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ETHICS, ABILITY AND CORRUPTION 1 PA 208 GROUP REPORT

ETHICS, ABILITY AND CORRUPTION In the course of history in public istration in the Philippines, state institutions and even the private sector have been taught valuable lessons on the implications of negative bureaucratic behavior on state governance and societal development in general. In particular, lingering issues on graft and corruption have not only attracted public attention throughout the years, but also increased the demand for istrative integrity, ability, and stronger anti-corruption strategies. After all, persistent problems such as poverty, massive inflation and rising social inequality compete for airtime or column space along with news of graft and corruption in the public sector, a clear reflection that graft and corruption indeed hinder inclusive growth and sustainable development. As technology develops and more complex istrative problems arise in the Philippine istrative system, new tools for preventing corruption and upholding ethical standards and ability are constantly being developed to impose greater responsibility over public officials, monitor bureaucratic practices and guard against negative bureaucratic behavior. Even then, responding to or addressing emerging forms of graft and corruption remains a daunting task for state institutions and oversight agencies. This paper discusses relevant issues on istrative ethics and ability. From here, the paper takes off from a number of recent events to reflect on the consequences of corruption. Ultimately, the paper presents current and prospective strategies to guard against graft and corruption in the bureaucracy. Ethics in the Public Sector The persistence of problems on graft, corruption and other forms of negative bureaucratic behavior, warrant a constant, meaningful discourse on ethics, particularly in the field of public istration. While this may not be a relatively new topic to discuss —in fact, it may be a little overrated for some, especially those that somehow consider corruption as the “new normal” in the Philippine istrative system—and while ethics is a multifaceted concept that is constantly evolving according to the demands of time and necessity of citizens, we tend to all agree that one of the hindrances to progress and development of the state and society in general is unethical bureaucratic practices, including the “classic” graft and corruption. Then again, policymakers and even bureaucrats are faced with the dilemma of differentiating what is right from wrong in public istration. Many state institutions: the Constitution, the Church, interest groups, professionals, indigenous peoples, etc., have crafted ethical standards with different determinants of acceptable and unacceptable bureaucratic behavior, adding to the confusion. The evolution of public istration also aggravated the problem by introducing emerging ethical norms. In the ensuing discussion on istrative ethics in the Philippine setting, we find that there are common junctures—honed through history, experience and evolution of Page 1

ETHICS, ABILITY AND CORRUPTION 2 PA 208 GROUP REPORT istrative approaches—among these plethora of norms under which bureaucrats must adhere to. The commonalities of what is acceptable and unacceptable point ultimately to the emergence of a free market society and economy-based government that has since transformed public governance from being citizen-oriented to consumeroriented.

Ethics, ability and corruption in the Philippines: a history Pre-conquest era Historical records pointing to the existence of sultanates in the southernmost parts of Mindanao during 15th century tells us that indeed, political organizations were already established even before the Spaniards came into the Philippines in 1521. Small communities composed of around 30-100 families called barangays were established along rivers. These barangays were headed by datus or village chiefs whose functions were to maintain existence and uphold peace and order in the community. The datu being at the apex of hierarchy had stratified authority and performed the roles of a chief executive, a lawmaker and a judge. He settled disputes, provides services and mobilizes communities to act (Reyes, 2003). The datu’s authority was considered to be supreme and pre-eminent; however, the position was customarily hereditary (Endriga, 1979). If not inherited, the datu remained in power by endowments, display of prowess and valor during battles, or by exemplary leadership. The concept of graft and corruption may have not yet been clearly defined during the pre-conquest era, and no clear standards were set to differentiate which istrative activities were ethical or unethical. Meanwhile, some cultural practices in the pre-colonial period mirrored or were embedded in the present istrative system. For example, the inextricable link with families and personal loyalties, as well as leadership-centered activities typical of the pre-colonial communities, still affects how our government works today (Reyes, 2003). Since customary laws prevailed during the pre-colonial society, and there were no concrete definitions for graft and corruption, there may have been occasions when people during that period engaged in corrupt practices. The existence of social classes, feudalism, concentration of authority to the datu and his subjects, and inheritance of position by virtue of blood or display of valor in battles, or endowments, may have likely encouraged corruption in the pre-colonial period. These assumptions were of course made by Spanish conquistador-writers whose customs and practices were not in line with that of the pre-colonial Filipinos (Endriga, 1979). Spanish colonization Graft and corruption was said to be prevalent during the Spanish period. The culture of corruption said to have been earlier perpetuated by the class system in the precolonial period was rather reinforced at that time. In particular, Endriga (1979:246) Page 2

ETHICS, ABILITY AND CORRUPTION 3 PA 208 GROUP REPORT mentioned that corruption during the Spanish period can be broadly defined as the “deviation from the idealistic, high-minded norms contained in legislation of various forms.” Sources of graft and corruption may be attributed to the inconsistencies of colonial objectives and istrative approaches during the Spanish regime. Conflict between Authority of Will and Authority of Wisdom gave Spanish bureaucrats wide discretion based mainly on their priorities and motivations. Simply put, there was disconnect between the interest of the colonizers to promote evangelical law and the interest to increase collection of profits. This compromised idealism and expediency in the istrative system during the period. Public office, during the Spanish regime, was regarded as a grant or favor from the king or by purchase. The latter means violated the provisions of Spanish law at the time; positions were endowed on the basis of highest bidding and not on the basis of competence and capabilities of personnel. Eventually, bureaucratic positions were considered private investments or property. This meant that the officeholder could invest in a position, which eventually will be recovered through profit. Another factor was the dominance of colonial bureaucracy and its effect on the Filipinos during the Spanish period. Endriga (1979) described the bureaucracy as a rule over a powerless population that was unable to affect its colonizers. With colonial bureaucracy, the highest position that a Filipino may occupy was cabeza de barangay. All the rest were occupied by the Spaniards. Some of the remedies that were established during the Spanish regime to control graft and corruption were the institution of the Visitador General, an official sent out by Council of Indies in Spain and vested with investigatory, judicial and executory powers, to conduct Visita, an unanticipated investigation of officials, which provides basis for suspending or removing erring officials from their positions; and Residencia, which required bureaucrats to render at the end of their term an or their conduct before they could assume another office position. These were “essentially” effective counterchecking procedures; however they were not strictly implemented. American regime The Philippine political structure was vastly improved during the American period, mimicking that of the United States (Endriga 2003). Church was separated from state; and the Filipinos were somewhat encouraged to participate in all levels of government, albeit at a much later time after the Americans occupied the country. The concept of a public office being position of public trust and responsibility, and the merit system were among the new philosophies introduced during the American colonization (Endriga 1979). Among the first laws implemented to increase the credibility of civil service was the “Act for Establishment and Maintenance of an Efficient and Honest Civil Service in the Philippine Islands.” It reflected the practice of the Weberian Bureaucracy, characterized by selection of based on qualifications and not merely by political patronage that was typical of the spoils system. Page 3

ETHICS, ABILITY AND CORRUPTION 4 PA 208 GROUP REPORT The civil service laws during the American regime benefited public service in the Philippines. Professionalization of and adequate compensation for civil servants increased the morale of bureaucrats who were treated like milking cows back in the Spanish period. In a way, reforms in the civil service were a preventive mechanism against graft and corruption. This supplemented the Penal Code, which was established in the 1930s to prevent corrupt practices in the bureaucracy (Endriga, 1979). However, Endriga (1979) pointed out that corruption was still manifest during this period. The civil service system in the American colonial period eliminated the spoils system, but only in part, to supposedly accommodate Filipino experiences and interests. This loophole gave some of the bureaucrats a window of opportunity for petty or smallscale corruption. Then again, these problems were usually settled or addressed promptly or effectively under the American colonial government. Independent Republic After World War II, the country had to go through vast rehabilitation of infrastructure such as roads, bridges and school buildings, which were devastated after the World War II. Reyes (2003: 51) described it as a time when “poverty was endemic and the widespread destruction of property served to exacerbate the situation.” Opportunities for public personnel to commit corrupt practices came from the huge amount of financial aid that the country received for reconstruction. Amid economic crisis, public officials were tempted to commit corrupt practices, slowly eroding public’s trust towards the government. Co (2005), in her paper on Challenges To Philippine Culture Of Corruption: Causes, Consequences And Change, referred to corruption as a result of misconceptions about public office as an opportunity to reap personal rewards than to nobly serve in the government. With the constantly changing perspectives and practices of corruption through the years, public officials began to concede that corruption was a natural act. Marcos dictatorship Graft and corrupt practices during Marcos regime were prevalent among his cronies and associates. Misuse of government funds, drawn from monopolies of major industries such as sugar, tobacco and coconut, led to accumulation of ill-gotten wealth. Blood relatives of either former President Marcos or his First Lady Imelda owned and dominated public and private enterprises. The Marcos regime was described as a deviation from democracy to the so-called “kleptocracy”, resulting in a loss of multibillion assets from foreign investments and government revenues, and accumulation of unexplained wealth.1 1

Roa, Anna. “Regime of Marcoses, cronies, kleptocracy.” [online]. Available from http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/641277/regime-of-marcoses-cronies-kleptocracy [Accessed 15 May 2015].Almario, Manuel F. (2011, February 27). The dismal record of the Marcos Regime. Retrieved from http://www.philstar.com/letters-editor/660957/dismal-record-marcos-regime

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ETHICS, ABILITY AND CORRUPTION 5 PA 208 GROUP REPORT Several ethical issues, aside from graft and corrupt practices, can be rooted from Marcos’ twenty-year presidency. President Marcos perpetuated massive militarization campaign when he declared Martial Law in 1972, supposedly as a means to restore peace and order; however, others believed that it was his way of prolonging his dictatorship and authority. There were s of human rights violations and curtailment of the freedom of expression and assembly. Nonetheless, a number of anti-corruption laws were enforced during Marcos’ time, albeit being weak and altogether a lukewarm response to corruption. Among these were the following: Presidential Decree No. 6, which identified punishable istrative offenses and immediate dismissal of guilty officials; Presidential Decree No. 46, which prohibited public official to receive gifts on any occasion including Christmas; and Presidential Decree No. 677, which required public officials to submit Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SAL) (Quah, 2010). These laws, however, are almost inoperable and overlapping with the existing law Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act of 1960) (Co, 2005). Post-Marcos period After the Marcos dictatorship, succeeding leaders strived to undo the mistakes of the past and focused on installing a number of anti-corruption laws and regulations. In fact, Quah (2010) points out that, among Asian countries, the Philippines has the most number of anti-corruption mechanisms implemented. In particular, the Philippine government has maintained seven anti-corruption laws and 19 presidential anticorruption agencies in the past half-century. However, the mushrooming of these organizations was usually due to changes in leadership and the leader’s own discretion to abolish and create new agencies. Even then, these agencies had to be salvaged over and over again. The Presidential Commission on Good Governance (PCGG) itself allegedly harbored graft and corruption during Cory Aquino’s istration. It was replaced by the Presidential Committee on Public Ethics and ability in May 1987, which was equally incompetent due to lack of resources. This agency was repeatedly rehashed under the Ramos, Estrada and Arroyo istrations. In 2002, the Arroyo istration initiated “lifestyle checks” on public officials, examining their leisure habits, possible relatives employed through influence, and other possible conflicts of interest. However, this gained little from the citizens due to Arroyo’s alleged graft and corruption offenses, among which are the controversial NBN-ZTE deal and the “Hello Garci” scandal (Quah, 2010). President Benigno Aquino III tried to rectify and take into the alleged corrupt practices committed during the past istrations. In 2012, President Aquino signed the Act to Further Strengthen the Anti-Money Laundering Law and the Terrorism Financing Prevention and Suppression Act in an effort to improve transparency and ability, capacity to investigate graft and corruption cases and suppress funding for terrorist activities, respectively. President Aquino also signed the third amendment to the Anti-Money Laundering Act, expanding the scope of the law to more illegal acts. The Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC), on the other hand, mandated the ten most corruption-prone government agencies to submit to lifestyle checks and/or report major Page 5

ETHICS, ABILITY AND CORRUPTION 6 PA 208 GROUP REPORT corruption cases every three months. Meanwhile, the Freedom of Information Bill, one of the anticipated laws to improve transparency and ability in the public sector, is yet to be ed by the government. However, as what will be discussed in the section on “Corruption,” these laws and mechanisms remained weakly implemented and unenforceable due to poor mainstreaming and coordination across government agencies (GAN Integrity Solutions [online]). Box 1 lists a number of anti-corruption laws and policies, as well as constitutional anti-corruption bodies. istrative ethics In one of his renowned lectures on politics, Jovito Salonga, a well-known Filipino statesman, described ethics as a “discipline dealing with right and wrong.” But how do we distinguish right from wrong? In relation to this question, Salonga also stated that ethics is a multi-faceted concept that goes beyond the usual limitations of law. He further elaborates on this by saying: This is another way of saying that what is legal may not be moral, that what may not violate the law may nevertheless violate standards of honesty, fairness, propriety decency, ability, and comion (Salonga, in Tapales, 1994:69). Salonga also discussed a number of issues that were relevant during his time, such as the appointment of relatives in another public office, state funeral for Marcos, and the controversial Senate decision in 1991 on the RP-US Bases Treaty, to illustrate that istrative ethics may tend to go beyond the confines of law. In the following discussion, we will see some of the perspectives of istrative ethics, their differences and common junctures that could clarify ethical dilemmas in public istration. Normative foundations Ethics is a very broad concept and is a subject of interest of many scholars. It is composed of diverse perspectives which may be rooted from religious, political, professional and social beliefs. Among the perspectives of istrative ethics, according to Cooper (2004), are the following: a. Regime Values These are values embodied in the constitution. While states differ on their constitutional frameworks, Scholar John Rohr, author of Ethics for Bureaucrats: An Essay on Law and Values, identified general constitutional values as freedom, equality and property. b. Citizenship Theory In this perspective, public s are encouraged to “put themselves in the shoes of” the citizens. They are expected to consider the welfare of citizens in the conduct of public service; and their ethical obligations dwell with good citizenship. Thus, Page 6

ETHICS, ABILITY AND CORRUPTION 7 PA 208 GROUP REPORT should also be responsive, responsible and able to the citizens. They are expected to be people-centered, to forgo self-interest, lead people towards common good and establish moral bond with the community. As custodians of resources public s should be responsible in using, allocating and generating the same. Moreover, public s should be able by sharing authority and reducing control. c. Social Equity It was during the New Public istration movement that social equity became the central principle of government. Forerunners of New PA—H.G. Frederickson, Frank Marini, William Lambright, among other scholars—pointed out that despite economic growth, indeed social problems such as poverty, unemployment and illiteracy still prevail. New PA sought to address the deprivation of the poor, and eventually social equity became a guiding principle for public istration ethics. d. Virtue Virtue is an essential element of public istration ethics and, as a form of character, assessed using the frameworks of moral crises and moral processes. Ultimately, under this perspective, an individual tends to slowly build his/her tendencies to act according to his/her espoused principles and values particularly in situations wherein these principles and values are attacked or confronted with. e. Public Interest Public interest, according to scholars, is widely recognized normative foundation for istrative ethics. This is true especially because serving the public interest is a major function of the government and is the primary distinction of public from private istration. However, public interest scope has a wide scope. It is not homogenous because there is a wide range of interests made by the public and it continues to evolve over time. Public interest as normative istrative ethic leads us to the fundamental obligation of serving the general shared interest and not that of the few. These normative foundations offer a general scope of what istrative ethics should entail. While they should ideally comprise what should be “ethical” to istrative institutions, they each differ on the approach to ethics. From these five normative foundations, we will magnify ethics based on regime values and public interest and how they usually clash with that determined by virtues, social equity and citizenship theory. Clash of bureaucratic and cultural norms Cariño (1979), in of Salonga, explained that there indeed exists a conflict between the legal and cultural determinants of bureaucrat behavior. In particular, what are determined unacceptable by law may fall within the ideal and acceptable behavior according to culture. In her article on the conflict of ethics and law, Cariño purported seven bureaucratic legal norms that govern the behaviors of bureaucrat and its corresponding provisions it embodies in Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act. These are the following: Page 7

ETHICS, ABILITY AND CORRUPTION 8 PA 208 GROUP REPORT a. Universalistic Norms This norm upholds equal, depersonalized treatment of stakeholders. In Republic Act No. 3019, the principle is manifest in the provision prohibiting acts that give client undue advantage, such as:

“Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the Government and any other party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law.” (Section 3b, RA 3019) b. Priority Norms The priority norm adheres to the idea of “first come, first served basis” versus the idea of preference; however, “special cases” may be accommodated in favor of public service. Meanwhile, this norm prohibits actions reflected in the following Sections of Republic Act No. 3019: “Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official istrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.” (Section 3e, RA 3019) c. Efficiency Norms It is defined as the delivery of service at the least time and with the least cost as possible. RA 3019 indicates that unreasonable delay in the delivery of public services in favor of the public officials is prohibited: “Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time on any matter pending before him for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage, or for the purpose of favoring his own interest or giving undue advantage in favor of or discriminating against any other interested party.” (Section 3f, RA 3019) d. Technical Norms The norm upholds a public official’s technical or professional standards in dealing with clients. Negative behaviors that violate the technical norm are reflected on Sections 3(g) and 3(j) of Republic Act No. 3019: Page 8

ETHICS, ABILITY AND CORRUPTION 9 PA 208 GROUP REPORT Section 3(g): “Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.” Section 3(j): “Knowingly approving or granting any license, permit, privilege or benefit in favor of any person not qualified for or not legally entitled to such license, permit, privilege or advantage, or of a mere representative or dummy of one who is not so qualified or entitled.” e. Jurisdictional Norms This norm upholds that the public official must carry out tasks within his/her respective functions or jurisdiction. Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019 states that: “Persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit such violation or offense.” f.

Propriety

This norm adheres to one of Weber’s principles of structural arrangements, which is separation of office from a person. This norm declares that a public official must address conflicts of interests that may hinder him/her from carrying out his/her functions in office (e.g. family relations, private gains), as what is described in Sections 3(h) and (i) of RA 3019: Section 3(h) “Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest.” Section 3(i) “Directly or indirectly becoming interested, for personal gain, or having a material interest in any transaction or act requiring the approval of a board, or group of which he is a member, and which exercises discretion in such approval, even if he votes against the same or does not participate in the action of the board, committee, or group.” Page 9

ETHICS, ABILITY AND CORRUPTION 10 PA 208 GROUP REPORT g. Secrecy Under the norm of secrecy, the public official is mandated to keep official secrets confidential to preserve its power, or to avoid giving undue advantage to a particular client, as stated in Section 3(k) of RA 3019: “Divulging valuable information of a confidential character, acquired by his office or by him on of his official position to unauthorized persons, or releasing such information in advance of its authorized release date.” RA 3019 is just one of the many anti-corruption laws in the country, which are deemed as having a “public-office orientation”—that is, our laws against corruption focus more on bureaucratic practices and compliance to rules, those dictated by Cooper’s notion of regime values, above other normative foundations of ethics. By examining the nature of our cultural values, we find a conflict between legal and cultural norms. Cariño (1979) asserted that Filipino culture is characterized by particularism, ascription and diffuseness. The Filipino is viewed as a system rather than as part of the system. He/She is defined by personalities; thus, by giving or denying a person services, the public official has in turn refused the client his/her integrity, family background, etc. (and, by virtue of hiya and utang na loob, it is considered “rude” to refuse someone’s requests). As such, in dealing with the citizens, the bureaucrat must consider all aspects of the client, including his/her networks and linkages. This may be the reason why relational/parochial interests prevail over general/common interests in the delivery of public services. This is where the conflict between law and culture emerges.

The Filipino bureaucrat typically puts much value on his/her relationship with relatives, friends, neighbors and other personal networks, thus deviating from Weber’s ideal type of a bureaucrat. Personalism can be discordant in bureaucracy where relations are supposed to be governed by institutional rules and general interest rather than particularistic considerations (Cariño, 1979). Table 1 illustrates the possible scenarios of ideal, acceptable and unacceptable behavior according to bureaucratic-legal norms may be unacceptable in of cultural ethical norms, and vice versa. Table 1. Bureaucratic-legal and cultural-ethical norms by types of acceptable behavior (Carino, 1979). Cultural Bureaucratic-Legal Norms Ethical Ideal Acceptable Unacceptable Norms (Illegal) Ideal No example. Law Utang na loob Utang na loob shown does not require shown in extraby bureaucrat by utang na loob to be bureaucratic giving unfair acknowledged situations and advantage to alter Page 10

ETHICS, ABILITY AND CORRUPTION 11 PA 208 GROUP REPORT Acceptable

Utang na loob shown only where it does not hurt other clients

Unacceptable (Unethical)

Treating alter like anybody else (e.g. abstaining from decision on grounds of conflict of interest)

decisions Introducing alter to agency personnel— to help dispel strangeness of impersonal organization— without endorsement or comment Abstaining from decision affecting alter (after due suggestion from agency)

Utang na loob shown by giving confidential information or endorsing alter but without directly deciding or persuading decisionmaker to rule in his favor “True” corruption— when a person does not show utang na loob, deviation from law will have other bases

In the above table, Cariño used the practice of utang na loob in of bureaucratic-legal and cultural-ethical norms to best illustrate the congruencies and discord between the two normative perspectives. The table basically points out that what may be ideal or acceptable in law may not be ideal or acceptable in culture or practice, and vice versa. Some of the cases of illegal bureaucratic behavior being treated as culturally acceptable are the following: 1) praising corrupt officials for accumulating wealth and being stealthy about it; and 2) praising Robin Hood officials who had the opportunity to share their illegally-amassed wealth to others. However, there are certain congruencies in areas, where both the law and the culture consider the behavior of a public official acceptable and unacceptable. For instance, the fact that corruption (which is illegal according to law) puts a public official in the hall of shame (which is culturally-driven) proves that somewhat there are areas where both aspects can agree with each other. Another common juncture between legal and cultural norms is found when, for example, granting of favors disregards another Filipino value—pagkakapantay-pantay or equality. Cariño finally argues that in general, the root of negative bureaucratic behavior that is certainly both legally and culturally unacceptable—that is, the greed for money and power—ultimately point to lack of law enforcement and free market conditions as factors contributing to persistent corruption in the Philippines. There is thus a need to strengthen ability and audit mechanisms that prevent negative bureaucratic practices. Moreover, regardless of the cultural traditions, we Filipinos should begin to acknowledge and accept legal standards of bureaucratic behavior if we are to indeed eradicate corruption. As Co (2005) wrote, we should embrace a “culture of rules.” Evolution of ethics in public governance

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ETHICS, ABILITY AND CORRUPTION 12 PA 208 GROUP REPORT The “Reinventing Government” movement ushered in by Osborne and Gaebler has transformed the public sector from being rule-bound, machine-like and hierarchic towards being market-oriented. While the paradigm has paved way for innovations in public istration, in some ways, this movement has affected ethical standards in public governance which transformed the ethical foundations to commercial values (Haque, 1999). According to Haque (1999), one of the major features of this ethical shift was consideration of citizens as consumers, thus equating citizen satisfaction with consumer satisfaction. This transformed traditional public istration into public management, leaning towards managerialism as opposed to post-war concept of citizenship, which was viewed as a value of democracy pertaining to social, political and civil rights. Subsequently, there emerged the shift from traditional principles of public welfare to the commercial norm of value for money public sector reforms in developed and developing nations. The paradigm also narrowed the gap between public and private istration, eventually introducing public-private partnership, on one hand, and compromising impartiality and neutrality, on the other. The ultimate goal of economic efficiency redirected government programs towards trade and industry and deprioritized antipoverty programs. Finally, the paradigm encouraged managerial autonomy in decisionmaking, therefore challenging the ethics of public ability based on people’s control over governance (Haque, 1999). This begs the question, “What kind of ability does the public sector really need?” Is it managerial ability, “people-based” ability, or the best of both worlds? In the succeeding section, the concept of ability and its different forms will be discussed. We will then be guided by a particular framework of ability that links political and istrative processes, thereby strengthening the involvement of citizens in exacting ability from bureaucrats and political officials. ability ability is one of the principles espoused by the United Nations in its “good governance” paradigm. It is deemed essential in containing or eradicating negative bureaucratic behavior and ensuring institutional integrity. As technology develops and more complex istrative problems arise in the public sector, new tools for ensuring ability are constantly being developed to impose greater responsibility over public officials in their roles and functions, to monitor bureaucratic practices and guard against negative bureaucratic behavior. In this section, we will be looking at the nature and scope of ability, the types of ability, and more importantly, issues that confront the practice of ability in the public sector. What is ability? There exist many definitions of ability in the literature of governance and public istration. The World Bank (undated) and Ebrahim (2003) both define ability as a relational dynamic between two individuals or agencies in of two aspects: answerability, wherein individuals or agencies inform or justify their actions Page 12

ETHICS, ABILITY AND CORRUPTION 13 PA 208 GROUP REPORT to the inquiring body; and enforcement, which involves sanctioning, guiding or rewarding individuals or agencies for their actions (or lack thereof). Cariño (1983), Wang (2001), Cendon (2000) and Lindberg (2013) all refer to ability as a product or function of the following dimensions, which will be useful upon discussion of the forms of ability: 1) The person/institution being held into (agent); 2) The person/agency to whom the agent is to give (principal), which may be internal or external to the agent; 3) The content or subject matter for which the agent is able; 4) Mechanisms that ensure answerability and enforcement, which would depend on the degree and direction of control; and 5) ability effects or outcomes. Types of ability For the purpose of this report, the discussion of ability will focus on the typologies by Cariño (1983) and Cendon (2000), with emphasis on Cariño’s typologies of istrative ability. These forms will be classified according to the following: 1) principal or source of ability; 2) agent; 3) content subject to ability; 4) ability mechanisms; and 5) ability outcomes or consequences. The typologies will also be described based on Lindberg’s (2013) additional dimensions: degree of control and spatial direction. The former refers to the rigor of monitoring and evaluation mechanisms used and the amount of information required in ensuring ability; while spatial direction is related to the source of ability. In particular, it is upward in nature if service s or shareholders hold higher authorities able; downward if higher authorities hold lower-level employees able; and horizontal if ability is among peers in a single organizational level (Lindberg, 2013). As discussed earlier, the source, content and mechanisms of ability vary on the nature of the parties involved, the roles that they play in the ability relationship and the external environment under which the relationship works. As such, a single institution or individual may be able under two or more types of ability, depending on the circumstances. Table 2 shows the different types of ability and their characteristics. Political ability According to Cendon (2000) political ability ensures that decisions or actions made by public employees are aligned with the programmatic or political agenda currently put in place by the government (or what is loosely assumed as the “will of the people”). The focus of political ability is therefore on ideally meeting the expectations of the elected official who in turn represents the needs and interests of the electorate. Page 13

ETHICS, ABILITY AND CORRUPTION 14 PA 208 GROUP REPORT Political ability assumes both vertical and horizontal dimensions. Vertically, political ability relates high-ranking authorities and lower-level bureaucrats with one another. Horizontally, political ability links high-ranking officials with one another through the legislative branch; in a presidential form of government, the role of lawmakers is limited to appointing officials and, in special cases, impeaching them. Political ability is mainly measured through technical standards as well as value judgments and political considerations (Cendon, 2000). Lindberg (2013) points out that political ability typically has the lowest degree of control. First, rules or standards for attaining ability are somewhat general in scope, allowing for more flexibility and wider discretion among lower-level bureaucrats. Second, political officials have relatively little control over bureaucracies mainly due to time and skill constraints as well as conflicts of interest. As a result, officials are likely to leave important decisions to bureaucrats. In the long run, however, bureaucrats may capture the decisions of political officials, especially when there is lack of discernment or ability on part of the officials. On the other hand, under heavy political influence, bureaucrats may be used as tools to further political agenda (Alfiler, 2003; Lindberg, 2013). istrative ability According to Cendon (2000), istrative ability focuses on the level of compliance with istrative rules and procedures, as well as legal and functional strictures on the efficient use of resources. Values and standards for this form of ability are hinged on the constitutional or legal framework of the state, which usually governs public offices and guarantees the citizen equal treatment and clear relationship boundaries with the state. It is also characterized by neutrality. Cendon explains that public employees must be willing to work with different government agencies and commit to government programs regardless of political or ideological bias. Professional ability Under professional ability, public employees equipped with the competence and skills to address the problem first-hand are able for their faculties in carrying out their functions and to the authorities that entrusted them these functions (Lindberg, 2013). In professional ability, it is important to keep the principal (e.g. the higher-level bureaucrat or political official) well-informed of the agent’s performance, especially when the principal is inexperienced in the field being handled by the subordinates (Romzek & Dubnick, 1987). Otherwise, there will be low degree of control involved in maintaining professional ability. How is professional ability addressed? Cendon (2000) refers to the concept as an oversight on activities conducted by professionals with the appropriate skills or expertise to achieve organizational or program goals and objectives. Thus, there is greater emphasis on the respect for and compliance with professional ethics and Page 14

ETHICS, ABILITY AND CORRUPTION 15 PA 208 GROUP REPORT standards of a particular field. Whether or not professional ability is linked with istrative ability remains a point of contention, since professional standards may, in some cases, be different with istrative standards. Democratic ability Democratic ability establishes the link between public istration and society as an active participant in the ability relationship. This implies that the istrative system must not only be able to garner and acceptance from the society in its actions and decisions, but it should also be able to hold the istrative system able for addressing their needs and interests. This type of ability does not require a specific formal or legal framework (Cendon, 2000), although the Constitution itself provides for principles such as the freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and notion of public interest. Cendon’s concept of democratic ability is parallel to the concept of “societal ability” and “representative ability” as explained by Lindberg (2013), wherein citizens, through the media, Church and other interest groups, informally assume the role of the principal in the ability relationship. The source of control of democratic ability is thus external to the istrative system, coming from the citizens themselves. However, how much citizen control is needed is derived from two factors: 1) the scale of action required to ensure ability; and 2) whether or not government agencies facilitate considerable citizen control (Lindberg, 2013). Characteris tic Basic operational principle

Forms of ability Political istrative -Acting following the -Acting in full compliance with political and the legally established rules programmatic provisions and procedures adopted by the government Internal ability, to whom? -Superior political authority -Superior political authority -Superior istrative organ or authority -Superior professional organ or authority (technical evaluation)

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Professional -Acting in full compliance with the technical rules and practices of the profession

Democ -Acting needs social g a whol