The Robin Hood Virus - Discovery: The Robin Hood Virus, #1 565m3m

The Robin Hood Virus - Discovery

The Robin Hood Virus, Volume 2

robert nerbovig

Published by robert nerbovig, 2021.

This is a work of fiction. Similarities to real people, places, or events are entirely coincidental.

THE ROBIN HOOD VIRUS - DISCOVERY

First edition. August 23, 2021.

Copyright © 2021 robert nerbovig.

ISBN: 978-1393796657

Written by robert nerbovig.

Table of Contents

Title Page

Title Page

Copyright Page

Attempts to Steal the Virus

Working with INSCOM

HOLDING RUSSIA HOSTAGE

DC-10 AERIAL FIREFIGHTING SYSTEMS, LLC

Hacking Russian Oligarchs

Exposing Kremlin Hackers

IQ45’s Relationship with the Kremlin

HOMES FOR HOMELESS VETERANS

Hacking the NRA

North Korean Payback

Hacking APT1, China’s Cyber Threat Actor

WRHC MOBILE DISASTER HOSPITALS

About the Author

Attempts to Steal the Virus

This continuing story centers around a computer virus that we will call "The Robin Hood Virus". This computer virus is undetectable and will never be discovered. We received an email from INSCOM thru one of our anonymous email addresses. This email informed us of chatter they had intercepted. The subject of the chatter concerned finding the author, the hardware, and the software for The Robin Hood Virus. The location of the chatter was Moscow, Russia. INSCOM ed us the I.P. address of the chatter. We immediately entered the computer associated with this I.P. address. We also entered the computers in this network and the cell Phones in the area looking for related conversations. We discovered very high-level conversations concerning The Robin Hood Virus. It is obvious that they are assembling a large covert operation involving many black-hat hackers with unlimited resources, software, and equipment. We believe they will use all legal and illegal methods to try and discover who we are and where we are. We received another email thru one of our anonymous email addresses stating that they knew who we are and where we were located. This email was from the hacker team in Russia. They must have hacked INSCOM or one of the sites that we hacked to obtain our anonymous email address. They went on to offer us $250,000,000.00 for our hardware and our software. They indicated that if we did not agree to sell that they would take The Robin Hood Virus, its hardware and its software. They assured us that they had the where-with-all to get whatever they wanted. They gave us one week to accept their offer. They also indicated that they represented one of the deputy prime ministers and their orders to acquire The Robin Hood Virus came from a very high place. They also told us that failure was not one of their options. We sent them an email from one of our other anonymous email addresses that we received their email message and we would respond to their offer in a timely manner. The Robin Hood Virus utilizes a back door that has never been thought of or used in the black-hat hacker world. We also developed the same type of intrusion system to locate and enter cell phones and monitor all suspicious calls by screening keywords that we have

chosen. When we encounter a keyword, we then utilize our locator software to determine the location of the caller's computer and enter the caller's computer and the recipient's computer to examine their plans and motives. If we determine that they are engaged in illegal activities, violating the rule of competitive fairness, or plotting against the United States we will take aggressive action to stop them in their tracks and empty their bank s. We will divert resources (goods and money) to non-profit entities such as food banks, homeless shelters, orphanages, families going thru catastrophic health issues, small rural non-profit hospitals struggling to survive, a new national rural hospital start-up, a Mobile Disaster Hospital Corporation, and our newest charity, The DD214 Foundation. We will find other needy groups or individuals to help with the fruits of our labor. We have assembled a very knowledgeable and loyal team consisting mostly of former military veterans who know the value of protecting each other’s backs They have served in Iraq, Vietnam, Afghanistan, the USA, and the pentagon. Both their military duties and their civilian duties involved computer programming, or network set-up and analysis, or database creation and maintenance. We all have a current mission to help eradicate hacking and the damage that is done by hackers. OUR TEAM: TEAM LEADER Arjay, a former hospital controller with a intricate knowledge of computer hacking techniques and methods who has been programming computers for over 45 years mainly in healthcare. SOFTWARE ENGINEER Paula, our software engineer, has 35 years’ experience deg and developing business applications. She has extensive knowledge in deg database systems for efficient, secure operations. She also has experience writing and testing anti-virus software for large entities. NETWORK SECURITY SPECIALIST Paco, our network security specialist, has been actively involved in protecting vital government military installations both in Iraq and here in the United States.

He has implemented anti-virus network protection and the tools to determine intruders and their location. He has ed security operations for an academic enterprise, the U.S. Army at a forward operating base in Iraq, and he constructed and monitored very large wide area networks to prevent intrusion. HOSPITAL Duck is a retired hospital with 38 years’ experience in small rural hospitals who will head our Medical Services Division. He has defined proper business conduct for the medical service industry and he will oversee the entry, the verification of business practices, and planned corrective action if business violations occur (rate’s too high, re-imbursements too low, etc.). The medical services division will also oversee the "World Rural Hospital Corporation" (WRHC). DATABASE/WEB DEVELOPER Trent, our database/web developer, has 25 years of experience deg and developing very sophisticated index methods for storing and tracking various business operations. He has written complex web pages for various clients in various vertical markets. TELEPHONE NETWORK ENGINEER Pablo is our telephone network expert who has been deg and developing telephone networks and software for the last 15 years. He has installed numerous, very complicated, telephone networks all over the world. LANGUAGE, LINGUISTICS EXPERT Rob, our language expert, is proficient in several languages including Arabic, Farsi, and most languages in the middle east. He has designed language conversion programs that we will use to monitor conversations of suspected violators. The team perform their functions from their chosen locations all over the world.

Some of the offshore locations include: Waimanalo Hawaii, Belize, Cancun, Paris, Rome, Barcelona, London, Maui, Hana Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Sidney, U.S. Virgin Islands, Vancouver, Rio de Janeiro, Zurich, Edinborough, Montreal, Prague, Crete, Bora Bora, Budapest, Maldives, Cape Town, Aukra Norway, and the Bahamas. The team will use a copy of all our developed software and to our network operations center in Arizona from their location to conduct business, as usual, to access, evaluate, and penalize the target individuals, companies, or countries they have chosen based on their area of responsibility. We have set up non-profit foundations for each member to draw salary from and we donate anonymously to those foundations. We fund their individual operating s with offshore transfers from various offshore s. The team leader will operate the network operations center from his log home in northern Arizona. All of the daily operating specifics will be handled using encoded emails. We have established offices throughout the world in the most desirable vacation locations chosen by our team . They will spend 6-9 months at each location before moving to another location of their choice. We established a non-profit foundation for each team member in order to receive our anonymous donations for operating expenses. The team leader will operate the network operations center from the basement in his log home in Arizona. All of the daily operating specifics will be handled using encoded emails. We set up data encryption for transferring data communications. We have developed a very complex encryption algorithm. There is no known cryptanalysis of our algorithm. Because of the need to ensure that only those eyes intended to view our sensitive information can ever see this information, and to insure that the information arrives un-altered, our security systems ENCODE THE DATA PRIOR TO ENCRYPTION. We have also developed codes for critical information...dollar amounts, people, team , locations, weekly progress and new ideas. Our team has the necessary hardware and software to perform all of the necessary intrusions. They are able to be very productive in any and all locations.

Our security team is continuing to enter into the computer systems of large corporations to determine overpricing, product monopoly, business coercion, hacking, and dishonest activities on behalf of corporations, politicians, and foreign governments. When we find illegal or improper activities that are conducted by these entities we will extract money and resources and divert it to the non-profit endeavors that we have previously identified and make those donations in a pre-determined timeframe. We will also warn the offending entity if the illegal or improper activities continue, we will extract more severe penalties. We are continuing to enter various networks and we perform our tasks without detection. The results of these intrusions will be divulged in further chapters. We continue to enjoy the occupation of the computers that we have entered. There is no way to determine who we are, how we entered their system, or what we are accessing in their systems. We have developed an extensive package of computer programs that will enable us to modify hacker software. The modifications include: 1. Publishing the I.P. Address of the hackers’ Computers. 2. Logging all computers that they attack. 3. Nullifying all negative impact of the hacking attempt. This will allow us to have a log of all of their intrusions so a severe penalty can be assessed. We hope that once the existence of this anti-hacker software is made public that eventually hackers will be dissuaded from hacking. We will make the penalties extremely severe. We will obtain I.P. addresses of suspected hackers from the computer systems of Homeland Security, the IRS, the FBI, existing hacked companies, the defense department, and the state department. That will give us a very good starting point on which base our initial intrusions. We will describe the results of our hacker intrusions in a later chapter. One of the devices that we have developed is used to determine the exact location of the target computer system. We have a checklist of computer systems that we will enter.

We will enter each system on our schedule. Once in the computer system we will create, modify, delete, and email documents as necessary to accomplish our mission. We keep a log of all systems we enter including the entry specifics, task, operational specifics, results obtained, and reactions of the system owner, if any. The network computer invasion system (NCIS) consists of several software programs and several pieces of hardware that are used for various coupled processes that determine a target, locate its' exact coordinates, execute the mapping program, determine the extent of the network, log node addresses for entry, connect to the nodes simultaneously, perform basic functions to determine proper business conduct and take appropriate action. The data will be logged to facilitate the re-entry into all of these networks. We have established a very extensive set of conditions to guide us thru computer entry, evaluating business operations, and setting the standards for proper business conduct based on the type of business and the violations that are occurring. We utilize our scanning alert system to identify prospective violations. We have also established a set of dollar penalties based on the type and severity of the of the misconduct. We have developed a formula for offshore dollar transfers and which charities or organizations to donate to on a daily, weekly, and monthly basis. We conduct our activities from our operations center located in an underground bunker (NOC) in the basement of a large log home, owned by the team leader, located in the mountains of Arizona on 10 acres with 500 feet of lakefront property. We designed the secure bunker with these features: 1. We built it in the right location, quiet, picturesque, and ultra-secure. 2. We have redundant utilities, electricity, water, voice and data. 3. When we built the log cabin, we designed the basement to have foot-thick walls and foundation. We designed our network operations center to have the utmost flexibility for data storage, transmission and flexibility. We have upgraded our data storage to 4

RAID DRIVES (15TB each), a standalone server that we can access remotely from our desktop’s, multiple mirrored drives that are hot swappable from the front of the cabinet with 16gb of DDR2 dual channel memory and hi speed 64bit quad processors, a 64gb desktop that we use to control the screens capable of displaying 12 companies each with interactive touch. We designed this video wall in order to instantly control up to 252 network intrusions at the same time. We have written the controller software to display a different background color on each of the display screens depending on the severity of the violation. A light red background is most severe and requires immediate attention. Backgrounds such as light green, light blue, white, and magenta denote the severity of the violations. It makes the viewing of the surveillance data much easier to monitor. We wrote our video software to monitor all of our current network incursions that we determine to be critical and take the appropriate action when needed. We have established the monetary limits to assess violators based on the severity of the violation. The more severe the violation the more money we assess to the violating country, company, or individual. We have conducted our incursions from this network operations center for about 6 years. We utilize data encryption for transferring data between team in whatever location they happen to be working. We have developed a very complex encryption algorithm. There is no known cryptanalysis of our algorithm. Because of the need to ensure that only those eyes intended to view our sensitive information can ever see this information, and to insure that the information arrives un-altered, our security systems ENCODE THE DATA PRIOR TO ENCRYPTION. We have also developed codes for critical information, dollar amounts, people, team , locations, weekly progress and new ideas. We will extract information, obtain s, emails, ledgers, ing reports, and insert documents including emails, currency transfer requests with authorizations, purchase requests, and general ledger entries without detection. Using their encryption keys, data about the target's VPN configurations, and Adobe g keys, we have the ability to sign PDF documents as if we were the owner of the key. The network computer invasion system (NCIS) will allow us to do anything in the system that we deem necessary.

There will be systems and procedures created to process all info gained from each incursion: 1. How to decipher it 2. How to categorize it 3. How to proceed if the data meets the criteria as to importance. 4. Develop and execute a plan to gather information on specific companies. 5. Use the information gathered to discredit these companies if they fail our proper business conduct tests. 6. Modify banking records and cause disruption in those companies. 7. Transfer funds to the master off shore s to be distributed to other worldwide s for distribution to our pre-designated non-profits and needy causes. 8. Divulge confidential information when necessary and put these companies on the run. We have established divisions within our company to match the expertise of our partners. The partners and their divisions are: TEAM LEADER - Monitors the network operations center for alerts and insures appropriate action is taken. All punitive action is taken automatically. SOFTWARE ENGINEER - Political Division NETWORK SECURITY ENGINEER - Cyber Warfare Combat & Tactics. HOSPITAL - Medical Services Division. DATABASE/WEB DEVELOPER - Commercial Division.

TELEPHONE NETWORK DESIGNER - Develops and installs cell-phone monitoring software. LANGUAGE, LINGUISTICS EXPERT - Worldwide terrorist activities. Our hardware and software networks are setup so the various partners will select the various companies, entities, or individuals to monitor in their respective divisions. That information is transmitted to the network operations center in Arizona. One of the several displays will constantly monitor the company, entity, or individual. When the parameter limits are exceeded the pre-determined actions are instituted. The entity is warned, resources are extracted and forwarded to our off-shore s, and the entity is monitored in the background. This system has worked extremely well. We are currently monitoring 182 entities in the background for repeat offenses. When there are repeat offenses the pre-determined actions are again instituted, the background color is upgraded, and this time the penalty is more severe. There is no way to determine who we are, how we entered their systems, or what we are accessing in their systems. We have successfully entered several computer networks and we continue to occupy most of the computers that we have entered. Key elements of each of the particular systems are monitored on our screens to identify repeat violations and assess additional penalties. Diversion total to date $1,564,000,000 Donation total to date $1,548,000,000

Working with INSCOM

Paco, our network security engineer, is responsible for Cyber warfare Combat & Tactics, has relocated to Kauai with his beautiful wife Ruby. They will spend 6 months enjoying the surf, sand, food, and the beautiful sunsets. Paco is working at the Pacific Missile Range Facility Barking Sands as a Computer Network Consultant and his wife, Ruby, is writing a book about cooking. Paco has the equipment and software necessary to monitor his area of responsibility and communicate with the network operation center with regards to alerts he feels are warranted. Paco has setup a U.S. Government communication channel with THE UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND (INSCOM) that does not reveal our identity or location. He has sent numerous pieces of information that they have verified to be true and have welcomed our continued forwarding of information concerning people, places, activities, I.P. Addresses of major hackers, military plans and activity, individuals we have identified as terrorists and their location and activities. INSCOM oversees a number of major subordinate commands, and coordinates efforts between the various command groups in order to gather and best use the information received. This can include providing linguistic to various commanders throughout the Army, ensuring the security and maintenance of US Army computer systems and servers, working with other intelligence agencies such as the National Security Agency, and providing location specific and analysis in numerous military theaters across the world. US Army military intelligence can be used in peace time to prepare for potential attacks and coordinate defensive efforts or during wartime to give soldiers an advantage on a battlefield. Information gathered through US Army military intelligence efforts can be used for political negotiations and treaties between the U.S. and other nations, as well as for advising political leaders on better understanding world military actions. This type of US Army military intelligence is often gathered by intelligence personnel specially trained in

intelligence gathering techniques. Headquartered at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, with 17,500 Soldiers, Department of the Army civilians and contractors, located at 180 locations in 45 countries, INSCOM executes mission command of operational intelligence and security forces. We have been authenticated and authorized to communicate directly with INSCOM’S tactical units to along information we gather from our hacking activities and which we deem critically important. We will always copy INSCOM command with all of our communications to the tactical units. We utilize data encryption for transferring data to INSCOM locations. We have developed a very complex encryption algorithm. There is no known cryptanalysis of our algorhythm. Because of the need to ensure that only those eyes intended to view our sensitive information can ever see this information, and to insure that the information arrives un-altered, our security systems ENCODE THE DATA PRIOR TO ENCRYPTION. We have communicated our algorithm description process to INSCOMM thru a different secret channel. We communicate with the following INSCOM units as Necessary: 1st Information Operations Command (Land) The 1st IO Command is the only Army full-spectrum IO organization engaged from information operations theory development and training to operational application across the range of military operations. 66th Military Intelligence Brigade The 66th MI Brigade conducts theater level multidiscipline intelligence and security operations and, when directed, deploys prepared forces to conduct t/combined expeditionary and contingency operations in of U.S. Army Europe and U.S. European Command. 116th Military Intelligence Brigade The 116th MI Brigade conducts 24/7 tasking, collection, processing, exploitation, dissemination and of multiple organic and t intelligence aerial-intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (A-ISR) missions

collected in overseas areas of operation. 207th Military Intelligence Brigade The 207th MI BDE is assigned to U.S. Africa Command with operational control to U.S. Army Africa. It conducts intelligence collection and exploitation in of U. S. Army Africa and U.S. Africa Command in order to disrupt transnational and trans-regional threats and promote regional stability in Africa. 300th Military Intelligence Brigade (Linguist) The 300th MI Brigade provides trained and ready linguist and military intelligence soldiers to commanders from brigade through Army level. 470th Military Intelligence Brigade The 470th MI Brigade provides timely and fused multi-discipline intelligence in of U.S. Army South, U.S. Southern Command and other national intelligence agencies. 500th Military Intelligence Brigade The 500th MI Brigade, located at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, provides multidisciplined intelligence for t and coalition warfighters in the U.S. Army Pacific area of responsibility. 501st Military Intelligence Brigade The 501st MI Brigade conducts theater-level multi-discipline intelligence for t and Combined Warfighters from the Republic of Korea. 505th Military Intelligence Brigade Conducts theater level, multidiscipline intelligence collection and analysis operations to the USARNORTH preparation for unified land operations, conduct of security cooperation activities, and force protection within the USNORTHCOM AOR to contribute to the defense and security of the U.S. and its interests. 513th Military Intelligence Brigade

The 513th MI Brigade deploys in strength or in tailored elements to conduct multidiscipline intelligence and security operations in of Army components of U.S. Central Command, and theater Army commanders. 704th Military Intelligence Brigade The 704th MI Brigade conducts synchronized full-spectrum signals intelligence, computer network and information assurance operations directly and through the National Security Agency to satisfy national, t, combined and Army information superiority requirements. 706th Military Intelligence Group The 706th MI Group, located at Fort Gordon, Ga., provides personnel, intelligence assets and technical to conduct signals intelligence operations within the National Security Agency/Central Security Service Georgia (NSA/CSS Georgia) and worldwide. 780th Military Intelligence Brigade The 780th MI Brigade, located at Fort George G. Meade, Md., conducts signals intelligence, computer network operations, and enables Dynamic Computer Network Defense operations of Army and Defense networks. 902d Military Intelligence Group The 902d MI Group provides direct and general counterintelligence to Army activities and major commands. Army Cryptologic Operation ACO serves as the Army G2 and Service Cryptologic Component representative to provide expert cryptologic leadership, , guidance and advice to U.S. Army Warfighters and Intelligence leaders. Lead the Army’s Cryptologic effort to satisfy Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) requirements by leveraging NSA Extended Enterprise, Intelligence Community, Sister Services and Service Laboratories. Ensure timely and effective to operations by providing optimized capabilities, training and resources.

Army Field Center AFSC provides specialized operational, istrative and personnel management to Department of the Army and other Department of Defense Services and Agencies as directed. Army Operations Group AOG conducts human intelligence operations and provide expertise in of ground component priority intelligence requirements using a full spectrum of human intelligence collection methods. t Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) Army JSTARS provides Army aircrew aboard JSTARS aircraft to surveillance and targeting operations of Army land component and t or combined task force commanders worldwide. National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) NGIC is the Defense Department’s primary producer of ground forces intelligence. INSCOM’S mission is to collect intelligence information in all intelligence disciplines to provide unit commanders intelligence for the battlefield and the focus of combat power. The organization also conducts intelligence production activities, ranging from intelligence preparation of the battlefield to situation development, SIGINT analysis, imagery exploitation, and science and technology intelligence production. INSCOM also has significant responsibilities in counterintelligence, force protection, electronic warfare, and information warfare. Additionally, INSCOM s force modernization and training. Another major building block initially used to form INSCOM consisted of a group of field operating agencies engaged in intelligence production. These included the US Army Intelligence Threat Analysis Detachment US Army Imagery Interpretation Center, US Army Special Research and US Army Intelligence Operations Detachment—all from ACSI; and the US Army Forces Command Intelligence Center from the US Army Forces Command

(FORSCOM). Assigned to INSCOM on 1 January 1977, these elements were formed into INSCOM'S production element, the US Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center (ITAC), in 1978. Subsequently, INSCOM took over the function of disseminating special compartmented intelligence throughout the Army when it was given command of the US Army Special Security Group (SSG) in 1980. On 1 October 1991, the SSG was reorganized to reflect the decentralization of Special Security Office (SSO) functions to other MACOM'S. The formation of INSCOM put an end to the fragmentation of Army intelligence assets under the separate control of ACSI, USAINTA, and USASA. By centralizing control of all Army intelligence and security activities conducted at echelon above corps (EAC) level, the Army sought to achieve its intelligence goals with maximum economy and efficiency. The establishment of INSCOM promoted the integration of the various intelligence disciplines within the Army and provided the Army with a viable intelligence structure for the immediate future. After years of training and preparation, INSCOM'S ability to the US Army in a tactical environment was tested on two different continents in rapid succession. On 20 December 1989, President Bush responded to Panamanian dictator General Manuel Noriega's campaign of physical harassment against U.S citizens by ordering the use of military force under Operation JUST CAUSE. The US forces successfully seated pro-Noriega strongholds, cornered Noriega, and forced him to surrender on 3 January 1990. The 470th Military Intelligence Brigade received the Panama Battle Streamer for its participation and was recognized as the first INSCOM unit to participate in combat operations. In less than a year, INSCOM was called upon to provide to US forces responding to a second crisis. On 2 August 1990, the President of Iraq ordered three of his heavy divisions of Iraqi-Republican Guards to invade protect Saudi Arabia from further Iraqi aggression. Immediately, our President inserted U.S. combat troops into Kuwait under operation DESERT SHIELD. On 16 January 1991, a multinational force launched an air campaign which was followed weeks later by a successful ground assault. Throughout Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, INSCOM'S 513th M l Brigade served as the principal

intelligence and security element in of the Army Central Command. Diversion total to date $1,564,000,000 Donation total to date $1,548,000,000

HOLDING RUSSIA HOSTAGE

Trent, our database/web developer has the responsibility for deg and developing very sophisticated index methods for storing and tracking various business operations. He also scans various countries capital headquarters to find bad actors. Trent and his wife Trudy have relocated to Kaanapali Maui. They have purchased a small shop where they rent surfboards and bicycles at the beach. They will spend 6 months enjoying the surf, sand, food, and the beautiful sunsets. Trent has the equipment and software necessary to monitor his area of responsibility and communicate with the network operation center with regards to alerts he feels are Warranted. Trent has sent us information about the kremlin, the coordinates, and network log-in specifics. We will hack into the Kremlin, government offices, scientific and military organizations, defense companies, and other sectors of Russia’s critical infrastructure to hold Russia hostage. On 25 May 2005, Moscow's power supplies were the center of a major incident, which resulted in the supply being disrupted for several hours in many of the City of Moscow districts, as well as Moscowmarker, Tula, Kalugamarker and Ryazan provinces. Some tens of thousands of people were trapped in stranded underground trains in the Moscow Metro and in lifts, railway signaling was put out of action and many commercial and governmental organizations were paralyzed. The incident, which some s state affected more than 2 million people, started in power station no. 510 Chagino, situated in the south-east of Moscow in the Kuzminki district. Here the voltage (500kV) current, going into the capital along the main power lines, is lowered via transformers for city usage to 220kV and 110kV. The Chagino substation, built in 1964, is equipped with six high-tolow transformers. Another six substations situated around the MKAD carry out the same functions, and form the Moscow energy ring, which supply Moscow and neighboring provinces with electricity supplies.

The immediate cause of the incident, some state, was a mixture of several factors, among which feature: equipment wear-and-tear, absence of back-up powers, the fact that Moscow had endured temperatures above 30°C for a number of days. Moreover, Moscow is a very complex region and has the most complex electrical schemata, or "copper board", as it is known by those in the business. It is the only region in which there has been no automatic shut-off system installed since the fall of the Soviet Union marker. Moscow Refinery is the one of the voltage consumers that is fed directly from this substation. The following power stations represent Moscow's electrical network: Leninskaya transforming power substation No. 90 110kV (Moscow) Borisovo tansforming power substation No.785 220 kV (Moscow) Kuryanovo transforming power substation No.665 110kV (Moscow) Yuzhnaya transforming power substation No. 213 220kV (Moscow) Chertanovo transforming power substation No. 370 (220/110/10 kV) (Moscow) Butovo transforming power substation (220 kV) (Moscow) Yasenevo power substation (220/110kV) (Moscow) Fili transforming power substation No.17 (110 kV) (Moscow) Ochakovo power substation No. 214 (500 kV) (Moscow) Choboty transforming power substation No.554 (110 kV) 28 km Chagino transforming power substation No. 510, 50KV (Moscow) As the first step in holding Russia hostage, we have hacked into the Moscow power grid and all of its sub-stations. We now have the ability to shut down the power at some or all of the power-generating stations. We also hacked into Russia’s new super military nerve center called the National Defense Control Center (NDCC) located along the Moskva River, just a mile

and a half south of the Kremlin. Claimed by the Russian press to be “more powerful than the Pentagon,”19 this facility houses multiple new command and control assembly areas, all supposedly hardened from external attacks. The complex’s three major auditorium-like control areas include the Control Center of Strategic Nuclear Forces, the Combat Control Center that analyses threats, and the Daily Activities Control Center which is said to deal with procurement and general military activities. When it comes to computers, the new center is said to only utilize Russian-built computer components so as to limit the chances of espionage and cyber intrusion. Other command and control facilities within the National Defense Command Center seem to exist beyond the three primary ones. These include what appears to be an air combat command center20, similar to America’s Combined Air Operations Center21, from which Russia’s air campaign in Syria is being waged. Russian efforts to influence the 2016 US presidential election represent the most recent expression of Moscow’s longstanding desire to undermine the US-led liberal democratic order, but these activities demonstrated a significant escalation in directness, level of activity, and scope of effort compared to previous operations. The Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the US presidential election. Russia’s goals were to undermine public faith in the US democratic process, denigrate Secretary Clinton, and harm her electability and potential presidency. Putin and the Russian Government developed a clear preference for President-elect Trump. Putin and the Russian Government conspired to help President-elect Trump’s election chances by spreading false stories on social media. Moscow’s influence campaign followed a Russian messaging strategy that blends covert intelligence operations such as cyber activity with overt efforts by Russian Government agencies, state funded media, third-party intermediaries, and paid social media s or “trolls”. Russia, like its Soviet predecessor, has a history of conducting covert influence campaigns focused on US presidential elections that have used intelligence officers and agents and press placements to disparage candidates perceived as hostile to the Kremlin. Russia is currently trying to undermine the 2020 presidential election.

The Russian military intelligence agency used the Guccifer 2.0 persona and DC Leaks to release US victim data obtained in cyber operations publicly and in exclusives to media outlets and relayed material to WikiLeaks. Russian intelligence obtained and maintained access to elements of multiple US state or local electoral boards. The types of systems Russian actors targeted or compromised were involved in vote tallying. A notorious Russian internet “troll factory” spent about $2.3 million during the 2016 election cycle to meddle in US politics, paying the salaries of 90 “US desk” employees who helped wage disinformation campaigns via social media that reached millions of Americans. The operation also ed US activists directly and offered them thousands of dollars to organize protests on divisive issues, including race relations. These revelations and many more came out in an investigation published by the Russian newspaper RBC about the Internet Research Agency (IRA), a tech firm based in St. Petersburg, Russia, that has developed a specialty in spreading pro-Kremlin messages in the West. The IRA has been written about before by a number of news outlets, and by RBC itself. But this latest piece from RBC—a respected business newspaper in Russia known for angering the Kremlin with its reporting on Putin’s associates is the first to hone in on the IRA’s operations during the 2016 US election. RBC’s investigation reveals an unprecedented level of detail about the money and staffing that went into IRA’s US-influence operation. Here are some of the key data points: By the middle of 2015, as the US election was ramping up, the IRA’s staffing had increased to between 800 and 900 people. The organization had also shored up its arsenal of media tools to include “videos, infographics, memes, reporting, news, analytical materials,” and more. In spring 2015, a number of IRA staffers held an experiment to see if they could successfully organize a live event in the US from behind their computer screens in St. Petersburg. They did this by targeting New Yorkers on Facebook and attempting to lure them to a specific event where they would receive a free hot dog. There were no actual hot dogs, but enough people showed up at the specified location to make the agency deem the experiment a success. “From this day, almost a year and a half before the election of the US President,” writes RBC, “the ‘trolls’ began full-fledged work in American society.”

Within the next year, the staff of the IRA’s “American Department” grew threefold, increasing to between 80 and 90 people—about one-tenth of the entire agency. Three former employees of the IRA told RBC that the head of the American Department is a 27-year-old Azerbaijani man named Dzeihun Aslan, a point also corroborated by an internal Telegram chat obtained by RBC. By RBC’s calculations, the American Department spent about $1 million annually on salaries. The lowest-level employees were paid about 55,000 rubles ($960) per month, but also received bonuses based on “the reactions of participants in communities” they were targeting. RBC identified 118 Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram s linked to the IRA’s meddling in US politics. In September 2016, at the height of the US election season, the American Department posted more than 1,000 pieces of content per week, reaching between 20 and 30 million people that month. A source close to the leaders of the IRA told RBC that most of the agency’s American content had less to do with ing a specific candidate than with promoting volatile social issues that happened to dovetail with Trump’s rhetoric. “There was no directive to ‘ Trump,'” one source told RBC. “Direct connections were drawn between societal problems and the actions of the ruling party at that time [the Democrats]. Hillary [Clinton] is the party’s representative, which means she’s also to blame.” RBC analyzed hundreds of IRA posts and found that Clinton was mentioned in the posts much more often than Trump. The total budget for promoting political ads to American audiences came to about $5,000 a month, or about $120,000 from June 2015 to May 2017. About half of that was spent on content aimed at sowing racial divisions. The IRA spent about $80,000 to 100 US activists who organized 40 different protests across the United States. The cyber threat has expanded dramatically in recent years, with a series of damaging, high-profile attacks that have made headlines around the world.

Nuclear facilities and critical command and control systems are not immune to cyberattack—such an attack could facilitate the theft of weapons-usable nuclear materials or a catastrophic act of sabotage. In addition, there is even the possibility that nuclear weapons command and control could be compromised. Governments are working to understand and minimize these vulnerabilities, but cyber threats are becoming more sophisticated every day and those responsible —from policymakers to military officials to facility operators to regulators— are working to keep pace. A Russian State-sponsored cyber-espionage group has come back to life with a very large spear-phishing campaign that has targeted both the U.S. government and the private sector. The hacking group is known as Cozy Bear, APT 129. The Dukes, or PowerDuke. This group of black-hat hackers are infamous because it is one of the two Russian state hacking crews that hacked the Democratic National Committee before the 2016 US Presidential Elections. They are conducting massive Phishing operations in order to break into various sites. We have located the offices of Power Duke and we have utilized The Robin Hood Virus to enter their network and their individual computers and cell phones. We have deducted 160 million dollars from their bank s and diverted it to our offshore s. We issued them a warning to SHUT DOWN NOW Or 160 million dollars will be deducted from their bank s or the bank s of the Kremlin, EVERY WEEK. We will continue to monitor this hack until they cease operations. Moscow will apply lessons learned from its Putin-ordered campaign aimed at the US presidential election to future influence efforts worldwide, including against US allies and their election processes. Putin most likely wanted to discredit Secretary Clinton because he has publicly blamed her since 2011 for inciting mass protests against his regime in late 2011 and early 2012. Putin’s public comments about the US presidential race avoided directly praising President-elect Trump, probably because Kremlin officials thought that any praise from Putin personally would backfire in the United States. Nonetheless, Putin publicly indicated a preference for President-elect Trump’s stated policy to work with Russia, and pro-Kremlin figures spoke highly about what they saw as his Russia-friendly positions on Syria and Ukraine. The Kremlin’s campaign aimed at the US election featured disclosures of data

obtained through Russian cyber operations; intrusions into US state and local electoral boards; and overt propaganda. Russian intelligence collection both informed and enabled the influence campaign. Moscow’s use of disclosures during the US election was unprecedented, but its influence campaign otherwise followed a longstanding Russian messaging strategy that blends covert intelligence operations—such as cyber activity—with overt efforts by Russian Government agencies, state-funded media, third-party intermediaries, and paid social media s or “trolls.” The GRU used the Guccifer 2.0 persona, DC Leaks., and WikiLeaks to release US victim data obtained in cyber operations publicly and in exclusives to media outlets. These election-related disclosures reflect a pattern of Russian intelligence using hacked information in targeted influence efforts against targets such as Olympic athletes and other foreign governments. Such efforts have included releasing or altering personal data, defacing websites, or releasing emails. Guccifer 2.0, who claimed to be an independent Romanian hacker, made multiple contradictory statements and false claims about his likely Russian identity throughout the election. Putin said publicly it was important the DNC data was exposed to WikiLeaks, calling the search for the source of the leaks a distraction and denying Russian “state-level” involvement. Russian media hailed President-elect Trump’s victory as a vindication of Putin’s advocacy of global populist movements. Russia used trolls as well as RT as part of its influence efforts to denigrate Secretary Clinton. This effort amplified stories on scandals about Secretary Clinton and the role of WikiLeaks in the election campaign. Pro-Kremlin proxy Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, leader of the nationalist Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, proclaimed just before the election that if Presidentelect Trump won, Russia would “drink champagne” in anticipation of being able to advance its positions on Syria and Ukraine. Russia’s effort to influence the 2016 US presidential election represented a

significant escalation in directness, level of activity, and scope of effort compared to previous operations aimed at US elections. We assess the 2016 influence campaign reflected the Kremlin’s recognition of the worldwide effects that mass disclosures of US Government and other private data—such as those conducted by WikiLeaks and others—have achieved in recent years, and their understanding of the value of orchestrating such disclosures to maximize the impact of compromising information. The Russian intelligence services will continue to develop capabilities to provide Putin with options to use against the United States, judging from past practice and current efforts. Immediately after Election Day, Russian intelligence began a spear phishing campaign targeting US Government employees and individuals associated with US think tanks and NGOs in national security, defense, and foreign policy fields. This campaign could provide material for future influence efforts as well as foreign intelligence collection on the incoming istration’s goals and plans. We have instituted a $500,000,000.00 wire transfer from the Kremlin’s bank s to our off-shore s and issued a warning to Putin that if he does not stop interfering, we will TRIPLE this penalty every 30 days. We installed our Logo into their system and setup their system to print the logo on the lower right-hand corner of all financial and Military documents. They will know we are watching. We also notified Putin that if he continues with globally hacking countries to undermine democratic processes’ we will shut down key portions of Russia’s electrical grid and make sure the Russian people know Putin is responsible. We understand by listening to high-level cell phone conversations and reading Kremlin email that they are very upset that we are in their computer networks, and their total power grid. We will not let them know that we hacked into their Military command and control center and all of the related computer networks. There is nothing that they can do about their network occupation or the transfer of money, now or in the future.

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Diversion total to date $2,224,000,000 Donation total to date $2,208,000,000

DC-10 AERIAL FIREFIGHTING SYSTEMS, LLC

As global temperatures slowly increase, a number of nations, including the United States, are finding themselves battling widespread drought and huge, devastating wildfires that threaten properties, lives, infrastructure and ecosystems alike. Whatever the causes, new tools are clearly required to help subdue the massive bushfires that have destroyed an area the size of Oregon over the last 18 years. Aerial attack is often the quickest and most effective response to a large wildfire front - fixed-wing aircraft or helicopters can dump water or fire-retardant chemicals directly onto the advancing fire front in large volumes that dwarf the comparatively puny streams put out by a fire truck. Where the smaller planes and helicopters have carried around 1000 gallons, the DC-10 fire bomber carries 12,000 gallons and the 747air tanker carries 18,600 gallons. We have acquired an existing DC-10 fire bomber company that we will call DC-10 Aerial Firefighting Systems, LLC. We have selected the DC-10 instead of the 747 for its maneuverability at low altitudes, 200 feet or lower. Despite its size, field experience has proven the plane’s agility above all types of terrain and in all atmospheric conditions deemed suitable for fixed wing operations in a Fire Traffic Area. Unlike most existing and proposed Large Air Tankers, the DC-10 arrives at a Fire Traffic Area weighing significantly less than its certified maximum gross takeoff weight. This is principally due to the reduced fuel load carried on fire missions. The DC-10 is frequently dispatched at a takeoff weight 40% lighter than its certified maximum gross takeoff weight. The DC-10 turns comfortably within the turn radii of smaller aircraft including Single Engine Air Tankers and lead planes. The DC-10’s improved thrust to weight ratio significantly increases rate of climb, and greatly enhances safety margins in a failed engine scenario. The DC-10 enjoys a wide margin above stall at typical drop speeds and weights, even with a full retardant load. One drop from the aircraft is equivalent to 12 drops from a Grumman S-2 Tracker.

The external retardant tanks are designed to be filled from standard 3” cam-lock couplings. Utilizing one, two or three hoses, the tanks can be filled as quickly as base loading capabilities permit, typically 15–20 minutes. The tanks are vented to atmosphere by a vent system installed on top of each tank to allow sufficient air into and out of the tanks during retardant drops and filling. Accurate quantity gauges are part of the installation. The number of drops it can make in a day is only limited by the time it takes to reload the aircraft with water/ fire retardant and fuel, as well as its need for a proper landing field, which may well be a considerable distance from the fire. We will finance DC-10 Aerial Firefighting Systems, LLC. with anonymous donations. We are prepared to anonymously donate up to 1 billion dollars for DC-10 fire bomber development and operations. There is no limit on how big the budget will be. Putting out fires will be our number 1 priority. We have named Captain Dax Burdick to be the CEO of DC-10 Aerial Firefighting Systems, LLC. Captain Burdick has extensive experience piloting the DC-10 and using the DC10 fire bomber on firefighting missions. He has a financial background and great people skills. The company has 17 DC-10 fire bombers, hangars and equipment. They also have all of the parts and equipment and hangars to modify existing DC-10's to our specifications. We have developed a special system that allows multiple dumps during one flight, where most firefighting aircraft simply drop all their fire suppressant at once. Previous aircraft have tended to be WW2era planes that have been modified to carry large volumes of liquid - and this approach has had its issues; many of the planes come right up to their maximum possible takeoff weight capacity when filled with water, making them difficult to handle and removing a degree of safety margin. Additionally, many of these older aircraft can't land with full water tanks, meaning that if they don't discharge their water at a fire, they have to empty their tanks elsewhere before landing, wasting thousands of gallons of precious water in the process. The DC10 fire bomber will still be well inside both its takeoff AND landing carrying capacities even at full load. This kind of aerial firefighting system has been very difficult to achieve in the past because of the low altitudes required for an effective drop when water is simply released from a plane. The DC-10 fire bombers can safely at these altitudes, usually around 200 feet, and it's a fairly dangerous exercise in the older, smaller aircraft. Our DC-10 fire bombers use a high pressure needed, right down to a lower setting that's roughly the equivalent of heavy rain. The pressure system allows the DC-10 fire bomber to make effective liquid

deliveries from an altitude of between 400 and 800 feet. The drop speed is around 140 knots, and the aircraft approaches the drop zone in exactly the same way as it would approach a landing zone, meaning that the drop stays comfortably within the DC-10 fire bomber’s speed and flight parameters. The DC-10 fire bomber has a range of 6,220 miles to 7,400 miles. This means that a single unit based in North America could service the entire country from its home base, provided refilling options and landing zones are also make it a viable platform for helping to contain oceanic oil spills or drop biochemical decontaminants on areas affected by chemical weapons or other hazards available. The 11 western states are in the grip of a dangerous trend of increasingly larger and faster-moving blazes that will require new methods and strategies to fight in the coming years. Night-flying will become essential in the coming years given the increasing wildfire risk and drought conditions. Night firefighting is important because typically fires tend to lay down at night and the fire behavior is much less aggressive. All of our DC-10 fire bombers have nightflight characteristics. This includes night vision goggles with modifications made to the lights, sensor data and processors that will fuse together information and display it to pilots so they can get a real-time view of the terrain and fire environment, infrared systems, a GPS controlled illuminated laser drop heights across a variety of illumination levels in different terrain. For example, dealing with moonlit and starlit-nights and low-light scenarios, working toward pointer to inform the DC-10 fire bomber where to drop the loads, twin adjustable Night Suns, and lead plane searchlights. We have also developed safe and effective minimums for illumination levels for terrain and drop height. We have determined the following effective uses for our DC-10 fire bombers: WILDFIRE SUPRESSION: Carrying almost 12,000 gallons of retardant at nearly 600 mph and capable of up to 8 segmented drops, the DC-10 fire bomber is a valuable tool in our aerial tanker fleet. With significant performance margins and excellent low speed maneuvering characteristics, the aircraft is capable of flight profiles unavailable to any other tanker aircraft. MARINE FIRES: Capable of responding to oil tanker, transport ships or offshore drilling rig fires

in hours instead of days, the DC-10 fire bomber can significantly reduce the environmental impact and air pollution of heavy oil fires. This rapid response to events along a coastline anywhere in the world can mean the difference between a livelihood and disaster for the local population and no other aircraft can match the DC-10 fire bomber’s speed or capacity. REMOTE RAIL/HIGHWAY FIRES OR CHEMICAL SPILLS: As with normal fire suppression, the DC-10 fire bomber can respond quickly to remote sites with limited or no vehicle access to reduce the event impact and allow expedited handling by ground crews. MARINE OIL SPILLS: The DC-10 fire bomber is the only VLAT aircraft certified by the USDA for oil spill dispersal. We are currently conducting a study to evaluate pre-treatment of wet lands and shorelines to reduce the effect of advancing oil spills. RESEEDING/REFORESTATION: Many major fire events impact steep slopes that are not easily addressed to prevent or reduce the effects of wet season runoff. The nature of the pressurized system in the DC-10 fire bomber lends itself well to aerial reseeding on a large scale. TANKER CAPABILITY: World-wide tanker capability of select liquids to replenish critically depleted local supplies. Maximum transit time from port of loading is approximately 20 hours including fuel stops, if required. Comparison of fixed-wing, firefighting tanker airplanes: Make and model Country of origin Cat Capacity Gals PZL-Mielec M-18 Dromader Poland Light 570 Air Tractor AT-802F United States Light 807 AT-1002 United States Medium 1,000

Grumman S-2 Tracker United States Medium 1,200 Douglas DC-6 United States Medium 2,800 Douglas DC-7 United States Medium 3,000 Lockheed C-130 Hercules United States Medium 3,000 Lockheed C-130Q Hercules United States Medium 3,500 Lockheed L-188 Electra United States Medium 3,000 P-2V Neptune United States Medium 2,362 P-3 Orion United States Medium 3,000 Evergreen 747 United States Super 18,000 Martin Mars United States Medium 7,200 McDonnell Douglas DC-10 United States Heavy 12,000 Ilyushin Il-76 Russia Heavy 11,419 Beriev Be-200 Russia Medium 3,173 Bombardier Dash 8 Q400-MR Canada Medium 2,600 PBY Catalina United States Medium 1,000 Canadair CL-215 Canada Medium 1,300 Bombardier CL-415 Canada Medium 1,621 BAe 146 United Kingdom Medium 3,000 ShinMaywa US-2 Japan Medium 3,595 AN-32P Firekiller Ukraine Medium 2,113 Boeing 737-300 United States Medium 3,000

Category legend: Light: under 1,000 US gallons Medium: under 10,000 US gallons Heavy: under 20,000 US gallons Super Heavy: Over 20,000 US gallons Other former military aircraft utilized as firefighting air tankers in the U.S. in the past included the B-17 and the PB4Y-2, a version of the B-24. LEAD PLANES The Lead Plane function directs the activities of the DC-10 fire bombers by verbal target descriptions, by physically leading the air tankers on the drop run, a night-flight GPS controlled illuminated laser pointer to inform the DC-10 fire bomber where to drop the loads, twin adjustable Night Suns, and lead plane searchlights. The more common lead plane is the Beechcraft King Air and the Twin Commander 690. FIRE RETARDANT Borate salts used in the past to fight wildfires have been found to sterilize the soil and be toxic to animals so are now prohibited. Newer retardants use ammonium Sulfate or ammonium polyphosphate with attapulgite clay thickener or diammonium phosphate with a guar gum derivative thickener. These are not only less toxic but act as fertilizers to help the re-growth of plants after the fire. Fire retardants often contain wetting agents, preservatives and rust inhibitors and are colored red with ferric oxide or fugitive color to mark where they have been dropped. Some water-dropping aircraft carry tanks of a guar gum derivative to thicken the water and reduce runoff. Water is usually dropped directly on flames because its effect is short-lived. Fire retardants are typically dropped ahead of the moving fire or along its edge and may remain effective for two or more days. This can create artificial firebreaks where the terrain is too rugged or remote for ground crews to cut fire line. FIRE BOMBER DESIGN

The air tanker modification can be carried out to either a DC-10-10 or DC-10-30 series and involves the addition of an external tank and associated systems and structure. The water or retardant is carried in three center-line belly tanks. The tanks have internal baffles to prevent fluid shift (and consequent shift in center of gravity) while in flight, and sit with a 15-inch ground clearance. All three tanks can be filled simultaneously on the ground in eight minutes. The retardant is gravity-fed out of the tanks, and the entire load can be dumped in eight seconds, although the actual drop rate is computer controlled by the flight crew in order to produce the desired retardant spread over the fire lines. The aircraft is capable of applying a line of retardant 300 ft wide by 1 mile long. The external retardant tanks are designed to be filled from standard 3” cam-lock couplings. Utilizing one, two or three hoses, the tanks can be filled as quickly as base loading capabilities permit, typically 15–20 minutes. The tanks are vented to atmosphere by a vent system installed on top of each tank to allow sufficient air into and out of the tanks during retardant drops and filling. Accurate quantity gauges are part of the installation. The number of drops it can make in a day is only limited by the time it takes to reload the aircraft with water/fire retardant and fuel, as well as its need for a proper landing field, which may well be a considerable distance from the fire. DC-10 MANEUVERABILITY The DC-10 is very maneuverable. Field experience has proven the plane’s agility above all types of terrain and in all atmospheric conditions deemed suitable for fixed wing operations in a Fire Traffic Area. Unlike most existing and proposed Large Air Tankers, the DC-10 arrives at an Fire Traffic Area weighing significantly less than its certified Maximum Gross Takeoff Weight. This is principally due to the reduced fuel load carried on fire missions. We have established DC-10 fire bomber bases with complete refueling in: Victorville, California San Diego, California Los Angeles, California

Sacramento, California Portland, Oregon Roswell, New Mexico Denver, Colorado Amarillo, Texas These fire bases will house multiple DC-10 fire bombers, lead aircraft, all equipment and crews. It is the goal of DC-10 Aerial Firefighting Systems, LLC., to extinguish wildfires in an efficient and timely manner. To accomplish this, we intend to line up DC-10 fire bombers 4 at a time, 5 minutes apart, and drop 48,000 gallons of fire retardant or water directly on the fire and surrounding areas. We believe that a constant fire -bombing effort will extinguish wildfires before they grow into a wildfire that requires a Type 1 management team to fight. Diversion total to date $2,224,000,000 Donation total to date $2,208,000,000

Hacking Russian Oligarchs

During the many government investigations into whether the Trump campaign colluded with the Russian government during the 2016 presidential elections, President Donald Trump has insisted he doesn't have business dealings with Russia. “I have any loans in Russia, I don't have any deals in Russia,” the president said in February. WE WILL EXPOSE TRUMPS TAX RETURNS IN AN BOOK! We will prove Trump has extensive financial ties to Russia, Putin, and many oligarchs. Trump has had these Financial ties for years! But that doesn't mean that Russians aren't investing in Trump. In fact, at least 63 Russian elites and oligarchs have invested around $100 million into Trump-brand real estate in southern Florida. In the Florida resort town of Sunny Isles Beach, an area with the highest number of Russian-born residents in the U.S., Trump has six residential towers. Some of the individuals investing in these towers have ties to the Russian political establishment, and their identities could shed light on the complex web of business dealings that connect Trump to Russia. We have determined by hacking into the computers and cell phone conversations and reading oligarchs email that they are continuing to donate to, and , the cyber intrusion into various countries around the world. Their major impetus is to disrupt the democratic system of government in the United States. We have initiated a $50 million wire transfer from each of the following oligarchs with a warning that if they continue to fund the Russian cyber warfare operation’s we will repeat the $50 million wire transfer every 30 days. We installed our logo into their systems and setup their systems to print the logo on the lower right-hand corner of all financial documents. They will know we are watching. We understand by reading their communications that they are very upset. They have not realized that there is nothing that they can do about their network occupations or the transfer of money, now or in the future. OLIGARCHS

1. Aleksey Mordashov: $19.6 billion Mordashov owns stake in the world's largest tourism company, TUI Group, as well as a number of gold mining and engineering firms. 2. Vladimir Lisin: $19 billion Lisin owns a majority share of a steel mill company called Novolipetsk, and also controls Universal Cargo Logistics Holding. 3. Leonid Mikhelson: $18.1 billion Mikhelson founded and chairs a natural gas company called Novatek, and also chairs a gas processing and petrochemical company called Sibur. 4. Vladimir Potanin: $16.5 billion Potanin acquired a stake in Norilsk Nickel during Russia's privatization in 1995; today he owns 30%. He used government s to cofound Onexim Bank, which controlled industrial behemoths, in 1993. The oligarch formerly owned interests in insurance, media, agriculture, engineering and oil. Today he also has stakes in pharmaceutical company Petrowax and ski resort Rosa Hutor. 5. Andrey Melnichenko: $16.4 billion Melnichenko owns majority shares in a fertilizer company called Eurochem and a coal company called SUEK. 6. Vagit Alekperov: $16.4 billion Alekperov is the president of Russian oil company Lukoil, which he started in 1991 after acquiring three large oil fields. 7. Alisher Usmanov: $16 billion The oligarch's largest holding today is his stake in iron ore and steel giant Metalloinvest. An early Facebook investor, he currently owns stakes in JD and Xiaomi.

He also owns shares in telecom, mining and media companies, as well as the Arsenal Football Club. The Uzbekistan-born tycoon made his first fortune more than two decades ago making plastic bags, a commodity so scarce in the former Soviet Union that people washed and reused them. He headed Gazprom Investholding, a subsidiary of state-run conglomerate Gazprom, from 2000 to 2014. 8. Mikhail Fridman: $15.7 billion Fridman owns Alfa Group, along with German Khan and Aleksey Kuzmichev. 9. Gennadiy Timchenko: $15.7 billion. Timchenko owns shares in multiple Russian businesses, including a gas company called Novatek and a petrochemical company called Sibur Holding, among others. He's also close to Putin, and was sanctioned by the US in 2014 after Russia's annexation of Crimea. 10. Roman Abramovich: $11.2 billion This oligarch owns stakes in steel giant Evraz, Norilsk Nickel and the U.K.'s Chelsea soccer team. He owns the world's second-largest yacht, 533-foot Eclipse, bought for nearly $400 million in 2010. After oil export deals in the 1990s, he took over oil firm Sibneft with the help of Boris Berezovsky. He sold a 73% stake in Sibneft to state-owned gas titan Gazprom for $13 billion in 2005. 11. German Khan: $10.2 billion Khan owns the majority of Alfa Group with oligarchs Aleksey Kuzmichev and Mikhail Fridman. 12. Viktor Rashnikov: $9.8 billion Rashnikov is the majority owner of Magnitogorsk Iron & Steel Works. 13. Mikhail Prokhorov: $8.7 billion Owner, Brooklyn Nets Prokhorov owns 100% of the Brooklyn Nets and Barclays Center, worth an

estimated $1.55 billion after debt. Much of his fortune stems from the 2008 sale of his stake in metals giant Norilsk Nickel. He has stakes in Russian aluminum, power, insurance, banking and media companies. 14. Aleksey Kuzmichev: $7.9 billion. Kuzmichev controls the Alfa Group conglomerate, which owns Alfa Bank, along with other listed oligarchs German Khan and Mikhail Fridman. 15. Dmitry Rybolovlev: $7.4 billion Rybolovlev sold his stake in a potassium company called Uralkali for $6.5 billion in 2010, and has since bought Trump's former Palm Beach mansion — Maison de L'Amitie — and the AS Monaco Football Club. 16. Andrei Skoch: $7.2 billion Skoch is a partner in the metallurgy company, Metalloinvest conglomerate. 17. Iskander Makhmudov: $7.2 billion Makhmudov is the majority owner of Urals Mining and Metals Company, led by Andrey Kozitsyn. Spain filed money laundering charges against him 2009 and later handed the case over to Russian authorities, who eventually dropped the case. 18. Leonid Fedun: $7.1 billion Fedun is the "right hand man" of Vagit Alekperov, the CEO of oil and gas company Lukoil. 19. Oleg Deripaska: $6.9 billion Deripaska owns large stakes in aluminum, power, insurance, and auto companies. He also employed Paul Manafort, who even offered to give him personal briefings about the 2016 presidential election 20. Mikhail Gutseryev: $6.4 billion

Mikhail Gutseriev is the majority shareholder of Safmar Group (former name BIN Group), a diversified conglomerate. His brother, Sait-Salam Gutseriev, and nephew, Mikail Shishkhanov—also billionaires—own the rest. Safmar Group own the oil giants Russneft and Neftisa. In 2016 Russneft went public via IPO. Safmar Group got $500 million on that deal. In recent years, he's taken advantage of Russia's economic crisis to build up his portfolio. In 2015, he spent $1.5 billion acquiring banks, pension funds, oil fields, factories, real estate development companies, warehouses and a popular Russian radio station, Radio Shanson. Earlier, he'd bought Multinational Logistics Partnership from billionaire Victor Vekselberg and two five-star hotels in central Moscow from Bidzina Ivanishvili, the billionaire former prime minister of Georgia. He also bought Moscow's famous National Hotel from billionaire Elena Baturina, Russia's richest woman. In late 2006 he was accused of violating of his oil license and failing to pay taxes. After denying the charges, he sold Russneft to billionaire Oleg Deripaska for $2.8 billion and moved to London. When the charges were dropped in 2010, Gutseriev returned to Russia and bought back Russneft. Gutseriev writes lyrics for songs performed by famous Russian singers. Russia's biggest organized crime family, the Solntsevo Brotherhood, is the major dominant mafia clan in Moscow. The organization was formed in the 1980s in Moscow, Russian Federation. The group was named for Solntsevo, a southern district of Moscow, from where many original hailed. 21. Suleyman Kerimov: $6.2 billion. Kerimov "has made a career of investing in distressedcompanies," according to Forbes, and represents Dagistan in Russia's Federation Council. 22. Aleksandr Abramov: $5.4 billion Abramov is the chairman of a steel company called Evraz. He also owns a large stake in Norilsk Nickel with hisbrother Roman Abramovich, who is also on the "Putin list." Putin awarded him the Decoration of Beneficence for his charity work in January. 23. Samvel Karapetyan: $5.3 billion

Karapetyan leads the Tashir Group, which owns multiple shopping centers, hotels, and office complexes. 24. Petr Aven: $5.3 billion Aven heads Russia's second largest private bank, Alfa Bank. 25. Dmitriy Kamenshchik: $5 billion Kamenshchik owns Moscow's Domodedovo Airport. He was briefly held responsible for a 2011 terrorist attack at the airport, and a criminal case was even opened against him, but Russia's Prosecutor General's office later dropped the charges. 26. Andrey Kozitsyn: $4.8 billion Kozitsyn leads a copper producing company called Urals Mining and Metals Company, but he also manages agricultural, construction, and telecom companies. These oligarchs are involved in Central America and the Caribbean specifically: Drug trafficking, arms trafficking, extortion, human trafficking, prostitution, kidnapping, credit card Fraud, and money laundering. Globally: Drug trafficking, arms trafficking, contract killing, extortion, human trafficking, prostitution, kidnapping, fraud, auto theft and smuggling, cargo theft, cybercrimes, possible RN material smuggling. There is no information available from open sources as to who leads operations in Latin America. However, the group in general is still believed to be led by Sergei Mikhailov (AKA: “Mikhas”). Solntsevskaya Bratva has access to revenue from legitimate businesses in addition to revenue obtained from its illicit activities. The group was believed to control over 120 businesses in the late 1990s. In order to maintain low profiles in Mexico, Russian groups often operate out of resorts [or hotels or houses] owned by their Mexican business partners. According to a Balkan crime expert, Russians, for whom Serbian and

Montenegrin criminal groups reportedly work beneath in Latin American drug trafficking, utilize “oceangoing vessels” in a “big system” to smuggle cocaine. One of the most significant sources of power for Russian organized crime is its connections within the government. In fact, criminal organizations and their leadership often have direct ties to oligarchs and others in positions of power. In general, assessed as technically sophisticated. It is unknown from open sources the degree of technical sophistication the Solntsevskaya Bratva displays in of its operations in Central America and the Caribbean. However, it is known that the group utilizes excellent information technology (IT) resources and personnel of the highest technical sophistication to aid in traditional operations, but also, increasingly to engage in manipulation and exploitation of cyberspace and information within the cyber realm. Within the United States, Russian groups are known to operate extensively in New York, particularly in Brighton Beach and Brooklyn, and in the “tri-state” area in general (Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York). Diversion total to date $3,474,000,000 Donation total to date $3,458,000,000

Exposing Kremlin Hackers

Terrorism remains the top concern for American intelligence services but recent directives from the White House and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) have moved Russia up the list of intelligence priorities for the first time since the Soviet Union's collapse. Russia has aggressively expanded its Foreign Intelligence Service operation over the past decade, according to recent satellite imagery that provides evidence of Moscow's efforts to wage clandestine operations across Europe and in the United States. The satellite imagery, which was compiled in a recent report on Russia's global intelligence operation, shows that Moscow added several new buildings and structures to its intelligence headquarters, known as SVR, from 2007 to 2016, a period that saw a dramatic rise in Russian espionage operations, experts said. The images show the completed construction of at least three new buildings around the complex, as well as an expansion of parking areas, which appear to have quadrupled in capacity, according to an analysis of the images provided by the Federation of American Scientists. The Russian government is building an electronic intelligence-gathering facility in Nicaragua as part of Moscow's efforts to increase military and intelligence activities in the Western Hemisphere. The signals intelligence site is part of a recent deal between Moscow and Managua involving the sale of 50 T-72 Russian tanks. The tank deal and spy base have raised concerns among some officials in the Pentagon and nations in the region about a military buildup under leftist Nicaraguan leader Daniel Ortega. Disclosure of the Russia-Nicaraguan spy base comes as three US officials were expelled from Nicaragua. The three Department of Homeland Security officials were picked up by Nicaraguan authorities, driven to the airport, and sent to the United States without any belongings. A new space surveillance and tracking center will be completed by late 2017 in the Russian Far Eastern town of Zeya. "The builders are to construct a checkpoint, a fire depot, electrical substations, local waste treatment facilities, engineering networks and video surveillance systems, develop on-site roads and equip a helicopter landing pad. Russia has been increasing its space intelligence infrastructure. Earlier in May, a surveillance center was completed in the Siberian town of Yeniseysk. The center, under construction since 2013, is

designed to act as a rocket attack warning system. Every month another story of cybertheft linked to China or Russia emerges. Recent data breaches at Target, United Airlines, Blue Cross Blue Shield, and OPM have been linked back to Russia, while theft of key technology across major Department of Defense contractors such as Lockheed Martin and US government laboratories have been linked to China. Neither China nor Russia's government formally it to leveraging the internet to steal secrets from other countries but hacks have been linked directly to their intelligence services' respective buildings or individuals known to be under governmental influence. International cyber incidents in Ukraine, Georgia, and Estonia have all been apparently linked back to Russia while the Canadian government recently set up domestic cyber-protection programs after several major corporations were hacked by Chinese intelligence. The US government struggles on how to approach these cyber intrusions. Welcome to the REAL cyber era, where multiple players try to steal the world one byte at a time while pretending to do nothing of the sort. The Chinese, American, and Russian intelligence services have no issue launching clandestine internet attacks to pursue what they all consider to be legitimate national security and foreign policy objectives. Sometimes the information collected is economic, directed against or about important corporations; other times the information is military and political. In all cases the information is highly strategic. While it is true that the information the Russian and Chinese intelligence services are providing to their respective policymakers is much broader in scope than the CIA or US Department of Defense, and is arguably much more domestically invasive than the FBI or DEA, both Russia and China have successfully started campaigns questioning the purity of purpose' within American intelligence given the details of the Snowden scandal. The Pentagon is sending dozens of additional intelligence analysts to Iraq to pore over a trove of information that is expected to be recovered in the offensive to recapture Mosul from the Islamic State, data that could offer new clues about possible terrorist attacks in Europe. European intelligence and counterterrorism officials said they were eagerly

awaiting data gleaned from computer hard drives, cellphones, recruiting files and other sources after Iraqi forces advanced into the city of Mosul. Pentagon's t Staff recently warned against using equipment made by China's Lenovo computer manufacturer amid concerns about cyber spying against Pentagon networks, according to defense officials. A recent internal report produced by the J-2 intelligence directorate stated that cyber security officials are concerned that Lenovo computers and handheld devices could introduce compromised hardware into the Defense Department supply chain, posing cyber espionage risks, said officials familiar with the report. The "supply chain" is how the Pentagon refers to its global network of suppliers that provide key components for weapons and other military systems. The J-2 report also contained a warning that Lenovo was seeking to purchase American information technology companies in a bid to gain access to classified Pentagon and military information networks. The report warned that use of Lenovo products could facilitate cyber intelligence-gathering against both classified and unclassified but still sensitive US military networks. Some of the same un-hackable applications that have become the "favorite technologies" of the Islamic State and other terrorist groups have gained popularity in Washington, DC, in part because the federal government is still struggling to find ways to protect government communications. Wickr, Telegram, and similar apps that promise the ability to send encrypted, self-destructing messages have a certain appeal throughout the political class, but especially within the intelligence community. During the Cold War, the Soviet KGB coined the term "desinformatsiya," or disinformation, which the CIA defined as "false, incomplete or misleading information" fed to various targets. Both the Soviet Union and the United States engaged in the same game, though the Russians played it far more vigorously. In the digital age, the players might not have to go to the trouble of altering information, or mixing true information with false. Simply hacking into sensitive emails or other data, even when the information is true, can have the same impact as disinformation. China and India need a basis in espionage to improve their relationship. The two

countries are ignorant of each other's strategies, with suspicion taking the place of intelligence just when understanding is critical. Both nuclear powers, they have the world's largest border dispute on their hands, at over 100,000 square kilometers. They tussle over sea routes in the Indian Ocean, spheres of influence in neighboring countries and relations with Pakistan. They need to know each other better. Neither country engages satisfactorily in normal people-to-people interaction. Only 175,000 Chinese tourists visited India last year, compared with 2.4 million to China's arch-rival Japan. China's investments in India total just $4 billion, less than its investments in Poland. India's investments in China are smaller still. There is also a dearth of diplomatic exchange. India's embassy in China has just 30 diplomats. Only 9,200 Indian student’s study in China, with even fewer Chinese students in India. China's spy service network is widespread with hundreds of thousands of staff in several different agencies and more outside the intelligence services. The data provided is often useless, and if useful, often ignored. India's spy services are smaller but it has some outstanding agents who carry out the bulk of the useful work. These exceptional agents have, by themselves, justified the budgets of the entire intelligence network by serving India's national interests at critical moments. But India does not have an effective team focused on China. Meanwhile, China has not devoted resources to India - its government accepts that it lacks detailed intelligence on India but believes there is no need to assign more resources. The recurring media coverage of cyberattacks on the US public and private sectors have undoubtedly advanced the rapid growth of IT security industry solutions for predicting, preventing, and responding to cyber threats. Reliable IT systems and infrastructure are crucial to the successful management, stability, and growth of most American companies. A major data compromise can be damaging to profits, prestige, and strategy, not to mention disastrous to a company's competitive edge and downright embarrassing. Add the risk of a potential Snowden insider to the threat of a cyberattack, and American businesses can hardly be blamed for perceiving computer vulnerabilities to be the biggest risk to company security and in turn focusing their risk management efforts and spending on IT security.

As companies shop for expensive IT security software packages, hire information assurance specialists, or enter into contracts with IT security firms to provide up-to-date cyber threat intelligence, they should not overlook the threats posed to company data from traditional espionage tradecraft. Not even the most robust computer security measures or the latest behavioral analytic/machine learning algorithms can defeat the insider who does not rely on a computer or the exploitation of to steal company information. U.S. spies are catching up to the masses in their gradual embrace of 21st-century technology, from installing wireless connections in secure facilities to wielding iPhones and tablets, according to an official with the US National GeospatialIntelligence Agency. The NGA provides intelligence to other parts of the government from battlefield maps to satellite imagery of national disasters. It's among agencies that are working with the Director of National Intelligence to study how to maximize the use of secure wireless networks and devices, while still maintaining the cover that spies need. Already, NGA has secure wireless for its senior leaders in its mammoth headquarters in Springfield, Virginia, outside of Washington. Protective equipment needed to make a wireless system secure can be costly and there are people who are skeptical that there's value there. The emergence of cyber as a battlespace domain has changed the formula for intelligence gathering as well as warfighting. No longer can any form of the traditional intelligence architecture guarantee national security superiority. Global networks ing commerce and government have shifted quickly to agile, mobile, network-based technologies and applications as cyber has transitioned from cable-bound actors to radio frequency (RF) free-rangers. Unfortunately, current and planned Intelligence acquisitions will not deliver the capabilities the United States needs fast enough to tackle rapidly emerging cyberthreats. A new intelligence strategy is required to achieve global information dominance. This strategy must converge multiple dimensions of the Internet to detect global changes for indications and warning and to exploit, correlate, track and target threats in real time in both cyberspace and the battlespace. Only this will enable the United States to maintain its superpower edge and reverse adversaries' asymmetric advantages in cyberspace. The

industrial base's knowledge can help develop and create a new technologyconverged intelligence enterprise in the next decade that will re-establish U.S. information and intelligence superiority. The country must act immediately and in earnest to advance the national intelligence mission or risk losing the diminishing margin of dominance it now has to prosecute national interests. ISIS is facing certain defeat in Iraq and Syria. However, its demise seems to be unleashing a new phase in the global terror war that may make it far more lethal and powerful. Its bombing campaign during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan killed more than 800 people. Only a truly global task force can combat the challenges terrorism presents. It is time for an antiterrorism variant of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Like NATO, it would be a multilateral alliance specifically focused on collecting antiterrorism intelligence, detecting and facilitating disruption of terrorist plots, and attacking cyber-based networks. However, the next iteration of ISIS and Al Qaeda warriors will exist in a hybrid world of very small, covert terror cells and lone-wolf jihadis that are led through a cyberspace-based command network. This "ghost caliphate" will be even harder to root out. Terrorist leaders are planning to find new shadows between the lines of political and military control to consolidate and form a new global terror nucleus. The world needs to establish a Global Alliance of Terrorism Task Organizations, or GATTO, headquartered in Europe. GATTO would comprise of law enforcement, intelligence, and legal staff from all member states. It would be a one-stop clearinghouse for intelligence on terrorists worldwide. Information would be shared widely, freely, and without restriction to any nation that seeks to help. GATTO would be able to overcome the elastic and adaptive nature of self-radicalized individuals or groups. In countries with highly complex law enforcement approaches and disparate legal agencies, such as Belgium, GATTO could give access to the world's collective intelligence in order to quickly disrupt any potential plot. This means suspected terrorists would no longer be able to hide within refugee streams, be overlooked by routine police checks, buy illicit weapons in another country, or be set free by uninformed local police. Once on the GATTO grid, everyone would be informed of suspects.

Technology capability and dependency has increased at a tremendous rate in the last three decades and has changed the way we live our lives on a daily basis. The Department of Justice unsealed an indictment against the Russian hacker ALEXSEY BELAN and three others as the culprits behind a massive cyberattack of Yahoo. The indictment alleges that BELAN did the kinds of things -criminal hackers do all the time; namely that, after hacking into Yahoo's servers, he stole information from marketing. This appears to be the kind of thing BELAN excels at. Indeed, accusations of past hacks of US companies had already gotten him indicted twice before, and named to FBI's Most Wanted list. It's charges concerning BELAN's other activities that make this indictment remarkable. There are 47 charges altogether, 38 of which name him. Those charges allege that BELAN helped two spies from Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB), and one other hacker, to spy - in much the same way America's own National Security Agency does - in Russia, in its neighboring countries, and in the United States (the FSB officers were themselves also indicted). Other countries have hacked US tech companies before. China, for instance, hacked Google in 2010. But no one, Chinese spy or not, was indicted in that attack, as they were here. By indicting the FSB officers along with BELAN, the US Justice Department has revealed many of the advantages American spies have over their Russian counterparts, thanks to the fact that so many of the world's tech companies are located in the United States. The alleged Russian effort to spy on targets by hacking Yahoo worked much the same way the NSA's spying does. By the indictment's , in 2014, BELAN started by stealing a massive amount of metadata, ultimately ing a database including s' names, secondary email addresses, phone numbers, and challenge questions and answers from 500 million Yahoo customers. As the NSA did with the bulk internet and phone metadata databases it collected until 2011 and 2015, respectively - and still collects overseas – the Russians are alleged to have used that metadata to pick which Yahoo s they wanted content from, as well as to identify s from other email providers that might be of interest. From there, the Russian hackers would collect the email content of targeted s on an ongoing basis, according to the indictment. The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ and Russian Non-Linear War Call it non-linear war, or hybrid war, or special war, Russia’s operations first in Crimea and then

eastern Ukraine have demonstrated that Moscow is increasingly focusing on new forms of politically-focused operations in the future. In many ways this is an extension of what elsewhere I’ve called Russia’s ‘guerrilla geopolitics,’ an appreciation of the fact that in a world shaped by an international order the Kremlin finds increasingly irksome and facing powers and alliances with greater raw military, political and economic power, new tactics are needed which focus on the enemy’s weaknesses. Paco, our network security engineer, is currently enjoying a 6 month stay in Hana Hawaii with his wife. They are monitoring world-wide cyber activity. They have the necessary equipment and software to do all that is necessary to occupy cell phones and computer networks of suspected black hat hackers all over the world. As with all of our teams, Paco communicates with the network operations center in Arizona using encoded emails. We set up data encryption for transferring data communications. We have developed a very complex encryption algorithm. There is no known cryptanalysis of our algorithm. Because of the need to ensure that only those eyes intended to view our sensitive information can ever see this information, and to insure that the information arrives un-altered, our security systems ENCODE THE DATA PRIOR TO ENCRYPTION. We established a non-profit foundation for each team member in order to receive our anonymous donations for operating expenses. Paco has identified the computer network of the Ministry of State Security (MGB) in the Kremlin. On his recommendation we entered their computer network and diverted $350 million American dollars to our off-shore s with their signatures. We have warned them to stop their cyber-intrusion into off-shore computer systems including the United State. We installed our logo

into their systems and setup their systems to print the logo on the lower righthand corner of all financial documents. They will know we are watching. We are in their systems and will know if they are continuing to hack into offshore s anywhere in the world. We can determine this using color-coded screens in the network operation center. If they are not violating our rules their screen background is a light green. If they begin to hack into off-shore computers the background color on their screen turns a light red. We then know to double their penalty and re-asses the dollar amount. They will know we are watching. Diversion total to date $3,824,000,000 Donation total to date $3,808,000,000

IQ45’s Relationship with the Kremlin

The Russian regime has been cultivating, ing and assisting IQ45 for at least 6 years. We have no idea how many investments IQ45 has in Russia since he will not release his tax returns. Once Congress receives IQ45’s tax returns he will be exposed as a total fraud. He declined to it his business relationship however he and his inner circle have accepted a regular flow of intelligence from the Kremlin, including on his Democratic and other political rivals. A former top Russian intelligence officer claims FSB has compromised IQ45 through his activities in Moscow sufficiently to be able to blackmail him. According to several knowledgeable sources, his conduct in Moscow has included perverted sexual acts which have been arranged/monitored by the FSB. Speaking to trusted compatriots active inside the Kremlin have asserted that the IQ45 operation was both ed and directed by Russian President Vladimir PUTIN. Its aim was to sow discord both within the US itself, but more especially within the Transatlantic alliance. A senior Russian financial official said the Titqu operation should be seen in of a desire to return to Nineteenth Century 'Great Power' politics’ anchored upon countries' interests rather than the ideals based international order established after World War Two. The Kremlin has been feeding IQ45 and his team valuable intelligence on U.S. opponents, including Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden for two years. This was confirmed by a close associate of IQ45 who had organized and managed his trips to Moscow. The Kremlin’s cultivation operation on IQ45 also had comprised offering him various lucrative real estate development business deals in Russia. One of the damaging observations which had borne fruit for them was to exploit personal obsessions and sexual perversion in order to obtain suitable 'kompromat' on IQ45. The secret undercover observations involved conduct in Moscow including hiring the presidential suite of the Ritz Carlton Hotel, where he knew President OBAMA {whom he hated] had stayed on one other official trip to Russia, and disrespecting the bed where they had slept by employing a number of prostitutes to perform a 'golden showers'

(urination) show in front of him. The hotel was known to be under FSE control with microphones and concealed cameras in all the main rooms to record anything they wanted to. A former top level Russian intelligence officer asserted that unorthodox behavior in Russia over the years had provided the authorities there with enough embarrassing material on the now Republican presidential candidate to be able to blackmail him if they so wished. Russia has an extensive program of state-sponsored offensive cyber operations. External targets include foreign governments and big corporations, especially banks. Russia has had limited success in attacking top foreign targets like G7 governments, security services and through IT back doors. FSB often uses coercion and blackmail to recruit most capable cyber operatives in Russia into its state-sponsored program. Heavy use also, both wittingly and unwittingly, of CIS emigres working in western corporations and ethnic Russians employed by neighboring governments such as Latvia. There was a successful Russian cyber operation targeting senior Western business visitors provided back door into important Western institutions and a US citizen of Russian origin approached by FSB and offered incentive of "investment" in his business when visiting Moscow. Problems however for Russian authorities themselves in countering local hackers and cyber criminals, operating outside state control. Central Bank claims there were over 20 serious attacks on correspondent s held by CBR in 2015, comprising several billion Rubles in fraud. A former senior intelligence officer divided Russian state sponsored offensive cyber operations into four categories. Targeting foreign corporations, monitoring western political officers, western banks and domestic opponents both at home and abroad. The former intelligence officer reported that the Federal Security Service (FSB) was the lead Investigative organization within the Russian state apparatus for cyber operations. To compensate a massive effort had been invested, with much greater success, the "secondary targets", particularly western private banks and the governments of smaller states allied to the West. Hundreds of agents, either consciously cooperating with the FSB or whose personal and professional IT

systems had been unwittingly compromised, were recruited. Many were people who had ethnic and family ties to Russia and or had been incentivized financially to cooperate. Such people often would receive monetary inducements or contractual favors from the Russian state or its agents in return. This had created difficulties for parts of the Russian state apparatus in obliging, indulging the Central Bank of Russia knowingly having to cover up for such agents' money laundering operations through the Russian financial system. In of the SB's recruitment of capable cyber operatives to carry out its, ideally deniable, offensive cyber operations, a Russian IT specialist with direct knowledge reported that this was often done using coercion and blackmail. In of 'foreign' agents, the FSB was approaching US citizens of Russian (Jewish) origin on business trips to Russia. In one case a US citizen of Russian ethnicity had been visiting Moscow to attract investors in his new information technology program. The FSB clearly knew this and had offered to provide seed capital to this person in return for them being able to access and modify his IP, with a view to targeting priority foreign targets by planting a Trojan virus in the software. The US visitor was told this was common practice. The FSB also had implied significant operational success as a result of installing cheap Russian IT games containing their own malware unwittingly by targets on their PCs and other platforms. In a more advanced and successful FSB operation, an IT operator inside a leading Russian SOE, who previously had been employed on defensive IT work there, had been under instruction for the last year to conduct an offensive cyber operation against a foreign director of the company. Although the latter was apparently an infrequent visitor to Russia, the FSB now successfully had penetrated his personal IT and through this had managed to access various important institutions in the West through the back door. In of other technical IT platforms, an FSB cyber operative flagged up the 'Telegram' enciphered commercial system as having been of special concern and therefore heavily targeted by the FSB, not least because it was used frequently by Russian internal political activists and oppositionists. The FSB successfully cracked this communications software and therefore it was no longer secure to use. The Central Bank of Russia itted that there had been more than 20 attempts at serious cyber embezzlement of money from corresponding s held

there, comprising several billion Roubles. There are more than 15 major organized crime groups in the country involved in cybercrime, all of which continued to operate largely outside state and FSB control. These included the so-called 'Anunak', 'Buktrap' and 'Metel' organizations. Russians are receiving intel from a team of Russian oligarchs and their families in US: - Mechanism for transmitting this intelligence involves 'pension' disbursements to Russian emigres living in US as cover, using consular officials in New York, DC and Miami. - Suggestion from source close to IQ45 and MANAFORT that Republican campaign team happy to have Russia as media bogeyman to mask more extensive corrupt business ties to China and other emerging countries. - A Russian close associate of Republican US presidential candidate Donald IQ45, itted that there was a well-developed conspiracy of data exchange between the IQ45 team and the Russian leadership. This was managed on the IQ45 side by the Republican candidate's Russian campaign manager, Paul Manafort, who was using foreign policy advisor, Carter Page, and others as intermediaries. IQ45 and his team were relatively relaxed about this because it directed the media and Democrats’ attention away from IQ45’s business dealings in China and other emerging markets. Unlike in Russia, these were substantial and involved the payment of large bribes and kickbacks which, were they to become public, would be potentially very damaging to IQ45 and his campaign. IQ45 advisor Carter Page held secret meetings in Moscow with SECHIN and senior Kremlin Internal Affairs official, DIVYEKIN raises issues of future bilateral US-Russia energy cooperation and associated lifting of western sanctions against Russia over Ukraine. A consultant to IQ45’s campaign confirms regular exchange with Kremlin has existed for at least 8 years, including intelligence fed back to Russia on oligarchs' activities in US. Russians apparently have promised not to use 'kompromat' they hold on IQ45 as leverage, given high levels of voluntary cooperation forthcoming from his team.

Because of the secret one-on-one meetings between IQ45 and Putin we have found out about the $800 million dollar loan between the Russian Mob run by 3 Russian Oligarchs and IQ45. The loan was for the Trump Moscow Hotel. The Trump hotel in Moscow is still on the drawing boards and will be completed when IQ45 is voted out of office in 2020. IQ45 will go to into exile in Russia. He will be indicted in New York for tax evasion, rape, money laundering, and the Rico act. He will continue to run his many businesses from Moscow. His daughter and son-in-law will be with him as they are also in legal jeopardy. IQ45 will pardon himself and all of his family and close associates but that pardon is for federal crimes, not state crimes in New York. We have determined that the continuing information exchange between IQ45, his political campaign, his corporation, his family, and the Kremlin is anti-American if not illegal based on entry into all cell phones and computer networks of IQ45 and his associated business and political networks including the cell phones and computers of political campaign top-level operatives and the cell phones of his corporation board and his family . The emails and cell phone discussions that we uncovered made reference to IQ45's vast corruption activities including illegally caging children at the Mexican border. Based on this illegal activity, we have transferred 575 million dollars from IQ45's associated and related bank s to our offshore s. We also entered the bank s of 2 of his relatives and transferred 82 million dollars from each to our offshore s. We have placed a warning o IQ45's personal and corporate computers that if they continue their illegal personal, public, and political activities, we will continue to assess a penalty. We have warned them to cease and desist their illegal activities. We are in their systems and will know if they are continuing to engage in their illegal activities against the United States. If we find that they are continuing their illegal activities we will double the penalty we have assessed. We installed our logo

into their systems and setup their systems to print the logo on the lower righthand corner of all financial documents. They will know we are watching. With our offshore s we will transfer various amounts of money to 25 of our other offshore s and then we will anonymously donate money to many s ing companies that are working for immigrant rights. These organizations include: ActBlue, ACLU, Border Angels, The Florence Project, Freedom for Immigrants, KIND - Kids in Need of Defense, Project Corazon, RAICES - The Refugee and Immigrant Center for Education and Legal Services, El Refugio, Save the Children and The Texas Civil Rights Project. Diversion total to date $4,561,000,000 Donation total to date $4,545,000,000

HOMES FOR HOMELESS VETERANS

We will make massive donations to find homeless veterans and severely injured Veterans, to give them small homes, all utilities, insurance, and food paid for a year. We will pay for their training, and if they so desire, to rebuild their lives and get re-introduced into the work force. Some of these Veterans have sustained injuries including multiple limb amputations, partial or full paralysis, and/or severe traumatic brain injury (TBI). These homes restore some of the freedom and independence our Veterans sacrificed while defending our country, and enable them to focus on their family, recovery, and rebuilding their lives. We will build these homes wherever the Veteran chooses to live, and continue our relationship with the Veteran after home delivery to assist them with rebuilding their lives. We also assist the Veteran with services such as health care, mental health treatment and substance abuse counseling to help them in their recovery process. Despite their life-altering injuries, many of these Veterans have embarked on new careers, completed their college degrees, or started families. Our goal is to build a home for every homeless and/or disabled Veteran. We are not a charity as we are privately funded by an anonymous donor. We are dedicated to Respect, Esprit de Corps, Commitment, Honor, and Loyalty. Economic hardships usually involve employment issues and mounting debt. The cost of housing in most communities makes it unlikely for a single-wage earner to be able to afford a comfortable and safe rental unit and have enough money for food, utilities, transportation and other necessities. Even if one is lucky enough to find a low-rent apartment, there is little extra money for insurance, clothing, education, entertainment and recreation. Young veterans who want to live independently once they return home from military duty face incredible economic pressures. The cost of housing often prevents younger veterans from living independently. Unless they are able to save money as they plan for their futures, these veterans are already at a higher risk of becoming homeless. Many people who have never served in the military have difficulty managing personal finances. National Guardsmen and Reservists also face

significant economic pressures, even though most return to their pre-deployment occupations. Often their income while on active duty is lower than what they earned as civilians, so they may be depleting their savings or increasing their debt during military service. This is especially true for families that depend on a single primary wage earner’s income. Unemployment and underemployment are two of the most critical issues affecting homeless veterans. Particularly for younger veterans, many military occupational specialties during wartime – weapons specialists, munitions handlers, door gunners on helicopters and infantrymen – are not transferable to the civilian sector. The occupation of infantryman is problematic because although law enforcement is a great option for some of these veterans, the availability of these jobs is statistically insignificant compared to the large number of job-seeking combat veterans returning from Iraq and Afghanistan. And, increasingly, many of those positions require college credits to be eligible for consideration. Many transferable military occupations of younger veterans – warehousemen, clerical and food service workers, health care assistants and lower-level workers with limited experience – are on the low end of the wage scale. In many markets, veterans may be competing for rare employment opportunities with civilians who have more site-based training or more personal with potential employers and their crews or staff. For individuals who must rely solely on their own incomes to themselves and their families, economic pressures are compounded by the difficulty of paying for and attending educational programs to improve their earning potential. For single heads of household, the issue of paying tuition and fees is often not as prohibitive as child care and other necessary expenses associated with going back to school. Studies show that gainful employment at a livable wage with opportunities for advancement is the foundation for maintaining economic stability and reducing the risk of homelessness. Market factors such as layoffs, plant closings, high unemployment rates, and changes in a region’s commercial base that alter the nature of available jobs usually affect younger, less experienced workers the most. Veterans who lose their housing – regardless of the reasons – will most likely have to progress through all three levels before they become self-sufficient and able to live independently. Depending on how long a veteran has lived on the street, that progression can take up to five years or longer to complete.

Veterans with serious mental illnesses or other disabilities may never be able to achieve full independence. Veterans with histories of alcohol and drug abuse, legal problems or incarceration face extreme obstacles when trying to obtain and maintain housing. Because of limited public assistance resources, homeless programs are usually subject to a priority system that favors single parents with dependent children, the elderly and the disabled over veterans without an obvious substance abuse disorder, mental illness or other disability. We have established our service-oriented company to address the exact problem of limited housing for low-income veterans. These veterans may be un-employed, or disabled, or on drugs, or alcoholics, living on the street, married, single, or whatever their obstacle is that is preventing them from obtaining affordable housing, a job, and a life that is looking forward with hope. Most communities have shelters that provide emergency assistance on a daily basis to victims of catastrophic events, domestic violence and homelessness. Most of these are restricted to individuals, the main exception being shelters that accept women with children. There are very few shelters that are able to receive men with dependent children. The availability of social workers and referrals to ive services varies widely, and people who are known to be homeless are usually asked to leave the premises each morning and are not allowed to check back in until late afternoon. This practice makes it difficult to connect homeless veterans with service providers who can help them, even from VA sources, particularly if the veteran is dealing with serious emotional or mental disorders. For veterans with alcohol or substance abuse issues, this may be their only recourse until they complete a sobriety or drug rehabilitation program. In those cases, they most likely will need a case manager from a veteran service provider or veterans service organization (VSO) to work with them to ensure completion of the program in order to become eligible for enrollment in a transitional housing facility. Veterans without substance abuse problems who must reside in an emergency shelter while waiting for placement in a transitional program may need similar because of the emotional stress and lower self-esteem often developed by people who find themselves in this situation. Transitional housing programs are designed to provide temporary housing in a safe, alcohol and drugfree environment to help homeless people work toward the goal of independent living. The VA Homeless Providers Grant and Per Diem Program (GPD) is a partnership for community-based organizations that provide those services and work closely with VA medical facilities and benefits offices to make sure veterans receive the benefits they earned through their military service.

Recognizing the lack of affordable housing in their communities, some veteranspecific transitional housing programs have been developing permanent housing opportunities for veterans who are ready for independent living. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)-VA ive Housing Program provides 20,000 vouchers for chronically homeless veterans, but for other programs, veteran service providers must compete with other housing projects for limited HUD funding and constantly search for additional funding sources to provide this housing option. Presently, many of the permanent housing units being planned by veteran service providers are more accurately described as “permanent ive housing” – rental units that will be offered to veterans who need services such as case management, income s, outpatient mental health care, and long-term physical and occupational therapy. This means veterans at risk of becoming homeless solely because of low incomes will remain at risk for the foreseeable future. A large percentage of homeless veteran’s experience depression or posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) related to their military service and periods of homelessness. Untreated psychosocial disorders often lead to self-medication with alcohol and illegal drugs. Approximately three-quarters of homeless veterans have substance abuse and/or mental health issues. Addiction is a disease that requires treatment and follow-up ive counseling. The VA estimates women will soon for 10 percent of the veteran population. Women veterans have special needs and challenges; many are single parents with dependent children. The VA and community-based service providers have developed programs offering specialized services for women. All VA medical centers and many Re adjustment Counseling (Vet) Centers have a designated Women Veterans Program Manager to help women veterans access VA benefits and health care services. We gather our Veterans from the street, VA Health Care Services, HUD, transitional housing—including short-stay bridge housing—and/or service centers for Veterans who are homeless. We also monitor very low-income Veterans to prevent the imminent loss of a Veteran’s home or identify a new, more suitable housing situation for the

individual and his or her family; or to rapidly re-house Veterans and their families who are homeless and might remain homeless without this lifeline. We also use referrals and direct outreach, nonprofit agencies and community cooperatives to quickly house Veterans and their families who are homeless and keep others from slipping into homelessness by providing our small-home package that promote housing stability. Case management includes helping the Veteran by securing VA and other benefits such as educational aid and financial planning. In order to qualify for our Veterans Program, veterans need only to have a: A DD214 – Certificate of Release or Discharge from Active Duty or A NGB Form 22 – Report of Separation and Record of Service. We will construct 2 bedroom 1 bath, homes on a lot in the area the homeless veteran selects. The veteran will determine where they want to live, anywhere in the country. We will construct the home, furnish the home, provide insurance, food, healthcare, and job training for 2 years. We will make sure the veteran gets back into in the workforce earning a decent living. That is the least that we can do. We the following veteran non-profit organizations: Operation Troop Appreciation, West Mifflin, PA Provides wish list items for deployed military units across the globe, with a special focus on those serving in Afghanistan, the Middle East, and Africa. The wish list items are intended to ease the burden of deployment, contribute to safety, and enable our troops to perform more effectively. Reel American Heroes Foundation, Woodbridge, VA. Works with military hospitals and military bases to provide recreational therapy for our nation's wounded Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, disabled veterans, and combat veterans by getting them out on the water to fish and duck hunt. Freedom Alliance, Dulles, VA Aims to advance the American heritage of freedom by honoring and

encouraging military service, defending the sovereignty of the United States, and promoting a strong national defense. They do this through such programs as scholarships for the children of veterans. Operation Second Chance Inc, Germantown, MD Works to serve wounded, injured, and ill combat veterans by building relationships and identifying and ing immediate needs and interests. They provide help through counseling, retreats, hospital visits, and more. Starfish Foundation Inc, Milwaukee, WI Raises funds for scholarships to assist individuals to attend programs for emotional healing, including providing programs for military veterans to heal the emotional wounds of war. Genesis Joy House Homeless Shelter Inc., Warner Robins, GA Facilitates social change and empowers veterans and community by providing enrichment programs and counseling services to improve quality of life. Green Beret Foundation, San Antonio, TX Provides help for wounded Green Berets and their families, and the families of those that gave their lives for our country. Bikers, inc., Indianapolis, IN Through their Bikers Helping Veterans program, helps bridge the gap between the Battlefield and the Home front by assisting returning Veterans. Esposas Militares Hispanas USA Armed Forces, Schertz, TX Creates awareness and helps provide information to Hispanic Military spouses regarding benefits, scholarships, insurance, and more. They also offer translation services and other , as well as scholarships. Operation Supply Drop Inc., Austin, TX

Military Mama Network NFP, Joliet, IL Guardian Angels Medical Service Dogs Inc, Williston, FL H.E.R.O.E.S. Care, Inc., Fenton, MO Swords to Plowshares, San Francisco, CA FOURBLOCK FOUNDATION INC, New York, NY Healing4Heroes™ Inc, Peachtree City, GA Working Dogs for Vets, Lawrenceburg, TN Pets Enriching Troops Association, Wilmington, DE Backpacks for Life Inc, Verona, NJ Warrior Bonfire Program, Clinton, MS US Naval Sea Cadet Corps, Arlington, VA The Jonas Project, Long Beach, CA. Allen Soldier Memorabilia Boxes, Inc. Paso Robles, CA Wounded Warrior Network, San Diego, CA Central Florida Chapter Paralyzed Veterans of America, Sanford, FL Operation Love Our Vets, Felton, CA Alpha Omega Veterans Services, Inc., Memphis, TN Just Our Soldiers Helpers Inc., Lake Mary FL Warfighter Foundation, Houston, TX Military Warriors Foundation, San Antonio, TX

Train Our Troops, Austin, TX Veteran's PATH, San Rafael, CA Semper K9 Assistance Dogs, Woodbridge, VA USA Cares Inc, Radcliff, KY AMVETS Blinded Veterans Association Disabled American Veterans Jewish War Veterans Military Order of the Purple Heart Non-Commissioned Officers Association Paralyzed Veterans of America Veterans of Foreign Wars Vietnam Veterans of America The American Legion Diversion total to date $4,561,000,000 Donation total to date $4,545,000,000

Hacking the NRA

The NRA, or National Rifle Association, is an American non-profit organization originally established in 1871 in New York that helps to protect gun owners and ensure they are able to exercise their right to bear arms. According to the Second Amendment of the United States Bill of Rights, citizens are afforded the right to purchase and own guns. There are currently over four million of the NRA, and statistics show that this number is steadily growing. Many in Washington, D.C. consider the National Rifle Association to be the most powerful of all lobbying groups. They have fought tirelessly for the rights of American citizens to bear arms, yet promote using them in a responsible and sensible manner. There is a large, 75-member board of directors that meet and discuss important current events and issues regarding firearms. The NRA also publishes five different gun-related magazines. Some gun control groups challenge the NRA’s operations, stating that they are promoting gun use and that guns should be controlled. This hasn’t stopped the National Rifle Association, and they still remain one of the most influential groups of civil rights activists in the nation today. Eleven days after the massacre at Columbine, Wayne La Pierre – a lifelong political operative who had steadied the National Rifle Association through many crises – stood before an American flag and soberly addressed the nation about firearms and student safety: "We believe in absolutely gun-free, zero-tolerance, totally safe schools. That means no guns in America's schools, period," La Pierre said, carving out a "rare exception" for professional law enforcement. La Pierre even proposed making the mere mention of the word "guns" in schools a crime: "Such behavior in our schools should be prosecuted Just as certainly as such behavior in our airports is prosecuted," La Pierre said. This speech wasn't delivered in an alternate universe. The date was May 1st,

1999, at the NRA's national convention in Denver. Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold's rampage at Columbine High School in nearby Littleton, Colorado, had just killed 13 students and teachers, shocking the conscience of the nation. The disconnect between the NRA chief 's conciliatory address on that day 14 years ago and his combative press conference in the aftermath of the slaughter of 20 first-graders in Newtown, Connecticut, could hardly be more jarring. In his now-infamous December 21st tirade, La Pierre ripped the gun-free zones he once championed as an invitation to the "monsters and predators of this world," advertising to "every insane killer in America that schools are their safest place to inflict maximum mayhem with minimum risk." La Pierre then offered what he called a "proven" solution to school gun violence – one that would open a lucrative new market for the gun industry while tidily expanding the power of the NRA itself. "The only thing that stops a bad guy with a gun is a good guy with a gun," La Pierre insisted, before proposing that armed, NRAtrained vigilantes should patrol each of the nation's nearly 100,000 public schools. The shift in La Pierre's rhetoric underscores a radical transformation within the NRA. Billing itself as the nation's "oldest civil rights organization," the NRA still claims to represent the interests of marksmen, hunters and responsible gun owners. But over the past decade and a half, the NRA has morphed into a front group for the firearms industry, whose profits are increasingly dependent on the sale of military-bred weapons like the assault rifles used in the massacres at Newtown and Aurora, Colorado. Today's NRA stands astride some of the ugliest currents of our politics, combining the "Astro turf " activism of the Tea Party, the unlimited and undisclosed "dark money" of groups like Karl Rove's Crossroads GPS, and the sham legislating conducted on behalf of the industry through groups like the American Legislative Exchange Council. "This is not your father's NRA," says Josh Sugarmann, executive director of the Violence Policy Center, a top gun-industry watchdog. Feldman is more succinct, calling his former employer a "cynical, mercenary political cult." The NRA's alignment with an $11.7 billion industry has fed tens of millions of dollars into the association's coffers, helping it string together victories that would have seemed fantastic just 15 years ago. The NRA has hogtied federal regulators, censored government data about gun crime and blocked renewal of the ban on assault weaponry and high-capacity magazines, which expired in

2004. The NRA secured its "number-one legislative priority" in 2005, a law blocking liability lawsuits that once threatened to bankrupt gun makers and expose the industry's darkest business practices. Across the country, the NRA has opened new markets for firearms dealers by pushing for state laws granting citizens the right to carry hidden weapons in public and to allow those who kill in the name of self-defense to get off scotfree. The NRA's unbending opposition to better gun control measures does not actually reflect the views of the nation's gun owners or, for that matter, its claimed 4 million . That's by design. Today's NRA is a completely top-down organization. It has been led since 1991 by La Pierre, its chief executive, who serves at the pleasure of a 76-member board that is all but self-perpetuating. Only one-third of the board's hip is up for re-election in any given year. Voting is limited to the NRA's honored "lifetime" and to dues-payers with at least five consecutive years of being in good standing. Write-in candidates occasionally pepper the ballot, but in practice, the tiny slice of eligible who bother to vote rubber-stamp a slate of candidates dictated by the NRA's 10-member nominating committee – one of whose is George Kollitides II, CEO of Freedom Group, which manufactures the Bushmaster semiautomatic that Adam Lanza used to slaughter children in Newtown. The NRA's board is stocked with industry brass. Pete Brownell, president of Brownells – an Internet arms superstore that features "ultra-high-capacity magazines" – campaigned for his seat touting the importance for the NRA to have "directors who intimately understand and work in leadership positions within the firearms industry." Another board seat belongs to Ronnie Barrett, CEO of Barrett Firearms Manufacturing, whose company produces .50-caliber sniper rifles capable of piercing armor from nearly a mile away. Barrett's firm also sells scope-mounted ballistics computers that enable clueless civilians to hit targets like they were special-forces snipers. Donors from the industry and other dark reaches of the corporate world –

including Xe, the new name of the mercenary group Blackwater – had funneled up to $52 million to the NRA in recent years. More disturbing, the NRA receives funds directly from the sales of arms and ammunition. The "Round-Up" program, launched by arms retailer Midway USA, encourages customers to increase their purchases to the nearest dollar and sends the extra coin to the association. Midway customers alone have contributed nearly $8 million in this way to NRA's lobbying division, the Institute for Legislative Action. In more than three decades of service to the NRA, Wayne La Pierre has done more than any other man alive to make America safe for crazed gunmen to build warlike arsenals and unleash terror on innocents at movie theaters and elementary schools. In the 1980s, he helped craft legislation to roll back gun control ed in the wake of the Kennedy and King assassinations. And since the late 1990s, twice he has destroyed political deals that might have made it hugely difficult for accused killers like Holmes and Lanza to get their hands on their weapons. By the late 1990s, however, the once mighty NRA was reeling on La Pierre's watch: It had suffered stinging legislative defeats – the age of the Brady Bill in 1993 and the Assault Weapons Ban a year later. It wasn't only restrictions on the sale of military-grade weaponry that the NRA fought. It also fought to keep Americans in the dark about the relative dangers of such guns. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms compiles detailed records about what firearms are used in what types of crime, and even published a list of the top 10 crime guns. To block the release of that data, Todd Tiahrt, a GOP congressman from Kansas and an NRA ally, tacked a rider onto a 2003 appropriations bill that forbids ATF from spending any money to share the data it collects with the public – or even with Congress. "If you wanted to know how many Bushmasters have been used in what kinds of crime for the last five years, that information is in ATF's files," says Diaz. "But it can't be released because of the Tiahrt Amendment." With Bush in the White House and the public now Facing the perils of semiautomatic weapons, the Assault Weapons Ban was on a glide path to expire in 2004. And the NRA, hell bent to free the gun makers and dealers from any responsibility resulting from the use of these dangerous weapons, continued to

press ahead in its fiercest fight: a federal bill immunizing the industry from liability. After President Bush signed the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act that October, La Pierre called it "the most significant piece of pro-gun legislation in 20 years." Who did it benefit? La Pierre made no pretenses: "History will show that this law helped save the American firearms industry." To stay afloat, the NRA relies on tens of millions in grants and gifts – increasingly linked to the gun industry. Such funds totaled $71 million in 2010 and have been growing twice as fast as hip dues have. And the NRA, looking to bring in even bigger bucks, is now fishing for donors with Koch-size wallets. On its website, the NRA lists a donor tier for those who give $25 million or above, which it calls the "Charlton Heston Society." Twenty tiny coffins have again put the NRA on the defensive. In the wake of the Sandy Hook massacre, which Adam Lanza perpetrated with his mom's arsenal, public of new gun-control laws is overwhelming. Today, 92 percent of the country background checks for gun buyers, and 63 percent limiting the capacity of gun magazines. "If there's a conflict for some of Congress between their politics and their conscience, they should ponder that 92 percent number," says Axelrod. Since the beginning of 2017, at least 199 people have died in mass shooting in the United States. A mass killing is generally defined as four or more people killed in a single incident. The mass shooting in Las Vegas has sparked a national conversation about gun control, as most mass shootings do. Republicans in the House and Senate rode into power in 2016 on a wave of NRA money, and career NRA for some of the 115th Congress now reach well into the seven-figure range. No politician benefited more from the NRA’s 2016 spending binge than President Donald Trump. The NRA spent over $30 million in of Trump’s candidacy — or more than its combined spending in all races during the 2008 and 2012 presidential election cycles, which include 45 Senate and 145 House races. Under Federal Law, and in almost every state, the Minimum age for purchasing a long gun from a Licensed dealer is 18. This category of firearms Encomes shotguns and rifles, including Assault-style weapons that have

become popular in mass shootings. Federal law provides no minimum age for possession of long guns, and in some states, it’s legal for children younger than 18 to own these weapons as long as they have parental consent. The White House refuses to release photo of trump g bill weakening gun laws for mentally ill. “THE NRA IS THE ENABLER OF DEATH – PARANOID, DELUSIONAL AND AS VENOMOUS AS A SCORPION. WITH THE WEEK-KNEED ACQUIESCENCE OF OUR POLITICIANS, THENATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION HAS TURNED THE SECOND AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION INTO A CRUEL AND DEADLY HOAX” BILL MOYERS (2018) In the 2016 election, the NRA spent $11,438,118 to Donald Trump’s campaign and donated $19,756,346 to groups opposing Hillary Clinton’s. However, the bulk of the contributions have gone to House and Senate . As president, Trump has promised to be a champion for the NRA. In April, he told a gathering of gun rights advocates that the “eight-year assault on your Second Amendment freedoms has come to a crashing end”. And while mass shootings in Las Vegas, Sutherland Springs and Tehama County grabbed the nation’s attention, the istration has shied away from discussing measures that might anger the NRA. In 2017, the NRA is not laying low. With a sympathetic Congress and an istration keen to them, the NRA has already spent more on lobbying in the first three quarters of this year than it has spent in any full year in the past. Here are some of the most notable mass shootings in the U.S. in recent decades: AUGUST 4, 2019: 10 people killed outside a bar in Dayton, Ohio AUGUST 3, 2019: 20 people killed at a Walmart in El Paso, Texas MAY 31, 2019: 13 people killed in a city works building in Virginia Beach, Virginia FEBRUARY 19, 2019: 6 people killed in a factory in Aurora,

Illinois NOVEMBER 19, 2018: 4 people killed at Mercy Hospital In Chicago, Illinois NOV 7, 2018: 13 people killed in a bar in Thousand Oaks, California OCT 27, 2018: 11 people were killed at a synagogue in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania MAY 25, 2018: Noblesville, Indiana Two people were injured when a gunman opened fire at Noblesville West Middle School in Noblesville, Indiana MAY 18, 2018: Santa Fe, Texas 10 people were killed in a shooting at Santa Fe High School MAY 11, 2018: Palmdale, California A 14 year old boy went to Highland High, his former school, and began shooting a semiautomatic rifle shortly before classes were scheduled to begin. A 15-yearold boy was struck in the shoulder. MARCH 20: Lexington Park, Maryland An armed student shot two others at Great Mills High School before a school resources officer fired a round at the shooter. The shooter was killed. One of the students, a 16 year old girl was taken off life two days later. FEBRUARY 14, 2018 17 people dead, 15 wounded at Marjory Stoneman Douglas HIGH school in Parkland, Florida. NOVEMBER 5, 2017

26 people dead, 20 wounded inside First Baptist Church in Sutherland Springs, Texas. OCTOBER 1, 2017 59 killed, more than 500 injured: Las Vegas, Nevada. JUNE 5, 2017 5 killed: Orange County, Fla. JAN. 6, 2017 5 killed, 6 injured: Fort Lauderdale, Fla. SEPT. 23, 2016 5 killed: Burlington, Wash. JUNE 14, 2017 4 killed: San Francisco JUNE 12, 2016 49 killed, 58 injured in Orlando , Fl. DEC. 2, 2015 14 killed, 22 injured: San Bernardino, Calif. NOV. 29, 2015 3 killed, 9 injured: Colorado Springs, Colo. OCT. 1, 2015 9 killed, 9 injured: Roseburg, Ore. JULY 16, 2015

5 killed, 3 injured: Chattanooga, Tenn. JUNE 18, 2015 9 killed: Charleston, S.C. MAY 23, 2014 6 killed, 7 injured: Isla Vista, Calif. APRIL 2, 2014 3 killed; 16 injured: Ft. Hood, Texas SEPT. 16, 2013 12 killed, 3 injured: Washington, D.C. JUNE 7, 2013 5 killed: Santa Monica, Ca. DEC. 14, 2012 27 killed, one injured: Newtown, Conn. A gunman forces his way into Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Conn. and shoots and kills 20 first graders and six adults. The shooter, Adam Lanza, 20, kills himself at the scene. Lanza also killed his mother at the home they shared, prior to his shooting rampage. OCT. 21, 2012 3 killed, 4 injured: Brookfield, Wis. SEPT. 28, 2012 6 killed, 2 injured: Minneapolis, Minn.

AUG. 5, 2012 6 killed, 3 injured: Oak Creek, Wis. JULY 20, 2012 12 killed, 58 injured: Aurora, Colo. APRIL 2, 2012 7 killed, 3 injured: Oakland, Ca. OCT. 12, 2011 8 killed, 1 injured: Seal Beach, Calif. JAN. 8, 2011 6 killed, 11 injured: Tucson, Ariz. AUG. 3, 2010 8 killed, 2 injured: Manchester, Conn. FEB. 12, 2010 3 killed, 3 injured: Huntsville, Ala. NOV. 5, 2009 13 killed, 32 injured: Ft. Hood, Texas APRIL 3, 2009 13 killed, 4 injured: Binghamton, N.Y. FEB. 14, 2008 5 killed, 16 injured: Dekalb, Ill. DEC. 5, 2007

8 killed, 4 injured: Omaha, Ne. APRIL 16, 2007 32 killed, 17 injured: Blacksburg, Va. FEB. 12, 2007 5 killed, 4 injured: Salt Lake City, Utah OCT. 2, 2006 5 killed, 5 injured: Nickel Mines, Pa. JAN. 30, 2006 6 killed: Goleta, Calif. MARCH 21, 2005 9 killed, 7 injured: Red Lake Indian Reservation, Minn. JULY 8, 2003 5 killed, 9 injured: Meridian, Miss. OCT. 28, 2002 3 killed: Tucson, Az. MARCH 5, 2001 2 killed, 13 injured: Santee, Calif. DEC. 26, 2000 7 killed: Wakefield, Mass. NOV. 2, 1999 7 killed: Honolulu, Hi. SEPT. 15, 1999

7 killed, 7 injured: Fort Worth, Tx. JULY 29, 1999 9 killed, 12 injured: Atlanta. Ga. APRIL 20, 1999 13 killed, 24 injured: Columbine, Colo. MARCH 24, 1998 5 killed, 10 injured: Jonesboro, Ark. DEC. 7, 1993 6 killed, 19 injured: Garden City, N.Y. JULY 1, 1993 8 killed, 6 injured: San Francisco, Ca. MAY 1, 1992 4 killed, 10 injured: Olive hurst, Calif. NOV. 1, 1991 4 killed, 2 injured: Iowa City, Iowa OCT. 16, 1991 22 killed, 20 injured: Killeen, Tx. JUNE 18, 1990 10 killed, 4 injured: Jacksonville, Fla. JAN. 17, 1989 5 killed, 29 injured: Stockton, Calif.

AUG. 20, 1986 14 killed, 6 injured: Edmond, Okla. JULY 18, 1984 21 killed, 19 injured: San Ysidro, Calif. We have put together a plan to help the victim’s families of gun violence. This plan utilizes “The Robin Hood Virus”. If we determine that they are engaged in illegal activities, violating the rule of competitive fairness, or plotting against the United States we will take aggressive action to stop them in their tracks and empty their bank s. We will divert resources (goods and money) to nonprofit entities such as food banks, homeless shelters, orphanages, families going thru catastrophic health issues, small rural hospitals struggling to survive, a new national rural hospital start-up, and our newest charity, the DD214 foundation. They build and supply small homes for homeless veterans. We will find other needy groups or individuals to help with the fruits of our labor. One of our nagging concerns is the total disregard for American safety that the NRA has proposed. They do this by continually lobbying against any and all gun legislation that comes up. We have determined that this practice is anti-American if not illegal based on entry into all cell phones and computer networks at the NRA including the cell phones and computers of the NRA board . We also entered the cell phones of the key people in those companies. The emails and cell phone discussions that we uncovered made reference to legislative bribes on countless occasions to congressmen and senators. Based on this illegal activity, we have transferred 150 million from the NRA bank to our offshore s. We also entered the bank s of 5 of the biggest gun producers and transferred 150 million from each of the gun producer’s s to our offshore s. We have placed a warning on the NRA computers and the gun manufacturers computers that if they continue with bribing federal and local officials, we will continue to extract large amounts of money from their s.

With our offshore s we will transfer various amounts of money to 25 of our other offshore s and then we will anonymously donate money to many s ing the victims of gun violence. Those s include: A. Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence B. Funds for Las Vegas Victims and their families. C. Funds for Pulse Victims and their families. D. Funds for San Bernardino, Ca. shooting victims and their families. E. Funds for Sutherland Springs victims and their families. F. Funds for Stoneman Victims and their families. Diversion total to date $5,461,000,000 Donation total to date $5,445,000,000

North Korean Payback

Based in North Korea, Room 39, also known as Bureau 39 is a secretive organization whos’ sole purpose is to find ways to obtain foreign currency for Kim Jong-un. Established in 1970, the organization has been described as the kingpin of North Korea. Although very little has been published on room 39, it is believed that the organization has over 20 bank s in Switzerland and China and are used solely for the purpose of money laundering and other illegal transactions. It has also been reported that the organization is involved in drug smuggling and illicit weapon sales. What is known, is that the secretive group have over 130 trading companies under its jurisdiction which are controlled by Kim Jong-un. If you ever fancy popping over to North Korea and attempting to enter the organizations HQ, you need to head towards the Workers Party building in Pyongyang. A hacking group—known as "Lazarus"—also attacked financial institutions in Costa Rica, Ethiopia, Gabon, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Kenya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Poland, Taiwan, Thailand, and Uruguay. The Lazarus hackers carefully routed their signal through , South Korea and Taiwan to setup their attack server. Experts say it's still far too early to say whether North Korea was behind the outbreak of ransomware attacks that has affected hundreds of thousands of computers. While some of North Korea's hacking activities appear to be motivated by its cash shortage or personal retribution, the regime also conducts more traditional attacks on its southern neighbor. South Korea said in December that North Korea had hacked its military intranet and leaked confidential information. Top South Korean government officials' smartphones were also hacked in 2016, according to the country's spy agency. Seoul accused North Korea of stealing text messages and voice communications by "sending enticing text messages." Pyongyang is also suspected of turning 60,000 computers in South Korea into "zombies," or computers that have been compromised by hackers and can then be used for cyberattacks. South Korea's spy agency estimated that Pyongyang took control of 10,000 computers in a single month in 2015. On February 1, when banks were closed for the weekend in Bangladesh, criminals executed five transfers from the central bank's at the New York Fed. The requests looked real: They appeared to come from a Bangladesh server, and the thieves supplied the correct bank codes to

authenticate the transfers. Most of the stolen funds ended up in s located in the Philippines, while roughly $20 million, which has since been recovered, went to Sri Lanka. The robbers tried to steal $850 million more, but the requests were denied by the New York Fed. The theft has raised questions over the international banking system's vulnerability. The Philippines investigators revealed that the missing $81 million had been tracked to Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation, a bank in the country. From there, it went to a local money-transfer firm, and then into the country's casinos. The $81 million was deposited into s at RCBC. As alarm bells began to ring, RCBC tried to freeze the s with stolen funds but the funds went to money-transfer company Philrem, which moved them to casinos and individuals connected to the Philippine gaming industry. The country's gaming industry is source for illegal activity and money laundering. Transnational drug trafficking organizations based in East Asia use the existing banking system, casinos, and commercial enterprises to transfer drug proceeds from the Philippines to offshore s. North Korea's conventional military of aging Soviet jets and tanks can't compete against the high-tech military of the US, but its capabilities in cyber warfare keep on getting better. Offensive cyber operations are a cost-effective way to develop asymmetric, deniable militia options. While North Korea may not be able to hurt a Goliath like the US or South Korea with guns or missiles, it sees hacking as a cheaper way of getting to that result. Attributing a cyberattack to a nation-state can be difficult, given that hackers often hide behind proxy servers and mask their tracks, but intelligence officials at the time told the Washington Post they had "99% certainty" that North Korea was behind the Sony hack. Comments from FBI Director James Comey were clear: "We could see that the IP addresses they used ... were IPs that were exclusively used by the North Koreans. It was a mistake by them. It was a very clear indication of who was doing this. They would shut it off very quickly once they realized the mistake, but not before we saw them and knew where it was coming from." North Korea has approximately 6,000 trained hackers in its military ranks, a defector from the country told the BBC. The defector taught computer science at a Pyongyang University and said many of his former students went on to the hacking unit known as Bureau 121. That an

Army general would warn of North Korea's growing progress in cyberspace comes as the Pentagon ramps up its own efforts in what it calls the "cyber domain" after the release of a new cyber strategy in April 2015. In it, the military proposed 133 teams for its "cyber mission force" by 2018, 27 of which were directed to combat missions by "generating integrated cyberspace effects in of ... operations." Though North Korea's missile infrastructure lacks the competence of Russia's, Russians using the same type of missiles achieved a 13% failure rate, while North Korean attempts failed a whopping 88% of the time. North Korea's internal networks are fiercely insulated and not connected to the larger internet, however, which does not pose a challenge for The Robin Hood Virus. A recent report on Russian hacking in The New Yorker detailed one case in which Russia gained access to a NATO computer network in 1996 by placing bugged thumb drives for sale in local shops near a NATO base in Kabul, Afghanistan. NATO operators bought the thumb drives, used them on the network, and just like that, the Russians were in. SIGINT (signals intelligence) or COMINT (communications intelligence) comes into collaboration with HUMINT (human intelligence)," is the "golden age of espionage," as cyberwarfare remains non-lethal, un-attributable, and almost completely unpunished. But the recent missile salvo from North Korea suggests that even a prolonged, sophisticated cyberattack can't fully derail North Korea's nuclear-missile program. Because of the limited number of servers and access points to North Korea's very restricted internet, the west would claim an overwhelming cyberwar victory. North Korean hackers stole a vast cache of data, including classified wartime contingency plans tly drawn by the United States and South Korea, when they breached the computer network of the South Korean military last year. One of the plans included the South Korean military’s plan to remove the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un, referred to as a “decapitation” plan, should war break out on the Korean Peninsula. It was not known whether any of the military’s top secrets were leaked, but that nearly 300 lower-classification confidential documents were stolen. The military has not yet identified nearly 80 percent of the 235 gigabytes of leaked data. North Korea and South Korea have long had each other’s computer networks in their sights. The United States, piggybacking on South Korean operations, broke into the North’s computer systems in 2010, targeting the Reconnaissance General Bureau, the North’s

equivalent of the C.I.A. South Korean intelligence officials told lawmakers in June that Mr. Kim was desperate to get hold of South Korea’s decapitation plan. He had also begun using his deputies’ cars as decoys to move from place to place, they said. The military plans for dealing with North Korea have been rewritten in recent months by Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis, in response to the North’s accelerated threats. The plan containing the so-called decapitation operation, Operations Plan 5015, had been updated in 2015 to reflect the growing nuclear and missile threat from North Korea. Its details remain classified. Under their mutual defense treaty, the United States takes operational control of South Korean troops in the event of war on the divided Korean Peninsula. The two allies hone their war plans through annual t military exercises. As Mr. Kim, the North Korean leader, has accelerated his nuclear missile program in recent years, South Korean defense officials have publicly discussed pre-emptive strikes at critical missile and nuclear sites in North Korea and an operation to eliminate the North’s top leaders. After North Korea’s sixth — and by far most powerful — nuclear test last month, the South Korean defense minister, Song Young-moo, told lawmakers in Seoul that a special forces unit with a task of removing Mr. Kim would be established by the end of the year. Last month, United States strategic bombers and fighter jets also flew deep to the north along the east coast of North Korea in what some South Korean defense analysts said was an exercise to target the North Korean leadership in the event of conflict. North Korea bristles at any threat to Mr. Kim, and a war of words has escalated between North Korea and the Trump istration. North Korea claimed a right to shoot down American warplanes flying in international airspace if they came near the country. When President Trump threatened to “totally destroy” North Korea last month, Mr. Un vowed to “tame the mentally deranged U.S. dotard with fire”. In the attack in September 2016, later code-named “Desert Wolf” by antihacking security officials, North Korean hackers infected 3,200 computers, including 700 connected to the South Korean military’s internal network, which is normally cut off from the internet. The attack even affected a computer used by the defense minister. Investigators later learned that the hackers first infiltrated the network of a company providing a computer vaccine service to the ministry’s computer network in 2015. They said the hackers operated out of IP addresses originating in Shenyang, a city in northeast China that had long been

cited as an operating ground for North Korean hackers. The intruders used the vaccine server to infect internet-connected computers of the military with malicious codes in August last year, the investigators said. They could also infiltrate the malware into intranet computers when the military’s closed internal network was mistakenly linked to the internet during maintenance. The break-in by the United States into North Korea’s own government networks in 2010 was documented in classified materials released by Edward J. Snowden, a former National Security Agency contractor. The New York Times reported in 2015 that the penetration figured in quickly identifying the North Korean origins of the hack of Sony Pictures Entertainment. With a shortage of good options on the table for dealing with North Korea’s strategic weapons, there is an understandable temptation to look for unconventional alternatives. So-called “cyberwarfare” is definitely unconventional and the appeal is obvious. Whether one wants to meddle in an election, stop an offensive movie release or derail a weapons program, cyberattacks involve no politically embarrassing dead bodies on either side, carry little risk and are eminently deniable. But cyberwarfare is a long game, and a secret one. Victories will not take the form of spectacular explosions on the launch pad, and we will need to look for more subtle indications of success. Victory may not be possible at all. Cyberwarfare is only effective against cybernetic targets; North Korea makes only limited and selective use of computers, and when they do, they use custom operating systems designed with a paranoid concern for security. The North maintains a cadre of extremely skilled cyberwarriors, most of whom are likely playing defense. The exploits that enable skilled adversaries to readily subvert the relatively open networks of the Western democracies will be of little use north of the DMZ. Finding the narrow vulnerabilities that may exist in North Korea’s systems, developing the tools to exploit them, and infiltrating Northern networks while remaining concealed from Pyongyang’s security services, is going to be an exceedingly tedious process. Undoubtedly, the NSA, CIA and others have been working on this for many years, but it will take them longer to tap Kim Jong Uns phone than it did for Angela Merkel’s, and some targets will remain forever beyond reach. Ballistic missiles may be among them. A ballistic missile is literally and figuratively air gapped to an extreme degree—that is, thoroughly insulated from any attacker. The only connection to the outside world is a hardwired connection to a secure launch control center; however, once a launch is initiated, even that narrow path is severed.

Even within the missile, and particularly the 1960s-style ballistic missiles favored by North Korea, there will be very little in the way of digital electronics with programmable software. Engines, warheads and the like will probably use hardwired, analog controllers. The guidance system might also be hardwired except for the details of the trajectory to be flown. One potential vulnerability, though, is North Korea’s known use of foreign commercial electronics components in the guidance control systems of their space launch vehicles, and presumably its more advanced missiles as well. Commercial generally means insecure when it comes to electronics, so it may be possible to find or create vulnerabilities in these components, effectively hacking the missile before it is even built. That is, if we can determine exactly which components are being used, and how, and find a path to them through North Korea’s sparse and secure networks. And that’s just too many “ifs” to be at all confident of success. A successful attack, then, will likely be aimed at something other than the missile itself. Note that the highly-publicized “Stuxnet” attack did not target Iran’s (probably nonexistent) nuclear weapons, but the uranium enrichment facility that would be used to manufacture them. North Korea positively brags about its computer-controlled milling machines; these can, in principle, be hacked to produce parts that aren’t exactly what the designer intended. Ovens used to temper and anneal alloys might also be computer-controlled, and subtle changes to the temperature profile can lead to parts that are visually perfect but will fail under load. There are numerous possibilities, and while most will not be practical to exploit, perhaps some will be vulnerable. North Korea’s factories might, perhaps, be “hacked” to produce defective missiles. An attack on the manufacturing process will most likely result in defective components that fail even in ground testing. We would likely never know about this, except to wonder why the ground test phase is taking so long. Interestingly, North Korea’s KN-08 ICBM was first seen in mock-up form in 2012, but there was not a single successful ground test until last year. Only sheer luck enabled a 22-year-old British hacker to defuse the biggest North Korean cyberattack to date, a ransomware attack last May that failed to generate much cash but brought down hundreds of thousands of computers across dozens of countries — and briefly crippled Britain’s National Health Service. Amid all the attention on Pyongyang’s progress in developing a nuclear weapon capable of striking the continental United States, the North Koreans have also

quietly developed a cyber program that is stealing hundreds of millions of dollars and proving capable of unleashing global havoc. Unlike its weapons tests, which have led to international sanctions, the North’s cyber strikes have faced almost no pushback or punishment, even as the regime is already using its hacking capabilities for actual attacks against its adversaries in the West. For decades Iran and North Korea have shared missile technology, and American intelligence agencies have long sought evidence of secret cooperation in the nuclear arena. In cyber, the Iranians taught the North Koreans something important: When confronting an enemy that has internet-connected banks, trading systems, oil and water pipelines, dams, hospitals, and entire cities, the opportunities to wreak havoc are endless. And just as Western analysts once scoffed at the potential of the North’s nuclear program, so did experts dismiss its cyber potential — only to now acknowledge that hacking is an almost perfect weapon for a Pyongyang that is isolated and has little to lose. The country’s primitive infrastructure is far less vulnerable to cyber retaliation, and North Korean hackers operate outside the country, anyway. Sanctions offer no useful response, since a raft of sanctions are already imposed. And Mr. Kim’s advisers are betting that no one will respond to a cyberattack with a military attack, for fear of a catastrophic escalation between North and South Korea. Both the United States and South Korea have also placed digital “implants” in the Reconnaissance General Bureau, the North Korean equivalent of the Central Intelligence Agency, according to documents that Edward J. Snowden released several years ago. American-created cyber and electronic warfare weapons were deployed to disable North Korean missiles, an attack that was, at best, only partially successful. There is evidence Pyongyang has planted so-called digital sleeper cells in the South’s critical infrastructure, and its Defense Ministry, that could be activated to paralyze power supplies and military command and control networks. Once North Korea counterfeited crude $100 bills to try to generate hard cash. Now intelligence officials estimate that North Korea reaps hundreds of millions of dollars a year from ransomware, digital bank heists, online video game cracking, and more recently, hacks of South Korean Bitcoin exchanges. One former British intelligence chief estimates the take from its cyber heists may bring the North as much as $1 billion a year, or a third of the value of the

nation’s exports. A recent analysis by a cybersecurity firm found heavy North Korean internet activity in India, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nepal, Kenya, Mozambique, and Indonesia. In some cases, like that of New Zealand, North Korean hackers were simply routing their attacks through the country’s computers from abroad. In others, researchers believe they are now physically stationed in countries like India, where nearly one-fifth of Pyongyang’s cyberattacks now originate. Intelligence agencies are now trying to track the North Korean hackers in these countries the way they have previously tracked terrorist sleeper cells or nuclear proliferators: looking for their favorite hotels, lurking in online forums they may inhabit, attempting to feed them bad computer code and counterattacking their own servers. By midsummer 2012, Iran’s hackers, still recovering from an American and Israeli-led cyberattack on Iran’s nuclear enrichment operations, found an easy target in Saudi Aramco, Saudi Arabia’s state-owned oil company and the world’s most valuable company. That August, Iranian hackers flipped a kill switch at precisely 11:08 a.m., unleashing a simple wiper virus onto 30,000 Aramco computers and 10,000 servers that would destroy data, and replace it with a partial image of a burning American flag. The damage was tremendous. Seven months later, during t military exercises between American and South Korean forces, North Korean hackers, operating from computers inside China, deployed a very similar cyberweapon against computer networks at three major South Korean banks and South Korea’s two largest broadcasters. Like Iran’s Aramco attacks, the North Korean attacks on South Korean targets used wiping malware to eradicate data and paralyze their business operations such as The Philippines in October 2015; then the Tien Phong Bank in Vietnam then the Bangladesh Central Bank. The attacks on Bitcoin exchanges from their heists for Monero, a highly anonymous version of cryptocurrency that is far harder for global authorities to trace. The most widespread hack was WannaCry, a global ransomware attack that used a program that cripples a computer and demands a ransom payment in exchange for unlocking the computer, or its data. In a twist the North Koreans surely enjoyed, their hackers based the attack on a secret tool, called “Eternal Blue,” stolen from the National Security Agency.

In the late afternoon of May 12, panicked phone calls flooded in from around Britain and the world. The computer systems of several major British hospital systems were shut down, forcing diversions of ambulances and the deferral of nonemergency surgeries. Banks and transportation systems across dozens of countries were affected. Britain’s National Cyber Security Center had picked up no warning of the attack, said Paul Chichester, its director of operations. Investigators now think the WannaCry attack may have been an early misfire of a weapon that was still under development — or a test of tactics and vulnerabilities. We know this was part of an evolving effort to find ways to disable key industries. It ended thanks to Marcus Hutchins, a college dropout and self-taught hacker living with his parents in the southwest of England. He spotted a web address somewhere in the software and, on a lark, paid $10.69 to it as a domain name. The activation of the domain name turned out to act as a kill switch causing the malware to stop spreading. As the first step in Paying Back North Korea we have hacked into the North Korean Power grid and all of its sub-stations. We now have the ability to shut down the power at some or all of the power-generating stations. We also hacked into North Korea's military command, control, and communications system consisting of extensive hardened wartime command facilities, ed by redundant communication systems, which are believed to be largely separate from systems ing other sectors. North Korea currently is modernizing its aged telecommunications infrastructure to improve the speed and quality and expand the capacity of both domestic and international communications. A fiber-optic cable linking Pyongyang and Hamhung was complete by early 1995, with construction from Pyongyang to Kangwon, North Hamgyong, and South Pyongan Provinces almost complete by midyear. In 1995, North Korea acquired digital Chinese switching equipment for Chongjin, Najin, and Hamhung. Large quantities of new and used telephones from a number of countries increased the number of telephones to 3.7 per 100 persons by 1993. The current emphasis in the modernization program is on upgrading communications ing the Najin-Sonbong Free Trade Zone in northeast North Korea. A large communications center at Najin will be the focal point; it

will be equipped with digital switching and other modern equipment and will offer modern communication services to businesses operating in the zone. Vastly improved communications between the Free Trade Zone and other countries will include fiber-optic cable and a digital microwave relay link between Pyongyang, Najin, and Vladivostok, with a shorter link between Najin and Hunchun, China. Additional plans for the Free Trade Zone include construction of a satellite earth station, as well as communication center branches, in the zone. There are more than a dozen leader’s residences in North Korea, according to Kim Jong-il’s former bodyguard Lee Young-kuk. Many of the residences were identified on satellite images in the North Korea Uncovered project. Ryongsong Residence is the central residence of Kim Jong-un. All residences are kept secret by the North Korean government and few photographs exist. We have entered the computer systems in each of these residences and garnered very vital information regarding back s, banks, and off-shore locations of secret s including Switzerland and the Philippines. We have completed a $81,000,000.00 wire transfer with the authorization of the Chairman, Kim Jongun. He will find out about the transfer after the fact. We transferred the 81 million to 1 specific offshore . From this offshore we will transfer set amounts to various other offshore s in locations throughout the world. From these s we will donate anonymously to our non-profit, needy, and start up recipients. The transfers will be accomplished immediately to get the funds into the hands of groups that most need it and put it to good use. We have assured Kim Jong-un that in addition to hacking into his residences, all of his bank s located on the North Korean Mainland, in other countries, and offshore, we have hacked into all of North Korea’s Power Grid, and North Korea’s Military Command and Control Center. We have the ability to cause North Korea or any and all of its towns to go dark on a moment’s notice. We have installed code in the Military Command and Control computer network to cause complete havoc on a moment’s notice. We have assured Kim Jong-un that if all of the hacking by North Korea did not cease within 10 days, the off-shore wire transfer would be repeated and selective blackouts would ensue, among other Military remedies. We will repeat the $81,000,000.00 wire transfer every 10 days or until Kim Jong-un complies. We installed our logo

into their system and setup their system to print the logo on the lower right-hand corner of all financial and Military documents. They will know we are watching. We repeated our notification that we are in his system and will stay there to monitor their actions, including hacking operations, to insure they follow our instructions. The wire transfer dollars are automatically distributed to various recipients based on a pre-determined schedule. We have anonymously distributed: $10,000 to 100 Homeless shelters = $1,000,000 $10,000 to 100 food banks = $1,000,000 $10,000 to 100 domestic abuse shelters = $1,000,000 and we will continue to donate to organizations like this each month. We will continue to donate the above amounts to various charities at a rate that matches the amounts in the offshore s. As the amounts increase the number of charities and amounts donated will increase. Diversion total to date $5,542,000,000 Donation total to date $5,526,000,000

Hacking APT1, China’s Cyber Threat Actor

Because of our ability to enter any cell phone, computer, and any computer network anywhere in the world we have determined that China’s APT1’s network is the most devastating hacking organization in China. We have discovered intrusions against nearly 500 victims over ten years. We tracked APT1 back to four large networks in Shanghai, two of which are allocated directly to the Pudong New Area. We uncovered a substantial amount of APT1’s attack infrastructure, command and control, and modus operandi (tools, tactics, and procedures). In an effort to underscore there are actual individuals behind the keyboard, we have identified three personas we have attributed to APT1. These operators, like soldiers, may merely be following orders given to them by others. APT1 is likely government-sponsored and one of the most persistent of China’s cyber threat actors. We also determined that People’s Liberation Army (PLA’s) Unit 61398 is similar to APT1 in its mission, capabilities, and resources. PLA Unit 61398 is also located in precisely the same area from which APT1 activity appears to originate. APT1 is believed to be the 2nd Bureau of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Department’s (GSD) 3rd Department, which is most commonly known by its Military Unit Cover Designator (MUCD) as Unit 61398. The nature of “Unit 61398’s” work is considered by China to be a state secret; however, we believe it engages in harmful “Computer Network Operations.” Unit 61398 is partially situated on Datong Road in Gaoqiaozhen, which is located in the Pudong New Area of Shanghai. The central building in this compound is a 130,663 square foot facility that is 12 stories high and was built in early 2007. We estimate that Unit 61398 is staffed by hundreds, and perhaps thousands of people based on the size of Unit 61398’s physical infrastructure. China Telecom provided special fiber optic communications infrastructure for the unit in the name of national defense. Unit 61398 requires its personnel to be trained in computer security and computer network operations and also requires its personnel to be proficient in the English language. APT1’s activity has been tracked to four large networks in Shanghai, two of which serve the Pudong New Area where Unit 61398 is based. APT1 has systematically stolen hundreds of terabytes of data from at least 141

organizations spanning 20 major industries, and has demonstrated the capability and intent to steal from dozens of organizations simultaneously. APT1 has a well-defined attack methodology, honed over years and designed to steal large volumes of valuable intellectual property. Once APT1 has established access, they periodically revisit the victim’s network over several months or years and steal broad categories of intellectual property, including technology blueprints, proprietary manufacturing processes, test results, business plans, pricing documents, partnership agreements, and emails and lists from victim organizations’ leadership. APT1 uses some tools and techniques that have not yet observed being used by other groups including two utilities designed to steal email — GETMAIL and MAPIGET. APT1 maintained access to victim networks for an average of 356 days. Among other large-scale thefts of intellectual property, APT1 has stolen 6.5 terabytes of compressed data from a single organization over a ten-month time period. In the last two years APT1 has established a minimum of 937 Command and Control (C2) servers hosted on 849 distinct IP addresses in 13 countries. The majority of these 849 unique IP addresses were ed to organizations in China (709), followed by the U.S. (109). In the last three years, APT1 has used fully qualified domain names (FQDNs) resolving to 988 unique IP addresses. Over the course of two years there were 1,905 instances of APT1 actors logging into their attack infrastructure from 832 different IP addresses with Remote Desktop, a tool that provides a remote with an interactive graphical interface to a system. There are three personas that are associated with APT1 activity. The first persona, “Ugly Gorilla”, Has been active in computer network operations since October 2004. His activities include ing domains attributed to APT1 and authoring malware used in APT1 campaigns. “Ugly Gorilla” publicly expressed his interest in China’s “cyber troops” in January 2004. The second persona, an actor we call “DOTA”, has ed dozens of email s used to conduct social engineering and spear phishing attacks in of APT1 campaigns. “DOTA” used a Shanghai phone number while ing these s.

The third persona, who uses the nickname “Super Hard,” is the creator or a significant contributor to the AURIGA and BANGAT malware families which we have observed APT1 and other APT groups use. “Super Hard” discloses his location to be the Pudong New Area of Shanghai. An advanced persistent threat (APT) is a network attack in which an unauthorized person gains access to a network and stays there undetected for a long period of time. The intention of an APT attack is to steal data rather than to cause damage to the network or organization. APT attacks target organizations in sectors with high-value information, such as national defense, manufacturing and the financial industry. In a simple attack, the intruder tries to get in and out as quickly as possible in order to avoid detection by the network's intrusion detection system (IDS). In an APT attack, however, the goal is not to get in and out but to achieve ongoing access. To maintain access without discovery, the intruder must continuously rewrite code and employ sophisticated evasion techniques. Some APTs are so complex that they require a full-time . An APT attacker often uses spear fishing, a type of social engineering, to gain access to the network through legitimate means. Once access has been achieved, the attacker establishes a back door. The next step is to gather valid credentials (especially istrative ones) and move laterally across the network, installing more back doors. The back doors allow the attacker to install bogus utilities and create a "ghost infrastructure" for distributing malware that remains hidden in plain sight. Although APT attacks are difficult to identify, the theft of data can never be completely invisible. Detecting anomalies in outbound data is perhaps the best way for an to discover that his network has been the target of an APT attack. Here is a very simplified explanation for how an AET works: Let's say that the words "attack" and "intrude" represent two strings of known malicious code. When an IDS identifies those strings in a request, the system intervenes and denies entry. If, however, "kaarindtuettcr" and "tittnrrakdeuac" were part of a request, the system wouldn't recognize the code as simply being the well-known malicious strings "attack" and "intrude" combined and rearranged in a new way. The IDS would not intervene and entry would be allowed. The Finnish data security vendor Stonesoft was the first to identify and report on the danger of AETs. The Community Emergency Response Team

(CERT) in Finland is working with Stonesoft and other network security suppliers to address vulnerabilities that are being exposed during testing. Metamorphic and polymorphic malware are two categories of malicious software programs (malware) that have the ability to change their code as they propagate. Metamorphic malware is rewritten with each iteration so that each succeeding version of the code is different from the preceding one. The code changes make it difficult for signature-based antivirus software programs to recognize that different iterations are the same malicious program. In spite of the permanent changes to code, each iteration of metamorphic malware functions the same way. The longer the malware stays in a computer, the more iterations it produces and the more sophisticated the iterations are, making it increasingly hard for antivirus applications to detect, quarantine and disinfect. Polymorphic malware also makes changes to code to avoid detection. It has two parts, but one part remains the same with each iteration, which makes the malware a little easier to identify. For example, a polymorphic virus might have a virus decryption routine (VDR) and an encrypted virus program body (EVB). When an infected application launches, the VDR decrypts the encrypted virus body back to its original form so the virus can perform its intended function. Once executed, the virus is re-encrypted and added to another vulnerable host application. Because the virus body is not altered, it provides a kind of complex signature that can be detected by sophisticated antivirus programs. In another example, a new key might be randomly generated with each copy to change the appearance of the encrypted virus body—but the virus decryption routine would remain constant. In either scenario, it is the static part of the code that makes it possible for an anti-virus program to identify the presence of malware. Metamorphic malware is considered to be more difficult to write than polymorphic malware. The author may use may use multiple transformation techniques, including renaming, code permutation, code expansion, code shrinking and garbage code insertion. Consequently, advanced techniques such as generic decryption scanning, negative heuristic analysis, emulation and access to virtualization technologies are required for detection.

The nefarious types looking to compromise network security are getting craftier at their trade. Case in point is the rise of Advanced Evasion Techniques (AETs), which obfuscate malicious code by slicing and dicing it into bits and pieces that arrive by different paths. Ultimately, that code re-assembles on an endpoint, where it can wreak havoc. The big problem with AETs is that they are very successful for the most part, evading the technologies deployed by Next Generation Fire-Walls (NGFWs) that are used to detect malware. What's more, AETs are often the first shot fired in a battle that s the spread of APTs, which ultimately target intellectual property and financial resources. In other words, AETs enable drive by attacks that can go unnoticed until long after the damage is done. Defending against AETs is no simple task and the obfuscation techniques employed are sophisticated enough to by the detection capabilities of many firewalls. So the first question that comes to mind becomes "how can I tell if my firewall can withstand an AET attack." China's Old-School Spies Chinese intelligence operations have long been regarded as mysterious and unfamiliar to those who witnessed the East-West intelligence contest across the Iron Curtain. The mystery remains in part because of a reluctance to examine the available record closely. Chinese officials and citizens engage all kinds of activities that can be viewed as intelligence work - from stealing intellectual property, to surveilling students to organizing overseas Chinese communities to covert influence to recruiting sources. But only some of this activity comes back to the intelligence services, the Chinese organizations charged with ing the leadership's information needs. The US espionage cases centered around Larry Wu-Tai Chin (arrested 1985), Kuo Tai-Shen (arrested 2008) and Glenn Duffie Shriver (arrested 2010) offer a window into the conduct of Chinese clandestine agent operations. They demonstrate China's capability and highlight the Chinese use of the traditional tools of espionage that are shared among most of the world's intelligence services involved running human intelligence operations. In many respects, the Chinese are not so different. Larry Wu-Tai Chin was recruited by Chinese intelligence while he was working for the US mission in Nanjing prior to the formation of the People's Republic of China in 1949. Chin continued to report to Chinese intelligence for almost forty years

until his arrest in 1985. For most of this time, he worked as a translator in various capacities, such as for the US Army in Korea helping with prisoner interrogation and later at the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Chinese intelligence may have paid him over a $1 million, but the amount of money was difficult to track through Chin's rundown rental properties and frequent gambling. Throughout the operation, Chin made several surreptitious trips into China via Hong Kong for meetings and to be recognized for his reporting. When Chin was ready to documents onward, he would mail a letter to an accommodation address in Hong Kong and that would signal a follow-on meeting at a preset time in Canada, where he would the documents to a courier. Chinese hackers have gained access to designs of more than two dozen major U.S. weapons systems, a U.S. report said on Monday, as Australian media said Chinese hackers had stolen the blueprints for Australia's new spy headquarters. Citing a report prepared for the Defense Department by the Defense Science Board, the Washington Post said the compromised U.S. designs included those for combat aircraft and ships, as well as missile defenses vital for Europe, Asia and the Gulf. Among the weapons listed in the report were the advanced Patriot missile system, the Navy's Aegis ballistic missile defense systems, the F/A-18 fighter jet, the V-22 Osprey, the Black Hawk helicopter and the F-35 t Strike Fighter. The report did not specify the extent or time of the cyber-thefts or indicate if they involved computer networks of the U.S. government, contractors or subcontractors. But the espionage would give China knowledge that could be exploited in a conflict, such as the ability to knock out communications and corrupting data, the Post said. It also could speed China's development of its defense technology. In a report to Congress this month, the Pentagon said China was using espionage to modernize its military and its hacking was a serious concern. It said the U.S. government had been the target of hacking that appeared to be "attributable directly to the Chinese government and military”. China dismissed the report as groundless. China also dismissed as without foundation a February report by a U.S. computer security company which said a secretive Chinese military unit was probably behind a series of hacking attacks targeting the United States that had stolen data from 100 companies.

In Australia, a news report said hackers linked to China stole the floor plans of a $630 million headquarters for the Australia Security Intelligence Organization, the country's domestic spy agency. The attack through the computers of a construction contractor exposed not only building layouts, but also the location of communication and computer networks, it said. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei, asked about the Australian report, said China disapproved of hacking. "China pays high attention to the cyber security issue and is firmly opposed to all forms of hacker attacks," Hong said at a daily briefing. "Since it is very difficult to find out the origin of hacker attacks, it is very difficult to find out who carried out such attacks," Hong said. "I don't know what the evidence is for media to make such kinds of reports." Repeating China's position that every country was susceptible to cyberattacks, Hong said nations should make t efforts towards a secure and open Internet. Australia security analyst Des Ball told the ABC that such information about the yet to be completed spy headquarters made it vulnerable to cyberattacks. "You can start constructing your own wiring diagrams, where the linkages are through telephone connections, through wi-fi connections, which rooms are likely to be the ones that are used for sensitive conversations, how to surreptitiously put devices into the walls of those rooms," said Ball. The building is designed to be part of an electronic intelligence gathering network that includes the United States and Britain. Its construction has been plagued by delays and cost over-runs with some builders blaming late design changes on cyberattacks. The ABC report said the Chinese hacking was part of a wave of cyberattacks against business and military targets in the close U.S. ally. It said the hackers also stole confidential information from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, which houses the overseas spy agency, the Australian Secret Intelligence Service, and had targeted companies, including steelmanufacturer Blue scope Steel, and military and civilian communications manufacturer Codan Ltd. The influential Greens party said the hacking was a "security blunder of epic proportions" and called for an inquiry, but the government did not confirm the breach. Prime Minister Julia Gillard said the reports were "inaccurate", but declined to say how. Despite being one of Beijing's major trade partners, Australia is seen by China as the southern fulcrum of a U.S. military pivot to the Asia-Pacific. In 2011, it agreed to host thousands of U.S. Marines in near-permanent rotation. Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei was last year barred from bidding for construction contracts on a new

Australian high-speed broadband network amid fears of cyber espionage. The Reserve Bank of Australia said in March that it had been targeted by cyberattacks, but no data had been lost or systems compromised amid reports the hackers had tried to access intelligence negotiations among a Group of 20 wealthy nations. Instead of entering the bank s of the actual cyber criminals in China, we have entered the bank s of the Chairman and his associates at the highest level in China. We have transferred 750 million dollars to our offshore s. We have warned the Chairman that if the hacking does not stop within 30 days the offshore amount would triple. We installed our logo into their system and

setup their system to print the logo on the lower right-hand corner of all financial and Military documents. They will know we are watching. Diversion total to date $6,242,000,000 Donation total to date $6,226,000,000

WRHC MOBILE DISASTER HOSPITALS

In a mass casualty event of any significant magnitude, hospitals and other traditional venues for health care will most likely be overwhelmed with patients or rendered inoperative, making it necessary to establish MOBILE DISASTER HOSPITALS (MDH's). WORLD RURAL HOSPITAL CORPORATION (WRHC), a worldwide hospital constructor and operator described in chapter 4 of “The Robin Hood Virus”, has set up a division for developing, equipping, staffing, and positioning in key areas of the United States and around the world, Mobile Disaster Hospitals. We have contracted with Ret. USMC Major D. Cordero a specialist with many years of experience in the field of disaster response and relief. Major Cordero will spearhead the creation of a new streamlined MDH team, "whose reason will be to distinguish and moderate the particular shortcomings or insufficiencies in the preparing of staffing, and arranging of the Adaptable Versatile Catastrophe Clinics (VDH) to regions home or abroad where they could/would be required the most. Major Cordero's team will create a course of action that puts into place a framework that establishes a method for putting together the equipment, staffing, supplies and logistics for our Versatile Catastrophe Clinics. This will permit us to proceed in our Helpful Help and Calamity Aid ventures far and wide, and with an abundance of caution, security forces will be deployed to provide our patients, hospitals, and staff, security and safety in times of chaos. This will allow our Helpful Help and Calamity Aid ventures staff to carry out their duties in a safe environment. Major Cordero has determined that the need exists for light-weight, highly adaptable, mobile disaster hospitals that are comprehensive in their ability to respond to Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief efforts and capable of providing Level 1 or Level 2 medical care. Benefits of the WRHC MDH include:

A. 100% portable and permits many transportation options. B. A small trained unit can easily and rapidly assemble the WRHC MDH with minimal training. C. Considered optimal for a meeting. U.S. Army Role 2 medical care facility requirements (4 and 10 bed) and providing an immediate response capability, Rapidly delivered, placed, and operating “boots on the ground” in less than 72 hours when alerted, and Far lighter and more durable than the classic Army MEUs or CASHs, and Fully integrate with t Forces operations. D. United Nations and Centers for Disease Control has proven in similar situations to have great success in the Prevention of Ebola isolation and treatment facilities in West Africa. The level of medical needed can be as minimal as a single shelter Unit for triage and first aid, to a larger MDH that mobilizes considerable resources including turnkey field hospitals capable of providing Level 1 or level 2 trauma care, personnel, medical equipment, and evacuation assets. WRHC MDH's have been used around the world and in locations where: A. Topographical factors such as terrain and road conditions make it difficult to access for in the deployment of trailers or ISO container-based hospitals for the medical needs to patients in a timely fashion, and medical infrastructure is either non-existent, has deteriorated or been compromised as a result of man-made or natural disasters, and emergencies or mass casualty situations are occurring. B. Medical facilities from WRHC can be reconfigured and adapted to meet the ever-changing needs of providing medical care or specialized treatment following a disaster or emergency, and on the battlefield provide critical care for wounded soldiers. Unlike specialized medical trailers and expandable hospital containers that have ‘fixed’ medical equipment intended to meet specific medical needs, A WRHC MDH can be customized with an assortment of modular health care packages, medical equipment, and supplies that seamlessly integrate with our medical shelter systems but are not fixed to the fabric structure. This allows the same WRHC MDH to be reconfigured for mobile emergency rooms, mobile trauma

centers, command and control centers, medical facilities for hospital surge capacity, as well as portable outpatient clinics. The WRHC MDH is designed, to be rapidly deployed to the scene of a disaster or used to provide medical services in a remote part of the world. Engineered, and made in the USA, using the highest quality materials, strict quality control processes, and utilizing lean manufacturing techniques to reduce waste. WRHC MDH's are engineered for durability, and undergo rigorous setup and strike testing, to ensure our modular building systems can withstand the demands of several setup cycles without mechanical failure, each medical shelter system is tested according to mil-spec tests, both in the field and by government and independent laboratory testing facilities. All WRHC MDH's utilize a fabric membrane tensioned over a metal frame system. The fabric membrane is made using a proprietary blend of materials that will not rot, is mold and mildew resistant, UV stabilized for prolonged exposure to high solar loads, offers a greater abrasion resistance compared to other PVC (polyvinyl chloride) or PE (polyethylene) based covers, has been tested to withstand temperatures as low as -80°F to +130°F, and exceeds the fire safety requirement outlined in The Code of Federal Regulations. WRHC MDH can be made of galvanized steel or lightweight aircraft-grade aluminum. All WRHC MDH medical shelters can be securely anchored to virtually any level surface, including wood platforms, asphalt, and concrete. Optional sub-flooring is available for deployments to locations with gravel, dirt, or grass surfaces. Once set up, a WRHC MDH is virtually maintenance-free, however a contingent of maintenance engineers will deliver, set up, and maintain the WRHC MDH's emergency shelters, allowing first responders, governments, and aid organizations to focus on the medical mission. Expandable hospital containers have similar handling requirements to shipping containers and are considered ‘intermodal’, allowing setup crews different modes of transportation to move and remove them, such as rail, ship, truck, or airlift. As the name suggests, expandable hospital containers employ a design where the sides of the container fold out to create a larger interior space. The expanding sides of the hospital container are typically made of fabric or metal.

Disasters can happen at any moment anywhere in the world, typically the logistics for the sourcing and securing a movement of current heavier, bulker, emergency units, is typically more expensive, compared to the transportation efficiency or reduced cost of shipping a WRHC MDH made using engineered fabric structures. A critical point to be addressed is, the placement of storage sites in centralized areas in the USA, and Abroad in Europe, The Middle East, Asia, and Africa, with the proper equipment to locate and construct the WRHC MDH's emergency shelters, in Urban, Rural, or Remote locations in the event of a major disaster. As expressed before with reconfigured design and construction of our WRHC MDH's produced using condition of workmanship built texture structures will allow immediate access to our disaster Strike teams, composed of specialists on call, from many locations in the event of a major disaster, or crises anywhere in the world. With our lighter modular WRHC MDH's, Medical shelters and disaster response strike teams are capable of being set up in significantly less time than the 24-hour response time recommended by WHO. The U.S. Air Force Expeditionary Medical , United States Navy Medical Corps, and U.S. Army Combat Hospital programs use WRHC MDH's around the world for military and civilian applications. U.S. Navy hospital ships USNS Mercy and USNS Comfort will be used to reserve in a role for overwhelming injured casualties. The following are some of the applications for WRHC MDH's: Disaster Response, First Aid Shelters Triage Surgical Centers Treatment/ICU Ward Beds & Convalescence Hospital Surge/Expansion Negative Pressure Isolation

Ebola Treatment Pre-Evacuation Stabilization Postoperative Care Pharmacy Mobile Morgue Combat Field Hospitals The fabric structure of the WRHC MDH is designed to provide a clean, safe, and scalable environment to all levels of medical and health care needs, including isolation and treatment facilities for infectious diseases, hospital staff housing, mobile command centers, and more. They consist of 10 interconnected fabric structures for: A. 21-bed Emergency Department with x-ray unit, clinical lab, medical supply unit, pharmacy, and logistic unit. B. 12 bed ICU with medical supply and logistic unit. C. 2 Operating Rooms with surgical processing, medical supply, and logistic unit. D. 1 Operating Room with C-Arm and Operating Microscope. E. 6 Bed Pre/Post Op. F. 1 Rapid Response Unit. SITE REQUIREMENTS: A. Outside site; a large, well-drained, flat, hard surface and is clear overhead. B. Good access roads and be near a major highway.

C. Deep Water Port with berthing capabilities for USN Hospital Ships, and offloading WRHC MDH equipment, and strike team personal, when Naval access is required. D. Airplane and helicopter landing zones, capable of placing t bulk petroleum and water filtration depot's. In the event of long-term deployments are required, the capacity to integrate with water, sewage, and electrical power frameworks. Capitalizing on WRHC MDH's flexible disaster-relief scalable and modular design, Modular units can be expedited by land, air, and sea, into urban, rural, and the remotest inaccessible places, within hours of a disaster. PARTNERSHIPS: The Mobile Disaster Hospital has created a partnership bringing federal, state, and private organizations together in response to critical needs during a disaster. The WRHC MDH deploys a Medical Strike Team that includes logistic and clinical technical advisors, whose purpose and goal is managing patients under relatively austere conditions, with only limited supplies, & equipment. The WRHC MDH and USN Hospital Ships (When required) will serve as a primary triage point, helping to designate critical patients requiring immediate hospitalization, and home medical treatment, and palliative care for patients that may require observational care and minimal intervention. The design of the WRHC MDH allows the OR suite and the Shock Trauma Center to share, operating rooms within the MDH will mark the newest way to perform surgery, with MDH fully-wired rooms will contain a sterile environment, computers, X-ray capability online, voice control lights, laparoscopic cameras, and video-enhanced whiteboards, and recovery and sterile areas. And for efficiency, radiology/catheter lab to a conventional operating room, allowing surgeons to operate if a patient's condition deteriorates or presents an option for a combination angioplasty and open technique, without moving the patient. Another room will be copper shielded to prepare for a portable intraoperative MRI.

Each OR will use high-definition flat display screens for crisper details and greater Videoscopic control in the body cavity. The screens will be moveable and can be placed for more optimal use by the surgical team. The Chiefs of Surgery, Nursing, and Medicine, at the local level, will have 24-hour access via closed-circuit television to all surgeries in WRHF MDH, anywhere in the world. While today's OR is cluttered with equipment, cables, and instrumentation, the WRHF operating rooms will house bulky equipment in sterile spaces connected to the suites, allowing immediate service access without impeding traffic flow activity in the OR. With advanced video and communication technologies, WRHF suites will allow ongoing visualization and communication with all operating rooms, to offer visual access, and be alerted when a patient is, "Code Blue" and requires assistance, and when the surgical team has finished a case. WRHC MDH ER WRHC MDH emergency rooms will contain the most advanced technology available. The key function of the emergency department is primarily a triage center, visibility and accessibility are key points for the WRHF MDH emergency rooms so that staff, and possibly security personnel, can be quickly alerted in critical situations. For patients who are not critically ill and immediate access to CT scan and other radiology services are required, each WRHF MDH ER will feature a chest pain evaluation center available within the suite. WRHC MDH PATIENT ROOMS WRHC MDH patient rooms are designed with privacy and security in mind, as well as efficiency for the medical staff, and are in close proximity to the Shock Trauma Center, Operating Rooms, radiology, and the hyperbaric chamber. In the United States, and around the globe, WRHC has placed it's MDH's in mobile storage units around key airports and seaports. When alerted, WRHC can fly or transport by sea the MDH to any location in the world. Often used during tornados, hurricanes, major forest fires, and earthquakes. The

goal is to deploy within twenty-four (24) hours of mission assignment. All units can begin operations within forty-eight (48) hours. These unit’s function under the direction of the requesting host medical unit. The WRHC Medical Disaster Hospital is designed to function as a complete trauma center and, and when needed provide care for large numbers of casualties, it has the capacity to relieve medical problems created by the loss of other facilities, medications, food, services, and other features of a hostile environment. Considered optimal for meeting U.S. Army Role 2 medical care facility requirements (4 and 10 bed) and providing an immediate response capability, rapidly delivered, placed, and operating “boots on the ground” in less than 72 hours from an alert, and Far lighter and more durable than the classic Army MEUs or CASHs, and Fully integrate with t Forces operations. Proven in similar situations to HA/DR by the United Nations and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention for Ebola isolation and treatment facilities in West Africa. The WRHC MDH allows for a flexible disaster-relief response through its scalable and modular design. WRHC has positioned it's MDH's around the United States at key airports. When alerted, WRHC can fly the MDH to any location in the world. Most often it has been used during tornados, hurricanes, major forest fires, and earthquakes. The goal is to deploy within twenty-four (24) hours of mission assignment. All units can begin operations within forty-eight (48) hours. These unit’s function under the direction of the requesting host medical unit. The WRHC Medical Disaster Hospital is designed to function as a complete trauma center and, if it is ever needed to provide care for large numbers of casualties, it has the capacity to relieve medical problems created by loss of other facilities, medications, food, services, and other features of a hostile environment. Diversion total to date $6,242,000,000 Donation total to date $6,226,000,000

PREVIEW OF BOOK THREE THE ROBIN HOOD VIRUS – VALIDATION By ROBERT NERBOVIG The Robin Hood Virus is in danger. There are groups of hackers wanting to get their hands on our hardware and software. We will attempt to stop them in their tracks. We will continue to exploit our network connections in Russia, China, North Korea, and in the systems of other black hat hackers. We will also enter databases exposing world secrets such as: Large World Banks The Roswell Project The Philadelphia Experiment Area 51 Mysterious Alien Encounters Witness Protection Databases We will also provide updates on our new corporations including: World Rural Hospital Corporation DC-10 Aerial Firefighting Systems, LLC Homes for Homeless Veterans WRHC Mobile Disaster Hospitals We will also be incorporating Artificial Intelligence into The Robin Hood Virus

About the Author

About Robert Nerbovig: I have been married for 59 years to my wife Pat.I am a former active duty Marine as are my 2 sons. We live in the mountins of Arizona. I have been programming computers for business since 1970 and deg and developing web pages since 1996. I am familiar with computer viruses and the havoc they wreak. I am the 26th great great grandson of King Olaf of Norway. (Saint Olaf) Read more at robert nerbovig’s site.