Hope And Destiny: Truman, Eisenhower, Fulbright, And Us Foreign Policy In The Middle East, 1945-1958 6b1c47

HOPE AND DESTINY

TRUMAN, EISENHOWER, FULBRIGHT, and US Foreign Policy in the Middle East, 1945-1958

HARRY KEATTS CHENAULT JR., PhD

Copyright © 2019 Harry Keatts Chenault Jr., PhD.

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ISBN: 978-1-4808-8303-1 (sc) ISBN: 978-1-4808-8304-8 (hc) ISBN: 978-1-4808-8302-4 (e)

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Archway Publishing rev. date: 12/13/2019

Dedicated to all, past and present, who are working for a genuine Middle East peace process.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER 1 Abounding Prominence

CHAPTER 2 Greece, Turkey, Palestine, and the Soviet Threat

CHAPTER 3 Eisenhower’s Mission, Fulbright’s Vision

CHAPTER 4 Beirut: “The Line in the Sand”—How Eisenhower Used the Eisenhower Doctrine

CHAPTER 5 Policy and Controversy

CONCLUSION

APPENDIX A The Truman Doctrine

APPENDIX B The Eisenhower Doctrine

APPENDIX C The Fulbright Resolution of 1957

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

We are saved by Hope. But Hope that is seen is not Hope; for what a man seeth, why doth he yet hope for? But if we hope for that we see not, then do we with patience wait for it.¹

—Romans 8:24, 25

Invariably those who suffer from the arrogance or the power of others wrongfully assume that the evils from which they suffer are solely the consequence of the peculiar malice of their oppressors; and fail to recognize the root of the same evils in themselves.²

—Reinhold Niebuhr

More than in any area of the world, our policy in the Middle East has been a creature of crisis, jagged in its ups and downs and ambiguous in its direction.³

—Senator John F. Kennedy October 1957

These crises [in the Middle East\, which at times threatened to touch off World War III, posed a constant test to the United States’ will, principle, patience, and resolve.⁴

—From the Memoirs of President Dwight D. Eisenhower

Of course, there were many wrinkles and complications, but in the very large picture one could say that the policy put in place by the Truman istration and built into bipartisan continuity by the Eisenhower istration—the “Pattern of Responsibility” to use Acheson’s phrase—did what its proponents said it would. Containment worked.⁵

—William Lee Miller

INTRODUCTION

President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the commander in chief of the US armed forces during World War II and the longest serving president in US history (January 20, 1933, to April 12, 1945; elected four times) made his final journey abroad in February 1945 in order to meet with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and the Russian leader Marshal Joseph Stalin at Yalta. The purpose of the meeting, held February 4–11, was to discuss a plan for collective security and discuss the fate of war-torn Europe. Less than two months later, Roosevelt ed away on April 12, 1945. On his return trip to the United States, Roosevelt decided to meet with three rulers: two from the Middle East and one from the Horn of Africa. These meetings would begin the US involvement in the Middle East in the modern era. One of the many issues for Roosevelt was itting the Jewish refugees from Europe into Palestine. King ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia met with Roosevelt on USS Quincy on February 12, 1945. In addition to ibn Saud, Roosevelt met with King Farouk of Egypt and King Halie Salassie of Ethiopia. Roosevelt arranged to hold the three meetings in Egypt on Great Bitter Lake. Harry Hopkins, aide to Roosevelt, described King ibn Saud as

a man of austere dignity, great power and a born soldier and, above all, an Arabian first, last and all the time.

The meeting with the biggest consequences was with ibn Saud, and the primary disagreement emerged when Roosevelt talked about the possibility of the Jewish refugees being itted to Palestine. Each time, according to Hopkins, the king smiled and said no when the subject was brought up.⁷ When he met with Churchill in Alexandria to discuss the meetings, Roosevelt did not make a big issue of them, even though he was trying to find out what the Arab perspective was on Jewish refugees being itted to Palestine. Churchill was alarmed at

Roosevelt’s condition and believed the president “had a slender with life.” That was the last time the two wartime leaders saw one another.⁸ After Roosevelt’s meeting at the Great Bitter Lake, Emir Abdallah, who was to become king of Transjordan in May 1946, sent President Roosevelt a letter in Arabic dated March 10, 1945. The letter stated that the king wanted “to convey my deepest feelings regarding the matter,” pertaining to the issue of Jewish refugees. The interpretation by the US state department translator left ambiguities in the translation. The king actually wanted to convey his “deepest nationalistic [‫ ﻗﻮﻣﻲ‬pronounced: qaumi] feelings concerning the Arabs [‫ ﺑﺎﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ إﻟﻰ اﻟﻌﺮب‬pronounced: bin nisbati ila al-Arab]” (italics added). The translator did not give the US president the essence of what the Jordanian king was actually writing to him. The significance of this error was that President Roosevelt and his advisors did not obtain the total viewpoint on the subject of holocaust refugees entering Palestine from an Arab point of view.

The end of World War II brought the world to a new level of uncertainty. The United States was propelled to superpower status with an undefined foreign policy. The world remained dangerous. Two alliances, Russia and China, that fought the war with the US as invaluable partners, were rapidly becoming an enigma to the West. US foreign policy was facing challenges in all corners of the world as the United States was determining how to define its role on the world stage. Europe was decimated militarily and economically. Japan was recovering from nuclear aftermath and total defeat. China was devastated by the Japanese onslaught and a civil war. Russia had suffered unprecedented losses in the war. Arab nations were watching carefully how the world war was going to affect their various nations and alliances. Two US presidents, one Democrat and the other a Republican, had to devise new strategies to keep the world at peace and prevent another world war. In the course of events this led to the Truman Doctrine [see Appendix A] and the Eisenhower Doctrine [see Appendix B] implemented by President Harry S. Truman and President Dwight David Eisenhower, the thirty-third and thirty-fourth presidents, respectively. Senator J. William Fulbright believed in President Woodrow Wilson’s strategy about collective security. In the Senate, he acted as the moral conscience of US foreign policy statecraft. He also authored some of the most important legislation in US history with the Fulbright Resolution (September 21, 1943) to institute the United Nations and the Fulbright Act (August 1, 1946) that began the international Fulbright Scholar program. Both of these landmark pieces of legislation would have far-reaching results decades and likely centuries beyond Fulbright’s life. Senator Fulbright sought to ensure that the foreign policies of the executive branch of government were not allowed to go unchecked nor without a rigorous debate. He wrote the Fulbright Resolution of 1957 [see Appendix C] to ensure the Eisenhower istration would stay focused on issues in the Middle East that mattered to the nations in that region above and beyond issues relating to the Cold War in all areas of the world. Fulbright’s 1957 Resolution anticipated UN Resolution 242, written after the 1967 Six-Day War, that remains the cornerstone for the peace process in the twenty-first century.

The purpose of this book is to answer two primary questions. The first is about how Palestine—Israel after 1948—affected US foreign policy while the Truman istration concentrated on Greece and Turkey. The contention is that Palestine was just as strategic an issue for US foreign policy. Few historians of US foreign policy discuss how strategically vital Palestine was to the United States during the Greek and Turkish crisis, the crisis that led to the Truman Doctrine. The significance of the crisis was great, as Dean Acheson, then deputy secretary of state, described.

The prime necessity was to save the pivotal position occupied by Greece and Turkey.

Acheson alludes to the gravity of the situation in his memoir, Present at the Creation, by discussing how an unnamed officer called upon his own artillery to fire on his position in order to block the enemy advancement. Acheson used that analogy to describe how dangerous the world was at that time. The US government had to make serious decisions in order to preserve world peace and not to face SOS ( or suppression) fire.¹ Basil Kondis, past director of The Institute of Balkan Studies, argued that the State Department’s hands-off attitude during the mid-1940s not only looked upon Greece as a “British responsibility,” it also ed the “British policies.” The United States and Britain both believed that Greece had “internal weaknesses” and “external pressures.” Kondis believed these two factors made the case why outside was so critical for Greece; without it, the collapse of Greece was on the horizon. He believed three factors played a decisive role in US involvement in Greece:

1. The Communist uprising in Greece, December 1944 2. Truman’s offer to assist Greece in 1947

3. Deteriorating relations between Washington and Moscow

These factors caused the United States to adjust its foreign policy objectives in Greece from “a ive policy of political idealism to an active realistic role in Greek affairs.”¹¹ On the other hand, many scholars believe the US government gave scant attention to Palestine. The view of this book is that although outwardly that is how it seemed, secretly, it may have been just the opposite. Michael J. Cohen’s book Fighting World War Three from the Middle East contends that after World War II, Palestine was a “critical trouble spot in the Middle East.”

Soon after the end of World War Two, Palestine became a critical trouble spot in the Middle East. By the end of 1945, the British security forces there had been reinforced by 100,000. However, facing a revolt by the Jewish community, they had yet to restore law and order. In August 1946, with the country in civil turmoil, and its political future still far from clear, an American strategy paper assessed the outcome of a Soviet airborne assault on Palestine. The Americans did not expect the Soviets to attack Palestine during the opening stages of a war, due to the distance between that country and the nearest Soviet airbases in the southern Caucasus and Bulgaria. However, once the Soviets had occupied northern Iraq, as the Americans expected them to do within two to three months, they would be able to airlift some 40,000 troops to Haifa. This Soviet airborne force would be able to hold Haifa for up to 45 days, until ed by reinforcements expected to break through from Turkey via the Lebanon and Syria. American strategists did not believe that the British would be able to preempt or hold up Soviet operations.¹²

Annex B of the t Chiefs of Staff Report related to the Report of the AngloAmerican Committee Report in 1946 looked into the possibility of itting 100,000 Jews from Europe to Palestine. The report stated that it would take a US force of 52,000 soldiers four months to arrive in Palestine, though a Special Marine Brigade of 3,250 marines could be deployed in Palestine in five days should the United States need to confront the USSR there. The report stated that

if US forces were sent to pacify Palestine, it would cause such a stir in the Middle East that it might lead to general war; therefore, the t Chiefs in 1946 were not keen on sending US forces to Palestine. However, with the report on USSR forces aiming at Haifa as a stronghold in Soviet military strategy, it becomes very clear how Palestine featured in plans for a tactical war between the United States and USSR.¹³ Twelve years later, on July 15, 1958, Eisenhower would turn military planning into military action by sending US forces to Beirut. It would send a strong message to Russian Premier Khrushchev and President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt as well as keep US military combat forces out of the Middle East until US Marines returned to the Middle East and specifically Beirut from 1982 to 1984, nearly twenty-four years later.¹⁴ According to Cohen, US strategists were contemplating the possibilities of a Russian airborne assault on Palestine, and it was believed that the Soviets themselves were targeting Haifa to airlift 40,000 soldiers. Why Haifa? Prior to the war, oil was supplied to Palestine by Iraq. When the War of 1948 began, the supply ceased. The USSR provided oil to the Israelis through Romania.¹⁵ Political scientist Arthur Jay Klinghoffer’s comprehensive of this little-discussed matter suggests that the more important crisis was in fact Palestine. The fact that the two governments, USSR and pre-state Israel, had an on-going secretive relationship places Palestine as a very significant foreign policy issue between the two superpowers.¹ Prior to receiving oil from Romania, during the Mandate period, 1918 to 1948, oil was piped into Palestine from the oil field in Kirkuk, Kurdistan. The oil pipeline extended from Kirkuk via Iraq and Jordan to Haifa and was built by the Iraqi Pipeline Company in 1933. The oil refinery in Haifa received oil from Kirkuk until 1947; after the 1948 War, the oil-flow stopped.¹⁷ The USSR had been the first to give Israel de jure recognition and provide Czech arms when neither the Americans, British, or French would do so. In July 1948, Israeli diplomat Mordechai Namir negotiated with the Romanian government for oil and the release of Romanian Jews to emigrate to Israel. As Romania was a satellite of the USSR, it is believed that the Romanians acted with the approval of the Kremlin since the Romanian oil and partial ownership were interconnected to the Kremlin. The Romanians wanted to send crude oil to Haifa; however, Shell Oil refused to open the refineries.

As the war progressed, by October 1948, Shell Oil believed that the Israelis might win the war and reopened the refineries in Haifa. The oil from Romania stopped after 1948, but the USSR did resume selling oil to Israel again in 1953. Israel had to pay maximum prices to oil companies in the West. The Israelis paid for part of their oil to the Soviet Union in citrus fruit. As the oil trade between the USSR and Israel continued, the Arab states were not pleased. The Soviet government tried to give reassurance to the Arabs that the USSR had their friendship in mind while simultaneously keeping the oil arrangements with Israel secret. By 1956, the year of the Suez War, the Soviets were favoring the Arabs over the Israelis while at the same time “oil sales to Israel were probably related to a Soviet desire to keep all options open.”¹⁸ The works by Cohen and Klinghoffer indicate that Palestine was a very significant factor pertaining to White House policy in the evolving cold war and oil in the Middle East.¹ During his presentation at the American Jewish Historical Society in December 1976, Eugene V. Rostow, who served in the US state department during the Greece and Turkish crisis, claimed that the US government missed opportunities during the period 1947–1949. He said that although the crisis in Greece occurred at the same time as the crisis in Palestine, the reactions of the US government were different, saying that in Greece the United States reacted decisively while in Palestine the reaction was lethargic.

The problem in Greece was simple, as compared to that in Palestine.²

Rostow talked about the difficulties of US foreign policy not being able to prevent the Arab-Israeli War of 1948. He also stated that it was Israel that stood in Nasser’s path to conquering Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. Israel was the “only sure access point the US has between Western Europe and US allies in the Far East, Australia, New Zealand, Korea and Japan.”

From the security point of view, this is a fact of cardinal importance in many

perspectives. Ideally, if the Middle East were at peace, Israel could be an important influence for progress throughout the area.²¹

Rostow did talk about the dilemma the United States was in with Israel during the late 1940s and said the US government was hard at work on the issue of Palestine, even when it appeared that it was not acting decisively. Rostow said that, as secretary of state,

[George\ Marshall emphasized that on matters as important as Palestine, vital national security interests must take precedence over domestic political considerations.²²

Count Bernadotte, the UN mediator during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, requested that a battalion of US Marines be sent to Jerusalem. Marshall turned him down on the grounds US armed forces might become involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

But Marshall’s concern for stability and desire to foreclose Soviet intervention were so intense that he did not rule out the possibility of using US troops in the future.²³

While Rostow stated the US response to Palestine was different to that to the crisis in Greece, he does not go into detail about the role that the US government had in opposing the USSR in Palestine. Many of the details were highly classified, and only through archival review of unclassified documents is it possible to understand what actually took place. That will be clarified in the following chapters. He said that during the period 1945–1947 there was no common US policy in the Middle East and that the State Department much preferred to “leave it to the British” in the Middle East. He said the United States

should have pushed hard for a peace treaty in 1949 instead of an armistice following the 1948 War between Israel and several Arab states. That decision, according to Rostow, was a fundamental mistake; the USSR was pursuing peace, and the United States was not.²⁴ As the US government worked behind the scenes on how to deal with the Soviet threat in the Middle East, it became very clear that the United States had to act and assume the role of the superpower in the region. Truman and Eisenhower both had to maneuver to keep the USSR and her satellites out of Palestine/Israel and the countries of the Middle East. This was not always successful. Both presidents did secure the oil in the region while preserving the national security and economic interests of Europe and the United States. Historians writing about the Eisenhower presidency shortly after he left office misinterpreted Eisenhower’s conduct as the commander in chief. Some believed he delegated his authority in the day-to-day affairs and acted as a hands-off president. Nothing could have been more inaccurate.²⁵ Eisenhower was intimately involved in running the nation’s affairs. The same can be said about Truman and why he rushed to recognize Israel before the Kremlin did: he wanted to keep the Soviet Union out of the Middle East.² How he went about doing this will be clarified. The late Professor Yaacov Bar Siman Tov put it thusly:

The State of Israel changed the landscape of the Middle East forever.²⁷

Greece and Turkey were important, but the difference with Palestine is that the Greek and Turkey crisis did not change the landscape of Europe. The new state of Israel forced the United States and the USSR to revise their approach to foreign policy in the Middle East and how they reacted to each other in the Cold War. Greece might have had a similar effect on US and USSR relations in Europe, but that is only speculation, since Greece did not succumb to Communism, largely thanks to the Truman Doctrine and the role US military advisors played in Greece.

The historian Peter Hahn’s view of Israel and the Truman istration was that

Israel also assumed strategic importance because of its location at the center of the region and its internal political complexion.²⁸

Israel would go on to become a client state of the United States. The USSR would turn to the Arab world to gain their entry to the region while simultaneously using the secret oil deal with Israel to keep another pathway open. Spheres of influence were set after the founding of the State of Israel and remain so in the twenty-first century. The Truman istration did not ignore its role in Palestine and believed the greater threat-zone in the Cold War was Palestine rather than Greece, as will be explained in chapter 2, based on the archives from the Truman istration. The Jewish perspective between 1945 and 1947 is critical to understanding the US role in the Middle East as it dealt with its British and Soviet counterparts in Palestine prior to the statehood in Israel. According to Professor Uri Bialer, after World War II, the world powers began a series of political actions that were being keenly watched by Mapai, the political party of David Ben-Gurion, who would become the first prime minister of modern Israel. Before the war, the Zionists in Palestine did not have a lot of dealings with the USSR, and the British remained the dominant foreign power in Palestine. The war changed that in several ways:

1. The increased involvement by the US government during and after World War II, indicating the growing role the United States was going to have on the world stage 2. The British Labour government’s hardened policy towards Zionist interests 3. The beginning of Russia’s change of attitude towards Zionist political aspirations

Consequently, Ben-Gurion and his ers decided that the United States would be the first nation they would reach out to as the British were planning to return the question of Palestine to the UN. The British were the backup to the United States in Ben-Gurion’s view. His resolve began to waver by 1947, when the Jews in Palestine were willing to reach out to any nation that would assist them; at that time, it meant the United States, Great Britain, and the USSR. Moshe Sharett, the first Israeli foreign minister, stated that his party was “knocking on any door.”² Between 1945 and 1947, the northern provinces of Greece were invaded by Communist troops from Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia who were trying to score a victory for the Kremlin by bringing down the government in Greece. Truman sent US military advisors to Greece and began the first of many unconventional wars the United States would become involved in. The US military greatly assisted the Greek military, and combined with the provisions from the Truman Doctrine helped save Greece from falling into the hands of the Communist insurgents. This is not to over-simplify a very serious problem facing the West and its freedom at the time, but it is to say the issue of Palestine was quite different and more complex. Palestine was not as easy to deal with. While Truman needed to send US military advisors to Greece, that was the last thing he wanted to do in Palestine. The situation there was murky. It has been thought that the Truman White House was wringing its hands and did not know how to handle Palestine. However:

1. There was a great concern that Soviet spies would be among the Jewish refugees migrating to Palestine after World War II and would use Palestine as a gateway to the Middle East. The US government was not taking that lightly and was watching that situation carefully. 2. The US government was keenly aware of the importance of keeping UN peacekeeping forces out of Palestine. That would eventually have allowed Soviet forces via the UN to be sent to Palestine, providing the desired foothold the Kremlin was seeking. 3. As mentioned, Secretary Marshall refused the request from Count Bernadotte

to send US Marines to Jerusalem. Due to the intense fighting between the Arabs and Jews, Marshall did not want to involve the US military. However, it is clear he did not rule it out for the future. This means that the Pentagon, the state department, and the White House, as well as the CIA (formed in 1947), all had to become very involved in the issue of sending or not sending the US military to Palestine. A government that has to perform all the detailed planning involved in such an undertaking is definitely not one sitting on its hands and wondering what to do in the problematic Palestine. The United States also backed up its strategy: as Leffler indicated, Marshall kept open the option to use military forces in Palestine due to his “concern for stability.” That US option was magnified by the intense desire of the USSR to gain a foothold in Palestine. 4. Truman recognized Israel before the Russians did. That decision alone had profound consequences. The effort involved in Truman making that momentous decision required immense work inside the Truman istration.

Truman’s recognition of Israel before the USSR totally revised the Kremlin’s foreign policy in the Middle East. The Kremlin had been favoring the Jewish side in Palestine prior to the official recognition of Israel. On May 14, 1947, Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko made a speech to the UN General Assembly ing “a binational or federal state.”³ Leffler ed the argument for the greater importance of Palestine/Israel. By August 1948 there was much concern that the USSR might succeed in sending an international force to Palestine.

Even a small number of Russian troops might lead to the Kremlin’s domination of the entire area.³¹

That concern was made even greater because the National Security Council believed that if Israel requested from the United Nations, it would lead to a Kremlin response by “deploying several divisions to the region.”³² Although the United States did observe the 1948 Israeli-Arab war on the sidelines, it was fully engaged and was not standing by idle.

One very important aspect that greatly assisted in the security and foundation of Israel was the arms deal that the Kremlin orchestrated through Czechoslovakia. Ben-Gurion warned the Zionist Congress as early as December 1946 about the security situation for the Jews in Palestine and that war was possible. He said that dealing locally with the Palestinian Arabs was one matter and another was to deal with the surrounding Arab states who “have the right and capacity to acquire arms.” He summed the situation in late 1946 by telling the Zionist Congress:

We are thus facing mortal danger.³³

Professor Uri Bialer shed new light on the Czech arms deal after the Israeli State Archive, the Haganah Archive, and the Ben-Gurion Archive released new material. In his September 1985 article, Bialer clarified that most historians up to that time believed the arms stopped arriving in Israel at the end of 1948. He said that the date when the arms actually stopped flowing to Israel was a benchmark for how long the Soviet Union would the State of Israel and what that meant for Israeli-Soviet relations. The significance of knowing this was due to the fact that an independent Israel ed Soviet objectives of having the British depart from Israel. The new records revealed that the arms deal continued long after 1948. Professor Bialer said this revelation was very sensitive since declassification of arms agreements in Israeli archives takes fifty years. Due to the secrecy, he said that “cryptic and laconic evidence” was needed. He believed that the arms termination took place in February 1951 and it was “difficult to pinpoint the exact date.” Two decades later, Ben-Gurion stated that, “They saved the country, I have no doubt of that. The Czech arms deal was the biggest help we had then, it saved us and without it I very much doubt whether we could have survived the first month.” By 1955 the Czech arms deal with Egypt demonstrated how complicated the relations were between Israel, Egypt, the USSR, and the United States. For example, Ben-Gurion negotiated an economic aid deal with the United States between 1949 and 1951, and he did not want to discuss publicly the continuation of arms from a Soviet satellite.³⁴ Dr. Amitzur Ilan listed the Czech arms deal in 1948 as follows:

Type of Assistance Small arms Ma rifles, 470,000 MG34 machine-guns, 5,300 ZB37 machine-guns, 850 7.92-mm, 80 million

Dates of Availability Stages: 1. End of March to early April 2. April 28 until second truce 3. Pre-October offensive 4. During 1949

Fighter aircraft I 23 S-199 Messerschmitts Other weapon, ammunition, and equipment

May 16–July 31 Air bombs, parachutes, radio, and other aircra

Fighter aircraft II 56 Spitfires Training of air and ground crews Training flight cadets Advanced pilots on S199 and ground crews

Stages: 1. 3 towards the October offensive 2. 10 at the end of December 3. The rest throughout 1949 and 1950

The training of 25 not completed 10–12 pilots trained to fly S199 Most other co

Source: Data from Ilan, Origin of the Arab-Israeli Arms Race, 173–74.

Pertaining to small and medium arms, Dr. Ilan wrote:

Stage

Date and Type of Transportation Type of Weapon Mo rifles MG34 mach. Guns

Dalet Plan³⁵ 3.4, boat 28.4, boat

31.3, flight 4,500 100,000

200 200 1,415

40 -

Pre-truce period 30.5, boat 6.6, boat June, flight

25.5, boat 2,500 -

5,000 1,230

1,200 224

First Truce 27.6, flight July, boat

Not recorded -

2,500 -

117

Second Truce 8.9, boat 19.9, boat

6.8, boat 100,000 -

594 100

100 100

IDF Offensives 10.11, boat Not recorded

12,051

521

Total

226,751

5,300

Source: Data from Amitzur Ilan, Origin of the Arab-Israeli Arms Race, 173– 74.35

An important revelation by Dr. Ilan was of the illegal arms deal the Israelis did with the United States and Latin America in 1948. The execution and number of arms received from this arms acquisition are listed here:

Sort

Original Deal Absorbed in IDF Notes Amount Date Amount Date

Carrier Aircrafts C46 Commando C69 Constellation Sky master

12 3 2

December 1947 9 November 1947 1 April 1948 2

May–June 194 June 1948 May–June 194

Original bombers B17 “Fortress” B25 Mitchell A2OG Havoc

4 10 4

March 1948 May 1948 June 1948

3 -

July 1948 -

Improvised Bombers C47 Dakota T6 Harvard

5 17

June 1948 March 1948

2 9

October November

Fighter aircraft P51 Mustang

8

May 1948

1

November 194

Light aircraft L4 Piper Cub T13 Trainer PT13 Steerman

8 2 15

May 1948 February 1948 May 1948

8 -

From Novemb

Entered servic

AFVs M5 Tanks M3 Half Tracks

38 100

Jeeps

?

Artillery 75 mm (Mexican)

35

Navy vessels Aircraft carrier LTC and guard bts

13 18 24

March 1948 September 194 During 1949

40

June to Decem

June 1948

32

September

1 3

February 1948 April–June

3

In 1949

Ammunition 75 mm shells 0.3, 0.5 inch Air bombs

20 tons 2 million 3,000

June 1948 April 1948

Miscellaneous Machine guns Aviation fuel Radio & Telephone

500 15,999 tons 2,000

April–May

?

September

January 1948

most

April 1948

April–May April–May April–May

most 30–5 most

August–Septem Early 1949 October

Various equipment & Military stores Sub machine guns 500 R2800 aircraft 50–60 Engines 50

March 1948 January 1948

September ? ?

Source: Data from Ilan, Origin of the Arab-Israeli Arms Race, 94.

The reasoning behind these clandestine purchases for arms requires an explanation. There appeared an attitude in Washington that the Truman Doctrine would open the door for military assistance to the Middle East and not just to Greece, Turkey, and Iran. Two organizations opposed that view; one was the Policy Committee on Arms and Armament (PCA). That committee was under the authority of the Secretary of State and had representatives from the Department of Defense and the sub-departments of the Army and Navy. The other concerned group in Washington was the Munition Division (MD) in the State Department. That division worked with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and together they gathered information in and outside the United States pertaining to individuals who were trafficking arms. It also worked with the Department of Justice. After the failure to partition Palestine in November 1947, the United States decided an arms embargo must be implemented. That became public on December 14, 1947. The response from the Arab world was not as strong as from the Zionists. The Zionists soon realized the embargo by the United States was not going away. There were many other Zionist aims, however, that the United States did :

• State Department ing partition and not trusteeship as previously proposed • Truman’s immediate recognition of Israel without confirmation at State Department or the US ambassador at the UN • Establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel • Withdrawal of the US delegation at the UN Security Council after Truman was re-elected due to the orders at the Security Council that IDF forces withdraw from the areas it held after the 1948 War

• Not honoring the Bernadotte plan

Dr. Ilan clarified that Truman upheld the embargo because he eventually realized that the embargo was working in favor of Israel. The second reason for the continuation was that the US and British governments both believed that the embargo and a truce in Palestine were essential.³

As for Senator J. William Fulbright’s influence on the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957 and the future of US foreign policy in the Middle East, there was a clear disagreement on US foreign policy in the Middle East between the Eisenhower camp on the Republican Party side and those aligned with Senator Fulbright on the Democratic Party side. Fulbright was effective in challenging the executive branch of government, which kept over-reaching its authority in foreign policy at the expense of the legislative branch. Fulbright was very concerned about these developments and took it upon himself to make an effort to address the balance between the two branches in order to stop what he believed to be an erosion of the power of the legislative branch. The Eisenhower Doctrine was the outcome of the Suez War in October 1956 when Great Britain, , and Israel attacked Egypt after Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal and blocked international shipping from ing through it. While Eisenhower forced Prime Minister Anthony Eden out of office after the war, he simultaneously wanted to preserve a strong US-British alliance. As will be fully explained in Chapter 3, Eisenhower was against trying to remove Egypt’s president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, from power by military force. He warned Eden in a series of letters that using force against Nasser was not in the best interest of the West. Eisenhower was, however, very concerned about the way Nasser tried to become the dominant force in the Middle East. Ray Takeyh believed that by November 1956 the most important challenge for Eisenhower was to “develop certain measures to reconstitute the Western influence in the Middle East.” Eisenhower won a landslide presidential election for his second term, in spite of the war. Eisenhower’s istration

feared that Egypt would fill the growing power vacuum and obstruct reorientation of the region to the cause of the Cold War.³⁷

The istration believed that two possible scenarios existed with how the Soviet Union might fill the void after Great Britain and lost the war. One way, although considered unlikely, was for the USSR to invade either Turkey or Iran. A second possibility was for Moscow to build on its relationship with other

Arab nations as it did with Egypt and Syria through economic and military assistance. This is precisely what Eisenhower would do, with the caveat that he would use military force in the region for any nation that requested US against a potential threat of international Communism. How this developed and what resulted of this strategy is explained in the following chapters.³⁸ Fulbright not only intervened in formulating US foreign policy in the Middle East, he also improved them. The following example demonstrates how Fulbright worked with others in government and influenced their ideas. During the 1960 presidential campaign, John F. Kennedy was considering Fulbright as his secretary of state but did not because Fulbright signed the “Southern Manifesto,” a document that had originated with Senator Strom Thurmond, Democrat from South Carolina and 1948 presidential candidate for the short-lived Dixiecrat Party. Thurmond strongly opposed the integration of schools in the southern states and asked all southern politicians to sign a document pledging they would defend segregation. Many politicians signed the document. Some, like Senator Al Gore Sr. of Tennessee, did not but were reelected anyway. Fulbright was from Arkansas and did not agree with Thurmond. On the other hand, he seriously believed he would not be re-elected to the US Senate if he did not sign the document and that a more extreme segregationist would take his seat.³ It is argued that just as Fulbright toned down the rhetoric of the Southern Manifesto, he influenced the Eisenhower foreign policies in the Middle East. He countered the Eisenhower Doctrine with his own resolution by focusing more on the region’s core issues. This will be clarified in the chapters dealing with the Eisenhower-Fulbright debate over how best to handle US foreign policy in the Middle East. Just as Fulbright did sign the Southern Manifesto, even though it was far from his core values, he submitted an alternative resolution to the Eisenhower Doctrine. Instead of military issues, it dealt with issues relevant to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The common thread that runs through each chapter is how the United States dealt with the USSR in the Middle East. The Kremlin was always thinking of ways to undermine the US role in the region in an attempt to fill the void after Great Britain and left.

This book is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 examines some biographical and philosophical aspects of President Truman, President Eisenhower, and Senator Fulbright. Each man made significantly difficult decisions in his career, such as Truman using the atom bomb against Japan to win the war and recognizing the State of Israel against the view by many in his istration. Eisenhower, not only as president, made many serious decisions such as when he was the Supreme Allied Commander during World War II dealing with the allied invasion of . As a general and as president, he had to deal with the Kremlin in the Middle East several times. Fulbright was the lone US senator who stood up to the ruthless tactics of Senator Joseph McCarthy and the red scare in the late 1940s and early 1950s that ruined many careers. Chapter 2 deals with the Truman presidency and how he and his istration formed and executed the Truman Doctrine. This chapter seeks to explore and explain how Palestine had a direct bearing on US foreign policy decisionmaking during the Greece and Turkey crisis. The contention, based on declassified sources, is that the Truman istration was just as concerned about the Soviet threat in Palestine as it was with the civil war in Greece leading to the Truman Doctrine of 1947. These sources show that the White House and the State Department were concerned Soviet spies might enter Palestine with the many Jewish immigrants who were coming back to their ancient homeland. They feared this could totally disrupt the Middle East. Once the Russians had access to the region through Palestine, they would be able to cause unknown amounts of controversy and disruption among the Arab states and even force the United States to leave the region. Chapter 3 focuses on why and how Eisenhower formulated the Eisenhower Doctrine. At the same time, Fulbright thought it his role to modify the Eisenhower and Dulles foreign policy in the Middle East. Eisenhower and Fulbright could not have been further apart in their foreign policy visions for the United States. Even so, Eisenhower recognized the brilliance of Fulbright and kept to one of his leadership axioms: be sure to keep someone on your staff who you know will not always agree with you. That fitted Fulbright’s philosophy that the role of a senator was to dissent when necessary, even if it meant standing alone. This relationship will be clarified in Chapters 3, 4, and 5. Another significant aim in chapter 3 is to explain the relationship between

Eisenhower and President Gamal Abdel Nasser, who became the president of Egypt in April 1954 after the Junior Officer’s Rebellion in July 1952 that overthrew the monarchy in Egypt. Nasser was very charismatic, but he was a thorn in the side of Eisenhower and belligerently challenged US foreign policy in the Middle East. As much as they were antagonists, Eisenhower and Nasser respected each other. This iration between Nasser and Eisenhower was highlighted by Salim Yaqub.

Eisenhower himself was widely respected in the Arab world, and while Nasser had harsh words for U.S. policies in the 1950s, he never attacked Eisenhower the man.⁴

In November 1956 Eisenhower was elected to his second term, winning the popular vote by 35 million votes to 26 million votes to Adlai Stevenson, the largest difference since 1936, when Franklin Roosevelt defeated Republican Alf Landon.⁴¹ During his first term, 1952–1956, Eisenhower faced numerous challenges in the Middle East, the seminal event being the Suez War of 1956. An event that influenced the Eisenhower Doctrine was the issuance of the Formosa Doctrine of 1955, which gave Eisenhower and not Congress the authority to use military force if and when he decided. At the time it proved to be a wise move for US foreign policy, for with this authority Eisenhower was able to avoid a possible war with China over the Quemoy and Matsu Islands off mainland China that involved Nationalist China in Formosa, now Taiwan. The power authorized to Eisenhower, however, was extraordinary and unprecedented. On the downside, it set the stage for presidents to erode more and more of the legislative role pertaining to war, a major concern to Fulbright. The age of the Formosa Doctrine during his first term gave Eisenhower a precedent during the early days of his second istration as he was trying to decide the best way to proceed in the Middle East. Eisenhower also had the benefit of the Truman Doctrine. These two doctrines aided Eisenhower in early January 1957. As Eisenhower was forming his new Middle East foreign policy, Fulbright was also examining the istration’s policies in the Middle East. Fulbright was

one of many in and out of government who wanted to know why the handling of American foreign policy in the Middle East appeared to be faulty. He cited examples such as Nasser turning to the Soviet Union for weapons in 1955 even though as an Arab and Muslim, Nasser despised Communism. Chapter 3 will highlight the political skills Fulbright exerted as he led the battle against the Eisenhower-Dulles foreign policy in the Middle East. His speech on February 11, 1957, in the chamber of the United States Senate is a prime example. Senator Morse of Oregon complimented Fulbright by saying it was the finest speech he had ever heard by his colleagues. Many of Fulbright’s colleagues referred to him as “the professor,” due to his thorough knowledge of the issues he raised in Congress. He discussed the merits and demerits of the Eisenhower Doctrine. He focused on many legislative concerns, such as the power of the executive branch of government to erode the legislative branch. He pointed out that there were differences between Eisenhower’s presentation to the American people concerning the doctrine on January 5, 1957, and the resolution itself. Fulbright developed an alternative to the Eisenhower Doctrine that became known as the Fulbright Resolution of 1957. Chapter 4 is basically an extension of chapter 3. It will relate how Eisenhower carried out his use of the Eisenhower Doctrine in the Middle East. He was compelled to use it four times. The first instance was after the Suez War of 1956 when Israel refused to withdraw from Gaza. The Eisenhower–Ben-Gurion exchange of letters demonstrates how difficult the situation had become from the American and Israeli perspectives. The next instance was during a crisis when it was thought that the USSR was moving into Syria. At that time, there was concern over a possible US-USSR confrontation. Patrick Seale discusses many of the facts and nuances involving US-USSR relations in Syria and how they contributed to the Eisenhower Doctrine and to the creation of the United Arab Republic that Nasser brokered with Syria in 1958. In Seale’s The Struggle for Syria, he describes the intricate situation in Syria leading up to the Suez War of 1956 and the involvement by the United States and Great Britain.⁴² This will be clarified in Chapter 4. The third and fourth instances of the use of the Eisenhower Doctrine occurred when President Chamoun of Lebanon asked Eisenhower to assist King Hussein of Jordan in his conflict with the Nasserites. Simultaneously, Chamoun feared the overthrow of his government and asked the United States to intercede based

on the Eisenhower Doctrine. In response to Chamoun’s request, Eisenhower sent military forces to Lebanon in July 1958. A question about his decision is whether or not the Eisenhower Doctrine actually applied to sending troops to Lebanon. The Fulbright perspective will be examined. Simultaneous with the problems in Beirut was the difficulty in Jordan. Eisenhower and British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan agreed Great Britain should assist King Hussein. This resulted in the realignment of American and British foreign policy in the Middle East after the serious fallout Eisenhower had previously had with Anthony Eden. Chapter 5 compares and contrasts the Truman Doctrine with the Eisenhower Doctrine while detailing differences between the latter and the Fulbright Resolution of 1957. There are three main issues discussed in this chapter. There have been several viewpoints of the significance of the Truman Doctrine. One was rendered by Professor John Lewis Gaddis, one of the preeminent scholars of the Cold War and George Kennan’s role in it. Another was by Robert Donovan, who wrote about Truman; and finally, one was by Eugene V. Rostow, who worked in the State Department during the Truman years and later as an advisor to President Johnson. Another theme is the various drafts of the Truman Doctrine and the Eisenhower Doctrine. Nuances and important issues are revealed in this process. Three drafts of the Truman Doctrine speech are examined. It is interesting to note the differences in approach between the Truman White House staff and the State Department. The Eisenhower Doctrine speech, on the other hand, was reviewed and modified by Eisenhower and not the State Department. Finally, Fulbright had a lot to say in opposition to the Eisenhower Doctrine. He clarified the differences between the speech that Eisenhower gave on January 5, 1957, and Resolution 19 that was ed by Congress. Additionally, Fulbright laid out the differences between the powers that were in place for the president to use and what Eisenhower was asking Congress to give him. They were unprecedented and troubled Fulbright greatly. The Truman and Eisenhower Libraries contain extensive documentation on events in the Middle East and around the globe. The items vary in many ways, from personal memos and letters written by Truman and Eisenhower to notes by their staff in addition to correspondence with world leaders. The variety of information gives a very good cross-reference to the executive branch of government in action. Both libraries provide insight as to how each president

and his staff dealt with foreign and domestic affairs. They both provide detailed s on how each president dealt with the Cold War. Once the archives were opened, both Truman and Eisenhower were seen very differently than right after they left office. In the case of Truman, he left office with an approval rating of 32 percent.⁴³ In time scholars have begun to fully appreciate the policies that Truman set forth during his presidency, such as establishing the Central Intelligence Agency, making the Air Force a separate military branch, and integrating the armed forces, all in 1947. After the 1980s, historians began viewing the Eisenhower presidency from a different perspective than had earlier scholars. Many believed that Eisenhower merely delegated his duties and executed the role of president in a hands-off manner. The revisionists reveal a president intimately involved in the decisionmaking process. The archives leave no doubt that the former Allied Commander was just as diligent in his duties as commander in chief. Truman and Eisenhower’s memoirs provide the personal perspective so important in writing historical fact. Their speeches and diaries reveal not only the president, but also the man. The Fulbright papers have revealed a great wealth of material relating to the Middle East. The variety of material, such as letters to and from Fulbright, is enormous. There are governmental sources, such as the resolution forming the Eisenhower Doctrine. The papers reveal the personal side of Fulbright regarding what he believed was happening in the Eisenhower istration and particularly his opposition to Secretary Dulles. Fulbright’s speeches shed light on his thought process about how various problems should be resolved. Other source material used are books written by Fulbright, where he was able to divulge his personal views on foreign relations and the Middle East specifically. Biographies on Fulbright have also proven to be very useful. Other sources used are The New York Times, The Jerusalem Post, Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic History, and The Nation. Arabic sources such as the Egyptian daily newspaper al-Ahraam and the Palestinian daily paper al-Quds both provide the Arab perspective, giving the views, opinions, and thoughts of the nations of the Middle East as they saw the events unfolding before them. This adds greatly to a better understanding of the complexities of the region through a very different lens.

Before probing the Truman Doctrine, the Eisenhower Doctrine, and the Fulbright Resolution, it is important to know more about Truman, Eisenhower, and Fulbright. The distance between the heartland of Truman’s Independence, Missouri; the spacious, rolling plains of Eisenhower’s Abilene, Kansas; and the mountains of the Ozarks where Fulbright’s Fayetteville, Arkansas, is serenely nestled is not great. There were differences of philosophy and leadership style by all three of these statesmen; however, they also had their similarities. All three had their human flaws, as will also be brought to light. One rose from the battlefields of World War I to become president, while another became a great general and president, and yet another became a great senator and acted as the conscience for America. The common thread of these three varied lives was their great respect and love for the United States of America and their tireless desire to keep her free. All three men had the abounding courage to make hard and often lonely decisions, a mark of true greatness.

The full stature of this man will only be proven by history, but I want to say here and now that there has never been a decision made under this man’s istration, affecting policies beyond our shores, that has not been in the best interest of this country. It is not the courage of these decisions that will live, but the integrity of the man. ⁴⁴

—Secretary of State George C. Marshall in tribute to President Truman on his birthday, 8 May 1948

Inherent in the whole of Eisenhower’s education was the concept of dedication, and its corollary, duty. ⁴⁵

—Stephen E. Ambrose

I have often thought that creating this opening [at the University of Arkansas Law School\ for the future Senator Fulbright may well have been the single most important contribution of my lifetime to the welfare of the State and Union. ⁴

—Professor Robert Leffler at the age of eighty-five in reflection of his sixty

years as a legal scholar

1 ABOUNDING PROMINENCE

President Truman, President Eisenhower, and Senator Fulbright came from solid families in the heartland of America. Truman’s family came from Kentucky, but ended up in Kansas and later Missouri.⁴⁷ The Eisenhower and Fulbright families were of German ancestry. All three families upheld the ethics of hard work. The ways each of these men were formally educated, however, were different. Truman was the only president in the twentieth century not to have received a formal university education. However, it is known that he read nearly all or all the two to three thousand books in the library at Independence, Missouri. Denise Bostdorff confirmed that in 1971 former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who studied at Yale and Harvard Law School, said that Truman had a “remarkable education” by reading all those books.⁴⁸ Those books and others given to him provided Truman a deep sense of history and an edge when making decisions in the White House.⁴ In the case of President Eisenhower, his formal education included West Point, the US Army Command and General Staff College at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas and the US Army War College at Ft. McNair in Washington, DC. Eisenhower credited his time in Panama as one of his best educational experiences. Major General Fox Conner, highly regarded in army circles as a genius, provided the future Allied Commander the best education of his life. He would lend Eisenhower books from his personal library, and then they would discuss and analyze the decision-making processes of the greatest military leaders over the centuries. The merits of that education were proven on the beaches of Normandy in 1944.⁵ Senator Fulbright’s formal education was at the University of Arkansas, Oxford University, and George Washington Law School. Fulbright also had an outstanding politics tutor at Oxford: Professor Robert McCallum. He taught Fulbright how to write and influenced him to President Wilson’s ideas of collective security.⁵¹

On June 5, 1945, less than two months after Truman took office, the State Department sent him a memorandum on an urgent matter in the Middle East. The presidents and foreign ministers of Syria and Lebanon thanked Truman for “precious ” during the “bloody days of abominable oppression” by the French. The report went on to say that the conditions in Syria were dire, and people were starving in Damascus. The French finance minister let it be known that if did have to depart from the French mandate, consisting of Syria and Lebanon and located in the Levant (Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, and— after May 1948—Israel), he hoped the Russians would go head to head with the British and show them up, demonstrating the animosity that existed between the British and the French in the Levant.⁵² At a press conference on June 7, 1945, Truman was asked if he would consider a Big Five conference on Syria. His response was of a Big Three conference that consisted of the United States, Great Britain, and . He had no intention of dealing with Stalin on Syria.⁵³ Pertaining to Palestine as the Second World War was winding down, Undersecretary of State Joseph Grew sent President Truman a memorandum in May 1945, just weeks after Truman became president.

On April 18 Secretary Stettinius sent you a personal and confidential letter in which he pointed out that efforts would undoubtedly be made by the Zionists to obtain commitments from you in favor of their program for Palestine, and that while we were making every effort to relieve the suffering of the Jews in Europe we felt that the question of Palestine was a highly complex one which must be handled with the greatest of care.⁵⁴

The correspondence of President Truman’s cabinet show clearly that they were paying very close attention to the Levant and specifically to Palestine. Harry S. Truman was born on May 8, 1884. After losing their first child, John and Martha Young Truman had a boy and named him Harry after Martha’s brother Harrison. Some thought that, like another president, Ulysses S. Grant,

Truman’s S was a filler.⁵⁵ Alonzo Hamby showed that the S stood for two of Truman’s grandfathers, one named Solomon Young and one named Anderson Shippe Truman.⁵ One of the first books that Truman liked very much was Charles F. Horne’s Great Men and Famous Women, given to him by his mother. As mentioned by Dean Acheson, Truman read all the books in the Independence library and read the Bible three times before the age of twelve.⁵⁷ Truman’s knowledge of history and the Bible helped him make some of the most important decisions in the history of the United States of America as it and its allies ended the most intensive war the world had ever witnessed. His childhood reading acted as a moral primer for the momentous decisions that were laid upon him as president. Among them were dropping the first atomic bomb to end the war against Japan, approving the Marshall Plan to save a starving Europe, approving the Truman Doctrine that began the US defense against the Soviets and winning the Cold War, integrating the armed forces in 1947, setting up the Central Intelligence Agency, making the Air Force a separate branch of the armed forces, and ing the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. Dean Acheson may have said it best.

President Truman’s strength lay not only in knowing that he was President and that the buck stopped with him, but that neither he nor the White House staff was the Secretary of State, or Defense, or Treasury, or any other … He made the ultimate decisions upon full and detailed knowledge, leaving to lieutenants the execution.⁵⁸

Many of the heroes that Truman read about in the Bible and history books would later influence how he dealt with many of the individuals with whom he would later associate in his adult life. This held true if it was Missouri politics with local boss Tom Pendergast or international politics with Secretary Marshall and Secretary Acheson. After ing the State of Israel, Truman said, “I am Cyrus.” King Cyrus in the Old Testament freed the Jews from their days of enslavement in Babylon. Truman was not boasting about his role in Israel; rather, he was stating that he, like King Cyrus, had a significant place in Jewish history.⁵ As Sandra Mackey wrote, it was King Cyrus who liberated the Jews

with their remaining gold and silver confiscated by Nebuchadnezzar and who allowed them to return to Israel “to rebuild their temple in Jerusalem.” Truman also would rely on historical figures such as President Andrew Jackson— Truman believed Jackson was the greatest of all US presidents. Even the Palestinian newspaper al-Quds (‫ )اﻟﻘﺪس‬wrote about Truman’s famous quote in an article on January 13, 2014, by Muhammad Gallil Aniya, an American writer of Palestinian origin. In the article, he wrote a historical summary of the Arab-Israeli relations and the difficulties since World War II. He summarized the situation by saying that President Truman was the American president sitting between two other presidents, Roosevelt and Eisenhower, who favored the Palestinian cause more than Truman. He used the example of Roosevelt believing there was not enough land for the incoming Jewish refugees from Europe, while Eisenhower was tough on Ben-Gurion after the Suez War, asking him to withdraw Israeli troops from the Sinai. ¹ One of Truman’s great desires as a young man was to attend West Point, but due to his eyesight, he could not be itted. Not deterred from serving in the military, he ed the Missouri National Guard in April 1917. His National Guard unit became the 135th Division and trained at Camp Doniphan in Fort Sill, Oklahoma. Truman was thirty-three years old at the time of his enlistment. He believed he would be a sergeant. “Instead, he was elected a first lieutenant, officers in the Guard then still being chosen by the men as in the Civil War days.” ² He was in an artillery regiment. One of his duties was to run the canteen for the soldiers. Truman selected one of his Jewish friends, Eddie Jacobson, to assist him in running the canteen, which became a profitable business for the unit. In time, Jacobson became instrumental in persuading Truman to the foundation of Israel. Truman believed he could trace his political career back to his days in the military. ³ During Truman’s service in , he wrote to his girlfriend and future wife, Bess Wallace, constantly. On October 8, 1918, he described how tough the fighting was from September 10 until October 6. He indicated a sense of pride in not losing a single member of his battery, as others had on his flanks. Truman commanded Battery D. ⁴ As he rose in the political world, Battery D became famous. After Truman won the 1948 presidential election, of the battery ed him in his

inaugural parade in January 1949. He became a respected commander who cared for his soldiers, who in turn did all they could to perform for him. ⁵ Truman would keep a very close relationship with of his battery the rest of his life. After returning home from the war he remained in the National Guard and retired with the rank of colonel. In his memoirs, President Truman highlighted the experience he had in the military. His wartime experiences during World War I benefited him while he headed the Senate committee to investigate warproduction mismanagement just before World War II. On January 1, 1923, Harry Truman was elected judge of Jackson County, primarily through his connection with the politically corrupt Pendergast machine. Throughout his political career, Truman never let on that he was in the least bit regretful that Tom Pendergast promoted his rise in local politics, even when Pendergast was sent to prison. When Tom Pendergast ed away during his first term, Truman went to Kansas City to attend his funeral. Truman was a Wilsonian, but he did not want to make the same mistakes Wilson made at Versailles. Truman believed that had Wilson been successful in forming the League of Nations, World War II might have been prevented, as the United States would have been much more involved in European politics. ⁷ Anne Pierce discussed the fact that Wilson was the first president to have the boldness and the reason to break with neutrality that had so long been US foreign policy.

Wilson would eventually take the position that we must sacrifice some of the purity which comes from aloofness from foreign struggles and wars in order to influence and help others.

George Washington’s farewell address set the policy for the United States not to get entangled in European affairs, and that advice prevailed in America from 1797 until World War I, as ’s U-boat campaign in the Atlantic sank many cargo ships, including US ships. As a result, Wilson could no longer avoid involvement in the war being waged in Europe. No president until Wilson became so involved with Europe. He wanted the United States to influence Europe and not the other way around. America was beginning to rethink its broader role in the world as the “dangers and aggression” in others parts of the

world were seen as bearing on the United States itself. ⁸ Truman handed the presidency, on January 20, 1953, to Eisenhower, who was sworn in as the thirty-fourth president. For Truman, the main issues concerning the Middle East were the State of Israel and the Truman Doctrine aimed at the Soviets. For Eisenhower, it was Nasser, pan-Arabism, and keeping the Soviets out of the region. The result was the Eisenhower Doctrine, again aimed at the Soviets and sending armed forces to Lebanon to provide a strong message to Nasser. Dwight David Eisenhower, born on the night of October 14, 1890, in Denison, Texas, was one of six brothers. He was the third son of David and Ida Eisenhower. The Eisenhower’s were Pennsylvania Dutch, originating in the Lower Rhineland. The name was Anglicized from Eisenhauer, meaning “iron hewer.” Hans Nicol Eisenhauer, along with his wife, three sons, and brother, left the Rhineland in 1741, bound for Philadelphia.⁷ In Abilene, Kansas, a century and a half later, the Eisenhower’s were a respected family. After a bad financial experience with a clothing store in Hope, Kansas, David always ensured his bills were paid. Ida was a good mother to her children, and instilled the importance of hard work, fun, and honesty. David and Ida were not prominent in their community. Their sole investment was in their sons, all so that they should have a better life and more opportunities than they had. Years later, when General Eisenhower laid the cornerstone to the Eisenhower Library in Abilene, on June 4, 1952, he said:

I found out in later years we were very poor, but the glory of America is that we didn’t know it then. All we knew was that our parents of great courage could say to us: Opportunity is all about you. Reach out and take it.⁷¹

Eisenhower’s parents instilled in him and his brothers’ solid virtues, including daily Bible readings and praying. Being a tough football player and having “Best Historian and Mathematician” under his name in the Abilene High School annual helped him enter the United States Military Academy at West Point.⁷² Eisenhower’s experience there shaped the rest of his life. Eisenhower was devoted to playing football, and when he badly injured his knee, he became so

dismayed that he thought about leaving the Academy. As a result of his injury, he coached the junior varsity team, gave speeches before games to the corps, and was a cheerleader. One of his early fitness reports as a junior officer said, “he was born to command.”⁷³ He graduated in the class of 1915, commonly referred to as “the class the stars fell on.” He finished sixty-first in a class of 164. Of those, all of whom graduated, fifty-nine became brigadier generals or higher; three became full generals; and two, General Eisenhower and General Omar Bradley, achieved the rank of general of the army, or five-star general.⁷⁴ During his military career, General Eisenhower had the fortune of working with the best generals of his day, particularly in Panama under General Fox Conner. General Conner was credited as being the “brains of the Pershing AEF Headquarters” during World War I. The Eisenhowers lived next door to General and Mrs. Connor. General Conner was from a wealthy family in Mississippi and graduated from West Point in 1898. He was a true military scholar of war. His home in Panama was filled with books on the subject, and Major Eisenhower was able to take advantage of General Connor’s library. He also had the opportunity to talk about great battles and strategy with General Connor. Eisenhower proved to be an astute student, graduating first in his class out of 245 students at the Command and General Staff College at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1926. Eisenhower did not fight in World War I, much to his chagrin. Eventually, however, he caught the eye of General George C. Marshall, the chief of staff of the army. During World War II, Eisenhower was promoted rapidly due to his outstanding abilities. General Marshall put Eisenhower in command of the invasion of North Africa and Sicily in November 1943. That experience resulted in Eisenhower’s promotion to supreme Allied commander and conducting the Allied invasion of Normandy that commenced June 6, 1944. General Marshall was impressed by Eisenhower, who would analyze a situation and then present a solution to it in simple . Unlike many other capable leaders, Eisenhower would not just bring problems to Marshall but, more important, would make decisions. He never brought Marshall a problem without recommendations, one of Marshall’s criteria of leadership.⁷⁵ After World War II, Truman appointed Eisenhower chief of staff of the army,

where he served from November 1945 until February 1948. Foreign policy went through a change as Truman transformed the US government. The National Security Act was ed in 1947, creating the Central Intelligence Agency⁷ and the Department of Defense. Within the Department of Defense were the Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force (separated from the Army under this Act).⁷⁷ Eisenhower understood the importance of “strong cooperative arrangements” between the United States and the United Kingdom. He pursued a strong US-UK alliance to save the world from a third world war. Eisenhower did not believe, as did many, that the United States was facing an imminent land war with the Soviets. He based his belief on the fact that the Soviets were not building a large logistical base for an impending invasion.⁷⁸ As the Army Chief of Staff, Eisenhower was involved in strategic planning for the event of war with the Soviet Union. The Middle East was indispensable in US strategy, and the Truman Doctrine had a major role in US planning. There was a possible threat through Soviet subversion in Greece. Had it succeeded, Greece would have fallen under Soviet dominion. The fear was that Turkey and Iran and possibly and Italy would also fall to the Soviet Union.⁷ Since 1945 the USSR had tried to pressure Turkey for access to the Dardanelles, but the Turkish government did not capitulate to Soviet demands. The American government also believed the Soviets wanted Turkish naval bases. The American ambassador to Turkey informed President Truman that if Turkey fell to the Soviets, the Persian Gulf and the Suez Canal would be vulnerable to a Soviet takeover.⁸ Eisenhower agreed with the other services that the US military role at that time was defensive. It was estimated that the Soviet Union would try to overrun , , Spain, Turkey, the Middle East, and—with Yugoslav —all of Greece and at least part of Italy. The US role in that situation was twofold: First, hold onto the bases in the Middle East with Great Britain. Second, keep the lines of communication open in case the need arose for military personnel and supplies in the region. If there was to be an US air offensive, bases in Europe and Korea were to be evacuated. It was predicted that the United States and its allies would be able to mount an offensive during the third year of war. They would launch the attack through the “Southern Approach” of the Mediterranean and the Near East.⁸¹

It was during this time that America was forming what became a three-phased strategy in the Middle East. It began with the Truman Doctrine dated March 12, 1947. The strategy was based on the idea of a containment policy against the Soviets and was first devised by George Kennan in an article he wrote in May 1945 entitled “Russia’s International Position at the Close of the War with .” Kennan was concerned by the fact that the Soviet Union wanted to move in and take over much of the “postwar world.”⁸² Kennan’s theory, implemented by Truman, eventually evolved into the Truman Doctrine that was to contain the Soviet expansion into Greece and Turkey and then the Middle East.

The immediate cause of Truman’s epochal speech in March [12, 1947] was the impending crisis in Greece, but in reality, his willingness to extend American aid to nations threatened by the communist specter was based on the threats to Iran and Turkey.

Dean Acheson, who became President Truman’s secretary of state during the second Truman istration, was convinced that if the USSR controlled Greece and Turkey, it would lead to the capitulation of the Middle East to the Soviet Union. The Truman Doctrine was a US commitment to reigning in Communism around the world. Although the Doctrine was confined to a regional policy, its implications were global. Other US motives were to keep the lines of communication open to the Middle East for shipping and international air routes.⁸³ In between the second and third phase of America’s containment strategy, an attempt was made in July 1951 to set up a Middle East Command in Cairo. At a special meeting that Acheson requested of the North Atlantic Council, he first approached the Council on itting Greece and Turkey to that organization. Then he discussed the possibility of the Middle East Command, with the idea that Turkey would be a “founding member.” The National Security Council had decided that Greece and Turkey should be of NATO. Turkey was going to be invaluable, because the t Chiefs of Staff recognized that the United States needed to repair the airbases in Turkey for the use of both US and Turkish planes. A neutral Turkey would have been problematic. Additionally, Turkish

armed forces would be “key” in any attempt by Soviet forces to advance towards Cairo, Suez, and the Saudi oil fields. The matter was also urgent because the Egyptians were trying to remove the British military forces from Suez, and it was vital that the issue of Turkey be settled first.⁸⁴ Acheson requested, through General Marshall, then Secretary of Defense, to work with the State Department to look at America’s interests and policies extending from the Eastern Mediterranean to India. What they found was not encouraging. Acheson discovered that, since 1947, as the United States was involving itself in a region long dominated by the British and French, the US role was “waxing and waning.” There was growing turmoil between Arabs and Israelis, and the door was widening for Soviet penetration. The United States did not want to sign security arrangements or commit to a US military presence with forces on the ground. The preference was to let the British provide the needed armed forces in the area, though that was before the United States found out that the British were pulling out their assets from the Middle East. What Acheson wanted to do in conjunction with the Pentagon was to assist Arabs and Israelis with “small military training missions, more of their officers placed into US Military Schools and provide limited weapons and ammunition for training.”⁸⁵ The strategy was to establish stability among the Arab states and Israel so emphasis could be placed on Greece, Turkey, and Iran. At the same time, Turkey and Greece made it clear that they wanted to become of NATO. On September 8, 1951, the United States had invited the British to the Pentagon to establish a Middle East Command (MEC) that would be overseen by a Supreme Allied Commander Middle East headquartered in Cairo. The Command was to have Egyptian officers and to be under the direction of Middle East Chiefs of Staff. The United States and mainly the Pentagon thought the plan had merit because the British were relinquishing the Suez Canal to the Egyptians and withdrawing many of the British troops. However, based on the MEC, there would be British troops remaining. The United States wanted the British to take responsibility for the canal in addition to the Middle East. The Egyptians thought this might be a kind of devious plan to keep the British in Suez.⁸ General Omar Bradley, the last appointed five-star general, first official chairman of the t Chiefs of Staff, and first chairman of the NATO Committee,⁸⁷ visited Turkey in October 1951 and found out the Turks were not committed to being the “linchpin between Western Europe and the Middle East.” Under the Middle East Command scenario, the Turks would serve under a

British Supreme Allied Commander, and they refused this requirement. The Turks also wanted to have a significant role in the defense of Europe. All else, from the Turkish point of view, “would affront their national prestige, endanger their internal political position, and weaken their claims for military assistance.”⁸⁸ What eventually became a significant contributor to the downfall of the Middle East Command were clashes between British and Egyptian military forces around the town of Ismailia. On July 22 and 23, 1952, a coup d’état overthrew King Farouk. General Muhammad Naguib headed the coup while the real power was Nasser. At first it appeared that the new Egyptian government was going to the US and British effort with the Middle East Command in exchange for military and economic aid. It appeared as though the Egyptians were going to settle any problem they had with the British over the Suez Canal and with defending the area. Due to internal disagreements between the US and British governments, however, the arrangement hoped for did not materialize in Egypt. This would eventually lead to the third phase of the American strategy for containment.⁸ Secretary Dulles had traveled to the Middle East in 1953 to promote the Middle East Command. He was concerned that so much attention was being given by the Arab nations to Israel, Great Britain, and the French that in fact the possible threat by USSR was being overlooked. Because of that he wanted the Northern Tier to be established as a buffer zone. The Northern Tier would be comprised of Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. The goal was to protect the British base at Suez. Dulles emphasized to the nations in the region that any collective security program needed to be comprised of nations in the region.

It should be designed and grow from within out of a sense of common destiny and common danger.

At first Naguib was enthusiastic, knowing an organization like that required local and regional from within. However, the Egyptian point of view changed, as it might interfere with Anglo-British negotiations for British withdrawal, weaken Egypt’s influence in the Arab world, and strengthen Iraq,

who was trying to establish its own sphere of influence among the Arab nations. These factors led to the failure of the Middle East Command. ¹ The second phase of American strategy in the Middle East came in 1955 with the formation of the Baghdad Pact formed to counter the Soviet penetration into Egypt. The Pact was also formed due to the failure of the Middle East Command. The third phase was the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957. ² Much of the success of the Eisenhower Doctrine is related to the leadership that Eisenhower experienced in the military. While the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Eisenhower based his philosophy of leadership on three principles. He first believed in the unity of command, which he learned through his own difficult and very trying experiences during World War II. Next, he believed in a “strong peacetime military organization.” He was fully aware of the responsibilities the United States was facing internationally, and he wanted the army to be fully in step with the rapidly changing world. He was primarily concerned in having a peacetime military that could switch to wartime footing immediately and avoid many of the difficulties the military faced when mobilized for World War II. General Eisenhower’s third principle was avoiding future conflict. He sought to achieve this by developing “cooperation among the former wartime allies.” He was aiming for:

• US-Soviet relations to improve • A strong role for the United Nations • Nations of the West to be strongly united ³

In February 1948, General Eisenhower stepped down as the Army Chief of Staff. He hoped to find a small college in mid-America where he might be able to become the president and enjoy life. Instead, he was persuaded by the CEO of IBM, Thomas J. Watson, to become the next president of Columbia University. Before he took the job at Columbia, Eisenhower decided it was important to write his World War II memoirs. He accomplished this task in six months, using Grant’s memoirs as an example. Eisenhower’s book, Crusade in Europe, became

an enormous bestseller, selling over 1 million copies. For his endeavors, he received $635,000. ⁴ After writing Crusade in Europe, Eisenhower was a guest of William Robinson at the Augusta National Golf Club. Robinson was the vice-president of the New York Herald Tribune, and through him Eisenhower was introduced to a group of powerful and wealthy men known as “the gang,” with Robinson in charge. Other were Clifford Roberts, a New York investment banker; Robert Woodruff, chairman of the board of Coca-Cola; W. Alton (Pete) Jones, president of the Cities Service Company; and George Allen, a New York and Washington corporate lawyer and the only Democrat of the group. The gang built Eisenhower a cottage at Augusta National and gave him a hip. They also looked after Eisenhower’s financial and political interests. The gang played bridge, golf, hunted, and fished together. Eisenhower discussed with them Columbia and what was best for the nation. Those discussions broadened his perspective and gave him a sounding board to voice his views on the nation and the world. The education Eisenhower received through these men was not unlike what General Fox Conner did for him many years before. The gang had their own influential connections and spent time and effort to promote Eisenhower for president. Robinson became Eisenhower’s best friend and a principle player in Eisenhower’s presidential election in 1952. ⁵ During his tenure at Columbia University, Eisenhower was committed to “capitalism and democracy.” He started a program of annual conferences at the university that he believed would allow the university to use its “moral and intellectual strength as a power for good throughout the country in the Western world.” One of these conferences was the American Assembly. It brought together individuals from various backgrounds to discuss the numerous problems and challenges facing the nation. He also began a program for the conservation of human resources. He founded the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia as well as a new engineering center. In 1948, the same year Eisenhower went to Columbia, Truman was struggling with the issue of recognizing Israel as a state. Truman knew it was his moral obligation to recognize the state of Israel, especially after the Holocaust. He even declared when he assumed the presidency in 1945 that the “Arab-Jewish conflict over Palestine was the issue that most troubled his istration.” The decision by Truman was made against strong opposition from the State Department.

General Marshall, then secretary of state, believed recognizing Israel would strain US-Arab relations. For Truman to deny Secretary Marshall was not simple, because Truman considered Marshall the greatest American of the twentieth century. ⁷ The president was finally convinced that recognition of a Jewish state in Palestine was the right decision after he met Chaim Weizmann, who would become the first President of Israel, at the White House. The meeting was secret and set up by Eddie Jacobson, President Truman’s old Army friend and business partner. Israel was founded on May 14, 1948, and Truman ensured the United States would be the first nation to recognize it. ⁸ Two years later, after the recognition of Israel, an arms race in the Middle East was a major concern for the American government, along with Great Britain and . President Truman turned to Great Britain and , and together the three nations formulated the Tripartite Declaration of 1950, blocking the possibility of an arms race in the Middle East. In December 1950, President Truman asked Eisenhower to return to Europe to serve as the first commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO. On January 31, 1951, General Eisenhower made a speech to both houses of Congress. He told them that he believed NATO was a “feasible military alliance.” He also believed that if the military forces in Europe could be assembled under a single, unified command, this would result in a strong Europe. And finally, he believed the United States would need to keep six divisions in Europe for the foreseeable future. As the supreme Allied commander of Europe, General Eisenhower instituted one unifying policy for the governments of Europe.

If we could make a go of a practical pact permitting common military plans, procurement, organization, and control of the forces of NATO, the security of Western Europe would be assured. The region would then become a complex which would be, militarily, economically, politically, as powerful as any other in the world.

General Eisenhower spent a year and a half as the commander of NATO. As the first to hold that position, he had no formal guidelines, so he had to make every

aspect of NATO work by establishing the parameters while performing his mission. By the time of his departure from NATO in May 1952, only days away from entering the political race for the presidency, Eisenhower believed he had built a strong organization and stated he was proud of what he and his organization had established. Eisenhower formally entered politics in the summer of 1952.¹ Senator J. William Fulbright had been in Congress since 1943. During World War II, Fulbright was a member of the House of Representatives and was thinking beyond the war. He dwelt on how the world might be a safer place after the war was brought to a successful conclusion. During World War II, Fulbright studied the main issues of international relations and the war. In 1940, while president of the University of Arkansas, he advocated US intervention against Hitler. During that year, Fulbright lectured on how Hitler was threatening the United States while conquering Europe. He said the world was at war and America needed to decide what it should do about it. He wanted America to defend the “Atlantic Highway.”¹ ¹ Fulbright, like Truman, was greatly influenced by President Wilson, who served from 1912 to 1920.¹ ² At the end of World War I, Wilson struggled to form a League of Nations, firmly believing it was the answer to the bitterness of four years of war. The League of Nations was not successful; however, the Wilsonian ideal prevailed. Fulbright, under Wilson’s influence, identified yet another opportunity to form such an organization. He was instrumental in forming the United Nations through the Fulbright Resolution. Fulbright was an honest broker of US foreign policy during the Truman and Eisenhower presidencies. He was very concerned about the way US foreign policy was being istered in the Middle East. Fulbright believed the Truman Doctrine had merit in March 1947, but over the next two decades he began to question America’s global foreign policy based on the Truman Doctrine.

From Korea to Berlin to Cuba to Vietnam the Truman Doctrine governed America’s response to the Communist world. Tactics changed—from “massive retaliation” to “limited war” and “counterinsurgency”—but these were variations on a classic formulation, based on assumptions which few really questioned. Sustained by an inert Congress, the policy makers of the forties, fifties and early

sixties were never compelled to reexamine the premises of the Truman Doctrine, or even to defend them in constructive adversary proceedings.¹ ³

A decade later Fulbright sought to alter the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957. He and the influential journalist Walter Lippmann sought to rein in the influence of Eisenhower’s secretary of state, John Foster Dulles. Fulbright was determined to keep White House policies, whether Democrat or Republican, from straying too far to the right or left. At a 1956 New Year’s Eve party at Lippmann’s home in Washington, Fulbright complained about Congress’ role and how it was progressing. Fulbright believed the executive was eroding the legislative branch of the government, and he was a staunch advocate of the separation of powers as prescribed by the founding fathers. Lippmann then asked Fulbright to take the leadership role to “indict not only Eisenhower’s foreign policy, but the assumptions and values that underlay it.”¹ ⁴ This was right after the Suez War and just days before Eisenhower declared the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957. James William Fulbright was one of six children of Jay and Roberta Fulbright. He was born in 1905 in the city of Sumner, Missouri. Less than a year later his family moved to Fayetteville, Arkansas. The Fulbright family, like the Truman and Eisenhower families, had a reputation for work. Fulbright’s father ed away in 1923. At his untimely death at the age of fifty-two, Jay “owned all or part of several small banks in the area, a hotel, a grocery, a Coca-Cola franchise, an ice-house, and significantly, a newspaper.”¹ ⁵ All business matters in the Fulbright household fell to Roberta Fulbright after Jay ed away. Over the years, she would receive help from her son Bill in managing the business affairs of the Fulbright family. She had previously studied journalism for a short time at the University of Missouri. When the family responsibilities were sorted out, she turned to their family-owned newspaper, the Daily Democrat. She wrote a personal column, “As I See It,” and became involved in Arkansas politics. Bill Fulbright had an ideal childhood. From the most prominent family in Fayetteville, he was an exceptionally bright student who also proved his athletic abilities in football and tennis. He graduated from the University of Arkansas in 1924 and then applied for the Rhodes Scholar Program at Oxford. Fulbright was accepted and before attending Oxford, he remained at the University of Arkansas

and attended classes in the law school. There he met three people who would be influential in his life. The first was the founder and dean of the law school, Julius Waterman. Professor Waterman would eventually ask Fulbright to the faculty at the University of Arkansas.¹ Another influence was a young, twenty-four-year-old Harvard Law School graduate and gifted professor of law at the University of Arkansas, Claude Pepper. He and Fulbright became lifelong friends through politics, serving together in the Senate. After being defeated for re-election to the Senate, Pepper served twenty-seven years in the House of Representatives. Fulbright said of Pepper:

He was the mentor I trusted most, a good advisor to me until his death.¹ ⁷

The third influence in Fulbright’s life was Robert Leflar, professor of law at the University of Arkansas. As a legal scholar, he had a brilliant career. He was involved in many diverse activities including “writing a nationally recognized treatise on conflict of laws, working as a Roosevelt istration lawyer during World War II, [serving] as a Justice on the Arkansas Supreme Court, and initiating the Appellate Judges Seminars at New York University in the mid1950s and teaching more than a 1000 appellate judges over a 30-year period.”¹ ⁸ Likely the most important mentor for Fulbright was his politics tutor at Oxford University, Professor Robert B. McCallum, who was only seven years older than his pupil. In one of the many letters they exchanged over twenty-five years, McCallum wrote:

One of my greatest satisfactions is seeing how far some of my pupils have gone in life and what they have achieved, you above all. I am most grateful for the continuing friendship.¹

Having just returned from Princeton University the year before in 1924,

McCallum became a lifelong irer of President Wilson.¹¹ President Wilson’s influence would be felt throughout Fulbright’s life and inspire him to be a staunch advocate of the UN, though in later years he expressed his dissatisfaction with the way the UN was operating. He believed international conflicts could be best resolved by a world organization such as the League of Nations envisioned by President Wilson. Thus, the impact of Robert McCallum was indeed significant.¹¹¹ Fulbright graduated from Oxford in 1928, taking a second in modern history.¹¹² After Oxford, Fulbright toured Europe with his family and a friend. After the trip Fulbright remained in Vienna, a haven for foreign correspondents. While in Vienna he would hang out at the Louvre, a restaurant where the correspondents would meet. It was there that Fulbright met Mike Fodor, a Hungarian correspondent. Fodor, senior to Fulbright, took him under his wing, just as McCallum had at Oxford. Fodor knew many of the heads of state in Europe and introduced Fulbright to them. When he decided to tour the Balkans, he asked Fulbright to him. Fodor broadened Fulbright’s views on the world and international arena. Fodor did for Fulbright what General Conner did for Eisenhower: provide a practical education outside the classroom and in the real world.¹¹³ Following Oxford, Fulbright graduated from George Washington Law School in 1934, second in a class of 135. After teaching on the faculty at the University of Arkansas Law School, Fulbright became the president of the University in 1939. In 1943 Fulbright entered politics after a disagreement he had with the governor of Arkansas over matters pertaining to the University of Arkansas. He won a congressional seat. While a junior member of the House of Representatives, Fulbright wrote the Fulbright Resolution and introduced it on April 5, 1944, as H.R. 200 (House Resolution 200). The outcome was the formation of the United Nations. In an article written by Associated Press writer Norman Walker, Fulbright told Walker that it took him fifteen years to write the resolution. The Fulbright Resolution made Fulbright “the House’s leading spokesman on foreign affairs and the darling of the internationalists.” On July 2, 1945, President Truman addressed both the Senate and the House in Congress and discussed before them the Fulbright and Connally Resolutions. Senator Tom Connally was a Democrat from Texas on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Although not

considered an intellectual, he was shrewd. He disagreed with Fulbright on the UN Resolution.¹¹⁴ Fulbright’s Resolution was a very succinct statement that was being looked upon as a future post-war guide. It reads as follows:

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring) that the Congress hereby expresses itself as favoring the creation of appropriate international machinery with power adequate to establish and maintain a just and lasting peace among the nations of the world, and as favoring participation by the United States therein.¹¹⁵

While Fulbright was very moved to hear President Truman read off the various points of his resolution, he was also very concerned about the remnants of isolationism in Congress. Many senators and congressmen were writing resolutions at the time. Fulbright, as a young, first-term congressman, trumped them all, including the senators. When a committee formed to review the proposed resolutions, it was the clarity of the Fulbright Resolution that won them over. Fulbright believed the United States had no foreign policy but rather relied on “a policy of expedients.” Fulbright was putting what he had learned from Fodor and McCallum to practical use for the good of America. Fodor had provided Fulbright with a first-hand look at the governments of Europe and their leaders while McCallum had provided Fulbright his Wilsonian point of view that the best foreign policy was one that included collective security and abandoned isolationism. Fulbright upheld those views thirty-one years in Congress.¹¹ When Fulbright did not get the opportunity to attend the UN Conference in San Francisco in 1945, he felt slighted because of it.¹¹⁷ Fulbright would be a dissenting voice in Congress, often disagreeing with presidents, Democrat or Republican. This was true during the Suez crisis over how the Eisenhower istration handled Nasser. Fulbright differed with Eisenhower on “strategic deterrence.” The Eisenhower-Dulles idea was to protect the anti-Communist world through the threat of the Strategic Air Command, armed with nuclear weapons. This was their alternative to President Truman’s method of equal division of the defense allocations among the three

services. Prior to the 1956 presidential election, Senator Fulbright thought that using massive retaliation as a foreign policy would “lead to nuclear war or a Communist takeover of the developing world.”¹¹⁸ Fulbright thought that the primary accomplishment of his life as a public servant was establishing his student exchange program, known today as the Fulbright Scholarship. The state department said the Fulbright Program was

‘the most fabulously profitable investment ever authorized by Congress,’ a program that one day would lead Fulbright’s tutor at Oxford, R. B. McCallum, to say that his former pupil had been ‘responsible for the largest and most significant movement of scholars across the earth since the fall of Constantinople in 1453,’ and to cause a President of the United States, John F. Kennedy, to refer to it as ‘the classic modern example of beating swords into plowshares.’¹¹

The Fulbright Program is a work of genius. The program was introduced in Congress quietly in 1945, in the aftermath of World War II. Fulbright wanted to establish an educational program so that American students could study abroad and foreign students could study in America. Having been a Rhodes Scholar helped Senator Fulbright create the program bearing his name. It was funded through the American surplus materials abroad. The debt from the war was high. Throughout the world there was surplus equipment such as trucks, jeeps, and bulldozers serving no purpose. Many nations that may have wanted them were unable to buy them. Fulbright knew if countries were provided with a way to buy the surplus with their own currency, that money might be turned into credit for the scholar exchange program. The Fulbright Act was ed on August 1, 1946.¹²

Eventually (who knows?) we may even kick over the household gods once and for all and become good friends— ¹²¹

—J. William Fulbright while writing on the Truman Doctrine

The world was now divided into two hostile camps, Acheson warned, a situation unprecedented since the days of Rome and Carthage. ¹²²

—John Lewis Gaddis on the Cold War

Forrestal worried that if the Russians gained a presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, they would have the ability to cut the flow of critical raw materials to the West. ¹²³ [Secretary of the Navy\

—Melvyn P. Leffler on the subject of the Truman Doctrine and the Middle East

2 GREECE, TURKEY, PALESTINE, AND THE SOVIET THREAT

During the first Truman istration, the issues of Greece and Palestine were parallel and at times overlapping as each played a key role in Truman’s foreign policy. Truman’s policy towards Palestine was critical to his policies in the Middle East, influencing US relations with the Arab world and the importance of securing oil for the United States and Europe. It was a vital matter of national defense. President Truman maintained that it was critical for the Jews of Europe to have a homeland after the unspeakable suffering they had endured during the Second World War. Faith mattered to President Truman. Elizabeth Spalding wrote:

Religion was important to Truman and his worldview. Upon inspection, what emerges is a man of deep, if simple, faith, who depended only a little on formal religion but prayed daily. And Truman did not change when he became president. He carried his faith into his approach to and practice of statecraft, arguing that an ethical code was necessary to politics properly understood. Reflected in private writings, public speeches, and other official documents, his religious convictions also informed his Cold War statesmanship.¹²⁴

The journalist and Truman biographer Robert Donovan believed the issue of a homeland for Jews defined foreign and domestic matters more than any previous US foreign policy issue facing the United States. He maintained that Truman’s innate understanding of the Bible justified his view that the Jews had a right to return to their ancient roots in Palestine. He claimed that

By federation, trusteeship, or extension of the British Mandate, fell by the wayside. By dint of history, of immigration, legal and otherwise, and of their

own efforts to build and defend a community, the Jews had a destiny in Palestine that was beyond Truman’s power to change, even if he had wished to, which was not the case.

According to Donovan, Truman made the decision to recognize Israel because he and his advisers believed it to be in the best interest of US security.¹²⁵ His understanding of history, world affairs, and national security led Truman to his seemingly abrupt and unhesitating recognition of Israel before the Russians. When Truman assumed office, he sought advice on “the great issues of wartime strategy and diplomacy” from iral William D. Leahy, chief of staff to the commander in chief; Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal; Secretary of War Henry L Stimson; Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall; and iral Earnest J. King, chief of naval operations. He also relied on James F. Byrnes, a “former congressman, senator, Supreme Court Justice, and wartime director of mobilization.” Byrnes assisted Roosevelt on the domestic economy, and according to Melvyn Leffler, he was acting “as an assistant president.” Roosevelt selected Truman as his 1944 running mate, and that greatly disappointed Byrnes. As he was leaving office, he was asked to attend the Yalta Conference with Roosevelt. After attending the conference, Byrnes became the istration’s staunchest “proponent of the Yalta accords.”¹² Following the Potsdam Conference in July 1945, where Truman met with Churchill and Stalin, it appeared the USSR had hardened its stance in Europe. By December 1945, US officials began reassessing their views of the USSR and began thinking that US policy makers had misjudged the Kremlin’s intentions. There was a split among Truman’s advisors on how to approach the Soviets. Some took the position that the Soviet actions in Eastern Europe and military build-up should be carefully watched. They included Secretary of Navy Forrestal and Brigadier General George A. Lincoln, a member of the Strategy and Policy Group of the US Army’s Operations Division. Other of the Strategy and Policy Group were Colonel Charles A. Bonesteel; Colonel James McCormack Jr.; and a future secretary of state in the Kennedy istration, Colonel Dean Rusk. Each had been a Rhodes Scholar, and they had an interest in “the interlocking nature of political-military affairs.” They wrote many papers on the subject of Soviet-US relations ing General Lincoln’s opinions from an academic viewpoint.

Other Truman advisors included General Marshall, General Eisenhower, and General Lucius Clay, who maintained positive views of the Russians based on their relations during the war. However, Senator Vandenberg, a Republican and chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, along with General Lincoln, agreed with iral Leahy and Forrestal: the USSR policy was one of expansion and not to be trusted. This diversity of opinion did not help Truman when he took office because he wanted to concentrate on domestic affairs. He was vacillating on whether or not to trust the USSR, and with time he began to suspect their activities in Eastern Europe, Iran, and the Turkish Straits.¹²⁷ During the postwar period of 1945, according to Michael Cohen,

Americans believed that the key British strategic positions in the Middle EastPalestine and Egypt-would not be susceptible to attacks by the yet-to-bemodernized Red Air Force. Nor were the Soviets capable of any rapid ground offensive. However, the JCS warned against complacency in regard to the future. By 1952, British military strength in the area was expected to have declined considerably, especially in the air. In consequences, the JCS warned that without active American , the eventual loss of those areas to the USSR would be a distinct possibility.¹²⁸

In December 1945, Byrnes was in Moscow to meet with the Russian leaders. His conduct upset many in Congress because they believed him to be making too many concessions to Stalin. The main sticking point during these talks was Stalin’s refusal to pull out of Azerbaijan in Northern Iran as had the British. That became a warning signal to Truman and others that the only way to deal with the Communists was from a position of strength. Even though Byrnes was eventually replaced, he did set a new policy of “patience with firmness.” It would later become the cornerstone of the Truman foreign policy when dealing with the Soviets and would be referred to as “containment.”¹² A classified working paper written by the Council on Foreign Relations on the defense of the Middle East, entitled “The Near East and Western Defense” analyzed the strategic value of the Middle East. It identified Iran as the first target of the USSR. The Kremlin believed that as a pivotal region in the Middle

East, Iran was especially important and that in 1918 they even declared that a revolution in Iran was key to “all of the Orient.” Iran also became the first test in the Cold War between the Russians with her satellites and the West in 1946. The working paper listed three reasons why the Middle East was so strategically valuable to the West:

1. Geography—combined with South Asia, the region “offered the greatest single gap in the Western system of alliances”; it was determined that it was vital to have “strong positions” in the Middle East in order to protect the right flank of Western Europe. 2. Oil—the resource was vital to Europe, and oil fields had yet to be explored. If the USSR had gained access to those fields, it would have been disastrous to the West, primarily in Europe due to the heavy dependence of the nations there on oil from the Middle East. 3. Of the regions that had recently received independence from colonial rule, the Middle East was considered “one of the most vocal.” These nations were the most prominent in the “movement toward Westernization and industrialization of non-Western agrarian areas.”

The council discussed the Soviets’ intentions and the West’s response after World War II. It highlighted how the Soviet-German agreement in 1940 had allowed Stalin to concentrate on Bulgaria, obtaining a military base in the Turkish Straits aimed at the area south of Batum and Baku as “the center of aspiration of the Soviet Union” because it led to the Persian Gulf. The Soviet ambassador to Greece also approached the Greeks about placing a Soviet refueling station in the Dodecanese. Had that offer been taken, it would have made for a “complete surrender” of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.¹³ Truman wrote in his memoirs that as early as 1941, while he was a US senator, the US government was already viewing Greece as a strategic country. He stated that along with Great Britain and China, it was among the countries to which the United States was preparing to send enormous amounts of financial assistance.

Truman referred to this as “all-out aid.”¹³¹ At the Yalta Conference on February 11, 1945, the third paragraph, clause (D), in the declaration on liberated Europe stated that the three governments (United States, Great Britain, and Russia) would “consider how best to assist any interim governments in the holding of free and unfettered elections.” Greece, along with Romania and Bulgaria, “immediately required” this type of .¹³² Two positive outcomes at Potsdam were the Russian agreement to assist in the war against Japan and the three powers agreeing to set up a Council of Foreign Ministers. Future issues included:

1. Disposition of Italian colonies; 2. Revision of the Montreux Convention on the Black Sea Straits; 3. Troop withdrawals from Iran; and 4. American proposal for the internationalization of inland waterways.¹³³

The Black Sea Straits and Soviet troop withdrawals from Iran became two of President Truman’s major foreign policy issues by the end of World War II. At Yalta and Potsdam, Russia was an ally. The division of spoils was taken into by the Russians. Great Britain was on the verge of downsizing its empire. The United States had no colonies, with the exceptions of Hawaii and Alaska, and had not earmarked any foreign lands for occupation or colonization. As the war was winding down in 1945, Truman examined US-Soviet relations carefully. ing Wilsonian ideals, Truman was trying to keep optimistic. Truman’s point of view began changing after Stalin extended Poland’s western border into and then took similar action in Romania and Bulgaria. Stalin did not keep his promise to allow Poland’s new government to hold open elections.¹³⁴

The paper by the Council on Foreign Relations praised the way that Truman handled the various threats in the region. It stated Truman’s handling of the Soviet threat in 1945 and 1946 was “well suited” to his policies. For example, Truman returned the body of the Turkish ambassador by means of the battleship USS Missouri, sending a strong message foreign policy in the Turkish Straits. By this action, Truman demonstrated his resolve to keep the Straits open. Truman wanted to make sure the USSR did not make any attempt to occupy the Straits, and sending the Missouri through them was a show of force from Washington that signaled a very clear message diplomatically. Truman also handled the problems with the Soviets in Iran diplomatically and with due diligence. He acted “with due regard for Russia’s prestige.” The report stated that Truman had secretly given the Soviets an ultimatum on Iran, and in doing so, it allowed the Soviets to give the world the impression it was “bowing” to world opinion by withdrawing gracefully.¹³⁵ In his memoirs Truman claimed that the Soviets used the Iranian situation like part of a “giant pincers movement” to gain access to the Middle East.

These were ominous signs which called for every effort we could make through the United Nations to compel the Russians to carry out the London agreement and get out of Iran.¹³

In September 1945, Great Britain and Russia made an agreement that the British and Soviet troops would withdraw from Azerbaijan by March 2, 1946. Both nations put their military in northern and southern Iran during 1942 to block the possible threat posed and to protect the oil there. By November 1945 the Soviets ed a separatist movement in Azerbaijan that did not permit the Shah of Iran to send any of his military forces to that region, causing a major crisis. The British had agreed to leave Iran, but the Soviets were refusing to leave, and when they did leave, it was due to Truman’s demand. The Soviet soldiers withdrew from Azerbaijan in April 1946. That ended the first US-USSR confrontation and started Truman down a road that would lead to the Truman Doctrine. Ambassador George Allen sent a cablegram to Acheson stating that the reason the separatist movement by the Tudeh Party in Azerbaijan collapsed

was because the Russians, the Iranians, and the Azerbaijanis all understood that “the United States was not bluffing but solidly ing Iranian sovereignty.”¹³⁷ By 1946, George Kennan began sounding the alarm about Moscow’s intentions. As the chargé d’ affaires in Moscow, Kennan heard Stalin give a speech on foreign policy on February 9, 1946. The people of the Soviet Union were told that no “peaceful international order was possible.” He also warned his people that the Russian nation had to be self-sufficient and prepared to defend itself against any enemy. He told the people that he wanted to triple their production of iron and steel and to double their output of oil and coal. Stalin said that the state of affairs in Russia was dire. After hearing Stalin’s speech, Kennan sent what is known as the “Long Telegram,” written on February 22, 1946. Acheson referred to it as “a long and truly remarkable dispatch” to the State Department. What Kennan discerned from Stalin’s speech reflected “centuries of a Russian fear of physical and a tyranny’s fear of political insecurity.” Kennan predicted that the Soviet intent was to weaken the West by all possible means and that the United States needed to respond to this threat. Kennan believed, after living in East Europe and the Soviet Union for years, that the Russians no longer maintained any ethical values and were willing to discard them if they interfered with their objectives. Acheson believed that Kennan’s warnings of the impending Soviet threat were “accurate and sound,” but he did not fully agree with Kennan’s “historical analysis.”¹³⁸ Truman was very concerned about Stalin’s intentions in the Middle East.¹³ This Long Telegram gives credence to the genesis of the Truman Doctrine. Churchill was a guest at the White House in Washington on February 8, 1946, and he reviewed his “Iron Curtain” speech with President Truman and Byrnes. After he showed his speech to iral Leahy and Byrnes, both approved it on March 1.¹⁴ On March 5, 1946, former Prime Minister Winston Churchill gave his notable speech on Stalin’s expansionist moves in Eastern Europe at Fulton College in Truman’s home state of Missouri. Churchill made the speech at the invitation of President Truman. This gave Truman a way to voice his concerns with the growing Soviet threat by none other than Winston Churchill, who many believe saved western society. The president wished Churchill to relay to the public the dangers of Soviet intentions. Churchill defined the West’s Cold War adversary as one dividing Europe with an “iron curtain.” Truman believed the speech was very positive, but he did not endorse it immediately.¹⁴¹

On July 12, 1946, Truman asked for a report on the USSR. The report was written by George Elsey and Clark Clifford using data from Kennan’s Long Telegram. They wrote the report from the perspective of Soviet ideology, whereas Kennan wrote from the historical position and the current situation in the USSR. Truman wanted to know how many times the Russians had broken agreements. Elsey, a naval aide assistant to Clifford, “recommended a far more extensive study on US-USSR relations” and spent two months writing the report. One of the primary findings was the inevitable problem the two superpowers faced: Capitalism vs. Communism. The report supplemented Kennan’s telegram because it said the United States needed to use “military strength as essential to back up the United States’ words.” The report was a forerunner of the Truman Doctrine. It recommended a “global policy” while emphasizing economic for Greece and Turkey, as did the Truman Doctrine. The report was based on facts, studies, and consultations with “the Secretary of State, Secretary of War, the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Navy, Fleet iral Leahy, the t Chiefs of Staff, Ambassador [Edwin] Pauley, the Director of Central Intelligence, and other persons who have special knowledge in this field.” The report was presented to President Truman September 24, 1946.¹⁴² During this very uncertain time as the Cold War was evolving, Arab rulers were busy dealing with the issues pertaining to their region, as indicated in a letter from King ibn Saud to Truman, dated May 24, 1946. The purpose of the letter was to voice the opinion of the kings and princes in the Arab League in reference to the findings of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine. The purpose of the committee was to evaluate the ission of one hundred thousand Jewish refugees to Palestine. Truman favored the recommendation of the committee that the answer was for “a binational state in which neither Jew nor Arab would predominate.” The report on their findings was released April 30, 1946. The findings of the committee were not followed, and William Roger Louis believed that Truman then began to increase his for the position of the Zionists. Louis thought Truman was trying to build up the Jewish for his election in 1948. Truman gave his “Yom Kippur statement” in October 1946 that called for a narrowing of the British and Zionists position on Palestine. His remarks were apparently misunderstood, and many believed he was favoring the Zionists’ cause. The White House did not oppose that view, and eventually Truman definitely ed the State of Israel.¹⁴³ ibn Saud’s position was to separate the refugee issue from the Zionist cause for

the Jewish state. His remarks to Truman were about how does one right the wrong of the plight of the European Jews under Nazism and Fascism by creating another wrong, meaning the injustice of imposing a Jewish state upon the Palestinian people. Once again, as in the letter from King Abdallah, the translator of the letter made a mistake that totally misrepresented the Saudi king’s message to Truman. The letter in Arabic was reviewed beside the translation. The error was significant, because the king summarized his letter by agreeing that there should be a home found for the victims who suffered in Europe, but he said that cause needed to be separated from political Zionism and ethnic racial principles. The translator erred by stating that the king believed that the cause of the victims should be separated from political Zionism and “military principles.” Interpreting the word for “ethnic” as “military” gives a very different and ambiguous understanding of the king’s intent.¹⁴⁴ Louis’ book discusses the challenges that the British faced in the Middle East during March 1946 while trying to resolve their difficulties in Greece.

1. The Iranian Crisis in Azerbaijan 2. A treaty revision on British policy for troop withdrawal from Egypt 3. The third month of the Anglo-American Committee¹⁴⁵

Truman responded to ibn Saud on July 8, 1946, stating the king’s views provided “a very real help” in understanding the refugee issue in Palestine. He further appreciated the king’s “humanitarian principles” about the Palestine problem. Then he said: The report of that Committee reflects the complexity of the situation in Palestine. Truman further informed the king that it was his opinion that Palestine could absorb one hundred thousand refugees, and it would not “prejudice the rights and privileges” of the Arabs, nor would it “constitute a change in the basic situation.”¹⁴

In his July 1947 article in Foreign Affairs titled “The Sources of Soviet Power,” Kennan stated it was within the US government’s capability to “increase enormously the strains under which Soviet policy must operate.” Kennan recommended a policy of containment to the White House. That became the beginning of President Truman and his istration’s plan to defend the United States and the free world from the threat of Communism. Kennan, rightly or wrongly, believed the policy of containment would influence the people of the Soviet Union. Containment would work if the United States would do the following:

1. Create the impression of a country that knew what it wanted; 2. Cope successfully with its internal problems; and 3. Hold its own amid the geopolitical and ideological currents of international affairs.

Kennan signed his Foreign Affairs article as “X.” The article did not discuss the Truman Doctrine or the problems in Greece and Turkey that prompted the doctrine, likely because these events were happening while the article was awaiting publication. The seminal sentence in Kennan’s article is this:

In these circumstances, it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.

Kennan discussed the fact that the Soviets were driven by a goal. He explained that if the path in one area of the world was blocked, they, like a river, would figure out how to by it. Kennan called it a “fluid stream” that was always moving toward its intended goal. He cited Napoléon, Hitler, and the tactics the

Soviets used. It was both easier yet more difficult to work with the Soviets diplomatically. He thought it easier because the Soviets “were more sensitive to contrary force” and they would be willing to “yield” on certain diplomatic issues if they believed resistance was too strong to deal with. On the other hand, Kennan said, the Russians were not “easily defeated or discouraged.”¹⁴⁷ Kennan firmly believed that the Soviet Union had a political personality of two parts: “ideology and circumstances.” Their ideology was inherited from the beginnings of the Soviet Revolution in 1917. He was convinced the direction the Soviet leadership chose was due to the influence of the past three decades: the First World War, the Russian Revolution in 1917, and the Second World War.¹⁴⁸ The theologian Reinhold Niebuhr advised several US presidents and Niebuhr served in an advisory capacity in Kennan’s Policy Planning Group in 1948. The two did not see Marxism in the same light. Niebuhr saw it as a “secular version of religious redemption,” while Kennan thought of Marxism as “a fig leaf of moral and intellectual respectability.” Kennan believed the Russians turned to Marxism due to their innate insecurity developed over centuries. Kennan predicted the United States would turn to détente in dealing with the Soviets.¹⁴ While the Truman istration and public servants like Kennan were grappling with Communism, Niebuhr explained Marxism as a form of utopianism. He claimed during periods of history, whenever pessimism existed, there have always been those who tried to find a utopian solution, using the Soviet leadership as an example.¹⁵

The British delivered a “blue piece of paper” to the Truman White House on February 21, 1947, signifying that the British government was delivering a message of the highest importance. Diplomatically, it is a formal procedure of the British government. It would no longer be possible for Great Britain to provide military and economic assistance to Greece and Turkey. The responsibility fell upon the United States to prevent the Soviet Union from making territorial gains. Assistant Secretary of State Acheson had been following these developments and was ready with an American response.¹⁵¹ With Secretary Marshall in Russia, Acheson took charge. The British decided to end aid to Greece and Turkey within six weeks. The notes the British sent discussed the financial situation in both Greece and Turkey. Acheson knew the US government was aware that the Greek economy and military were both in great need of financial . Soviet pressures remained on the Turks pertaining to issues like the Turkish Straits.¹⁵² On February 27, 1947, Truman met with his advisors to discuss the US responsibility to contain the Communists in Greece. According to Senator Fulbright, after Marshall made his assessment, Acheson asked to speak. He did not believe Marshall was convincing. In Acheson’s own words,

never have I spoken under such a pressing sense that the issue was up to me alone.¹⁵³

Fulbright believed that if Greece fell to Communism there would be a risk of it spreading to Iran, the Middle East, Africa, Asia Minor, and Europe, including and Italy. Following Acheson, Arthur Vandenberg, senator from Michigan, informed Truman that if he would say to the t session of Congress what Acheson had just said to those present at the White House, he would Truman. That was significant since Vandenberg was the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and a Republican.¹⁵⁴ Truman presented his Truman Doctrine Speech on March 12, 1947, before both houses of Congress. Denise Bostdorff noted how much Truman ired Cicero, the great Roman orator. Just as Cicero spoke plainly and defended what he

hypothesized, Truman did the same. He wanted the American people to know Greece was in great trouble after the Nazi occupation, citing as an example that 85 percent of the children there were tubercular. Truman spoke with firmness, urgently asking for the US government to act unilaterally as no other nation had the funds necessary to bail out Greece. Great Britain had laid the problem before the UN. Truman wanted to by the UN because he knew there was no time to waste. He did not want to tangle with the USSR at the United Nations Security Council, and that was the reason he elected to Greece and Turkey unilaterally. Truman did not mention the Russians or the word USSR in the speech, although he referred to Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia, all of which acted as Soviet proxies in Greece. He itted that although Greece had a government that had made its share of mistakes, it was, nonetheless, elected democratically and worthy of US . Truman requested $400 million for Greece and Turkey.

Should we fail to aid Greece and Turkey in this fateful hour, the effect will be far reaching to the West as well as to the East.¹⁵⁵

Kennan would both agree and, on March 14, two days after the Truman Doctrine speech, disagree with Truman. He presented his views at a lecture at the National War College, where he was teaching. Kennan believed the Truman Doctrine ed aid to Greece in order to stop the possible spread of Communism there and to other nations in Europe. He did not agree on the issue of Turkey:

1. There was no civil war in Turkey. 2. He did not want to provoke the Soviet Union. 3. He believed the “ambitions” of the Soviets in Turkey to be limited. 4. He did not think that a crisis in a single country, such as Greece, should have an “open-ended commitment to resist oppression everywhere.”¹⁵

Senator Vandenberg made a modification to the Truman Doctrine. He was not pleased with President Truman’s policy. He perceived that the draft copy of the bill “made no mention of bringing the program within the United Nations Charter.” The senator wrote a new preamble to the bill, linking the Truman Doctrine to this body. He added a provision permitting the UN to terminate it if and when it was deemed necessary. The result was “a sigh of relief” from the delegates at the UN. They were convinced modifying the bill “was acting within the Charter and not forsaking it.”¹⁵⁷ Acheson confessed he should have consulted more with the UN. He did cooperate with Vandenberg. Acheson believed it counterproductive to oppose Vandenberg, since time was of the essence. He considered Vandenberg’s modifications as “window dressing.” After the Greek-Turkish Aid Pact was amended, it ed the House of Representatives by a vote of 287 to 107, and the Senate by a vote of 67 to 23. Truman signed the act known as the Truman Doctrine on May 22, 1947.¹⁵⁸ Fulbright noted that one of the drafters, Joseph Jones, wrote:

All barriers to bold action were indeed down.

Fulbright added that State Department officials believed

a new chapter in world history had opened, and they were the most privileged of men, participants in a drama such as rarely occurs even in the long life of a great nation.¹⁵

Truman defined the first US doctrine on US foreign policy in the 124 years since the Monroe Doctrine of 1823. He knew if the United States failed to take the role vacated by Great Britain, “the effect would take on global proportions.” He believed the world was at a “critical juncture” and he was prepared to act. He

lived up to the quotation that he kept on the oval office desk in the White House that stated, The Buck Stops Here.¹ In October 1947, President Truman established the Central Intelligence Agency. It made an assessment of the Mediterranean, Middle East, and Southern Europe. The CIA believed nations such as , Italy, and Spain to be more secure than nations in the Eastern Mediterranean. They were not “contiguous to the USSR,” with the exception of Italy bordering on a satellite, Yugoslavia. The Eastern Mediterranean was assessed differently, with Turkey and Iran having long borders along the USSR while Greece bordered on three satellite nations: Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Albania. The agency believed that although , Italy, Spain, Greece, Turkey, and Iran could constitute a barrier to the Soviet threat,

it would not of itself, however, prevent the USSR from developing a dangerous degree of influence in the Arab states and North Africa through exploitation of the antagonisms which exist in those areas.

According to the report, the nations of critical importance in the region were Italy, Greece, the Arab States, and Iran. Italy was close to collapsing from within, and that would open the possibility of a Soviet or Communist intervention. That would bring a “profound psychological effect throughout Western Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Near East.” The situation in Greece appeared even more dangerous. The agency reported the Soviets were actually in the process of taking over parts of Greece via its satellite nations of Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Albania. The situation in Greece was “already at an advanced state of deterioration,” and if Moscow achieved its aim there, Russia would have “access to the Aegean and would outflank the Dardanelles.” The report confirmed President Truman’s concerns about Greece. The CIA’s assessment of the Arab States was tied to Palestine. The report was written during October 1947, a month before the UN General Assembly voted for a partition of Palestine. It stated that if the partition were to be ed, it would lead to violence and also open Palestine up to Soviet influence. The situation in Palestine was significant in the US-USSR Cold War. If the “Russians

succeeded in influencing the Arab States, it would isolate Turkey and Iran.” Partition would “adversely affect US economic and strategic interests in their territories.”¹ ¹ On November 3, 1947, Secretary Marshall sent a memorandum to President Truman about sending military advisers to Greece because of the deteriorating situation. During the summer of 1947, the Greek Army had been losing against the guerrillas. Money allocated for economic projects from the Truman Doctrine had to be diverted to military use. The Greek Civil War marked the beginning of US intervention in guerrilla warfare abroad after World War II. Marshall informed Truman that Eisenhower, then the Army Chief of Staff, dispatched Major General S. J. Chamberlain to Greece to assess the situation and make recommendations. Chamberlain did recommend, with the approval of Eisenhower, that operational advice was required by US military personnel. That resulted in an additional ninety officers being dispatched with a number of enlisted men. During October 1946, the United States had sent an additional eight army officers to augment the attaché at the US embassy. The New York Times reported this as an indication of the worsening situation in northern Greece.¹ ² Those deployed were an advisory and planning group to “provide high staff advice to the Greek forces, and to place observers with Greek military units down to and including divisions. The exception to this action was that the military contingency would not be involved in combat.” The National Security Council agreed to this action with the following provisions:

a. The Secretary of the Army as the representative of the National Military Establishment should advise the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of the proposed action. b. The Advisory Planning Group should be a part of the American Mission for Aid to Greece (AMAG), however, with direct communications to the t Chiefs of Staff when dealing with military operations. The Chief of the AMAG will render decisions of operational advice to the Greek forces to the Advisory and Planning Group as long as it did not impact on AMAG policies and activities. “Military decisions involving high policy, as defined in supplemental

instructions, which are attached, to be issued to the U.S. Ambassador to Greece and the Chief of AMAG, will be brought to the attention of the Ambassador by the head of the Advisory and Planning Group, through the Chief of AMAG, and no such decisions will be taken without the Ambassador’s authority.” c. The Secretary of State will, upon the approval of the President, initiate a strong recommendation to the Congress to continue the assistance to Greece beyond the expiration date of June 30, 1948.¹ ³

The CIA and the National Security Council both understood that further US involvement in Greece was of “global importance.” The primary concern was the Soviets gaining control in the Mediterranean. That would impair the US position in the Middle East. The result would cause Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia to re-examine their policies towards the Russians. The CIA considered Greece of “utmost urgency.” If the Soviets gained a foothold, the United States might have to “use armed intervention to save Greece.” The White House was principally concerned with how to contain the problem and not allow it to spill over into other nations or regions. The Allies learned from the Second World War what the Russians were likely to do. The Allies learned that when the Germans controlled the Greek Islands, they controlled the Eastern Mediterranean. If the USSR gained possession of Greece and its islands, Turkey would be threatened.¹ ⁴ Military assistance was needed to bring order to Greece. Then Greece could use its economic assistance from the Truman Doctrine. The White House was concerned about sending a military contingent and wanted the British to remain. Having a military presence would mean that the United States would share in the responsibility in resolving the Greek Civil War. US foreign policy was being tested in Greece. The United States did not want to send combat troops to fight. The troops already there in an advisory role were in jeopardy. This was why the White House hoped the Truman Doctrine would assist the US foreign policy decision in Greece. By sending a military contingent, the United States was at least demonstrating its commitment to resolving the problem.¹ ⁵ The British author William Roger Louis wrote about the British perspective on its departure from Greece and Turkey in 1947. From the British perspective in 1946, the future of the Middle East was dependent on the future of Greece,

intertwining the two. This was very true in Egypt due to the Suez Canal. Four events in 1946 had made it a very important year in Anglo-Greek and AngloMiddle Eastern relations:

• the Iranian Crisis in Azerbaijan; • the British making final decisions on troop withdrawals from Egypt; • the Anglo-American Committee on Palestine’s progress investigating Jewish immigration to Palestine from Europe; and • the Greek elections in March¹ .

British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin was concerned that the southern part of Europe, known as its soft underbelly, needed British presence in order for the region not to fall to Communism. Further illuminating the ties of Greece to the Middle East was the assessment made by Lord Bernard Montgomery, Chief of the Imperial General Staff. When he visited Greece in November 1946, General Montgomery stated that in his view the situation in Greece was similar to that in Palestine in that both nations were engaged in “terrorism,” aimed at the British and civilians in both places. He believed that British forces in Palestine had the ability to contain terrorism; however, he was concerned about the British getting caught up in a Greek civil war. The British had reduced their forces in Greece from about 41,000 troops to 10,000, whereas in Palestine they had increased them to almost 100,000.¹ ⁷ If Greece did succumb to the Communists, theoretically the Communists might have made their next move in the Middle East just as Acheson had warned. Britain wanted to be strategically situated in order to defend their interests there, not the least of which was the Suez Canal. The British were under pressure from Egypt to withdraw their forces from the Canal Zone, on the basis of negotiations, and from Egypt altogether. Palestine was one of three likely spots they could still maintain military forces in the Mediterranean region in addition to Jordan and Cyprus. Simultaneously, the United States was assessing its bases worldwide, addressing

collective security versus national security. William Roger Louis said a base was considered more important than a port. A “strategic base” was “usually associated with the idea of an insular area or of a beachhead in foreign territory.” The base system was derived from strategic planning during World War II. Of the 434 bases built by the United States in 1943, 11 were built in the Indian Ocean and the Near East. World War II and the base system ended the period of US foreign policy based on the Monroe Doctrine, which stated that the United States would not allow foreign aggression into its Western Hemisphere.

What is the Western hemisphere? Where are its frontiers? The idea to which we are adjusting ourselves to is that the frontiers of our national security zone lie wherever American interests are at stake, and that they reach anywhere that peace is endangered. It means, of course, that as a yardstick for determining the extent of our security zone, the Monroe Doctrine has crumbled.

Professor Haas W. Weigert, who believed in sea power, was asserting that American airpower and the atomic bomb would now allow the United States to defend its security interests wherever problems developed.¹ ⁸ This article was written in January 1947, just two months before President Truman would declare the Truman Doctrine. It did have overtones of how the Truman istration was thinking about its use of power in relation to the Soviet threat. There was perhaps one issue that Professor Weigert did not have the insight to consider. That was the Truman Doctrine, and in essence it did not undermine the Monroe Doctrine but rather extended it worldwide by stating that the United States would defend its interests globally whenever and wherever it was necessary. In the Soviet threats, there were numerous places worldwide that posed concerns for the security of the United States and its Western allies. The best example was the Middle East with the importance of its oil. This also underlies the importance of the Truman Doctrine to Greece and Turkey, in order to keep the Soviets out of the Middle East. Success of the doctrine would prevent the USSR from controlling the flow of oil, including access to the Suez Canal and its strategic importance for the transportation of the oil. The Pentagon knew that it would not be possible to conduct an air campaign by flying over the polar ice cap, only reinforcing the need to have US bases in the

Mediterranean. General Hap Arnold, the Air Force chief of staff, believed that if the United States were to engage the Soviets in a Third World War, it would involve what he called the “Arctic Mediterranean,” or the North Pole, which he believed would be the strategic center of the war.¹ The primary question among US military planners was whether or not the United States would have the military capacity to defend its interests in the Middle East, as well as in the Mediterranean. Secretary of the Navy Forrestal worked diligently to demonstrate to the president that the United States could make strategic air strikes against the Soviets by using bases both in the Middle East and the Mediterranean. There were three general categories of bases:

permanent operational bases, which are to be fortified and garrisoned with sufficient force to be held against a major attack until relieved from the continental United States; limited operational bases, which would be used chiefly for aerial reconnaissance; and emergency bases, which need not to be garrisoned in normal times but which we would be entitled to occupy should an emergency arise.¹⁷

The United States would also be able to attack from Great Britain and Okinawa. Forrestal emphasized the importance of securing the region when conflicts began. Another primary concern for Secretary Forrestal was keeping the lines of communication open for the US bases in Africa and the Middle East. The third reason Forrestal considered the region to be so strategically important was oil.¹⁷¹ George Kennan, working as head of the policy planning staff, realized after World War II that the British withdrawal from Greece was, “a new power vacuum in an area of strategic importance to the United States, not as a result of an enemy’s defeat in war, but from an ally’s weakness in the first years of peace.” Kennan was very concerned that the Soviets might try to fill this vacuum in Europe and the Middle East. This would then provide them with a long sought-after regional presence in the Middle East. With the lack of military troops to put on the ground due to the reduction of the American forces after the war, the US strategy was to gain access to and secure air and naval bases in Italy and Greece. That would complement the strong presence of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, which would also be reinforced.

Kennan developed a strategic formula against the Soviets. He referred to the United States using “counter pressures.” When the USSR used its military power through “concealed aggression,” the United States countered with “corresponding advances.” When the Soviets hid agents in a nation and used their presence to cause unrest, the United States would counter by gaining access to bases in the region, bringing a strong presence to probe the weaknesses of the Communists’ tactics. This meant that the United States would have to greatly expand its air and sea power.¹⁷² Prior to the Truman Doctrine speech, Kennan believed there was a distinct difference between Europe and the Middle East and that the distribution of funds should only apply to Greece. He did not agree with the state department’s assessment of the Middle East. He had disagreements with the Truman Doctrine speech. Kennan believed that Greece would succumb to Communism. He did not, however, believe the Communists would be able “to govern Greece.” Nor did Kennan believe that Turkey would become a Communist satellite.¹⁷³ Kennan is considered the “father of the containment strategy” against the Russians. To Truman’s credit he outlined the strategy that eventually won the Cold War. This made Kennan and Truman the two primary architects of containment policy. Perhaps Byrnes should be considered a third member of that team.

It is essential to understand how the United States operated diplomatically and militarily when responding to the threat in Greece on the one hand and to Palestine on the other. On December 28, 1976, Dr. Eugene V. Rostow spoke on Greece and Palestine before 1,200 attendees at a conference sponsored by the American Jewish Historical Society. The author Barbara Tuchman and former advisor to President Truman, Clark Clifford also spoke. Rostow spoke about the dilemma the Truman istration had handling the two strategic areas of Greece and Palestine. They were dealt with quite differently. The Soviet threat loomed over Europe and the Middle East. In the case of Greece, the concern was of the growing civil war that threatened the sovereignty of Greece. The growing apprehension was that Communism would spread to other nations like Italy and . That would provide an opening for the USSR in their long-desired entry to the Middle East. In the case of Palestine, the istration believed that was primarily a problem for Great Britain. That, however, did not work, and the United States had to fill the void before the Russians did. Rostow said that the US response to the situation in Palestine was “American hand-wringing, dithering, ineffectiveness, and indeed irresponsibility” when it became clear the British policy in Palestine was floundering. Past historians have taken that view. But the Truman istration was in fact hard at work to meet the challenges of the Palestine problem in the context of the Cold War. Since the British were downsizing their empire, and because of the unsatisfactory position of the American government, the British placed the issue of Palestine before the United Nations in 1947. The Jewish Agency ed partition, and the Arabs opposed it, threatening to use force if the plan were put into effect. According to Rostow, the Arabs thought the decision by the UN was beyond what the UN could do. The Arabs believed the UN decision was “a violation of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination.”¹⁷⁴ The winter of 1947 was especially harsh in Great Britain and on the European continent. As Acheson put it, “week after week, blizzards battered England.” Transportation was brought to a halt. Even fueling homes for heat became an immense problem. There were six million people out of work. All of these conditions further placed the economy of Great Britain in jeopardy.¹⁷⁵ By 1947,

the burden, however, was an American one because the British were in such dire straits financially, they could no longer maintain their empire. First Greece and then Palestine—the British were turning these areas over to the United Nations. According to Rostow, 1947 was a transformational year at the state department. At the time Rostow began working for the department in 1943, the word was to “Keep out of trouble,” and to “Leave it to the British.” That attitude prevailed even up to 1968 when it came to problematic regions in the Gulf and Africa. Rostow recalled President Wilson’s difficulties in trying to form the League of Nations, that ultimately did not receive US Senate on November 19, 1919. It wasn’t wise to advocate involvement in world affairs. The exception in the state department was Dean Acheson, the assistant secretary of state. Acheson was taking the state department into the modern era. He revised the state department by encouraging officials within the department to take a more aggressive and responsible way of looking at the world. This included the USSR policy towards Greece in 1947.¹⁷ Basil Kondis took Rostow’s statement about the state department’s hands-off attitude a step further by indicating during the mid-1940s the United States not only looked upon Greece as a “British responsibility,” it also ed the “British policies.” The United States and Britain both believed that Greece had “internal weaknesses” and “external pressures.” Kondis believed these two factors made the case why outside was so critical for Greece and why, without it, the collapse of Greece was on the horizon. He believed there were three factors that played a decisive role in US involvement in Greece:

1. The communist uprising in Greece, December 1944 2. Truman’s offer to assist Greece in 1947 3. Deteriorating relations between Washington and Moscow

These factors caused the United States to switch its foreign policy objectives in Greece from “a ive policy of political idealism to an active realistic role in Greek affairs.” A CIA analysis in late November 1947 ed Rostow’s assessment.¹⁷⁷

Palestine, Greece, and the Soviet Union were a continuing theme in the overall analysis. The report accurately predicted that Zionists would continue to promote an independent state. The British thought that would happen in August 1948, when it actually happened in May 1948. August, the date set by the British, was the projected time frame the British would withdraw from Palestine. It was also estimated that the Jews would have a fighting force of 200,000, with volunteers coming to Palestine to fight. There were only 650,000 Jews in country at the time. The Jews were predicted to succeed initially against the Arabs because of “superior organization and equipment.” On the other hand, if a war of attrition developed, the Jews would have problems with their economy and their agriculture from hit-and-run tactics by the Arabs. For this reason, the CIA thought the Jews would be able to hold out for only two years unless they received “substantial outside aid in of manpower and material.” The United States was losing its prestige in the Arab world by ing partition.

In the event that partition is imposed on Palestine, the resulting conflict will seriously disturb the social, economic, and political stability in the Arab world, and US commercial and strategic interests will be dangerously jeopardized.

The Agency predicted the USSR would take advantage of the poverty in the Arab world. It said Soviet agents disguised as Jewish DPs (displaced persons) had already entered Palestine and would go to the Arab states to promote “democratic movements,” as in Greece. The CIA assessment clarifies that Moscow was making every attempt to use the Greek model in Palestine. The CIA concluded that the UN recommended partition would have to for the “serious threat to peace,” and the major powers in the UN would have to enforce the partition. This would greatly hamper US-Arab and US-USSR relations.¹⁷⁸ By 1947 President Truman knew the only way to deal with the Russians was through strength. Between 1945 and 1947, Truman went through a mental process from wanting to trust the Russians as a World War II ally to the realization that Stalin was no one to trust and that he could no longer take an easy path with the Russian leader. For example, the Truman istration negotiated with the Russians on keeping their word to remove troops in

Azerbaijan by March 1, 1946, and then reneging on their pledge.¹⁷ When Truman set up the Truman Doctrine, he knew he was coming from a position of strength.¹⁸ In 1948 the British government decided to resolve nearly all of its foreign relations problems in the Arab world, with the exception of Palestine. Egyptian manpower was a concern for them. They studied the USSR model that viewed all nationalities within the Soviet Union as one, and by doing so all people within it were one workforce. The British foreign secretary thought the British should do the same not only in Egypt but in all the Arab nations, with the idea that the British would have one major army in the region. The strategy was considered important due to the fact that the British could no longer look to the Indian Army for assistance. The British were looking for a major line of defense against the Russians in the Middle East. If they could build such an alliance with the Arab world, then they could view the loss of Palestine as minor.¹⁸¹ On January 7, 1948, President Truman delivered his State of the Union Address before Congress. He said the following about his aid to Greece and Turkey:

We have been giving substantial aid to Greece and Turkey to assist those nations in preserving their integrity against foreign pressures. Had it not been for our aid, their situation today might well be radically different. The continued integrity of those countries will have a powerful effect upon other nations in the Middle East and in Europe struggling to maintain their independence while they repair the damages of war.¹⁸²

al-Ahraam wrote about Truman’s delivery, stating he was defending his policy by attacking criticisms about the Marshall Plan and demanding that Congress approve it. The paper reported that Truman also made a ing remark toward the USSR. He said it was unfortunate that “all the governments”—meaning Moscow—did not share the economic restoration that the United States was undertaking.¹⁸³ By February 1948 the US State Department made an assessment of the US position in Palestine including the possible use of military force. The National Security Council concluded that the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East

were “vital to the security of the United States.” By recommending partition of Palestine to the UN General Assembly, the State Department said the United States “assumed a moral obligation, along with the other of the UN.” This meant the United States “cannot without cause fail to fulfill this moral obligation.” The state department believed if the United States did not take a resolute stand on the Palestine problem, it would demonstrate an “incompatibility” for the security of the United States itself. In the report the state department looked at various courses of action on Palestine, including sending armed forces under the United Nations. To protect the Jewish state from an onslaught by Arabs in Palestine, the surrounding Arab states, and the greater Muslim world, the United States would supply arms, ammunitions, and other types of equipment for war. The UN Security Council stated that the United States would be acting in accordance with Article 39 of the UN Charter. That would protect the UN resolution for partition. Next the United States would an international force with either of the “US armed forces or volunteers.” The concern the United States had was that the only other country at the time that could provide such was the USSR. The United States believed it needed to match any such force the Russians might use. The state department highlighted the advantages and disadvantages of any US proposal using armed force. The advantages were listed as follows:

1. It keeps UN and US policy constantly in the eyes of the world; and 2. It contributes to the settlement of the displaced Jews of Europe;

The disadvantages were described as follows:

1. It alienates the Muslim world with the resultant threat of: 1. Suspension or cancellation of US air base rights and commercial concessions including oil, and drastic curtailment of US trade in the area; 2. Loss of access to British air, military, and naval facilities in the area, affecting

our strategic position in the Middle East and Mediterranean that were of tactical importance should war break out with the USSR; 3. Closing of our educational, religious, and philanthropic institutions in the area; 4. Possible deaths, injuries, and damages arising from acts of violence against individual US citizens and interests throughout the Middle East; and 5. A serious impediment to the success of the European Recovery Program, which is dependent on increased production of Middle East oil. 2. It provides a vehicle for Soviet expansion into an area vital to our security interests; 3. It deploys US troops in a situation where there is high probability of loss of American lives and which might result in war; 4. It fails to provide a final peaceful solution to the Palestine problem even if Arab and Jewish states are established; 5. It increases the probability of anti-Semitic activities in the US; and 6. It requires the Security Council to act contrary to the charter in imposing a settlement by force on the people of Palestine.¹⁸⁴

A distinct matter that proved to be an embarrassment to Truman was the miscommunication between the White House and the state department on the status of partition versus trusteeship in Palestine between the Jews and the Arabs. On March 12, 1948, one year after the Truman Doctrine speech, Eddie Jacobson was trying to persuade Truman to meet with Ezer Weizman, head of the World Zionist Organization and president of the Jewish Agency in London. On March 18, Truman and Weizmann did meet, and Truman promised to partition in Palestine. That was not the way the state department reported the US position in Palestine. Marshall advised Warren Austin, US ambassador to the UN, to state to the UN General Assembly on March 19 that the US position was that partition would not work peacefully and the United States ed a trusteeship in Palestine. This caused a major conflict between the White House

and the state department that Truman always believed had it in for him and was one reason he referred to them as “the striped pants conspirators.”¹⁸⁵ Professor Alon Kadish wrote that the trusteeship plan, as stated at the UN, would have been a “temporary trusteeship.” The Trustee Council of the United Nations would have taken the responsibility for implementation. The plan was for the trusteeship to be in place until such time as a peaceful transition to partition could be realized. The Jewish Agency had observers at the Security Council and believed the statement by Ambassador Austin to be both “shocking” and an “amazing reversal” from the plan for partition. Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver confirmed that even a trusteeship by the UN was not a guarantee that would “automatically ensure peace.” He said “force” was the only way to enforce trusteeship, just like it would be to “carry out partition” at the United Nations.¹⁸ Rabbi Silver was born in Lithuania in the year 1883. He became a rabbi in 1915 and continued “a long line of rabbis.” He was a “committed Zionist.” Although abrasive he was a “very effective political strategist.”¹⁸⁷ Truman ed Weizmann and assured him he ed partition. The whole affair greatly upset Truman, who believed that Weizmann might think of him as a betrayer. Truman was trying to prevent “civil or international war and the dispatch of troops to Palestine, whether to restore international peace or to enforce partition.” Truman surmised that a temporary trusteeship would “develop a long-term peaceful solution.” Marshall was very concerned that UN peacekeeping forces “would lead to enforcing partition and allow the Soviets into the area.”¹⁸⁸ On April 4, 1948, Forrestal, by then the secretary of defense, requested an evaluation from the t Chiefs on what the force structure would look like should the United States send a military force to Palestine. iral Leahy sent a memorandum to President Truman entitled “Provision of US Armed Forces in Palestine.” Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson stated that two conditions needed to be met, and the t Chiefs did their assessment based on:

a. The Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher Committee agree to cooperate by refraining from further violence, and that they maintain the truce. b. The United Kingdom agrees to undertake its share of the responsibility for

ing the proposed program¹⁸ .

The t Chiefs were asked to answer two questions. The first was what would be required of the armed forces outside Palestine to maintain the peace inside Palestine. Based on the two questions asked by Acheson, the t Chiefs recommended the following force structure:

Army 1 Corp of 3 Infantry Divisions plus Other Troops, totaling 100,076 personnel Troops (for harbor patrol) 1 Air Reconnaissance Sqdn About 3,124 personnel About 921 personnel

Naval 6 Destroyers (o 2 Sqdn Ln type 1 Sqdn Photo R Necessary Main

The t Chiefs did believe the violence would continue because of what they called “irresponsible elements.” Second, they were asked from the US military standpoint what the relative composition of the force should be and what nations should compose the force. In addition to the United States and Great Britain, it was recommended that should also participate, albeit on a smaller scale since was one of the remaining Allied and Associated Powers. They recommended the following force percentages:

United Kingdom 45% United States 45% 10%

46,800 personnel 46,800 personnel 10,400 personnel

The final question referenced the military implications:

1. Partial mobilization would include early implementation of the Selective Service, the draft. 2. The United States would not deploy forces before May 15 (the date the British Mandate was to end). 3. It would over-extend the armed forces. 4. A supplementary budget would be required. 5. The United States would have to accept the loss of the bulk of its general reserve for at least six months.¹

The day before, April 3, 1948, Acheson sent Truman a memorandum on the subject of Palestine. He informed the president that under Article 84 of the UN, the Jews should be able to defend themselves “through locally recruited police and volunteer forces.” The assessment by Forrestal was in the eventuality that the Israelis needed US , once the State of Israel was established.¹ ¹ On August 23, 1948, Secretary of Defense Forrestal produced “NSC-27: U.S. Military Point of View for the Eventuality of United Nations Decision to Introduce Military Forces in Palestine.” The report was dated August 19, 1948. Even though Israel had been declared a state in May, the secretary still used “Palestine” and not “Israel.” On page three of the report, Forrestal concluded the following about the advantages and disadvantages of US and Soviet military forces in Israel:

Thus, Soviet freedom of military action not only would be retained, but also would be improved, while that of the United States would be immediately restricted, and to an unpredictably serious extent.

The t Chiefs did not want Soviet forces in Israel because it would “have the most far-reaching implications.” The Soviets would be “entitled” to either sea or land communications, allowing them access to other regions in the Middle East. This was considered important by the secretary of defense because there would be “no limitation on the number of Soviet forces that might enter Palestine with or without justification by the developing situation.” The main concern was “Soviet military domination” in the Middle East. This would “exert tremendously harmful influence on and even jeopardize our [US] global strategy and resources in the event of war with our most probable enemy [USSR].” The same pertained to any of the Soviet satellite countries if they entered Israel under Soviet influence. The secretary said sending any number of US forces to Palestine for peaceful purposes would undermine troop strengths the United States needed worldwide. Those strengths were considered “vital” to US national security. Forrestal said placing US forces in Israel would detract from the Marshall Plan and could endanger other European nations that were in need of US security. The situation was so serious that all US ground forces would either be utilized in Israel initially or later. The only way the US military would be able to meet world-wide commitments would be to start the selective service program, i.e., the draft. Sending soldiers and marines to Palestine would create a major logistical problem. It would affect “the existing and projected programs of military assistance for our [US] allies.” The secretary used the US commitment in Berlin as an example. The t Chiefs of Staff faced two controversial consequences if the United States assumed greater responsibility:

• Introduction of US forces in Palestine • Introduction of Soviet or Soviet satellite forces in Palestine

Deployment of US forces to Palestine would require agreements under Article 43 and Article 106 by the UN. The US government was not prepared to use

either US or UN armed forces in Palestine, and NSC-27 made the stipulation that there would be no use of armed forces from either one. US policy was to “neither endorse nor permit a decision by the United Nations to employ military enforcement measures in Palestine.”¹ ² The events in Palestine were being followed keenly in the Arab press. Several months prior to Forrestal’s policy paper, al-Ahraam (‫ )اﻻﻫﺮام‬in Cairo published an article about Forrestal and Palestine. It reported that Forrestal made a very strong stance against the partition of Palestine as had been planned November 1947. The article was printed January 22, 1948. It also covered the ongoing debate about the internal issues that Jews were having between the Zionists and the secular Jews that was occurring before the State of Israel would be declared in May.¹ ³ Two weeks later Forrestal wrote NSC1-27/1, the supplement to NSC-27, confirming Soviet intentions of making Palestine a threat to US national security. The United States prevented the USSR from sending observers to the mission of Count Bernadotte, the United Nations mediator sent after the 1948 war began. The UN also defeated a resolution submitted by the Security Council allowing the USSR to send observers. NSC-27/1 stated that the United States had repeatedly refused to send armed forces to Jerusalem to defend the holy sites. The t Chiefs of Staff were fully aware of problems with the Soviets sending infiltrators to Palestine. NSC-27/1 cited three ongoing problems:

1. Czechoslovakia had sent fighter aircraft, bombs, and other war material from Zatec to Tel Aviv and were training mercenaries to parachute into Israel and in other types of infiltration. 2. Dissident Jewish groups such as the Stern gang, also known as Israeli Freedom Fighters, and the “Irgun Zvai” were allegedly receiving assistance from the Soviets, providing a threat to the sitting Israeli government. The Soviets and their satellites also had the potential of overthrowing the current government in Israel or influencing its policy, which could pose a threat to the United States. 3. The Soviets and other Eastern European nations were posing threats in the Arab world with the idea of overthrowing their governments or turning them

against the United States. This also included the Kurds.

NSC-27/1 predicted that the security of the United States would be “seriously prejudiced by large-scale fighting in the Middle East, but particularly in Palestine.” Forrestal believed that if the Arab and Jewish, to use his term, forces continued fighting, it would definitely “undermine” everything the Truman istration had done in Greece, Turkey, and Iran. Although Forrestal did not say it in NSC27/1, the Marshall Plan could also be jeopardized due to the dependence on oil from the Middle East. The fighting had potential to “permanently alienate” any influence the West might have in the Arab world. He pointed out, that within the UN Charter, there were alternative courses of action that could be used by the Security Council under the auspices of Articles 39, 40, and 41. There were economic and armed embargos as alternatives to armed force.¹ ⁴ On October 18, 1948, Acting Secretary of State Robert A. Lovett wrote a letter to the secretary of defense about armed forces being used to protect the holy sites in Jerusalem. The numbers calculated by the United States were 6,000, with a minimum of 4,000. The t Chiefs of Staff were concerned about the introduction of Soviet or Soviet satellite armed forces or US armed forces being sent to Jerusalem. The use of an outside force was recommended by UN mediator Count Bernadotte. The t Chiefs did provide three points of view:

a. ing the acting secretary of state’s view that certain nations be excluded from any international force, meaning the USSR or its satellites. While the t Chiefs ed this recommendation, they did believe US forces would be involved. b. The t Chiefs believed that if the security force was made up of individuals rather than armed forces, it would be more acceptable. It would not introduce Soviet troops even though it would open up the possibility of allowing Soviets to enter as individuals. c. They did not believe it would be wise for American citizens to go to Jerusalem as private individuals or as of the armed services, with the former

being “less prejudicial.”¹ ⁵

The t Chiefs provided an alternative to the State Department, suggesting Jerusalem would eventually become a “trust territory.” That was the recommendation by the UN General Assembly on November 29, 1947. They pointed out that a “trust territory” is the responsibility of the “istering authority.” That falls under the supervision of the UN Trusteeship Council. The t Chiefs wanted the recruitment and istration of any forces to be by the “istering authority” and not by the secretary general of the United Nations. They were working diligently to prevent Soviet armed forces from entering Israel, as outlined in USC-27. Annex 27/3, submitted on November 16, 1948, reiterated what Annex 27/2 stated.¹ On November 17, 1948, the secretary of defense produced NSC-35. It pertained to the role of US commitments worldwide and to the likelihood of global warfare. The only place in the world the department of defense used the words very great was the Middle East. US armed forces would be sent to Palestine to assist in the restoration of peace and security. The US military would perform that duty in accordance with the United Nations Security Council Resolution of July 15, 1948.¹ ⁷ On February 4, 1949, the Egyptian paper al-Ahraam (‫ )اﻷﻫﺮام‬published a frontpage article stating that President Truman was not willing to meet with Marshal Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin behind the iron curtain in any remote town located in nations like Czechoslovakia and Poland. The Russian journalists said it was an opportunity to end the problems between the United States and the USSR, but the United States was unwilling to act; the Russian reporters believed that Truman was trending toward war and not peace. The European papers, according to al-Ahraam (‫)اﻷﻫﺮام‬, suggested that Truman and Stalin meet to resolve the international relations that “spoils” the international situation. Vienna was also suggested as a meeting place. The significance of the article is that it demonstrates that the Arab world was reporting the fact that Truman was standing up to Stalin. It also reveals that the Arab journalists were reporting on what Russian journalists were writing for the people within the iron curtain on diplomatic issues between the United States and the USSR. According to Michael Dobbs, Stalin’s only flight resulted in “a terrible nose bleed, in addition to an earache that lingered for days.” After that experience the politburo forbade

him to fly again. Possibly, Stalin used the ruling by the Politburo as a reason for his refusal to fly again. It also makes the case that he would not meet Truman outside the Soviet Union. Truman was also making his case that he refused to meet in the Soviet Union, creating a standoff.¹ ⁸ As the war in Greece continued, the President received a recommendation from General Marshall, now secretary of defense, to send General James A. Van Fleet, highly respected and a soldier’s soldier, to command the American forces in Greece. By 1950, with all the good that the Truman Doctrine had done, the United States was still in confrontation with the USSR. Officials in the Truman istration drew up another set of rules of containment, known as NSC-68, which as matters evolved, became a corollary of the Truman Doctrine. It was designed to contain the Soviet Union and prevent a hot war. There were significant differences between the Truman Doctrine and NSC-68. The Truman Doctrine focused on Greece and Turkey, encoming both Europe and the Middle East. That made it a regional policy of containment. In contrast, NSC-68 was designed to confront the Communists on the world stage. It was not limited to regional boundaries. Its intentions were:

1. Have the United States store large quantities of atomic and conventional arms. 2. Build major military forces. 3. Forge a US-led alliance system. 4. Foster extensive economic-military aid programs, covert operations, and psychological warfare.¹

Howard Jones wrote an extensive of the Greek Civil War and the importance of the Truman Doctrine. He was critical of Senator Fulbright’s critique of the Truman Doctrine.

Almost thirty years later, during the peak period of American torment over Vietnam, Senator Fulbright attributed nearly every US mistake in foreign policy to the Truman Doctrine.²

Fulbright responded.

It cannot be said that the assumptions underlying the Truman Doctrine were wholly false, especially for their time and place, but there is a powerful, presumptive case against their subsequent universal application: the case deriving from the disaster of our policy in Asia.

Senator Fulbright did agree with the Truman Doctrine in Greece and Turkey but not with the policies in Vietnam. History has proven him correct. Fulbright acknowledged the value of the Marshall Plan and the formation of NATO. He did not agree with the United Nations Charter. As the author of the legislation for UN, he said that “it seems appropriate to look back and try to discover how and why the promise of the United Nations Charter gave way so quickly to ideological warfare between East and West.”² ¹ Senator Fulbright upset and angered sitting presidents, both Democrats and Republicans. He was from a different school of thought on US foreign policy. He worried about where the country was heading. This was the disagreement Fulbright had with Dean Acheson. Another factor was behind-the-scenes diplomacy that President Truman and his istration accomplished in the dangerous world that emerged from World War II. By recognizing Israel before the Soviets, President Truman is seen as performing a great humanitarian act that was justified in every way. Many in his istration did not believe it would be wise because it would upset the Arab world. However, there seems to be another likely reason why President Truman preceded the Soviets in recognizing Israel. NSC-27, its annexes, and NSC-35 provide significant insight into the thought processes of the istration. The

greater threat to US national security and the greatest possible place for the beginning of a local war leading to total global warfare was in Palestine/Israel. Palestine was a greater threat than was Greece. President Truman and his istration proved equal to the task. On the one hand, they ed sending military personnel in an advisory role to Greece, which was sufficient in stopping the Greek Civil War. Sending General Van Fleet to Greece to conduct American military operations proved to be the right strategy. It reinforced the success of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. While discussing the important role Israel had in US foreign policy it is more than relevant to present the attitude of Israel, through the thoughts of Israel’s charismatic prime minister, David Ben-Gurion. He broke the idea of which power to look to as Israel’s best partner into three components:

a. When he thought about comparing from Great Britain to from the Slavs, he decided the Slavic side best “constituted the Zionist principal base of .” On the other hand, he thought British versus American was “ideologically and practically impossible.” b. He believed that an anti-British policy was also anti-American. He believed an anti-American policy was very unwise because half the world’s Jewish population was in the United States. c. Ben-Gurion did not believe in a total British policy because he believed that would be non-productive due to the fact there would be a tendency to “acquiesce” to the British, and he felt that would definitely be anti-Zionist. d. As a “student of temporary nature of alliances and relationships of hostility throughout history,” Ben-Gurion gave considerable thought to siding with the Soviet-Slavic side in order not to lose what that meant to the numerous Jewish people living in that region. He also weighed that consideration with the fact that he knew the Anglo-Saxon world would have a considerable, long-term place in the region.² ²

What the Truman istration did in Israel was linked to the policy in Greece. Eugene V. Rostow’s discussion foreign policy roles in Greece and

Palestine alluded to the fact that not enough attention was paid to Palestine. That was true on the surface. Behind the scenes, the t Chiefs of Staff were informing the President exactly what military force would be needed should the United States intervene in the Arab-Israeli War in 1948. The main point of this chapter has been to highlight the similarities and differences between Greece and Palestine, and how NSC-27 and NSC-35 were important factors influencing US foreign policy in the Middle East and Western Europe at the end of World War II.

My point was that since the struggle with Russia had obviously taken on a new tactical form, as we had to be especially careful that any course of action we adopted should by its logic and justice command world respect, if not sympathy. ²³

—Letter from President Eisenhower to Sir Winston Churchill November 27, 1956

Mr. President [of the Senate\, the President of the United States and his Secretary of State have solemnly asked the Senate for an unprecedented delegation of authority to make wars and to spend money without restriction. ²⁴

—Senator J. William Fulbright speaking in the Senate February 11, 1957

3 EISENHOWER’S MISSION, FULBRIGHT’S VISION

President Dwight David Eisenhower spent his military career giving and taking orders. The military’s top priority is the mission. As a retired five-star general, Eisenhower was prepared to take on the numerous missions he was going to face as President every day, whether it was for instance, building a highway infrastructure or foreign challenges around the globe. Senator J. William Fulbright viewed the world through a different set of lens as an educator and legislator. He had a vision of the world that would out live him in the century that followed and the next century after that when he wrote the Fulbright Resolution for the United Nations and the Fulbright Act for the Fulbright Scholar Program. Pertaining to the Middle East, Eisenhower’s perceived mission in that region and Fulbright’s perceived vision in the same region provided the world at least, hope for peace and resolution. On a July 17, 1956 letter sent to President Eisenhower from Professor Eli Ginzberg, Eisenhower penned the following handwritten note to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles:

Dear Foster—One thing developed herein is one concerning what I’ve often spoken to you—weakening Nasser.² ⁵

Ginzberg was an economics professor whom Eisenhower knew when he was president of Columbia University. The letter concerned Ginzberg’s recent trip to the Middle East. The note from Eisenhower to Dulles was a reminder to Dulles about the issues and problems the Eisenhower istration was having to deal with in the region. Eisenhower’s handwritten note to Dulles may have been prompted by the four-page paper Ginzberg sent to Eisenhower after he returned from the Middle East. The gist of the paper was that with the success Eisenhower had in Guatemala in overthrowing the government there, possibly

the same should be done with Nasser and the Saudi leadership.² Even though Eisenhower did not suggest to Dulles regime change, it is at least plausible that Ginzberg’s paper did make Eisenhower think once again how important it would be to “weaken Nasser.” Ginzberg also spoke about Lebanon being the most reliable Arab country at that time in the Middle East. There is no way of telling how much impact individuals like Ginzberg had on Eisenhower. We can only speculate the weight of Ginzberg’s report when Eisenhower decided to send US armed forces to Lebanon two years later. Events dictated Eisenhower’s decision to use military force in the Middle East. Ginzberg’s paper seems to have at least prompted Eisenhower to think of ways to weaken Nasser and at the same time send a definite message to Moscow. Both Suez and eventually Nasser would become dominant themes Eisenhower had to contend with while waging peace in the Cold War. The first event, the Suez Crisis in October 1956, would compel Eisenhower to develop a comprehensive Middle East strategy that would become known as the Eisenhower Doctrine. Eisenhower’s strategy was two-fold. The first, aimed at the USSR in the Cold War, was to keep it out of the Middle East. The second strategic goal was to keep Nasser from dominating the entire Middle East, as Nasser wanted to do. That was a primary reason Eisenhower wrote the note to Dulles. Eisenhower wrote in his memoirs that he was visited by British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden on the day before Stalin died, March 5, 1953. The British foreign minister went to see Eisenhower about the on-going controversy the British were having with the Egyptian president, General Muhammad Naguib. After overthrowing King Farouk in 1952, the Egyptians wanted the British out of Egypt. For Eisenhower, this was a knotty thread that he would continue to unwind throughout his presidency. Although it began with Naguib, it would eventually evolve into the confrontations he would have with the real power behind the 1952 coup, Nasser, who took over as president of Egypt in April 1954. Early in the Eisenhower presidency, the international setting was rapidly changing. These changes would dramatically impact US foreign policy. During the first two years of Eisenhower’s presidency two major events occurred that would influence Eisenhower. The first was the death of Stalin in March 1953, and the second was Nasser’s rise to power in 1954. Salim Yaqub stated that after the death of Stalin, the Soviet Union “began courting the Arabs” for two reasons.

One was in response to the way that the West ed Israel in spite of the fact that the Kremlin had ed the creation of Israel.² ⁷ As for Nasser, Eisenhower was forced to deal with him and his ideologies the entire length of his two in office. During Churchill’s second period as prime minister (1951–1955), the British had a five-point plan for Egypt that was aimed at Britain’s ability to have bases in that region due to the growing threat and activities of the Russians. The plan presented to Eisenhower:

1. Maintenance of the Canal Zone Base in time of peace with a view to its immediate reactivation in the event of war. (This meant in time of war, operational control of the Canal Zone Base would return primarily to the British.) 2. Arrangements for air defense in Egypt. 3. A phased withdrawal of British armed forces from Egyptian territory. 4. The participation of Egypt in a Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO). 5. A program of military and economic assistance to Egypt.

Eisenhower noted that the British had entered Egypt on July 10, 1882, and under the Constantinople Convention of 1888, the “canal was to remain open in time of both war and peace to every vessel of commerce or war.” In other words, should Egypt seize the canal it would be in direct conflict with the Convention of 1888.² ⁸ Based on these five points, the British devised three alternatives for their withdrawal from Suez. They were known as Case A, Case B, and Case C. In Case A, the British wanted to keep depots and installations under British control around Suez after they made a major withdrawal of forces from Egypt. These would provide for “a working maintenance base for a portion of the Middle East land forces in peacetime.” To maintain this base the British estimated they would need five thousand soldiers and two thousand Royal Air Force personnel to

remain in the Canal Zone Base area. Additionally, the British were proposing a combined Anglo-Egyptian air-defense organization that would include “headquarters and a few RAF squadrons, and an Allied-manned staging post.” Case B was offered as an alternative to the Egyptians if they did not want seven thousand British military in the area. In Case B, the Egyptians would maintain all the equipment and supplies the British had around the Canal Zone. Because the Egyptians would not be familiar with how to operate much of the machinery, the British proposed leaving a contingent of “Allied supervisory and technical Army and Air Force personnel,” but far fewer than in Case A. If neither Case A nor Case B was acceptable, the British had a third proposal to evacuate nearly all personnel, “retaining only occasional inspection privileges.” There was one stipulation that was factored in Cases A, B, and C: in time of war, the Suez Canal Base would be available for all Allied, and especially British, use.² Just after Churchill returned as prime minister in 1951, he spoke before both houses of the US Congress on January 17, 1951. He suggested that if the United States, , and Turkey would place just “a token force” at Suez that would be “a symbol of the unity of purpose which inspires us.”²¹

Eisenhower had been well known for his writing. According to Geoffrey Perret,

his remarkable writing ability was, meanwhile, keeping his pen busy on other projects … Ike, like Ulysses S. Grant, could write a speech, a letter, an official report, plan or memo with enviable limpidity and vigor … He was so talented that MacArthur, a man with literary skills of his own, had him write his annual report as Chief of Staff in 1931.²¹¹

Although his penmanship was often questioned, what he wrote was considered superior. A letter he wrote as president provides insight into his Middle East philosophy. It was a letter he wrote in response to a letter he received from British Prime Minister Anthony Eden (April 6, 1955–January 10, 1957), who had succeeded Sir Winston Churchill’s second term as prime minister. The letter was edited with his hand-written comments. Eisenhower’s aim was to explain to Prime Minister Eden why he thought Nasser was a danger to the West. That was in addition to Eisenhower’s concerns about the Russians in the Middle East. What he wrote and then scratched out about Nasser is revealing.

Moreover, while the Soviets are using Nasser it seems clear that he is foolishly assuming that he can use Soviet to gain his own ends in the Arab world and against the West without eventually paying a fearful price.

Eisenhower understood Nasser. He was trying to think as Nasser thought. Eisenhower was convinced an Egyptian-Soviet alliance would not be in Nasser’s favor. Eisenhower kept this personal view from Eden. This sentence was not included in the letter. As the note to Dulles indicates, he did not keep his wish to weaken Nasser from his State Department. The letter revealed Eisenhower’s dilemma about the Middle East.

Seldom, I think, have we been faced by so grave a problem.

Coming from the supreme Allied commander of World War II, it shows just how dangerous Eisenhower believed the world situation was in 1956. Near the end of the letter to Eden, Eisenhower inserted words that clearly laid out the problems he faced with Nasser. He stated two fundamental problems with Nasser. The first was the use of the Suez Canal that Nasser had nationalized. Eisenhower wanted

the assurance of permanent and efficient operation of the Suez Canal with justice for all concerned.

The second problem was

to see that Nasser should not grow as a menace to the peace and vital interests of the West.

Eisenhower informed Eden that the two problems

need not and possibly cannot be solved simultaneously and by the same means.

In the end of his handwritten inserts, Eisenhower was very specific. He deemed it very unwise to use the Suez Canal as a means to “proceed forcibly against Nasser.” Eisenhower concluded his handwritten notes by informing Eden that

the American public was definitely against the use of force against Nasser

until every possible peaceful means of protecting our vital interests have been exhausted without results.

This letter was written in the summer of 1956, just months before the Suez War in October. It clarifies any doubts where Eisenhower stood on Nasser.²¹² It was written after the London Conference in August. Eisenhower asked Dulles to convene the conference in order to find a solution to Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal. The letter was firm and direct. It was not the first from Eisenhower to Eden on the same subject. Just days after Nasser’s decision to nationalize the Suez Canal, Eisenhower had prepared a similar letter to Eden. He informed Eden he knew from secret sources that Eden wanted to remove Nasser by force. Eisenhower made an effort in his letter to convince Eden that force was not the right solution. Eisenhower informed Eden it was his “personal conviction and that of his associates” that it was not wise at the time “of even contemplating the use of military force.” Eisenhower knew that twice in the same century when Great Britain went to war, the United States had followed. This time Eisenhower emphasized to Eden that the only way the United States could go to war was by congressional approval. That would happen only after the United States had used every peaceful means possible to resolve the problems with Nasser.²¹³ In spite of the effort Eisenhower made to discourage Eden, Eden still went to war. This leaves little doubt why Eisenhower was so angry with Eden. There was a clear difference of views on the Middle East of President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles and that of Prime Minister Eden. Eden did not fully understand that Eisenhower was fully engaged in the Middle East and was essentially acting as his own foreign policy expert. Eisenhower totally disavowed the colonial practice of the British and French. He maintained a strong disapproval of Soviet presence in the Middle East. Eden did not know how to read Eisenhower’s determined policy for the Middle East. Eisenhower did not want to use force until it was the last possible choice.²¹⁴ On October 29 Israel attacked Egypt in the Sinai as planned by Great Britain, , and Israel. Following air attacks on October 31, on November 5 Great

Britain and attacked Egypt at Suez. Patrick Seale provides a lucid of why , Great Britain, and Israel attacked Egypt at Suez and aimed at Nasser. After the three following reasons, an explanation is provided from the Egyptian view by Mohamad H. Heikal, who was chief editor for alAhraam and spokesman for Nasser on his perspective about the motives behind the Suez War. Seale:

1. was concerned about Nasser providing weapons and training to the rebels in Algeria. The French believed that by eliminating Nasser in Egypt, it would send a strong signal to the rebels in Algeria. 2. Israel considered Nasser her number one enemy after he became the president of Egypt in 1954. Israelis were observing the Egyptian foreign policy by Nasser that was bent on independence from foreign powers, like Great Britain. Nasser wanted “total Arab solidarity” that would lead to “a united Arab front under Egyptian direction.” The Israelis watched carefully as Nasser espoused Arab rights for Palestinians. Seale believed the Israelis wanted to “humble” Nasser by attacking him. By this time Nasser had already received his large cache of weapons in the Czech arms deal, supervised by the Soviet Union. Israelis wanted to leave Nasser without “leadership and independence.” The Israelis wanted to dismantle Nasser’s military gains. That was even more important than stopping the fedayeen raids along the Israeli borders, that were driving the possibility of annexing the Sinai as a buffer zone for Israel. 3. Seale believed the British aims for war to be the most complex due to the long-term relations the British had with Egypt at Suez. He indicated that between 1945 and 1954, the British-Egyptian relations were more ive and turned aggressive between 1954 and 1956, when Nasser came to power. In 1954 Nasser’s foreign policy was to demand Arab solidarity against the foreign powers, while Great Britain was still in Egypt. Then, in 1955 when the British and the Eisenhower istration formed the Baghdad Pact, Nasser was able to secure Syria’s foreign policy, following the overthrow of the government of Faris al-Khuri in February 1955. That complicated matters for Jordan, Iraq, and the Gulf states, all of whom were loyal to Great Britain, whom Nasser also placed pressure on. Seale then stated that the way Nasser maneuvered through

the region was what he called

a tacit principle in Arab politics: that control of Syria was the key to the struggle for local primacy.

Due to the threat that Nasser posed for in Algeria and for the British in Jordan in early 1956, the British and French believed force was needed in order to “stop Nasser.” Therein lay one of the great dilemmas that faced Eisenhower: he too wanted to “weaken Nasser,” as he informed Dulles, but without doing it by direct military force.²¹⁵ Heikal: Nasser’s reasoning began near the end of World War II when the Egyptian government wanted the British to vacate the Suez Canal and also wanted the unification of Egypt and the Sudan. That debate went on for five years until there was a new issue that became the same one for both Egypt and Great Britain, but from different perspectives and for different reasons. Great Britain announced it was departing Palestine in 1947 and presenting the case to the United Nations. The “Palestine Question” played a central role in Arab politics because of Palestine’s strategic location and the “common identity and commitments” it had in the Arab world. In view of the entanglement with the British, Egypt believed it would be difficult to intervene in Palestine on behalf of the Palestinian Arabs because the British possessed the weapons needed for intervention. If the British provided the weapons, as was beginning to be a possibility, the Egyptians were then concerned that if they failed in Palestine, the British would have a reason to remain in Egypt. Five months before the 1948 War, weapons were stolen from the British base at Suez, thereby preventing access to them by the Egyptians. The 1948 War ended as a major disappointment to Nasser and others who led the Junior Officer’s Rebellion on July 23, 1952. Once Egypt gained its independence, Nasser had two primary goals he believed central to the success of the revolution. The first was the “Palestine Problem,” and the second was gaining control of the Egyptian military. After that Nasser was set on removing Great Britain from Egypt. That led to his refusal to become part of the Baghdad Pact, not receiving US funds for the High Dam, and

eventually finding Egypt being attacked by Israel and later British and French troops landing in Egypt.²¹ After the British, French, and Israeli attack in October and November 1956, Soviet Minister of Defense Nikolai Bulganin, under Premier Nikita Khrushchev, sent very threatening messages to London, Paris, and Jerusalem stating that the fighting could lead to World War III. Eisenhower wrote in his memoirs that Bulganin proposed to him that the United States and USSR unite and enter the Middle East to stop the fighting. Eisenhower wanted to send a strong signal to Bulganin that the United States would not interfere with the UN plan for a cease-fire. Eisenhower was concerned that the Soviets might embark on “any wild adventure,” due to feeling the same type of desperation that felt in the latter days of the Second World War. Eisenhower made that analysis, due to the fact just as Hitler was “scared and furious in his last days,” he saw the Soviets viewing their satellite system as failing. Eisenhower said the White House response to Bulganin’s recommendation of a US-USSR intervention into Egypt was “unthinkable.”²¹⁷ Yevgeny Primakov, who had an extensive amount of first-hand experience “as a correspondent for Pravda, as deputy director (and later director) of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations at the USSR Academy of Sciences; at the Academy’s Institute of Oriental Studies; as head of the SVR (Russia’s foreign intelligence service); as Russian foreign minister, as Russian prime minister, and as the deputy of the Duma, Russia’s parliament,” provided the Russian side to the Suez War. He confirmed that Eisenhower demanded the military action halt and that all invading troops be pulled back from the Sinai. Primakov then asserted that, like Eisenhower, Bulganin did issue a vehement statement that if fighting did not stop the Soviet Union would be “launching missiles” against all invading countries attacking Egypt. Eisenhower did not mention the missile threat in his memoir. Even Primakov stated that he did not believe Bulganin would carry out a missile attack in the region. Then Primakov stated that Khrushchev let Nasser know that Moscow did not have any intention of allowing Suez to escalate into a world war. He believed that Nasser “fully understood” the message he received. Primakov then made an astute observation about the weapons sent to Nasser before the war at the beginning of 1956. He estimated that Nasser’s military did not have sufficient time to learn how to use the weapons before the attacks by

Great Britain, , and Israel. He said the Egyptians would have needed Soviet specialists to train the military in how to use the weapons. That did not happen immediately, and Primakov believed it made Nasser think deeply about how much he needed a military “fit for combat.” Only after Suez did Nasser think about a wider war fought on a larger scale. Between 1948 and 1956, the wars, according to Primakov, between Egypt and Israel were “localized clashes.” An exception to that should be the 1948 War that involved numerous Arab nations fighting against the new state of Israel.²¹⁸ The Eisenhower-Dulles relationship was important. By the time Dulles assumed his responsibilities as secretary of state, he had been tagged as the “unofficial spokesman of the international wing of the Republican party.” He was the grandson of John W. Foster, who served as secretary of state during the last year of President Benjamin Harrison’s term (1892–1893), and the nephew of Robert Lansing, who was secretary of state under President Woodrow Wilson (1915– 1920).²¹ Dulles assisted President Wilson at the Versailles Conference after World War I. Eisenhower liked Dulles because of his commitment to “internationalism.” Dulles had his critics who believed he was too “moralistic.” In spite of those who thought Dulles heavy handed, Eisenhower fully ed his secretary of state until his death.²² Fulbright’s senatorial staff referred to Eisenhower and Dulles as “the General and the Priest.”²²¹ Eisenhower was compared to General and President Ulysses S. Grant, elected in 1868. Grant won the Civil War over his great rival, General Robert E. Lee. Grant was considered the right president to take on the Indian uprisings in the West. Likewise, Eisenhower made a significant contribution to defeating Hitler and the Third Reich. Americans thought Eisenhower to be the right person to end the three-year war in Korea.²²² Eisenhower, like every new president, would inherit several issues to deal with. In addition to Korea, he would have to prevent a civil war in China between mainland China and the government in exile in Formosa. Eisenhower threatened to use tactical nuclear weapons against China. His China policy became known as the Formosa Doctrine. That would later be used by Eisenhower as he formulated his Middle East strategy, the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957. The Middle East would prove to be very trying for Eisenhower, just as it did for Truman and every US president since. Starting in the Truman istration, the

United States, Great Britain, and were trying to prevent the Arabs from going over to the Soviet camp, making the Arab-Israeli conflict all the more difficult. The West depended on Middle Eastern oil. On May 25, 1950, the United States, Great Britain, and set up the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 that was an attempt to slow down the arms flow into the Middle East and to prevent any territory from being taken by force. June 1952 the Near East Arms Coordinating Committee was set up to coordinate sales of arms to the region. The British and French sold limited arms into the region competitively, while the United States did not. The idea of the committee was to provide stability that allowed the flow of oil to the West, limited tensions in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and tried to gain Arab-Israeli with the West against the Soviet threat to the Middle East. There was an understanding that the nations in the region did need arms for self-defense and internal security. The policy failed. Nasser tried to gain US to build the High Dam in Aswan. The United States turned him down and also did not provide Nasser with weapons that he requested. That led Nasser to seek weapons from the USSR, which was only too pleased to accommodate Nasser’s request. There was a secret Franco-Israeli arms deal that had been in effect in the early 1950s with US consent.²²³ On September 27, 1955, Nasser announced that he had signed an arms-forcotton-and-rice deal with the Soviet Union the week before. According to Moshe Dayan, that deal marked a “turning-point in Middle Eastern affairs.” Dayan clarified that the Czech arms deal

revolutionized the scale and quality of arms supplies to the region, planted a Soviet foot firmly in the area which had been closed to her, opened a second front for the United States in the Cold War, and greatly threatened the existence of Israel.²²⁴

Dayan further elaborated on the weapons that Nasser received from the Soviet Union:

• 300 medium and heavy tanks of the latest Soviet type

• 200 armored personnel carriers • 100 armored self-propelled guns • several hundred field howitzers, medium guns, and anti-tank guns • 134 anti-aircraft guns • 200 MIG-15 jet fighters • 50 Ilyushin bombers • transport plans (numbers unspecified) • radar systems • 2 destroyers • 4 minesweepers • 12 torpedo boats • ammunition, spare parts, ground equipment for aircraft • hundreds of battle vehicles of various types • all small arms and light weapons to be replaced by huge quantities of the Russian semi-automatic rifle.²²⁵

The quoted amount of the arms-for-cotton deal in dollars was $250 million. One dollar then would be the equivalent of $9.41 in 2019. This makes the arms deal in 2019 figures equal to $2.353 billion. Nasser’s leaning to the Soviet Union coincided with the twin factors that concerned him: Zionism and Western imperialism. Nasser successfully exploited both as a means to build up his pan-Arabism philosophy. He wanted to remove the British and French from the Middle East. He rejected the idea of ing the Baghdad Pact as a means to keep the USSR out of the region. He did not want to appear as submitting to the imperialistic ways of the nineteenth century.

Nasser had a three-point foreign policy strategy for the greater Middle East:

1. The Arabs were a single people sharing a common destiny and he wanted a common Arab policy to address the threats of Zionism and Western imperialism with Egypt driving the policy. 2. Arab peoples had to rid themselves of all vestiges of European imperialism and colonialism, primarily aimed at the French in Algeria, British relations in its Persian Gulf protectorates and the British defense treaties with Iraq, Jordan and Libya. 3. Social and economic justice.²²

Moshe Dayan clarified the Israeli perception of the Czech arms deal and that Israel believed the true intention was ultimately to wipe out the Israeli military and leave Israel in “helpless subjugation.” This idea was based on a series of events:

1. The weapons would assist Egypt in preparation for a major confrontation with Israel in the near future. 2. The Egyptian direction of increasing Palestinian raids against Israel. 3. The Egyptian blockade.²²⁷

The British and French both had interests in the Middle East. They did agree that Nasser was getting more emboldened and they believed something had to be done. Both countries wanted the United States to them in military action against Nasser.²²⁸ After Nasser’s arms deal, Peter Hahn wrote about the attitude Israel had about attaining weapons from the United States to strengthen its balance of power in

the region. Ben-Gurion discussed the US need to sell arms to Israel as a moral issue. Hahn clarified that attitude was not in keeping with US officials, nor Dulles. They believed an arms deal with Israel would change the political climate among Arab states and force them to seek in the Soviet camp. Eisenhower, on the other hand, was not convinced that denying the Israelis weapons was the right path. Dulles was concerned about the way Abba Eban was challenging Eisenhower on the issue of weapons. By the spring of 1956, Eisenhower and Dulles collectively decided how they could Israel with weapons while at the same time not showing publicly. Eisenhower alluded to the fact that purchasing jets from Canada would be a “preventive measure” to war.²²

******

The Formosa Doctrine of 1955 was shaped by Eisenhower as the Cold War was intensifying. Eisenhower believed a confrontation with China would involve an eventual US-USSR confrontation. It was significant later in his presidency because of the enormous power Congress gave him. It also assisted him as a precedent that he established when deciding how to manage the Middle East, resulting in the Eisenhower Doctrine. On mainland China, the government of Mao Tse-Tung and his Communists was involved in a clash with the internationally recognized government of Nationalist China that was the exiled government in Formosa, now Taiwan, under the leadership of Chiang Kai-Shek. There was a great amount of concern that the Communists would invade Formosa. In 1954 they began shelling the Matsu Islands on the southern coastline of China and the Quemoy Islands further to the south. Eisenhower, not to be deterred, informed the world at a press conference that he would consider the use of tactical nuclear weapons. The Communists decided not to attack. It was a calculated risk. His response to the question whether he would use tactical nuclear weapons against China:

Well, Mr. Harsch, I must confess that I cannot answer that question in advance.

The only thing I know about war are two things: the most changeable factor in war is human nature in its day-to-day manifestation; but the only unchanging factor in war is human nature.

And the next thing is that every war is going to astonish you in the way it occurred, and in the way it is carried out.

So that for a man to predict, particularly if he has the responsibility for making the decision, to predict what he is going to use, how he is going to do it, would I think exhibit his ignorance of war; that is what I believe.

So I think you just have to wait, and that is the kind of prayerful decision that may someday face a president.

We are trying to establish a condition where he doesn’t.²³

The Communists backed off. There was no US-USSR confrontation. What is important in this case is that it shows that Eisenhower kept important decisions like this one close to his chest and made this critical decision himself.²³¹ In addition, what is important is the fact that he had tactical nuclear weapons on the table as a viable option. Or as Robert Divine wrote:

The beauty of Eisenhower’s policy is that to this day no one can be sure whether or not he would have responded militarily to an invasion of the offshore islands, and whether he would have used nuclear weapons.²³²

The Formosa Resolution was adopted by Congress on January 29, 1955. The Senate approved it 83-3, and the House approved it 410-3. The resolution gave Eisenhower unprecedented presidential authority

to employ the armed forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores [Penghu Islands\ against armed attack.

The Formosa Crisis was critically important to Eisenhower’s leadership in foreign policy.²³³ Eisenhower summed up the first Formosa Crisis with:

The hard way is to have the courage to be patient.²³⁴

The executive and legislative branches of the US government along with the Department of Defense were all moving more confidently in the Middle East as they confronted the USSR following the Formosa Resolution. After the Suez War in October 1956, USSR intervention in Syria looked like a possibility. On November 17, Eisenhower believed it appropriate to inform congress of the perceived Soviet intent in Syria. The USSR was exploiting the actions of the British, French, and Israelis at Suez. This was in line with Nasser’s rhetoric and determination to eliminate Zionism and imperialism from the Middle East. iral Radford, the chairman of the t Chiefs of Staff, believed the United States needed “to draw a line in the sand” against the Soviets. He was already thinking of a t resolution by both houses of congress for the president to execute his duties in the Middle East as he did in the Formosa crisis. Harold Stassen, special advisor on disarmament, believed Eisenhower should send the Russians a strong message not to bring Nasser into their camp.²³⁵

As Salim Yaqub indicates, Eisenhower and Dulles were determined to keep the USSR from gaining control of the oil-rich Middle East. They were not as successful dealing with Nasser and his policy ambitions of pan-Arabism. The Democratic Party compounded the situation for Eisenhower’s policies. It was not satisfied with his approach. Fulbright was one of a group of senators who were unhappy with the way Eisenhower and Dulles were conducting foreign policy in the Middle East. He would eventually say that the Eisenhower Doctrine was like giving a “blank check” from the legislative branch of government to the executive branch.²³ Mohamed Heikal pointed to two US NSC papers that were aimed at US policy in the Middle East. The first was NSC 5428, which had two primary goals:

• [to] move continuously towards the depth of the Middle East with the aim of reaching a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict as a necessary introduction for a stable Middle East • to move continuously and energetically to build the northern tier in the Middle East and have it connected through security arrangements with the heart of the Middle East (Arab World)

The second paper mentioned by Heikal was NSC 5401:

to keep the sources of oil in the Middle East in American hands and defend them at all costs, and deny them to the Soviet Union, even if this led to a confrontation or to the destruction of these resources by the Americans themselves.²³⁷

Eden wanted Eisenhower to the Baghdad Pact. Eisenhower gave his , but he would never commit to ing it. In opposition, Nasser wanted his own alliance with Syria and Saudi Arabia. Eisenhower would later try to

persuade the Saudis to become the legitimate opposition to Nasser. Nasser’s ambitions, Iraq’s desire to counter Nasser, King Hussein’s tenuous position in Jordan, and problems in Algeria with the French were causing tension and turmoil in the Middle East. Along with US-USSR relations in the Middle East, these dynamics were coupled with other challenges, such as Sunni-Shi’a difficulties. During Nasser’s reign as president, Egyptian-Iranian relations remained strained, and that continued until Anwar Sadat tried to repair the relationship.²³⁸ In spite of the strained relations with Iran, Nasser used the Iranian model when he nationalized the Suez Canal based on the way the Iranians negotiated with the British on the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Supplemental Agreement in September 1949.²³ Professor Elie Podeh highlights the fact that Nasser was totally opposed to the Baghdad Pact. He was in competition with Nuri al-Said of Iraq as to who would lead the Arab world. Nasser was very much against the Turco-Pakistani Agreement—known as the Agreement of “Friendly Cooperation”—signed April 2, 1954. In addition to Iraq, Turkey was hoping Syria would the pact. Dulles almost did not provide financial aid to Iraq for its refusal to with Turkey and Pakistan, but relented. The British then pressured Iraq, and the response was that due to the British-Egyptian problems, just the thought of an Arab nation ing the Pact would be “a stab in the back to the Arab world.” After Adib Shishakli was removed from power in Syria in February 1954, the new government of Syria considered ing the pact. Eventually Iraq reversed its thinking on the pact and also encouraged Syria to . Egypt was convinced that Britain and Iraq brought Shishakli’s downfall and insisted upon preventing Syria from ing the pact.²⁴ Eugene V. Rostow believed the United States missed one of the most important opportunities in the post-World War II era during the Suez Crisis in 1956 and 1957. The Communists had been stopped in Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia due to Western assistance. The United States saved Europe with the Marshall Plan, the Berlin Airlift, and forming NATO as well as the European Economic Community in 1958. Communist forces were stopped in Korea. Rostow likened the Atlantic Alliance’s importance to that of the Monroe Doctrine that prevailed as the US beacon of secure foreign policy for over a century. He believed the Atlantic Alliance to be the answer in checking Soviet aggression. He said that by 1948, after the State of Israel was established, the USSR turned its foreign policy to the Arab World. The Soviet Union had a three-pronged strategy to defeat Europe without having to invade it. They believed that if they could take control

of the Mediterranean, North Africa, and the Middle East, Europe would collapse. The Soviets became intimately involved with the Arab world when

abandoning their 1948 policy of for Israel, the Soviets embraced Arab nationalism, and began to intervene not only in the Arab-Israeli conflict, but in the irredentist rivalries among Arab sects, states, parties, and leaders as well²⁴¹.

After the United States, Great Britain, and had honored the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 to stop an arms escalation between Israel and the Arab states, the situation began changing. Although the British and French still maintained an authoritative presence in the region with the backing of the US Navy, the dynamics began changing after the Free Officers Rebellion in Egypt in 1952, eventually allowing Nasser to become president in 1954. The Tripartite Declaration was weakened because the Western powers wanted to try to keep the peace by providing arms to Israel and various new nations in the region. Nasser was also asking for weapons until the USSR provided them. The Western powers were trying to keep the region from going to war. Rostow pointed out that many historians had faulted Eisenhower and Dulles for turning Nasser away from the United States by not ing him on the High Dam project in Aswan. That decision forced Nasser into the Soviet camp to buy weapons from them. Rostow states it was the proper decision by Eisenhower and Dulles. First, Nasser wanted to purchase weapons on a scale that the Americans, British, and French would never . According to Dayan, the weapons deal with the USSR

represented a stunning acceleration of the pace of rearmament in the Middle East.²⁴²

The United States turned Nasser down on the Aswan Dam project because he turned to the Soviets for weapons after the British began leaving Egypt in 1954. The US position on why Nasser wanted the weapons was that he intended to

promote “campaigns of aggression in the area as a Soviet proxy, ally, and satellite.” It is important to understand that in 1954 Syria did sign an arms deal with Czechoslovakia, being the first Arab nation to make such a deal with either the USSR or one of the satellite nations in the beginning of that year. It would be followed with a bigger deal the same year.²⁴³ The Eisenhower istration had no intention of ing Nasser on the dam while Nasser’s intent was to gain full control of the Middle East. Nasser wanted to challenge and defeat Iran. He allowed the Soviets a long-desired foothold into the region. He caused the USUSSR confrontation to become more problematic. Rostow made the same analysis about the Soviets that Kennan had made when he stated:

In the age-old style of Russian diplomacy, they sought to flow around the obstacles, and resume the struggles on another front.²⁴⁴

On March 28, 1956, the Eisenhower istration began a new strategic policy in the Middle East, primarily aimed at Nasser. Nasser could not keep dealing with the Soviets and expect the of the United States. According to David Nichols, Eisenhower and Dulles decided to keep the door open should Nasser want to return to the United States for and aid. The strategy was put forth in the following measures:

1. The United States would provide more to the Baghdad Pact, but it would not formally become a member. 2. The United States would continue its policy under the Tripartite Declaration of not supplying weapons to Israel but would, however, its allies who might want to the Israelis. (The United States was in essence lending to end the ban on weapons to the region.) 3. The United States would work on strengthening the US-Saudi relationship, with the idea that Saudi Arabia might counter Nasser’s desire for hegemony in the Middle East.

Additionally, Dulles wanted to “manipulate American cotton imports to damage the Egyptian markets,” and to institute regime change in Syria for better relations with Iraq and the West.²⁴⁵ On July 26, 1956, Nasser’s response to the US decision on the High Dam caught the United States off guard. He decided to nationalize the Suez Canal. Egypt would finance the canal through its own tax revenue from international shipping ing through Suez. The author of Ike’s Gamble, Michael Doran, refers to Eisenhower’s dilemma with Nasser as “three-dimensional chess.” Doran clarified that by the end of March 1956, Eisenhower began to better understand what Nasser was up to. Eisenhower believed that the Russian to Nasser gave him a new feeling of power that he could in fact be the leader of the Arab world. Nasser clarified his intentions to Eisenhower, once the US president understood that Nasser’s main goal was to remove his Arab rivals. The saber rattling against Israel was Nasser’s way to ensure that he was the primary Arab leader opposing Israel. Doran stated that Nasser did not want to end the tension on the borders surrounding Israel. His strategy would make the United States reassess its Middle East foreign policy.²⁴ US actions leading up to Nasser’s July 26 speech and nationalizing the Suez Canal require further examination. On July 17 Eisenhower had written his note to Dulles to “weaken Nasser.” Many historians write that due to the ill health of Eisenhower, Dulles was calling the shots on foreign policy for the istration. This might be partially true; however, the note by Eisenhower is seldom or ever discussed. It is plausible that since the note was written only nine days before Nasser’s speech that Dulles was following Eisenhower’s guidance. Even in ill health, the records indicate that Eisenhower was quietly wielding his “hidden-hand presidency.” This would more or less implicate Eisenhower in the misreading of Nasser’s nationalizing tactic. Nasser upset the heads of state in Europe, who were vitally dependent on the oil fields in the Middle East. Another and more common view is to allow most of the blame to fall on the shoulders of Dulles. Maybe he did not keep Eisenhower fully up to date on Nasser’s actions and decisions leading up to the July 26 speech. This would remove more of the burden from Eisenhower. He was ill, and had he been fully

in command, he would not have made such a foreign policy decision. It alienated Nasser from the West, causing him to turn to the USSR. Yet another reasonable scenario is to cite what Rostow stated in 1976 where he was actually ing Dulles. He stipulated that Nasser began negotiating with the Soviet Union in 1954 after the British departed Egypt.²⁴⁷ The United States did not Nasser in October 1955 on the High Dam project because the Eisenhower istration was aware that Nasser had purchased weapons from the Soviets in February 1955, although that purchase was not made official until September 1955. Nasser’s decision left the Eisenhower istration in a difficult position. Nor was the US Congress able to Nasser on the dam project “while Egypt undertook campaigns of aggression in the area as a Soviet proxy, ally and satellite.” Rostow concluded that Eisenhower and Dulles both knew about the Czech arms deal and were keeping the door open to see if Nasser might return to the US side. Once the arms deal was made public, the United States was forced to cancel any deal on the High Dam with Nasser. Maybe Dulles felt obliged to act on the behalf of the ill President. If he did so without Eisenhower’s approval, he made decisions on US foreign policy in the Middle East dealing with Nasser directly and the Soviet Union indirectly. Or as Rostow indicated, Dulles was responding to Nasser’s decision to turn to the USSR in February 1955. Another possibility, as indicated by Eisenhower’s handwritten note, is that Dulles was following Eisenhower’s guidelines weakening Nasser. Or as Rostow stated, the United States knew of the deal in February, and it was keeping that fact under wraps.²⁴⁸ Steven Freiberger wrote about the Turkish-Iraqi Pact that was discussed on January 13, 1955. The Baghdad Pact was drawn up under Article 51 of NATO. That meant that an attack on one country in the region was considered an attack on all. The British favored the Baghdad Pact because it ed another part of the Middle East Command. The United States ed it due to the northern tier that acted as a stopgap to any potential Soviet invasion. On the other hand, Nasser was very upset about the Baghdad Pact. He gave a speech resembling one of Churchill’s during World War II. Nasser informed the Arab world at a conference sparsely attended by other Arab nations that

if Egypt has to go it alone it will do so… Egypt will not be intimidated… Egypt

will continue to champion the cause of the Arabs even if the rest have become slaves of the West and the Turks.

The conference in Cairo began January 22 and ended February 6. The TurkishIraqi Pact was signed February 24. Eden visited Cairo on February 26. He met with Nasser and found him emboldened and in no way cooperative. Nasser decided that he would not receive arms from the West. He was not pleased with his grand scheme of uniting the Arab world due to embarrassment over the pact the Iraqis made with non-Arab Turkey.²⁴ Nasser signed the arms deal with the Soviets in February. This may have been why Nasser was emboldened and non-receptive to Eden on February 26. Rostow does not mention the date that Nasser made the arms deal with the Soviets. Nasser began making decisions that he believed in the best interest of Egypt. This was leading him to his plan for pan-Arabism. Historian David Lesch asserts that the Suez War affected the primary combatants in the following ways:

1. It was a big success for Nasser. He was ired due to the fact he confronted the traditional nations of imperialism and Egypt’s primary enemy, Israel. Lesch believed Nasser moved the Arab policy from Arab nationalism to Nasserism. He was a hero in the Arab world that looked to him for Arab unity. That ended in the 1967 Six-Day War. 2. Lesch believed the war was a success for Israel. The Gulf of Aqaba was open for Israeli shipping. Lesch stated that the Israeli government received a commitment from the Eisenhower istration for its maritime rights in the Gulf of Aqaba. After withdrawing under pressure from Eisenhower in the Sinai, the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) was set up in the Sinai, and the Sinai was demilitarized. A lesson for Israel was not to leave any Arab land without a peace treaty, using the lesson in the Sinai, since Egypt attacked again in 1967. Negatively, Israel was viewed as a “tool of Western imperialism,” while Nasser was on the rise. 3. The term “disaster” is used, describing how Suez left Great Britain and

. Their influence diminished. US-French relations were strained, whereas the British and Israelis both learned that it was in their best interest to keep the US istration informed, regardless of the party in power. It also resulted in US-Great Britain unity in the ensuing decades ahead.²⁵

The war angered Eisenhower, as he had repeatedly advised Eden not to attack Nasser. The war especially upset Eisenhower because it was launched by Israel only days before the 1956 presidential election. In spite of the Suez War, Eisenhower won the election against Adlai Stevenson, winning the popular vote by 35 million to 25 million and “the largest presidential majority since FDR routed Alf Landon in 1936.”²⁵¹ After Suez, Eisenhower needed to make a foreign policy decision. He wanted to define the US role in the Middle East. According to Professor Moshe Ma’oz, after Suez, Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion was very concerned about IsraeliUS relations. Ben-Gurion warned the United States and other nations that if the Soviet Union succeeded in Egypt and Syria, it would lead to the collapse of all Africa. He believed that within Egypt and Syria there were pockets of resistance to Nasser and Quwwatli.²⁵²

The Eisenhower Doctrine was forged as an outcome of the Suez War. The president knew that as the British and French began to pull back from the Middle East after the debacle of their military intervention in the Suez War/Sinai Campaign, the United States had to take a more active and responsive role in the region. Eisenhower would use the Formosa Doctrine in 1955 during his first term as a precedent when strategizing his Middle East doctrine.²⁵³ On January 1, 1957, at a meeting at the White House, Congressman Leo Allen, the ranking Republican on the House Rules Committee, made a comment to the president that his new proposal for the Middle East was similar to the one he used during the Quemoy and Matsu crisis. In his memoirs, the President supplied the following answer:

I agreed, commenting that in modern warfare there might not be time for orderly procedures; it was necessary to make our intent clear in advance.²⁵⁴

In his memoirs President Eisenhower recalled how he told of Congress that “time was of the essence.” He believed it was critical that the Soviets understood that despite the problems the United States had at Suez with its allies, there was a determined effort to “sustain Western rights in the region.” The president said the following to those present:

The existing vacuum in the Middle East must be filled by the United States before it is filled by Russia. Should there be a Soviet attack there, I can see no alternative to an immediate United States move to stop it.²⁵⁵

The president said loss of the Middle East to the Soviet Union would be “disastrous” for Europe due to the oil. He thought it was extremely important for the world to be put on notice that, if necessary, the United States would move “instantly.” He informed the body of legislators present that he would abide by constitutional procedures, but he wanted them to be assured that “modern war

might be a matter of hours only.” He wanted to assure the legislators that his doctrine was based on months of study. It was not finished and still open for discussion, but it was important to fill the vacuum in the Middle East before the Soviets had the opportunity.²⁵ To put oil in perspective, the following data on the progression of oil prices between 1951 and 1958 is important based on how much the West paid for oil in the Middle East:

Oil Revenues in the Middle East 1951–1958 Millions of Dollars Year 1951 1955 1956 1957 1958

Iran 23 90 152 214 246

Iraq 38 206 193 137 237

Kuwait 30 305 306 365 415

Saudi Arabia 155 274 283 291 304

Source: Data from Podeh, Quest for Hegemony in the Arab World, 24.

Klinghoffer wrote that during World War II the Soviet Union had such decreases in oil production that the United States provided oil to the USSR between 1941 and 1947 in addition to the Soviet Union receiving oil from Iran. The reason was the German attack on Russia in June 1941, with a key target being the oil fields in the Caucuses. After the war the USSR “incorporated” regions of oil from areas like South Sakhalin from Japan and Droholycz-Borislaw from Poland in addition to oil fields in Romania, Hungary, and Austria. Klinghoffer said that it took time for the USSR to rebuild its oil industry and was a “net-importer” until 1954. By 1950 oil amounted to 1.5 percent of Soviet exports and 5.5 percent of imports. By 1957, 9.1 percent and 3.0 percent, and then the USSR became a major exporter of oil.²⁵⁷ After the 1948 War, even with minimal exporting of oil, the USSR made sure it was looking after Israel’s need for oil via Romania. Between 1946 and 1954 Soviet oil imports and exports:

1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954

Imports Crude oil 9.1 74.9 74.0 131.9 336.6 59.9 197.6 104.6 193.0

Exports Oil products 900.0 500.0 800.0 1,700.0 2,300.0 2,600.0 3,600.0 4,600.0 3,800.0

Crude oil 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 300.0 900.0 1,300.0 1,500.0 2,100.0

Oil products 500.0 800.0 700.0 800.0 800.0 1,600.0 1,800.0 2,700.0 4,400.0

Source: Data from Klinghoffer, International Oil Politics, 40–42.

The USSR had its own oil policies in the Middle East “to limit Western oil activities.” Additionally, the USSR surmised that US and British intentions to intervene in Suez in 1956 and Lebanon and Jordan in 1958, respectively, were “to buttress sagging oil fortunes.” The Soviet Union wanted to undermine the oil supply to the West by “nationalization, embargoes and regional control over vital waterways and pipelines.” They also encouraged the Arab nations to negotiate direct deals “between the producing and consuming states” in order to by the Western oil companies while simultaneously finding ways “to consolidate the socialized oil sector within Arab economies. The goal was to “eliminate the Western presence” totally. The Kremlin policy was “not to advance its own oil power, but to undercut the ‘supply effect’ of states in the West.²⁵⁸ Countries who supplied oil to Israel between 1954 and 1956 are listed below.

Sources of Israel’s Oil Imports, 1954–1956 Crude (barrels) Fuel Oil (barrels) Origin 1954

1955

98,000 895,000 176,000 36,000

USSR Venezuela USSR Venezuela

383,000 98,000 13,000

USSR Venezuela Iran Italy USSR Venezuela Italy

194,000 184,000 614,000 50,000

1956

180,000 900,000 281,000 46,000

USSR Iran USSR Venezuela

Professor Bialer wrote that until late 1956, Israel depended upon the USSR for most of its fuel oil.²⁵

On New Year’s Day 1957, Eisenhower and Dulles met with the cabinet and key of Congress to seek their for a decisive Middle East policy.² According to the chart drawn by Dr. L. Arthur Minnich, an assistant staff secretary and unofficial historian,² ¹ Fulbright sat directly across from the president and next to Senator Green. Fulbright would eventually succeed Green as the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1959. The night before, Fulbright and his wife, Betty, had attended the annual New Year’s Eve party at the home of the famed columnist Walter Lippmann and his wife, Helen. The party was one of Washington’s elite affairs with a collage of “ambassadors, senators, government officials, art connoisseurs and journalists.” During the evening, Fulbright expressed his feelings about how disappointed he was in Congress and the Democratic Party. Walter Lippmann asked Fulbright to take the lead “in a movement that would indict not only Eisenhower’s foreign policy, but the assumptions and values that underlay it.”² ² Fulbright, in opposition to the Eisenhower Doctrine, believed that it

was an attempt to eliminate debate through an emotional appeal to patriotism and to stampede Congress into giving the President an unrestricted grant of power over the Armed Forces and American economic resources.² ³

Lyndon Johnson, as the Senate Majority Leader, opposed Fulbright’s view, believing that opposition within Congress would be looked upon as weakness in the world, and he assisted in the age of the Eisenhower Doctrine. Senator Fulbright’s political philosophy as a senator was different, favoring debate of the issues with the executive branch of government, privately and publicly.² ⁴ Eisenhower presented his Middle East doctrine January 5, 1957.² ⁵ He told the of Congress that he was placing the Soviets on notice concerning the serious intentions of the United States. As he stated on New Year’s Day, he believed it was imperative to present his executive decision before the world as soon as possible. There would be no doubt where the United States stood on the Middle East and the importance it was placing on that strategic part of the world. The president began by saying that the US objective in international affairs

remained “peace—a world based on justice.” He talked about the fact that the Soviet Union wanted to show its influence in the region primarily for world politics. He assured the Soviet government and its people that they had nothing to fear from the United States in the Middle East or any place in the world, as long as they did not “first resort to aggression.” Then he stated:

That statement I make solemnly and emphatically.

Eisenhower talked about the value of the Middle East and how many of the Truman istration initiatives, such as the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), would be ineffective if the Soviets dominated the region. He emphasized the importance of the birthplace of the three great religions in the Middle East like Jerusalem for Judaism and Christianity and Mecca for Islam. The president emphasized how terrible it would be for holy places to fall under the domination of atheistic materialism. He then clearly stated what he believed to be fact in the Middle East:

1. The Middle East, which has always been coveted by Russia, would today be prized more than ever by International Communism. 2. The Soviet rulers continue to show that they have no scruples in using any means to gain their ends. 3. The free nations of the Mid East need, and for the most part want, added strength to assure their continued independence.

The president discussed the differences between the Soviets in Hungary and Great Britain in Egypt in their responses to the UN when asked to stop their aggression. He indicated the two European nations had a sense of respect for the “opinions of mankind” versus the refusal of the Soviets to withdraw from Hungary, even under censure. He brought up an important and relevant point about the weakness of the UN. He stated the UN might be helpful, but it could

not “be a wholly dependable protector of freedom when the ambitions of the Soviet Union are involved.” When the president began talking about his proposed doctrine, it raised a great amount of disagreement among individuals like Fulbright. At the end of section VI of the document, the president began outlining the plan for the doctrine. He said it would do four things:

First… authorize the United States to cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence.

Second… authorize the Executive to undertake in the same region programs of military assistance and cooperation with any nation or group of nations which desires such aid.

Third… authorize such assistance and cooperation & include the employment of the armed forces of the United States to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations, requesting such aid, against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by International Communism.

Fourth… authorize the President to employ, for economic and defensive military purposes, sums available under the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, without regard to existing limitations.²

An additional point of later controversy was the funding allocations in the proposal. For approximately four months, until June 30, the ending date of the fiscal year, the president would allocate the amount of current appropriations. Then, for each of the next two years, 1958 and 1959, the president requested

$200 million. Continuing in Section VII, the president highlighted problems in the Middle East, such as the confrontation between Israel and the Arab states, the future of the Arab refugees, and the future of the Suez Canal. He stated that the legislation he was promoting was for the purpose of dealing with direct and indirect Communist aggression. After stressing and clarifying this point, he stated one of the more controversial parts of his plan.

If, contrary to my hope and expectation, a situation arose which called for the military application of the policy which I ask the Congress to in with me in proclaiming, I would of course maintain hour-by-hour with the Congress if it were in session. And if the Congress were not in session, and if the situation had grave implications, I would, of course, at once call the Congress into special session.² ⁷

Reactions to Eisenhower’s new doctrine for the Middle East was varied. Geoffrey Barraclough, successor to Arnold Toynbee as professor of international affairs at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, wrote that England and had forced the United States to come up with a new foreign policy.² ⁸ The United States, more or less by default, had to rethink its foreign policy in the Middle East, fully knowing that if it did not, the region would be exposed to the possibility of Soviet subversion and even Soviet expansion. The day after Eisenhower delivered his doctrine speech to the nation, reporters prodded istration officials for further clarification. The istration officials said the geographical region would extend from Morocco in the west, to Afghanistan in the east, and as far south in Africa as Tanganyika. Morocco and Tunisia might be included, because as newly formed Arab nations in North Africa they were facing the same type of problems as nations in the Middle East. It was thought they might be able to counter the “Egyptian influence in the economic councils of the enlarged Middle Eastern area.” The nations comprising the Middle East in 1957 were Egypt, the Sudan, Libya, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Turkey, Iran, and Israel. According to The New York Times journalist Dana Adams Schmidt, the term Middle East never really had a

true definitive meaning. The British used the term during World War II to describe the location of a British Army command. The istration wanted to include Afghanistan in the doctrine because the Soviets had a very large influence there, having just lent the Afghanis $100 million. The African nations of Tanganyika, Uganda, Kenya, and the Belgian Congo were included because of the Nile River. In addition, whenever major decisions were made concerning the Nile River, the Eisenhower istration also wanted Ethiopia, the source of the Blue Nile, included in the framework of the doctrine for the Middle East.² House Speaker Sam Rayburn proposed a thirty-four-word declaration as a substitute for the Eisenhower Doctrine.

The United States regards as vital to her interests the preservation of the independence and integrity of the states of the Middle East and, if necessary, will use her armed forces to that end.

Secretary Dulles totally rejected the premise of the substitute resolution because it would give the appearance that the United States wanted to set up an American protectorate, like a shield, that did not consider the wishes of the people in the region. Second, he opposed it because it would force the United States alone into a guarantee of the existing boundaries in the Middle East. Third, the Rayburn proposal would be in violation of the UN Charter, because it would require military action to overthrow regimes under the control of the Communists by peaceful means. Finally, the proposal gave no importance to economic aid. The president received different reviews of his doctrine from around the world. The president said that in Great Britain and the plan was “generally favored.” The views from the Soviet Union and Communist China were that the plan was just another form of imperialism the United States was taking from the British and French. Among the nations in the Middle East, the president said there was a division: Syria was “hostile,” and Saudi Arabia and Iraq were critical but also cautious. The other three non-Arab nations of the Baghdad Pact— Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran—were very ive of the plan. Lebanon ed the three nations of the “Northern tier” in of the Eisenhower Doctrine.

Prime Minister Nehru of India did not like the idea of military force being introduced into the region, informing Eisenhower that he believed it would be a catalyst for division in the Arab world, further adding to the already tense situation. Nehru also believed the Soviets were too occupied with their satellite nations to enter into military conflict in the Middle East.²⁷ Russian Premier Bulganin (1955–1958) claimed that the Eisenhower Doctrine was an “adventurous policy” that would make the Middle East very dangerous again. Speaking at a ceremony, the g of a Soviet-East German agreement, the premier said, “American imperialism had now embarked on ‘gross interference’ in the internal affairs of Middle Eastern countries and a general programme of enslavement of their peoples.”²⁷¹ On January 10, 1957, Dean Acheson, the secretary of state during the Truman istration, addressed the Congressional House Foreign Affairs Committee. He began his speech by saying President Eisenhower’s Middle East plan was “not a policy, but an invitation to devise one.” He agreed that the United States needed a policy, but he questioned what kind of policy it should be. The former secretary believed Eisenhower was correct by stating that as the president, he and Congress had worked together in areas where the national integrity of other nations affected the security of the United States. Acheson raised several key matters of foreign policy as he addressed the House:

1. Presidential authority—He was concerned about the fact that the president could send US military forces to the Middle East “as he deemed necessary.” He believed that if one read the statement by President Eisenhower, it looks less like an executive policy statement and more within the powers of the legislative branch of government. 2. Nuclear threat—Acheson believed it was not wise for the Eisenhower istration to use vague nuclear threats with the Soviet Union, saying:

Vague phrases which suggest that we might respond to any but the most vital danger by nuclear retaliation carry a vicious risk, whether believed or not believed, and may cause a fatal miscalculation. There can be no bluff here.

3. Use of American armed forces—Acheson believed the resolution read that the United States would be acting unilaterally in the Middle East. He believed the possibility of acting unilaterally, as a matter of policy, might be deficient. He believed the istration had to be fully aware of its treaty obligations. The istration needed to know where the armed forces might be deployed, and to and from what bases they might be deployed. Acheson hoped the United States would be ed by its allies in using military force. He believed an agreement with all nations involved was very important. He indicated that if the United States looked to the UN to form American policy, this would be a big mistake and “an unprecedented abdication of responsibilities and power.”²⁷²

On January 12, 1957, Truman wrote an article ing the Eisenhower Doctrine. He used his own form of “plain speaking” regarding the situation in the Middle East. He indicated that Congress should Eisenhower’s decision to use armed forces against “any Communist or Communist-dominated aggressor in the Middle East and provide economic aid to help the Arab nations with their independence.” Truman did not believe Congress had any alternative to ing the president’s plan. The doctrine was structured to prevent the Soviets from taking over the Middle East that was so necessary for the economy and peace of the world. Truman thought that the Eisenhower istration should have moved faster. He believed the istration should have acted when Nasser accepted weapons from Czechoslovakia in 1955. Truman pointed out that the president cannot delegate his constitutional authority to dictate foreign policy to Congress or to the United Nations. He said Congress should allow the president to do his job by voting to give him the funds he needed and at the same time require the president to inform Congress more often and to consult it. Truman urged executive action in the Middle East, with the following warning:

Let us make no mistake. This is what Russia is after—control of these resources.

He warned that war would eventually follow if the Soviet Union took control of the resources in the region, since they would be denied to the rest of the world. He then made the following recommendations:

1 a) Place an embargo on all ammunitions going to the Middle East from the Soviet Union and other nations, until the situation improved.

b) Arms and ammunitions should only go to the emergency forces of the United Nations in this region.

c) The Soviet Union must be warned about sending arms to Egypt and Syria.

d) In addition to warning the Soviets, place US Navy cruisers at the end of the Black Sea Straits and cruisers and aircraft carriers in the Eastern Mediterranean.

2 a) Enlarge and strengthen the United Nations Emergency Forces until the Suez problem is solved and a peace treaty is attained between Israel and Egypt.

b) All waterways of the world where peace and the economy are involved should be open to all commerce.

c) Work to relieve world tensions.

d) Achieve a permanent solution to the Suez Canal.

e) Settle and guarantee the border between Egypt and Israel.

3 a) Never again allow the United States to be separated from its allies.

b) Assume some of the responsibility of the actions taken by the British, French and Israel at Suez.²⁷³

Fulbright, however, as one of the leading senators on foreign affairs in the US Senate, challenged the Eisenhower decisions in the Middle East. Fulbright made a speech honoring The Reporter. His topic was US foreign policy and how it had evolved since the founding of America. He noted that between the end of the Revolutionary War in 1783 and 1853 the executive branch did not believe it needed US foreign policy specialists. Congress debated the issues, and the people carried on a discourse on US foreign policy. In the twentieth century, foreign policy became more complicated. It required the executive branch to carry on affairs that neither Congress nor the people were privy to. Fulbright’s point was to emphasize his beliefs that the division of labor on foreign affairs was changing. He believed the executive branch was growing in power dealing with foreign affairs. The legislative was falling behind. It was not able to keep up with the daily events the president had to deal with on foreign affairs. Fulbright’s speech reflected his beliefs on the use of executive powers during the Suez crisis. Fulbright ended saying the following:

Europe and America have enormous resources for survival, indeed for the mastery of any challenge hurled our way by the Soviets. But those resources will not be mobilized, they will remain in their present state of disarray, until public men and the public on both sides of the Atlantic fit those resources into a grand design for closer union. In striving to bring this design to in our own time, we may make mistakes; but in striving, we may find our salvation. If we do not

strive for it at all, our epitaph will read: They chose to stand still, and so were lost forever.²⁷⁴

The alternative resolution drafted by Fulbright was presented to the Senate on January 12, one week after Eisenhower presented his Middle East plan. Fulbright clarified his intent by stating he was not trying to oppose the Eisenhower resolution but instead was presenting an alternative resolution that was not as strongly worded as the Eisenhower Doctrine. This goes back to Fulbright’s philosophy of making policy work on both sides. The purpose of Fulbright’s action was to present a policy to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) “as a basis for discussion.” Eisenhower and Fulbright both presented their plans with the caveat that they were not complete and were open for discussion. Two major points of the senator’s plan were similar to the one drafted in the House of Representatives by Congressman Clement J. Zablocki, which was intended to

eliminate any specific authorization of economic aid funds for the Middle East and omit authority for the President to use force as he deems necessary against communist armed aggression in the area.

Fulbright’s aim for an alternative to the Eisenhower Doctrine was consistent with his philosophy on the role of a senator. He believed the opposition party in Congress should provide criticism. If, on the other hand that party was in a weak position or agreed so much with the president that it made the party weak, the task should fall to the majority party.²⁷⁵ Fulbright turned his philosophy into practice, as observed by his opposition to President Eisenhower, a Republican president, and to President Johnson, a Democratic president. The New York Times predicted the Eisenhower istration would be successful in ing Resolution 19, the Eisenhower Doctrine, but only after a thorough review by Congress and, more specifically, by the Senate. On January 3, 1957, the Eighty-Fifth Congress was called into session; the breakdown of US senators and of the House of Representatives for the first session from

January 3, 1957, to August 30, 1957, was as follows:

US Senate: 50 Senators in the Democratic Party and 45 Senators in the Republican Party and 1 Vacant seat

US House of Representatives: 234 in the Democratic Party (majority) and 201 in the Republican Party (Minority)²⁷

The paper added that Senator Fulbright’s proposal complemented the Vandenberg Resolution, written by Senator Arthur Vandenberg. Fulbright wanted the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to study both alternatives to warn the Soviet Union about its involvement in the Middle East. The specific differences in the two resolutions were as follows:

President Eisenhower’s Proposal if approved as a t resolution (meaning if it were ed by the House of Representatives a

would give the president the authority to use the armed forces as “he deemed necessary” in or

would give the president the authority to begin “military assistance programs” and a special p

would expire when the president believed the peace and security of the nations in the “general did not put any emphasis on the Arab-Israeli conflict.

On January 24, 1957, Fulbright requested a thorough study of the EisenhowerDulles policies.²⁷⁷ Dulles said the study should go back to 1946 instead of 1953, as Senator Fulbright had requested. Due to the voluminous amount of material involved, Fulbright eventually dropped the investigation. His request did constitute a statement that American foreign policy in the Middle East was not working and needed to be carefully planned. On February 11, 1957, Senator Fulbright gave a speech on the Senate floor. The first order of business for Fulbright was to read the main element of the Eisenhower Doctrine, or Senate t Resolution 19.

The President is authorized to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of any such nation or group of nations (in the general area of the Middle East) requesting such aid against overt aggression from any nation controlled by international communism,’ and to use without regard to the provisions of any other law or regulation, not to exceed $200 million. The resolution shall expire as the President may determine.

After discussing various aspects of the Resolution, Fulbright asked two related questions. The first was whether or not the Senate should “strike down” its rights and duties in the conduct of foreign affairs after 168 years under the Constitution. He said the next question was whether or not the Senate should affirm a “radical proposal” over which the Senate would be abandoning its constitutional system of checks and balances. Fulbright believed the resolution abridged the separation of legislative and executive powers and the power of Congress to declare war under the principles of the Constitution. SJ Resolution 19 was not a resolution or a concurrent resolution, both of which are limited to “advice and policy.” As a t resolution, the Eisenhower Doctrine had the “force of law.” The second problem was a result of the first. Due to the force of law that the resolution represented, it acted as a “blanket transfer to the Executive of the

Constitutional right vested in Congress to declare war.” This was a “startling innovation.” To simplify the matter, Fulbright asked his colleagues if they would be doing their job if they requested the president “to appoint the next ten ambassadors, cabinet officers and of the Supreme Court without the Senate ing on them?” It was unbelievable that they give any president the “blank forms… to wage war.” Fulbright proposed to his fellow senators to vote for an advisory resolution. It would have the Senate’s for the president to form a policy “opposing the expansion of Communist influence in the Middle East.” He talked about a precedent to do this. One was the resolution leading to the formation of the United Nations (of which he was an author); another was the Vandenberg Resolution leading to the formation of NATO. Both resolutions did not have the “force of law.” Nor did they their responsibilities to the executive. They did not attempt to merge the legislative branch with the executive. However, “they evidenced the will of a united and determined people in of a definite and constructive policy.” Fulbright acknowledged the wisdom of the founding fathers of the American Constitution. He reinforced the fact that they foresaw the tendency of the executive to try and take over much of the legislative functions and set up provisions to prevent that from happening. He said he would not contribute further to the “erosion of the power of the Senate.” Fulbright next talked about the doctrine of inherent or residual power of the president and the doctrine of emergency power as these pertained to the Middle East. He said the Constitution gives the president a legal authority in “cases of compelling necessity” needed to “protect the vital interests of the republic.” Eisenhower already had the power he was requesting in his resolution. The presumption may have been that the president should not act with these powers without a congressional resolution. If the nation had a timid president it might limit an important executive power and place the Republic in jeopardy if there were a true emergency. As to the doctrine of emergency power applied to the Middle East, the president should take whatever action he felt necessary if an emergency arose in the Middle East. The president should protect the vital interests of the nation. Then, if the president believed he had overstepped his authority, he should seek the approval of Congress as soon as possible.

Fulbright did not believe Congress should abandon its constitutional functions for any length of time. He did believe Congress should give the president what he needed by way of special legislation and what the president could justify, but he did not think it was right for Congress to “grant him vague and unlimited power.” A final issue that Fulbright pointed out was the fact that the speech Eisenhower gave on January 5 and SJ Resolution 19 were not the same. He added that when President Truman introduced the Truman Doctrine, he spoke on that doctrine only. Senator O’Mahoney of Wyoming asked Fulbright if President Eisenhower’s speech mentioned consultation with Congress. The senator pointed out the fact that this was left out of the resolution. He went on to say the public should know that the speech and the resolution were in conflict with each other. Fulbright recognized Senator O’Mahoney, who spoke that morning, as the brightest constitutional scholar in the Senate. The debate went on for a long while. One gets a sense from the minutes in the Congressional Record how opposed many of the senators were to the Eisenhower Doctrine. Fulbright believed the best alternative for the secretary of state would have been to “make an advisory declaration, which is something Congress has done on many occasions.”²⁷⁸ Congress did Senate t Resolution 19, the Eisenhower Doctrine, into law on March 9, 1957, by a vote of 72-19. President Eisenhower believed the age of his doctrine demonstrated the resolve of his istration

to block the Soviet Union’s march to the Mediterranean, to the Suez Canal and the pipelines, and to the underground lakes of oil which fuel the homes and factories of Western Europe.

In his memoirs the president commented on the opposition to his doctrine. He objected to House t Resolution 117, introduced the day he spoke to Congress on January 5. The new resolution would have limited the doctrine to “nations in the general area of the Middle East.” The Eisenhower Doctrine specified “any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East.” The president further clarified his point.

As in the Formosa Strait, the istration refused to draw a hard line, thin line around the countries of the Middle East it stood ready to defend; such a definition, we believed, could encourage an aggressor to seize any area outside the boundary.²⁷

The Jerusalem Post reported that Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion came out in favor of the Eisenhower Doctrine, as did the Knesset with a vote of 59 for the doctrine, 5 opposed, and 39 abstaining.²⁸ Abba Eban, Israeli Ambassador to the United States 1950–1959, did not believe the Eisenhower Doctrine was “a relevant security guarantee to Israel.” He said the threat to Israel was not from “International Communism” but rather from the Arab states “of varying orientation.” On the other hand, Eban clarified that the Soviet Union had “recently intimidated us with violent menace,” and he was concerned that it might be repeated. He also wrote that it was not unforeseen that nations surrounding Israel might someday fall under the “international Communist system.” Although the “official Israeli opinion” was split, Eban answered his opinion by stating, “I had no doubt that our course was clear”— meaning that Israel ed the Eisenhower Doctrine.²⁸¹ In some areas, the differences between the Eisenhower Doctrine and the Fulbright alternative resolution are sharp and distinctive. There are two issues. The first was how to deal with the Middle East. The second was the Constitutional issue of the division of labor between the executive and the legislative branches of the US government. The Eisenhower istration is faulted for not addressing the more acute issues within the Middle East, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, settling the issue of Palestinian refugees, determining the borders of Israel, and helping to foster peace agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Perhaps it is fairer to argue that because of Eisenhower’s overall strategy in the Cold War, he set the stage so that those regional issues might be more easily solved by future presidents. Is it not also possible that to solve both issues simultaneously were beyond one istration’s capabilities? Senator Fulbright knew that President Eisenhower’s address before Congress

and the world on January 5, 1957, was substantially different from the president’s doctrine and the final product. In that speech, Eisenhower assured the of Congress that should he need to send America’s fighting force into harm’s way he would be in constant touch with them. However, when SJ Resolution 19 was ed into law, it did not mention this important issue. Fulbright addressed issues facing the nations of the Middle East that were not addressed in the Eisenhower Doctrine, such as settling the Suez issue. In order to save his doctrine, Eisenhower was forced to address this issue, as will be shown in the next chapter. The Fulbright Resolution maintained that the president already had many of the powers he was asking for. Fulbright warned the Senate that the Eisenhower Doctrine would actually weaken the presidency. He believed the Eisenhower Doctrine was dangerous in the hands of a weak president.

President Truman holding the Chicago Daily Tribune with the headline, “Dewey Defeats Truman,” November 3, 1948

Same picture showing the crowd greeting President Truman

President Truman. Former Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Clark Clifford at Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri, for the “Iron Curtain” speech, March 5, 1946.

President Truman, Senator Fulbright and one other as President Truman signs the Fulbright Act of 1946 (Public Law 584) for the Fulbright Scholar Program

President Eisenhower and Senator Fulbright.

President Truman shaking hands with General George Catlett Marshall, Jr.

President Truman with Secretary of State Dean Acheson

President Truman sitting with Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion and Abba Eban standing in the background

President Truman, Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion standing in front of a menorah with Abba Eban

President Eisenhower sitting with Egyptian President Gamal Abdul-Nasser.

President Truman sitting with General of the Army Dwight David Eisenhower.

The hard way is to be patient. ²⁸²

—President Eisenhower

I have thought ever since the 1956 Suez War that the best way to settle the situation was to do what Eisenhower did at that time—require Israel to return to its original borders. ²⁸³

—Senator Fulbright

4 BEIRUT: “THE LINE IN THE SAND”—HOW EISENHOWER USED THE EISENHOWER DOCTRINE

There were specific incidents in the Middle East during 1956, 1957, and 1958 requiring the use of the Eisenhower Doctrine. The first incident was after the Suez War, when President Eisenhower pressured Prime Minister Ben-Gurion to return to the 1949 Armistice borders of Israel. The second was in 1957 when the Eisenhower istration was deeply concerned about Soviet penetration into Syria. The third incident was in Jordan in 1957 when Lebanese President Chamoun asked President Eisenhower to help King Hussein. The fourth incident was in Lebanon in 1958, when President Eisenhower drew his “line in the sand,” sending US Marines to Beirut. At the end of the Suez War of 1956, Great Britain and withdrew their military forces from the war zones, as required by the UN. Prime Minister BenGurion, however, refused to withdraw Israel’s military forces from the Sinai. Eisenhower understood Israel’s concerns. Since 1950 the Egyptians had closed the Suez Canal to Israel. There were also problems of fedayeen, or suicide raids, into Israel from the Gaza Strip. Fedayeen raids in 1955 were coming from the Jordanian border with Israel, not only from Gaza. The raids were planned by Egyptian officials who were going from one Palestinian refugee camp to another to encourage these raids. Nasser was concerned about Jordan being more proWestern and in turn providing more to Nasser’s nemesis in the Middle East, Iraq. Jordan’s and Iraq’s rulers were of the same Hashemite clan. Secondly, the raids from the Jordanian border would take pressure off of the Egyptians. Egypt remained the greater threat to Israel, and for that reason Israel did not want to withdraw.²⁸⁴ Dulles believed that part of the problem was how Israel and Egypt interpreted the of the 1949 Armistice after the War of 1948. The 1949 Armistice was the guideline for a peaceful settlement in 1956, just as UN Resolution 242 following the Six-Day War in 1967 remains the guideline until today. Israel’s claim was that Egypt did not have “the rights of belligerency” in the Gulf of

Aqaba. The Straits of Tiran was the narrowest point in the Gulf of Aqaba, a sixmile distance between Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Under the three-mile limit this was not an area of international waters. The rights of “innocent age” pertain to these waters under international law. Vessels have the right to through territorial waters as long as they are proceeding to international waters.²⁸⁵ The other problem between Israel and Egypt was the Gaza Strip. The controversy revolved around whether or not Egypt had the right to ister that area under the 1949 Armistice. In Eisenhower’s memoirs he states that Egypt “had been allocated” the area to ister under the Armistice of 1949. After the Suez War, because Israel occupied the area during the fighting, it claimed Egypt had no right to the area. In defiance, Egypt said this was a violation of the 1949 Armistice. Egypt threatened military retaliation to defend its territorial waters in the Gulf of Aqaba and its right to the Gaza Strip if Israel did not withdraw.²⁸ Several letters were exchanged between Eisenhower and Ben-Gurion from the end of the Suez War until Israel did eventually withdraw its military forces in March 1957. An article titled “Withdrawal of the Armed Forces from the Sinai and Gaza 1956 and 1957” (1957–1956 ‫ )נסיגת צהייל מסיני ועזה‬discussed the intense period that Israel faced after the war. Ben-Gurion stated that on November 3, 1956, he received two letters, one from Prime Minister Bulganin and one from Eisenhower. He said of the two the one from Eisenhower was much friendlier. It began ‫“(הממשלה היקר ךאש‬Dear Prime Minister”), and it ended with the words ‫“( באיחולים טובים ביותר ובידידות‬Very best wishes and friendship”). When Ben-Gurion addressed the Israeli Parliament, he wanted the to know that Eisenhower was making the best effort in a very difficult situation.²⁸⁷ On November 8, 1956, Prime Minister Ben-Gurion responded to a letter from President Eisenhower. The Israeli prime minister informed President Eisenhower that Israel had no intention of annexing the Sinai Desert. He was very pleased when Eisenhower informed him that the UN would be sending forces to the region. Ben-Gurion further indicated that, in keeping with the proposed UN resolution requesting that all foreign troops withdraw from Egypt and the successful dispatching of a UN force, Israel would be willing to withdraw. One of the prime minister’s primary aims in the Sinai campaign was to destroy the fedayeen gangs and their strongholds. He said there was much more at stake

for Israel.

We must repeat our urgent request to the United Nations to call upon Egypt, which has consistently maintained that it is in a state of war with Israel, to renounce this position, to abandon its policy of boycott and blockade, to cease the incursions into Israeli territory of murder gangs and, in accordance with its obligations under the United Nations Charter to live at peace with member states, to enter into direct peace negotiations with Israel.²⁸⁸

By the end of January 1957, Egypt was upset by the fact that Israel had not withdrawn from the Sinai. The Egyptians had been clearing the Suez Canal of all the sunken debris they placed there in order to prevent age through the canal. The Egyptians threatened to stop the clearance if Israel did not withdraw.²⁸ In a telegram on February 2, 1957, to the Israeli prime minister, Eisenhower praised Ben-Gurion for the letter he wrote November 8, 1956, where he indicated Israel would withdraw from the Sinai in accordance with the UN General Assembly Resolution on November 2. The president expressed his concern that Israel had still not withdrawn. In addition to adding to the tensions in the region, the president mentioned the fact that two UN resolutions were introduced on February 1, 1957. The first resolution asked Israel to withdraw to the General Armistice line. The second resolution was calling for “scrupulous observance” of the 1949 Armistice Agreement. The second resolution ensured that the withdrawal of Israel would be followed by actions to ensure progress towards a peaceful solution. Eisenhower indicated that other nations were involved “deeply and directly” for peace in the Middle East and had ed forces with the United States by ing the two resolutions. In his letter to Ben-Gurion, Eisenhower added that he truly hoped the Israeli withdrawal would be completed quickly. He tried to encourage Ben-Gurion by reminding him how close the American-Israeli relationship was. He also stated that the United States wanted to “continue the friendly cooperation which has contributed to Israel’s national development.” During a conference with his advisors on October 29, 1956, Eisenhower emphasized America’s pledge to the

defense of Israel when Secretary of Defense Wilson had asked a second time how committed the United States was to the Middle East.² Eisenhower was trying to assure Israel that America was still honoring the Tripartite Declaration by attempting to prevent a serious arms race in the region. The president stated how serious the situation was for Israel if it did not adhere to the UN resolutions. Eisenhower believed adhering to the UN would bring “tranquility and justice” to Israel and her neighbors. He included a softly worded warning to Prime Minister Ben-Gurion: Eisenhower informed Ben-Gurion that if he continued to ignore the UN’s warnings, the results would bring further complications upon Israel and jeopardize the relations between her and member nations of the UN, including the United States.² ¹ On February 8, 1957, Ben-Gurion answered Eisenhower. He indicated that Israel was withdrawing its military, in spite of the fact that Egypt had not relinquished its state of war against Israel. Israel would evacuate the area as soon as it could be granted freedom of age. Ben-Gurion finally expressed his concern that the UN was holding Israel to one standard and Egypt to a different standard. The prime minister was specific. One concern he had was about Egypt disregarding, over the past eight years, the 1949 Armistice Agreement and the UN Charter by pursuing a “policy of belligerency towards Israel.” Ben-Gurion said that belligerence prevented the Security Council from making an “express resolution” and that Egypt denied Israel “free transit through the Suez Canal and broke its pledged word in regard to the freedom of shipping in the Gulf of Aqaba.” Next the prime minister referred to “a solemn undertaking” by Egypt on January 28, 1950, that was made to the American ambassador in Cairo. “It was part of an overall plan to eliminate Israel by force.” The prime minister stated in his letter that the blockade in the Gulf of Aqaba was now effectively crushed and that all nations were able to sail through the age. The same was true of stopping the raids from Gaza. The prime minister asked, “Under the Charter of the United Nations are we not like any other state entitled to security from attack?” Near the end of his letter he wrote:

More than any man now living, you, Mr. President, may be able to help in putting an end to all this hostility and establishing peace between our neighbors and ourselves.² ²

On February 11, 1957, Dulles wrote an aide-memoire to Ben-Gurion and discussed the matters of the Israeli withdrawal with Israeli Ambassador Abba Eban the same day. The day before, February 10, it was reported that about 150,000 Israelis were protesting in the streets of Tel Aviv. Eisenhower wanted Ben-Gurion to know that he understood that:

1. Israel would withdraw from Gaza if it retained the civil istration and if it retained some type of relationship to the UN. 2. Israel would withdraw from Sharm el Shaikh if it has the assurance of continued age through the Straits of Tiran.

Eisenhower then responded to Ben-Gurion’s concerns:

1. Gaza Strip—the United States believed the UN General Assembly had no authority to make a substantial modification to the Armistice Agreement in 1949; as the situation currently stood, Egypt had control of Gaza and Israel should withdraw. 2. The Gulf of Aqaba—Eisenhower believed that was international water and that no state had the right to prevent another state from ing through it. Eisenhower also believed the UN should authorize a United Nations Emergency Force to the area of the Straits as Israel withdrew. 3. Eisenhower agreed with the UN resolutions that all invading parties (Great Britain, , and Israel) should withdraw and for Israel that meant to the Armistice lines after the 1948 War. He then said that the United States would use its influence, along with other UN , to assure that the measures implemented be carried out upon Israel’s withdrawal.² ³

By the middle of February 1957, President Eisenhower was under the impression that the Eisenhower Doctrine was in grave jeopardy. Israel had not withdrawn its armed forces from the territories it occupied during the Suez War. Dulles believed that the entire Western influence in the Middle East was at stake. It was his assessment that the Arab nations would believe the government of the United States was under the control of the Jewish influence in America. Dulles further believed that the Arab nations would then turn to the Soviet Union, believing that the Arab-Soviet relationship would be their only hope. If the Arab nations did turn to the Soviet Union, Eisenhower believed that the Eisenhower Doctrine was facing failure. Henry Cabot Lodge, the US ambassador to the UN, believed that war might follow if the Eisenhower Doctrine failed in the Middle East.² ⁴ On February 16, 1957, Secretary Dulles and UN Ambassador Lodge flew down to Thomasville, Georgia. The president was vacationing there at the plantation of George Humphrey, the secretary of the treasury. Eisenhower made the decision to put pressure on Israel to withdraw its military forces. It was at this time that the president believed his doctrine was in jeopardy. Ambassador Lodge urged the president to condemn Israel since the Arabs were pressuring the UN General Assembly. Ambassador Lodge warned that the time was short. Dulles presented a series of options:

1. a resolution of condemnation—The president said that was insufficient. 2. a resolution calling for a suspension of governmental to Israel —The president said it had been done. 3. a resolution calling on to suspend not merely governmental assistance but private assistance to Israel as well—The president thought this was the appropriate course of action. 4. a resolution calling for present sanctions against Israel and prospective sanctions against Egypt if she did not open the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping—The president thought this was a good idea.² ⁵

On February 20, 1957, Eisenhower convened a bipartisan legislative meeting.

The president wanted to know how much money was involved in public and private contributions to Israel each year. The secretary of the treasury reported that about $40 million was sent to Israel in private donations and about $60 million Israeli bonds were sold each year in the United States. The president believed the withholding of such funds to Israel would encourage Israel to withdraw. Many of the of Congress were concerned about the idea of sanctions against Israel. When someone asked if all the of Congress thought Israel should withdraw its forces, Fulbright said that he was not sure all the thought it was the best policy, unless there was certainty of Israel getting “justice in the future.”² Eisenhower warned Ben-Gurion to move quickly, before the resolutions came before the UN. After Eisenhower explained the situation to the American people, Ben-Gurion requested a little more time. Ambassador Lodge was able to forestall matters in the UN. On March 1, 1957, Foreign Minister Golda Meir said Israel was planning a “full and complete withdrawal.” In essence the Eisenhower Doctrine remained intact, and on March 9, 1957, it was signed into law.² ⁷ On March 2, 1957, Eisenhower sent Ben-Gurion a telegram expressing his gratification about the Israeli prime minister’s decision for withdrawal. He fully acknowledged the fact the prime minister’s decision was not an easy one. Eisenhower said that Israel’s withdrawal “should be a united effort by all nations” in order for the region to have stability. The president was trying to paint a picture of hope by stating that the UN was trying to build a brighter future for the nations in the Middle East.² ⁸ On March 7 and March 13, Ben-Gurion responded with two messages to Eisenhower. The first message explained why Israel had refused to withdraw. The other one was, more or less, a warning. In the first message Ben Gurion explained that,

during the past 4 months, for the first time in 8 years, settlers in our villages in the south and Negev have been able to live in peace, in knowledge that grenades would not be thrown into their houses during the night, and that they would not be shot from ambush when they went out to till their fields by day. These pioneers are some of our finest young people, who have left behind well-to-do families in Haifa and Tel Aviv, given up their studies after high school, and gone

out to live on frontier facing danger in order to settle wasteland. You will understand why since yesterday our hearts are heavy, and our peace of mind of our settlers is shaken. Our anxiety is greater lest U. N. Security-General, out of merely formalistic interpretation of his own, may seek to bring Egyptians back to Gaza, which never belonged to them. We have, however, relied on your attitudes as expressed in your letter, and on your belief that hopes and expectations by our Foreign Minister will not be in vain.²

The final correspondence on March 13 in this exchange between Washington and Tel Aviv came as a sad warning by Ben-Gurion. In less than a week, after Israel withdrew from the Gaza Strip, the fedayeen raids, originating from Gaza, started again. Nasser was about to send a military governor and staff to Gaza, with the grave concern on the part of Israel that the UN secretary general was going to Egypt in such a move. Radio Cairo was also broadcasting that Egypt would not allow ships to through the Straits of Tiran. Ben-Gurion asked Eisenhower to use what Secretary Dulles called the “de facto exclusion” of Egypt from Gaza and stop the gradual return of violence. The prime minister left the military option open for Israel, if the situation demanded. The prime minister added:

Mr. President, I place my reliance on your assurance that we shall have no cause to regret our withdrawal.

On March 24, the big news in Israel was

24 1957 . (“The Ship Brigitah Tofet ed by the Straits on 24 March 1957 without being disturbed and sailed to the Port of Elat and was received with celebrations.”)³

It was carrying oil.

In summarizing the Suez War and the diplomatic efforts following it, Eisenhower thought the whole affair “one of the most difficult episodes in recent diplomatic history.”³ ¹ It involved three of America’s closest allies. Two of the allies, Great Britain and , had been, as Eisenhower stated, “traditional allies.” The United States was forced to Egypt. Eisenhower wrote that he “suspected” Nasser was under the influence of the Soviet Union. Nasser was trying to unite the Arab world through nationalism and definitely not Communism. He turned to the United States for with the Aswan Dam and was rejected, thus feeling forced to turn to the Soviets for . This gives credibility to Eisenhower’s concern that the whole Arab world might turn to the Soviet Union if he was not able to successfully negotiate a withdrawal by Ben-Gurion. Eisenhower believed his Middle East doctrine was at stake. Even when the Eisenhower Doctrine became a resolution, it was unable to resolve the regional instability of the Middle East, although it did succeed in Lebanon. Was the Fulbright Resolution successful? It did concentrate more on the regional issues of the Middle East than did the Eisenhower Doctrine. In summary, Patrick Seale makes the argument that the Suez War was a dualphased attack. Even though he decided it was unlikely that the attack at Suez by Great Britain, , and Israel was in tandem with a US-led attack on Syria, he did believe there was one purpose to the two events:

to unseat ‘Abd al-Nasir and check the expansion of Egyptian and Soviet influence in Arab Asia.

Seale also stated:

While the Soviet-Egyptian advance was the dominant theme of Syrian history in 1956, preparations for a counter-attack by opposition groups in Syria and exiles outside the country, in league with Iraq, Britain, and the United States, were steadily continuing.³ ²

Matthew Jones added that the strategic importance of Syria to the United States was due to the oil pipelines running through it as well as its lines of communication to the Persian Gulf with Turkey, a NATO ally. From the Arab perspective there were two groups vying for hegemony in the region. They were the nations of the so-called Fertile Crescent—Jordan, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon— that were in competition with Nasser in Egypt. Syria was vital for both.³ ³ The “Preferred Plan” was developed by an Anglo-American Working Group during August and September 1957 with the idea of bringing about unrest in Syria and using that as an excuse for the Iraqi and Jordanian armies to intervene under Article 51 of the UN. Ideally a coup d’état would result. By October 1957, the desired actions in Syria did not take place. Instead it had emboldened Nasser to unite Egypt and Syria. It also brought back Anglo-American cooperation in the Middle East.³ ⁴

The next crisis involving the Eisenhower Doctrine occurred in Jordan, during April 1957. When King Hussein removed his pro-Soviet premier, Nasser intervened in Jordan. King Hussein received the of his military. Next, he declared martial law and formed a new government under Premier Ibrahim Hashim. The situation remained destabilized by late April. President Chamoun of Lebanon asked Eisenhower to save Jordan. Eisenhower assured President Chamoun that the Sixth Fleet had received orders to move toward Jordan. In addition, Eisenhower authorized $10 million for Jordan. Eisenhower indicated in his memoirs that this military and economic was carried out under the auspices of the Middle Eastern resolution (the Eisenhower Doctrine). The Sixth Fleet left the area by early May.³ ⁵ Before discussing the use of the Eisenhower Doctrine in Syria, there were at least three times that the United States intervened in Syria. The first was a proposed coup in late October 1956. Known as “Operation Straggle,” it was planned during July 1956, but due to the Suez War the United States decided not to intervene. The second incident, “Operation Wappen,” followed warnings by Dulles’s brother, Director of the CIA Alan Dulles, that Syria was going Communist. Syria had “supposedly” received 123 Migs. Dulles proposed the plan to Eisenhower under the Eisenhower Doctrine. In September the United States sent a fleet to the Mediterranean, armed several Syrians, and persuaded Turkey to place fifty thousand troops on their Syrian border. Later, after it was exposed and did not achieve its desired results, Dulles publicly denied that he had approved the plan. The same month the United States ed the British in an attempt to eliminate certain Syrian officials. A very elaborate plan was devised with the idea of implicating Syrians who were supposedly plotting, conducting sabotage, and inciting violence in surrounding Arab nations. That was meant to incite many of the surrounding nations, including the Muslim Brotherhood, whom the Americans and British were arming to attack Syria. The plan was not followed through. On August 20, 1957, Dulles sent Eisenhower a memorandum on Syria advising the president to avoid making any statements that would link Syria to international Communism as it pertained to the Eisenhower Doctrine. At that time Dulles itted that the situation remained “confused.” To clarify, Dulles advised the president to “avoid any statement that you think it is not so controlled,” with the word not underlined by Dulles. He said the censorship in

Syria at that time was very tight and that even the US embassy in Damascus was “virtually blockaded.” It was difficult to understand the extent of the SovietSyrian relationship, and American diplomats did not have a good idea about any possible Soviet penetration there. Dulles did try to reassure Eisenhower that the changes going on in Syria at that time may not have been as great as the United States feared. Dulles warned Eisenhower not to give Israel any reason to start a confrontation with Syria. The United States presumed Syria was under Soviet control. Dulles was advising to keep Syria guessing intentions. He said “we will want to keep freedom of action to make such a decision under certain contingencies.” Dulles was, in other words, advising Eisenhower not to use the Israeli card. He wanted to keep Syria guessing if the United States was going to encourage Israel to attack Syria. Dulles made an astute observation about the Soviets when he said they were setting “a dangerous and classic pattern.” He clarified that the Soviets would work with a nation they might want to bring into the Soviet camp. First, they promise that nation would receive military and/or economic aid. While on the surface that sounded like the Soviet version of the Eisenhower Doctrine. The difference was that the Soviets placed their own pro-Soviet officials in positions they wanted to control. The result of that tactic led to the end of the independence of any nation being manipulated under the Soviets. Consequently, it would become a satellite nation controlled by Moscow. According to Dulles, the Soviets were using this pattern as “a smokescreen” by letting it be known that nations such as the United States were the ones posing the threat to a particular nation. Dulles was unsure of Syrian cooperation with this Soviet process. He reckoned it should be a warning to other nations. Dulles ended his memorandum by stating:

The Middle East, as we know, has recently become a prime target of Communist aspirations. The Soviet and Chinese Communists have sought every opportunity to promote instability and disunity in this area. We are following with concern developments in Syria as they affect the peace, tranquility and prosperity of the area.³

On August 21, 1957, the president convened a meeting attended by Dulles;

General Twining, chairman of the t Chiefs of Staff; Mr. Roundtree, assistant secretary in the State Department; General Goodpaster; and Major Eisenhower, the president’s son, who worked with General Goodpaster. The minutes in the memorandum of conference with the president indicated that there was a “state of extreme tension in Syria.” According to the general consensus of the group, the situation in Syria was grave. If the Syrian regime currently in power was not removed, the Eisenhower istration felt certain a Soviet takeover was imminent as pro-Communist elements had overtaken the government in Syria. Another possibility was that Turkey might also force the United States to act. The third possibility was that nothing would happen. There was an agreement by the president and his advisors that a general feeling in the Middle East might be that the Eisenhower istration had failed. The primary decision at the conference with the president was that the United States should not interfere with any Arab nation that might want to use force in order to “rectify the situation in Syria.” That decision was based on the realization that the United States had no more influence, internally, within Syria. On the other hand, there were other venues open. One was working with the surrounding Arab nations, who believed that their states were threatened by the strong Soviet presence in Syria. The State Department received word that Iraq was prepared to take military action. At this point in time the istration was also convinced that Turkey, a Muslim but not an Arab state, was prepared to take action. During the meeting, it was suggested that if the nations surrounding Syria, excluding Israel (Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey) would place their military forces on their respective borders with Syria, this would greatly weaken Syria militarily. Iraq would then have enough force to be militarily effective against Syria. During this meeting, the decision was made that the nations involved should have the backing of the United States, if and when the Soviets intervened. There was a consensus among the group that assurances should be given to the Arab nations, should Israel try to exploit the situation on the Israeli-Syrian border. Eisenhower brought up three questions during the discussion. First, he wanted to know if the surrounding Arab nations or Turkey attacked Syria, would that lead to intervention by the Soviet Union in Syria? Then the president wanted to know if his istration would be able to assist in finding a better government for Syria than the one in place. Finally, the president was under the strong impression that the surrounding Arab nations might want to annex a part of Syria

if they intervened. Therefore, would there be a partition of Syria? Dulles believed that there was a possibility for a pro-Western government in Syria. The secretary believed that partitioning Syria would prove difficult, due to the strong feelings by King Saud, who did not want to see any of the surrounding Arab nations taking on any expansionist activities. The secretary believed that it was important to establish the American position rapidly. It was also important to commit the prestige of the United States. Several courses of action were decided upon at this meeting:

1. Act quickly before there might be a Soviet-Syrian treaty or before the Soviets annexed Syria. 2. Send a message to all the Arab nations involved that the problem was a Muslim problem that also included Turkey. The message should encourage the friendly Arab nations to band together under whatever reasons they wanted to use and eliminate the government of Syria. These nations would be ensured the protection of the United States and also the assurance the United States would not allow any outside nations to make any countermoves. The US would also act promptly on any arms commitments to the region. The President wanted the message sent out immediately. 3. Prime Minister Ben-Gurion must be told that Israel should not exploit the situation. 4. Ambassador Warren, the US Ambassador to Iraq should inform the Iraqi Government of the of the other Arab nations and there was an emphasis on the of Turkey. 5. Ensure notification to King Saud and encourage him to take the role of Arab leadership. 6. Move the Sixth Fleet immediately, at a minimum to Malta. 7. As part of a NATO exercise, move airplanes to Adana, Turkey. 8. Notify key of Congress the following morning about the situation.

9. Inform all United States military forces “of the gravity of the situation.”³ ⁷

On August 22, Dulles and General Twining met with the president about Syria. Others ing the meeting were Major Eisenhower, Ambassador Loy Henderson, and Assistant Secretary of State Roundtree. Eisenhower wanted to ensure that there was no “appearance that the Arabs are bringing the West into this operation.” The president wanted the whole affair to appear as though the Arab nations were solving the situation. The group believed that if the Soviets succeeded in Syria, they would continue to penetrate countries throughout the Middle East. The group thought that King Saud definitely did not want to become involved. They also believed that Nasser had to be worried but had no choice other than to the Soviets in Syria. Secretary Dulles believed that there were “certain pre-conditions” for acting. There had to be a cause for the Arab nations surrounding Syria to intervene. Iraq would have to make it clear, before it entered Syria, that it was doing so only for the purpose of its own security and that there was no intent on the part of Iraq to take over any part of Syria. A third part of the rationale behind Iraq invading Syria should be based on the of Turkey, with a pledge from Turkey that it would act if necessary. It was also thought Turkey could provide weapons to Iraq and mass its army on the Syrian border, along with the Arab nations that had borders with Syria. Ambassador Henderson was sent immediately to Ankara. Dulles wanted him to relay this information to Turkey. The president believed that the Arab states should make this whole issue emotional, raising a great cry to the world that what they were doing was to “protect Islam against militant atheism.” Eisenhower made sure that everyone present in the meeting understood that the istration would maintain an outward show of , responding to the Arab need, such as providing weapons as fast as possible. The president was defining the use of the Eisenhower Doctrine and how it should be istered.³ ⁸ The Ann Whitman files contain a document dated September 6, 1957. It is not known who wrote the document, that is, if it originated in the Department of State, the Department of Defense, or the White House. It outlines the plan the United States intended to follow in reference to the crisis in Syria. It began by

taking the position that the United States believed Syria was already or about to become “a base for military and subversive activities in the Near East.” The United States further believed that the independence in the region would be destroyed and that each nation might fall under the domination of Soviet Communism. The document stated that this analysis was in agreement with the views of Great Britain and all nations bordering on Syria. If Soviet arms, propaganda, and the like resulted in “deeds,” as in Lebanon, then “a case existed for individual or collective self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.” There was also a statement referring to Israel and Turkey. It was thought wise if Israel would show restraint, unless invaded, so as not to arouse the Arab world in of Syria. This was based on the theory that if Israel did act it would be based on “aggressive purposes and territorial ambitions.” The United States believed that Turkey should not act in other than a mode of “reinforcement of Arab defensive action.” The United States was worried the Arab nations might unite against Turkey if it intervened unilaterally in Syria. It was also believed Turkey would find it difficult to solve the problem in a timely or sufficient manner if it acted alone. If the Arab nations surrounding Syria believed their security was endangered by the aggressive actions of Syria and they requested economic or military assistance, the United States would give such requests “prompt and sympathetic consideration.” If the Arab nations around Syria needed help under Article 51 of the UN Charter, the US response would be within the confines of the Eisenhower Doctrine, and the nations would receive the needed economic and military assistance. The United States would also defend these countries if attacked in the UN Security Council or the General Assembly. In other words, the United States would not let the Communists Syria and then block any other nations might need as a result of the Soviet-controlled regime in Syria. The US policy went a step further: if the neighboring Arab nations were physically attacked by the Sino-Soviet Bloc and requested US , the US response would be through the use of American armed forces to assist the nation or nations attacked. The American response would also be forthcoming in case Sino-Soviet “volunteers” were used to infiltrate the nations in the Middle East. If an Iraqi military response resulted in Syria blowing up the oil pipelines, thus

affecting Iraq monetarily, the United States would provide temporary financial . If Turkey decided, in the region’s best interest, to assist an Arab nation facing hostilities from Syria, the US policy would be to defend Turkey in the UN. If Turkey were attacked directly by the Sino-Soviet Bloc or indirectly by “volunteers,” there would be two options for a US response. The first response would be under NATO, of which Turkey was a member. The second would be under the Eisenhower Doctrine. During September, Eisenhower had written to King Saud of Saudi Arabia to reassure him -Israeli relations. He informed the king that the United States “had never been an important supplier of weapons to Israel” and did not intend to become one any time soon. He emphasized the US reaction to the Suez War as his model by informing the king that if Israel wanted to conquer another country, he, Eisenhower would react as he did following the Suez War: he would make Israel withdraw from such a nation’s territory. Simultaneously, Dulles was sending his guidelines to American embassies in the Middle East:

1. Stress the strong opposition by the US government of any Israeli expansion at the expense of its neighbors. 2. Publicize the fact of US arms going to Arab nations at the current time and those weapons already sent. 3. Talk discreetly about any complaints from Israel or any pro-Israeli sources about any US economic and military aid going to Arab states. 4. Point out that any aid by the Soviets to Arab states was motivated by the Soviet’s wish to gain influence in the region and the fact that the Soviet Bloc ed the State of Israel and the partition of Palestine, while simultaneously sending arms to Israel during the 1948 War. Point out how the USSR had reversed its position only recently, trying to establish a beachhead in the region.³

In the case of hostilities, the US response would be to activate the “Middle East

Plan of Action,” in order “to meet the effects of any interruption of the flow of oil to the free world markets which might result from closure of the trans-Syrian pipelines, or the Suez Canal.”³¹ Should Egypt decide to once again close the Suez Canal in an “act of solidarity,” the United States would look upon such an act as a breach of the Treaty of 1888 and the Security Council “requirements” of 1956. This would result in the United States consulting with the other states directly in the belief it would be important to reopen the canal under the Treaty of 1888. Should hostilities break out between Syria and its Arab neighbors, excluding Israel, the United States would try to break the will of the Communist regime in Syria through covert means. It would also assist in re-establishing the Syrian government in exile. The government in exile would be ready to assume power as soon as the current regime relinquished power. The American policy of ing Syria’s neighbors made it explicit that a nation would receive only after there was clear understanding that hostilities were only for giving back Syria to the people of Syria. The was not for interfering with the political independence or the territory of Syria. In addition, the United States would continue the policy of deploying the Sixth Fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean and would keep diplomatic channels open with Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. The Eisenhower istration decided this policy would be carried out only in full agreement with Great Britain. After a full American-British agreement, the United States would communicate with the affected Arab countries. They would be informed what had been “agreed to in so far as relevant to them.”³¹¹ This memorandum shows the preparations of the Eisenhower istration in of analysis, policy-making, and pre-emptive measures, if needed, during the Syrian crisis. Eisenhower did not want the appearance of US involvement, but it is clear he wanted the United States to provide guidance and reassurance to the nations of the Middle East involved in the Syrian crisis that were dependent on US . This crisis pointed out two distinct problems. First, the Cold War was definitely being fought in the Middle East between the United States along with its European allies on the one hand and Russians along with its Soviet Bloc on the other hand. The second problem was the tangled issues, webs of deceit,

and ambiguities within the Middle East. The Syrian crisis was not only an Arab problem but also a Muslim problem, due to the involvement of Turkey. Israel was also involved, but it was the US policy for Israel not to become involved because that might trigger a greater problem by uniting the Arab world against Israel. The Nasser factor was also present. The Arab nations, under threat, were looking for US and guidance. President Eisenhower provided both through the Eisenhower Doctrine. Eisenhower indicated that the events became “very confused” when Iraq began backing down, with Turkey abstaining from any type of action. Iraq began to worry about the income it would lose should Syria blow their pipelines. It would mean the loss of half of Iraq’s total yearly state income: $200 million. From Jordan, King Hussein went on a trip to Italy, giving the clear indication that he did not want to participate in the crisis. The president was surprised that King Saud was not paying attention to the crisis in Syria. The king was still worrying about Israel and other matters like Aqaba and weapons he wanted from President Eisenhower. Eisenhower believed, in retrospect, that at least two matters needed attention. First was the negative Arab reaction to Turkey’s role in the crisis with Syria. The president knew that he could not prevent Turkey from taking military action. However, he did believe that he should use his influence to persuade Turkey not to attack. The president also believed he should send weapons to the region as soon as possible. In a broader context, events in the Middle East made Secretary Dulles believe that the Cold War was intensifying. He based his analysis on the following:

• Serious penetration by the Soviets in Syria • Soviet naval maneuvers in the Mediterranean • Lack of interest in American-Russian exchange • Boasting of Soviet IBCMs with threatening overtones • Recent Soviet correspondence on the Middle East in the crudest of

Eisenhower wrote in his memoirs that by the end of the summer of 1957, he believed that he and his istration had done everything possible in the Syrian crisis:

• Israel had been restrained • The Arabs were assured of in case of Communist penetration • Arms were expedited to Turkey and other nations in the region • The Sixth Fleet was in place to bring American influence and power into the region • The British were kept informed of the Middle East situation and the US pledge of should the pipelines in Syria be blown up • The United States was in place to observe the next move, either attack by Syria or improvement in the situation³¹²

No sooner had the Eisenhower istration sailed through the perilous waters of 1957 than it received news in January 1958 that Nasser had united Egypt with Syria and formed the United Arab Republic. In response, Jordan and Iraq formed the Arab Union.³¹³ In of the Eisenhower Doctrine for the Middle East, the United Arab Republic was not a success. This event indicates that the Fulbright Resolution would have been more practicable for the Middle East. Eisenhower was concerned that Nasser intended to take over the entire Middle East much like Hitler did Europe. The istration was under the incorrect impression that Nasser was a Communist because he took weapons and money from the Soviets. The istration was apprehensive that the USSR would eventually move in and take over the Middle East and its oil. Eisenhower repeated his answer to the Soviet challenge when he said he “would fight” before allowing the Soviets a place in the Middle East.³¹⁴ On July 15, 1958, Eisenhower sent US armed forces to Lebanon, in keeping with his doctrine; it was his only military deployment on foreign soil in the eight years of his presidency. He justified his actions by saying he was responding to an urgent request by the president of Lebanon. He said that request merited sending military forces to Lebanon within the limits described in the Eisenhower Doctrine. He further justified his decision based on protecting American lives in Lebanon.

United States forces are being sent to Lebanon to protect American lives and by their presence to assist the Government of Lebanon in the preservation of Lebanon’s territorial integrity and independence, which have been deemed vital to United States national interests and world peace.

Eisenhower also explained that in June there had been a violent insurrection on the border of Lebanon with Syria. He mentioned that Syria was now a part of the United Arab Republic with Egypt. He then tied Nasser and the Soviets tly to this insurrection by stating that radio broadcasts from Cairo and Damascus and Arab broadcasts from Soviet radios greatly encouraged the actions taking place on the Lebanese border. Eisenhower was responding to Nasser’s grand scheme

of ruling the Middle East and his concerns over the Soviets meddling in the Middle East. Eisenhower said he had hoped the United Nations would be able to resolve the problems in Lebanon after the June insurrection. However, he said, it was imperative that the United States act promptly after the bloody coup in Baghdad that overthrew the Hashemite monarchy. The moment he received the request from President Chamoun, he knew the UN was not strong enough to stabilize the situation in Lebanon, and he acted rapidly to stop any further deterioration. He ended his address to Congress by saying:

As we act at the request of a friendly government to help preserve its independence and to preserve law and order which will protect American lives, we are acting to reaffirm and strengthen principles upon which the safety and security of the United States depend.

There has been speculation that sending US Marines to Lebanon was not because of a Soviet threat but rather one of internal strife inside Lebanon. According to Douglass Little, the United States had been building up Lebanon as one of the few places that the United States could place bases in the Levant. Another reason for Eisenhower to act was to thwart his nemesis in the Middle East, Nasser. The Sunni minority in Lebanon was sympathetic to the United Arab Republic, while the Shi’a were not satisfied with the Christian Maronite domination.³¹⁵ A secret White House document discussed the divide in the Arab world between Iraq, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia that were opposed to Nasser’s pan-Arabism and what it labeled as Nasser’s policy of “positive neutralism” as he was going allout to unite the Arab world. The report also mentioned that leaders like Chamoun and Hussein were looking for from the West while the Soviet Union was

committed to a policy of fostering dynamic Arab nationalism under Nasser’s

banner. Inherent contradictions between Soviet communism and Arab nationalism were left in abeyance, covered over by a common dedication to weakening what remained of Western influence in the area.

The report on the Iraqi Revolution of 1958 stated that, due to the “strong Communist influence” that was connected to the revolution, Nasser had changed his strategic thinking and developed a policy that opposed the Russian “Imperialism” throughout the Arab world. He also tried to mend relations with the United States and the Arab nations that were opposing him. The report stated these events were overshadowed by the Soviet-Nasser relationship that was still very active and that Nasser was having difficulty with nations opposed to him in the Arab world.³¹ Eisenhower knew his justification for using the Eisenhower Doctrine was the minor reason for going to Lebanon. At the same time, he knew if he did not act according to his doctrine, many nations would feel that US foreign policy was not living up to its pledge. Eisenhower had to view the Lebanon crisis from both the micro and the macro perspectives. The micro was because he had invested time and money in building up Chamoun; he did not want to look like a leader who would turn his back on an ally in need, even though that need may have been self-interest. On the other hand, he had to look at the macro view of the world defined by the Cold War. In this respect, Eisenhower was on solid ground for going into Lebanon. Radio broadcasts from Soviet sources speaking in Arabic were being used to encourage incitement and unrest by Sunni Muslims in Lebanon.³¹⁷ At 9:00, July 15, 1958, Eisenhower held a meeting with Vice President Richard Nixon. The president knew the United States was at a “crossroads.” Since 1945, the United States had been trying to gain access to vitally needed petroleum by using peaceful means. Eisenhower was now justifying his actions by stating that his deployment of US forces was due to “the struggle of Nasser to get control of these supplies—to get the income and the power to destroy the Western world.”

Somewhere along the line we have got to face up to the issue.

Eisenhower spoke in more optimistic when he said:

We need a strong powerful voice speaking in the Mid-East-powerful in the of technical capacity and a man (as well as a station) that could present the Western point of view all the time and would also legitimate nationalism.

He said the campaign against the United States was not by the governments but rather by the people, saying, “The people are on Nasser’s side.” Vice President Nixon advised the president not to link his reasons for sending troops to Lebanon to oil. He advised that “for world opinion” the Middle Eastern nations should not feel they were being used as pawns among the superpowers for their oil resources. Nixon mused that every nation had a right to a revolution. However, he went on to say, what was required “was a historical announcement of when a civil war becomes the type of action in which outside intervention by the United States is justified.” Nixon said every nation has a right to selfdetermination and no outside nation has any right to “stimulate” that selfdetermination. He justified intervention in Lebanon because the United States was invited by a freely elected governing official who believed his country was being “infiltered by corruption, subversion and bribery.” Nixon said that if the president did not find a way to deal with civil war, “we [the United States] will lose the world.” Nixon used the example of how the Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia and the use of fighters from Bulgaria, Albania, and Yugoslavia in Greece that led to the Greek and Turkey crisis and the Truman Doctrine. Nixon said the United States had made a stand.

What we are doing here is saying that the West has reached a conclusion. We will not stand by to allow civil war to deliver a country even to Nasser.³¹⁸

The situation in Lebanon for the United States was unique in the Arab world, since Lebanon had a Christian majority.

By October 1958, the NSC was making revisions to the US policy towards the Near (Middle) East, which was previously bound by NCS 5801/1. Important differences in wording were “denial of the area to Soviet domination” and “continued availability of sufficient Near Eastern oil to meet Western European requirements on reasonable .” Five secondary objectives were viewed as desirable but not essential:

1. Early peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli problems 2. Continued availability to the United States and its allies of peaceful age through and intercourse with the area 3. Promotion of stable governments, popularly ed and resistant to Communist influence 4. Continued availability to the United States and its allies of important strategic positions 5. Expansion of US and Free World influence and the reduction of Communist influence

The Planning Board believed it would provide the United States “greater flexibility” to carry out US policies. The NSC was prepared to go farther than the then current policy by “recognizing the force of Arab nationalism and providing policy guidance in working with it toward the attainment of U.S. objectives.” This was in contrast to previous US policy statements. The new NSC policy recommended recognizing “the essentially neutralist character of radical pan-Arabism.” The new policy directed “that the US accept it, where necessary, and work with states following such policies.” The United States should recognize the “Soviet presence in the area” while at the same time make it clear so that the Soviets knew the “nature of western interests and determination to defend those interests.”

The new policy paper asked Arab nations to become more involved in new regional security arrangements. The istration anticipated that Iraq would withdraw from the Baghdad Pact after the July coup. Eisenhower was not looking to form any new security arrangements like the Middle East Defense Organization and the Baghdad Pact, as he did not believe in their successful outcomes. He did encourage ing a soundly organized Arab development organization, “if it was funded by the region.” He asked the UN to ensure that there would be no arms race. One new development was on oil. The United States promoted the idea of receiving oil from a “broad diversification of means of transporting oil to the Free World.” The old policy was to transport oil from the Middle East only. The istration wanted to reduce the dependence of Western Europe on Middle East oil. The istration was willing to make “an inter-agency study of using other sources of petroleum and transit facilities.” A new statement made in the paper delineated the conditions for the United States to use force ensuring oil was delivered to Western Europe from the Middle East. There were two groups of thoughts within the istration on US policy in the Middle East. The majority believed the United States should have “an effective working relationship with radical pan-Arab nationalism…and to that end seek understanding with Nasser…in areas of mutual interest.” They believed they could establish a normal working relationship with Nasser while not “enhancing his position.” The minority believed the United States must solve problems in the Middle East and halt Soviet penetration. They thought the US government must emphasize “authentic Arab nationalism” and work more closely with the Arab people in order to help them with their aspirations and “legitimate aims.” The majority view in the Eisenhower istration was that radical pan-Arab nationalism, led by Nasser, had “gained predominance in the area.” They concluded it is the “wave of the future.” They believed US objectives in the region would be “frustrated” if the United States was unable to “deal with the movement and with Nasser on a mutually accepted basis.” The t Chiefs of Staff had analyzed the radical elements of pan-Arab nationalism that Nasser was spreading and identified the following characteristics that they believed interfered with US objectives in the Middle East:

• Unscrupulous expansionist tendencies • Interference, including incitement to violence in the affairs of neighboring nations • Unfriendly propaganda activities directed against other nations in the Near East, the West in general, and the United States in particular

The other significant difference between the majority and minority view was the Arab-Israeli peace process. The majority view, including the State Department, was that the United States should follow initiatives that were taken by the United Nations or third parties. The minority view, including Defense-JCS-OCDM, was that the United States must not wait for opportunities.³¹ On January 22, 1958, the National Security Council stated that the Arab-Israeli conflict should be settled as soon as possible. World War III would begin in the Middle East, the council predicted, and national policy on the Middle East “should be shaped” accordingly. If war broke out in the Middle East, there was no guarantee that it would be limited to small operations. The National Security Council tried to decide on the mission statement for their strategy. One draft was by the Department of Defense–Office of Defense Mobilization–t Chiefs of Staff. The other draft was from the State Department. The State Department mission prevailed. It was based upon a speech given by Dulles on August 26, 1955.³² On January 22, 1958, the National Security Council decided that it was important for US Middle East foreign policy to resolve the following issues pertaining to the Arab-Israeli problem:

• The plight of 900,000 refugees • The fear that hung over the Arab and Israeli people • The lack of fixed permanent borders³²¹

When analyzing the differences between the Eisenhower Doctrine and the Fulbright Resolution, the latter is found more in keeping with the emerging foreign policy. After the creation of the UAR, the number of border crossings by Syrians between the Syrian and Lebanese border increased. In April, President Camille Nimr Chamoun of Lebanon tried to amend the constitution in Lebanon in order to give him a second term in office. Chamoun was a Christian, but many of the Christian leaders opposed him, including the Maronite Patriarch. In 1957, Chamoun had accepted the Eisenhower Doctrine, offending both Egypt and Syria. Eisenhower did not agree with Chamoun’s decision to amend the Lebanese Constitution. Chamoun’s initiative resulted in rebellion and an armed uprising in Beirut during May. On May 13, Eisenhower met with Dulles in order to decide what to do if President Chamoun should request in keeping with the Eisenhower Doctrine. Chamoun had sent a message to Eisenhower, wanting to know how the istration would react if he requested help. The president and Dulles felt like they were meeting “in a climate of impatience.” They believed “Chamoun’s uneasiness was the result of one more Communist provocation.” Eisenhower stated in his memoirs that the Soviets were pursuing a line of “soft” propaganda around the world. This included Venezuela, Indonesia, Burma, and the Middle East. Radio Cairo was encouraging the Lebanese rebels.³²² The president believed American intervention in Lebanon might lead to a disastrous situation. Dulles informed the president that the landing of American military in Lebanon would cause a negative reaction in the Middle East. There was a good possibility the pipelines in Syria would be blown up and the Suez Canal blocked. The secretary also thought that the negative Arab reaction might cause a rift between the governments of Jordan and Iraq. The Soviet reaction also had to be taken into . Eisenhower responded:

This point did not worry me excessively; I believed the Soviets would not take action if the United States movement were decisive and strong, particularly if other parts of the Middle East were not involved in the operations.

Eisenhower wanted to make sure it was made very clear to Chamoun why the United States would enter Lebanon and that it would only be under the following conditions:

• The United States would not send troops to Lebanon to a second term in office for President Chamoun. • President Chamoun’s request should be in concurrence with another Arab nation. • The United States’ mission in Lebanon would have two purposes: o Protection of the life and property of Americans o Assistance to the legal Lebanese Government

Eisenhower ordered amphibious units of the Sixth Fleet into the Mediterranean. Army Airborne Battle Groups stationed in Europe were to be alerted and would provide air transport to the Middle East. They would airlift the police equipment, small arms, ammunition, and tear gas already promised to Chamoun under the Eisenhower Doctrine. The president wanted Chamoun to try and avoid any “outside tactical help.” Eisenhower wanted US intervention as a last alternative.³²³ At the NSC meeting on May 22, 1958, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Allen Dulles, brother of John Foster Dulles, reported on the internal situation in Lebanon. It was “not very encouraging.” Beirut was quiet, but there was a problem in Tripoli between the army and Lebanese rebels. Several Syrians were infiltrating the Lebanese-Syrian border. There were only 9,000 soldiers and 2,500 in the gendarmerie. The night before, General Chehab, the chief of staff, tried and failed to form a cabinet. Director Dulles believed Chamoun was the strongest among many weak politicians in Lebanon, but he did not believe Chamoun would be a candidate for re-election, though he might provide a pro-Western substitute. The director said the alternative would be

losing Lebanon to Nasser.³²⁴ On the same day, Chamoun requested that the UN Security Council act on his complaint that the Egyptians and Syrians were arming the rebels. Eisenhower said there was “no doubt” of the truth alleged by Chamoun. The president said that the Lebanese rebels were “arrogant and aggressive.” The strategy of the rebels was to separate the northern half of Lebanon from the southern half with the ultimate goal of taking the whole country.³²⁵ The Lebanese situation was discussed during the NSC Meeting on June 19, 1958. Chamoun was desperate. He asked for and received permission from his government to accept the intervention of American and British armed forces. Then he backed down. Chamoun did not believe his chief of staff, General Chehab, was doing enough to stop the rebels. The director of the CIA believed a plot was in the making by some of the Army officers against General Chehab scheduled for the night of June 17. Because it did not occur that night, it was believed that the coup would not take place. The CIA did not view the coup in totally negative ; it was believed that if General Chehab were removed, Lebanon would have a stronger military. Iraq and Jordan both thought that the United States should intervene. If it did not, they were considering intervention.³² UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold did not favor any type of outside intervention into Lebanon. Since Secretary Hammarskjold did not believe the UN could provide an adequate force, he did not want to risk “the prestige” of the UN. He agreed that Syria was infiltrating Lebanon, but he looked upon the situation in Lebanon as an internal problem.³²⁷ On July 14, 1958, General Abdul Karim Kassem led a revolution in Iraq. He killed King Faisal II and Prime Minister Nuri as-Said, whose body was dragged through the streets of Baghdad. Neither the CIA nor any other agencies in Washington knew the coup was going to take place. It was unknown at that time if the USSR or Nasser might be behind the coup. Chamoun made an urgent request for assistance. The coup resulted in Iraq pulling out of the Baghdad Pact, leaving “a deep sense of crisis.” During the National Security Council session that morning, Dulles began to explain the options. The president interrupted the Secretary of State by responding:

Foster, I’ve already made up my mind. We’re going in.³²⁸

Based on Article 51 of the UN Charter and the Eisenhower Doctrine, the president decided to send American armed forces to Lebanon.³² On July 15, 1958, Eisenhower sent fourteen thousand US Marines to Lebanon at the request of President Chamoun, three battalions of marines from the Sixth Fleet, and two airborne battle groups from .³³ The same day Eisenhower addressed Congress. He relayed President Chamoun’s urgent request, backed by the entire Lebanese cabinet, to send the American military to Lebanon and that Chamoun had said his government would not survive without US . Eisenhower let Congress know he had informed President Chamoun that he would back the government of Lebanon. Then Eisenhower informed Congress that US Marines were in Lebanon and “Operation Blue Bat” was under way.³³¹ He said the marines would be reinforced as needed and US forces would be withdrawn as soon as possible. Eisenhower said he was requesting an urgent meeting the same day with the UN Security Council asking the UN to take a more active role in the Lebanese situation. He would ensure the full backing of the United States in this endeavor. The president reassured of Congress that US Marines were deployed to Lebanon to protect American lives, as there were about 2,500 Americans in Lebanon. While there, US Marines would also be used in the preservation of “Lebanon’s territorial integrity and independence.” Eisenhower believed this was “vital to the United States national interests and world peace.” Eisenhower added that the United Arab Republic encouraged the violence that took place in Lebanon, involving major problems on the border with Syria. Money, weapons, ammunition, and personnel infiltrated Lebanon from Syria. The purpose of this activity was to overthrow the Chamoun government and install one friendly to the United Arab Republic. The president stated he did not believe the actions of the UN Security Council were enough to solve the problems of Lebanon. The president informed Congress he was acting in accordance with the UN Charter.³³² The president’s address to Congress did not address the relevance of the Eisenhower Doctrine. Instead, he justified his actions under the UN Charter. The presidential authority was already in place for sending marines to Beirut—the

very argument Senator Fulbright had made about the Eisenhower Doctrine! Fulbright believed the justification for the use of military force in Lebanon was “a curious outgrowth of the Eisenhower Doctrine.” He predicted the president would justify his actions under the Mansfield Amendment, which was a clause added to the resolution by Democratic Senator Mike Mansfield of Montana. The Mansfield clause affirmed “that ‘the independence and integrity of nations of the Middle East’ were ‘vital to the national interests’ of the United States.” Senator Mansfield thought the president would be relying on his residual powers as commander in chief to justify his decision in Lebanon.³³³ Professor Stephen Ambrose paraphrased Eisenhower speaking to Dulles on the crisis in Lebanon:

and noted that in such circumstances we would have to fulfill our commitments.

Ambrose believed that only the president knew what those commitments were; there is no record of anyone asking the president about those commitments. The United States did not have a treaty with Lebanon, and the Eisenhower Doctrine itself did not apply because Lebanon was not being invaded by either the USSR or Egypt and Syria (UAR).³³⁴ When Chamoun sent Eisenhower a letter of gratitude on July 21, 1958, he thanked Eisenhower for his decision to send US armed forces to Lebanon under the auspices of Article 51 of the UN Charter. Nowhere in his letter did Chamoun thank Eisenhower for using the Eisenhower Doctrine to send US forces to Lebanon. Yet, Douglass Little argued, Chamoun stated that he would use the force of the Eisenhower Doctrine when he so desired. He said he had the ability to “whistle up the Six Fleet any time they found themselves in trouble.” Lebanon was the only Arab nation to readily the Eisenhower Doctrine. There was, however, a difference of opinion about the US doctrine. Among the Arabs in Lebanon, many believed the Eisenhower Doctrine was a “transparent ploy” that was being used by “restraining Nasser’s brand of nationalism”; it was viewed as “imperialism” promoted by the United States. As to the Lebanese parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held in June 1958, there were rising

numbers of Lebanese who did not either the Eisenhower Doctrine or Chamoun. Many Muslims “idolized Nasser” and ed the anti-American broadcasts from Cairo. The Muslims were not the only sects opposed to the Eisenhower Doctrine. “Druse Chieftain Kamal Jumblatt and Sunni overlord Rashid Karame charged that Chamoun’s endorsement of the Eisenhower Doctrine violated the 1943 National Pact, which had prescribed strict neutrality for Lebanon in foreign affairs.” Chamoun said he wanted US foreign policy to loosen its of Israel in favor of Lebanon. The State Department began to believe that Chamoun was more or less using the Eisenhower Doctrine as a means to stay in office, but it was just the opposite from Eisenhower’s viewpoint. When he approved the deployment of US forces to Lebanon, he made sure Chamoun knew he had to step down and not run again for office.³³⁵ At the end of his letter Chamoun writes the following about his gratitude for the US against aggression:

I want to assure you Mr. President, that we are both happy and honored to find ourselves side by side with the great American nation defending, not only our independence and integrity against direct aggression, but the high principles in which the free world believes and by which it lives.³³

Article 51 of the UN Charter reads:

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

The NSC minutes on July 24, 1958, indicated that in Secretary Dulles’ view the new regime in Iraq was “exercised by Nasser, and behind Nasser by the USSR.” This statement might also be read with the stipulation that Dulles viewed much of foreign policy through the prism of the Cold War. The British were disturbed by the situation in Iraq as well as in Kuwait, where the ties to Iraq were very close. The British government was concerned about the oil fields in those two countries. Britain believed if hostile elements altered the prices of oil, it would be a disaster for the British economy. The British were able to purchase oil at a low rate and then used the oil to strengthen their sterling. The minutes said the British were actively trying to find ways to keep their access to the oil fields.³³⁷ Ambrose contrasted Eisenhower’s decision to intervene in Lebanon with his response to the crisis in the Far East between 1953 and 1955. During the crisis in the Far East, the president was calmer than his cabinet. In Lebanon, the roles were reversed. The president wanted to go to Lebanon. He was trying to find a place where he might challenge the USSR. He chose Lebanon rather than Indochina or the China coast, that is, Quemoy and Matsu. The Democratic Party was criticizing the istration for not developing a military strategy that would allow the military to make a “flexible response,” and Eisenhower wanted to prove the US military could move rapidly anywhere in the world. Ambrose believed this was one of the reasons why Eisenhower was ready to go to Lebanon.

Within just two weeks, he had the equivalent of a full division in the country, equipped with Honest John rocket batteries that had atomic weapons, with another two divisions alerted to go on a few hour’s flight from .³³⁸

President Eisenhower recalled he used the following force structure:

July 15: Second Battalion, Second Marine Division (1,700 men).

July 16 (morning): Third Battalion, Sixth Marine Regiment

July 16 (nightfall): First Battalion, Eighth Marine Regiment (actually landed at 09:00 on July 18.)

On twelve-hour call were the following battle groups in :

187th Battle Group 503rd Airborne Battle Group

Air Force tankers (number not given) were deployed in their forward positions

Strategic Air Command (more than 1,100 aircraft armed, their crews ready) was put on higher alert

The following preparatory and ing moves were ordered:

Available for movement overseas, with the restriction “shipping was short” (additional vessels would be needed) were the following:

101st Airborne Division Second Marine Division

Part of the Eighty-Second Airborne Division held ready for quick airlift to Europe³³

Professor Ambrose called Eisenhower’s decision in Lebanon “a show of force— and a most impressive one.” He believed Eisenhower was not aiming his military influence at the Soviet Union or the Lebanese but at Nasser. The president wanted to change Nasser’s thinking by showing him the Soviet Union was not reliable. Eisenhower also wanted to reassure King Saud that the king might indeed rely on the Americans. Eisenhower believed the Middle East was “more vital” to the United States than the Far East. Prime Minister Macmillan wanted the United States to Great Britain in a large show of force in the Middle East. Eisenhower refused, wanting only to do what he deemed important in Lebanon. When Great Britain sent an airborne unit into Jordan to help King Hussein, Eisenhower again refused to Great Britain. Elections were held in Lebanon in July, and General Chehab was elected. The Soviet Union never responded to the American show of force, and the US military left Lebanon by 25 October. Eisenhower believed he had indeed helped Nasser’s “change of attitude.”³⁴ In looking back at his decision in Lebanon, Eisenhower compared it with the one he made to begin the Allied invasion of Normandy. He said “in operations of war, the problem was to select the least objectionable of several courses of action.” For D-Day he had to decide between allowing the Allied Forces to attack under adverse weather conditions or to immobilize them for two weeks even though they were primed to fight. He said that in Lebanon he had to decide between the resentment of the Arab world and other parts of the free world and “by doing so risk general war with the Soviet Union” or, in his opinion, do something he believed to be “worse—which was to do nothing.” He had no doubt that he made the right decisions in both cases. While the differences between the two military operations were vast, the consequences of anything going wrong “were chilling.”³⁴¹ During the crisis in Lebanon on August 6, 1958, Fulbright gave a speech in the chamber of the US Senate. Fulbright believed the US forces were in the Middle East because the foreign policy of the United States was “inadequate, outmoded and misdirected.” Although the United States was “looking squarely into the

abyss of war,” the issue of war or peace was something more. He believed the issues of this type were tied to America’s long-term interests. Living in a “free, peaceful and secure world,” he said, was just a hope and not a policy. He also believed that if the United States lost “more ground diplomatically, politically and economically,” war in itself would become irrelevant. Fulbright said Sputnik put Americans in shock and demonstrated to the United States that there were other places in the world developing in the scientific, intellectual, and technical fields. Senator Fulbright’s speech was pessimistic. He was trying to inform his fellow senators and the president that America had to wake up. He was concerned that the United States was “the defender of the ‘status quo’ throughout the world.” He was critical that the United States providing arms throughout the world ended in such disasters as the coup in Iraq. Fulbright believed the istration, while evaluating its Middle East foreign policy, also needed to determine the relationship between pan-Arabism and Communism.³⁴² On August 21, 1958, the National Security Council held a discussion on the Middle East. The Planning Board produced a paper, “Factors Affecting U.S. Policy toward the Near East.” The new paper was “departing” from “NSC 5801/1—Long Range U.S. Policy Towards the Middle East” in the following ways:

1. The US government now recognized the fact that the Soviets had “certain influence or position in the area.” 2. The US government did not feel obliged to friendly Near Eastern governments in any and every way. 3. A policy of genuine neutralism by the Arab states in the East-West struggle was not viewed as incompatible with primary US objectives. 4. The bedrock objectives in the region were, first, “denial of the area to Soviet domination,” and second, “availability of Near Eastern oil to Western Europe, on reasonable , whatever the precise meaning of that clause.” 5. The paper suggested “several alterations” to the existing course of actions with Israel and the Arab-Israeli dispute.

6. The paper assumed that the nationalist movement in the Near East and for some time to come would continue to be dominated almost completely by its radical, pan-Arab elements.

The Planning Board indicated that its “principal split” occurred when it was discussing the US attitude toward pan-Arabism and toward Nasser. Should the United States accept pan-Arab nationalism, of which Nasser is the symbol, where consistent with our bedrock objectives, or go further and actively “accept and seek to work with radical pan-Arab nationalism” which Nasser symbolizes was a primary question. The meeting also discussed whether the “preservation and independence of Israel was considered to be a part of those bedrock objectives.” The third issue for discussion was whether the United States would militarily with Great Britain over oil or be willing to send troops again to the Middle East.³⁴³ The Eisenhower istration did in fact change its attitude toward Arab nationalism after the Suez War in 1956 and during the Lebanese Crisis in 1958. In a US policy paper dated October 16, 1958, it discusses the “principle differences between the old policy paper and the proposed restatement.” The majority view was

that radical pan-Arab nationalism, as symbolized and led by Nasser, has gained predominance in the area. It is the ‘wave of the future’ and whether we like it or not—according to this view—the attainment of primary U.S. objectives will be frustrated if we are not able to deal with the movement and with Nasser on a mutually acceptable basis.³⁴⁴

I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way. ³⁴⁵

From Truman Doctrine Speech March 12, 1947

He said no matter what you think of Nasser, at least he is a leader. ³⁴

Eisenhower on Nasser, June 15, 1958

I reaffirmed my regard for constitutional procedures but pointed out that modern war might be a matter of hours or even of minutes. If Russia moves there will be no such thing as a ‘small war.’ ³⁴⁷

Eisenhower speaking to the leadership of both houses of Congress, January 1, 1957

5 POLICY AND CONTROVERSY

The Truman Doctrine has been discussed and studied extensively. One theory on the purpose of the doctrine was written in 1974 by one of America’s preeminent scholars on the Cold War, Professor John Lewis Gaddis. It was Gaddis’ belief that the Truman Doctrine’s true aim was not Greece and Turkey in 1947 but rather Korea in 1950. Many scholars at the time were convinced that the United States was finally taking the stage as a world power and abandoning isolationism. Truman finally set US foreign policy on a broad scale with worldwide implications. Most of those who the Truman Doctrine or oppose it agree on two points:

that the President’s statement marked a turning point of fundamental importance in the history of American foreign policy; and that U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War grew logically, even inevitably, out of a policy Truman thus initiated.³⁴⁸

Fulbright took another view. He quoted Acheson, who wrote a policy letter after the downfall of China, indicating that the Russian Communists had invaded China basically by influence as opposed to direct military force. Acheson did not believe that invasion would stick. He believed

however tragic may be the immediate future of China and however ruthlessly a major portion of this great people may be exploited by a party in the interest of foreign imperialism, ultimately the profound civilization and the democratic individualism of China will reassert themselves and she will throw off the foreign yoke. I consider that we should encourage all developments in China which now and in the future work toward this end.

Fulbright said Acheson’s statement became the Truman Doctrine for the Far East. He agreed with Acheson and did not believe the Chinese entered the Korean War in their own national interests.³⁴ Two years after Professor Gaddis wrote his article, Eugene V. Rostow gave a speech on missed opportunities by the Truman istration. Having been in the State Department at the time, Rostow had first-hand insight into what the Truman istration had done. He suggested that in 1976 the Truman Doctrine was still the viable foreign policy pursued by US presidents.

While those ideas have been questioned in recent years, in the shadow of Korea and Vietnam, no alternative line of policy has been proposed or accepted to replace them. They remain the basis for our actions in the theater of world politics, despite the uncertainty, for the moment, of the public opinion needed to sustain them.³⁵

Robert Donovan believed the Truman Doctrine was another step among many that Truman had been making since reading Kennan’s Long Telegram. The previous steps leading to the Truman Doctrine speech were:

1. Truman resisted further concessions to the Soviet Union. 2. He made a strong stance against Soviet penetration in Iran. 3. He dispatched a naval force to the Mediterranean to discourage Soviet designs on the Dardanelles. 4. He ed the Baruch plan on international control of atomic energy. 5. He accepted the Byrnes decision that resulted in the economic merger of the American and British zones in .

6. He backed Byrnes on his stubborn negotiations on the Eastern European peace treaties. 7. He fired Henry Wallace for denouncing the firm American policy. 8. He approved economic aid to South Korea. 9. He received the Clifford-Elsey Report recommending the United States keep Western Europe and the Middle East out of the Soviet influence.

The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan constituted one unified plan, and Truman’s speech was more urgent due to the deteriorating situation in Northern Greece.³⁵¹ Rostow stated the State Department believed Stalin was going to respect the British in Greece. He said the State Department had “long feared” the weakening of Great Britain and . The United States had to do something because of the Soviet policies in Iran and Eastern Europe.³⁵² Rostow’s concerns were fully ed by CIA reports in 1947, which stated that the Soviets had three aims in Palestine:

1. End the British mandate and bring about the removal of British troops from the area. 2. Keep the situation unsettled. 3. Take an active part in “maintaining order” in the country.

The Agency reported the success of the Soviets in their first two aims. If the Russians were able to set up a base in Palestine, they would be able to cause havoc in the region with their propaganda and subversive activities. The Agency said the USSR had a two-pronged plan. The first was to recommend

a bi-national state in Palestine, and through this they would be making “a gesture” to the Arab world as if the Soviets had their welfare in mind. On the other hand, the Soviets would also be able to partition. The Agency reported the USSR would be showing how much it thought about minorities as part of a strategy to endear themselves to the minorities in Palestine. At that time in 1947 the Palestinians comprised two-thirds of the populace in Palestine and the Jews about one-third. Additionally, there were—and are today—Arameans [Israeli Christians who received their own identity in September 2014 and are no longer categorized as Arabs], Bedouins, Druze, Arab Christians, Baha’i, and Circassians.³⁵³ ing minorities in Palestine would then provide the Russians leverage to the Kurdish people and champion a Kurdish state. In addition, they were making the case that Kars Province, located in Turkey, should receive its independence and be ed to Soviet Armenia.³⁵⁴ Before the United States recognized the new State of Israel, the Soviets assisted the Jews in Europe clandestinely by helping them to migrate to Palestine via the Jewish underground. The city of Constanza in Romania was one place in Eastern Europe from which the Soviets were known to be smuggling Jews into Palestine. The CIA also believed that if hostilities broke out between the Jews and Arabs, the smuggling would continue even while the Russians also covertly assisted the Arabs.³⁵⁵ The CIA report of November 1947 reported that Jewish Displaced Persons or DPs were being transported through the Balkans to Palestine. The Agency believed in case of war between Arabs and Jews, that route would be used to provide additional fighting forces for the Jews in Palestine. The Jews were being transported from “Poland, the Soviet Zone of , Hungary, and the Balkans.” They were sent to locations in Austria, Italy, and ; from there they sailed to Palestine. The CIA estimated that “about 1800 Jews cross into Austria every month.” In Italy the Agency knew that the Hagana was “operating a secret immigration service” for the estimated 30,000 Jewish refugees there. The government in Greece was fighting guerillas from Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia. At the same time the Romanian and Bulgarian governments were assisting Jews in getting to ports along the Black Sea. From there they would board ships trying to run the blockades that prevented entry into Palestine. Other Jewish groups, the IZL (Irgun Zvai Leumi) and the Stern Gang, were reported to

have been receiving training and assistance from the Soviets. However, in the case of a war in Palestine, it was believed that neither the Jews nor Arabs “would receive overt material aid from the USSR or its satellites, with the exception of Czechoslovakia.” and Belgium were also thought to be selling arms to the Jews. The CIA reported that Soviet agents were infiltrating with the Jews entering Palestine. The United States believed that the Russians would use Palestine as their gateway to the Arab world to spread their propaganda and would try to duplicate what they were doing in Greece by organizing Arab “democratic movements.”³⁵ Arnold Krammer’s article on Soviet intentions in Palestine s the CIA report of November 1947. The three million Jews in the Soviet Bloc could be used as what Krammer referred to as a “Trojan Horse.” By March 1947, US military personnel in charge of the Displaced Persons camps in Europe were reporting to the State Department about Soviets ing the Jewish refugees. Following World War II, Krammer points out, Great Britain was the “sole power in the Middle East.” Additionally, “the Soviet Union was also aware of Britain’s underlying weaknesses: the war had left her drained financially and psychologically.” Strategically, the USSR knew this was working to its advantage and aiding its objectives in the Middle East. The one fear the Soviet Union had was that Great Britain would turn to the United States and form a partnership in the region. The Soviets were trying to force the British and essentially the West out of the Middle East. Along with the decline of the British Empire, Palestine was possibly seen as the key to the Soviet entry to the Middle East. Just as in Greece, the British did not want to depart without the United States stepping in. It was that fact that likely persuaded Stalin to a Jewish State in Palestine. In order to keep the United States from being asked by the British to enter the Middle East, in March 1947 Stalin requested a Foreign Ministers’ Conference in Moscow, according to Krammer, at “the earliest opportunity.” Earnest Bevin (Great Britain’s Foreign Secretary, 1945-1951) met secretly with Stalin after the conference, and Stalin assured Bevin of the following:

1. The Soviet Union would make no difficulties for the British nor aid those who sought to do so.

2. “The USSR, in conformity with its invariable policy of non-interference, did not intend to interfere.” 3. In response to Bevin’s hope that Stalin would appreciate and recognize Britain’s position in the Middle East and that it “would be reflected in Soviet policy,” the USSR would pledge to recognize Great Britain in the Middle East upon the condition that the United States stayed out of the region.³⁵⁷

The Soviets, having understood Britain’s situation, were counting on the fact that the British would soon realize their “tenuous position” and “place the Palestine Question before the United Nations for a solution.” When the British went to the UN with the Palestine Question, Stalin thought he had achieved his strategy of keeping the United States out of the region. This is why it becomes more and more likely that the decision Truman made to recognize Israel ahead of the Soviets has every aspect of wanting to determine who would be the dominant force in the Middle East.³⁵⁸ Rostow makes the case that the Truman Doctrine did stop the Soviets in Iran, Turkey, Greece, Berlin, and South Korea. It reflected the Wilsonian principle that “peace is indivisible” and the importance of collective security. If the UN Charter did not enforce the policy, then the istration was looking to “regional arrangements of self-defense” to resist the “aggression” of either the Russians or their “proxies.”³⁵ The USSR viewed 1947 as a year it would reverse three decades of for the Arab world and the possibility of the State of Israel.³ This s the view of US intelligence that the main Soviet threat was in Palestine and not in Greece and Turkey. Krammer states there were four objectives to the Soviet’s policy in the Middle East:

1. They wanted to keep watch on their eastern flank with Turkey. They were concerned about their “metallurgical industries” and became very worried that Iran and Turkey might be used against them. They also were concerned about their oil field in the Caucasian region.

2. Stalin continued the long-held Russian desire to have a warm-water port. 3. They were concerned that the United States and Great Britain would monopolize the oil in the Middle East. 4. The Soviets wanted to oust Great Britain from the Middle East and were concerned that the United States would become more involved in the region and disrupt their strategy. Soviet in Palestine was the perfect reason to become involved in the region.³ ¹

At the end of 1947, Americans were tracking the true motives of Moscow in Palestine—to the US of a Jewish State but for reasons far different than the United States. The USSR wanted to drive a wedge between the United States and Palestine’s Arab neighbors. That view was published in the Washington Star on December 3, 1947. If the Russians were able to alienate the United States from the Arab states it would provide “a permanent strategic victory.” In other words, the USSR would not have to worry about any strategic air bases in the Arab world or worry about Arab oil for its own consumption. Krammer believed that one of the initiatives behind the Soviet for the partition plan in 1947 was the fact the USSR wanted to be observed as ing the Jews on that issue and not the Arabs. He believed the Soviets saw the possibility of Jewish as a means to break “the Anglo-American front and weakening Western unity.” He believed the Soviets would be able to make the United States “become the chief target of Arab national resentment.” Krammer also believed that Moscow was searching for any “state or movement” that would break up the US and British relationship, “regardless of the ideological persuasion.”³ ²

Preceding the Truman Doctrine was the Elsey File written by George Elsey and Clark Clifford. It had a major influence on the formulation of the Truman Doctrine speech along with the Long Telegram and the Foreign Affairs article by George Kennan. Eisenhower had the benefit of the Truman Doctrine as a precedent for his Cold War strategy. Eisenhower used the Formosa Straits Resolution as a means to ward off World War III with China and eventually with the USSR. He learned from the Formosa Resolution while developing his foreign policy in the Middle East. Joseph Jones wrote about the group working on the Truman Doctrine:

All who participated in the extraordinary developments of that period were aware that a major turning in American history was taking place.³ ³

Fulbright also quoted Jones on the men at the State Department:

All barriers to bold action were indeed down… a new chapter in world history had opened, and they were the most privileged of men, participants in a drama such as rarely occurs even in the long life of a great nation.³ ⁴

If anyone had any right to praise the Truman Doctrine, it was Dean Acheson. He is given the primary credit by so many who wrote and edited Truman’s speech. At that time, he was the undersecretary of state. On September 30, 1947, Arthur Krock wrote in The New York Times that he gave Acheson credit for beginning the Marshall Plan, devised by Truman and his State Department. Truman, having the highest respect for Marshall, preferred that Secretary Marshall’s name be attached to the plan. Krock thought that the Marshall Plan evolved from the Truman Doctrine, and he noted Acheson’s role.³ ⁵

On February 22, 1946, Kennan sent the “Long Telegram” to the secretary of state. Kennan was concerned the Russians were taking its centuries-old form of nationalism with its “blurred distinction” of offensive and defensive actions now under the cover of Marxism.³ With the Long Telegram Kennan divided the world into two centers that would become an “International Revolution”: a socialist center that focused on socialism and a capitalist center that “incline[d] to capitalism.” He said these two centers would battle for the “command of world economy.” It would also decide the fate of capitalism and Communism around the world. He believed that “internal conflicts of capitalism” led to wars of two kinds: intra-capitalist wars between two capitalist states and wars of intervention against the socialist world. Kennan’s following words would become a very clear and present danger to the West and free nations in the world as they were applied to the Middle East during the Truman and Eisenhower presidencies as well as for future presidencies:

Soviet efforts, and those of Russia’s friends abroad, must be directed toward deepening and exploiting of differences and conflicts between capitalist powers. If these eventually deepen into an “imperialist” war, this war must be turned into revolutionary upheavals within various capitalist countries.

Kennan went further about the USSR:

In the name of Marxism they sacrificed every single ethical value in their methods and tactics. Today they cannot dispense with it. It is the fig leaf of their moral and intellectual respectability.

Kennan asserted that the Soviets’ tactics were the same in the past; it was part of Russian nationalism. By 1946 they organized their tactics under “the new guise of international Marxism.” Kennan believed the Communists to be “more dangerous and insidious than ever before.” They were, he wrote, using their

tactics with “honeyed promises” to the world, a world totally “desperate and war torn.” Out of “immediate strategic necessity,” the Communists were using these tactics in Northern Iran, Turkey, and likely in Bornholm, Denmark. Bornholm is mentioned because it was occupied by the Germans from 1940 to 1945 and the Russians from 1945 to 1946. It was a contentious place that Moscow did not want any NATO troops, with the exception of Denmark, to occupy. It is a Danish island in the Baltic Sea to the east of the rest of Denmark, south of Sweden, northeast of , and north of the westernmost part of Poland.³ ⁷ Kennan warned Washington:

However, other points may at any time come into question, if and as concealed Soviet political power is extended to new areas.

Kennan warned that the Soviets would use the United Nations to their advantage, and he had no doubts they would leave the UN if it did not suit their strategic need. Kennan further warned of another strategy of the Soviets, which was to become involved in trusteeship arrangements around the world due to

a desire to be in a position to complicate and inhibit exertion of western influence.³ ⁸

This would explain part of the reason the Soviets were involved so directly with Palestine. After Truman’s recognition of Israel, the Soviets turned to the Arab world, where they might be more successful. The most important line in Kennan’s Foreign Affairs article defined US policy for the Truman istration and the next forty years:

In these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.³

With the Long Telegram and the Foreign Affairs article, Kennan reached the top levels of Washington foreign policy-making. Henry Kissinger, in a tribute to Kennan, wrote in 1979:

George Kennan came as close to authoring the diplomatic doctrine of his era as any diplomat in our history.³⁷

During July 1946 President Truman asked one of his presidential aides, George Elsey, a graduate of Princeton and Harvard, to write a report on Soviet diplomacy and Soviet-American relations. ing Elsey was President Truman’s naval aide, Clark Clifford, who was a lawyer before entering military service at the age of forty. The two of them wrote a seventy-nine-page report. It reflected much of what Kennan had written in his Long Telegram. The title of the report was American Relations with the Soviet Union: A Report to the President by the Special Counsel to the President. Describing its importance, Michael Hogan said that it explained the US policy and ideology towards the Soviets.³⁷¹ Truman sought to avoid confrontation with the USSR while allowing its selfdestruction by placing two types of pressure upon it—direct and indirect. Elizabeth Spalding clarifies Truman’s thought about how the principles and institutions of democracy would prevail over Soviet totalitarianism. She applauds Truman for initiating a grand strategy for containment, very different from Woodrow Wilson or Franklin Roosevelt. Spalding also makes the case that Truman knew how and when to use unilateral and multilateral action best suited for US foreign policy.³⁷² He used a multilateral approach during the Korean War when US armed forces fought as a part of the United Nations and implemented his unilateral strategy in Greece to stop the Soviet threat. He avoided direct confrontation with the main Soviet armed forces but used armed intervention to stop elements from Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Albania turning Greece into a Soviet state.

Spalding highlights Churchill’s Fulton, Missouri, speech. Churchill, in her opinion, was the modern-day Paul Revere.³⁷³ Churchill’s grandson, Winston Churchill III, stated that his grandfather traveled to Fulton in order to make sure the United States did not make the same mistake it did in 1918 by adopting an isolationist attitude. Churchill warned the Americans that the Soviet threat was real.³⁷⁴ Churchill made his speech on March 5, 1946. As early as May 12, 1945, Churchill had used the iron curtain phrase when he expressed his growing concerns to Truman about the Soviets.³⁷⁵ Churchill made the case that the two major threats from the Soviets were “war and tyranny.” He called them the “two giant marauders.” As Churchill frequently stated, “English-speaking people, have the constancy of mind, persistency of purpose, and the grand simplicity of decision.” These traits would inspire them in peacetime just as it did in war. Churchill fully understood the urgency of persuading the United States to lead the fight in the approaching Cold War. It was his firm belief that the United States and Great Britain must unite their defenses around the world; by doing so it would “double the mobility” and “greatly expand” both nations’ military capability.

Beware, I say; time may be short… There is the path of wisdom… Prevention is better than cure.

Churchill wisely offered Stalin an olive branch by publicly stating that he had “strong iration and regard” for the “valiant Russian people” and his wartime ally, Stalin. The British people had “deep sympathy and good will” towards the Russian people. But, he believed, he had an obligation to present an accurate picture to the Americans and to the free world. Moscow had placed all the capitals of Eastern Europe under “Soviet influence.” Greece was “free” to decide its fate under British, French, and American protection.³⁷

The Russians were supposed to have withdrawn their troops from Azerbaijan in Northern Iran by March 2, 1946, just as the British had withdrawn their troops from the same area. When they had not withdrawn, US Ambassador to Russia, General Bedell Smith was instructed by President Truman to tell Stalin that Stalin had been “a man to always keep his word” and that he was upset by Stalin’s actions.³⁷⁷ The fact that the Soviets were making a stand in Azerbaijan prompted Truman to do the same. Secretary Byrnes met with Stalin in midDecember 1945. Byrnes departed Russia without Stalin telling him that he would remove his troops from Azerbaijan. Nor would Stalin stop putting pressure on Turkey to allow a Soviet naval base in the Dardanelles, and he would not remove his demands for territorial concessions. During this period Kennan had met Isaiah Berlin in Moscow. Berlin, a Russian-British social theorist, believed the Russians were on a direct course of confrontation with the West.³⁷⁸ Others in Moscow perceived the moves by the USSR to be in keeping with their expansionist aims. Secretary of Defense Forrestal informed Churchill that he believed the Soviets were expanding like Peter the Great did with the “additional missionary force of a religion.” John Patton Davies, the first secretary at the Moscow embassy, believed the Soviets were

as intolerant and dogmatic as that which motivated the zealots of Islam or the Inquisition in Spain.

He believed the Soviets were sending out their message with the goal of swaying others to follow them. They were accomplishing this with religious fervor, hidden in their atheistic ways.³⁷ In the revision draft of the Truman Doctrine speech, dated March 4, 1947, labeled Acheson’s copy, words like frank appraisal were revised to just say appraisal; later in the same paragraph the words frankly it were replaced with state. The words in imminent danger in the same paragraph were also removed, indicating the decision by those revising the speech to tone down the rhetoric. Acheson did not want to incite the Soviets but to put them on notice that their conduct would not be tolerated, while at the same time presenting a US

stance based on strength.³⁸ From the time Truman assumed office as president, he had been informed by Averill Harriman, the ambassador to Russia, that the Soviets were carrying out two policies. The first was the one that they used with the United States and Great Britain for cooperation. The second was one of expanding their control over the nations bordering Russia. Truman said he heard rumors of advisors to Stalin telling him that the cooperative attitude of the United States was a sign of weakness. Truman wrote in his response to Harriman that he was not afraid of the Soviets. He would be firm and fair with them.³⁸¹ During the 1945–1947 period leading up to the Truman Doctrine, Truman was firm with Stalin in Azerbaijan, forcing him to withdraw his troops there. Truman was also very concerned about the Soviet moves toward Turkey such as building up forces along the Turkish-Bulgarian borders. Truman was convinced that the Soviets might take the Turkish Straits and acted to ensure that would not happen. Molotov gave his assurance that the Soviets had no intention of going to war over the Straits, but Truman could not sit by. He believed the Soviets understood one thing, and that “was Divisions.” He was just sad that he had none to send to the region. The Kremlin was waging a “war of nerves” by holding maneuvers on the Bulgarian-Turkish borders.³⁸² The 1936 Montreux Convention of the Straits abrogated the Lausanne Convention of 1923 that provided the rules for commercial and warships to through the Straits. Great Britain, , Italy, and Japan had to provide security for its freedom of navigation and to defend the demilitarized region in the Straits if it were attacked. Commercial ships and warships were allowed to through the area. One view, taken by Great Britain, wanted the “Straits and Black Sea to be treated as open waters, while the Soviet Union desired the right to send naval units through the Straits without granting the reciprocal right of non-Black Sea powers to send their fleets into the Black Sea.”³⁸³ At the Potsdam Conference, Truman had ed a plan giving the Turks sole control of the Straits. That did not deter the Soviets, who wanted bases around the Straits, which Truman could not allow due to the international shipping that ed through the Straits. It could be argued that the Soviets had a valid grievance, for the United States and Great Britain had control of the Panama and Suez Canals in addition to military bases around the world. Offner clarifies that “American diplomats and military planners” were aware that the Soviets had a considerable military force in Bulgaria and Romania, but it was America’s estimate that the Russians were “too weak to undertake action over the Straits and risk general war.” It was also the American view that the Soviets only

wanted “to intimidate the Turks.”³⁸⁴ Truman kept a record of his talks with Churchill and Stalin at Potsdam. Stalin questioned why Turkey should be so worried. He stated that parts of Soviet Georgia and Soviet Armenia had been “torn” from the USSR in 1921 and that the territory must be returned. In the Montreux Convention he was ready and had been for some time to allow Soviet ships rites of age through the Turkish Straits, but he specified that he did not want Turkey to feel alarmed. Churchill went further and suggested it should be just a matter between the USSR and Turkey. When Molotov brought up treaties between Russia and Turkey in 1805 and 1833, Churchill did not budge; he was not going to pressure Turkey. Truman requested that that discussion resume after he had time to study the subject. Stalin compared Great Britain at Suez and the United States at the Panama Canal with Turkey, which under the Montreux Convention had the right to block the Straits in time of war or when war was threatened. Turkey, with the of Great Britain, had the authority to block a great nation like the Soviet Union. If the same were done at Suez or Panama, there would be major problems. Truman responded that the Montreux Convention needed revision and that the Straits should be a free waterway for all ships and all nations. Then Truman reminded Stalin that the area from the Black Sea to the Baltic and from to western Russia had been the origin of all wars in the previous two hundred years. That included the two wars in the twentieth century started by Austria—or really —in World War I and in World War II. Truman said those two wars had turned the whole world upside down. He believed it was the aim of the present conference and the future one in San Francisco to ensure the world was not engulfed by a world war again.³⁸⁵

A memorandum discussing the drafting of the Truman Doctrine, dated February 24, 1947, was produced after the British announced to the White House their planned withdrawal from Greece.³⁸ Acheson recalls in his memoirs having received a note from the British on February 21; he instructed Loy Henderson and John Hickerson to gather the European and Near Eastern Division that night and plan preliminary reports. As a result, groups of individuals, under the supervision of Hickerson “with Henderson as his second,” did the following:

1. Drafted the legislation 2. Organized and recruited the civilian group to exercise control and direction in Greece 3. Set up the Pentagon military training and advisory teams 4. Ordered supplies and weapons 5. Procured shipping³⁸⁷

Acheson called Secretary Marshall and President Truman, but neither had further instructions.³⁸⁸ After Acheson issued his orders, Loy Henderson began delegating responsibilities, and John Hickerson told those involved

this was certainly the most important thing since Pearl Harbor and that we should all approach our tasks with great humility.

Numerous drafts were written and approved. On March 8 they were sent to Clark Clifford, assistant to the president, who had co-authored the Clifford-Elsey

Report. His primary criticism was the structure of the speech. The draft “opened with the difficulties of Greece, went on to the general situation, and came back to Greece.” Clifford suggested that the speech should “begin with Greece and discuss Greece, proceed to the general, and then work up to specific proposals and peroration.” On March 10, Clifford discussed the March 10 draft with State. Many additions to the March 10 draft were eliminated.³⁸ It was the White House Staff that included the part on oil in the March 10 draft, which was eliminated when Clifford discussed it with the State Department. While the White House was thinking about oil resources in the Middle East, the State Department thought it best that oil not be made an issue in the Greece and Turkey Crisis. It would have opened up all sorts of problems with nations in the Middle East, and it likely would have caused friction in Congress at a time when US foreign policy had to be urgently approved. As discussed above, the Truman istration was working to keep the Middle East from becoming an area of confrontation between the United States and the USSR. They openly endorsed the much-needed aid to Greece and Turkey, paving the way for the Marshall Plan. At the same time, the istration was quietly making contingencies in case it had to go to war in Palestine after its recognition of the State of Israel in May 1948. On February 27, Congressional leaders were consulted at the White House. After Secretary Marshall spoke, Dean Acheson followed with a state-of-the-world survey showing the Communists making havoc everywhere. He informed the of Congress that

in the past eighteen months… Soviet pressure on the Straits, on Iran, and on Northern Greece had brought Balkans to the point where a highly possible Soviet breakthrough might open three continents to Soviet penetration.³

Acheson recalled that he felt compelled to speak out, and by doing so he was able to deliver the right message to the president. He said that Greece might affect the entire Balkans “like apples in a barrel.” He said that Iran and the East, along with Africa, Asia Minor and Egypt, and Western Europe by way of Italy and would all be affected. He further said the Soviet Union was

“playing one of the greatest gambles in history.” He clarified that the Soviet Union had little to lose. If it were to succeed in some, not all, of the possibilities, it would “have immense gains.” It was up to the United States “alone” to stop the “play” of the Soviet Union in light of the British withdrawal from Greece. With congressional approval, the Truman Doctrine speech was delivered by President Truman on March 12, 1947.³ ¹ Among the draft copies of the Truman Doctrine Speech preserved at the Truman Library, the draft dated March 4, 1947, did not mention or refer to the natural resources in the Middle East. The draft copy on March 10, 1947, did. However, the subject was taken out of the final speech. In the same paragraph, Truman began discussing Turkey and its importance in relation to Greece as well as the Middle East. At this point, Truman began his domino theory that if Greece fell, it would impact upon Turkey. The result would be a disaster for the Middle East. The following was removed from that paragraph:

an area in which the United States has a vital interest in the maintenance of peace and good order. This is an area of great natural resources which must be accessible to all nations and must not be under the exclusive control or domination of any single nation. The weakening of Turkey, or the further weakening of Greece, would invite such control.

It would appear that during the drafting between March 4 and March 10 there was a debate on the natural resources in the Middle East. In the final analysis, it was considered more important to avoid the impression that the United States was in the region for the oil.³ ² Truman never mentioned “Soviet Union,” “Soviets,” or “Stalin.” Instead he spoke of “totalitarian regimes,” “terrorist activities,” “terror,” “oppression,” and “Communists.” There was little doubt who Truman was referring to in his speech, but Truman did not directly accuse Stalin or the USSR.

President Eisenhower faced a different set of foreign policy challenges from President Truman. The Korean War ended July 27, 1953. The Arab world became a different challenge for Eisenhower. Arab nationalism was taking root, and the Middle East was hostile to the colonial powers. Nasser was one of the greatest challenges facing Eisenhower. That was compounded with the challenges posed by Israel. The Kremlin made a major policy change when it deviated from ing the formation of a Jewish state to turning its allegiance toward the Arab world. Its aim was to enter into the Middle East for the purpose of threatening the United States and the West with controlling the oil. This would lead to the Eisenhower Doctrine following the Suez War in October 1956 and would result in the Fulbright Resolution of 1957. As war seemed imminent between mainland China and Formosa in the mid1950s, Eisenhower gave serious thought to the use of tactical nuclear weapons to protect nationalist Chinese. The House of Representatives ed the Formosa Resolution by 409-3 on January 25, 1955, and the Senate by 85-3 on January 28, 1955.³ ³ The Formosa Resolution was groundbreaking legislation. Within paragraph six it reads:

That the President of the United States be and he hereby is authorized to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary.³ ⁴

—in other words, “pre-authorization to use American military forces without a formal declaration of war.”³ ⁵ Eisenhower presented the Eisenhower Doctrine speech to Congress on January 5, 1957, after Suez. Oil was initially part of Eisenhower’s speech to Congress and then omitted by Eisenhower himself. The age left out read:

The Western Hemisphere can temporarily become an alternative source of supply, free from transportation stoppages, but only partially and at the risk of a more rapid depletion of its own reserves. There are also many problems that arise from difficulties in foreign exchange.

The Truman istration on the one hand was concerned that the oil issue might raise suspicions in the Arab world that the United States was simply acting in its own self-interest. In retrospect oil was a hugely important issue for national security in the West, but it was not going to be highlighted as an argument for intervention. Eisenhower, on the other hand, did not want the international community to believe it could depend on America’s oil for any length of time. Nor did he not want Nasser to know that the United States could provide oil while he was blocking the canal. Oil was an issue with very different strategic connotations for Truman and Eisenhower. Eisenhower had the benefit of the Formosa Resolution and the Truman Doctrine as a point of departure. He followed Truman’s use of economic and military assistance. He then added a third step to his doctrine when he said:

It would, in the third place, authorize such assistance and cooperation to include the employment of the armed forces of the United States to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations, requesting such aid, against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by International Communism.

Truman sent military advisors to Greece and eventually had General Van Fleet go there to ister the situation on the ground. Under a new set of circumstances and a new doctrinal mindset, Eisenhower sent combat troops to Lebanon.

Eisenhower said he would keep the of Congress fully informed if US armed forces were deployed.

If, contrary to my hope and expectation, a situation arose which called for the military application of the policy which I ask the Congress to me in proclaiming, I would of course maintain hour-by-hour with the Congress if it were in session. And if the Congress were not in session, and if the situation had grave implications, I would, of course at once call the Congress into special session.³

Fulbright took issue with the fact that the speech that Eisenhower gave before Congress and the t Resolution that made the Eisenhower Doctrine into law did not state the same on how the president would strategically deploy US armed forces and simultaneously keep Congress informed. This raises the question of whether Eisenhower did in fact adhere to the Eisenhower Doctrine when deploying troops to Lebanon. He was invited by Chamoun to send armed forces to Lebanon when there was fighting on the Lebanese-Syrian border and the Kremlin was ing Nasser’s efforts to destabilize the Middle East. Eisenhower then used his doctrine when sending troops to Lebanon in July 1958, thereby demonstrating to the Russians his resolve to use force if needed. He let the Russians know where his red lines were and how much he would tolerate from them. He did not limit the Eisenhower Doctrine to just the Middle East. He stated that he would challenge the Soviet Union anywhere in the world if it resorted to aggression. This made the Eisenhower Doctrine a global policy and not just a promise to defend the nations in the Middle East. To understand Fulbright’s challenge to Eisenhower it is important to understand how Eisenhower truly felt about Fulbright. A series of hand-written notes during meetings at the White House were recorded by Arthur Minnich. One of the comments he wrote down was a direct quote from Eisenhower about Fulbright:

Of all the individuals I would want opposed to me… Fulbright.³ ⁷

One may challenge that statement and say that Eisenhower despised Fulbright. Another view might be that his statement followed his views on leadership. One of his axioms for leadership was

Proactively seek out those who disagree with your own points of view.

Another was

Argue both sides of an issue to maintain flexibility and reach the optimal decision.³ ⁸

Fulbright seriously challenged the wording of the t Resolution that was ed after the Eisenhower Doctrine speech. He said that nowhere in the t Resolution did it call for the president to consult with the of Congress, if the president was going to use “the military application” as indicated on January 5. Eisenhower emphasized that he would consult with Congress in an emergency situation. If they were in recess, he would bring of Congress back to Washington for a special session. This lack of consistency in the Eisenhower Doctrine speech and the t Resolution disturbed Fulbright, who was worried the executive branch of government was eroding the responsibilities of the legislative branch. However, this was not the only aspect of the Eisenhower Doctrine that concerned Fulbright. He also focused on the fact that it did not address more of the relevant issues in the Middle East such as Fulbright had in his Middle East Resolution on borders and refugees. Eisenhower’s objective was to send a clear signal to the Soviets and to Nasser.

He devoted some, but not much, attention to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Fulbright Resolution complemented Eisenhower’s resolution by focusing more on Middle East issues that Fulbright believed Eisenhower should have. Fulbright disagreed with Eisenhower on the use of the military. His preference was for Eisenhower to have “long-range economic development programs.” Another point Fulbright made was that the US government should “exercise the right of individual or collective self-defense under Article 51, should any armed attack occur affecting its international security.” Fulbright argued that the president already had the means to use the nation’s armed forces through Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. On February 11, 1957, Senator Fulbright spoke in the Senate. Many Senators believed that the Eisenhower Doctrine was not only leading to the erosion of legislative responsibilities in favor of the executive but also endangering the Republic itself. The first order of business for Fulbright was to read the main component of the Eisenhower Doctrine, known as Senate t Resolution 19:

The President ‘is authorized to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of any such nation or group of nations (in the general area of the Middle East) requesting such aid against armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism,’ and to use ‘without regard to the provisions of any other law or regulation, not to succeed $200 million. The resolution shall expire as the President may determine.

After discussing various aspects of Resolution 19, Fulbright asked two related and relevant questions. The first was whether or not the Senate should “strike down” its rights and duties in the conduct of foreign affairs after 168 years under the Constitution. His next question was whether or not the Senate should affirm a “radical proposal” abandoning its constitutional system of checks and balances. Fulbright believed the resolution abridged the separation of legislative and

executive powers and the power of Congress to declare war under the principles of the Constitution. As a t Resolution, the Eisenhower Doctrine had the “force of law.” The second problem was a result of the first. Due to the resolution’s force of law, it would act as a “blanket transfer to the Executive and the Constitutional right vested in Congress to declare war.” Fulbright referred to a “startling revelation.” To simplify the matter, he asked his colleagues if they would be doing their job if they requested the president “to appoint 10 Ambassadors, Cabinet Officers and of the Supreme Court without the Senate ing on them?” He pointed out how unbelievable it would be to give any president the “blank forms… to wage war.” Fulbright proposed to his fellow senators to vote for an advisory resolution that ed the president by forming a policy of “opposing the expansion of Communist influence in the Middle East.” Precedents to do this were the resolution leading to the formation of the United Nations (of which Fulbright was an author) and the Vandenberg Resolution by Senator Arthur Vandenberg, leading to the formation of NATO. Both resolutions did not, he explained, have the “force of law.” Nor did they their responsibilities to the executive, and they did not try to merge the legislative branch with the executive. Instead, “they evidenced the will of a united and determined people in of a definite and constructive policy.” Fulbright acknowledged the wisdom of the founding fathers of the American Constitution. They foresaw the tendency of the executive to try and take over much of the legislative functions and set up provisions to prevent that from happening. He would not contribute further to the “erosion of the power of the Senate.” Fulbright next discussed the doctrine of inherent or residual power of the president and the doctrine of emergency power as they pertained to the Middle East. Referring to the first doctrine, the Constitution gave the president a legal authority in “cases of compelling necessity” needed to “protect the vital interests of the republic.” Hence, Eisenhower already had the power he was requesting in his resolution. Referring to the doctrine of emergency power as applied to the Middle East, Fulbright said the president should take whatever action he felt necessary if an

emergency arose in that region. The president’s actions should be for the protection of the vital interests of the nation. Then, if the president believed he had overstepped his authority, he should seek approval of Congress as soon as possible. Fulbright believed Congress should give the president what he needed by way of special legislation. He did not think it was right for Congress to “grant him [the president], vague and unlimited power.”³ In comparing the Truman Doctrine, the Eisenhower Doctrine, and the Fulbright Resolution of 1957, only Eisenhower included using American armed forces in the Middle East. Truman made the case to send both military and economic assistance to Greece and Turkey, but he did not advocate committing US combat forces. He did, however, send military advisors to Greece as the situation there deteriorated and it appeared that Greece might fall. The Truman Doctrine does not mention the use of armed forces, whereas the Eisenhower Doctrine includes the use of armed forces if any nation requested them believing it was directly threatened by the Soviet Union or its satellite states. Similarly, Fulbright did not mention either advisors or armed forces in his resolution. Both Truman and Eisenhower made the stipulation that they would send military personnel to the region if they were requested to. Truman stated:

In addition to funds, I ask the Congress to authorize the detail of American civilian and military personnel to Greece and Turkey, at the request of those countries, to assist the tasks of reconstruction, and for the purpose of supervising the use of such financial and material assistance as may be furnished.⁴

When Eisenhower mentioned the use of armed forces, he did so in a more aggressive mode than Truman. He was prepared to confront the USSR’s armed forces if challenged.

Let me refer again to the requested authority to employ the armed forces of the United States to assist to defend the territorial integrity and the political independence of any nation in the area against Communist armed aggression.

Such authority would not be exercised except at the desire of the nation attacked. Beyond this it is my profound hope that this authority would never have to be exercised at all.⁴ ¹

Both Truman and Eisenhower invoked the domino theory. They indicated that Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and the Far East would all feel the results if the Communists succeeded. Truman stated that Turkey, the entire Middle East, and Europe would be affected by the loss of Greece. Eisenhower extended his message not only to Europe and the Middle East but also to Africa and the Far East. Subversion anywhere in the world could be taken as a direct threat to the security of the United States, resulting in a direct military confrontation with US armed forces. Fulbright thought that the president had sufficient emergency powers under Article 51 of the United Nations. Like President Wilson, he believed in collective security.

Contribute to the maintenance of peace by reaffirming, with particular reference to the Middle East, the determination of the United States to exercise the right of individual or collective self-defense under Article 51, should any armed attack occur affecting its international security.⁴ ²

The Truman Doctrine was not specifically for the Middle East, whereas the Eisenhower Doctrine and the Fulbright Resolution both concentrated on that region, with the stipulation that Eisenhower was prepared to use force against the USSR wherever needed, meaning outside the Middle East.

Fear cannot be vanished, but it can be calm, and without panic; and it can be mitigated by reason and evaluation. ⁴³

—Senator Vannevar Bush

Although he exercised freely the soldier’s right to grouse, he wanted it to be in the position he could have a maximum influence on events. ⁴⁴

—Ambrose on Eisenhower

And finally, are we to regard ourselves as a friend, counselor, and example for those around the world who seek freedom and who also want our help, or are we to play the role of God’s avenging angel, the appointed missionary of freedom in a benighted world. ⁴⁵

—J. William Fulbright

CONCLUSION

World War II changed the nature of US foreign policy as the United States became a nuclear superpower. As technology developed, Middle East oil became vital for the West. Eastern Europe had fallen under Russian domination. The USSR was bent on an ideological global campaign against Capitalism, replacing it with Marxism and Communism. The Colonial age was over. Nations were seeking independence, and leaders like Nasser wanted to promote a new order in the Arab world. Both Truman and Eisenhower realized they had to act rapidly to block the USSR. For Truman it was the recognition of Israel before Moscow at the risk of antagonizing the Arab world. Truman was very concerned about Russian disruptive influence in the Middle East and the possibility of war. Israel might provide the gateway, especially in view of the secret arrangement that Israel made with the USSR for oil from Romania. Eisenhower and his secretary of state believed it was important for the United States to establish a position in Syria before the Soviets. That decision was made in August 1957 and expressed in the Eisenhower Doctrine.⁴ By taking the initiative, Eisenhower was able to keep the USSR out of Syria. Eisenhower’s Syrian policy involved his “hiddenhand diplomacy.” It was thought that Nasser was not pleased with Syrian-Soviet relations, despite the fact that both Egypt and Syria received weapons from Moscow in 1955. Nasser succeeded in uniting Egypt with Syria and creating the United Arab Republic, leading Eisenhower to act decisively in July 1958, sending US Marines to Beirut. Truman recognized Israel for various reasons. On the surface, he did it because he greatly cared about the tragedy of the Holocaust and knew the Jews must have a homeland. Rostow pointed out that after World War II there was an “outcry” in the United States, Great Britain, and the Jewish communities in Palestine due to the limitations placed on immigration to Palestine, especially on behalf of the Jewish survivors of the Holocaust. Those survivors in addition to other displaced persons during the war were either turned back from Palestine, were sent to barbed-wired camps in Cyprus, or drowned at sea in attempting to reach Palestine. Rostow summarized the issue:

Palestine was being consumed in a storm of irrationality and violence, which affected the rationality of the policies of nearly all the nations.⁴ ⁷

Even though the decision to recognize Israel caused a rift within Truman’s cabinet, he made it believing it was the moral decision to make. General George Marshall, at the time secretary of state, strongly disagreed with him. That hurt Truman, as he believed General Marshall to be the greatest American of the twentieth century. There may have been another reason Truman wanted to recognize Israel before the USSR. Stalin wanted to use Palestine and then Israel as a gateway to the Middle East. Palestine was added to Azerbaijan, Greece, and Turkey as foreign policy challenges for the Truman istration during the 1945–1947 timeframe. Like Eisenhower in Beirut, Truman drew his own line in the sand with a get-tough policy towards Stalin in Iran and then in Greece. He did it a third time in Palestine. His strategy took time. Truman at first wanted to believe that the Russians would remain an ally and not a foe. This thinking was finally resolved by George Kennan and his Long Telegram, which changed the thinking in the White House. The istration’s approach towards the Russian menace focused on containment. Arnold Krammer s the contention that Truman may have rushed to Israel before the Soviet Union. He wrote that at the end of World War II the Soviet Union had to decide how it would proceed in the Middle East. By 1947 the Kremlin had to back out of Iran, and the governments of Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon used “strong repressive measures” against the Communist organizations and affiliations in their respective countries, leaving the Kremlin at a decision point:

the exploitation of differences between the newly emancipated Arab states and Britain, or the abandonment of the Arabs as irrevocably committed to the bourgeoise West, with a view toward undermining the area from within.⁴ ⁸

Krammer clarified that the Palestine Question of 1947 was an “unexpected opportunity” for the Soviet Union to exploit a “new tactic” in the Middle East. His assessment s the idea that Truman was correct in his decision to recognize Israel first. That thesis is also ed by Krammer when he was quoted in the Washington Evening Star on December 3, 1947:

Russia needs neither strategic air bases nor oil from the Arab countries. If she has alienated the Arabs from the United States, she can rejoice in a permanent strategic victory.

With the US strategy to keep United States and USSR troops out of Palestine in event of war with the Arabs, there was still one more strategy that concerned those in the United States who did not the partition plan, and that was “Communist infiltration.” With 3,000,000 Jews living “within the Soviet Bloc,” there was a major concern that Israel would be a “Trojan horse” and become the gateway for Soviet infiltration to the Middle East. Each of these events as discussed by Krammer gives validity to the idea that Palestine was not being ignored in the halls of Washington and not by Truman himself.⁴ Alonzo Hamby inferred that during the 1946–1947 timeframe, Truman and his advisors were well aware that the crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean was one with “far larger implications.” This was precisely the point Eugene V. Rostow made in his speech to the Jewish Historical Society in December 1976. Just as Hamby stated about the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the Atlantic Alliance all being formed as a comprehensive plan to curb Soviet aggression, Rostow had the same view. Rostow explained that the Soviet strategy after the foundation of the State of Israel was to turn to the Arab world and to gain control of the Mediterranean, North Africa, and the Middle East. If that strategy had worked, the USSR believed that Europe would have collapsed.⁴¹ Hamby said the Truman Doctrine had a “universal principle” that was not implemented just as a “tactical judgement.” In other words, the understanding of the Truman Doctrine was in what it represented: “a realistic understanding of the Stalinist challenge to liberal democracy in the immediate postwar era.” The Truman Doctrine was initiated in the “Eurocentric outlook” by Truman due to

the resources available for the foreign policy challenges at that time. This led to criticism because Truman did not apply the same type of policy to China.⁴¹¹ In preparing the Truman Doctrine speech, the issue of oil was debated between the White House and the State Department. It is now known that Acheson’s strong influence prevailed: the State Department did not want the doctrine to be associated with oil. On March 12, 1955, the eighth anniversary of the speech, Dean Acheson sent then retired president Truman the following note pertaining to the Truman Doctrine:

Eight years ago, you announced a great and gallant decision. It was one of the turning points in history. Today you and it look better than ever.⁴¹²

Another primary architect of the Truman defense strategy on containment, George Kennan, reflected on the Truman Doctrine in 1967. His concern was that his Foreign Affairs article “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” had been misunderstood in its meaning. He said the article “had not been intended as a doctrine or policy, but as a set of principles.” As Robert Frazier pointed out, the public accepted Kennan’s article as State Department policy, “regardless of which political party was in power.” Frazier stated that Kennan’s article had nearly the same significance in US foreign policy as did Truman’s speech. He clarified that the article was written as a request from Secretary of the Navy Forrestal “for an explanation of the ideological motivations of Soviet attitudes and policies.” Kennan added to the secretary’s request by asking the United States to react to “every aggressive move on the part of the Soviet Union.”⁴¹³ The Eisenhower Doctrine speech on January 5, 1957, also mentioned oil in the draft. Nasser had closed the Suez Canal, not allowing ships to carry oil to the West. Eisenhower and his staff considered addressing the possibility of oil supply in his speech by letting the public and the Western allies know the United States would open its reserves to Western nations needing oil. Again, oil was stricken from the speech. Both Truman and Eisenhower prevented the Kremlin from making any flamboyant statements about how the United States was involved in the Middle East strictly for the oil.

Eisenhower became one of the most powerful presidents in American history. He knew how to use his authority and when to use it. Individuals like Fulbright believed Eisenhower was overriding the authority of the legislative branch. Fulbright was concerned that the precedent might be misused or abused by a weaker president. Fulbright’s concerns were brought to light as President Johnson escalated the war in Vietnam and micro-managed it from the oval office. Eisenhower said of all the challenges he faced as president, none were any more challenging than those in the Middle East.⁴¹⁴ Dore Gold in an article about Eisenhower and Suez mentioned an interview in 1965 with a Republican, Max Fisher, in which Eisenhower stated:

You know Max, looking back at Suez, I regret what I did. I should have never pressured Israel to evacuate Sinai.

Eisenhower believed that his policy following the Suez War opened the way for the Soviet Union to advance its position in the Middle East. He regretted that he had ed Nasser, who caused problems in Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, and later in the Gulf.⁴¹⁵ Michael Doran wrote about Eisenhower’s regrets at Suez. He added more to what Eisenhower said to Max Fisher. Dulles thought ing Nasser was the Eisenhower istration’s “single greatest mistake.” It gave Nasser a “historic triumph.”⁴¹ Doran cites an interview that Eisenhower did in July 1967 with C. L. Sulzberger of The New York Times. During the discussion Eisenhower stated he regretted not working harder to bring Great Britain, , and Israel around to his point of view on Suez. Sulzberger wrote that Eisenhower and Dulles misunderstood the “inter-Arab struggle over the Baghdad Pact.” That statement reverts back to Fulbright’s Resolution of 1957, where he placed more emphasis on the intricate issues that make the Middle East so vexing for US foreign policy. Doran believed that although Nasser turned to the Russians, he wanted to be “in the Western camp.”⁴¹⁷ The Eisenhower istration might have been more successful had it separated international Communism from regional problems in the Middle East

and treated them as two completely different issues. Patrick Seale outlined some of the weaknesses in the Eisenhower Doctrine:

1. The Eisenhower istration saw all issues as part of the Cold War. 2. This left no room for any compromise or middle ground to negotiate. 3. The Cold War issues blurred America’s ability to see inter-Arab disputes clearly, clouding the issues that US officials thought they fully understood. 4. Arab states were forced to endorse the Eisenhower Doctrine publicly, and that put them at odds with the USSR as well as their Arab neighbors. 5. The Doctrine demanded the Arab nations side with the United States, thereby curtailing their room to maneuver.⁴¹⁸

Fulbright’s proposed Resolution in 1957 on the other hand addressed problems that are still relevant in the twenty-first century. Fulbright suggested in the matter of the Arab-Israeli conflict, that the UN assist in negotiating:

• Mutually accepted boundaries • The resettlement of refugees • The protection of holy places • The conclusion of the treaties of peace • Seeking continuous intervention of UN police forces until the above issues were resolved

Fulbright biographer Professor Randall Woods summarized Fulbright’s point of

view on Suez as a “monumental foreign policy blunder.”⁴¹ Lee Riley Powell wrote that Dulles muddled Communism “with Egyptian neutralism and nationalism.” Fulbright believed that was an opportunity missed to “promote political freedom and halt the expansion of communist influence in the Middle East.” Powell also asserted that Fulbright believed if the Western powers had been united, instead of divided because of Suez, they might have been able to put pressure on the Kremlin over the way it treated Hungarian revolutionaries in 1956.⁴² Eisenhower did act decisively in July 1958, sending US military forces to Lebanon. For Eisenhower it was crucial to his foreign policy under the Eisenhower Doctrine that he send military forces to Lebanon in order to reassure nations in the world that he was living up to his pledge to stop international Communism. Eisenhower also sent a message to Nasser that the United States would not allow him to dominate the Middle East. On the other hand, in October 1958 the National Security Council recognized that pan-Arab nationalism had gained dominance in the Middle East under the influence of Nasser and that “US objectives will be frustrated if we are not able to deal with the movement with Nasser on a mutually acceptable basis.”⁴²¹ Michael Doran made the same conclusion in his 2016 book Ike’s Gamble. He said that Brigadier General Henry Byroade was moved at Acheson’s request from the Pentagon to the State Department in 1952, with the idea of becoming the assistant secretary of state for the Middle East. Byroade worked the last seven months in the Truman istration and remained in the Eisenhower istration. He was eventually assigned as the US ambassador to Egypt. It was his assessment, like the NSC in 1958, that after Suez,

Nasser was the foremost representative of deep and inexorable historical forces, a policy that ed Nasser’s Arab rivals was a foolish effort to swim against the raging current of history.⁴²²

Doran believed that the Eisenhower of 1956 was not the Eisenhower of 1958. By that Doran concluded that had Eisenhower been as decisive in 1956 during the Suez Crisis as he was during the Lebanon Crisis in 1958, he would likely have

ed Great Britain, , and Israel and made sure Nasser did not appear to come out of the crisis as the winner. By 1967 Eisenhower reflected that he should have persuaded Nasser to “accept some form of international regime for the Suez Canal.”⁴²³ The Fulbright alternative did address the issues that were more pertinent to the Middle East. In addition to borders, refugees, and holy sites, Fulbright also addressed important issues of the limits of presidential power and authority. These issues may prove to be the most important in the long term. On August 2, 1964, President Johnson informed the American people that the North Vietnamese had attacked two US ships in the Gulf of Tonkin. This led to the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. As the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Fulbright called the t resolution allowing Johnson unlimited presidential authority “a blank check.” He went further.

Each time Senators have raised questions about successive escalations of the war, we have had the blank check of August 7, 1964, waved in our faces as supposed evidence of the overwhelming of the Congress for a policy in Southeast Asia which in fact has been radically changed since the summer of 1964.⁴²⁴

APPENDIX A THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE

Harry S. Truman Truman Doctrine (1947)

1

Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, of the Congress of the United States: The gravity of the situation which confronts the world today necessitates my appearance before a t session of the Congress. The foreign policy and the national security of this country are involved. One aspect of the present situation, which I wish to present to you at this time for your consideration and decision, concerns Greece and Turkey. The United States has received from the Greek Government an urgent appeal for financial and economic assistance. Preliminary reports from the American Economic Mission now in Greece and reports from the American Ambassador in Greece corroborate the statement of the Greek Government that assistance is imperative if Greece is to survive as a free nation. I do not believe that the American people and the Congress wish to turn a deaf ear to the appeal of the Greek Government. Greece is not a rich country. Lack of sufficient natural resources has always forced the Greek people to work hard to make both ends meet. Since 1940, this industrious and peace loving country has suffered invasion, four years of cruel enemy occupation, and bitter internal strife.

When forces of liberation entered Greece they found that the retreating Germans had destroyed virtually all the railways, roads, port facilities, communications, and merchant marine. More than a thousand villages had been burned. Eightyfive per cent of the children were tubercular. Livestock, poultry, and draft animals had almost disappeared. Inflation had wiped out practically all savings. As a result of these tragic conditions, a militant minority, exploiting human want and misery, was able to create political chaos which, until now, has made economic recovery impossible. Greece is today without funds to finance the importation of those goods which are essential to bare subsistence. Under these circumstances the people of Greece cannot make progress in solving their problems of reconstruction. Greece is in desperate need of financial and economic assistance to enable it to resume purchases of food, clothing, fuel and seeds. These are indispensable for the subsistence of its people and are obtainable only from abroad. Greece must have help to import the goods necessary to restore internal order and security, so essential for economic and political recovery. The Greek Government has also asked for the assistance of experienced American s, economists and technicians to insure that the financial and other aid given to Greece shall be used effectively in creating a stable and self-sustaining economy and in improving its public istration.

2

The very existence of the Greek state is today threatened by the terrorist activities of several thousand armed men, led by Communists, who defy the government’s authority at a number of points, particularly along the northern boundaries. A Commission appointed by the United Nations security Council is at present investigating disturbed conditions in northern Greece and alleged border violations along the frontier between Greece on the one hand and Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia on the other. Meanwhile, the Greek Government is unable to cope with the situation. The Greek army is small and poorly equipped. It needs supplies and equipment if it is

to restore the authority of the government throughout Greek territory. Greece must have assistance if it is to become a self-ing and self-respecting democracy. The United States must supply that assistance. We have already extended to Greece certain types of relief and economic aid but these are inadequate. There is no other country to which democratic Greece can turn. No other nation is willing and able to provide the necessary for a democratic Greek government. The British Government, which has been helping Greece, can give no further financial or economic aid after March 31. Great Britain finds itself under the necessity of reducing or liquidating its commitments in several parts of the world, including Greece. We have considered how the United Nations might assist in this crisis. But the situation is an urgent one requiring immediate action and the United Nations and its related organizations are not in a position to extend help of the kind that is required. It is important to note that the Greek Government has asked for our aid in utilizing effectively the financial and other assistance we may give to Greece, and in improving its public istration. It is of the utmost importance that we supervise the use of any funds made available to Greece; in such a manner that each dollar spent will count toward making Greece self-ing, and will help to build an economy in which a healthy democracy can flourish. No government is perfect. One of the chief virtues of a democracy, however, is that its defects are always visible and under democratic processes can be pointed out and corrected. The Government of Greece is not perfect. Nevertheless it represents eighty-five per cent of the of the Greek Parliament who were chosen in an election last year. Foreign observers, including 692 Americans, considered this election to be a fair expression of the views of the Greek people. The Greek Government has been operating in an atmosphere of chaos and extremism. It has made mistakes. The extension of aid by this country does not

mean that the United States condones everything that the Greek Government has done or will do. We have condemned in the past, and we condemn now, extremist measures of the right or the left. We have in the past advised tolerance, and we advise tolerance now. Greece’s neighbor, Turkey, also deserves our attention.

3

The future of Turkey as an independent and economically sound state is clearly no less important to the freedom-loving peoples of the world than the future of Greece. The circumstances in which Turkey finds itself today are considerably different from those of Greece. Turkey has been spared the disasters that have beset Greece. And during the war, the United States and Great Britain furnished Turkey with material aid. Nevertheless, Turkey now needs our . Since the war Turkey has sought financial assistance from Great Britain and the United States for the purpose of effecting that modernization necessary for the maintenance of its national integrity. That integrity is essential to the preservation of order in the Middle East. The British government has informed us that, owing to its own difficulties can no longer extend financial or economic aid to Turkey. As in the case of Greece, if Turkey is to have the assistance it needs, the United States must supply it. We are the only country able to provide that help. I am fully aware of the broad implications involved if the United States extends assistance to Greece and Turkey, and I shall discuss these implications with you at this time. One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the

creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion. This was a fundamental issue in the war with and Japan. Our victory was won over countries which sought to impose their will, and their way of life, upon other nations. To ensure the peaceful development of nations, free from coercion, the United States has taken a leading part in establishing the United Nations, The United Nations is designed to make possible lasting freedom and independence for all its . We shall not realize our objectives, however, unless we are willing to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States. The peoples of a number of countries of the world have recently had totalitarian regimes forced upon them against their will. The Government of the United States has made frequent protests against coercion and intimidation, in violation of the Yalta agreement, in Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria. I must also state that in a number of other countries there have been similar developments. At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one.

4

One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression. The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio; fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms.

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way. I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes. The world is not static, and the status quo is not sacred. But we cannot allow changes in the status quo in violation of the Charter of the United Nations by such methods as coercion, or by such subterfuges as political infiltration. In helping free and independent nations to maintain their freedom, the United States will be giving effect to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. It is necessary only to glance at a map to realize that the survival and integrity of the Greek nation are of grave importance in a much wider situation. If Greece should fall under the control of an armed minority, the effect upon its neighbor, Turkey, would be immediate and serious. Confusion and disorder might well spread throughout the entire Middle East. Moreover, the disappearance of Greece as an independent state would have a profound effect upon those countries in Europe whose peoples are struggling against great difficulties to maintain their freedoms and their independence while they repair the damages of war. It would be an unspeakable tragedy if these countries, which have struggled so long against overwhelming odds, should lose that victory for which they sacrificed so much. Collapse of free institutions and loss of independence would be disastrous not only for them but for the world. Discouragement and possibly failure would quickly be the lot of neighboring peoples striving to maintain their freedom and independence. Should we fail to aid Greece and Turkey in this fateful hour, the effect will be far reaching to the West as well as to the East. We must take immediate and resolute action.

I therefore ask the Congress to provide authority for assistance to Greece and Turkey in the amount of $400,000,000 for the period ending June 30, 1948. In requesting these funds, I have taken into consideration the maximum amount of relief assistance which would be furnished to Greece out of the $350,000,000 which I recently requested that the Congress authorize for the prevention of starvation and suffering in countries devastated by the war.

5

In addition to funds, I ask the Congress to authorize the detail of American civilian and military personnel to Greece and Turkey, at the request of those countries, to assist in the tasks of reconstruction, and for the purpose of supervising the use of such financial and material assistance as may be furnished. I recommend that authority also be provided for the instruction and training of selected Greek and Turkish personnel. Finally, I ask that the Congress provide authority which will permit the speediest and most effective use, in of needed commodities, supplies, and equipment, of such funds as may be authorized. If further funds, or further authority, should be needed for purposes indicated in this message, I shall not hesitate to bring the situation before the Congress. On this subject the Executive and Legislative branches of the Government must work together. This is a serious course upon which we embark. I would not recommend it except that the alternative is much more serious. The United States contributed $341,000,000,000 toward winning World War II. This is an investment in world freedom and world peace. The assistance that I am recommending for Greece and Turkey amounts to little more than 1 tenth of 1 per cent of this investment. It is only common sense that we should safeguard this investment and make sure that it was not in vain.

The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach their full growth when the hope of a people for a better life has died. We must keep that hope alive. The free peoples of the world look to us for in maintaining their freedoms. If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world — and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own nation. Great responsibilities have been placed upon us by the swift movement of events. I am confident that the Congress will face these responsibilities squarely.

Source: Transcript from the National Archives Online Portal http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?doc=81&page=transcript

APPENDIX B THE EISENHOWER DOCTRINE

Source: Modern History Sourcebook 1

Dwight D. Eisenhower The “Eisenhower Doctrine” on the Middle East Washington, D.C. January 5, 1957

I

The Middle East has abruptly reached a new and critical stage in its long and important history. In past decades many of the countries in that area were not fully self-governing. Other nations exercised considerable authority in the area and the security of the region was largely built around their power. But since the First World War there has been a steady evolution toward self-government and independence. This development the United States has welcomed and has encouraged. Our country s without reservation the full sovereignty and independence of each and every nation of the Middle East. The evolution to independence has in the main been a peaceful process. But the area has been often troubled. Persistent cross-currents of distrust and fear with raids back and forth across national boundaries have brought about a high degree of instability in much of the Mid East. just recently there have been hostilities

involving Western European nations that once exercised much influence in the area. Also, the relatively large attack by Israel in October has intensified the basic differences between that nation and its Arab neighbors. All this instability has been heightened and, at times, manipulated by International Communism.

II

Russia’s rulers have long sought to dominate the Middle East. That was true of the Czars and it is true of the Bolsheviks. The reasons are not hard to find. They do not affect Russia’s security, for no one plans to use the Middle East as a base for aggression against Russia. Never for a moment has the United States entertained such a thought. The Soviet Union has nothing whatsoever to fear from the United States in the Middle East, or anywhere else in the world, so long as its rulers do not themselves first resort to aggression. That statement I make solemnly and emphatically… . The reason for Russia’s interest in the Middle East is solely that of power politics. Considering her announced purpose of Communizing the world, it is easy to understand her hope of dominating the Middle East… . International Communism, of course, seeks to mask its purposes of domination by expressions of good will and by superficially attractive offers of political, economic and military aid. But any free nation, which is the subject of Soviet enticement, ought, in elementary wisdom, to look behind the mask. Source: Modern History Sourcebook 2 Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. In 1939 the Soviet Union entered into mutual assistance pacts with these then independent countries; and the Soviet Foreign Minister, addressing the Extraordinary Fifth Session of the Supreme Soviet in October 1939, solemnly and publicly declared that 11 we stand for the scrupulous and punctilious observance of the pacts on the basis of complete reciprocity, and we declare that all the nonsensical talk about the Sovietization of the Baltic countries is only to the interest of our common enemies and of all anti-

Soviet provocateurs.” Yet in 1940, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were forcibly incorporated into the Soviet Union. Soviet control of the satellite nations of Eastern Europe has been forcibly maintained in spite of solemn promises of a contrary intent, made during World War II. Stalin’s death brought hope that this pattern would change. And we read the pledge of the Warsaw Treaty of 1955 that the Soviet Union would follow in satellite countries “the principles of mutual respect for their independence and sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs.” But we have just seen the subjugation of Hungary by naked armed force. In the aftermath of this Hungarian tragedy, world respect for and belief in Soviet promises have sunk to a new low. International Communism needs and seeks a recognizable Success. Thus, we have these simple and indisputable facts:

1. The Middle East, which has always been coveted by Russia, would today be prized more than ever by International Communism. 2. The Soviet rulers continue to show that they do not scruple to use any means to gain their ends. 3. The free nations of the Mid East need, and for the most part want, added strength to assure their continued independence.

IV

Under all the circumstances I have laid before you, a greater responsibility now devolves upon the United States. We have shown, so that none can doubt, our dedication to the principle that force shall not be used internationally for any aggressive purpose and that the integrity and independence of the nations of the Middle East should be inviolate. Seldom in history has a nation’s dedication to principle been tested as severely as ours during recent weeks.

There is general recognition in the Middle East, as elsewhere, that the United States does not seek either political or economic domination over any other people. Our desire is a world environment of freedom, not servitude. On the other hand many, if not all, of the nations of the Middle East are aware of the danger that stems from International Communism and welcome closer cooperation with the United States to realize for themselves the United Nations goals of independence, economic well-being and spiritual growth… .

V Source: Modern History Sourcebook 3

Under these circumstances I deem it necessary to seek the cooperation of the Congress. Only with that cooperation can we give the reassurance needed to deter aggression, to give courage and confidence to those who are dedicated to freedom and thus prevent a chain of events which would gravely endanger all of the free world… .

VI

The action which I propose would have the following features. It would, first of all, authorize the United States to cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence. It would, in the second place, authorize the Executive to undertake in the same region programs of military assistance and cooperation with any nation or group of nations which desires such aid. It would, in the third place, authorize such assistance and cooperation to include the employment of the armed forces of the United States to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations, requesting

such aid, against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by International Communism. These measures would have to be consonant with the treaty obligations of the United States, including the Charter of the United Nations and with any action or recommendations of the United Nations. They would also, if armed attack occurs, be subject to the overriding authority of the United Nations Security Council in accordance with the Charter. The present proposal would, in the fourth place, authorize the President to employ, for economic and defensive military purposes, sums available under the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, without regard to existing limitations… .

VII

The proposed legislation is primarily designed to deal with the possibility of Communist aggression, direct and indirect. There is imperative need that any lack of power in the area should be made good, not by external or alien force, but by the increased vigor and security of the independent nations of the area. Experience shows that indirect aggression rarely if ever succeeds where there is reasonable security against direct aggression; where the government possesses loyal security forces, and where economic conditions are such as not to make Communism seem an attractive alternative. The program I suggest deals with all three aspects of this matter and thus with the problem of indirect aggression… . And as I have indicated, it will also be necessary for us to contribute economically to strengthen those countries, or groups of countries, which have governments manifestly dedicated to the Source: Modern History Sourcebook 4 preservation of independence and resistance to subversion. Such measures will provide the greatest insurance against Communist inroads. Words alone are not enough.

VIII

Let me refer again to the requested authority to employ the armed forces of the United States to assist to defend the territorial integrity and the political independence of any nation in the area against Communist armed aggression. Such authority would not be exercised except at the desire of the nation attacked. Beyond this it is my profound hope that this authority would never have to be exercised at all. In the situation now existing, the greatest risk, as is often the case, is that ambitious despots may miscalculate. If power-hungry Communists should either falsely or correctly estimate that the Middle East is inadequately defended, they might be tempted to use open measures of armed attack. If so, that would start a chain of circumstances which would almost surely involve the United States in military action. I am convinced that the best insurance against this dangerous contingency is to make clear now our readiness to cooperate fully and freely with our friends of the Middle East in ways consonant with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. I intend promptly to send a special mission to the Middle East to explain the cooperation we are prepared to give.

IX

The policy which I outline involves certain burdens and indeed risks for the United States. Those who covet the area will not like what is proposed. Already, they are grossly distorting our purpose. However, before this Americans have seen our nation’s vital interests and human freedom in jeopardy, and their fortitude and resolution have been equal to the crisis, regardless of hostile distortion of our words, motives and actions… . In those momentous periods of the past, the President and the Congress have united, without partisanship, to serve the vital interests of the United States and of the free world.

The occasion has come for us to manifest again our national unity in of freedom and to show our deep respect for the rights and independence of every nation - however great, however small. We seek, not violence, but peace. To this purpose we must now devote our energies, our determination, ourselves. “President Eisenhower: The Eisenhower Doctrine on the Middle East, A Message to Congress.” Modern History Sourcebook. 10/25/2010. http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1957eisenhowerdoctrine.html

APPENDIX C THE FULBRIGHT RESOLUTION OF 1957

The text of the Fulbright Resolution is as follows: Whereas peace with justice in defense of human rights and fundamental freedoms requires international cooperation through more effective use of the United Nations and otherwise, and Whereas peace with justice is not now assured in the Middle East, Therefore, be it resolved: That the Senate reaffirm the policy of the United States to achieve international peace and security in the Middle East, so that armed force shall not be used except in the common interest and that the President be advised that the sense of the Senate is that this government, by constitutional process, should particularly pursue the following objectives in the Middle East within the United Nations Charter:

1. In furtherance of the traditional policy of the United States so foster international trade and all the unobstructed international movement of the world commerce, negotiate arrangements which all will assure free age on equitable in war and peace of the Suez Canal to all nations. 2. In furtherance of the United Nations Charter to strive for a reduction in tensions between Israel and the Arab states, assist as may be possible in the negotiation of mutually acceptable boundaries, the re-settlement of refugees, the protection of the holy places, and the conclusion of treaties of peace; and until these purposes are accomplished, seek the continued intervention of the United Nations police forces between Israel and Egypt. 3. In of programs developed by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and otherwise, contribute its fair share of resources, including technical assistance, to long-range economic development

and to the development of independent and progressive social institutions in the Middle East area. 4. Contribute to the maintenance of peace by reaffirming, with particular reference to the Middle East, the determination of the United States to exercise the right of individual or collective self-defense under Article 51, should any armed attack occur affecting its international security.⁴²⁵

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tripartite_Declaration_of_1950. http://www.politico.com/story/2010/01house-backs-formosa-resolution-jan-251955-031927#ixzz3zOdWkoUU Gaddis, John Lewis. “Was the Truman Doctrine a Real Turning Point?” Foreign Affairs 52, no. 2 (January 1974). Jones, Matthew. “The ‘Preferred Plan’: The Anglo-American Working Group Report on Covert Action in Syria, 1957.” Intelligence and National Security 19, no. 3 (Autumn 2004). Kadish, Alon. “The ‘Trusteeship’ and the Yishuv’s Military Strategy.” In Harry S. Truman and the State of Israel, and the Quest for Peace in the Middle East, edited by Michael J. Devine. Kirksville, MO: Truman State University Press, 2009. Kennan, George F. “The Sources of Soviet Power.” Foreign Affairs 25, no. 4 (July 1947). Kennedy, John F. “A Democrat Looks at Foreign Policy.” Foreign Affairs 36, no. 1 (October 1957). Klinghoffer, Arthur Jay. “Soviet Oil Politics in the Middle East and SovietAmerican Relations.” Slavic and Soviet Series (Russian and East European Research Center, Tel Aviv University) 6 (December 1976). Kondis, Basil. “The United States Role in the Greek Civil War.” In The Truman Doctrine of Aid to Greece: A Fifty-Year Retrospective, edited by Eugene F. Rossides. New York: Academy of Political Science, 1998. Krammer, Arnold. “Soviet Motives in Partition of Palestine, 1947–1948.” Journal of Palestine Studies 2, no. 2 (Winter 1973). Little, Douglas. “His Finest Hour? Eisenhower, Lebanon and the 1958 Middle East Crisis.” Diplomatic History 20, no. 1 (Winter 1996). Pogue, Forrest C. “The Genesis of the Supreme Command: Personal Impressions of Eisenhower the General.” In Eisenhower: A Centenary Assessment, edited by Gunther Bischof and Stephen E. Ambrose. Eisenhower Center for Leadership

Studies, 1995. Reston, James. “Fulbright Seeks to Modify Plan for Middle East.” New York Times, January 12, 1957, late city edition. Rubinstein, Aryeh. “Knesset Backs B-G Statement on Doctrine, 59-5, 39 Abstain.” Jerusalem Post, June 1957 (day unknown). Schmidt, Dana Adams. “U.S. May Extend Aid Plans to More of Africa and Asia.” New York Times, January 7, 1957, late city edition. Text of the speech by former Secretary of State Dean Acheson before the House Foreign Relations Committee, January 10, 1957. New York Times, January 11, 1957. “The Eisenhower Doctrine: Message of President Eisenhower to Congress,” Jewish Virtual Library, https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-quoteisenhower-doctrine-quot-january-1957 Walker, Norman. “The Fulbright Resolution in Post-war Collaboration.” Magazine of Sigma Chi (University of Arkansas), February–March, 1944. Warren, James C. Jr. “Origins of the ‘Greek Economic Miracle’: The Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan Development and Stabilization Program.” In The Truman Doctrine of Aid to Greece: A Fifty-Year Retrospective, edited by Eugene F. Rossides. New York: Academy of Political Science, 1998. Weigert, Hans W. “U.S. Strategic Bases and Collective Security.” Foreign Affairs 25, no. 2 (January 1947). 1957–1956 ‫נסיגת צהייל מסיני ועזה‬-‫(ויקיפדיה‬Wikipedia—Withdrawal of the Armed Forces from the Sinai and Gaza) http://www.jpost.com/Business-and-Innovation/Israel-importing-77-percent-ofits-oil-from-Iraqi-Kurdistan-report-says-413056 https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/lansing-robert

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

My acknowledgments must begin with the amazing journey that started at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, founded by Albert Einstein, Sigmund Freud, and Martin Buber. The results of that beginning have been far more than my greatest expectations. I must highlight the three men who I have dedicated much time and effort to understand: Harry S. Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and J. William Fulbright. The privilege of getting to know these three individuals up close and personal through their archives, books, and articles has assisted me greatly in understanding US foreign policy and how the Truman and Eisenhower istrations formulated and implemented their Middle East strategies amidst the Cold War. Uniting three of the most influential individuals of the twentieth century together has proven to be a wide-ranging education of the highest sorts. To evaluate President Truman, President Eisenhower, and Senator Fulbright in the academic setting is to understand them intellectually and to gain a mindset that what they did by their leadership in the last century may very well prove to answer many foreign policy questions the world now faces. My thanks to Professor Alon Kadish are heartfelt, as he became my primary supervisor during my doctoral program when my original supervisor, Professor Haim Geber—to whom I am so grateful for beginning the process—retired. Both of these professors are profound scholars and provided me invaluable direction. I want to thank Professor Moshe Ma’oz, on my committee, who has the greatest insight to Syria and continues to be a national treasure for Israel. Likewise, my thanks go to Dr. Mordechai Nisan as a committee member, whose advice and guidance on Lebanon is immensely appreciated. I learned much from him on his impressive scholarship of Lebanon. Understanding the nuances of Syria and Lebanon were crucial, as the Eisenhower Doctrine was applied to each nation. My great thanks go out to my M. A. thesis supervisor, Professor Martin van Creveld, who made my entry into the doctoral program possible. His understanding of history is unique, and that is why many pay close attention to his works. I must pay tribute to the late Professor Yaakov Bar Siman Tov, who was a committee member. He and all the professors mentioned above are outstanding scholars in many fields. Two other professors in my department have an important place in my doctoral program: Professor Moshe Sharon and

the former dean of the Faculty of Humanities, Reuven Amitai, both erudite scholars of Islam. They have both been great mentors and have provided me with wise and savvy advice over many years, and I am so grateful. My great thanks to Professor Avi Zechai, who guided me on the Monroe Doctrine and whose wisdom on American history I seriously appreciated. A dissertation at the Hebrew University in the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies requires extensive understanding of foreign languages. My program has required the study of Arabic, Hebrew, and French that I studied in Hebrew. To gain an understanding of the Arabic language requires a total dedication, and it is definitely enhanced when you have the top grammarians to learn from. That was my great fortune with two of the world’s best, Avraham Yinon and Yael Cohen, whose great-uncle, Norman Bentwich, was one of the founders of the Hebrew University. These two individuals invested their time and their talents in me over a very long period, and I remain so grateful to them. My thanks also go to Avraham for his assistance when he helped me understand the subtle yet so important translator errors by the US State Department pertaining to the letters written to President Roosevelt and President Truman by the elite in the Arab world. These errors have remained in the historical record since the 1940s, and their correct interpretation provides a much better understanding of what these Arab leaders actually wanted to convey. This understanding provides a philosophical demonstration of why it is so important to understand the language of the region one is studying. Many thanks to Omar Othman and his brother Tawfic Othman for helping me speak Arabic, a beautiful and very rich language, and to so many more who taught me Arabic. My gratitude also goes to Professor Ghazi Abu Hakema and others at the Middlebury Arabic summer program. A sincere thank you to Professor Dustin Cowell and Mustafa Mustafa for their diligence in the Wisconsin Arabic summer program and assisting me with the nuances in writing Arabic. My thanks go out to Lily Agranat for her assistance with the Hebrew on the Abstract and Title Page. My thanks to the Hebrew Ulpan of the Rothberg International School at the Hebrew University where I spent many hours. My sincere thank you to two friends, Colonel Michael Boardman (Ret) and Gene Jennings for their meticulous review and on the manuscript. It was very insightful. My sincere thanks to Professor Wayne Horowitz, Professor Steve Frankel, and Colonel James Dinniman (Ret) for their very generous endorsements.

The research for this program has taken me to numerous libraries, including the Truman Library, the Eisenhower Library, and the Fulbright archives at the University of Arkansas. All three have the best archivists who have assisted so many. At the Truman Library I must begin with my thanks to the late Elizabeth Safly, who was a true treasure, along with Dennis Bilger, Randy Sowell and Laurie Austin. It was a great honor to greet Dr. Michael Devine, director of the Truman Library, and Dr. Ray Geselbracht, assistant director, in Jerusalem in 2008 on the sixty-year celebration of Israel and President Truman’s recognition of Israel. My sincere thanks to Dr. Geselbracht for over three summers. David Haight provided great to me at the Eisenhower Library, along with Mary Burtzloff. Betty Austin and Geoffrey Stark were wonderful in their assistance in the Fulbright Archives at the University of Arkansas in Fayetteville. Additional visits took me to the Kennedy and Johnson Libraries; those archives and acknowledgments will be reserved for a future date. My sincere thanks to the late Ambassador Hermann Eilts, whom I met twice in Boston and who endorsed my Fulbright Scholarship to Cairo and the Marjorie Kovler Fellowship at the Kennedy Library. Listening two hours to him describing his fifty years of service in the Middle East as the former US ambassador to Egypt and Saudi Arabia and deputy commandant at the US Army War College was a fascinating experience. My thanks go out to Ambassador Dennis Ross, world-renown scholar and advisor to US presidents on the Middle East, who wrote a letter of on my behalf. Not only did he highly praise my professors and the Hebrew University, he also received the Truman Peace Prize from the Hebrew University. There have been so many individuals whom I owe a great deal to, and at the top are my parents, Harry and Cotsy Chenault, and sister, Pamela Robinson, who encouraged me and never gave up on the conviction that I would bring this study to a successful conclusion. Having a spiritual leader also means a great deal, and I have had two of the best in Navy Chaplain and Canon in the Anglican Church, William Broughton and the late Army Chaplain and Chaplain for the Honor of the Purple Heart, Conrad Walker, both of whom have deep roots in their faith and influence over so many. Their counsel and prayers are genuinely appreciated. My special thanks to my cousin, Nelson Chenault for taking my official photo. His unique talents and meticulous detail are highly appreciated.

No book will ever succeed without a great publishing team, and I was honored to have Archway Publishing of Simon & Shuster guiding me through the intricate process. My thanks go to all those who worked on this book. Geoffrey Stewart, along with Carolyn Lockridge and Tim Fitch provided the guidance needed on working through the various stages and were always ready to explain what to expect. Anna Liao did a great job of content and grammatical editing and greatly assisted in the details that are so important. I was very pleased with Alison Holen for her vision that she used for the cover design and Alysha Smagorinsky for the book design. I am very proud to have this book published by Archway Publishing. As I began, this has been a profound journey leading me to many places, including two years of study in Cairo that provided me with an innate understanding of Islam and the Middle East from a different perspective that was greatly needed. Living among the great people in Israel and Egypt has been an education in and of itself. This total experience has given me insight to the charming, luminous, and kaleidoscopic cross-roads of the entire world that will have volumes to say foreign policy for decades to come. The three great faiths of Judaism, Islam, and Christianity echo their glory to mankind. They provide wisdom and guidelines for human understanding to all who seek them. It goes without saying that any mistakes are mine alone.

Harry Keatts Chenault, Jr., Ph.D. Sheikh Jarrah, Jerusalem April 28, 2017

Little Rock, Arkansas November 11, 2019

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Harry Keatts Chenault, Jr., a former military officer, lived in the Middle East studying at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He was awarded his Ph.D. in the Department of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies on the subject of US presidential foreign policy in the Middle East. During this time, he was simultaneously awarded a Fulbright Scholarship in Egypt studying Arabic and Islamic sciences at American University of Cairo. Dr. Chenault not only studied at the Universities, he immersed himself in the Israeli, Palestinian and Egyptian societies that allowed him to understand what concerns the people in these great societies. This has allowed him to know and feel first-hand what these individuals feel every day. His goal is to make a difference in the region and promote mutual understanding in the peace process. He has studied Advanced Arabic, Hebrew, French (in Hebrew) and now studies Farsi.

ENDNOTES

1 Jurgen Moltmann, Quoted from the Book of Romans, Chapter 8 in Theology of Hope (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993 edition, first published in 1967), 18. 2 Reinhold Niebhur, The Irony of American History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), 18. 3 John F. Kennedy, “A Democrat Looks at Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs 36, no. 1 (1957): 45. 4 Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956–1961 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965), 20. 5 William Lee Miller, Two Americans: Truman, Eisenhower and a Dangerous World (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2012), 197. 6 Roy Jenkins, Franklin Delano Roosevelt (New York: Henry Holt, 2003), 166. 7 Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History, rev. ed. (New York: Enigma Books, 2008; New York: Harper Bros., 1950), 675–76. Citations refer to the Enigma edition. 8 David L. Roll, The Hopkins Touch: Harry Hopkins and the Forging of the Alliance to Defeat Hitler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 376–77. 9 King Abdallah to President Franklin Roosevelt, letter, March 10, 1945. Included is the king’s letter in Arabic with the State Department translation. Harry S. Truman Papers, Official File, 204 misc. (October 1945), Box #771, Truman Library. This re-interpretation was made by the world-renowned scholar of the Arabic language Avraham Yinon, who spent over sixty years teaching Arabic. 10 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969), 220.

11 Basil Kondis, “The United States Role in the Greek Civil War,” in The Truman Doctrine of Aid to Greece: A Fifty-Year Retrospective, ed. Eugene T. Rossides (New York: Academy of Political Science, 1998), 144. 12 Michael J. Cohen, Fighting World War Three from the Middle East: Allied Contingency Plans, 1945–1954 (London: Frank Cass, 1997), 31–32. 13 British Proposals in Connection with the Report of the Anglo-American Committee on Palestine, J.C. S. Info Memo 495, Annex B and Draft to Proposed Substitution for Appendix “A” to J.C.S. 1684/1. Spot Review, FRC Box #17, Chief of Staff, Eisenhower Library. 14 Benis M. Frank, US Marine Corps in Lebanon 1982–1984 (Washington, DC: US Marine Corps, 1987), 6. 15 Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, The Soviet Union & International Oil Politics (New York: Guilford Surrey, 1977), 145–53. 16 Klinghoffer, International Oil Politics, 145–53. 17 http://www.jpost.com/Business-and-Innovation/Israel-importing-77-percentof-its-oil-from-Iraqi-Kurdistan-report-says-413056 18 Klinghoffer, International Oil Politics, 145–153. 19 Ibid., 145–153. 20 Clark M. Clifford, Eugene V. Rostow, and Barbara W. Tuchman, The Palestine Question in American History (New York: Arno Press, 1978), 52. 21 Clifford, Rostow, and Tuchman, Palestine Question, 68. 22 Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman istration and the Cold War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), 241. 23 Leffler, Preponderance of Power, 242. 24 Clifford, Rostow, and Tuchman, Palestine Question, 69.

25 Irwin F. Gellman, The President and the Apprentice: Eisenhower and Nixon, 1952–1961 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2015), 1. 26 Leffler, Preponderance of Power, 241–42. 27 The late Professor Bar Siman Tov was one of my committee and made that statement to me in a discussion on the subject of how the new State of Israel transformed the Middle East. 28 Peter Hahn, Caught in the Middle East: U.S. Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1945–1961(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 68. 29 Uri Bialer, Between East and West: Israel’s Foreign Policy Orientation, 1948–1956 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 12–14. 30 Arnold A. Offner, Another Such Victory: President Truman and the Cold War, 1945–1953 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002), 284–85. 31 Leffler, Preponderance of Power, 242–43. 32 Leffler, Preponderance of Power, 242–43. 33 Uri Bialer, “The Czech-Israeli Arms Deal Revisited,” Journal of Strategic Studies 8, no. 3 (September 1985): 307. 34 Ibid., 307-313. 35 Alon Kadish, “The ‘Trusteeship’ and the Yishuv’s Military Strategy,” in Harry S. Truman, the State of Israel, and the Quest for Peace in the Middle East, ed. Michael J. Devine (Kirksville, MO: Truman State University Press, 2009), 68. Plan Dalet was a strategic plan the Israelis had prepared that focused on how they would confront the surrounding Arab nations if and when they attacked after Israel declared independence. 36 Ilan, Origin of the Arab-Israeli Arms Race, 84. 37 Ray Takeyh, The Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine: The US, Britain and Nasser’s Egypt (New York: St. Marten’s Press, 2000), 144–45. 38 Salim Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and

the Middle East (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 1. 39 Lee Riley Powell with James O. Powell, J. William Fulbright and His Times (Memphis: Guild Bindery Press, 1996), 159. 40 Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism, 272. 41 Jean Edward Smith, Eisenhower: In War and Peace (New York: Random House, 2012), 704. 42 Patrick Seale, The Struggle for Syria (London: I. B. Tauris, 1965), 283–306. 43 http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/data/final_approval.php 44 David McCullough, Truman (New York: Simon and Schuster Paperbacks, 1992), 614. 45 Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower, Volume I: Soldier, General of the Army, President-Elect, 1890–1952 (New York: Simon and Schuster), 54. 46 Powell and Powell, Fulbright and His Times, 15. 47 Alonzo Hamby, Man of the People: A Life of Harry S. Truman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 4–8. 48 Denise Bostdorff, “Harry S. Truman, ‘Special Message to the Congress on Greece and Turkey: The Truman Doctrine’ (12 March 1947),” Voices of Democracy 4 (2009): 2. 49 Hamby, Man of the People, 12. 50 Geoffrey Perret, Eisenhower (New York: Random House, 1999), 85–89. 51 Randall Bennett Woods, Fulbright: A Biography (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 56. 52 Harry S. Truman Papers, PSF Subject File 1945–1953, Box #163, Truman Library. 53 Public Papers of Harry S. Truman, April 12 to December 31, 1945 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1961), 110–11.

54 Harry S. Truman Papers, WHCF: Confidential File 1946–1947, Box #38, Truman Library. 55 Jean Edward Smith, Grant (New York: Simon and Schuster Paperbacks, 2001), 23–24. 56 Hamby, Man of the People, 7. 57 Offner, Another Such Victory, 1–3. 58 Acheson, Present at the Creation, 733. 59 http://www. christianitytoday.com/history/issues/issue-99/i-am-cyrus.html 60 Sandra Mackey, The Iranians: Persia, Islam and the Soul of a Nation (New York: Plume by Penguin Group, 1998), 22. 61 Muhammad Gallil Aniya, “!!. . ‫ﻋﻨﺪﻣﺎ ﻛﺎن‬ ‫“( ”روزﻓﻠﺖ رﺋﻴﺴﺎ ﺣﻘﻴﻘﻴﺎ ﻷﻣﻴﺮﻛﺎ‬When Roosevelt was a Real President of America. . !!”) al-Quds (‫)اﻟﻘﺪس‬, January 13, 2014, 18. 62 McCullough, Truman, 104. 63 Offner, Another Such Victory, 6–7. 64 Robert H. Ferrell, ed., Dear Bess: The Letters from Harry to Bess Truman, 1910–1959 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1983), 273–74. 65 Hamby, Man of the People, 66–69, 489. 66 Harry S. Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman: Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1956), 345. 67 Ann R. Pierce, Woodrow Wilson and Harry Truman: Mission and Power in American Foreign Policy (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2007), 126. 68 Pierce, Woodrow Wilson and Harry Truman, 20, 23, 35, 36, 119. 69 Perret, Eisenhower, 3. 70 Carlo D’Este, Eisenhower: A Soldier’s Life (New York: Henry Holt, 2002),

9. 71 Ambrose, Eisenhower, Volume I, 19. 72 Perret, Eisenhower, 29–31. 73 Dwight D. Eisenhower, At Ease: Stories I Tell My Friends (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967), 16–26. 74 Ambrose, Eisenhower, Volume I, 52–54. 75 Dwight D. Eisenhower, “George Catlett Marshall,” Atlantic, August 1964, 41–42. 76 Robert J. Donovan, Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S Truman, 1945–1948 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1977), 305. 77 Robert Bowie and Richard H. Immerman, Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 42. 78 Louis Galambos, ed., The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, the Chief of Staff: VII (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), xv–xviii. 79 Louis Galambos, ed., “1377, Memorandum for the Secretary of War: Secretary of the Navy” in The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, The Chief of Staff: VIII (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 1596n2. 80 Galambos, “1377, Memorandum,” 1597n3. 81 Galambos, “1377, Memorandum,” 1583–84n1. 82 John Lewis Gaddis, George F. Kennan: An American Life (New York: Penguin Press, 2011), 194–95. 83 Thomas A. Bryson, American Diplomatic Relations with the Middle East, 1784–1975: A Survey (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1977), 135–48. 84 Leffler, Preponderance of Power, 425. 85 Acheson, Present at the Creation, 562–67.

86 Ibid., 562–67. 87 http://www.biographybase.com/biography/Bradley_Omar.html 88 Leffler, Preponderance of Power, 476. 89 Acheson, Present at the Creation, 562–67. 90 Elie Podeh, The Quest for Hegemony in the Arab World: The Struggle over the Baghdad Pact (Leiden, Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1995), 61–62. 91 Ibid., 61-62. 92 Bryson, American Diplomatic Relations, 174–87. 93 Galambos, Chief of Staff: VII, xv–xviii. 94 William B. Pickett, Dwight David Eisenhower and American Power (Wheeling, IL: Harlan Davidson, 2011), 66. 95 Ambrose, Eisenhower, Volume I, 476–77. 96 Pickett, Eisenhower and American Power, 68–69. 97 Donovan, Conflict and Crisis, 382. 98 Ibid., 369–87. 99 Robert A. Devine, Eisenhower and the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 71–72, 85. 100 Eisenhower, At Ease, 368–78. 101 Powell and Powell, Fulbright and His Times, 35. 102 Woods, Fulbright: A Biography, 24. 103 J. William Fulbright, The Crippled Giant: American Foreign Policy and Its Domestic Consequences (New York: Random House, 1972), 18–19. 104 Woods, Fulbright: A Biography, 218–19.

105 Powell and Powell, Fulbright and His Times, 2. 106 Ibid., 7–8. 107 Ibid., 7. 108 Ibid., 15. 109 Ibid., 10. 110 Woods, Fulbright: A Biography, 23–24. 111 Powell and Powell, Fulbright and His Times, 10–11. 112 Ibid., 10. 113 Woods, Fulbright: A Biography, 36–37. 114 Ibid., 80–85. 115 Norman Walker, “The Fulbright Resolution for Post-War Collaboration,” Magazine of Sigma Chi (University of Arkansas), February–March 1944, 55–57. 116 Bill Johnson to Frank McNaughton, Note, Fulbright Resolution (USAW), June 17, 1943. Frank McNaughton Papers, Truman Library. 117 Woods, Fulbright: A Biography, 128. 118 Ibid., 213. 119 Haynes Johnson and Bernard M. Gwertzman, Fulbright: The Dissenter (London: Hutchinson, 1968), 108. 120 Ibid., 114. 121 Fulbright, Crippled Giant, 71. 122 Gaddis, George F. Kennan, 255. 123 Leffler, Preponderance of Power, 143.

124 Elizabeth Edwards Spalding, The First Cold Warrior: Harry Truman, Containment, and the Remaking of Liberal Internationalism (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2006), 205. 125 Donovan, Conflict and Crisis, 386–87. 126 Leffler, Preponderance of Power, 27. 127 Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, 46. 128 Cohen, Fighting World War Three, 31. 129 John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origin of the Cold War, 1941–1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), 282–84. 130 Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., Discussion Group on the Defense of the Middle East, Working Paper No. 1: The Near East and Western Defense, not dated, by Dankwart A. Rustow, 1–3. 131 Harry S. Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman: Year of Decisions (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1955), 164. 132 Truman, Year of Decisions, 345–46. 133 Gaddis, Origins of the Cold War, 241–42. 134 Denise M. Bostdorff, Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine: The Cold War Call to Arms (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2008), 16–17. 135 Council on Foreign Relations, Discussion Group on the Defense of the Middle East, Working Paper No. 1, 3. 136 Truman, Year of Decisions, 523. 137 Acheson, Present at the Creation, 197–98. 138 Acheson, Present at the Creation, 150–51. 139 Gaddis, George F. Kennan, 215–16. 140 Martin Gilbert, Churchill: A Life (New York: Henry Holt, 1991), 864–65.

141 Hamby, Man of the People, 348. 142 Bostdorff, Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine, 37–38. 143 William Roger Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945–1951: Arab Nationalism, The United States, and Postwar Imperialism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 393–94. 144 King ibn Saud to President Truman, letter, May 24, 1946, in response the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry Report of April 30, 1946, Harry S. Truman Papers, Official File, 204 misc., June 1948, 204D, Box #775, Truman Library. 145 Louis, British Empire in the Middle East, 88. 146 Harry S. Truman to King ibn Saud, letter, July 8, 1946, in response the King’s letter of May 24, 1946, on the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry Report of April 30, 1946, Harry S. Truman Papers, Official File, 204 misc., June 1948, 204D, Box #775, Truman Library. 147 George F. Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Power,” Foreign Affairs 25, no. 4 (July 1947): 575. 148 Kennan, “Sources of Soviet Power,” 566. 149 John Patrick Diggins, Why Niebuhr Now? (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 72–74. 150 Robert McAfee Brown, ed., The Essential Reinhold Niebuhr (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986), 12. 151 Gaddis, George F. Kennan, 254. 152 Acheson, Present at the Creation, 217. 153 Fulbright, Crippled Giant, 5–6. 154 Ibid., 5. 155 Bostdorff, Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine, 6, 109–14.

156 Gaddis, George F. Kennan, 253–55. 157 Joseph M. Jones Papers, Box #2, Truman Library. 158 Acheson, Present at the Creation, 223–25. 159 Fulbright, Crippled Giant, 22. 160 McCullough, Truman, 481. 161 Central Intelligence Agency, The Current Situation in the Mediterranean and the Near East, October 17, 1947 (Declassified), 1–3, PSF Box #55, CIA Papers, Truman Library. 162 Kondis, “United States Role in the Greek Civil War,” 146–47. 163 Memorandum for The President from the Secretary of State, Subject: Extension of Operational Advice to the Greek Armed Forces, November 3, 1947. Harry S. Truman Papers, President’s Secretary’s File, Truman Library. 164 Kondis, “United States Role in the Greek Civil War,” 145. 165 Howard Jones, A New Kind of War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 97–100. 166 William Roger Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945–1951: Arab Nationalism, The United States, and Postwar Imperialism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 88–97. 167 Ibid., 88–97. 168 Hans W. Weigert, “U.S. Strategic Bases and Collective Security,” Foreign Affairs 25, no. 2 (January 1947): 250–62. 169 Ibid., 260. 170 Ibid., 254 171 Leffler, Preponderance of Power, 222. 172 Gaddis, George F. Kennan, 293–94.

173 Spalding, First Cold Warrior, 66–67. 174 Clifford, Rostow, and Tuchman, Palestine Question, 58–59. 175 Acheson, Present at the Creation, 212. 176 Clifford, Rostow, and Tuchman, Palestine Question, 53–55. 177 Ibid., Introduction page. 178 Central Intelligence Agency, The Consequences of the Partition of Palestine, 28 November 1947, Truman Library, PSF Boxes, CIA Papers, ORE 1947, No. 55, 1–17. 179 Leffler, Preponderance of Power, 79. 180 Offner, Another Such Victory, 211–12. 181 Louis, British Empire in the Middle East, 106. 182 http://www.infoplease.com/t/hist/state-of-the-union/159.html. 183 “Truman Defends His Policy and Demands the Congress to Confirm His Marshall Plan,” al-Ahraam, January 7, 1948. (‫ﺗﺮوﻣﺎن‬ ، ١،١ ،‫ﻳﺪاﻓﻊ ﻋﻦ ﺳﻴﺎﺳﺘﻪ وﻳﻄﺎﻟﺐ اﻟﻜﻮﻧﺠﺮس ﺑﺈﻗﺮار ﻣﺸﺮوع ﻣﺎ رﺷﺎﻻﻻﻫﺮام‬ ١٩٤٨). 184 Department of State, “The Position of the United States with Respect to Palestine,” February 17, 1948, Clark Clifford Papers, Truman Library. 185 Offner, Another Such Victory, 279, 293–94. 186 Kadish, “The ‘Trusteeship’,” 67. 187 Allis Radosh and Ronald Radosh, Safe Haven: Harry S. Truman and the Founding of Israel (New York: HarperCollins, 2009), 8. 188 Offner, Another Such Victory, 279, 293–94. 189 Memorandum for the President (Thru the Secretary of Defense): Subject:

Provision of U.S. Armed Forces in Palestine, April 4, 1948, Palestine File, Box #160, Truman Library. 190 Ibid, Truman Library. 191 Draft Memorandum from the Acting Secretary of State to the President, Subject: Palestine, April 3, 1948, Palestine File, Box #160, Truman Library. 192 NSC-27, written by the Secretary of Defense and titled: U.S. Military Point of View for the Eventuality of United Nations Decision to Introduce Military Forces into Palestine, August 23, 1948, Declassified from Top Secret, Harry S. Truman Papers, PSF: Subject File, 1945–1953, Box #177. 193 “A New Development in the American Policy Towards Palestine: Statement by the American Secretary of Defense and its Echo in the Arab Circles,” alAhraam, January 22, 1948. (‫ﺗﻄﻮر ﺟﺪﻳﺪ ﻓﻲ‬ ‫اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﺔ اﻷﻣﺮﻳﻜﻴﺔ إزاء ﻓﻠﺴﻄﻴﻦ‬ ‫ﺗﺼﺮﻳﺢ ﻟﻮزﻳﺮ اﻟﺪﻓﺎع اﻷﻣﺮﻳﻜﻲ وﺻﺪاه ﻓﻲ اﻟﺪواﺋﺮ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴﺔ‬،). 194 NSC-27/1, written by the Secretary of Defense and titled: U.S. Military Point of View for the Eventuality of United Nations Decision to Introduce Military Forces into Palestine, September 3, 1948, Declassified from Top Secret, Harry S. Truman Papers, PSF: Subject File, 1945–1953, Box #177. 195 Annex NSC-27/2, written by the Acting Secretary of State titled: Provision of a Military Police Force for Jerusalem, declassified from Top Secret, November 3, 1948, Harry S. Truman Papers, PSF: Subject File, 1948–1953, Box #177. 196 Annex NSC-27/3, written by the Acting Secretary of State titled: Provision of a Military Police Force for Jerusalem, declassified from TS, November 16, 1948, Harry S. Truman Papers, PSF: Subject File, 1948–1953, Box #177. 197 NSC-35, written by the Secretary of Defense, titled: Existing International Commitments Involving the Possible Use of Armed Forces, declassified from Top Secret, November 17, 1948, Harry S. Truman Papers, PSF: Subject File, 1945– 1953, Box #177. 198 Michael Dobbs, Six Months in 1945: FDR, Stalin, Churchill, and Truman-

From World War to Cold War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2012), 24. 199 Offner, Another Such Victory, 366. 200 Howard Jones, “A Reassessment of the Truman Doctrine and Its Impact on Greece and U.S. Foreign Policy,” in The Truman Doctrine of Aid to Greece: A Fifty-Year Retrospective, ed. Eugene T. Rossides (New York: Academy of Political Science and the American Hellenic Institute Foundation, 1998), 25, 27, 39. 201 Fulbright, Crippled Giant, 19. 202 Bialer, Between East and West, 14–15. 203 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 680. 204 Congressional Record—Senate, February 11, 1957, p. 1670, Fulbright Papers, Fayetteville, AR. 205 Dulles-Heter Series, Box #6, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower Library. 206 Ibid., Eisenhower Library. 207 Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism, 33. 208 Dwight. D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Mandate for Change, 1953–1956 (London: Heinemann, 1963), 150. 209 Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 151. 210 Martin Gilbert, Churchill: A Life, 902. 211 Perret, Eisenhower, 108–9. 212 Dwight S. Eisenhower to Prime Minister Eden, proposed letter, Ann Whitman File, Box #6, Dulles -Herter Series, Eisenhower Library. 213 David A. Nichols, Eisenhower, 1956 (New York: Simon and Schuster Paperbacks, 2011), 142. 214 Stephen Z. Freiberger, Dawn Over Suez: The Rise of American Power in

the Middle East, 1953–1957 (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1992), 160. 215 Seale, Struggle for Syria, 247–49. 216 Mohamed H. Heikal, Cutting the Lion’s Tail: Through Egyptian Eyes (London: Andre Deutsch, 1986), 14–17, 31. 217 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 89–90. 218 Yevgeny Primakov, Russia and the Arabs: Behind the Scenes in the Middle East from the Cold War to the Present, trans. from Russian Paul Gould (New York: Member of the Perseus Books Group, 2009), 39–40. 219 Smith, Eisenhower: In War and Peace, 552; Wikipedia, s.v. “John W. Foster,” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_W._Foster; https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/lansing-robert 220 Cole C. Kingseed, Eisenhower and the Suez Crisis of 1956 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1995), 10–13. 221 Woods, Fulbright: A Biography, 213. 222 Smith, Eisenhower: In War and Peace, 547. 223 Wikipedia, s.v. “Tripartite Declaration of 1950,” last modified 24 December 2018, 20:05 (UTC), https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tripartite_Declaration_of_1950. 224 Dayan, Moshe, The Story of My Life (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1976), 190. 225 Dayan, Story of My Life, 190. 226 Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism, 31–32. 227 Dayan, Story of My Life, 191. 228 Orna Almog, Britain, Israel and the United States, 1955–1958: Beyond Suez (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 78–79. 229 Peter Hahn, Caught in the Middle East, 189–90.

230 Smith, Eisenhower in War and Peace, 659. 231 Evan Thomas, Ike’s Bluff: President Eisenhower’s Battle to Save the World (New York: Little, Brown, 2012), 413. 232 Ibid., 659. 233 Ibid., 658. 234 Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 465. 235 Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism, 69–71. 236 Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism, 94–95. 237 Heikal, Cutting the Lion’s Tail, 37–38. 238 Wikipedia, s.v. “Iran relations,” last modified 21 March 2019, 22:01 (UTC). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Egypt%E2%80%93Iran_relations. 239 Mackey, The Iranians, 198. 240 Podeh, Quest for Hegemony in the Arab World, 65–71. 241 Clifford, Rostow, and Tuchman, Palestine Question, 71–75. 242 Dayan, Story of My Life, 190, 235. 243 Moshe Ma’oz, Syria and Israel: From War to Peacemaking (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 44. 244 Clifford, Rostow, and Tuchman, Palestine Question, 71–75. 245 Nichols, Eisenhower 1956, 90–91. 246 Michael Doran, Ike’s Gamble: America’s Rise and Dominance in the Middle East (New York: Free Press, 2016), 159–60. 247 Wikipedia, s.v. “Suez Crisis,” last modified 26 May 2019, 21:13 (UTC), https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suez_Crisis. In October 1954 the Egyptians and British signed an agreement for the phased withdrawal of British armed forces

over a period of twenty months. The British were to maintain maintenance [The three conditions referred to as Case A, B, C previously explained in Eisenhower’s memoir, The White House Years: Mandate for Change, 150–51.] The British “held the right to return in seven years.” The agreement stated that the Suez Canal Company would be placed under Egyptian authority November 16, 1968, under the auspices of the treaty. 248 Clifford, Rostow, and Tuchman, Palestine Question, 78–79. 249 Freiberger, Dawn Over Suez, 98–100. 250 David W. Lesch, The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 182. 251 Smith, Eisenhower in War and Peace, 704. 252 Ma’oz, Syria and Israel, 64–65. 253 Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower, Volume II: The President (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 245. 254 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 179. 255 Ibid., 178. 256 Bipartisan Congressional Meeting, January 1, 1957, Eisenhower Library. 257 Klinghoffer, The Soviet Union & International Oil Politics, 40-42. 258 Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, “Soviet Oil Politics in the Middle East and SovietAmerican Relations,” Slavic and Soviet Series (Russian and East European Research Center, Tel Aviv University) 6, (December 1976): 5–6. 259 Uri Bialer, Oil and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948–63 (Oxford: MacMillan Press, 1999), 192, 250. 260 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 178. 261 Ambrose, Eisenhower, Volume II, 677. 262 Woods, Fulbright: A Biography, 218–219.

263 Powell and Powell, Fulbright and His Times, 69. 264 Ibid., 69. 265 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 180. 266 The Eisenhower Doctrine: Message of President Eisenhower to Congress, Jewish Virtual Library, Internet, 8 pages. 267 Ibid. 268 Geoffrey Barraclough, “Doctrine for Mideast Disaster…,” Nation, February 7, 1957. 269 Dana Adams Schmidt, “U.S. May Extend Aid Plans to More of Africa and Asia,” New York Times, January 7, 1957, late city edition. 270 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 180–81. 271 “Bulganin Claims Ike Creating New Designs in M-E,” Jerusalem Post, January 9, 1957. 272 Speech by former Secretary of State Dean Acheson before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, January 10, 1957, New York Times, January 11, 1957. 273 “Truman Backs Eisenhower on a Firm Mideast Policy,” New York Times, January 13, 1957, late city edition. 274 J. William Fulbright, “What Makes U.S. Foreign Policy,” Address by Senator J. William Fulbright at 10th Anniversary Banquet of The Reporter Magazine Overseas Press Club, New York City, April 16, 1959. Special Collections Department, J. William Fulbright Papers, University of Arkansas. 275 Fulbright, The Arrogance of Power (New York: Random House, 1966), 55– 56. 276 Wikipedia, s.v. “85th United States Congress,” last modified 3 May 2019, 15:29 (UTC), https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/85th_United_States_Congress.

277 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 182. 278 Congressional Record—Senate, February 11, 1957, pp. 1669–86. Fulbright Papers, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, AR. 279 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 180n3. 280 Aryeh Rubinstein, “Knesset Backs B-G Statement on Doctrine, 59-3; 39 Abstain,” Jerusalem Post, June 1957 (date unknown). 281 Abba Eban, Abba Eban: An Autobiography (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977), 261. 282 Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 483. 283 J. William Fulbright and Seth Tillman, The Price of Empire (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989), 177. 284 Podeh, Quest for Hegemony in the Arab World, 180. 285 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 183–84n6. 286 Ibid., 183–84n6. 287 ‫ ויקיפדיה‬1956-195 ‫(– נסיגת צהייל מסיני ועזה‬Wikipedia- Withdrawal of the Armed Forces from the Sinai and Gaza 1956 and 1957), April 12, 2016, 5. 288 Ann Whitman File, International Series, Box #32, Eisenhower Library. 289 Ambrose, Eisenhower, Volume II, 385. 290 Memorandum of Conference with the President, October 29, 1956, 7:15 p.m., Ann Whitman File, DDE Series, Box #19, Eisenhower Library. 291 Dwight D. Eisenhower PM Ben-Gurion, letter, February 2, 1957, Ann Whitman File, International Series, Box #32, Eisenhower Library. 292 Ben-Gurion to President Eisenhower, letter, February 8, 1957, Ann Whitman File, International Series, Box #32, Eisenhower Library. 293 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, Appendix J, 684–85.

294 Ibid., 183–85. 295 Ambrose, Eisenhower, Volume II, 386. 296 Bipartisan Legislative Meeting, February 20, 1957, 8:30 a.m.–10:50 a.m., LLM, Eisenhower Library. 297 Ambrose, Eisenhower, Volume II, 385–88. 298 Dwight D. Eisenhower to Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, message, March 2, 1957, Ann Whitman File, International Series, Box #32, Eisenhower Library. 299 Ben-Gurion to President Eisenhower, message, March 13, 1957, Ann Whitman File, International Series, Box #32, Eisenhower Library. 300 ‫ ויקיפדיה‬1956-195 ‫(– נסיגת צהייל מסיני ועזה‬Wikipedia- Withdrawal of the Armed Forces from the Sinai and Gaza 1956 and 1957), April 12, 2016, 12. 301 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 183. 302 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 263. 303 Matthew Jones, “The ‘Preferred Plan’: The Anglo-American Working Group Report on Covert Action in Syria, 1957,”Intelligence and National Security 19, no. 3 (Autumn 2004): 401–15. 304 Ibid., 401–15. 305 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 194–95. 306 Secretary Dulles to President Eisenhower, “Memorandum for the President,” August 20, 1957, Ann Whitman File, Diary Series, Box #9, Eisenhower Library. 307 Memorandum of Conference with the President, August 21, 1957, Ann Whitman File, International Series, Box #48, Eisenhower Library. 308 Memorandum for the Record, August 23, 1957, Ann Whitman File, International Series, Box #48, Eisenhower Library. 309 Ma’oz, Syria and Israel, 66–67.

310 Note: This was based upon the “Middle East Plan of Action” that President Eisenhower approved in November, 1956, during the Suez Crisis. The Plan was designed “to add two hundred thousand barrels of oil a day to the quota of three hundred thousand then being shipped to Western Europe from ports on the Gulf of Mexico and in South America.” Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 98. 311 Unidentified document, dated September 6, 1957, Ann Whitman File, International Series, Box #48. 312 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 196–204. 313 Ambrose, Eisenhower, Volume II, 462. 314 Ambrose, Eisenhower, Volume II, 462. 315 Douglass Little, “His Finest Hour? Eisenhower, Lebanon, and the 1958 Middle East Crisis,” Diplomatic History 20, no. 1 (Winter 1996): 27–54. 316 The President’s Committee on Information Activities Abroad: The Middle East, July 25, 1960, 2. White House Office, National Security Council Staff Papers 1948–1961, NSC Registry Series, 1947–1962, Box #13, PCIAA Study No. 36, Eisenhower Library. 317 Little, “His Finest Hour?,” 27–54. 318 Anne Whitman File, International Series, Box #40, Eisenhower Library. 319 Briefing Notes for NSC October 16, 1958, “U.S. Policy Toward the Near East,” Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower: Papers 1953–1961, Eisenhower Library. 320 352nd NCS Meeting, January 22, 1958, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, Box #9, Eisenhower Library. 321 Address by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, August 26, 1955, White House Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, NSC Series, Policy Papers Sub-Series, Box #12, Eisenhower Library. 322 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 264–69. 323 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 262–67.

324 366th NSC Meeting, May 22, 1958, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, Box #10, Eisenhower Library. 325 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 267. 326 369th NSC Meeting, June 19, 1958, NSC Series, Ann Whitman File, Box #10, Eisenhower Library. 327 370th NSC Meeting, June 26, 1958, Box #10, Eisenhower Library. 328 Devine, Eisenhower and the Cold War, 99. 329 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 272–73. 330 Smith, Eisenhower: In War and Peace, 741. 331 Little, “His Finest Hour?,” 27. 332 Presidential address to Congress, July 15, 1958, Ann Whitman File, International Series, Box #40, Eisenhower Library. 333 Little, “His Finest Hour?,” 50–53. 334 Ambrose, Eisenhower, Volume II, 466. 335 Little, “His Finest Hour?,” 34–39. 336 President Chamoun to President Eisenhower, letter, July 21, 1958, Ann Whitman File, International Series, Box #40, Eisenhower Library. 337 373rd NSC Meeting, July 24, 1958, NSC Series, Ann Whitman File, Box #10, Eisenhower Library. 338 Ambrose, Eisenhower, Volume II, 471–72. 339 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 275–76. 340 Ambrose, Eisenhower, Volume II, 471–73. 341 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 274.

342 “On the Brink of Disaster,” August 6, 1958, Speech by J. William Fulbright, A-Files, Subject, Senator Fulbright, Eisenhower Library. 343 NSC Meeting August 21, 1958, Eisenhower: Papers, 1953–1961, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower Library. 344 Briefing Note for NSC, dated October 16, 1958, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower Library. 345 Bostdorff, Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine, 5. 346 Ann Whitman Diary Series, Box #10, Eisenhower Library 347 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 178. 348 John Lewis Gaddis, “Was the Truman Doctrine a Real Turning Point?,” Foreign Affairs 52, no. 2 (January 1974): 386. 349 Fulbright, Crippled Giant, 49–50. 350 Clifford, Rostow, and Tuchman, Palestine Question, 58. 351 Donovan, Conflict and Crisis, 279–80. 352 Clifford, Rostow, and Tuchman, Palestine Question, 520–53.

353 https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Society_&_Culture/Minority_communities.html. 354 Central Intelligence Agency, The Consequences of the Partition of Palestine, November 28, 1947, Harry S. Truman Papers, PSF: Intelligence File 1946–1953, Central Intelligence Reports, O.R.E.: 1946 [July 24–December 26], Box #214, Truman Library. 355 CIA, Consequences of the Partition of Palestine, 9. 356 CIA, Consequences of the Partition of Palestine, 17. 357 Arnold Krammer, The Forgotten Friendship: Israel and the Soviet Bloc, 1947–1953 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1974), 41, 51.

358 Arnold Krammer, “Soviet Motives in the Partition of Palestine, 1947– 1948,” Journal of Palestine Studies2, no. 2 (Winter 1973): 112. 359 Clifford, Rostow, and Tuchman, Palestine Question, 56–57. 360 Krammer, “Soviet Motives,” 102. 361 Ibid., 103. 362 Krammer, Forgotten Friendship, 41, 52. 363 Joseph Marion Jones, The Fifteen Weeks: An Inside of the Genesis of the Marshall Plan (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1955), vii. 364 Fulbright, Crippled Giant, 22. 365 Arthur Krock, “Marshall Plan Genesis: State Department Attributes the Basis to the Speech by Ex-Under-Secretary of State Acheson,” Harry Howard Collections, Boxes #14 and #15, Truman Library. 366 Gaddis, George F. Kennan, 219–22. 367 Wikipedia, s. v. “Bornholm,” last modified 28 May 2019, 14:14 (UTC), https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bornholm. 368 George Kennan to Secretary of State George Marshall [“Long Telegram”], February 22, 1946, Harry S. Truman istration File, Elsey Papers, Truman Library. 369 George Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs 25, no. 4 (July 1947): 575. 370 Gaddis, George F. Kennan, 249–50. 371 Michael J. Hogan, A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945–1954 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 10–11. 372 Spalding, First Cold Warrior, 230–31. 373 Ibid., 39.

374 Winston S. Churchill (grandson), Never Give In! The Best of Winston Churchill’s Speeches (New York: Hyperion, 2003), 415. 375 G. W. Sand, ed., Defending the West: The Truman-Churchill Correspondence, 1945–1960 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004), 74–75. 376 Churchill, Never Give In!, 418–20. 377 Bostdorff, Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine, 29. 378 Gaddis, George F. Kennan, 210–11. 379 Gaddis, Origins of the Cold War, 318–19. 380 Draft copy of President Truman’s Truman Doctrine Speech on March 12, 1947, dated March 4, 1947, Truman Library. 381 Truman, Year of Decisions, 70. 382 Offner, Another Such Victory, 112–13. 383 “The Problem of the Turkish Straits,” Department of State Publication 2572, Near Eastern Series 5, Harry N. Howard Papers, Box #4, Truman Library. 384 Offner, Another Such Victory, 112. 385 Truman, Year of Decisions, 372–76. 386 Acheson, Present at the Creation, 217. 387 Acheson, Present at the Creation, 220. 388 Ibid., 218. 389 Memorandum for the File: The Drafting of the President’s Message to Congress on the Greek Situation, March 12, 1947, Harry Howard Collection, Truman Library. 390 Acheson, Present at the Creation, 219. 391 Ibid, 221.

392 Truman Doctrine Speech drafts, March 4 and March 10, 1947, Truman Library. 393 United States Statutes At Large 69 (1955): 7. The Resolution was repealed on October 26, 1974; see Vol. 88, Part 2 (1974): 1439. 394 United States Statutes At Large 69 (1974): 1439. 395 http://www.politico.com/story/2010/01/house-backs-formosaresolution-jan-25-1955-031927#ixzz3zOdWkoUU 396 Eisenhower Doctrine speech, January 5, 1957. 397 Arthur Minnich Papers, Eisenhower Library. 398 Brian W. Clark, Eisenhower’s Leadership: Executive Lessons from West Point to the White House (New York: Brian W. Clark Publisher, 2012), 171, 104. 399 Congressional Record—Senate, February 11, 1957, pp. 1669–86. Fulbright Papers, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, AR. 400 Bostdorff, Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine, 6. 401 Dwight D. Eisenhower, The Eisenhower Doctrine Speech before Congress January 5, 1957. https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-quot-eisenhowerdoctrine-quot-january-1957 402 Reston, “Fulbright Seeks to Modify Plan.” 403 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 205. 404 Ambrose, Eisenhower, Volume II, 9. 405 Fulbright, The Arrogance of Power, 256. 406 Memorandum of Conference with the President, August 21, 1957, Ann Whitman File, International Series, Box #48, Eisenhower Library. 407 Clifford, Rostow, and Tuchman, Palestine Question, 51.

408 Krammer, Forgotten Friendship, 33, 34. 409 Krammer, Forgotten Friendship, 42, 44. 410 Clifford, Rostow, and Tuchman, Palestine Question, 71–75. 411 Hamby, “Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the Truman Doctrine,” in The Truman Doctrine of Aide to Greece: A Fifty-Year Retrospective ed. Eugene F. Rossides (New York: Academy of Political Science, 1998), 22–23. 412 Ray Geselbracht, ed., and Dean Acheson, Affection and Trust: The Personal Correspondence of Harry S. Truman and Dean Acheson, 1953–1971, 69. 413 Robert Frazier, “Kennan, ‘Universalism,’ and the Truman Doctrine,” Journal of Cold War Studies 11, no. 2 (Spring 2009): 4, 33. 414 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 20. 415 https://www.algemeiner.com/2013/02/11/the-importance-of-theeisenhower-debate/ 416 Doran, Ike’s Gamble, 239. 417 Doran, Ike’s Gamble, 241, 253, 257. 418 Seale, Struggle for Syria, 286. 419 Woods, Fulbright: A Biography, 223. 420 Powell and Powell, Fulbright and His Times, 70. 421 Briefing Note for NSC, dated October 16, 1858. Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower Library. 422 Doran, Ike’s Gamble, 103–4, 251. 423 Ibid., 249. 424 Fulbright, Crippled Giant, 51.

425 Reston, James, “Fulbright Seeks to Modify Plan for Middle East,” The New York Times, Late City Edition, January 12, 1957.