Right Of Way 3l81u

1

THIRD DIVISION

their business and construct a warehouse on their property (the dominant estate), they asked for a right of way from Pedro sometime in April 1994.

APOLINARDITO C. QUINTANILLA and PERFECTA C. QUINTANILLA, Petitioners,

G.R. No. 160613 However, it appears that Pedro, who was the owner of Lot No. 3771-APresent: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CORONA,* NACHURA, and REYES, JJ.

-versus-

PEDRO ABANGAN and DARYL'S COLLECTION INTL. INC., Respondents.

1, containing an area of 1,164 square meters[5] (the servient estate) and a lot near the dominant estate, sold the same to DARYL'S on March 24, 1994,[6] and thereafter, DARYL'S constructed a warehouse over the servient estate, enclosing the same with a concrete fence.

Promulgated: February 12, 2008

Petitioners, thus, sought the imposition of an easement of right of way, six (6) meters in width, or a total area of 244 square meters, over the

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

servient estate.

RESOLUTION NACHURA, J.:

On June 21, 2000, the RTC dismissed the case for lack of merit. The RTC held that petitioners failed to establish that the imposition of the right of way Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45

was the least prejudicial to the servient estate. The RTC noted that there is already a concrete fence around the area and that six (6) meters from the

of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[2]dated April 21, 2003, which affirmed the Decision[3] of the

said concrete fence was a concrete warehouse. Thus, substantial damage and substantial reduction in area would be caused the servient estate.

Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 57 of Cebu City, dated June 21, 2000. Moreover, the RTC observed that petitioners' insistence on ing through the servient estate would make for easy and convenient access to the main This controversy flows from a case for Easement of Right of Way filed thoroughfare for their vans. Otherwise, if the right of way were to be by petitioner Apolinardito C. Quintanilla (Apolinardito) and his mother, constituted on any of the other surrounding properties, their vans would petitioner Perfecta C. Quintanilla (Perfecta) against respondent Pedro have to make a turn. On this premise, the RTC opined that mere convenience Abangan (Pedro) and respondent Daryl's Collection International, Inc. to the dominant estate was not necessarily the basis for setting up a (DARYL'S). compulsory easement of right of way. Sometime in the 1960s, Perfecta bought Lot No. 3771-B-1-A, with an Aggrieved, petitioners went to the CA on appeal. area of 2,244 square meters, located at Inayawan, Cebu City (the dominant estate) from one Dionisio Abasolo, who formerly owned all the properties

In its Decision dated April 21, 2003, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision,

therein. Thereafter, Perfecta donated the dominant estate to Apolinardito,

holding that the criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must

who is now the ed owner thereof.[4] Petitioners own QC Rattan Inc., a

prevail over the shortest distance. A longer way may, thus, be established to

domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture and export of rattan-

avoid injury to the servient tenement, such as when there are constructions

made furniture. In the conduct of their business, they use vans to haul and

or walls which can be avoided by a round-about way,[7] as in this case.

transport raw materials and finished products. As they wanted to expand

2

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[8] but the same was denied in [9]

the CA Resolution dated September 24, 2003.

have

adequate

ingress

to

or

egress

from

the

dominant estate by ing through other surrounding vacant lots. Lastly, DARYL'S points out that when Perfecta bought the dominant estate from

Hence, the instant petition based on the following grounds: a) IN A COMPULSORY EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY, AS SET FORTH IN THE PRECONDITIONS UNDER ARTICLES 649[10] AND 650[11] OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE, THE DETERMINATION OF THE LEAST PREJUDICIAL OR LEAST DAMAGE TO THE SERVIENT ESTATE SHOULD BE AT THE TIME OF THE FILING OF THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT AND NOT AFTER THE FILING, ESPECIALLY WHEN THE OWNER OF THE SERVIENT ESTATE IS GUILTY OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS CONSIDERED AS THE GREATEST OF ALL POSSIBLE WRONGS OR BAD FAITH BY CONSTRUCTING A CONCRETE FENCE AND WAREHOUSE THEREON THROUGH MISREPRESENTATION TO THE OFFICE OF THE CEBU CITY BUILDING OFFICIAL THAT IT HAD GRANTED A RIGHT OF WAY OF SIX (6) METERS TO PETITIONERS; AND b) WHETHER OR NOT COMPLIANCE WITH THE PRECONDITIONS SET FORTH IN ARTICLES 649 AND 650 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE IS SUPERIOR TO THE “MERE CONVENIENCE RULE AGAINST THE OWNER OF THE DOMINANT ESTATE.”

Dionisio Abasolo, the surrounding lots were also owned by the latter.[15]

For his part, Pedro manifests that he is adopting all the defenses invoked by DARYL'S in the belief that he is no longer a party to the instant case as he had already sold the servient estate to DARYL'S and a title already issued in the latter's name.[16] The instant petition lacks merit. We hold that Apolinardito as owner of the dominant estate together with Perfecta failed to discharge the burden of proving the existence and concurrence of all the requisites in order to validly claim a compulsory right of way against respondents.[17]

It should be ed that to be entitled to a legal easement of right of way, the following requisites must be satisfied: (1) the dominant estate is

Petitioners claim that DARYL'S constructed the concrete fence only after

surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public

petitioners filed the case for an Easement of Right of Way against Pedro

highway; (2) proper indemnity has been paid; (3) the isolation was not due to

on May 27, 1994. They submit that the criterion of least prejudice should be

acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; and (4) the right of way

applied at the time of the filing of the original complaint; otherwise, it will be

claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate.[18]

easy for the servient estate to evade the burden by subsequently constructing structures thereon in order to increase the damage or

The fourth requisite is absent.

prejudice.[12] Moreover, they pointed out that a Notice of Lis Pendens was annotated on Pedro's title. Thus, petitioners aver that DARYL'S is in bad faith and is guilty of abuse of rights as provided under Article 19[13] of the New Civil Code.[14]

On the other hand, DARYL'S counters that petitioners belatedly imputed bad faith to it since petitioners' pre-trial brief filed with the RTC contained no allegation of bad faith or misrepresentation. Moreover, DARYL'S reiterates its position that establishing a right of way over the servient estate would cause substantial damage, considering that a concrete fence has already been erected thereon. Most importantly, DARYL'S submits that petitioners can

We are in full accord with the ruling of the CA when it aptly and judiciously held, to wit: As provided for under the provisions of Article 650 of the New Civil Code, the easement of right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. Where there are several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, and the easement may be established on any of them, the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage should be chosen. But if these two circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, as in the instant case,the way which will cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be the shortest. The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail over the criterion of shortest distance. The court is not bound to establish what is

3

the shortest; a longer way may be established to avoid injury to the servient tenement, such as when there are constructions or walls which can be avoided by a round-about way, as in the case at bar.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION

As between a right of way that would demolish a fence of strong materials to provide ingress and egress to a public highway and another right of way which although longer will only require a van or vehicle to make a turn, the second alternative should be preferred. Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law as the basis for setting up a compulsory easement. Even in the face of necessity, if it can be satisfied without imposing the easement, the same should not be imposed. Finally, worthy of note, is the undisputed fact that there is already a newly opened public road barely fifty (50) meters away from the property of appellants, which only shows that another requirement of the law, that is, there is no adequate outlet, has not been met to establish a compulsory right of way.

Such pronouncement by the CA is in line with this Court's ruling in Quimen v. Court of Appeals,[19] where we held that as between a right of way that would demolish a store of strong materials to provide egress to a public highway, and another right of way which, although longer, will only require an avocado tree to be cut down, the second alternative should be preferred.

G.R. No. 114170 January 15, 1999 PROSPERITY CREDIT RESOURCES, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and METROPOLITAN FABRICS, INC., respondents.

MENDOZA, J.: For review in this case is a decision 1 of the Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA GR. 28684-SP dated November 26, 1993 setting aside a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 95). On August 3, 1984, petitioner Prosperity Credit Resources, Inc. gave a loan to private respondent Metropolitan Fabrics, Inc. 2 To secure the payment of the loan, private respondent mortgaged to petitioner seven parcels of land located at 685 Tandang Sora Avenue, Bo. Banlat, Quezonn City. 3 The lots comprise a commercial compound with Tandang Sora Avenue as the nearest public road. By October 27, 1987, private respondent's loan amounted to P10.5 million. 4 As private respondent defaulted in the payment of the loan, petitioner foreclosed the mortgage and, in the ensuing public bidding, became the highest bidder and purchaser of the seven (7) lots subject of the mortgage.

As a rule, findings of fact of the CA, affirming those of the trial court, are generally final and conclusive on this Court.[20] While this Court has recognized several exceptions[21] to this rule, none of these exceptions finds application in this case. Ergo, we find no cogent reason and reversible error to disturb the unanimous findings of the RTC and the CA as these are amply ed by the law and evidence on record.

Later, private respondent negotiated with petitioner for the redemption of three lots covered by TCT Nos. 317705, 317706, and 317707, 5 all located on the southern and middle portions of the compound. As the reacquisition of these three lots by private respondent would leave the remaining four lots on the northwestern side without access to Tandang Sora Avenue, petitioner acceded to private respondent's request on the condition that petitioner be given a right of way on the existing private road which forms part of the area to be redeemed by private respondent. The parties' agreement was embodied in a Memorandum of Undertaking, dated September 18, 1987, the full text of which reads: 6 MEMORANDUM OF UNDERTAKING

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Court of Appeals Decision, dated April 21, 2003, and Resolution dated September 24, 2003 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

KNOW ALL MEN THESE PRESENTS: That METROPOLITAN FABRICS, INC. is the ed owner of that certain land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 317709, more particularly described as follows: A parcel of land (Lot 11 (Existing Road) of the consolidationsubdn. plan (LRC) Pes-27706, approved as a non-subdn. project, being a portion of the

4

consolidation of Lots 373-E, (LRC) Psd-16383; 377-B, Fls2163-D; 377-C-1, 2, 3, & 4 (LRC) Psd-5025; 377-C-5-A, & B, (LRC) Psd-9474; 384-A & 387-B-1, (LRC) Psd-254813; 388-A & C, Psd-30663; 388-B-1, 2, 3, 4 & 5, Psd-54827; 389-A-1, 2 & 3, 389B-l (LRC) Psd-10087; and 389-B2-C, (LRC) Psd-18842; LRC (GLRO) Rec. No. 5975) situated in the Bo. of Banlat, Quezon City, Metro Manila, Is. of Luzon . . . . . . containing of an area of FIVE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED SIXTY SEVEN (5,367) SQUARE METERS, more or less. That the above-described lot, being an existing private road, will remain open to ingress and egress for whatever kind of age in favor of PROSPERITY FINANCIAL RESOURCES, INC. or its successors-ininterest, the mortgagee of Lots 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the consolidation-subdivision plan, Pcs-27706 of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 317699, 317702, 317703, 317704, 317705, 317706 & 317707, respectively, in the name of METROPOLITAN FABRICS, INC.

. . . [T]he court finds that to deny plaintiff's application for a preliminary mandatory injunction writ would be to disregard its right of way in respect of the road lot in question, a right clearly set forth in defendant's memorandum of undertaking of September 18, 1987; indeed, no cogent reason appears to warrant treating the "for whatever kind of age" contained therein as nothing more than a useless, meaningless redundancy . . . . ACCORDINGLY, plaintiff's subject application is hereby granted and the Court hereby directs that upon the filing and approval of the corresponding injunction bond in the sum of P500,000.00, . . . . let corresponding preliminary mandatory injunction writ be issued directing defendant to allow plaintiff to proceed with its MWSS installation project over the road lot in question, to allow plaintiff's and its tenant's delivery trucks and other vehicles access to the same at any time and without undergoing unnecessary searches, and to otherwise recognize plaintiff's right of way over the said road lot, pending the termination of this litigation and/or unless a contrary order is issued by this Court . . . . 12 On March 2, 1992, the trial court issued the writ upon filing of the required bond by petitioner. 13 Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the orders granting injunction which the trial court denied. 14 However, it increased the injunction bond to P2.1 million. 15

DONE this Sep. 18, 1987 in the city of Manila. On November 7, 1991, petitioner filed an injunctive suit in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 95). Petitioner alleged that, in violation of the of the Memorandum of Agreement, private respondent refused to allow petitioner to make excavations on one side of the access road for the installation of water pipes; that it banned entry of petitioner's trucks and those of its tenants between 11:30 A.M. to 1:00 P.M. and 10:00 P.M. to 7:00 A.M.; and that it subjected the vehicles to unnecessary searches. Petitioner sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction requiring private respondent "to allow [petitioner] to proceed with the MWSS installation project over the road lot in question, to allow [petitioner's] and [its] tenants' delivery trucks and other vehicles access to the same at any time and without undergoing unnecessary searches, and to otherwise recognize [petitioner's] right of way over the said lot." 7 Petitioner prayed that, after trial, the writ be made final. On December 21, 1991, private respondent filed an answer with counterclaim, alleging that petitioner's right to undertake excavations on the access road was not provided for in the Memorandum of Undertaking. 8 As counterclaim, private respondent alleged that it was petitioner which caused damage to private respondent's tenants by undertaking, without its consent, construction works on the access road which raised its level to about a meter and caused serious flooding of the nearby buildings whenever it rained; 9 and that, as a result, its tenants demanded compensation for damage to their merchandise and equipment occasioned by the flooding. Private respondent prayed for P2.1 million as counterclaim. 10 The trial court required the parties to submit position papers in connection with petitioner's prayer for a preliminary mandatory injunction. 11 After the parties had done so, the trial court granted, on February 14, 1992, petitioner's prayer for a preliminary writ, conditioned upon the filing by petitioner of a bond in the amount of P500,000.00. The trial court said in part:

Private respondent filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals to annul the aforesaid orders, dated February 14, 1992 and March 2, 1992, of the trial court. On November 26, 1994, the appellate court granted the petition and set aside the questioned orders after finding that the trial court had acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing them. 16 Its motion for reconsideration having been denied on February 28, 1994, petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari alleging that: 17 1.

2.

3.

4.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT EXERCISED CERTIORARI POWERS TO REVERSE AN ERROR OF JUDGMENT COMMIT'I'ED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAI COURT, UPON FINDING THAT THE LOWER COURT "MISUNDERSTOOD" THE RIGHT OF HEREIN PETITIONER PROSPERITY OVER THE ROAD LOT IN QUESTION. THE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY ERRED WHEN IT APPLIED THE DOCTRINE ENUNCIATED IN RIVAS V. SEC (190 SCRA 295) DESPITE THE DIVERSITY IN FACTUAL SETTING OF THE INSTANT CASE VIS-A-VIS THAT OBTAINING IN THE CITED CASE. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT DECIDED THE MERITS OF THE MAIN CASE IN A CERTIORARI PROCEEDING PRACTICALLY RENDERING ACADEMIC THE HEARING PROPER YET TO BE CONDUCTED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT MADE FINDINGS OF FACTS ON THE BASIS OF THE REPRESENTATION AND RECITAL OF FACTS MADE IN THE MFI PETITION AND PROCEEDED TO INTERPRET THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERTAKING WITHOUT CONSIDERING FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING ITS EXECUTION WHICH WERE YET TO BE ESTABLISHED 1N A FULL BLOWN TRIAL.

The assignment of errors raises a single question: whether, in issuing a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction ordering private respondent to allow

5

petitioner to undertake excavations along the access road for the purpose of installing water pipes, the Regional Trial Court gravely abused its discretion. As held in Pelejo v. Court of Appeals, 18 to justify the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction the following must be shown: (1) that the complainant has a clear legal right; (2) that his right has been violated and the invasion is material and substantial; and (3) that there is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. The right of the complainant must be clear and unmistakable because, unlike an ordinary preliminary injunction, the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction requires the performance of a particular act or acts 19 and thus tends to do more than maintain the status quo. 20 In the case at bar, petitioner anchors its alleged right to the preliminary mandatory injunction on the Memorandum of Undertaking, dated September 18, 1987, which provides that:

ample opportunity to substantiate its allegations on this point during the trial of the case. Rule 130 §11, which petitioner invokes, is actually a rule for interpretation of documentary evidence formally offered at the trial. It does not apply to preliminary proceedings concerning the issuance of ancillary remedies. Anent petitioner's contention that the writ of certiorari does not lie because the error sought to be corrected is an error of judgment, suffice it to say that the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction despite the doubt on petitioner's right to it. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated November 26, 1993, and its resolution, dated February 28, 1994, are hereby AFFIRMED.1âwphi1.nêt SO ORDERED.

[T]he above-described lot, being an existing private road, will remain open to ingress and egress for whatever kind of age in favor of PROSPERITY FINANCIAL RESOURCES, INC. or its successors-ininterest. There is no question as to the meaning of the "ingress" and "egress.'' They give petitioner the right to use the private road as a means of entry into and exit from its property on the northwestern side of the compound. The question concerns the meaning of the phrase "for whatever kind of age." The trial court read this phrase to mean that petitioner had the right to make excavations on the side of the access road in order to install a network of water pipes. The word "age" does not, however, "clearly and unmistakably" convey a meaning that includes a right to install water pipes on the access road. The ordinary meaning of the word, as defined in Webster's Dictionary, is that it is "the act or action of ing: movement or transference from one place or point to another."21 Its legal meaning is not different. It means, according to Black's Law Dictionary, the "act of ing; transit; transition."22 To achieve a meaning such as that which petitioner proposes requires the consideration of evidence showing the parties' intention in using the word which can only be done during trial on the merits. Until such time, petitioner cannot claim to have a "clear and unmistakable" right justifying the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in this case. Thus, the trial court should have observed caution and denied petitioner's application for the preliminary writ. Petitioner contends that resort should be made to facts surrounding the execution of the Memorandum of Undertaking which, according to it, shows the intention of the parties to give petitioner the right to install water pipes along the side of the access road. 23 It cites Rule 130 §11 24 of the 1964 Rules of Court, which provides: Sec. 11. Interpretation according to circumstances. — For the proper construction of an instrument, the circumstances under which it was made, including the situation of the subject thereof and of the parties to it, may be shown, so that the judge may be placed in the position of those whose language he is to interpret. That is precisely what we are saying. The recourse petitioner proposes must await the presentation of the parties' evidence during trial and the determination of their intention must be made by the trial court, not by this Court. Petitioner cannot circumvent the process by asking this Court to determine the facts surrounding the execution of their agreement. Indeed, for us to undertake such inquiry would be to expand the scope of the present review and intrude into the domain of the trial court. Petitioner will have

Republic of the Philippines Supreme Court Manila

SECOND DIVISION

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner,

- versus -

YUNITA TUAZON, ROSAURO TUAZON and MARIA TERESA TUAZON, Respondents.

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6

DECISION The respondents are co-owners of a 136,736-square-meter coconut land[4] in Barangay Sta. Cruz, Tarangnan, Samar. The land has been BRION, J.: declared for tax purposes in the name of the respondents’ predecessor-ininterest,

the

late

Mr.

Pascual

Tuazon.

Sometime

in

1996,

NAPOCOR[5] installed transmission lines on a portion of the land for its 350 This is a petition for review filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,

KV Leyte-Luzon HVDC

Power

TL

Project. In

the

process,

several

seeking the reversal of the decision[1] (dated March 15, 2010) of the Court of Appeals (CA)[2] in CA-G.R. CV No. 82480, which set aside the order[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarangnan, Samar, Branch 40, and remanded

improvements on the land were destroyed. Instead of initiating expropriation proceedings, however, NAPOCOR entered into a mere right-of-

the case back to the RTC for determination of just compensation. The RTC

way agreement[6] with Mr. Tuazon for the total amount of TWENTY SIX

had dismissed the complaint of respondents Yunita Tuazon, Rosauro Tuazon

THOUSAND

and Maria Teresa Tuazon against the National Power Corporation

PESOS (P26,978.21). The amount represents payments for “damaged

(NAPOCOR) for payment of just compensation and damages.

NINE

HUNDRED

SEVENTY

EIGHT

and

21/100

improvements” (P23,970.00), “easement and tower occupancy fees” (P1,808.21), and “additional damaged improvements” (P1,200.00).

ANTECEDENTS In 2002, the respondents filed a complaint against NAPOCOR for just compensation and damages, claiming that no expropriation proceedings The antecedent facts are not in dispute.

were made and that they only allowed NAPOCOR entry into the land after being told that the fair market value would be paid. They also stated that lots similarly located in Catbalogan, Samar, likewise utilized by NAPOCOR for the similar

projects,

from P2,000.00

were

paid

to P2,200.00

just per

compensation square

meter,

in

sums

pursuant

ranging to

the

determination made by different branches of the RTC in Samar.

Instead of filing an answer, NAPOCOR filed a motion to dismiss based on the full satisfaction of the respondents’ claims. The RTC granted the motion in this wise:

ORDER

7

Acting on the Motion to Dismiss and the Opposition thereto and after a very careful study of the arguments raised by the Parties, the court resolves in favor of the Defendant. Accordingly, the Court hereby orders the DISMISSAL of this case without costs.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Order dated February 3, 2004 of the RTC, Br. 40, Tarangnan, Samar is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The instant case is herebyREMANDED to the RTC, Br. 40 of Tarangnan, Samar for the proper determination of just compensation.[13]

IT IS SO ORDERED. The Petition Tarangnan, Samar, Philippines, February 3, 2004. The present petition reiterates that by installing transmission lines, NAPOCOR did not expropriate the respondents’ land, but merely established a The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals

right-of-way easement over it. The petition relies heavily on the lack of

The respondents filed an ordinary appeal with the CA. In its Appellee’s Brief, NAPOCOR denied that expropriation had occurred. Instead, it claimed to have lawfully established a right-of-way easement on the land per its agreement with Mr. Tuazon, which agreement is in accord with its charter, Republic Act No. (R.A.) 6395. NAPOCOR maintained that Section 3-A(b) of R.A. 6395 gave it the right to acquire a right-of-way easement upon payment of “just compensation” equivalent to not more than 10% of the market value of a private lot traversed by transmission lines.[8]The CA disagreed with the RTC. Citing National Power Corporation v. Hon. Sylvia G. Aguirre-Paderanga, etc., et al.[9] and National Power Corporation v. Manubay Agro-Industrial Development Corporation,[10] the CA pointed out that the demolition of the improvements on the land, as well as the installation of transmission lines thereon, constituted “taking” under the power of eminent domain, considering that transmission lines are hazardous and restrictive of the land’s use for an indefinite period of time. Hence, the CA held that the respondents were entitled, not just to an easement fee, but to just compensation based on the full market value of the respondents’ land. Citing Export Processing Zone Authority v. Hon. Ceferino E. Dulay, etc., et al.,[11] the CA maintained that NAPOCOR “cannot hide behind the mantle of Section 3-A(b) of R.A. 6395 as an excuse of dismissing the claim of appellants” since the determination of just compensation is a judicial function. “No statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court’s findings,”[12] the CA added. The dispositive of the assailed decision reads:

transfer of the land’s title or ownership. NAPOCOR maintains that since the respondents’ claim involved an easement, its charter — a special law — should govern in accordance with Article 635 of the Civil Code.[14] NAPOCOR insists that its agreement with the respondents’ predecessor-in-interest and the easement fee that was paid pursuant thereto were authorized by its charter and are, thus, valid and binding. Finally, the petitioner alleges that establishing right-ofway easements over lands traversed by its transmission lines was the “only mode” by which it could “acquire” the properties needed in its power generation and distribution function. It claims that R.A. 8974,[15] specifically its implementing rules, s this position.

THE COURT’ RULING

We find the petition devoid of merit and AFFIRM the remand of the case to the RTC for the determination of just compensation. In sum, after establishing that NAPOCOR’s acquisition of the right-of-way easement over the portion of the appellant’s land was a definite taking under the power of eminent domain, NAPOCOR is liable to pay appellants [referring to the respondents herein] just compensation and not only easement fee.

The petitioner pleads nothing new. It essentially posits that its liability is limited to the payment of an easement fee for the land traversed by its transmission lines. It relies heavily on Section 3-A(b) of R.A. 6395 to this position.

8

This position has been evaluated and found wanting by this Court in a plethora of cases, including Manubay[16] which was correctly cited by the CA in

upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right of way.”

the assailed decision.

In Manubay,[17] NAPOCOR sought the reversal of a CA decision that affirmed the payment, as ordered by the RTC in Naga City, of the full value of a property traversed by NAPOCOR’s transmission lines for its 350 KV Leyte-Luzon HVDC Power Transmission Project. Through then Associate Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, the Court —echoing the 1991 case of National Power Corporation v. Misericordia Gutierrez, et al.[18] —

True, an easement of a right of way transmits no rights except the easement itself, and respondent retains full ownership of the property. The acquisition of such easement is, nevertheless, not gratis. As correctly observed by the CA, considering the nature and the effect of the installation power lines, the limitations on the use of the land for an indefinite period would deprive respondent of normal use of the property. For this reason, the latter is entitled to payment of a just compensation, which must be neither more nor less than the monetary equivalent of the land.

formulated the doctrinal issue in Manubay,[19] as follows:

How much just compensation should be paid for an easement of a right of way over a parcel of land that will be traversed by high-powered transmission lines? Should such compensation be a simple easement fee or the full value of the property? This is the question to be answered in this case.[20]

In holding that just compensation should be equivalent to the full value of the land traversed by the transmission lines, we said:

Granting arguendo that what petitioner acquired over respondent’s property was purely an easement of a right of way, still, we cannot sustain its view that it should pay only an easement fee, and not the full value of the property. The acquisition of such an easement falls within the purview of the power of eminent domain. This conclusion finds in similar cases in which the Supreme Court sustained the award of just compensation for private property condemned for public use. Republic v. PLDT held thus:

Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss. The word “just” is used to intensify the meaning of the word “compensation” and to convey thereby the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample.

In eminent domain or expropriation proceedings, the just compensation to which the owner of a condemned property is entitled is generally the market value. Market value is “that sum of money which a person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefore.”[21] (Emphasis ours; citations omitted.)

We find it significant that NAPOCOR does not assail the applicability of Manubay[22] in the present case. Instead, NAPOCOR criticizes the application of Gutierrez[23]which the CA had cited as authority for the doctrine that eminent domain may also “be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and

“x x x. Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why the said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden

possession.”[24] NAPOCOR assails Gutierrez[25] as irrelevant on the ground that the expropriation proceedings were instituted in January 1965, when the NAPOCOR Charter had not been amended with the insertion of Section 3-

9

A(b) in 1976.[26] To NAPOCOR, Section 3-A(b) provides for a “fixed formula in

The determination of just compensation in expropriation cases is a

the computation of just compensation in cases of acquisition of easements of

function addressed to the discretion of the courts, and may not be usurped

right-of-way.” Heavily relying on Section 3-A(b), therefore, NAPOCOR argues:

by any other branch or official of the government.[35] This judicial function has constitutional raison d’être; Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that no private property shall be taken for public use without payment of just

Absent any pronouncement regarding the effect of Section 3-A (b) of R.A. 6395, as amended, on the computation of just compensation to be paid to landowners affected by the erection of transmission lines, NPC v. Gutierrez, supra, should not be deemed controlling in the case at bar.[27] We do not find NAPOCOR’s position persuasive.

The application of Gutierrez[28] to the present case is well taken. The facts and issue of both cases are comparable.[29] The right-of-way easement in the case similarly involved transmission lines traversing privately owned land. It likewise held that the transmission lines not only endangered life and limb, but restricted as well the owner’s use of the land traversed. Our pronouncement in Gutierrez[30] — that the exercise of the

compensation. In National Power Corporation v. Santa Loro Vda. de Capin, et al.,[36] we noted with approval the disquisition of the CA in this matter:

The [herein petitioner] vehemently insists that its Charter [Section 3A (b) of R.A. 6395] obliges it to pay only a maximum of 10% of the market value declared by the owner or or anyone having legal interest in the property, or such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower. To uphold such a contention would not only interfere with a judicial function but would also render as useless the protection guaranteed by our Constitution in Section 9, Article III of our Constitution that no private property shall be taken for public use without payment of just compensation.

power of eminent domain necessarily includes the imposition of right-of-way easements upon condemned property without loss of title or possession[31] — therefore remains doctrinal and should be applied.[32] The same principle further resolves NAPOCOR’s contention that R.A. 8974, specifically its implementing rules, s NAPOCOR’s claim that NAPOCOR’s protest against the relevancy of Gutierrez, heavily relying as it does on the supposed conclusiveness of Section 3-A(b) of R.A. 6395 on just compensation due for properties traversed by transmission

it is liable to the respondents for an easement fee, not for the full market value of their land. We amply addressed this same contention in Purefoods[37] where we held that:

lines, has no merit. We have held in numerous cases that Section 3-A(b) is not conclusive upon the courts.[33] In National Power Corporation v. Maria Bagui, et al.,

[34]

we categorically held:

Moreover, Section 3A-(b) of R.A. No. 6395, as amended, is not binding on the Court. It has been repeatedly emphasized that the determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function and that any valuation for just compensation laid down in the statutes may serve only as a guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation but it may not substitute the court's own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. (Citations omitted.)

While Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 6395, as amended, and the implementing rule of R.A. No. 8974 indeed state that only 10% of the market value of the property is due to the owner of the property subject to an easement of right-of-way, said rule is not binding on the Court. Well-settled is the rule that the determination of “just compensation” in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. In Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay, the Court held that any valuation for just compensation laid down in the statutes may serve only as guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation but it may not substitute the court's own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. The executive department or the

10

legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court's findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the "justness" of the decreed compensation. (Citations omitted.)

That the respondents’ predecessor-in-interest did not oppose the installation of transmission lines on their land is irrelevant. In the present petition, NAPOCOR insinuates that Mr. Tuazon’s failure to oppose the instillation now estops the respondents from their present claim.[38] This

land as just compensation. We so ruled in National Power Corporation v. Benjamin Ong Co,[40] and we reiterate this ruling today:

As earlier mentioned, Section 3A of R.A. No. 6395, as amended, substantially provides that properties which will be traversed by transmission lines will only be considered as easements and just compensation for such right of way easement shall not exceed 10 percent of the market value. However, this Court has repeatedly ruled that when petitioner takes private property to construct transmission lines, it is liable to pay the full market value upon proper determination by the courts. (Citations omitted.)

insinuation has no legal basis. Mr. Tuazon’s failure to oppose cannot have the effect of thwarting the respondents’ right to just compensation. In Rafael C. de Ynchausti v. Manila Electric Railroad & Light Co., et al.,[39] we ruled: WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the present petition for review and AFFIRM the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals, “The owner of land, who stands by, without objection, and sees a public railroad constructed over it, can not, after the road is completed, or large expenditures have been made thereon upon the faith of his apparent acquiescence, reclaim the land, or en its use by the railroad company. In such case there can only remain to the owner a right of compensation.” (Goodin v. Cin. And Whitewater Canal Co., 18 Ohio St., 169.)

“One who permits a railroad company to occupy and use his land and construct its road thereon without remonstrance or complaint, cannot afterwards reclaim it free from the servitude he has permitted to be imposed upon it. His acquiescence in the company's taking possession and constructing its works under circumstances which made imperative his resistance, if he ever intended to set up illegality, will be considered a waiver. But while this presumed waiver is a bar to his action to dispossess the company, he is not deprived of his action for damages for the value of the land, or for injuries done him by the construction or operation of the road.” (St. Julien v. Morgan etc., Railroad Co., 35 La. Ann., 924.)

promulgated on March 15, 2010, in CA-G.R. CV No. 82480.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines Supreme Court Manila FIRST DIVISION

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner,

G.R. No. 165828 Present:

- versus -

HEIRS OF MACABANGKIT SANGKAY, namely: CEBU, BATOWA-AN, SAYANA, NASSER, MANTA, EDGAR, PUTRI , MONGKOY*, and AMIR, all surnamed MACABANGKIT, Respondents.

CORONA, C.J., Chairperson, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO, and VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. Promulgated:

August 24, 2011 x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x DECISION

In sum, we categorically hold that private land taken for the installation of transmission lines is to be paid the full market value of the

BERSAMIN, J.:

11

Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. – Section 9, Article III, 1987 Constitution

Development Center; that such rejection had been followed by the withdrawal by Global Asia Management and Resource Corporation from developing the land into a housing project for the same reason; that Al-

The application of this provision of the Constitution is the focus of this

Amanah Islamic Investment Bank of the Philippines had also refused to accept their land as collateral because of the presence of the underground

appeal.

tunnel; that the underground tunnel had been constructed without their Petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC) seeks the review

knowledge and consent; that the presence of the tunnel deprived them of

on certiorari of the decision promulgated on October 5, 2004,[1] whereby the

the agricultural, commercial, industrial and residential value of their land;

Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision dated August 13, 1999 and the

and that their land had also become an unsafe place for habitation because

supplemental decision dated August 18, 1999, ordering NPC to pay just

of the loud sound of the water rushing through the tunnel and the constant

compensation to the respondents, both rendered by the Regional Trial Court,

shaking of the ground, forcing them and their workers to relocate to safer

Branch 1, in Iligan City (RTC).

grounds.

Antecedents

In its answer with counterclaim,[4] NPC countered that the Heirs of Macabangkit had no right to compensation under section 3(f) of Republic Act

Pursuant to its legal mandate under Republic Act No. 6395 (An Act

No. 6395, under which a mere legal easement on their land was established;

Revising the Charter of the National Power Corporation), NPC undertook the

that their cause of action, should they be entitled to compensation, already

Agus River Hydroelectric Power Plant Project in the 1970s to generate

prescribed due to the tunnel having been constructed in 1979; and that by

electricity for Mindanao. The project included the construction of several

reason of the tunnel being an apparent and continuous easement, any action

underground tunnels to be used in diverting the water flow from the Agus

arising from such easement prescribed in five years.

River to the hydroelectric plants.[2] Ruling of the RTC

On November 21, 1997, the respondents, namely: Cebu, Bangowa-an, On July 23, 1998, an ocular inspection of the land that was Sayana, Nasser, Manta, Edgar, Putri, Mongkoy and Amir, all surnamed conducted by RTC Judge Mamindiara P. Mangotara and the representatives Macabangkit (Heirs of Macabangkit), as the owners of land with an area of the parties resulted in the following observations and findings: of 221,573 square meters situated in Ditucalan, Iligan City, sued NPC in the RTC for the recovery of damages and of the property, with the alternative

a.

That a concrete post which is about two feet in length from the ground which according to the claimants is the middle point of the tunnel.

b.

That at least three fruit bearing durian trees were uprooted and as a result of the construction by the defendant of the tunnel and about one hundred coconuts planted died.

c.

That underground tunnel was constructed therein.[5]

prayer for the payment of just compensation.[3] They alleged that they had belatedly discovered that one of the underground tunnels of NPC that diverted the water flow of the Agus River for the operation of the Hydroelectric Project in Agus V, Agus VI and Agus VII traversed their land; that their discovery had occurred in 1995 after Atty. Saidali C. Gandamra, President of the Federation of Arabic Madaris School, had rejected their offer to sell the land because of the danger the underground tunnel might pose to the proposed Arabic Language Training Center and Muslims Skills

After trial, the RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiffs (Heirs of Macabangkit),[6] decreeing:

12

from 1979 due to its bad faith in concealing the construction of the tunnel from the Heirs of Macabangkit. WHEREFORE, premises considered: 1. The prayer for the removal or dismantling of defendant’s tunnel is denied. However, defendant is hereby directed and ordered: a)To pay plaintiffs’ land with a total area of 227,065 square meters, at the rate of FIVE HUNDRED (P500.00) PESOS per square meter, or a total of ONE HUNDRED THIRTEEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY TWO THOUSAND AND FIVE HUNDRED (P113,532,500.00), PESOS, plus interest, as actual damages or just compensation; b) To pay plaintiff a monthly rental of their land in the amount of THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS from 1979 up to July 1999 with 12% interest per annum; c)To pay plaintiffs the sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND (P200,000.00) PESOS, as moral damages; d) To pay plaintiffs, the sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND (P200,000.00) PESOS, as exemplary damages; e)To pay plaintiffs, the sum equivalent to 15% of the total amount awarded, as attorney’s fees, and to pay the cost. SO ORDERED.

The RTC found that NPC had concealed the construction of the tunnel

On August 18, 1999, the RTC issued a supplemental decision,[7] viz:

Upon a careful review of the original decision dated August 13, 1999, a sentence should be added to paragraph 1(a) of the dispositive portion thereof, to bolster, harmonize, and conform to the findings of the Court, which is quoted hereunder, to wit: “Consequently, plaintiffs’ land or properties are hereby condemned in favor of defendant National Power Corporation, upon payment of the aforesaid sum.” Therefore, paragraph 1(a) of the dispositive portion of the original decision should read, as follows: a)

To pay plaintiffs’ land with a total area of 227,065 square meters, at the rate of FIVE HUNDRED (P500.00) PESOS per square meter, or a total of ONE HUNDRED THIRTEEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY TWO THOUSAND AND FIVE HUNDRED (P113,532,500.00) PESOS, plus interest, as actual damages or just compensation; Consequently, plaintiffs’ land or properties are hereby condemned in favor of defendant National Power Corporation, upon payment of the aforesaid sum;

This supplemental decision shall be considered as part of paragraph 1(a) of the dispositive portion of the original decision. Furnish copy of this supplemental decision to all parties immediately.

in 1979 from the Heirs of Macabangkit, and had since continuously denied its SO ORDERED. existence; that NPC had acted in bad faith by taking possession of the subterranean portion of their land to construct the tunnel without their On its part, NPC appealed to the CA on August 25, 1999.[8] knowledge and prior consent; that the existence of the tunnel had affected the entire expanse of the land, and had restricted their right to excavate or Earlier, on August 18, 1999, the Heirs of Macabangkit filed an to construct a motorized deep well; and that they, as owners, had lost the urgent motion for execution of judgment pending appeal.[9] The RTC granted agricultural, commercial, industrial and residential value of the land.

the motion and issued a writ of execution,[10] prompting NPC to assail the writ by petition for certiorari in the CA. On September 15, 1999, the CA

The RTC fixed the just compensation at P500.00/square meter based on issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) to en the RTC from the testimony of Dionisio Banawan, OIC-City Assessor of Iligan City, to the implementing its decision. The Heirs of Macabangkit elevated the ruling of effect that the appraised value of the ading properties ranged

the CA (G.R. No. 141447), but the Court upheld the CA on May 4, 2006.[11]

from P700.00 to P750.00, while the appraised value of their affected land ranged from P400.00 to P500.00. The RTC also required NPC to pay rentals Ruling of the CA

13

NPC raised only two errors in the CA, namely I THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT NAPOCOR’S UNDERGROUND TUNNEL IN ITS AGUS RIVER HYDRO-ELECTRIC PLANT PROJECT TRAVERSED AND/OR AFFECTED APPELLEES’ PROPERTY AS THERE IS NO CLEAR EVIDENCE INDUBITABLY ESTABLISHING THE SAME II THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN GRANTING APPELLEES’ CLAIMS IN THEIR ENTIRETY FOR GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT NAPOCOR’S UNDERGROUND TUNNEL INDEED TRAVERSED APPELLEE’S PROPERTY, THEIR CAUSE OF ACTION HAD ALREADY BEEN BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION, ESTOPPEL AND LACHES

Issue

NPC has come to the Court, asg the lone error that:

THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION AND SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION OF THE COURT A QUO DIRECTING AND ORDERING PETITIONER TO PAY JUST COMPENSATION TO RESPONDENTS.

NPC reiterates that witnesses Enterone and Sacedon lacked personal knowledge about the construction and existence of the tunnel and were for that reason not entitled to credence; and that the topographic and relocation

On October 5, 2004, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC, maps prepared by Sacedon should not be a basis to prove the existence and holding that the testimonies of NPC’s witness Gregorio Enterone and of the location of the tunnel due to being self-serving. respondents’ witness Engr. Pete Sacedon, the topographic survey map, the sketch map, and the ocular inspection report sufficiently established the NPC contends that the CA should have applied Section 3(i) of Republic existence of the underground tunnel traversing the land of the Heirs of Act No. 6395, which provided a period of only five years from the date of the Macabangkit; that NPC did not substantiate its defense that prescription construction within which the affected landowner could bring a claim against already barred the claim of the Heirs of Macabangkit; and that Section 3(i) of it; and that even if Republic Act No. 6395 should be inapplicable, the action R.A. No. 6395, being silent about tunnels, did not apply, viz: of the Heirs of Macabangkit had already prescribed due to the underground As regard Section 3(i) of R.A. No. 6395 (An Act Revising the Charter of the National Power Corporation), it is submitted that the same provision is not applicable. There is nothing in Section 3(i) of said law governing claims involving tunnels. The same provision is applicable to those projects or facilities on the surface of the land, that can easily be discovered, without any mention about the claims involving tunnels, particularly those surreptitiously constructed beneath the surface of the land, as in the instant case.

tunnel being susceptible to acquisitive prescription after the lapse of 10 years

Now, while it is true that Republic Act No. 6395 authorizes NAPOCOR to take water from any public stream, river, creek, lake, spring or waterfall in the Philippines for the realization of the purposes specified therein for its creation; to intercept and divert the flow of waters from lands of riparian owners (in this case, the “Heirs”), and from persons owning or interested in water which are or may be necessary to said purposes, the same Act expressly mandates the payment of just compensation.

(1) Whether the CA and the RTC erred in holding that there was an underground tunnel traversing the Heirs of Macabangkit’s land constructed by NPC; and

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the appealed Decision dated August 13, 1999, and the supplemental Decision dated August 18, 1999, are hereby AFFIRMED in toto. SO ORDERED.

[12]

pursuant to Article 620 of the Civil Code due to its being a continuous and apparent legal easement under Article 634 of the Civil Code.

The issues for resolution are, therefore, as follows:

(2) Whether the Heirs of Macabangkit’s right to claim just compensation had prescribed under section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 6395, or, alternatively, under Article 620 and Article 646 of the Civil Code.

Ruling

We uphold the liability of NPC for payment of just compensation.

14

1. Factual findings of the RTC, when affirmed by the CA, are binding

plaintiffs-appellees’ property, and the outlet channel of the tunnel is another small man-made lake. This is a sub-terrain construction, and considering that both inlet and outlet are bodies of water, the tunnel can hardly be noticed. All constructions done were beneath the surface of the plaintiffs-appellees’ property. This explains why they could never obtain any knowledge of the existence of such tunnel during the period that the same was constructed and installed beneath their property.[14]

The existence of the tunnel underneath the land of the Heirs of Macabangkit, being a factual matter, cannot now be properly reviewed by the Court, for questions of fact are beyond the pale of a petition for review on certiorari. Moreover, the factual findings and determinations by the RTC as the trial court are generally binding on the Court, particularly after the CA affirmed them.[13] Bearing these doctrines in mind, the Court should rightly dismiss NPC’s appeal.

The power cavern and the inlet and outlet channels established the presence of the underground tunnel, based on the declaration in the RTC by Sacedon, a former employee of the NPC.[15] It is worthy to note that NPC did not deny the existence of the power cavern, and of the inlet and outlet

NPC argues, however, that this appeal should not be dismissed because the Heirs of Macabangkit essentially failed to prove the existence of the underground tunnel. It insists that the topographic survey map and the rightof-way map presented by the Heirs of Macabangkit did not at all establish the presence of any underground tunnel.

channels adverted to and as depicted in the topographic survey map and the sketch map. The CA cannot be faulted for crediting the testimony of Sacedon despite the effort of NPC to discount his credit due to his not being an expert witness, simply because Sacedon had personal knowledge based on his being NPC’s principal engineer and supervisor tasked at one time to lay out the tunnels

NPC still fails to convince.

and

transmission

lines

specifically

for

the

hydroelectric

projects,[16] and to supervise the construction of the Agus 1 Hydroelectric Plant itself[17] from 1978 until his retirement from NPC.[18] Besides, he

Even assuming, for now, that the Court may review the factual findings of the CA and the RTC, for NPC to insist that the evidence on the existence of the tunnel was not adequate and incompetent remains futile. On the

declared that he personally experienced the vibrations caused by the rushing currents in the tunnel, particularly near the outlet channel.[19] Under any circumstances, Sacedon was a credible and competent witness.

contrary, the evidence on the tunnel was substantial, for the significance of The ocular inspection actually confirmed the existence of the

the topographic survey map and the sketch map (as indicative of the extent and presence of the tunnel construction) to the question on the existence of the tunnel was strong, as the CA correctly projected in its assailed decision, viz: Among the pieces of documentary evidence presented showing the existence of the said tunnel beneath the subject property is the topographic survey map. The topographic survey map is one conducted to know about the location and elevation of the land and all existing structures above and underneath it. Another is the Sketch Map which shows the location and extent of the land traversed or affected by the said tunnel. These two (2) pieces of documentary evidence readily point the extent and presence of the tunnel construction coming from the power cavern near the small man-made lake which is the inlet and approach tunnel, or at a distance of about two (2) kilometers away from the land of the plaintiffs-appellees, and then traversing the entire and the whole length of the

tunnel underneath the land of the Heirs of Macabangkit. Thus, the CA observed: More so, the Ocular inspection conducted on July 23, 1998 further bolstered such claim of the existence and extent of such tunnel. This was conducted by a team composed of the Honorable Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 01, Lanao del Norte, herself and the respective lawyers of both of the parties and found that, among others, said underground tunnel was constructed beneath the subject property.[20]

It bears noting that NPC did not raise any issue against or tender any contrary comment on the ocular inspection report.

15

2. Five-year prescriptive period under Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 6395 does not apply to claims for just compensation

The CA held that Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 6395 had no application to this action because it covered facilities that could be easily discovered, not tunnels that were inconspicuously constructed beneath the surface of the land.[21]

NPC disagrees, and argues that because Article 635[22] of the Civil Code directs the application of special laws when an easement, such as the underground tunnel, was intended for public use, the law applicable was Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 6395, as amended, which limits the action for recovery of compensation to five years from the date of construction. It

its representative, the proper authority for the execution of such work. The Corporation is hereby given the right of way to locate, construct and maintain such works over and throughout the lands owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its branches and political subdivisions. The Corporation or its representative may also enter upon private property in the lawful performance or prosecution of its business and purposes, including the construction of the transmission lines thereon; Provided, that the owner of such property shall be indemnified for any actual damage caused thereby;Provided, further, That said action for damages is filed within five years after the rights of way, transmission lines, substations, plants or other facilities shall have been established; Provided, finally, That after said period, no suit shall be brought to question the said rights of way, transmission lines, substations, plants or other facilities;

posits that the five-year prescriptive period already set in due to the construction of the underground tunnel having been completed in 1979 yet.

A cursory reading shows that Section 3(i) covers the construction of “works across, or otherwise, any stream, watercourse, canal, ditch, flume,

Without necessarily adopting the reasoning of the CA, we uphold its street, avenue, highway or railway of private and public ownership, as the conclusion that prescription did not bar the present action to recover just location of said works may require.” It is notable that Section 3(i) includes no compensation. limitation except those enumerated after the termworks. Accordingly, we consider the term works as embracing all kinds of constructions, facilities, Section 3 (i) of Republic Act No. 6395, the cited law, relevantly and other developments that can enable or help NPC to meet its objectives provides:

of developing hydraulic power expressly provided under paragraph (g) of Section 3. Powers and General Functions of the Corporation. – The powers, functions, rights and activities of the Corporation shall be the following:

(i)

xxx To construct works across, or otherwise, any stream, watercourse, canal, ditch, flume, street, avenue, highway or railway of private and public ownership, as the location of said works may require:Provided, That said works be constructed in such a manner as not to endanger life or property; And provided, further, That the stream, watercourse, canal ditch, flume, street, avenue, highway or railway so crossed or intersected be restored as near as possible to their former state, or in a manner not to impair unnecessarily their usefulness. Every person or entity whose right of way or property is lawfully crossed or intersected by said works shall not obstruct any such crossings or intersection and shall grant the Board or

Section 3.[23] The CA’s restrictive construal of Section 3(i) as exclusive of tunnels was obviously unwarranted, for the provision applies not only to development works easily discoverable or on the surface of the earth but also to subterranean works like tunnels. Such interpretation accords with the fundamental guideline in statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, so must we not.[24] Moreover, when the language of the statute is plain and free from ambiguity, and expresses a single, definite, and sensible meaning, that meaning is conclusively presumed to be the meaning that the Congress intended to convey.[25]

Even so, we still cannot side with NPC.

16

We rule that the prescriptive period provided under Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 6395 is applicable only to an action for damages, and does

Constitution to bar the recovery of just compensation for private property taken for a public use solely on the basis of statutory prescription.

not extend to an action to recover just compensation like this case. Consequently, NPC cannot thereby bar the right of the Heirs of Macabangkit to recover just compensation for their land.

Due to the need to construct the underground tunnel, NPC should have first moved to acquire the land from the Heirs of Macabangkit either by voluntary tender to purchase or through formal expropriation proceedings.

The action to recover just compensation from the State or its

In either case, NPC would have been liable to pay to the owners the fair

expropriating agency differs from the action for damages. The former, also

market value of the land, for Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 6395 expressly

known as inverse condemnation, has the objective to recover the value of

requires NPC to pay the fair market value of such property at the time of the

property taken in fact by the governmental defendant, even though no

taking, thusly:

formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking agency.

[26]

Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the

property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of the word compensation in order to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real,

(h) To acquire, promote, hold, transfer, sell, lease, rent, mortgage, encumber and otherwise dispose of property incident to, or necessary, convenient or proper to carry out the purposes for which the Corporation was created: Provided, That in case a right of way is necessary for its transmission lines, easement of right of way shall only be sought: Provided, however, That in case the property itself shall be acquired by purchase, the cost thereof shall be the fair market value at the time of the taking of such property.

substantial, full, and ample.[27] On the other hand, the latter action seeks to vindicate a legal wrong through damages, which may be actual, moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated, or exemplary. When a right is exercised in a manner not conformable with the norms enshrined in Article 19[28] and like provisions on human relations in the Civil Code,and the exercise results to the damage of another, a legal wrong is committed and the wrongdoer is held responsible.[29]

This was what NPC was ordered to do in National Power Corporation v. Ibrahim,[33] where NPC had denied the right of the owners to be paid just compensation despite their land being traversed by the underground tunnels for siphoning water from Lake Lanao needed in the operation of Agus II, Agus III, Agus IV, Agus VI and Agus VII Hydroelectric Projects in Saguiran, Lanao del Sur, in Nangca and Balo-I in Lanao del Norte and in Ditucalan and Fuentes in Iligan City. There, NPC similarly argued that

The two actions are radically different in nature and purpose. The action to recover just compensation is based on the Constitution[30] while the action for damages is predicated on statutory enactments. Indeed, the former arises from the exercise by the State of its power of eminent domain against private property for public use, but the latter emanates from the transgression of a right. The fact that the owner rather than the expropriator brings the former does not change the essential nature of the suit as an inverse condemnation,[31] for the suit is not based on tort, but on the constitutional prohibition against the taking of property without just compensation.[32] It would very well be contrary to the clear language of the

the underground tunnels constituted a mere easement that did not involve any loss of title or possession on the part of the property owners, but the Court resolved against NPC, to wit: Petitioner contends that the underground tunnels in this case constitute an easement upon the property of the respondents which does not involve any loss of title or possession. The manner in which the easement was created by petitioner, however, violates the due process rights of respondents as it was without notice and indemnity to them and did not go through proper expropriation proceedings. Petitioner could have, at any time, validly exercised the power of eminent domain to acquire the easement over respondents’ property as this power encomes not only the taking or appropriation of title to and possession of the expropriated property but likewise covers even the imposition of a mere burden upon the

17

owner of the condemned property. Significantly, though, landowners cannot be deprived of their right over their land until expropriation proceedings are instituted in court. The court must then see to it that the taking is for public use, that there is payment of just compensation and that there is due process of law.[34] 3. NPC’s construction of the tunnel constituted taking of the land, and entitled owners to just compensation

We agree with both the RTC and the CA that there was a full taking on the part of NPC, notwithstanding that the owners were not completely and actually dispossessed. It is settled that the taking of private property for public use, to be compensable, need not be an actual physical taking or appropriation.[36] Indeed, the expropriator’s action may be short of acquisition of title, physical possession, or occupancy but may still amount to a taking.[37] Compensable taking includes destruction, restriction, diminution,

The Court held in National Power Corporation v. Ibrahim that NPC was “liable to pay not merely an easement fee but rather the full compensation for land” traversed by the underground tunnels, viz: In disregarding this procedure and failing to recognize respondents’ ownership of the sub-terrain portion, petitioner took a risk and exposed itself to greater liability with the age of time. It must be emphasized that the acquisition of the easement is not without expense. The underground tunnels impose limitations on respondents’ use of the property for an indefinite period and deprive them of its ordinary use. Based upon the foregoing, respondents are clearly entitled to the payment of just compensation. Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner only occupies the sub-terrain portion, it is liable to pay not merely an easement fee but rather the full compensation for land. This is so because in this case, the nature of the easement practically deprives the owners of its normal beneficial use. Respondents, as the owner of the property thus expropriated, are entitled to a just compensation which should be neither more nor less, whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than the money equivalent of said property.[35]

or interruption of the rights of ownership or of the common and necessary use and enjoyment of the property in a lawful manner, lessening or destroying its value.[38] It is neither necessary that the owner be wholly deprived of the use of his property,[39] nor material whether the property is removed from the possession of the owner, or in any respect changes hands.[40]

As a result, NPC should pay just compensation for the entire land. In that regard, the RTC pegged just compensation at P500.00/square meter based on its finding on what the prevailing market value of the property was at the time of the filing of the complaint, and the CA upheld the RTC.

We affirm the CA, considering that NPC did not assail the valuation in the CA and in this Court. NPC’s silence was probably due to the correctness of the RTC’s valuation after careful consideration and weighing of the parties’ evidence, as follows:

Here, like in National Power Corporation v. Ibrahim, NPC constructed a tunnel underneath the land of the Heirs of Macabangkit without going through formal expropriation proceedings and without procuring their consent or at least informing them beforehand of the construction. NPC’s construction adversely affected the owners’ rights and interests because the subterranean intervention by NPC prevented them from introducing any developments on the surface, and from disposing of the land or any portion of it, either by sale or mortgage.

Did such consequence constitute taking of the land as to entitle the owners to just compensation?

The matter of what is just compensation for these parcels of land is a matter of evidence. These parcels of land is (sic) located in the City of Iligan, the Industrial City of the South. Witness Dionisio Banawan, OIC- City Assessor’s Office, testified, “Within that area, that area is classified as industrial and residential. That plaintiffs’ land is adjacent to many subdivisions and that is within the industrial classification. He testified and identified Exhibit “AA” and “AA-1”, a Certification, dated April 4, 1997, showing that the appraised value of plaintiffs land ranges from P400.00 to P500.00 per square meter (see, TSN, testimony of Dionisio Banawan, pp. 51, 57, and 71, February 9, 1999). Also, witness Banawan, testified and identified Two (2) Deeds of Sale, marked as Exhibit “AA-2” and “AA-3,*”+ showing that the appraised value of the land ading or adjacent to plaintiff land ranges from P700.00 to P750.00 per square meter. As between the much lower price of the land as testified by defendant’s witness Gregorio Enterone, and that of the City Assessor of Iligan City, the latter is more credible.

18

Considering however, that the appraised value of the land in the area as determined by the City Assessor’s Office is not uniform, this Court, is of the opinion that the reasonable amount of just compensation of plaintiff’s land should be fixed at FIVE HUNDRED (500.00) PESOS, per square meter. xxx.[41]

damages, and attorney’s fees are deleted for insufficiency of factual and legal bases

The CA upheld the RTC’s granting to the Heirs of Macabangkit of rentals of P 30,000.00/month “from 1979 up to July 1999 with 12% interest per

The RTC based its fixing of just compensation ostensibly on the prevailing market value at the time of the filing of the complaint, instead of

annum” by finding NPC guilty of bad faith in taking possession of the land to construct the tunnel without their knowledge and consent.

reckoning from the time of the taking pursuant to Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 6395. The CA did not dwell on the reckoning time, possibly because NPC did not assign that as an error on the part of the RTC.

Granting rentals is legally and factually bereft of justification, in light of the taking of the land being already justly compensated. Conformably with the ruling in Manila International Airport Authority v. Rodriguez,[44] in

We rule that the reckoning value is the value at the time of the

which the award of interest was held to render the grant of back rentals

filing of the complaint, as the RTC provided in its decision. Compensation

unwarranted, we delete the award of back rentals and in its place prescribe

that is reckoned on the market value prevailing at the time either when NPC

interest of 12% interest per annum from November 21, 1997, the date of the

entered or when it completed the tunnel, as NPC submits, would not be just,

filing of the complaint, until the full liability is paid by NPC. The imposition

for it would compound the gross unfairness already caused to the owners by

ofinterest of 12% interest per annum follows a long line of pertinent

NPC’s entering without the intention of formally expropriating the land, and

jurisprudence,[45] whereby the Court has fixed the rate of interest on just

without the prior knowledge and consent of the Heirs of Macabangkit. NPC’s

compensation at 12% per annumwhenever the expropriator has not

entry denied elementary due process of law to the owners since then until

immediately paid just compensation.

the owners commenced the inverse condemnation proceedings. The Court is more concerned with the necessity to prevent NPC from unjustly profiting

The RTC did not state any factual and legal justifications for awarding to

from its deliberate acts of denying due process of law to the owners. As a

the Heirs of Macabangkit moral and exemplary damages each in the amount

measure of simple justice and ordinary fairness to them, therefore, reckoning

of P200,000.00. The awards just appeared in the fallo of its decision. Neither

just compensation on the value at the time the owners commenced these

did the CA proffer any justifications for sustaining the RTC on the awards. We

inverse condemnation proceedings is entirely warranted.

consider the omissions of the lower courts as pure legal error that we feel bound to correct even if NPC did not submit that for our consideration. There

In National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[42] a case that

was, to begin with, no factual and legal bases mentioned for the awards. It is

involved the similar construction of an underground tunnel by NPC without

never trite to remind that moral and exemplary damages, not by any means

the prior consent and knowledge of the owners, and in which we held that

liquidated or assessed as a matter of routine, always require evidence that

the basis in fixing just compensation when the initiation of the action

establish the circumstances under which the claimant is entitled to them.

preceded the entry into the property was the time of the filing of the

Moreover, the failure of both the RTC and the CA to render the factual and

complaint, not the time of taking,[43] we pointed out that there was no taking

legal justifications for the moral and exemplary damages in the body of their

when the entry by NPC was made “without intent to expropriate or was not

decisions immediately demands the striking out of the awards for being in

made under warrant or color of legal authority.”

violation of the fundamental rule that the decision must clearly state the facts and the law on which it is based. Without the factual and legal

4. Awards for rentals, moral damages, exemplary

19

justifications, the awards are exposed as the product of conjecture and

liabilities of NPC converted the fees to extraordinary. We have to disagree

speculation, which have no place in fair judicial adjudication.

with the RTC thereon, and we express our discomfort that the CA did not do anything to excise the clearly erroneous and unfounded grant.

We also reverse and set aside the decree of the RTC for NPC to pay to the Heirs of Macabangkit “the sum equivalent to 15% of the total amount awarded, as attorney’s fees, and to pay the cost.” The body of the decision

An award of attorney’s fees has always been the exception rather

did not state the factual and legal reasons why NPC was liable for attorney’s

than the rule. To start with, attorney’s fees are not awarded every time a

fees. The terse statement found at the end of the body of the RTC’s

party prevails in a suit.[47] Nor should an adverse decision ipso facto justify an

decision, stating: “xxx The contingent attorney’s fee is hereby reduced from

award of attorney’s fees to the winning party.[48] The policy of the Court is

20% to only 15% of the total amount of the claim that may be awarded to

that no should be placed on the right to litigate.[49] Too, such fees,

plaintiffs,” without more, did not indicate or explain why and how the

as part of damages, are assessed only in the instances specified in Art.

substantial liability of NPC for attorney’s fees could have arisen

2208, Civil Code.[50] Indeed, attorney’s fees are in the nature of actual

and been determined.

damages.[51] But even when a claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his rights, attorney’s fees may still be

In assessing attorney’s fees against NPC and in favor of the

withheld where no sufficient showing of bad faith could be reflected in a

respondents, the RTC casually disregarded the fundamental distinction

party’s persistence in a suit other than an erroneous conviction of the

between the two concepts of attorney’s fees — the ordinary and the

righteousness

extraordinary. These concepts were aptly distinguished in Traders Royal Bank

makeexpress findings of fact and law that bring the suit within the exception.

Employees Union-Independent v. NLRC,[46] thuswise:

What

of

his

cause.[52] And, lastly,

this demands is

that

the

trial

the factual,

court

must

legal

or

equitable justifications for the award must be set forth There are two commonly accepted concepts of attorney’s fees, the so-called ordinary and extraordinary. In its ordinary concept, an attorney’s fee is the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services he has rendered to the latter. The basis of this compensation is the fact of his employment by and his agreement with the client. In its extraordinary concept, an attorney’s fee is an indemnity for damages ordered by the court to be paid by the losing party in a litigation. The basis of this is any of the cases provided by law where such award can be made, such as those authorized in Article 2208, Civil Code, and is payable not to the lawyer but to the client, unless they have agreed that the award shall pertain to the lawyer as additional compensation or as part thereof.

not only in the fallo but also in the text of the decision, or else, the award should be thrown out for being speculative and conjectural.[53]

Sound policy dictates that even if the NPC failed to raise the issue of attorney’s fees, we are not precluded from correcting the lower courts’ patently erroneous application of the law.[54] Indeed, the Court, in supervising

By referring to the award as contingency fees, and reducing the award from 20% to 15%, the RTC was really referring to a supposed

the

lower

courts,

possesses

the

ample authority

review legal matters like this one even if not specifically raised or assigned as error by the parties.

agreement on attorney’s fees between the Heirs of Macabangkit and their counsel. As such, the concept of attorney’s fees involved was the ordinary. Yet, the inclusion of the attorney’s fees in the judgment among the

to

5. Attorney’s fees under quantum meruit principle are fixed at 10% of the judgment award

20

receive his attorney’s fees equivalent of 15% of the judgment award,[69] and Based on the pending motions of Atty. Macarupung Dibaratun

(b) a motion to his attorney’s lien that he claimed was contingent.[70]

and Atty. Manuel D. Ballelos to assert their respective rights to attorney’s fees, both contending that they represented the Heirs of Macabangkit in this Both Atty. Dibaratun and Atty. Ballelos posited that their entitlement to case, a conflict would ensue from the finality of the judgment against NPC. attorney’s fees was contingent. Yet, a contract for a contingent fees is an agreement in writing by which the fees, usually a fixed percentage of what A look at the history of the legal representation of the Heirs of may be recovered in the action, are made to depend upon the success in the Macabangkit herein provides a helpful predicate for resolving the conflict. effort to enforce or defend a supposed right. Contingent fees depend upon an express contract, without which the attorney can only recover on the Atty. Dibaratun was the original counsel of the Heirs of Macabangkit.

basis of quantum meruit.[71] With neither Atty. Dibaratun nor Atty. Ballelos

When the appeal was submitted for decision in the CA,[55] Atty. Ballelos filed his entry of appearance,[56] and a motion for early decision.[57] Atty. Ballelos subsequently filed also a manifestation,[58] supplemental manifestation,[

presenting a written agreement bearing upon their supposed contingent fees, the only way to determine their right to appropriate attorney’s fees is to apply the principle of quantum meruit.

59]

reply,[60] and ex parte motion reiterating the motion for early decision.[61] It

Quantum meruit – literally meaning as much as he deserves – is used as basis for determining an attorney’s professional fees in the absence of an

appears that a copy of the CA’s decision was furnished solely to Atty.

express agreement.[72]The recovery of attorney’s fees on the basis

Ballelos. However, shortly before the rendition of the decision, Atty. Dibaratun filed in the CA a motion to attorney’s lien,[62] alleging that

of quantum meruit is a device that prevents an unscrupulous client from running away with the fruits of the legal services of counsel without paying

he had not withdrawn his appearance and had not been aware of the entry for it and also avoids unjust enrichment on the part of the attorney of appearance by Atty. Ballelos. A similar motion was also received by the

himself.[73] An attorney must show that he is entitled to reasonable

Court from Atty. Dibaratun a few days after the petition for review was compensation for the effort in pursuing the client’s cause, taking into filed.[63]Thus, on February 14, 2005,[64] the Court directed Atty. Dibaratun to enter his appearance herein. He complied upon filing the comment.[65]

certain factors in fixing the amount of legal fees.[74]

Rule 20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility lists the guidelines Amir Macabangkit confirmed Atty. Dibaratun’s representation through for determining the proper amount of attorney fees, to wit: an ex parte manifestation that he filed in his own behalf and on behalf of his siblings Mongkoy and Putri.[66] Amir reiterated his manifestation on March 6, 2006,[67] and further imputed malpractice to Atty. Ballelos for having filed an entry of appearance bearing Amir’s forged signature and for plagiarism, i.e., copying verbatim the arguments contained in the pleadings previously filed by Atty. Dibaratun.

[68]

On September 11, 2008, Atty. Ballelos submitted two motions, to wit: (a) a manifestation and motion authorizing a certain Abdulmajeed Djamla to

Rule 20.1 – A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining his fees: a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required; b) involved;

The novelty and difficult of the questions

c)

The important of the subject matter;

d)

The skill demanded;

e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case;

21

f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP chapter to which he belongs; g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the service; h) The compensation;

contingency

or

certainty

of

i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and j)

The professional standing of the lawyer.

that the Court must next determine and settle by considering the amount and quality of the work each performed and the results each obtained.

Atty. Dibaratun, the attorney from the outset, unquestionably carried the bulk of the legal demands of the case. He diligently prepared and timely filed in behalf of the Heirs of Macabangkit every pleading and paper necessary in the full resolution of the dispute, starting from the complaint until the very last motion filed in this Court. He consistently appeared during the trial, and examined and cross-examined all the witnesses presented at

In the event of a dispute as to the amount of fees between the attorney and his client, and the intervention of the courts is sought, the determination requires that there be evidence to prove the amount of fees and the extent and value of the services rendered, taking into the facts determinative thereof.[75] Ordinarily, therefore, the determination of the attorney’s fees on quantum meruit is remanded to the lower court for the purpose. However, it will be just and equitable to now assess and fix the

that stage of the proceedings. The nature, character, and substance of each pleading and the motions he prepared for the Heirs of Macabangkit indicated that he devoted substantial time and energy in researching and preparing the case for the trial. He even advancedP250,000.00 out of his own pocket to defray expenses from the time of the filing of the motion to execute pending appeal until the case reached the Court.[77] His representation of all the Heirs of Macabangkit was not denied by any of them.

attorney’s fees of both attorneys in order that the resolution of “a comparatively simple controversy,” as Justice Regalado put it in Traders Royal Bank Employees Union-Independent v. NLRC,[76] would not be needlessly prolonged, by taking into due consideration the accepted guidelines and so much of the pertinent data as are extant in the records.

We note that Atty. Dibaratun possessed some standing in the legal profession and in his local community. He formerly served as a member of the Board of Director of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Lanao del Norte-Iligan City Chapter, and was an IBP national awardee as Best Legal Aid Committee Chairman. He taught at Mindanao State University College of

Atty. Dibaratun and Atty. Ballelos each claimed attorney’s fees equivalent to 15% of the principal award of P113,532,500.00, which was the

Law Extension. He was a Municipal Mayor of Matungao, Lanao del Norte, and was enthroned Sultan a Gaus.

amount granted by the RTC in its decision. Considering that the attorney’s fees will be defrayed by the Heirs of Macabangkit out of their actual recovery from NPC, giving to each of the two attorney’s 15% of the principal award as attorney’s fees would be excessive and unconscionable from the point of

In contrast, not much about the character and standing of Atty. Ballelos, as well as the nature and quality of the legal services he rendered for the Heirs of Macabangkit are in the records. The motions he filed in the

view of the clients. Thus, the Court, which holds and exercises the power to fix attorney’s fees on a quantum meruit basis in the absence of an express written agreement between the attorney and the client, now fixes attorney’s fees at 10% of the principal award of P113,532,500.00. Whether it is Atty. Dibaratun or Atty. Ballelos, or both, who should receive attorney’s fees from the Heirs of Macabangkit is a question

Court and in the CA lacked enlightening research and were insignificant to the success of the clients’ cause. His legal service, if it can be called that, manifested no depth or assiduousness, judging from the quality of the pleadings from him. His written submissions in the case appeared either to have been lifted verbatim from the pleadings previously filed by Atty. Dibaratun, or to have been merely quoted from the decisions and resolutions

22

of the RTC and the CA. Of the Heirs of Macabangkit, only Cebu, Batowa-an, Sayana, Nasser, Manta, Mongkoy

[78]

(b) The

awards

of P30,000.00

and Edgar gave their consent to Atty.

fee, P200,000.00

Ballelos to appear in their behalf in the CA, which he did despite Atty.

and P200,000.00

Dibaratun not having yet filed any withdrawal of his appearance. The Court

are DELETED; and

as as

as

rental

moral

damages,

exemplary

damages

did not receive any notice of appearance for the Heirs of Macabangkit from Atty. Ballelos, but that capacity has meanwhile become doubtful in the face

(c) The award of 15% attorney’s fees decreed to be

of Amir’s strong denial of having retained him.

paid by National Power Corporation to the Heirs of Macabangkit is DELETED.

In fairness and justice, the Court accords full recognition to Atty. Dibaratun as the counsel de parte of the Heirs of Macabangkit who

The Court PARTLY GRANTS the motion to attorney’s lien filed

discharged his responsibility in the prosecution of the clients’ cause to its

by Atty. Macarupung Dibaratun, and FIXES Atty. Dibaratun’s attorney’s fees

successful end. It is he, not Atty. Ballelos, who was entitled to the full amount

on

of attorney’s fees that the clients ought to pay to their attorney. Given the

of P113,532,500.00.

the

basis

ofquantum meruit at

10%

of

the

principal

award

amount and quality of his legal work, his diligence and the time he expended in ensuring the success of his prosecution of the clients’ cause, he deserves

The motion to attorney’s lien of Atty. Manuel D. Ballelos

the recognition, notwithstanding that some of the clients might appear to

is PARTLY GRANTED, and Atty. Ballelos is DECLARED ENTITLED TO

have retained Atty. Ballelos after the rendition of a favorable judgment.[79]

RECOVER from Cebu, Batowa-an, Sayana, Nasser, Manta and Edgar, all surnamed Macabangkit, the amount of P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees on the

Atty. Ballelos may claim only from Cebu, Batowa-an, Sayana, Nasser, Manta and Edgar, the only parties who engaged him. The Court considers his

basis of quantum meruit. Costs of suit to be paid by the petitioner.

work in the case as very minimal. His compensation under the quantum meruit principle is fixed at P5,000.00, and only the Heirs of Macabangkit

SO ORDERED.

earlier named are liable to him. Republic of the Philippines WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on October

Supreme Court Baguio City

5, 2004 by the Court of Appeals, subject to the following MODIFICATIONS, to wit:

SECOND DIVISION

(a) Interest

at

the

rate

annum is IMPOSED on of P113,532,500.00

the as

of

12% per

principal

amount

just

compensation,

reckoned from the filing of the complaint on November 21, 1997 until the full liability is paid;

23

CRISPIN DICHOSO, JR., EVELYN DICHOSO VALDEZ, and ROSEMARIE DICHOSO PE BENITO, Petitioners,

- versus -

G.R. No. 180282 a portion of Lot No. 1 in accessing the road since 1970. Respondent, Present: however, blocked the ageway with piles of sand. Though petitioners CARPIO, J., have Chairperson, been granted another ageway by the spouses Benjamin and Sylvia NACHURA, Arce (Spouses Arce), the owners of another adjacent lot, designated as Lot PERALTA, ABAD, and No. 21559-B, JJ. the former instituted the complaint before the RTC and prayed MENDOZA, Promulgated: that:

PATROCINIO L. MARCOS, Respondent.

April 11, 2011

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that judgment be rendered: 1. Granting the plaintiffs’ right of way over an area of 54 square meters more or less of Lot 01 by paying the defendant the amount of P54,000.00, and that the right be annotated on defendant’s title; 2. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P30,000.00 as damages for attorney’s fees and costs of suit;

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

Other reliefs, just and equitable under the premises, are likewise sought.[5]

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Instead of filing an Answer, respondent moved[6] for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action and noncompliance with

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of

the requisite certificate of non-forum shopping.

Court, seeking to reverse and set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[1] dated January 31, 2007 and Resolution[2] dated October 23, 2007

During the hearing on respondent’s motion to dismiss, the parties

in CA-G.R. CV No. 85471. The assailed Decision reversed and set aside the

agreed that an ocular inspection of the subject properties be conducted.

July 15, 2005 decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City,

After the inspection, the RTC directed the parties to submit their respective

Branch 14, in Civil Case No. 12581-14; while the assailed Resolution denied

position papers.

the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners Crispin Dichoso, Jr., Evelyn Dichoso Valdez, and Rosemarie Dichoso Pe Benito.

In a resolution[7] dated May 12, 2004, the RTC denied respondent’s motion to dismiss and required the latter to answer petitioners’ complaint.

The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows: In his Answer,[8] respondent denied that he allowed anybody to use Lot On August 2, 2002, petitioners filed a Complaint for Easement of Right

No. 1 as ageway. He stated that petitioners’ claim of right of way is only

of Way[4] against respondent Patrocinio L. Marcos. In their complaint,

due to expediency and not necessity. He also maintained that there is an

petitioners alleged that they are the owners of Lot No. 21553 of the

existing easement of right of way available to petitioners granted by the

Cadastral Survey of Laoag City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-

Spouses Arce. Thus, there is no need to establish another easement over

31219; while respondent is the owner of Lot No. 1. As petitioners had no

respondent’s property.

access to a public road to and from their property, they claimed to have used

24

In an Order[9] dated July 6, 2005, the RTC declared that respondent’s answer failed to tender an issue, and opted to render judgment on the

Aggrieved, petitioners come before this Court, raising the following issues:

pleadings and thus deemed the case submitted for decision.

On July 15, 2005, the RTC rendered a decision[10] in favor of petitioners, the dispositive portion of which reads, as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows: 1.

granting plaintiffs a right of way over an area of 54 square meters more or less over Lot 01 owned by defendant Patrocinio L. [Marcos] appearing in the Laoag City Assessor’s sketch (Annex A) found on page 28 of the record of the case;

I. CAN PETITIONERS BE ENTITLED TO A GRANT OF LEGAL EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY FROM THEIR LANDLOCKED PROPERTY THROUGH THE PROPERTY OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT WHICH IS THE SHORTEST ROUTE IN GOING TO AND FROM THEIR PROPERTY TO THE PUBLIC STREET AND WHERE THEY USED TO ? II. CAN RESPONDENT REFUSE TO GRANT A RIGHT OF WAY ON THE DESIRED AGEWAY WHICH HE CLOSED SINCE THERE IS ANOTHER AGEWAY WHICH IS MORE CIRCUITOUS AND BURDENSOME AND IS BELATEDLY OFFERED UNTO PETITIONERS?

2.

ordering plaintiffs to pay defendant the amount of P54,000.00 as proper indemnity; and

III. CAN PETITIONERS BE COMPELLED TO AVAIL OF A LEGAL EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY THROUGH THE PROPERTY OF ARCE WHICH WAS BELATEDLY OFFERED BUT HAS BEEN FORECLOSED BY THE BANK AND WHEREIN THE LATTER IS NOT A PARTY TO THE CASE?[14]

3.

ordering the of Deeds of Laoag City to duly annotate this right of way on defendant’s title to the property.

The petition is without merit.

SO ORDERED.[11] It is already a well-settled rule that the jurisdiction of this Court in The RTC found that petitioners adequately established the

cases brought before it from the CA by virtue of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court

requisites to justify an easement of right of way in accordance with Articles

is limited to reviewing errors of law. Findings of fact of the CA are conclusive

649 and 650 of the Civil Code. The trial court likewise declared petitioners in

upon this Court. There are, however, recognized exceptions to the foregoing

good faith as they expressed their willingness to pay proper indemnity.[12]

rule, namely:

On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and consequently dismissed petitioners’ complaint. Considering that a right of

(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;

way had already been granted by the (other) servient estate, designated as (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; Lot No. 21559-B and owned by the Spouses Arce, the appellate court concluded that there is no need to establish an easement over respondent’s property. The CA explained that, while the alternative route through the property of the Spouses Arce is longer and circuitous, said access road is adequate. It emphasized that the convenience of the dominant estate is never the gauge for the grant of compulsory right of way. Thus, the opening of another ageway is unjustified.[13]

(4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when, in making its findings, the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the issions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;

25

(8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;

3. The isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; and

(9) when the facts set forth in the petition, as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs, are not disputed by the respondent; and

4. The right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.[17]

(10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.[15]

Petitioners may be correct in the theoretical reading of Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code, but they nevertheless failed to show sufficient

The present case falls under the 7th exception, as the RTC and the

factual evidence to satisfy the above-enumerated requirements.[18]

CA arrived at conflicting findings of fact and conclusions of law. It must be stressed that, by its very nature, and when The conferment of a legal easement of right of way is governed by considered with reference to the obligations imposed on the servient estate, Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code, quoted below for easy reference:[16] an easement involves an abnormal restriction on the property rights of the Article 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use any immovable, which is surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other persons and without adequate outlet to a public highway, is entitled to demand a right of way through the neighboring estates, after payment of the proper indemnity. Should this easement be established in such a manner that its use may be continuous for all the needs of the dominant estate, establishing a permanent age, the indemnity shall consist of the value of the land occupied and the amount of the damage caused to the servient estate. In case the right of way is limited to the necessary age for the cultivation of the estate surrounded by others and for the gathering of its crops through the servient estate without a permanent way, the indemnity shall consist in the payment of the damages caused by such encumbrance.

servient owner and is regarded as a charge or encumbrance on the servient estate. It is incumbent upon the owner of the dominant estate to establish by clear and convincing evidence the presence of all the preconditions before his claim for easement of right of way may be granted.[19] Petitioners failed in this regard.

ittedly, petitioners had been granted a right of way through the other adjacent lot owned by the Spouses Arce. In fact, other lot owners use the said outlet in going to and coming from the public highway. Clearly, there is an existing outlet to and from the public road.

However, petitioners claim that the outlet is longer and circuitous, This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is due to the proprietor’s own acts. Article 650. The easement of right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.

and they have to through other lots owned by different owners before they could get to the highway. We find petitioners’ concept of what is “adequate outlet” a complete disregard of the well-entrenched doctrine that in order to justify the imposition of an easement of right of way, there must be real, not fictitious or artificial, necessity for it. Mere convenience for the

To be entitled to an easement of right of way, the following requisites should be met:

dominant estate is not what is required by law as the basis of setting up a compulsory easement. Even in the face of necessity, if it can be satisfied without imposing the easement, the same should not be imposed.[20]

1. The dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; 2. There is payment of proper indemnity; We quote with approval the CA’s observations in this wise:

26

belonging to other owners, as temporary ingress and egress, which lots were As it shows, [petitioners] had been granted a right of way through the adjacent estate of Spouses Arce before the complaint below was even filed. [Respondent] alleged that this right of way is being used by the other estates which are similarly situated as [petitioners]. [Petitioners] do not dispute this fact. There is also a reason to believe that this right of way is Spouses Arce’s outlet to a public road since their property, as it appears from the Sketch Map, is also surrounded by other estates. The fact that Spouses Arce are not insisting on a right of way through respondent’s property, although an opening on the latter’s property is undoubtedly the most direct and shortest distance to P. Gomez St. from the former’s property, bolsters our conviction that they have adequate outlet to the highway which they are now likewise making available to [petitioners].

grassy, cogonal, and greatly inconvenient due to flood and mud because such grant would run counter to the prevailing jurisprudence that mere convenience for the dominant estate does not suffice to serve as basis for the easement.[25]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated January 31, 2007 and Resolution dated October 23, 2007 in CA-G.R. CV No. 85471 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. SECOND DIVISION The convenience of the dominant estate has never been the

UNISOURCE COMMERCIAL AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,

gauge for the grant of compulsory right of way. To be sure, the true standard Petitioner, for the grant of the legal right is “adequacy.” Hence, when there is already an existing adequate outlet from the dominant estate to a public highway, as in this case, even when the said outlet, for one reason or another, be inconvenient, the need to open up another servitude is entirely unjustified.[21]

- versus -

Thus, in Cristobal v. CA,[22] the Court disallowed the easement prayed for because an outlet already exists which is a path walk located at the left side of petitioners’ property and which is connected to a private road JOSEPH CHUNG, KIAT CHUNG and KLETO CHUNG, about five hundred (500) meters long. The private road, in turn, leads to Ma. Elena Street, which is about 2.5 meters wide, and finally, to Visayas Avenue. This outlet was determined by the Court to be sufficient for the

Respondents. x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

needs of the dominant estate.

DECISION QUISUMBING, J.:

Also in Floro v. Llenado,[23] we refused to impose a right of way over petitioner’s property although private respondent’s alternative route

The instant petition assails the Decision[1] dated October 27,

was ittedly inconvenient because he had to traverse several ricelands

2005 and the Resolution[2] dated June 19, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-

and rice paddies belonging to different persons, not to mention that said

G.R. CV No. 76213. The appellate court had reversed and set aside the

age is imable during the rainy season.

Decision[3] dated August 19, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 49, in Civil Case No. 00-97526.

And in Ramos v. Gatchalian Realty, Inc.,[24] this Court refused to The antecedent facts are as follows: grant the easement prayed for even if petitioner had to through lots

27

house has a very wide door accessible to Matienza St. without any obstruction. Said street is perpendicular to J.P. Laurel St.

Petitioner Unisource Commercial and Development Corporation is the ed owner of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 176253[4] of the of Deeds of Manila. The title contains a memorandum of encumbrance of a voluntary easement which has been carried over from the Original Certificate of Title of Encarnacion S. Sandico. The certified English translation[5] of the annotation reads:

It is therefore found that the dominant estate has an egress to Matienza St. and does not have to use the servient estate.[10]

By order dated 08 October 1924 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Chamber IV (AP7571/T-23046), it is declared that Francisco Hidalgo y Magnifico has the right to open doors in the course of his lot described as Lot No. 2, Block 2650 of the map that has been exhibited, towards the left of the Callejon that is used as a age and that appears as adjacent to the said Lot 2 and to through the land of Encarnacion Sandico y Santana, until the bank of the estero that goes to the Pasig River, and towards the right of the other Callejon that is situated between the said Lot 2 and Lot 4 of the same Block N.[6]

In

their

Answer,[11] respondents

countered

that

the

extinguishment of the easement will be of great prejudice to the locality and that petitioner is guilty of laches since it took petitioner 15 years from acquisition of the property to file the petition.

In a Decision dated August 19, 2002, the trial court ordered the cancellation of the encumbrance of voluntary easement of right of way in favor of the dominant estate owned by respondents. It found that the

As Sandico’s property was transferred to several owners, the

dominant estate has no more use for the easement since it has another

memorandum of encumbrance of a voluntary easement in favor of Francisco M.

adequate outlet to a public road which is Matienza Street. The dispositive

Hidalgo was consistently annotated at the back of every title covering Sandico’s

portion of the decision reads:

property until TCT No. 176253 was issued in petitioner’s favor. On the other hand, Hidalgo’s property was eventually transferred to respondents Joseph Chung, Kiat Chung and Cleto Chung under TCT No. 121488.[7]

On May 26, 2000, petitioner filed a Petition to Cancel the Encumbrance of Voluntary Easement of Right of Way[8] on the ground that

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby orders the cancellation of the Memorandum of Encumbrance annotated in TCT No. 176253 which granted a right of way in favor of the person named therein and, upon the finality of this decision, the of Deeds of the City of Manila is hereby directed to cancel said encumbrance.

the dominant estate has an adequate access to a public road which is Matienza Street. The trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that it

is

a

land

registration

case. Petitioner

moved

for

reconsideration. Thereafter, the trial court conducted an ocular inspection of the property. In an Order[9] dated November 24, 2000, the trial court granted the motion and made the following observations: 1. The dominant estate is a property enclosed with a concrete fence with no less than three (3) doors in it, opening to an alley belonging to the servient estate owned by the petitioner. The alley is leading to Matienza St.;

With respect to the other prayers in the petition, considering that the same are mere incidents to the exercise by the owners of right of their ownership which they could well do without the Court’s intervention, this Court sees no need to specifically rule thereon. The Court cannot award plaintiff’s claims for damages and attorney’s fees for lack of sufficient bases therefor.

SO ORDERED.[12]

Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. On October 27, 2005, the appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court and

2. The dominant estate has a house built thereon and said

dismissed the petition to cancel the encumbrance of voluntary easement of right of way.

28

The appellate court ruled that when petitioner’s petition was

… DISREGARDING THE CIVIL CODE PROVISION ON UNJUST ENRICHMENT.

initially dismissed by the executive judge, the copy of the petition and IV.

the summons had not yet been served on respondents. Thus, when petitioner moved to reconsider the order of dismissal, there was no need for

… TREATING THE EASEMENT AS PREDIAL.[15]

a notice of hearing and proof of service upon respondents since the trial court has not yet acquired jurisdiction over them. The trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case and over respondents only after the summons was served upon them and they were later given ample opportunity to present

Petitioner

contends

that

the

fact

that

Sandico

and Hidalgo resorted to judicial intervention only shows that they contested the existence of the requisite factors establishing a legal easement. Besides,

their evidence.

the annotation itself provides that the easement is exclusively confined to the parties mentioned therein, i.e., Sandico and Hidalgo. It was not meant to The appellate court also held that the trial court erred in canceling the encumbrance of voluntary easement of right of way. The appellate court ruled that Article 631(3)[13]of the Civil Code, which was cited by the trial court, is inapplicable since the presence of an adequate outlet to a highway extinguishes only legal or compulsory easements but not voluntary easements like in the instant case. There having been an agreement between the original parties for the provision of an easement of right of way in favor of the dominant estate, the same can be extinguished only by mutual agreement or by renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate.

The decretal portion of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the appeal is hereby GRANTED and the assailed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the petition to cancel the encumbrance of right of way is dismissed for lack of merit. No costs.

bind their heirs or assigns; otherwise, they would have expressly provided for it. Petitioner adds that it would be an unjust enrichment on respondents’ part to continue enjoying the easement without adequate compensation to petitioner. Petitioner also avers that to say that the easement has attached to Hidalgo’s property is erroneous since such property no longer exists after it has been subdivided and ed in respondents’ respective names.[16] Petitioner further argues that even if it is bound by the easement, the same can be cancelled or revoked since the dominant estate has an adequate outlet without having to through the servient estate.

Respondents adopted the disquisition of the appellate court as their counter-arguments.

The petition lacks merit.

As defined, an easement is a real right on another’s property, [14]

SO ORDERED.

corporeal and immovable, whereby the owner of the latter must refrain from doing or allowing somebody else to do or something to be done on his property, for the benefit of another person or tenement. Easements are

Before us, petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in: I. … BRUSHING ASIDE PETITIONER’S CONTENTION THAT THE EASEMENT IS PERSONAL SINCE THE ANNOTATION DID NOT PROVIDE THAT IT IS BINDING ON THE HEIRS OR ASSIGNS OF SANDICO.

established either by law or by the will of the owner. The former are called legal, and the latter, voluntary easements.[17]

In this case, petitioner itself itted that a voluntary easement of right of way exists in favor of respondents. In its petition to cancel the encumbrance of voluntary easement of right of way, petitioner alleged

II.

that “*t+he easement is personal. It was voluntarily constituted in favor of a

… NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE EASEMENT IS PERSONAL SINCE NO COMPENSATION WAS GIVEN TO PETITIONER.

certain Francisco Hidalgo y Magnifico, the owner of [the lot] described as Lot No. 2, Block 2650.”[18] It further stated that “the voluntary easement of the right of way in favor of Francisco Hidalgo y Magnifico was constituted simply

III.

by will or agreement of the parties. It was not a statutory easement and definitely not an easement created by such court order because ‘*the+ Court

29

merely declares the existence of an easement created by the parties.”[19] In its Memorandum

[20]

dated September 27, 2001, before the trial court,

servient estate as free, that is, without the annotation of the voluntary easement, which extinguishes the easement.[29]

petitioner reiterated that “*t+he annotation found at the back of the TCT of Unisource is a voluntary easement.”[21]

Finally, the mere fact that respondents subdivided the property does not extinguish the easement. Article 618 [30] of the Civil Code provides

Having made such an ission, petitioner cannot now claim that

that if the dominant estate is divided between two or more persons, each of

what exists is a legal easement and that the same should be cancelled since

them may use the easement in its entirety, without changing the place of its

the dominant estate is not an enclosed estate as it has an adequate access to

use, or making it more burdensome in any other way.

a public road which is Callejon Matienza Street.

[22]

As we have said, the

opening of an adequate outlet to a highway can extinguish only legal or

WHEREFORE, the

instant

petition

is DENIED. The

Decision

compulsory easements, not voluntary easements like in the case at bar. The

dated October 27, 2005 and the Resolution dated June 19, 2006 of the Court

fact that an easement by grant may have also qualified as an easement of

of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76213 are AFFIRMED.

necessity does not detract from its permanency as a property right, which survives the termination of the necessity.[23] A voluntary easement of right of way, like any other contract, could be extinguished only by mutual agreement or by renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate.[24]

Neither can petitioner claim that the easement is personal only to Hidalgo since

the

annotation

merely

mentioned

Sandico

and Hidalgo without equally binding their heirs or assigns. That the heirs or assigns of the parties were not mentioned in the annotation does not mean that it is not binding on them. Again, a voluntary easement of right of way is like any other contract. As such, it is generally effective between the parties, their heirs and assigns, except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law.[25] Petitioner cites City of Manila v. Entote[26] in justifying that the easement should bind only the parties mentioned therein and exclude those not so mentioned. However, that case is inapplicable since the issue therein was whether the easement was intended not only for the benefit of the owners of the dominant estate but of the community and the public at large.[27] In interpreting the easement, the Court ruled that the clause “any and all other persons whomsoever” in the easement embraces only “those who are privy to the owners of the dominant estate, Lots 1 and 2 Plan Pcs-2672” and excludes “the indiscriminate public from the enjoyment of the right-of-way easement.”[28]

We also hold that although the easement does not appear in respondents’ title over the dominant estate, the same subsists. It is settled that the registration of the dominant estate under the Torrens system without the annotation of the voluntary easement in its favor does not extinguish the easement. On the contrary, it is the registration of the