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on Marinay.44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to oppose the petition.45 She would like to maintain her silence for fear that anything she say might cause misunderstanding between her and Fujiki.46 The Issues Petitioner raises the following legal issues: (1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable. (2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy. (3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The Ruling of the Court We grant the petition. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy." 48 I. For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be itted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.50 To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form and contents of the petition,51 the service of summons,52 the investigation of the public prosecutor,53 the setting of pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial court.56 This is absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues." 57 The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v. Rañada,58 this Court explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation."59 A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws. 60 Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of such citizen. A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under

the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order against a person creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that "the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is itted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and the protection of party expectations,61 as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other states.62 Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules of evidence.64 Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce decree does not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.65 There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court. II. Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life which are recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such as birth, death or marriage,66 which the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact."67 Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states: Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning thecivil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil , may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied) Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court. There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances68) his most intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts marriage.69 These property interests in marriage include the right to be ed "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family"70 and preserving the property regime of the marriage.71 Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution,72 but a spouse’s right in a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code. 73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish, increase, or modify" the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the integrity of his marriage. 74 In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by limiting the personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union recognized by law.

Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife"75—it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the prosecution and prevention of crimes.77If anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage,78 there is more reason to confer personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage. When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured party and is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit.79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse."80 Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once established, there should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage in the civil registry. III. In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court held that a "trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.81 Thus, the "validity of marriage[] x x x can be questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the marriage.82 The RTC relied on Braza in dismissing the petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage between Marinay and Maekara. Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage,83 pendente lite of the spouses and children,84 the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, 85and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion.86 A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court "where the corresponding civil registry is located."87 In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry. However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry based on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign court. Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." In Republic v. Orbecido,88 this Court recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26 which is "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse"89 under the laws of his or her country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on

the merits because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce. The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly that results from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. The correction is made by extending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree, which is already effective in the country where it was rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is based on this Court’s decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared that the Filipino spouse "should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served."91 The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be discriminated—the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry. Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are empowered to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A critical difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy. In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code. For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive evidence of a right between the parties." Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new status, right and fact92that needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public records in the Philippines. 1âw phi 1

However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.93 The recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine archipelago." Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to address the questions on venue and the contents and form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5, respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 are REVERSED andSET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision. SO ORDERED. Brion, Del Castillo, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

Footnotes 1

Penned by Judge Jose L. Bautista Jr.

2

In Pasay City, Metro Manila.

3

See rollo, p. 88; Trial Family Court Decree No. 15 of 2009, Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage between Maria Paz Galela Marinay and Shinichi Maekara dated 18 August 2010. Translated by Yoshiaki Kurisu, Kurisu Gyoseishoshi Lawyer’s Office (see rollo, p. 89). 4

Id.

5

FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES (E.O. No. 209 as amended): Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: xxxx (4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 41; xxxx Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

6

Rollo, pp. 79-80.

7

The dispositive portion stated:

WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby ordered DISMISSED and WITHDRAWN from the active civil docket of this Court. The RTC-OCC, Quezon City is directed to refund to the petitioner the amount of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000) to be taken from the Sheriff’s Trust Fund. 8

Rollo, pp. 44-45. Section 5 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) provides: Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition. – (1) The petition shall allege the complete facts constituting the cause of action. (2) It shall state the names and ages of the common children of the parties and specify the regime governing their property relations, as well as the properties involved. If there is no adequate provision in a written agreement between the parties, the petitioner may apply for a provisional order for spousal , custody and of common children, visitation rights, istration of community or conjugal property, and other matters similarly requiring urgent action. (3) It must be verified and accompanied by a certification against forum shopping. The verification and certification must be signed personally by the petitioner. No petition may be filed solely by counsel or through an attorney-in-fact.

If the petitioner is in a foreign country, the verification and certification against forum shopping shall be authenticated by the duly authorized officer of the Philippine embassy or legation, consul general, consul or vice-consul or consular agent in said country. (4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the City or Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the date of its filing and submit to the court proof of such service within the same period. Failure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for immediate dismissal of the petition. 9

RULES OF COURT, Rule 1, Sec. 3(c). See rollo, pp. 55-56 (Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration).

10

RULES OF COURT, Rule 1, Sec. 3(a).

11

FAMILY CODE (E.O. No. 209 as amended), Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: xxxx (4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 41; xxxx

12

Rollo, p. 56.

13

FAMILY CODE, Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. 14

Rollo, p. 68.

15

Enacted 26 November 1930.

16

CIVIL CODE, Art. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws.

17

Act No. 3753, Sec. 7. Registration of marriage. - All civil officers and priests or ministers authorized to solemnize marriages shall send a copy of each marriage contract solemnized by them to the local civil registrar within the time limit specified in the existing Marriage Law. In cases of divorce and annulment of marriage, it shall be the duty of the successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy of the final decree of the court to the local civil registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or annulled marriage was solemnized. In the marriage there shall be entered the full name and address of each of the contracting parties, their ages, the place and date of the solemnization of the marriage, the names and addresses of the witnesses, the full name, address, and relationship of the minor contracting party or parties or the person or persons who gave their consent to the marriage, and the full name, title, and address of the person who solemnized the marriage. In cases of divorce or annulment of marriages, there shall be recorded the names of the parties divorced or whose marriage was annulled, the date of the decree of the court, and such other details as the regulations to be issued may require. RULES OF COURT, Rule 108, Sec. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. — Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) 18

adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (1) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name. 19

273 Phil. 1 (1991).

20

Id. at 7. See rollo, pp. 65 and 67.

21

Rollo, p. 47.

22

Id. at 46.

23

Id. at 48.

24

Id.

25

G.R. No. 181174, 4 December 2009, 607 SCRA 638.

26

Id. at 641.

27

Id. at 643.

28

See rollo, p. 49.

29

Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC states in part: Contents and form of petition. – x x x xxxx (3) It must be verified and accompanied by a certification against forum shopping. The verification and certification must be signed personally by the petitioner. No petition may be filed solely by counsel or through an attorney-in-fact. If the petitioner is in a foreign country, the verification and certification against forum shopping shall be authenticated by the duly authorized officer of the Philippine embassy or legation, consul general, consul or vice-consul or consular agent in said country. xxxx Failure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for immediate dismissal of the petition.

30

Resolution dated 30 May 2011. Rollo, p. 105.

31

Under Solicitor General Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz.

32

Rollo, p. 137. The "Conclusion and Prayer" of the "Manifestation and Motion (In Lieu of Comment)" of the Solicitor General stated: In fine, the court a quo’s pronouncement that the petitioner failed to comply with the requirements provided in A.M. No. 02-1110-SC should accordingly be set aside. It is, thus, respectfully prayed that Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 be reinstated for further proceedings. Other reliefs, just and equitable under the premises are likewise prayed for.

33

G.R. No. 169766, 30 March 2011, 646 SCRA 637.

34

Id. at 656. Quoted in the Manifestation and Motion of the Solicitor General, pp. 8-9. See rollo, pp. 132-133.

35

Rollo, p. 133.

36

G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010, 628 SCRA 266.

37

Id. at 287.

38

Rollo, p. 133.

39

G.R. No. 160172, 13 February 2008, 545 SCRA 162.

40

384 Phil. 661 (2000).

41

De Castro v. De Castro, supra note 39 at 169.

42

Supra note 30.

43

See rollo, p. 120.

44

Id.

45

See rollo, p. 146.

46

Id.

47

Supra note 33.

48

Supra note 33 at 655.

RULES OF COURT, Rule 132, Sec. 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when issible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. 49

Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court. Rule 39, Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. — The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order, is as follows: (a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title of the thing; and (b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. 50

See RULES OF COURT, Rule 132, Sec. 24-25. See also Corpuz v. Santo Tomas, supra note 36 at 282.

51

A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Sec. 5.

52

Id., Sec. 6.

53

Id., Sec. 9.

54

Id., Sec. 11-15.

55

Id., Sec. 17-18.

56

Id., Sec. 19 and 22-23.

57

Mijares v. Rañada, 495 Phil. 372, 386 (2005) citing Eugene Scoles & Peter Hay, Conflict of Laws 916 (2nd ed., 1982).

58

Id.

59

Id. at 386.

60

Civil Code, Art. 17. x x x xxxx Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

61

Mijares v. Rañada, supra note 57 at 386. "Otherwise known as the policy of preclusion, it seeks to protect party expectations resulting from previous litigation, to safeguard against the harassment of defendants, to insure that the task of courts not be increased by never-ending litigation of the same disputes, and – in a larger sense – to promote what Lord Coke in the Ferrer’s Case of 1599 stated to be the goal of all law: ‘rest and quietness.’" (Citations omitted) 62

Mijares v. Rañada, supra note 57 at 382. "The rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations have established a usage among civilized states by which final judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in different countries." (Citations omitted) 63

43 Phil. 43 (1922).

64

Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010, 628 SCRA 266, 280; Garcia v. Recio, 418 Phil. 723 (2001); Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, supra. 65

FAMILY CODE, Art. 26. x x x

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. Act No. 3753, Sec. 1. Civil . — A civil is established for recording the civil status of persons, in which shall be entered: (a) births; (b) deaths; (c) marriages; (d) annulments of marriages; (e) divorces; (f) legitimations; (g) adoptions; (h) 66

acknowledgment of natural children; (i) naturalization; and (j) changes of name. Cf. RULES OF COURT, Rule 108, Sec. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. — Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (1) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name. 67

Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, supra note 36 at 287.

68

FAMILY CODE, Art. 35-67.

69


70

FAMILY CODE, Art. 195 in relation to Art. 194.

71

See supra note 69.

72

CONSTITUTION, Art. III, Sec. 1: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law x x x."

73


74

CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5). The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: xxxx (5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the ission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. xxx x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

75

Emphasis supplied.

76

Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815, as amended), Art. 349. Bigamy. - The penalty of prisión mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. 77

See III RAMON AQUINO, THE REVISED PENAL CODE (1997), 518.

RULES OF COURT, Rule 111, Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. — (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. 78

xxxx Cf. RULES OF COURT, Rule 3, Sec. 2. Parties in interest. — A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. 79

80

Juliano-Llave v. Republic, supra note 33.

81

Supra note 25.

82

Supra note 25.

83

See supra note 68.

84

FAMILY CODE, Art. 49. During the pendency of the action and in the absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement between the spouses, the Court shall provide for the of the spouses and the custody and of their common children. The Court shall give paramount consideration to the moral and material welfare of said children and their choice of the parent with whom they wish to remain as provided to in Title IX. It shall also provide for appropriate visitation rights of the other parent. Cf. RULES OF COURT, Rule 61. 85

FAMILY CODE, Art. 50. The effects provided for by paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and by Article 44 shall also apply in the proper cases to marriages which are declared ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45. The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and of the common children, and the delivery of third presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation. In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Sec. 19. Decision.— (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties. xxxx 86

FAMILY CODE, Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Sec. 9. Investigation report of public prosecutor. — (1) Within one month after receipt of the court order mentioned in paragraph (3) of Section 8 above, the public prosecutor shall submit a report to the court stating whether the parties are in collusion and serve copies thereof on the parties and their respective counsels, if any. (2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state the basis thereof in his report. The parties shall file their respective comments on the finding of collusion within ten days from receipt of a copy of the report The court shall set the report for hearing and if convinced that the parties are in collusion, it shall dismiss the petition. (3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the court shall set the case for pre-trial. It shall be the duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the State at the pre-trial.

87

RULES OF COURT, Rule 108, Sec. 1.

88

509 Phil. 108 (2005).

89

Id. at 114.

90

223 Phil. 357 (1985).

91

Id. at 363.

92

See RULES OF COURT, Rule 1, Sec. 3(c).

See RULES OF COURT, Rule 72, Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of civil actions. — In the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings. 93

Rule 111, Sec. 2. When separate civil action is suspended. — x x x If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been instituted, the latter shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found before judgment on the merits. The suspension shall last until final judgment is rendered in the criminal action. Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits is rendered in the civil action, the same may, upon motion of the offended party, be consolidated with the criminal action in the court trying the criminal action. In case of consolidation, the evidence already adduced in the civil action shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the criminal action without prejudice to the right of the prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses presented by the offended party in the criminal case and of the parties to present additional evidence. The consolidated criminal and civil actions shall be tried and decided tly. During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the period of prescription of the civil action which cannot be instituted separately or whose proceeding has been suspended shall be tolled. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action. However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.



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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 183896

January 30, 2013

SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner, vs. GLORIA GOO ABBAS, Respondent. DECISION VELASCO, JR., J.: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, questioning the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 11, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760, which reversed the Decision2 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM dated October 5, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 109, Pasay City, and the CA Resolution dated July 24, 2008, denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision. The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria GooAbbas (Gloria) with the RTC of Pasay City, docketed as Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM, and raffled to RTC Branch 109. Syed alleged the absence of a marriage license, as provided for in Article 4, Chapter I, Title 1 of Executive Order No. 269, otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, as a ground for the annulment of his marriage to Gloria. In the Marriage Contract3 of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that Marriage License No. 9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite on January 8, 1993, was presented to the solemnizing officer. It is this information that is crucial to the resolution of this case. At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in 1991, and they were married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan.4 He arrived in the Philippines in December of 1992. On January 9, 1993, at around 5 o’clock in the afternoon, he was at his mother-in-law’s residence, located at 2676 F. Muñoz St., Malate, Manila, when his mother-in-law arrived with two men. He testified that he was told that he was going to undergo some ceremony, one of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the nature of said ceremony. During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he did not know that the ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He further testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage license, and that he had never resided in that area. In July of 2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check on their marriage license, and was asked to show a copy of their marriage contract wherein the marriage license number could be found.5The Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage license number appearing in the marriage contract he submitted, Marriage License No. 9969967, was the number of another marriage license issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.6 Said certification reads as follows: 11 July 2003 TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage License filed in this office, Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued in favor of MR. ARLINDO GETALADO and MISS MYRA MABILANGAN on January 19, 1993. No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to MR. SYED AZHAR ABBAS and MISS GLORIA F. GOO on January 8, 1993. This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar Abbas for whatever legal purpose or intents it may serve.7 On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy cases against him in 2001 and 2002, and that he had gone to the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite to get certification on whether or not there was a marriage license on advice of his counsel. 8 Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite. Bagsic appeared under a letter of authority from the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, and brought documents pertaining to Marriage License No. 9969967, which was issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 20, 1993.9

Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for marriage licenses and that the numbers are issued chronologically.10 He testified that the certification dated July 11, 2003, was issued and signed by Leodivina Encarnacion, Registrar of the Municipality of Carmona, Cavite, certifying that Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued for Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 19, 1993, and that their office had not issued any other license of the same serial number, namely 9969967, to any other person.11 For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented Reverend Mario Dauz, Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez, Felicitas Goo and May Ann Ceriola. Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a minister of the Gospel and a barangay captain, and that he is authorized to solemnize marriages within the Philippines.12 He testified that he solemnized the marriage of Syed Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo at the residence of the bride on January 9, 1993.13 He stated that the witnesses were Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez (Atty. Sanchez) and Mary Ann Ceriola.14 He testified that he had been solemnizing marriages since 1982, and that he is familiar with the requirements.15 Rev. Dauz further testified that Atty. Sanchez gave him the marriage license the day before the actual wedding, and that the marriage contract was prepared by his secretary.16 After the solemnization of the marriage, it was ed with the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and Rev. Dauz submitted the marriage contract and copy of the marriage license with that office.17 Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the wedding of Syed Abbas and Gloria Goo by the mother of the bride, Felicitas Goo.18 He testified that he requested a certain Qualin to secure the marriage license for the couple, and that this Qualin secured the license and gave the same to him on January 8, 1993.19He further testified that he did not know where the marriage license was obtained.20 He attended the wedding ceremony on January 9, 1993, signed the marriage contract as sponsor, and witnessed the g of the marriage contract by the couple, the solemnizing officer and the other witness, Mary Ann Ceriola.21 Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and Syed Azhar Abbas is her son-in-law, and that she was present at the wedding ceremony held on January 9, 1993 at her house.22 She testified that she sought the help of Atty. Sanchez at the Manila City Hall in securing the marriage license, and that a week before the marriage was to take place, a male person went to their house with the application for marriage license.23 Three days later, the same person went back to their house, showed her the marriage license before returning it to Atty. Sanchez who then gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer.24 She further testified that she did not read all of the contents of the marriage license, and that she was told that the marriage license was obtained from Carmona. 25 She also testified that a bigamy case had been filed by Gloria against Syed at the Regional Trial Court of Manila, evidenced by an information for Bigamy dated January 10, 2003, pending before Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.26 As to Mary Ann Ceriola’s testimony, the counsels for both parties stipulated that: (a) she is one of the sponsors at the wedding of Gloria Goo and Syed Abbas on January 9, 1993; (b) she was seen in the wedding photos and she could identify all the persons depicted in said photos; and (c) her testimony corroborates that of Felicitas Goo and Atty. Sanchez. The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and presented the marriage contract bearing their signatures as proof.27 She and her mother sought the help of Atty. Sanchez in securing a marriage license, and asked him to be one of the sponsors. A certain Qualin went to their house and said that he will get the marriage license for them, and after several days returned with an application for marriage license for them to sign, which she and Syed did. After Qualin returned with the marriage license, they gave the license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer. Gloria testified that she and Syed were married on January 9, 1993 at their residence.28 Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on June 15, 1993.29 Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who had married a certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura during the existence of the previous marriage, and that the case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 02A-03408, with the RTC of Manila.30 Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on August 9, 1992 in Taiwan, but that she did not know if said marriage had been celebrated under Muslim rites, because the one who celebrated their marriage was Chinese, and those around them at the time were Chinese.31 The Ruling of the RTC In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid marriage license was issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed, as Marriage License No. 9969967 had been issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan, and the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite had certified that no marriage license had been issued for Gloria and Syed.32 It also took into the fact that neither party was a resident of Carmona, Cavite, the place where Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued, in

violation of Article 9 of the Family Code.33 As the marriage was not one of those exempt from the license requirement, and that the lack of a valid marriage license is an absence of a formal requisite, the marriage of Gloria and Syed on January 9, 1993 was void ab initio. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner, and against the respondent declaring as follows: 1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas is hereby annulled; 2. Terminating the community of property relations between the petitioner and the respondent even if no property was acquired during their cohabitation by reason of the nullity of the marriage of the parties. 3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Civil Registrar General, National Statistics Office, are hereby ordered to cancel from their respective civil registries the marriage contracted by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria GooAbbas on January 9, 1993 in Manila. SO ORDERED.34 Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 7, 2005, but the RTC denied the same, prompting her to appeal the questioned decision to the Court of Appeals. The Ruling of the CA In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the following assignment of errors: I THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT AS NULL AND VOID DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF A MARRIAGE LICENSE DESPITE EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWING THAT THERE WAS ONE. II THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING, AS A REQUISITE OF A VALID MARRIAGE, THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT A MARRIAGE CEREMONY TOOK PLACE WITH THE APPEARANCE OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES BEFORE THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER AND THEIR PERSONAL DECLARATION THAT THEY TOOK EACH OTHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE IN THE PRESENCE OF NOT LESS THAN TWO WITNESSES OF LEGAL AGE. III THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE ISSUE OF ESTOPPEL BY LACHES ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER, AN ISSUE TIMELY RAISED IN THE COURT BELOW.35 The CA gave credence to Gloria’s arguments, and granted her appeal. It held that the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent search for the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus held that said certification could not be accorded probative value.36 The CA ruled that there was sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed had been validly married and that there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law.37 It gave weight to the fact that Syed had itted to having signed the marriage contract. The CA also considered that the parties had comported themselves as husband and wife, and that Syed only instituted his petition after Gloria had filed a case against him for bigamy.38 The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 05 October 2005 and Order dated 27 January 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109, in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is DISMISSED. The marriage between Shed [sic] Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo Abbas contracted on 09 January 1993 remains valid and subsisting. No costs. SO ORDERED.39 Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 200840 but the same was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated July 24, 2008.41 Hence, this petition. Grounds in of Petition I THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN CITING REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS AS THE SAME IS DIAMETRICALLY INCONSISTENT AND CONTRARY TO THE COURT’S OWN FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN THIS CASE. II THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE, WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS, THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRANTING THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.42 The Ruling of this Court The petition is meritorious. As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9, 1993, Executive Order No. 209, or the Family Code of the Philippines, is the applicable law. The pertinent provisions that would apply to this particular case are Articles 3, 4 and 35(3), which read as follows: Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are: (1) Authority of the solemnizing officer; (2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and (3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age. Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2). A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45. An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and istratively liable. Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: xxxx

(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding Chapter. There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art. 2 of the Family Code, nor with the formal requisites of the authority of the solemnizing officer and the conduct of the marriage ceremony. Nor is the marriage one that is exempt from the requirement of a valid marriage license under Chapter 2, Title I of the Family Code. The resolution of this case, thus, hinges on whether or not a valid marriage license had been issued for the couple. The RTC held that no valid marriage license had been issued. The CA held that there was a valid marriage license. We find the RTC to be correct in this instance. Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and relied on the marriage contract as well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said license. To prove that no such license was issued, Syed turned to the office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued said license. It was there that he requested certification that no such license was issued. In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals43 such certification was allowed, as permitted by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which reads: SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – A written statement signed by an officer having the custody of an official record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is issible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry. In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil Registrar of Pasig to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license, the Court held: The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a . As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a book where they are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such other relevant data.44 The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil registrar enjoyed probative value, as his duty was to maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was allegedly issued, issued a certification to the effect that no such marriage license for Gloria and Syed was issued, and that the serial number of the marriage license pertained to another couple, Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine copy of Marriage License No. 9969967 was presented, which was issued in Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of Gloria and Syed do not appear in the document. In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the certification, stating that it did not comply with Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. The CA deduced that from the absence of the words "despite diligent search" in the certification, and since the certification used stated that no marriage license appears to have been issued, no diligent search had been conducted and thus the certification could not be given probative value. To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals. 45 It is worth noting that in that particular case, the Court, in sustaining the finding of the lower court that a marriage license was lacking, relied on the Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, which merely stated that the alleged marriage license could not be located as the same did not appear in their records. Nowhere in the Certification was it categorically stated that the officer involved conducted a diligent search, nor is a categorical declaration absolutely necessary for Sec. 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court to apply. Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an official duty has been regularly performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held, "The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty."46 No such affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing her duty of checking the records of their office, thus the presumption must stand. In fact, proof does exist of a diligent search having been conducted, as Marriage License No. 996967 was indeed located and submitted to the court. The fact that the names in said license do not correspond to those of Gloria and Syed does not overturn the presumption that the registrar conducted a diligent search of the records of her office.

It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy thereof to the court. She failed to explain why the marriage license was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location where, ittedly, neither party resided. She took no pains to apply for the license, so she is not the best witness to testify to the validity and existence of said license. Neither could the other witnesses she presented prove the existence of the marriage license, as none of them applied for the license in Carmona, Cavite. Her mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the contents of the license, having itted to not reading all of its contents. Atty. Sanchez, one of the sponsors, whom Gloria and Felicitas Goo approached for assistance in securing the license, itted not knowing where the license came from. The task of applying for the license was delegated to a certain Qualin, who could have testified as to how the license was secured and thus impeached the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar as well as the testimony of her representative. As Gloria failed to present this Qualin, the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys probative value. It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage contract and a copy of the marriage license were submitted to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy of the marriage license could have simply been secured from that office and submitted to the court. However, Gloria inexplicably failed to do so, further weakening her claim that there was a valid marriage license issued for her and Syed. In the case of Cariño v. Cariño,47 following the case of Republic,48 it was held that the certification of the Local Civil Registrar that their office had no record of a marriage license was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license. The case of Cariño further held that the presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had been overcome, and that it became the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the marriage was valid, and that the required marriage license had been secured. 49 Gloria has failed to discharge that burden, and the only conclusion that can be reached is that no valid marriage license was issued. It cannot be said that there was a simple irregularity in the marriage license that would not affect the validity of the marriage, as no license was presented by the respondent. No marriage license was proven to have been issued to Gloria and Syed, based on the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and Gloria’s failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license. To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to its conclusion that Gloria and Syed were validly married. To quote the CA: Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial and documentary, that appellant and appellee have been validly married and there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law. Both parties are legally capacitated to marry. A certificate of legal capacity was even issued by the Embassy of Pakistan in favor of appellee. The parties herein gave their consent freely. Appellee itted that the signature above his name in the marriage contract was his. Several pictures were presented showing appellant and appellee, before the solemnizing officer, the witnesses and other of appellant’s family, taken during the marriage ceremony, as well as in the restaurant where the lunch was held after the marriage ceremony. Most telling of all is Exhibit "5-C" which shows appellee g the Marriage Contract. xxxx The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and has [sic] one offspring, Aliea Fatima Goo Abbas, who was born on 15 June 1993. It took appellee more than ten (10) years before he filed on 01 August 2003 his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 4 of the Family Code. We take serious note that said Petition appears to have been instituted by him only after an Information for Bigamy (Exhibit "1") dated 10 January 2003 was filed against him for contracting a second or subsequent marriage with one Ma. Corazon (Maryam) T. Buenaventura. We are not ready to reward (appellee) by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom and in the process allow him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy.50 All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage contract was signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, "The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2)." Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except those exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same Code.51 Again, this marriage cannot be characterized as among the exemptions, and thus, having been solemnized without a marriage license, is void ab initio. 1âwphi 1

As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well be that his motives are less than pure, that he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same does not make up for the failure of the respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage license, given the weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage license cannot be attributed to him, as it was Gloria who took steps to procure the same. The law must be applied. As the marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio. WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated March 11, 2008 and Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial

Court, Branch 109, Pasay City dated October 5, 2005 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM annulling the marriage of petitioner with respondent on January 9, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED. No costs. SO ORDERED. PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice WE CONCUR: DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice


I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division. PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice Chairperson CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division. MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO Chief Justice

Footnotes 1

Penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo and concurred in by Associate Justices Regalado E. Maambong and Myrna Dimaranan Vidal. 2

Penned by Judge Tingaraan U. Guiling.

3

Rollo, p. 13.

4

Id. at 47.

5

Id.

6

Id. at 12.

7

Id. at 10.

8

Id. at 48.

9

Id. at 49, "January 19, 1993" in some parts of the records.

10

Id.

11

Id. at 49-50.

12

Id. at 50.

13

Id.

14

Id.

15

Id.

16

Id. at 51.

17

Id.

18

Id.

19

Id.

20

Id. at 52.

21

Id.

22

Id. at 53.

23

Id. at 54.

24

Id.

25

Id.

26

Id.

27

Id. at 55.

28

Id.

29

Id. at 56.

30

Id. at 57.

31

Id.

32

Id. at 58.

33

Article 9. A Marriage License shall be issued by the Local Civil Registrar of the city or municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, except in marriages where no license is required in accordance with Chapter 2 of this Title. 34

Rollo, pp. 58-59.

35

Id. at 122.

36

Id. at 128.

37

Id. at 129.

38

Id. at 130.

39

Id. at 131.

40

Id. at 135-146.

41

Id. at 173-174.

42

Id. at 31.

43

G.R. No. 103047, September 2, 1994, 236 SCRA 257.

44

Id. at 262.

45

Supra note 43.

46

Alcantara v. Alcantara, G.R. No. 167746. August 28, 2007, 531 SCRA 446, 456.

47

403 Phil. 861, 869 (2001).

48

Supra note 43.

49

Supra note 47, at 870.

50

Rollo, pp. 129-130.

51

Art. 27. In case either or both of the contracting parties are at the point of death, the marriage may be solemnized without necessity of a marriage license and shall remain valid even if the ailing party subsequently survives. Art. 28. If the residence of either party is so located that there is no means of transportation to enable such party to appear personally before the local civil registrar, the marriage may be solemnized without necessity of a marriage license. Art. 29. In the cases provided for in the two preceding articles, the solemnizing officer shall state in an affidavit executed before the local civil registrar or any other person legally authorized to ister oaths that the marriage was performed in articulo mortis or that the residence of either party, specifying the barrio or barangay, is so located that there is no means of transportation to enable such party to appear personally before the local civil registrar and that the officer took the necessary steps to ascertain the ages and relationship of the contracting parties and the absence of legal impediment to the marriage.

Art. 30. The original of the affidavit required in the last preceding article, together with a legible copy of the marriage contract, shall be sent by the person solemnizing the marriage to the local civil registrar of the municipality where it was performed within the period of thirty days after the performance of the marriage. Art. 31. A marriage in articulo mortis between engers or crew may also be solemnized by a ship captain or by an airplane pilot not only while the ship is at sea or the plane is in flight, but also during stopovers at ports of call. Art. 32. A military commander of a unit, who is a commissioned officer, shall likewise have authority to solemnize marriages in articulo mortis between persons within the zone of military operation, whether of the armed forces or civilians. Art. 33. Marriage among Muslims or among of the ethnic cultural communities may be performed validly without the necessity of marriage licenses, provided they arc solemnized in accordance with their customs, rites or practices. Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to ister oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage.



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September 23, 2013

JUAN SEVILLA SALAS, JR., Petitioner, vs. EDEN VILLENA AGUILA, Respondent. DECISION CARPIO, J.:

The Case This petition for review on certiorari1 assails the 16 March 2012 Decision2 and the 28 June 2012 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 95322. The CA affirmed the 26 September 2008 Order4 of the Regional Trial Court of Nasugbu, Batangas, Branch 14 (RTC), in Civil Case No. 787. The Facts On 7 September 1985, petitioner Juan Sevilla Salas, Jr. (Salas) and respondent Eden Villena Aguila (Aguila) were married. On 7 June 1986, Aguila gave birth to their daughter, Joan Jiselle. Five months later, Salas left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, he no longer communicated with Aguila or their daughter. On 7 October 2003, Aguila filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage (petition) citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The petition states that they "have no conjugal properties whatsoever."5 In the Return of Summons dated 13 October 2003, the sheriff narrated that Salas instructed his mother Luisa Salas to receive the copy of summons and the petition.6 On 7 May 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision7 declaring the nullity of the marriage of Salas and Aguila (RTC Decision). The RTC Decision further provides for the "dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, if any."8 On 10 September 2007, Aguila filed a Manifestation and Motion9 stating that she discovered: (a) two 200-square-meter parcels of land with improvements located in San Bartolome, Quezon City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-259299-A and TCT No. N-255497; and (b) a 108-square-meter parcel of land with improvement located in Tondo, Manila, covered by TCT No. 243373 (collectively, "Discovered Properties"). The ed owner of the Discovered Properties is "Juan S.Salas, married to Rubina C. Salas." The manifestation was set for hearing on 21 September 2007. However, Salas’ notice of hearing was returned unserved with the remark, "RTS Refused To Receive." On 19 September 2007, Salas filed a Manifestation with Entry of Appearance10 requesting for an Entry of Judgment of the RTC Decision since no motion for reconsideration or appeal was filed and no conjugal property was involved. On 21 September 2007, the hearing for Aguila’s manifestation ensued, with Aguila, her counsel and the state prosecutor present. During the hearing, Aguila testified that on 17 April 2007 someone informed her of the existence of the Discovered Properties. Thereafter, she verified the information and secured copies of TCTs of the Discovered Properties. When asked to clarify, Aguila testified that Rubina C. Salas (Rubina) is Salas’ common-law wife.11 On 8 February 2008, Salas filed an Opposition to the Manifestation12 alleging that there is no conjugal property to be partitioned based on Aguila’s petition. According to Salas, Aguila’s statement was a judicial ission and was not made through palpable mistake. Salas claimed that Aguila waived her right to the Discovered Properties. Salas likewise enumerated properties he allegedly waived in favor of Aguila, to wit:(1) parcels of land with improvements located in Sugar Landing Subdivision, Alangilan, Batangas City; No. 176 Brias Street, Nasugbu, Batangas; P. Samaniego Street, Silangan, Nasugbu, Batangas; and Batangas City, financed by Filinvest; (2) cash amounting to P200,000.00; and (3) motor vehicles, specifically Honda City and Toyota Tamaraw FX(collectively, "Waived Properties"). Thus, Salas contended that the conjugal properties were deemed partitioned. The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court In its 26 September 2008 Order, the RTC ruled in favor of Aguila. The dispositive portion of the Order reads: WHEREFORE, foregoing premises being considered, the petitioner and the respondent are hereby directed to partition between themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, the following properties, without prejudice to the legitime of their legitimate child, Joan Jisselle Aguila Salas: (1) A parcel of land ed in the name of Juan S. Salas married to Rubina C. Salas located in San Bartolome, Quezon City and covered by TCT No. N-259299-A marked as Exhibit "A" and its improvements; (2) A parcel of land ed in the name of Juan S.Salas married to Rubina C. Salas located in San Bartolome, Quezon City and covered by TCT No. N-255497 marked as Exhibit "B" and its improvements;

(3) A parcel of land ed in the name of Juan S.Salas married to Rubina Cortez Salas located in Tondo and covered by TCT No. 243373-Ind. marked as Exhibit "D" and its improvements. Thereafter, the Court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon bythe parties, and such partition, together with the Order of the Court confirming the same, shall be recorded in the Registry of Deeds of the place in which the property is situated. SO ORDERED.13 The RTC held that pursuant to the Rules,14 even upon entry of judgment granting the annulment of marriage, the court can proceed with the liquidation, partition and distribution of the conjugal partnership of gains if it has not been judicially adjudicated upon, as in this case. The RTC found that the Discovered Properties are among the conjugal properties to be partitioned and distributed between Salas and Aguila. However, the RTC held that Salas failed to prove the existence of the Waived Properties. On 11 November 2008, Rubina filed a Complaint-in-Intervention, claiming that: (1) she is Rubina Cortez, a widow and unmarried to Salas; (2) the Discovered Properties are her paraphernal properties; (3) Salas did not contribute money to purchase the Discovered Properties as he had no permanent job in Japan; (4) the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over her as she was not a party in the case; and (5) she authorized her brother to purchase the Discovered Properties but because he was not well-versed with legal documentation, he ed the properties in the name of "Juan S. Salas, married to Rubina C. Salas." In its 16 December 2009 Order, the RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Salas. The RTC found that Salas failed to prove his allegation that Aguila transferred the Waived Properties to third persons. The RTC emphasized that it cannot go beyond the TCTs, which state that Salas is the ed owner of the Discovered Properties. The RTC further held that Salas and Rubina were at fault for failing to correct the TCTs, if they were not married as they claimed. Hence, Salas filed an appeal with the CA. The Ruling of the Court of Appeals On 16 March 2012, the CA affirmed the order of the RTC. 15 The CA ruled that Aguila’s statement in her petition is not a judicial ission. The CA pointed out that the petition was filed on 7 October 2003, but Aguila found the Discovered Properties only on 17 April 2007 or before the promulgation of the RTC decision. Thus, the CA concluded that Aguila was palpably mistaken in her petition and it would be unfair to punish her over a matter that she had no knowledge of at the time she made the ission. The CA also ruled that Salas was not deprived of the opportunity to refute Aguila’s allegations in her manifestation, even though he was not present in its hearing. The CA likewise held that Rubina cannot collaterally attack a certificate of title. In a Resolution dated 28 June 2012,16 the CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration17 filed by Salas. Hence, this petition. The Issues Salas seeks a reversal and raises the following issues for resolution: 1. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s decision ordering the partition of the parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. N-259299-A and N-255497 in Quezon City and as well as the property in Manila covered by TCT No. 243373 between petitioner and respondent. 2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s decision in not allowing Rubina C. Cortez to intervene in this case18 The Ruling of the Court The petition lacks merit. Since the original manifestation was an action for partition, this Court cannot order a division of the property, unless it first makes a determination as to the existence of a co-ownership.19 Thus, the settlement of the issue of ownership is the first stage in this action.20

Basic is the rule that the party making an allegation in a civil case has the burden of proving it by a preponderance of evidence.21 Salas alleged that contrary to Aguila’s petition stating that they had no conjugal property, they actually acquired the Waived Properties during their marriage. However, the RTC found, and the CA affirmed, that Salas failed to prove the existence and acquisition of the Waived Properties during their marriage: A perusal of the record shows that the documents submitted by [Salas] as the properties allegedly ed in the name of [Aguila] are merely photocopies and not certified true copies, hence, this Court cannot it the same as part of the records of this case. These are the following: (1) TCT No. T-65876 – a parcel of land located at Poblacion, Nasugbu, Batangas, ed in the name of Eden A. Salas, married to Juan Salas Jr. which is cancelled by TCT No. T-105443 in the name of Joan Jiselle A. Salas, single; (2) TCT No. T-68066 – a parcel of land situated in the Barrio of Landing, Nasugbu, Batangas, ed in the name of Eden A. Salas, married to Juan S. Salas Jr. Moreover, [Aguila] submitted original copy of Certification issued by Ms. Erlinda A. Dasal, Municipal Assessor of Nasugbu, Batangas, certifying that [Aguila] has no real property (land and improvement) listed in the Assessment Roll for taxation purposes, as of September 17, 2008. Such evidence, in the absence of proof to the contrary, has the presumption of regularity. x x x. Suffice it to say that such real properties are existing and ed in the name of [Aguila], certified true copies thereof should have been the ones submitted to this Court. Moreover, there is also a presumption that properties ed in the Registry of Deeds are also declared in the Assessment Roll for taxation purposes.22 On the other hand, Aguila proved that the Discovered Properties were acquired by Salas during their marriage. Both the RTC and the CA agreed that the Discovered Properties ed in Salas’ name were acquired during his marriage with Aguila. The TCTs of the Discovered Properties were entered on 2 July 1999 and 29 September 2003, or during the validity of Salas and Aguila’s marriage. In Villanueva v. Court of Appeals,23 we held that the question of whether the properties were acquired during the marriage is a factual issue. Factual findings of the RTC, particularly if affirmed by the CA, are binding on us, except under compelling circumstances not present in this case. 24 1âw phi1

On Salas’ allegation that he was not accorded due process for failing to attend the hearing of Aguila’s manifestation, we find the allegation untenable. The essence of due process is opportunity to be heard. We hold that Salas was given such opportunity when he filed his opposition to the manifestation, submitted evidence and filed his appeal. On both Salas and Rubina’s contention that Rubina owns the Discovered Properties, we likewise find the contention unmeritorious. The TCTs state that "Juan S. Salas, married to Rubina C. Salas" is the ed owner of the Discovered Properties. A Torrens title is generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred to, because there is a strong presumption that it is valid and regularly issued.25 The phrase "married to" is merely descriptive of the civil status of the ed owner.26 Furthermore, Salas did not initially dispute the ownership of the Discovered Properties in his opposition to the manifestation. It was only when Rubina intervened that Salas ed Rubina’s statement that she owns the Discovered Properties. Considering that Rubina failed to prove her title or her legal interest in the Discovered Properties, she has no right to intervene in this case. The Rules of Court provide that only "a person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action."27 In Diño v. Diño,28 we held that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code, as in this case. Article147 of the Family Code provides: ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their t

efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed tly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household. Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation. When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation. (Emphasis supplied) Under this property regime, property acquired during the marriage is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through the couple’s t efforts and governed by the rules on co-ownership.29 In the present case, Salas did not rebut this presumption. In a similar case where the ground for nullity of marriage was also psychological incapacity, we held that the properties acquired during the union of the parties, as found by both the RTC and the CA, would be governed by co-ownership.30 Accordingly, the partition of the Discovered Properties as ordered by the RTC and the CA should be sustained, but on the basis of co-ownership and not on the regime of conjugal partnership of gains. WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated16 March 2012 and the Resolution dated 28 June 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95322. SO ORDERED. ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice WE CONCUR: ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE Associate Justice

Footnotes 1

Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

2

Rollo, pp. 10-21. Penned by Associate Justice Romeo F. Bar La with Associate Justices Noel G. Tijam and Edwin D. Sorongon, concurring. 3

Id. at 3!-32.

4

Id. at 77-87. Penned by Judge Wilfredo De Joya Mayor.

5

Id. at 59.

6

Records, p. 21.

7

Rollo, pp. 61-70. Penned by Judge Elihu A. Ibañez.

8

Id. at 70. The dispositive portion reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered DECLARING THE NULLITY of the marriage of petitioner Eden Villena Aguila Salas and respondent Juan Sevilla Salas, Jr. which was celebrated on September 7, 1985 and the DISSOLUTION of their conjugal partnership of gains, if any. SO ORDERED.

9

Id. at 71-72.

10

Records, pp. 188-189.

11

Id. at 174. TSN, 21 September 2007, p. 7.

12

Rollo, pp. 73-76.

13

Id. at 87.

14

Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A. M. No. 02-11-10-SC), Section 21. 15

Rollo, pp. 20-21. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The appealed orders of the lower court dated September 26, 2008 and December 16, 2009 are hereby AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED. 16

Id. at 31-32.

17

Id. at 22-29.

18

Id. at 44-45.

19

Lacbayan v. Samoy, Jr., G.R. No. 165427, 21 March 2011, 645 SCRA 677; Ocampo v. Ocampo, 471 Phil. 519 (2004) citing Heirs of Velasquez v. Court of Appeals, 382 Phil. 438 (2000) and Catapusan v. Court of Appeals, 332 Phil. 586 (1996). 20

Id.

21

Rules of Court, Rule 133, Sec. 1.

22

Rollo, pp. 85-86.

23

471 Phil. 394 (2004).

24

Land Bank of the Philippines v. Poblete, G.R. No. 196577, 25 February 2013, 691 SCRA 613 citing Montecillo v. Reynes, 434 Phil. 456 (2002). 25

Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 184589, 13 June 2013.

26

De Leon v. Rehabilitation Finance Corp., 146 Phil. 862 (1970) citing Litam v. Espiritu, 100 Phil.364 (1956).

27

Rules of Court, Rule 19, Sec. 1.

28

G.R. No. 178044, 19 January 2011, 640 SCRA 178 citing Mercado-Fehr v. Bruno Fehr, 460 Phil.445 (2003).

29

Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City, 328 Phil. 1289 (1996).

30

Buenaventura v. Court of Appeals, 494 Phil. 264 (2005).



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August 12, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, vs. DR. NORMA S. LUGSANAY UY, RESPONDENT. DECISION PERALTA, J.: Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the Court of Appeals (CA) 1 Decision2 dated February 18, 2011 and Resolution3 dated July 27, 2011 in CA-G.R. CV No. 00238-MIN. The assailed decision dismissed the appeal filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines and, consequently, affirmed in toto the June 28, 2004 Order4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 27, Gingoog City in Special Proceedings No. 230-2004 granting the Petition for Correction of Entry of Certificate of Live Birth filed by respondent Dr. Norma S. Lugsanay Uy; while the assailed resolution denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The facts of the case are as follows: On March 8, 2004, respondent filed a Petition for Correction of Entry in her Certificate of Live Birth.5 Impleaded as respondent is the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City. She alleged that she was born on February 8, 1952 and is the illegitimate daughter of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay6 Her Certificate of Live Birth7 shows that her full name is "Anita Sy" when in fact she is allegedly known to her family and friends as "Norma S. Lugsanay." She further claimed that her school records, Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) Board of Medicine Certificate,8 and port9 bear the name "Norma S. Lugsanay." She also alleged that she is an illegitimate child considering that her parents

were never married, so she had to follow the surname of her mother.10 She also contended that she is a Filipino citizen and not Chinese, and all her siblings bear the surname Lugsanay and are all Filipinos.11 Respondent allegedly filed earlier a petition for correction of entries with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City to effect the corrections on her name and citizenship which was supposedly granted.12 However, the National Statistics Office (NSO) records did not bear such changes. Hence, the petition before the RTC. On May 13, 2004, the RTC issued an Order13 finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance and setting the case for hearing, with the directive that the said Order be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Gingoog and the Province of Misamis Oriental at least once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks at the expense of respondent, and that the order and petition be furnished the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the City Prosecutor’s Office for their information and guidance.14 Pursuant to the RTC Order, respondent complied with the publication requirement. On June 28, 2004, the RTC issued an Order in favor of respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. THE CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF GINGOOG CITY, or any person acting in his behalf is directed and ordered to effect the correction or change of the entries in the Certificate of Live Birth of petitioner’s name and citizenship so that the entries would be: a) As to petitioner’s name : First Name

: NORMA

Middle Name

: SY

Last Name

: LUGSANAY

b) As to petitioner’s nationality/citizenship : : FILIPINO SO ORDERED.15 The RTC concluded that respondent’s petition would neither prejudice the government nor any third party. It also held that the names "Norma Sy Lugsanay" and "Anita Sy" refer to one and the same person, especially since the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City has effected the correction. Considering that respondent has continuously used and has been known since childhood as "Norma Sy Lugsanay" and as a Filipino citizen, the RTC granted the petition to avoid confusion.16 On February 18, 2011, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC Order. The CA held that respondent’s failure to implead other indispensable parties was cured upon the publication of the Order setting the case for hearing in a newspaper of general circulation for three (3) consecutive weeks and by serving a copy of the notice to the Local Civil Registrar, the OSG and the City Prosecutor’s Office.17 As to whether the petition is a collateral attack on respondent’s filiation, the CA ruled in favor of respondent, considering that her parents were not legally married and that her siblings’ birth certificates uniformly state that their surname is Lugsanay and their citizenship is Filipino. 18 Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated July 27, 2011. Hence, the present petition on the sole ground that the petition is dismissible for failure to implead indispensable parties. Cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry is governed by Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, to wit: SEC. 1. Who may file petition. – Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil , may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located. SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. – Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss

or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name. SEC. 3. Parties. – When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding. SEC. 4. Notice and Publication. – Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. SEC. 5. Opposition. – The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto. SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. – The court in which the proceeding is brought may make orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings. SEC. 7. Order. – After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the same in his record.19 In this case, respondent sought the correction of entries in her birth certificate, particularly those pertaining to her first name, surname and citizenship. She sought the correction allegedly to reflect the name which she has been known for since childhood, including her legal documents such as port and school and professional records. She likewise relied on the birth certificates of her full blood siblings who bear the surname "Lugsanay" instead of "Sy" and citizenship of "Filipino" instead of "Chinese." The changes, however, are obviously not mere clerical as they touch on respondent’s filiation and citizenship. In changing her surname from "Sy" (which is the surname of her father) to "Lugsanay" (which is the surname of her mother), she, in effect, changes her status from legitimate to illegitimate; and in changing her citizenship from Chinese to Filipino, the same affects her rights and obligations in this country. Clearly, the changes are substantial. It has been settled in a number of cases starting with Republic v. Valencia20 that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. 21 The pronouncement of the Court in that case is illuminating: It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably substantial as well as controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in nature. However, it is also true that a right in law may be enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long as the appropriate remedy is used. This Court adheres to the principle that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. x x x What is meant by "appropriate adversary proceeding?" Black’s Law Dictionary defines "adversary proceeding" as follows: One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application, one of which the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. Excludes an adoption proceeding.22 In sustaining the RTC decision, the CA relied on the Court’s conclusion in Republic v. Kho,23 Alba v. Court of Appeals,24 and Barco v. Court of Appeals,25 that the failure to implead indispensable parties was cured by the publication of the notice of hearing pursuant to the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. In Republic v. Kho,26 petitioner therein appealed the RTC decision granting the petition for correction of entries despite respondents’ failure to implead the minor’s mother as an indispensable party. The Court, however, did not strictly apply the provisions of Rule 108, because it opined that it was highly improbable that the mother was unaware of the proceedings to correct the entries in her children’s birth certificates especially since the notices, orders and decision of the trial court were all sent to the residence she shared with them.27 In Alba v. Court of Appeals,28 the Court found nothing wrong with the trial court’s decision granting the petition for correction of entries filed by respondent although the proceedings was not actually known by petitioner. In that case, petitioner’s mother and guardian was impleaded in the petition for correction of entries, and notices were sent to her address appearing in the subject birth certificate. However, the notice was returned unserved, because apparently she no longer lived there. Thus, when she allegedly learned of the granting of the petition, she sought the annulment of judgment which the Court denied. Considering that the petition for correction of entries is a proceeding in rem, the Court held

that acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner is, therefore, not required and the absence of personal service was cured by the trial court’s compliance with Rule 108 which requires notice by publication. 29 In Barco v. Court of Appeals,30 the Court addressed the question of whether the court acquired jurisdiction over petitioner and all other indispensable parties to the petition for correction of entries despite the failure to implead them in said case. While recognizing that petitioner was indeed an indispensable party, the failure to implead her was cured by compliance with Section 4 of Rule 108 which requires notice by publication. In so ruling, the Court pointed out that the petitioner in a petition for correction cannot be presumed to be aware of all the parties whose interests may be affected by the granting of a petition. It emphasized that the petitioner therein exerted earnest effort to comply with the provisions of Rule 108. Thus, the publication of the notice of hearing was considered to have cured the failure to implead indispensable parties. In this case, it was only the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City who was impleaded as respondent in the petition below. This, notwithstanding, the RTC granted her petition and allowed the correction sought by respondent, which decision was affirmed in toto by the CA. We do not agree with the RTC and the CA. This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with the issue involved in this case. Aside from Kho, Alba and Barco, the Court has addressed the same in Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo,31 Ceruila v. Delantar,32 and Labayo-Rowe v. Republic.33 In Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo,34 claiming that his parents were never legally married, respondent therein filed a petition to change his name from "Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo," the name appearing in his birth certificate to "Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng." The notice setting the petition for hearing was published and there being no opposition thereto, the trial court issued an order of general default and eventually granted respondent’s petition deleting the entry on the date and place of marriage of parties; correcting his surname from "Magpayo" to "Coseteng"; deleting the entry "Coseteng" for middle name; and deleting the entry "Fulvio Miranda Magpayo, Jr." in the space for his father. The Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, assailed the RTC decision on the grounds that the corrections made on respondent’s birth certificate had the effect of changing the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate and must only be effected through an appropriate adversary proceeding. The Court nullified the RTC decision for respondent’s failure to comply strictly with the procedure laid down in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Aside from the wrong remedy availed of by respondent as he filed a petition for Change of Name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, assuming that he filed a petition under Rule 108 which is the appropriate remedy, the petition still failed because of improper venue and failure to implead the Civil Registrar of Makati City and all affected parties as respondents in the case. In Ceruila v. Delantar,35 the Ceruilas filed a petition for the cancellation and annulment of the birth certificate of respondent on the ground that the same was made as an instrument of the crime of simulation of birth and, therefore, invalid and spurious, and it falsified all material entries therein. The RTC issued an order setting the case for hearing with a directive that the same be published and that any person who is interested in the petition may interpose his comment or opposition on or before the scheduled hearing. Summons was likewise sent to the Civil of Manila. After which, the trial court granted the petition and nullified respondent’s birth certificate. Few months after, respondent filed a petition for the annulment of judgment claiming that she and her guardian were not notified of the petition and the trial court’s decision, hence, the latter was issued without jurisdiction and in violation of her right to due process. The Court annulled the trial court’s decision for failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 108, especially the non-impleading of respondent herself whose birth certificate was nullified. 1âwphi1

In Labayo-Rowe v. Republic,36 petitioner filed a petition for the correction of entries in the birth certificates of her children, specifically to change her name from Beatriz V. Labayu/Beatriz Labayo to Emperatriz Labayo, her civil status from "married" to "single," and the date and place of marriage from "1953-Bulan" to "No marriage." The Court modified the trial court’s decision by nullifying the portion thereof which directs the change of petitioner’s civil status as well as the filiation of her child, because it was the OSG only that was made respondent and the proceedings taken was summary in nature which is short of what is required in cases where substantial alterations are sought. Respondent’s birth certificate shows that her full name is Anita Sy, that she is a Chinese citizen and a legitimate child of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay. In filing the petition, however, she seeks the correction of her first name and surname, her status from "legitimate" to "illegitimate" and her citizenship from "Chinese" to "Filipino." Thus, respondent should have impleaded and notified not only the Local Civil Registrar but also her parents and siblings as the persons who have interest and are affected by the changes or corrections respondent wanted to make. The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a newspaper of general circulation and notice thereof was served upon the State will not change the nature of the proceedings taken.37 A reading of Sections 4 and 5, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court shows that the Rules mandate two sets of notices to different potential oppositors: one given to the persons named in the petition and another given to other persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties.38 Summons must, therefore, be served not for the

purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction but to comply with the requirements of fair play and due process to afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses.39 While there may be cases where the Court held that the failure to implead and notify the affected or interested parties may be cured by the publication of the notice of hearing, earnest efforts were made by petitioners in bringing to court all possible interested parties. 40 Such failure was likewise excused where the interested parties themselves initiated the corrections proceedings;41 when there is no actual or presumptive awareness of the existence of the interested parties;42 or when a party is inadvertently left out.43 It is clear from the foregoing discussion that when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil involves substantial and controversial alterations, including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 ofthe Rules of Court is mandated.44 If the entries in the civil could be corrected or changed through mere summary proceedings and not through appropriate action wherein all parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented, the door to fraud or other mischief would be set open, the consequence of which might be detrimental and far reaching.45 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated February 18, 2011 and Resolution dated July 27, 20011 in CA-G.R. CV No. 00238-MIN, are SET ASIDE. Consequently, the June 28, 2004 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Gingoog City, in Spl. Proc. No. 230-2004 granting the Petition for Correction of Entry of Certificate of Live Birth filed by respondent Dr. Norma S. Lugsanay Uy, is NULLIFIED. SO ORDERED. DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice WE CONCUR: PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice Chairperson ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice


I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had en reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division. PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice Chairperson, Third Division CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division. MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO Chief Justice

Footnotes 1

Mindanao Station, Cagayan de Oro City.

2

Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr., with Associate Justices Angelita A. Gacutan and Nina G. AntonioValenzuela, concurring; rollo, pp. 47-61. 3

Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr., with Associate Justices Pamela Ann Abella Maxino and Zenaida T. Galapate Laguilles, concurring; rollo, pp. 62-63. 4

Penned by Presiding Judge Rexel N. Pacuribot; records, pp. 27-29.

5

Records, pp. 2-5.

6

Id. at 2.

7

Id. at 6.

8

Id. at 9.

9

Id. at 8.

10

Rollo, pp. 48-49.

11

Id. at 10.

12

Id.

13

Records, p. 13.

14

Id.

15

Id. at 28-29.

16

Id. at 27-28.

17

Rollo, p. 15.

18

Id. at 20.

19

Emphasis supplied.

20

225 Phil. 408 (1986).

21

Republic v. Valencia, supra, at 416.

22

Id. (Citation omitted; italics in the original)

23

G.R. No. 170340, June 29, 2007, 526 SCRA 177.

24

503 Phil. 451 (2005).

25

465 Phil. 39 (2004).

26

Supra note 23.

27

Republic v. Kho, supra note 23, at 191.

28

Supra note 24.

29

Alba v. Court of Appeals, supra note 24, at 460.

30

Supra note 25.

31

G.R. No. 189476, February 2, 2011, 641 SCRA 533.

32

513 Phil. 237 (2005).

33

250 Phil. 300 (1988).

34

Supra note 31.

35

Supra note 32.

36

Supra note 33.

37

Labayo-Rowe v. Republic, supra note 33, at 301.

38

Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo, supra note 31, at 543.

39

Ceruila v. Delantar, supra note 32, at 252.

40

Id.

41

Republic v. Kho, supra note 23, at 193.

42

Barco v. Court of Appeals, supra note 25, at 172.

43

Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo, supra note 31, at 545.

44

Id. at 546.

45

Labayo-Rowe v. Republic, supra note 33, at 307.


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