Sss Case Digests 2u185u

SSS Case Digests 1. ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA V. SSS, GR NO.15045, JANUARY 20, 1961 SYLLABUS 1. SOCIAL SECURITY; COVERAGE; EXISTENCE OF EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP NECESSARY. — The coverage of the Social Security Law is predicated on the existence of an employeremployee relationship of more or less permanent nature and extends to employment of all kinds except those expressly excluded. 2. ID.; ID.; ID.; RELIGIOUS, CHARITABLE AND NON-PROFIT ENTITIES INCLUDED IN TERM "EMPLOYER." — The term "employer" in the Social Security Law is sufficiently comprehensive as to include religious and charitable institutions or entities not organized for profit within its meaning. This is evident by the fact that it contains an exception in which said institutions or entities are not included. Had the Legislature intended to limit the operation of the law to entities organized for profit or gain, it would not have defined an "employer" in such a way as to include the Government and yet make an express exception of it. 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; DELETION OF PERTINENT PORTION OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 1161 CLEAR INDICATION OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT. — The fact that the portion of Republic Act No. 1161 which provides that services performed in the employ of institutions organized for religious or charitable purposes were by express provisions of said Act excluded from coverage thereof (sec. 8, par (j) sub-pars. 7 and 8), is clear indication that the Legislature intended to include charitable and religious institutions within the scope of the law. 4. ID.; ID.; ID.; SOCIAL SECURITY LAW LEGITIMATE EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER. — The Social Security Law is a legitimate exercise of the police power of the State. It affords protection to labor, especially to working women and minors, and is in full accord with the constitutional provisions on the "promotion of social justice to insure the well being and economic security of all the people." Being in fact a social legislation, compatible with the policy of the Church to ameliorate living conditions of the working class, the extent of its provisions cannot arbitrarily be delimited to relations between capital and labor in industry and agriculture. 5. ID.; ID.; ID.; NATURE OF FUNDS CONTRIBUTED TO THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM. — The funds contributed to the System created by the Social Security Law are not public funds, but funds belonging to the which are merely held in trust by the Government. hence, the inclusion of religious organization under the coverage of the law does not violate the constitutional prohibition against the application of public funds for the use, benefit or of any priest who might be employed by the Church. 6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ENFORCEMENT OF SOCIAL SECURITY LAW NOT IMPAIRMENT OF CHURCH RIGHT. — The enforcement of the Social Security Law does not impair the right of the Church to disseminate religious information, because all that the law requires of the Church is to make monthly contributions to the System for covered employees in its employ. These contributions are not "in the nature of taxes on employment." Together with the contributions imposed upon the employees and the Government, they are intended for protection of said employees against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death in line with the constitutional mandate to promote social justice to insure to well being and economic security of all the people. 7. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; PRINCIPLE OF EJUSDEM GENERIS; WHEN APPLICABLE. — The principle of ejusdem generis applies only where there is uncertainty. It is not controlling where the plain purpose and intent of the Legislature would thereby be hindered and defeated (Grosjean v. American Paints Works (La), 160 So. 499). Facts: Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, thru counsel, filed a request with the respondent Social Security Commission a request that they be exempted from coverage of RA No. 1161, otherwise known as the Social Security Law of 1954 because said act is a labor law and does not cover religious and charitable institutions. Appellant contends that the term "employer" as defined in the law should following the principle of ejusdem generis be limited to those who carry on "undertakings or activities which have the

element of profit or gain, or which are pursued for profit or gain," because the phrase ,activity of any kind" in the definition is preceded by the words "any trade, business, industry, undertaking." Respondent denied the request and the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Act provides: “in the System shall be compulsory upon all between the age of sixteen and sixty years inclusive, if they have been for at least six months at the service of an employer who is a member of the System, Provided, that the Commission may not compel any employer to become member of the System unless he shall have been in operation for at least two years and has at the time of ission, if itted for hip during the first year of the System's operation at least fifty employees, and if itted for hip the following year of operation and thereafter, at least six employees” employer - any person, natural or juridical, domestic or foreign, who carries in the Philippines any trade, business, industry, undertaking, or activity of any kind and uses the services of another person who is under his orders as regards the employment, except the Government and any of its political subdivisions, branches or instrumentalities, including corporations owned or controlled by the Government" (par. [c], see. 8) employee - any person who performs services for an 'employer' in which either or both mental and physical efforts are used and who receives compensation for such services" (par. [d], see. 8). Employment - covers any service performed by an employer except those expressly enumerated thereunder, like employment under the Government, or any of its political subdivisions, branches or instrumentalities including corporations owned and controlled by the Government, domestic service in a private home, employment purely casual, etc. (paragraph [i] of said section 8) Issue: Whether or not the term employer following the principle of ejusdem generis be limited to those who carry on activities for gain. Held: No, ejusdem generis applies only where there is uncertainty. It is not controlling where the plain purpose and intent of the Legislature would thereby be hindered and defeated. Contributions are intended for the protection of said employees against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death in line with the constitutional mandate to promote social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people. The law explicitly states those which are not covered by the contribution and the petitioner is not among those cited. significant to note that when Republic Act No. 1161 was enacted, services performed in the employ of institutions organized for religious or charitable purposes were by express provisions of said Act excluded from coverage thereof (sec. 8, par. [j] subpars. 7 and 8). That portion of the law, however, has been deleted by express provision of Republic Act No. 1792, which took effect in 1957. This is clear indication that the Legislature intended to include charitable and religious institutions within the scope of the law. 2. CMS ESTATE, INC. V. SSS, GR NO. L-26298, SEP. 28, 1984 FACTS:- Petitioner is a domestic corporation organized primarily for the purpose of engaging in real estate business. On December 1, 1952, it started doing business with only six (6) employees. - January 28, 1957: petitioner entered into a contract of management with one Eufracio D. Rojas for the operation and exploitation of the forest concession. The logging operation actually started on April 1, 1957 with four monthly-salaried employees. As of September 1, 1957, petitioner had 89 employees and laborers in the logging operation. - December 26, 1957: petitioner revoked its contract of management with Mr. Rojas. - August 1, 1958: petitioner became a member of the Social Security System with respect to its real estate business. On September 6, 1958, petitioner remitted to the System the sum of P203.13 representing the initial on the monthly salaries of the employees in its logging business. - October 9, 1958: petitioner demanded the refund of the said amount. - On November 10, 1958, petitioner filed a petition with the Social Security Commission praying for the determination of the effectivity date of the compulsory coverage of petitioner's logging business. - January 14, 1960: the instant petition was denied and petitioner was adjudged to be subject to compulsory coverage as Sept. 1, 1957 and the Social Security System was directed to effect such coverage of petitioner's employees in its logging and real estate business conformably to the provisions of Rep. Act No. 1161, as amended. - Petitioner’s Claim CMS Estate, Inc. is not yet subject to compulsory coverage with respect to its logging business because it does not have the minimum required number of employees (per company). - Respondent’s Comments

The logging business was a mere expansion of petitioner's activities and for purposes of the Social Security Act, petitioner should be considered a member of the System since December 1, 1952 when it commenced its real estate business. ISSUES: 1. WON the contributions required of employers and employees under our Social Security Act of 1954 are obligatory because the said Act was allegedly enacted by Congress in the exercise of the police power of the State, not of its taxing power 2. WON a contractee-independent contractor relationship existed between petitioner and Eufracio Rojas. during the time that he was operating its forest concession at Baganga, Davao 3. WON Section 9 of the Social Security Act on the question of compulsory hip and employers should be given a liberal interpretation HELD 1. Ratio The said enactment implements the general welfare mandate of the Constitution and constitutes a legitimate exercise of the police power of the State. Reasoning - The Social Security Law was enacted pursuant to the policy of the government "to develop, establish gradually and perfect a social security system which shall be suitable to the needs of the people throughout the Philippines, and shall provide protection against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death" (Sec. 2, RA 1161, as amended). - hip in the SSS is not a result of bilateral, concensual agreement where the rights and obligations of the parties are defined by and subject to their will, RA 1161 requires compulsory coverage of employees and employers under the System. It is actually a legal imposition on said employers and employees, designed to provide social security to the workingmen. The principle of non-impairment of the obligation of contract as provided in the Bill of Rights is not a proper defense, the enactment being a lawful exercise of the police power of the State. - The taxing power of the State is exercised for the purpose of raising revenues. However, under our Social Security Law, the emphasis is more on the promotion of the general welfare. The Act is not part of out Internal Revenue Code nor are the contributions and s therein dealt with and provided for, collectible by the Bureau of Internal Revenue. The funds contributed to the System belong to the who will receive benefits, as a matter of right, whenever the hazards provided by the law occur. - Together with the contributions imposed upon employees and the Government, they are intended for the protection of said employees against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death in line with the constitutional mandate to promote social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people. - It is the intention of the law to cover as many persons as possible so as to promote the constitutional objective of social justice. It is clear that a later law prevails over a prior statute and moreover the legislative intent must be given effect. 2. Ratio Rojas was not an independent contractor but merely an employee of the petitioner. Reasoning - Rojas was appointed as operations manager of the logging concession; he has no power to appoint or hire employees; as the term implies, he only manages the employees and it is petitioner who furnishes him the necessary equipment for use in the logging business; and he is not free from the control and direction of his employer in matter connected with the performance of his work. Rojas should be entitled to the compulsory coverage of the Act. 3. Ratio Because of the broad social purpose of the Social Security Act, all doubts in construing the Act should favor coverage rather than exemption. Reasoning - Prior to its amendment, Sec. 9 of the Act provides that before an employer could be compelled to become a member of the System, he must have been in operation for at least two years and has at the time of ission at least six employees. It should be pointed out that it is the employer, either natural, or judicial person, who is subject to compulsory coverage and not the business. - It is the intention of the law to cover as many persons as possible so as to promote the constitutional objective of social justice. It is axiomatic that a later law prevails over a prior statute and moreover the legislative in tent must be given effect. Disposition: The records show that petitioner started its real estate business on December 1, 1952 while its logging operation was actually commenced on April 1, 1957. Applying the provision of Sec. 10 (previously Sec. 9) of the Act, petitioner is subject to compulsory coverage as of December 1, 1952 with respect to the real estate business and as of April 1, 1957 with respect to its logging operation. The appeal is dismissed, with costs against the petitioner.

3. SSS V. DAVAC, ET AL. GR NO. 21642, JULY 30, 1966 SYLLABUS 1. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM; NATURE OF BENEFITS UNDER THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT; VALIDLY DESIGNATED BENEFICIARY ENTITLED TO BENEFITS. — The benefit receivable under the Social Security Act is in the nature of a special privilege or an arrangement secured by the law, pursuant to the policy of the State to provide social security to the workingmen. The amounts that may thus be received cannot be considered as property earned by the member during his lifetime, and, hence, do not form part of the properties of the conjugal partnership or of the estate of the said member. They are disbursed from a public special fund created by Congress pursuant to the declared policy of the Republic "to develop, establish gradually and perfect a social security system which . . . shall provide protection against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death." (Section 1, Republic Act No. 1792.) Consequently, if there is a named beneficiary and the designation is not invalid, it is not the heirs of the employee who are entitled to receive the benefits, unless they are the designated beneficiaries themselves. It is only when there is no designated beneficiary or when the designation is void that the laws of succession become applicable. The Social Security Act is not a law of succession. (See Tecson v. Social Security System, G. R. No. L-15798, December 23, 1961.) Facts: The late Petronilo Davac, a former employee of Lianga Bay, became a member of the SSS. He designated Candelaria Davac as his beneficiary and indicated his relationship to her as that of "wife". He died then each of the respondents (CandelariaDavac and Lourdes Tuplano) filed their claims for death benefit with the SSS. The deceased contracted two marriages, the first, with claimant Lourdes Tuplano and the second with Candelaria Davac. The processing was withheld. The SSS filed this petition praying that the two parties be required to litigate their claims. The SSS issued the resolution naming Davac as the valid beneficiary. Not satisfied with the resolution, Lourdes Tuplano brought the appeal. Issue: Whether or not the Social Security Commission acted correctly in respondent Candelaria Davac as the person entitled to receive the death benefits in question.

declaring

Held: Yes. SSS resolution affirmed. Ratio: Section 13, Republic Act No. 1161, provides: 1. SEC. 13. Upon the covered employee's death or total and permanent disability under such conditions as the Commission may define, …his beneficiaries, shall be entitled to the following benefit… The beneficiary "as recorded" by the employee's employer is the one entitled to the death benefits. The appellant contends that the designation made in the person of the second and bigamous wife is null and void, because (1) it contravenes the provisions of the Civil Code, and (2) it deprives the lawful wife of her share in the conjugal property as well as of her own and her child's legitime in the inheritance. As to the first point, appellant argues that a beneficiary under the Social Security System partakes of the nature of a beneficiary in life insurance policy and, therefore, the same qualifications and disqualifications should be applied. Article 739 and 2012 of the civil code prohibits persons whoi cannot receive donations from being beneficiaries of a policy. The provisions mentioned in Article 739 are not applicable to Candelaria Davac because she was not guilty of concubinage, there being no proof that she had knowledge of the previous marriage of her husband Petronilo. Regarding the second point raised by appellant, the benefits accruing from hip in the Social Security System do not form part of the properties of the conjugal partnership of the covered member. They are disbursed from a public special fund created by Congress in pursuance to the declared policy of the Republic "to develop, establish gradually and perfect a social security system which ... shall provide protection against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death." The sources of this special fund are from salary contributions. Under other provisions, if there is a named beneficiary and the designation is not invalid, it is not the heirs of the employee who are entitled to receive the benefits (unless they are the designated beneficiaries themselves). It is only when there is no desiganated beneficiaries or when the designation is void, that the laws of succession are applicable. The Social Security Act is not a law of succession.

Facts: The facts of the case as found by the Social Security Commission, briefly are: Thelate Petronilo Davac, a former employee of Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. became a member of the Social Security System on September 1, 1957. As such member, hedesignated respondent Candelaria Davac as his beneficiary and indicated his relationship to her as that of "wife". He died on April 5, 1959 and, thereupon, each of the respondents (Candelaria Davac and Lourdes Tuplano) filed their claims for death benefit with the SSS. It appears from their respective claims and the documents submitted in thereof, that the deceased contracted two marriages, the first, with claimant Lourdes Tuplano on August29, 1946, who bore him a child, Romeo Davac, and the second, with Candelaria Davac on January 18, 1949, with whom he had a minor daughter Elizabeth Davac. Due to their conflicting claims, the processing thereof was held in abeyance, whereupon the SSS filed this petition praying that respondents be required to interpose and litigate between themselves their conflicting claims over the death benefits in question. The Social Security Commission declared respondent Candelaria Davac as the person entitled to receive the death benefits payable for the death of Petronilo Davac. Issue: Whether or not the Social Security Commission acted correctly in declaring respondent Candelaria Davac as the person entitled to receive the death benefits. Ruling: Without deciding whether the naming of a beneficiary of the benefits accruing from hip in the Social Security System is a donation, or that it creates a situation analogous to the relation of an insured and the beneficiary under a life insurance policy, it is enough, for the purpose of the instant case, to state that the disqualification mentioned in Article 739 “The following donations shall be void: (1) Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation” is not applicable to herein appellee Candelaria Davac because she was not guilty of concubinage, there being no proof that she had knowledge of the previous marriage of her husband Petronilo. Regarding the second point raised by appellant, the benefits accruing from hip in the Social Security System do not form part of the properties of the conjugal partnership of the covered member. They are disbursed from a public special fund created by Congress in pursuance to the declared policy of the Republic "to develop, establish gradually and perfect a social security system which ... shall provide protection against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death." In short, if there is a named beneficiary and the designation is not invalid (as it is notso in this case), it is not the heirs of the employee who are entitled to receive the benefits (unless they are the designated beneficiaries themselves). It is only when there is no designated beneficiaries or when the designation is void, that the laws of succession are applicable. And we have already held that the Social Security Act is not a law of succession. 4. SSS V. TERESITA JARQUE VDA. DE BAILON, GR NO. 165545, MARCH 24, 2006 Facts: Clemente Bailon and Alice Diaz were married in Barcelona, Sorsogon. Fifteen years later, Bailon petitioned to declare Alice presumptively dead. The Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) thereafter, there being no opposition, declared Alice as presumptively dead. After thirteen years since Alice was declared presumptively dead, Bailon married Teresita Jarque in Casiguran, Sorsogon. Some years later, Bailon died. Since Bailon was a member of the SSS, Teresita Jarque, the respondent, filed a claim for funeral benefits and was consequently granted. After two months, respondent filed another claim-for death benefits-and was again, granted. It was revealed later that Bailon is married to three women: Alice, Elisa, and respondent respectively and who are all alive. Elisa and her children, and the brother of Alice later filed claims for funeral and death benefits Amidst the confusion as to whom is the legal wife and to whom the SSS benefits shall accrue to, the SSS cancelled the death pension (monthly) benefits accrued to and an order to refund both funeral and death benefits from respondent. Respondent returned the funeral benefits received, in protest, and filed a petition to restore her entitlement to the monthly pension. Issues: The SSC made decisions, with no judicial proceeding, and are the following: (1) Alice never disappeared. She was living with her parents. Thus, there is no presumptive death and deceased cannot remarry. (2) Bailon was the abandoning spouse and not Alice. (3) The deceased is in bad faith because of fraud in petitioning to declare first wife presumptively dead. (4) Marriage to respondent is void because previous marriage still subsists and no annulment, invalidation, nor marriage was dissolved. (5) Respondent is not the legitimate wife. (6) Respondent is merely a common-law wife. Thus, is not entitled to primary beneficiary to the SSS member Bailon’s death.

(7) Respondent must refund the total amount of death benefits she received from the SSS. The Court of Appeals ruled: (a) The SSS has no right, in its own investigation and without judicial proceeding, to declare a presumptive death as having no basis and override the decision of the RTC. (b) The SSS has no right to declare in its own that a marriage is nulled and void on the basis that the declaration of presumptive death has no basis. (c) SSS cannot arrogate upon itself the authority to review the decision of regular courts. (d) Affidavit of reappearance with the Civil Registry is no longer necessary because there is no more marital bond between Alice and Bailon as the latter is now deceased. (e) A subsequent marriage without the previous marriage being annulled or dissolved is illegal. (f) There is no marriage to dissolve between respondent and Bailon because the latter is already deceased. Held: (1) “That the SSC is empowered to settle any dispute with respect to SSS coverage, benefits and contributions…however, it cannot review, much less reverse, decisions rendered by courts of law.” (2) “The law does not give the SSC unfettered discretion to trifle with orders of regular courts in the exercise of its authority to determine the beneficiaries of the SSS.” (3) “The law applicable to the two marriages is the Civil Code. (In determining the validity of marriage, it is to be tested by the law in force at the time the marriage was contracted.)” (4) “A subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or dissolved or contracted under any of the exceptional circumstances (Article 83 paragraph 2 of the Civil Code).” (5) “Marriage under the exceptional cases (Article 83 paragraph 2 of the Civil Code) is deemed valid until declared null and void by competent courts.” (6) Exceptional cases (Article 83 paragraph 2 of the Civil Code) rests on the party assailing the second marriage. “Where a person has entered into two successive marriages, a presumption arises in favor of the validity of the second marriage (7) Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being voidable (Article 85), it is terminated by final judgment of annulment in a case instituted by the absent spouse who reappears or by either of the spouses in the subsequent marriage. Under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding to annul a subsequent marriage is necessary (Article 42). (Note: This sentence pertains to those presumed dead and those presumed dead must file an affidavit of reappearance.) (8) “It bears reiterating that a voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding. Consequently, such marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after the death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. Upon the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio.” The Ruling (a) As no step was taken to nullify, in accordance with law, Bailon’s and respondent’s marriage prior to the former’s death in 1998, respondent is rightfully the dependent spouse-beneficiary of Bailon. Facts: In 1955 Clemente Bailon and Alice Diaz married in Barcelona, Sorsogon. 15+ years later, Clemente filed an action to declare the presumptive death of Alice she being an absentee. The petition was granted in 1970. In 1983, Clemente married Jarque. The two live together untile Clemente’s death in 1998. Jarque then sought to claim her husband’s SSS benefits and the same were granted her. On the other hand, a certain Cecilia Baion-Yap who claimed that she is the daughter of Bailon to a certain Elisa Jayona petitioned before the SSS that they be given the reimbursement for the funeral spending for it was actually them who shouldered the burial expenses of Clemente. They further claim that Clemente contracted three marriages; one with Alice, another with Elisa and the other with Jarque. Cecilia also averred that Alice is alive and kicking and Alice subsequently emerged; Cecilia claimed that Clemente obtained the declaration of Alice’s presumptive death in bad faith for he was aware of the whereabouts of Alice or if not he could have easily located her in her parent’s place. She was in Sorsogon all along in her parents’ place. She went there upon learning that Clemente had been having extra-marital affairs. SSS then ruled that Jarque should reimburse what had been granted her and to return the same to Cecilia since she shouldered the burial expenses and that the benefits should go to Alice because her reappearance had terminated Clemente’s marriage with Harque. Further, SSS ruled that the RTC’s decision in declaring Alice to be presumptively death is erroneous. Teresita appealed the decision of the SSS before the Social Security Comission and the SSC affirmed SSS. The CA however ruled the contrary.

ISSUE: Whether or not the mere appearance of the absent spouse declared presumptively dead automatically terminates the subsequent marriage. HELD: There is no previous marriage to restore for it is terminated upon Clemente’s death. Likewise there is no subsequent marriage to terminate for the same is terminated upon Clemente’s death. SSS is correct in ruling that it is futile for Alice to pursue the recording of her reappearance before the local civil registrar through an affidavit or a court action. But it is not correct for the SSS to rule upon the declaration made by the RTC. The SSC or the SSS has no judicial power to review the decision of the RTC. SSS is indeed empowered to determine as to who should be the rightful beneficiary of the benefits obtained by a deceased member in case of disputes but such power does not include the appellate power to review a court decision or declaration. In the case at bar, the RTC ruling is binding and Jarque’s marriage to Clemente is still valid because no affidavit was filed by Alice to make known her reappearance legally. Alice reappeared only after Clemente’s death and in this case she can no longer file such an affidavit; in this case the bad faith [or good faith] of Clemente can no longer be raised – the marriage herein is considered voidable and must be attacked directly not collaterally – it is however impossible for a direct attack since there is no longer a marriage to be attacked for the same has been terminated upon Clemente’s death. 5. DYCAICO V. SSS AND SSC, GR NO. 161357, JUNE 6, 2006 Background: The Social Security System (SSS) and Social Security Commission (SSC) filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Supreme Court decision dated November 30, 2005. Facts: Bonifacio Dycaico became a member of the SSS on January 24, 1980. In his self-employed data record, he named Elena P. Dycaico and their 8 children as beneficiaries. At that time, Bonifacio and Elena were living together but were not married. Bonifacio retired on June 1989. He then began receiving his monthly pension since then until he ed away on June 19, 1997. A few months before he died, or on January 6, 1997, only then he married the petitioner. Upon Bonifacio's death, the petitioner filed with the SSS an application for survivor's pension. Her application was denied on the ground that under Section 12-B(d) of RA 8282, she could not be considered a primary beneficiary of Bonifacio as of the date of his retirement. In the November 2005 decision, the proviso "as of the date of his retirement" was struck down for violating the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. SC ruled that the proviso violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution because it impermissibly discriminates against those dependent spouses whose respective marriages to the SSS were contracted after the latter's retirement. Accordingly, the SC ruled that the SSS cannot deny the claim of petitioner Elena P. Dycaico for survivors pension on the basis of this invalid proviso. SSS filed its Motion for Reconsideration, stating the the possibility of some unscrupulous who might contract spurious marriage after the contingency (retirement) to enable their spouse[s] to claim the benefits under RA 8282. SSS also argued that, like the beneficiary in a life insurance policy, the beneficiary must have an insurable interest upon the occurrence of the contingency. In the case of the petitioner, she was only the common-law spouse of Bonifacio when he retired, which was the contingent event, according to the SSS, and, therefore, no insurable interest existed. On the other hand, the SSC contends that the proviso does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because it is applied uniformly and equally to all dependent spouses of SSS who contracted their respective marriages after the latter's retirement. Furthermore, the SSC adds that RA 8282 respects the sanctity of marriage as an institution and, consequently, provides that only the legitimate spouse is classified and is entitled to . The petitioner could not have qualified as a primary beneficiary notwithstanding her designation as such by Bonifacio because she was not his legal spouse at that time. Issue: Whether or not Elena Dycaico is considered a beneficiary? Held: Yes. Motions for Reconsideration are bereft of merit. The burden is on the SSS to prove that marriages contracted after retirement were so entered for an illicit purpose or solely for the purpose of receiving the benefits under RA 8282. The outright disqualification of surviving spouses whose respective marriages to the SSS were valid, although contracted after the latter's retirement, from entitlement to the survivorship pension by reason of the proviso "as of the date of his retirement" in Section 12-B(d) is repugnant not only to the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution, but also to its social justice policy.

SSS and SSC pointed out the fact that Bonifacio designated the petitioner as one of his beneficiaries, together with their children, they were not married at that time, hence the designation is void. However, it should be pointed out that the petitioner's entitlement to the survivor's pension does not arise from such designation. Rather, her entitlement to survivorship pension is based on the fact that, at the time of Bonifacio's death, she was his dependent spouse. In other words, regardless of the said invalid designation, the petitioner was the dependent spouse of Bonifacio by reason of their valid marriage to each other. At the time when the contingency occurred, in this case, Bonifacio's death, the petitioner was his primary beneficiary following Section 8(k) of RA 8282. Relying on Davac, the SSS and SSC disagree with the Court's characterization of the retirement benefits and survivorship pension as property interest falling within the ambit of the due process clause of the Constitution. The SSS and SSC have clearly misread Davac. A careful perusal thereof reveals that the Court therein merely declared that death benefits do not form part of the conjugal partnership of the covered member. It did not, in any way, make any pronouncement that death benefits are not considered property interest. Retirement and death benefits, including the survivor's pension, in RA 8282 are property interest protected by the due process clause of the Constitution. As the dependent spouse of Bonifacio entitled by law to receive from him, the petitioner has indubitably acquired a property interest in the survivor's pension. As such, comion for the petitioner in this case is not a dole out but a right. 6. GIL V. SSC-CA, GR NO. SP 37150, MAY 8, 1996 7. SSS V. AGUAS, GR NO. 165546, FEBRUARY 27, 2006 Facts: Pablo Aguas, SSS pensioner, died on December 8, 1996. His surviving spouse Rosanna Aguas filed a claim with the SSS for death benefits. In her claim, Rosanna indicated that Pablo was survived by his minor child Jeylnn. Her claim was approved on February 13, 1997. In April 1997, deceased sister, Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac contested Rosanna’s claim, saying that Rosanna abandoned the family abodeabout 6 years earlier and that she was living with another man. Leticia further alleged that Pablo did not have any children with Rosanna but Rosanna had several children with a certain Romeo dela Pena. SSS suspended the payment of the pension and conducted an investigation. The investigation confirmed that Pablo did not have any children with Rosanna and that Pablo was incapable of having children based on the certification of Dr. Manuel Macapinlac that Pablo was infertile. It was on this ground that the SSS denied Rosanna’s request to resume payment and ordered Rosanna to refund to SSS the Php10,350.00 death benefits already released to her and Jeylnn. When Rosanna filed a petition with the Social Security Commission, Janet H. Aguas also claiming to be a child of the deceased, ed Rosanna and Jeylnn as claimants. As proof, the petition included a photocopy of Jeylnn and Janet’s certificates of live birth. SSS denied their claims but decided to conduct hearings. During the hearings, the SSC found sufficient proof that Rosanna contracted marriage with Romeo dela Pena while still being married to Pablo; that Rosanna had a child with Romeo dela Pena while still married to Pablo (as evidenced by the baptismal certificate presented to the court for Jenelyn H. dela Pena showing that the showing that she was the child of Rosanna Hernandez and Romeo dela Pena) The SSC ruled that because of her adultery, Rosanna was no longer entitled to from Pablo. As for Jeylnn, the SCC ruled that Jeylnn was not Pablo’s legitimate child, even if her birth certificatewas signed by Pablo. The SSC deduced from the records that Jeylnn and Jenelyn was one and the same person. Janet on the other hand was only adopted by Pablo and Rosanna but with no legal papers. The Court of Appeals reversed the ruling based on the birth certificates of Janet and Jeylnn showing that they were children of the deceased. Issue: Whether or not the petitioners may be considered primary beneficiaries of the deceased for his SSS pension and therefore entitled to the SSS death benefits.

Held: Only Jeylnn has sufficiently established her right to a monthly pension. Jeylnn’s claim is justified by the photocopy of her birth certificateshowing the signature of Pablo as her father authenticating that Jeylnn was born on October 29, 1991. Records show that Rosanna and Pablo were married on December 4, 1977 which continued, as far as the records are concerned, until the death of Pablo on December 8, 1996. Based on the records, Jeylnn was born during the marriage of Rosanna and Pablo. Since Jeylnn was conceived or born during the marriage of the parents, she is considered legitimate. Petitioner Rosanna married Romeo dela Pena during her marriage to Pablo. A wife who is already separated de facto from her husband cannot be said to be “dependent from ” upon the husband Even if the records show that the spouses adopted Janet, there were no legal papers to prove it. She therefore does not qualify as a primary beneficiary 8. SIGNEY V. SSS, GR NO. 173582, JANUARY 28, 2008 istrative Law; In proceedings before istrative bodies, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not binding.· It is a well-known rule that in proceedings before istrative bodies, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not binding. The important consideration is that both parties were afforded an opportunity to be heard and they availed themselves of it to present their respective positions on the matter in dispute. It must likewise be noted that under Section 2, Rule 1 of the SSC Revised Rules of Procedure, the rules of evidence prevailing in the courts of law shall not be controlling Facts: Rodolfo Signey Jr. a member of the SSS, died on May 21, 2001. In his member’s records, he had designated petitioner Yolanda Signey as primary beneficiary and his four children with her as secondary beneficiaries. Petitioner filed a claim for death benefits with the public respondent SSS. She revealed in her SSS claim that the deceased had a common-law wife, Gina Servano, with whom he had two minor children. Petitioner’s declaration was confirmed when Gina herself filed a claim for the same death benefits which she also declared that both she and petitioner were common-law wives of the deceased and that Editha Espinosa was the legal wife. In addition, in October 2001, Editha also filed an application for death benefits with the SSS stating that she was the legal wife of the deceased. SSS denied the death benefit claim of the petitioner and found that the marriage between the deceased and the petitioner is null and void because of a prior subsisting marriage contracted between the deceased and Editha as confirmed by the local civil registry of Cebu. However, it recognized Ginalyn and Rodelyn, the minor children of the deceased with Gina, as the primary beneficiaries under the SSS Law. Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition with the SSC in which she attached a waiver of rights executed by Editha whereby the latter waived any/all claims from Social Security System (SSS), among others due to the deceased Rodolfo Signey Sr. SSC affirmed the decision of the SSS. The SSC gave more weight to the SSS field investigation and the confirmed certification of marriage showing that the deceased was married to Editha, than to the aforestated declarations of Editha in her waiver of rights. Issue: Whether or not petitioner has a superior legal right over the SSS benefits as against the illegitimate minor children of the deceased? Held: As to the issue of who has the better right over the SSS death benefits, Section 8(e) and (k) of R. A. No. 8282 is very clear. Hence, we need only apply the law. Section 8(e) and (k) of R.A. No. 8282 provides: SEC. 8. Defined.—For the purposes of this Act, the following shall, unless the context indicates otherwise, have the following meanings: xxx (e) Dependents — The dependent shall be the following:

(1) The legal spouse entitled by law to receive from the member; 2) The legitimate, legitimated, or legally adopted, and illegitimate child who is unmarried, not gainfully employed and has not reached twenty-one years (21) of age, or if over twenty-one (21) years of age, he is congenitally or while still a minor has been permanently incapacitated and incapable of self-, physically or mentally; and Whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish his or her right thereto by substantial evidence. Since petitioner is disqualified to be a beneficiary and because the deceased has no legitimate child, it follows that the dependent illegitimate minor children of the deceased shall be entitled to the death benefits as primary beneficiaries. The SSS Law is clear that for a minor child to qualify as a “dependent” the only requirements are that he/she must be below 21 years of age, not married nor gainfully employed. In this case, the minor illegitimate children Ginalyn and Rodelyn were born on 13 April 1996 and 20 April 2000, respectively. Had the legitimate child of the deceased and Editha survived and qualified as a dependent under the SSS Law, Ginalyn and Rodelyn would have been entitled to a share equivalent to only 50% of the share of the said legitimate child. Since the legitimate child of the deceased predeceased him, Ginalyn and Rodelyn, as the only qualified primary beneficiaries of the deceased, are entitled to 100% of the benefits.